ARRIVAL OF A FRENCH FLEET—CORRESPONDENCE OF WASHINGTON AND THE COUNT
D’ESTAING—PLANS OF THE COUNT—PERTURBATION AT NEW YORK—EXCITEMENT IN
THE FRENCH FLEET—EXPEDITION AGAINST RHODE ISLAND—OPERATIONS BY SEA
AND LAND—FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION—IRRITATION BETWEEN THE ALLIED
FORCES—CONSIDERATE LETTER OF WASHINGTON TO THE COUNT D’ESTAING.
While encamped at Paramus, Washington, in the night of the 13th of July,
received a letter from Congress informing him of the arrival of a French
fleet on the coast; instructing him to concert measures with the
commander, the Count D’Estaing, for offensive operations by sea and
land, and empowering him to call on the States from New Hampshire to New
Jersey inclusive, to aid with their militia.
The fleet in question was composed of twelve ships of the line and six
frigates, with a land force of four thousand men. On board of it came
Mons. Gerard, minister from France to the United States, and the Hon.
Silas Deane, one of the American ministers who had effected the late
treaty of alliance. The fleet had sailed from Toulon on the 13th of
April. After struggling against adverse winds for eighty-seven or
eighty-eight days, it had made its appearance off the northern extremity
of the Virginia coast, and anchored at the mouth of the Delaware, on the
eighth of July. Thence the count despatched a letter to Washington,
dated at sea. “I have the honor of imparting to your Excellency,” writes
he, “the arrival of the king’s fleet, charged by his majesty with the
glorious task of giving his allies, the United States of America, the
most striking proofs of his affection. Nothing will be wanting to my
happiness, if I can succeed in it. It is augmented by the consideration
of concerting my operations with a General such as your Excellency. The
talents and great actions of General Washington have insured him, in the
eyes of all Europe, the title truly sublime of Deliverer of America,”
&c.
The count was unfortunate in the length of his voyage. Had he arrived in
ordinary time, he might have entrapped Lord Howe’s squadron in the
river; co-operated with Washington in investing the British army by sea
and land, and, by cutting off its retreat to New York, compelled it to
surrender.
Finding the enemy had evacuated both city and river, the count sent up
the French minister and Mr. Deane to Philadelphia in a frigate, and
then, putting to sea, continued along the coast. A little earlier, and
he might have intercepted the squadron of Lord Howe on its way to New
York. It had had but a very few days the advantage of him, and when he
arrived with his fleet in the road outside of Sandy Hook, he descried
the British ships quietly anchored inside of it.
A frank and cordial correspondence took place forthwith between the
count and Washington, and a plan of action was concerted between them by
the intervention of confidential officers; Washington’s aides-de-camp,
Laurens and Hamilton, boarding the fleet while off the Hook, and Major
Chouin, a French officer of merit, repairing to the American
head-quarters.
The first idea of the count was to enter at Sandy Hook, and capture or
destroy the British fleet composed of six ships of the line, four fifty
gun ships, and a number of frigates and smaller vessels; should he
succeed in this, which his greatly superior force rendered probable, he
was to proceed against the city, with the co-operation of the American
forces. To be at hand for such purpose, Washington crossed the Hudson,
with his army, at King’s Ferry, and encamped at White Plains about the
20th of July.
In the mean time New York was once more in a violent perturbation.
“British seamen,” says a writer of the times, “endured the
mortification, for the first time, of seeing a British fleet blocked up
and insulted in their own harbor, and the French flag flying triumphant
without. And this was still more embittered and aggravated, by beholding
every day vessels under English colors captured under their very eyes by
the enemy.”[143] The army responded to their feelings; many royalists of
the city, too, hastened to offer their services as volunteers; there was
in short, a prodigious stir in every department, military and naval.
On the other hand, the French officers and crews were in the highest
state of excitement and exultation. The long low point of Sandy Hook was
all that intervened between them and a splendid triumph, and they
anticipated the glory of “delivering America from the English colors
which they saw waving on the other side of a simple barrier of sand,
upon so great a crowd of masts.”[144]
Several experienced American pilots and masters of vessels, however, who
had accompanied Colonels Laurens and Hamilton on board of the fleet,
declared that there was not sufficient depth of water on the bar to
admit the safe passage of the largest ships one of which carried 80 and
another 90 guns: the attempt therefore, was reluctantly abandoned; and
the ships anchored about four miles off, near Shrewsbury on the Jersey
coast, taking in provisions and water.
The enterprise which the American and French commanders deemed next
worthy of a combined operation, was the recapture of Rhode Island
proper, that it is to say, the island which gives its name to the
State, and which the enemy had made one of their military depôts and
strongholds. In anticipation of such an enterprise, Washington on the
17th of July wrote to General Sullivan, who commanded at Providence,
ordering him to make the necessary preparations for a descent from the
mainland upon the island, and authorizing him to call in
reinforcements of New England militia. He subsequently sent to his aid
the Marquis Lafayette with two brigades (Varnum’s and Glover’s).
Quartermaster-general Greene also was detached for the service, being
a native of the island, well acquainted with its localities, and
having great influence among its inhabitants. Sullivan was instructed
to form his whole force, Continental, State and militia, into two
equal divisions, one to be commanded by Greene, the other by
Lafayette.
On the 22d of July, the French fleet, having finished taking in its
supplies, appeared again in full force off the bar at Sandy Hook. The
British, who supposed they had only been waiting on the Shrewsbury coast
for the high tides of the latter part of July, now prepared for a
desperate conflict; and, indeed, had the French fleet been enabled to
enter, it is difficult to conceive a more terrible and destructive
struggle than would have ensued between these gallant and deadly rivals,
with their powerful armaments brought side to side, and cramped up in so
confined a field of action.
D’Estaing, however, had already determined his course. After a few
demonstrations off the harbor, he stood away to the eastward, and on the
29th arrived off Point Judith, coming to anchor within five miles of
Newport.
Rhode Island (proper), the object of this expedition, is about sixteen
miles long, running deep into the great Narraganset Bay. Seaconnet
Channel separates it on the east from the mainland, and on the west the
main channel passes between it and Conanicut Island. The town of Newport
is situated near the south end of the island, facing the west, with
Conanicut Island in front of it. It was protected by batteries and a
small naval force. Here General Sir Robert Pigott, who commanded in the
island, had his head-quarters. The force under him was about six
thousand strong, variously posted about the island, some in works at the
north end, but the greater part within strongly intrenched lines
extending across the island, about three miles from the town. General
Greene hastened from Providence on hearing of the arrival of the fleet
of Count D’Estaing, and went on board of it at the anchorage to concert
a plan of operations. Some questions of etiquette and precedence rose
between them in settling the mode in which the attack was to be
conducted. It was at length agreed that the fleet should force its way
into the harbor at the same time that the Americans approached by land,
and that the landing of the troops from the ships on the west side of
the island should take place at the same time that the Americans should
cross Seaconnet Channel, and land on the east side near the north end.
This combined operation was to have been carried promptly into effect,
but was postponed until the 10th of August, to give time for the
reinforcements sent by Washington to arrive. The delay was fatal to the
enterprise.
On the 8th, the Count D’Estaing entered the harbor and passed up the
main channel, exchanging a cannonade with the batteries as he passed,
and anchored a little above the town, between Goat and Conanicut
Islands. The English, on his approach, burnt or scuttled three frigates
and some smaller vessels, which would otherwise have been captured.
General Sullivan, to be ready for the concerted attack, had moved down
from Providence to the neighborhood of Howland’s Ferry, on the east side
of Seaconnet passage.
The British troops stationed opposite on the north end of the island,
fearful of being cut off, evacuated their works in the night of the 8th,
and drew into the lines at Newport.
Sullivan, seeing the works thus abandoned, could not resist the
temptation to cross the channel in flat-bottomed boats on the morning of
the 9th, and take possession of them.
This sudden movement, a day in advance of the concerted time, and
without due notice given to the count, surprised and offended him,
clashing with his notions of etiquette and punctilio. He, however,
prepared to co-operate, and was ordering out his boats for the purpose,
when, about two o’clock in the day, his attention was called to a great
fleet of ships standing toward Newport. It was, in fact, the fleet of
Lord Howe. That gallant nobleman had heard of the danger of Newport, and
being reinforced by four stout ships, part of a squadron coming out
under Admiral Byron, had hastened to its relief; though still inferior
in force to the French admiral. The delay of the concerted attack had
enabled him to arrive in time. The wind set directly into the harbor.
Had he entered promptly the French would have been placed between two
fires, from his ships and the batteries, and cramped up in a confined
channel where their largest ships had no room to operate. His lordship,
however, merely stood in near the land, communicated with General
Pigott, and having informed himself exactly of the situation of the
French fleet, came to anchor at Point Judith, some distance from the
south-west entrance of the bay.
In the night the wind changed to the north-east. The count hastened to
avail himself of the error of the British admiral. Favored by the wind,
he stood out of the harbor at eight o’clock in the morning to give the
enemy battle where he should have good sea room; previously sending word
to General Sullivan, who had advanced the preceding afternoon to Quaker
Hill, about ten miles north of Newport, that he would land his promised
troops and marines, and co-operate with him on his return.
The French ships were severely cannonaded as they passed the batteries,
but without material damage. Forming in order of battle, they bore down
upon the fleet of Lord Howe, confidently anticipating a victory from
their superiority of force. The British ships slipt their cables at
their approach, and likewise formed in line of battle, but his lordship
avoided an encounter while the enemy had the weathergage. To gain this
on the one part, and retain it on the other, the two fleets manœuvred
throughout the day, standing to the southward, and gradually
disappearing from the anxious eyes of the belligerent forces on Rhode
Island.
The army of Sullivan, now left to itself before Newport, amounted to ten
thousand men, having received the militia reinforcements. Lafayette
advised the delay of hostile operations until the return of D’Estaing,
but the American commander piqued and chagrined at the departure of his
allies, determined to commence the siege immediately, without waiting
for his tardy aid. On the twelfth, however, came on a tempest of wind
and rain, which raged for two days and nights with unexampled violence.
Tents were blown down; several soldiers and many horses perished, and a
great part of the ammunition recently dealt out to the troops was
destroyed. On the 14th, the weather cleared up and the sun shone
brightly, but the army was worn down and dispirited. Had the British
troops sallied forth at this juncture hale and fresh from comfortable
quarters, it might have fared badly with their weatherbeaten besiegers.
The latter, however, being unmolested, had time to breathe and refit
themselves. The day was passed in drying their clothes, cleaning their
arms, and putting themselves in order for action. By the next morning
they were again on the alert. Expecting the prompt return of the French,
they now took post on Honeyman’s Hill, about two miles from the British
lines, and began to construct batteries, form lines of communication,
and make regular approaches. The British were equally active in
strengthening their defences. There was casual cannonading on each side,
but nothing of consequence. Several days elapsed without the
reappearance of the French. The situation of the besiegers was growing
critical, when, on the evening of the 19th, they descried the expected
fleet standing toward the harbor. All now was exultation in the camp.
Should the French with their ships and troops attack the town by sea and
land on the one side, while the Americans assailed it on the other, the
surrender of the place was inevitable.
These sanguine anticipations, however, were shortlived. The French fleet
was in a shattered and forlorn condition. After sailing from before
Newport, on the 20th, it had manœuvred for two days with the British
fleet, each unwilling to enter into action without having the
weathergage. While thus manœuvring, the same furious storm which had
raged on shore separated and dispersed them with fearful ravage. Some
single encounters of scattered ships subsequently took place, but
without definite result. All were too much tempest-tost and disabled to
make good fight. Lord Howe with such of his ships as he could collect
bore away to New York to refit, and the French admiral was now before
Newport, but in no plight or mood for fighting.
In a letter to General Sullivan, he informed him that pursuant to the
orders of his sovereign and the advice of his officers, he was bound for
Boston, being instructed to repair to that port, should he meet with
misfortune, or a superior British force appear upon the coast.
Dismayed at this intelligence, which threatened ruin and disgrace to the
enterprise, Sullivan wrote a letter of remonstrance to the count, and
General Greene and the Marquis Lafayette repaired with it on board of
the admiral’s ship, to enforce it by their personal exertions. They
represented to the count the certainty of carrying the place in two
days, by a combined attack; and the discouragement and reproach that
would follow a failure on this their first attempt at co-operation; an
attempt, too, for which the Americans had made such great and expensive
preparations, and on which they had indulged such sanguine hopes. These
and other considerations equally urgent had their weight with the count,
and he was inclined to remain and pursue the enterprise, but was
overruled by the principal officers of his fleet. The fact is, that he
was properly a land officer, and they had been indignant at his having a
nautical command over their heads. They were glad, therefore, of any
opportunity to thwart and mortify him; and now insisted on his complying
with his letter of instructions, and sailing for Boston. On Lafayette’s
taking leave, the count assured him that he would only remain in Boston
time enough to give his men repose after their long sufferings, and
refit his ships; and trusted to leave the port again within three weeks
after entering it, “to fight for the glory of the French name and the
interests of America.”[145]
The marquis and General Greene returned at midnight, and made a report
of the ill success of their mission. Sullivan sent another letter on the
following day, urging D’Estaing in any event to leave his land forces.
All the general officers, excepting Lafayette, joined in signing and
sending a protest against the departure of the fleet for Boston, as
derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his most
Christian majesty and the interest of his nation, destructive of the
welfare of the United States, and highly injurious to the alliance
formed between the two nations. The fleet was already under way when
Colonel Laurens got on board of the admiral’s ship with the letter and
protest. The count was deeply offended by the tone of the protest, and
the manner in which it was conveyed to him. He declared to Colonel
Laurens that “this paper imposed on the commander of the king’s squadron
the painful, but necessary law of profound silence.” He continued his
course to Boston.
At the sailing of the ships there was a feeling of exasperation
throughout the camp. Sullivan gave vent to his vexation in a general
order on the 24th, wherein he observed: “The general cannot help
lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he
finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence
upon the assistance of it; though he can by no means suppose the army,
or any part of it, endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event
will prove America able to procure that by her own arms which her allies
refuse to assist in obtaining.”
On cooler reflection he thought proper, in subsequent orders, to explain
away the rash and unwarrantable imputation on French loyalty contained
in the foregoing document, but a general feeling of irritation against
the French continued to prevail in the army.
As had been foretold, the departure of the fleet was a death-blow to the
enterprise. Between two and three thousand volunteers abandoned the camp
in the course of four and twenty hours; others continued to go off;
desertions occurred among the militia, and in a few days the number of
besiegers did not exceed that of the besieged.
All thoughts of offensive operations were now at an end. The question
was how best to extricate the army from its perilous position. The
harbors of Rhode Island being now free, and open to the enemy,
reinforcements might pour in from New York, and render the withdrawal of
the troops disastrous, if not impossible. To prepare for rapid retreat,
if necessary, all the heavy artillery that could be spared, was sent off
from the island. On the 28th it was determined, in a council of war, to
fall back to the military works at the north end of the island, and
fortify there, until it should be known whether the French fleet would
soon return to their assistance, the Marquis Lafayette setting off with
all speed to have an interview with the Count D’Estaing, and ascertain
the fact.
General Sullivan broke up his camp, and commenced his retreat that very
night, between nine and ten o’clock; the army retiring by two roads; the
rear covered by parties of light troops, under Colonels Livingston and
Laurens.
Their retreat was not discovered until daylight, when a pursuit was
commenced. The covering parties behaved gallantly making frequent
stands, abandoning one eminence only to take post on another, and
keeping up a retreating fire that checked the advance of the enemy.
After a series of skirmishes they were pressed back to the fortified
grounds on the north end of the island; but Sullivan had already taken
post there, on Batt’s Hill, the main body of his army being drawn up in
order of battle, with strong works in their rear, and a redoubt in front
of the right wing.
The British now took post on an advantageous height called Quaker Hill,
a little more than a mile from the American front, whence they commenced
a cannonade which was briskly returned. Skirmishing ensued until about
ten o’clock, when two British sloops-of-war and some small vessels
having gained a favorable position, the enemy’s troops, under cover of
their fire, advanced in force to turn the right flank of the American
army, and capture the redoubt which protected it. This was bravely
defended by General Greene: a sharp action ensued, which had nearly
become a general one; between two and three hundred men were killed on
each side; the British at length drew back to their artillery and works
on Quaker Hill, and a mutual cannonade was resumed and kept up until
night.
On the following day (29th) the enemy continued his distant firing, but
waited for reinforcements before coming to close quarters. In the mean
time, General Sullivan had received intelligence that Lord Howe had
again put to sea with the design, no doubt, to attempt the relief of
Newport and then followed another report that a fleet with troops was
actually off Block Island, and must arrive almost immediately in the
harbor.
Under these circumstances it was determined to abandon Rhode Island. To
do so with safety, however, required the utmost caution, as the hostile
sentries were within four hundred yards of each other, and any
suspicious movements would be easily discovered and reported to the
British commander. The position on Batt’s Hill favored a deception.
Tents were brought forward and pitched in sight of the enemy, and a
great part of the troops employed throughout the day in throwing up
works, as if the post was to be resolutely maintained; at the same time,
the heavy baggage and stores were quietly conveyed away in the rear of
the hill, and ferried across the bay. As soon as it was dark the tents
were struck, fires were lighted at various points, the troops withdrawn,
and in a few hours the whole were transported across the channel to the
mainland. In the height of the transit, Lafayette arrived. He had ridden
from the island to Boston, a distance of nearly seventy miles, in seven
hours, and had conferred with the French admiral.
D’Estaing had convinced him of the inadequacy of his naval force, but
had made a spirited offer of leading his troops by land to co-operate
with the Americans. Eager to be in time for any engagement that might
take place, Lafayette had spurred back still more speedily than he went,
but was disappointed and mortified at finding all the fighting over. He
arrived in time, however, to bring off the pickets and covering parties,
amounting to a thousand men, which he did in such excellent order, that
not a man was left behind, nor the smallest article lost.
The whole army had crossed by two o’clock in the morning unperceived by
the enemy, and had reason to congratulate themselves on the course they
had taken, and the quickness of their movements; for the very next day
Sir Henry Clinton arrived at Newport in a light squadron, with a
reinforcement of four thousand men, a naval and land force that might
effectually have cut off Sullivan’s retreat, had he lingered on the
island.
Sir Henry, finding he had arrived a day too late, returned to New York,
but first detached Major-general Sir Charles Grey with the troops, on a
ravaging expedition to the eastward; chiefly against ports which were
the haunts of privateers. This was the same general that had surprised
Wayne in the preceding year, and effected such slaughter among his men
with the bayonet. He appears to have been fitted for rough and merciless
warfare. In the course of his present expedition he destroyed more than
seventy vessels in Acushnet River, some of them privateers with their
prizes, others peaceful merchant ships. New Bedford and Fair Haven
having been made military and naval deposits, were laid waste, wharves
demolished, rope-walks, storehouses and mills, with several private
dwellings, wrapped in flames. Similar destruction was effected at the
Island of Martha’s Vineyard, a resort of privateers; where the
inhabitants were disarmed, and a heavy contribution levied upon them in
sheep and cattle. Having thus ravaged the coasts of New England, the
squadron returned laden with inglorious spoil to New York.
Lord Howe, also, who had sailed for Boston in the hope of intercepting
the Count D’Estaing, and had reached there on the 30th of August, found
the French fleet safely sheltered in Nantasket Road, and protected by
American batteries erected on commanding points. He also returned to New
York, and shortly afterward, availing himself of a permission granted
him some time before by government, resigned the command of the fleet to
Admiral Gambier, to hold it until the arrival of Admiral Byron. His
lordship then returned to England, having rendered important services by
his operations along the American coast and on the waters of the
Delaware, and presenting a strong contrast, in his incessant activity,
to the easy indolence and self-indulgence of his brother.
The failure of the combined enterprise against Rhode Island was a cause
of universal chagrin and disappointment, but to none more so than to
Washington, as is evident from the following passage of a letter to his
brother, John Augustine:
“An unfortunate storm, and some measures taken in consequence of it by
the French admiral, blasted in one moment the fairest hopes that ever
were conceived; and, from a moral certainty of success, rendered it a
matter of rejoicing to get our own troops safe off the island. If the
garrison of that place, consisting of nearly six thousand men, had been
captured, as there was, in appearance at least, a hundred to one in
favor of it, it would have given the finishing blow to British
pretensions of sovereignty over this country; and would, I am persuaded,
have hastened the departure of the troops in New York, as fast as their
canvas wings would carry them away.”
But what gave Washington the greatest solicitude, was the effect of this
disappointment upon the public mind. The failure of the enterprise was
generally attributed to the departure of the French fleet from Newport,
and there was at one time such popular exasperation, that it was feared
the means of repairing the French ships at Boston would be withheld.
Count D’Estaing, and the other French officers, on their part, were
irritated by the protests of the American officers, and the expressions
in Sullivan’s general order derogatory to French loyalty. The Count
addressed a letter to Congress, explaining and vindicating his conduct
subsequent to his arrival on the coast.
Washington regarded this mutual irritation which had so suddenly sprung
up between the army and the fleet, with the most poignant anxiety. He
wrote to Sullivan and Greene on the subject, urging them to suppress the
feuds and jealousies which had already arisen, to conceal as much as
possible from the soldiery and public, the misunderstandings which had
occurred between the officers of the two nations; to discountenance all
illiberal or unfriendly observations on the part of the army, and to
cultivate the utmost harmony and good-will.
Congress, also, endeavored to suppress the protest of the officers of
Sullivan’s army which had given so much offence; and, in a public
resolution, expressed their perfect approbation of the conduct of the
count, and their sense of his zeal and attachment.
Nothing perhaps tended more to soothe his wounded sensibilities, than a
letter from Washington, couched in the most delicate and considerate
language. “If the deepest regret, that the best concerted enterprise and
bravest exertions should have been rendered fruitless by a disaster,
which human prudence was incapable of foreseeing or preventing, can
alleviate disappointment, you may be assured that the whole continent
sympathizes with you. It will be a consolation to you to reflect, that
the thinking part of mankind do not form their judgment from events; and
that their equity will ever attach equal glory to those actions which
deserve success, and those which have been crowned with it. It is in the
trying circumstances to which your excellency has been exposed, that the
virtues of a great mind are displayed in their brightest lustre, and
that a general’s character is better known than in the hour of victory.
It was yours, by every title which can give it; and the adverse element,
which robbed you of your prize, can never deprive you of the glory due
to you.”