DE KALB COMMISSIONED MAJOR-GENERAL—PRETENSIONS OF CONWAY—THWARTED BY
WASHINGTON—CONWAY CABAL—GATES REMISS IN CORRESPONDENCE—DILATORY IN
FORWARDING TROOPS—MISSION OF HAMILTON TO GATES—WILKINSON BEARER OF
DESPATCHES TO CONGRESS—A TARDY TRAVELLER—HIS REWARD—CONWAY
CORRESPONDENCE DETECTED—WASHINGTON’S APOLOGY FOR HIS ARMY.
We have heretofore had occasion to advert to the annoyances and
perplexities occasioned to Washington by the claims and pretensions of
foreign officers who had entered into the service. Among the officers
who came out with Lafayette, was the Baron De Kalb, a German by birth,
but who had long been employed in the French service, and though a
silver-haired veteran, sixty years of age, was yet fresh and active and
vigorous; which some attributed to his being a rigid water drinker. In
the month of September, Congress had given him the commission of
major-general, to date with that of Lafayette.
This instantly produced a remonstrance from Brigadier-general Conway,
the Gallic Hibernian, of whom we have occasionally made mention, who
considered himself slighted and forgot, in their giving a superior rank
to his own to a person who had not rendered the cause the least service,
and who had been his inferior in France. He claimed, therefore, for
himself, the rank of major-general, and was supported in his pretensions
by persons both in and out of Congress; especially by Mifflin, the
quartermaster-general.
Washington had already been disgusted by the overweening presumption of
Conway, and was surprised to hear that his application was likely to be
successful. He wrote on the 17th of October, to Richard Henry Lee, then
in Congress, warning him that such an appointment would be as
unfortunate a measure as ever was adopted—one that would give a fatal
blow to the existence of the army. “Upon so interesting a subject,”
observes he, “I must speak plainly. The duty I owe my country, the
ardent desire I have to promote its true interests, and justice to
individuals, require this of me. General Conway’s merit as an officer,
and his importance in this army, exist more in his own imagination than
in reality. For it is a maxim with him to leave no service of his own
untold, nor to want any thing which is to be obtained by
importunity. * * * * I would ask why the youngest brigadier in the
service should be put over the heads of the oldest, and thereby take
rank and command of gentlemen who but yesterday were his seniors;
gentlemen who, as I will be bound to say in behalf of some of them at
least, are of sound judgment and unquestionable bravery. * * * * * *
This truth I am well assured of, that they will not serve under him. I
leave you to guess, therefore, at the situation this army would be in at
so important a crisis, if this event should take place.”
This opposition to his presumptuous aspirations, at once threw Conway
into a faction forming under the auspices of General Mifflin. This
gentleman had recently tendered his resignation of the commission of
major-general and quartermaster-general on the plea of ill health, but
was busily engaged in intrigues against the commander-in-chief, towards
whom he had long cherished a secret hostility. Conway now joined with
him heart and hand, and soon became so active and prominent a member of
the faction that it acquired the name of _Conway’s Cabal_. The object
was to depreciate the military character of Washington, in comparison
with that of Gates, to whom was attributed the whole success of the
Northern campaign. Gates was perfectly ready for such an elevation. He
was intoxicated by his good fortune, and seemed to forget that he had
reaped where he had not sown, and that the defeat of Burgoyne had been
insured by plans concerted and put in operation before his arrival in
the Northern Department.
In fact, in the excitement of his vanity, Gates appears to have
forgotten that there was a commander-in-chief, to whom he was
accountable. He neglected to send him any despatch on the subject of the
surrender of Burgoyne, contenting himself with sending one to Congress,
then sitting at Yorktown. Washington was left to hear of the important
event by casual rumor, and was for several days in anxious uncertainty,
until he received a copy of the capitulation in a letter from General
Putnam.
Gates was equally neglectful to inform him of the disposition he
intended to make of the army under his command. He delayed even to
forward Morgan’s rifle corps, though their services were no longer
needed in his camp, and were so much required in the South. It was
determined, therefore, in a council of war, that one of Washington’s
staff should be sent to Gates to represent the critical state of
affairs, and that a large reinforcement from the Northern army would, in
all probability, reduce General Howe to the same situation with
Burgoyne, should he remain in Philadelphia, without being able to remove
the obstructions in the Delaware, and open a free communication with his
shipping.
Colonel Alexander Hamilton, his youthful but intelligent aide-de-camp,
was charged with this mission. He bore a letter from Washington to
Gates, dated October 30th, of which the following is an extract.
“By this opportunity, I do myself the pleasure to congratulate you on
the signal success of the army under your command, in compelling General
Burgoyne and his whole force to surrender themselves prisoners of war;
an event that does the highest honor to the American arms, and which, I
hope, will be attended with the most extensive and happy consequences.
At the same time, I cannot but regret that a matter of such magnitude,
and so interesting to our general operations, should have reached me by
report only; or through the channel of letters not bearing that
authenticity which the importance of it required, and which it would
have received by a line under your signature stating the simple fact.”
Such was the calm and dignified notice of an instance of official
disrespect, almost amounting to insubordination. It is doubtful whether
Gates, in his state of mental effervescence, felt the noble severity of
the rebuke.
The officer whom Gates had employed as bearer of his despatch to
Congress, was Wilkinson, his adjutant-general and devoted sycophant: a
man at once pompous and servile. He was so long on the road that the
articles of the treaty, according to his own account, reached the grand
army before he did the Congress. Even after his arrival at Yorktown he
required three days to arrange his papers, preparing to deliver them in
style. At length, eighteen days after the surrender of Burgoyne had
taken place, he formally laid the documents concerning it before
Congress, preluding them with a message in the name of Gates, but
prepared the day before by himself, and following them up by comments,
explanatory and eulogistic, of his own.
He evidently expected to produce a great effect by this rhetorical
display, and to be signally rewarded for his good tidings, but Congress
were as slow in expressing their sense of his services, as he had been
in rendering them. He swelled and chafed under this neglect, but
affected to despise it. In a letter to his patron, Gates, he observes:
“I have not been honored with any mark of distinction from Congress.
Indeed, should I receive no testimony of their approbation of my
conduct, I shall not be mortified. My hearty contempt of the world will
shield me from such pitiful sensations.”[98]
A proposal was at length made in Congress that a sword should be voted
to him as the bearer of such auspicious tidings: upon which Dr.
Witherspoon, a shrewd Scot, exclaimed, “I think ye’ll better gie the lad
_a pair of spurs_.”[99]
A few days put an end to Wilkinson’s suspense, and probably reconciled
him to the world; he was breveted a brigadier-general.
A fortuitous circumstance, which we shall explain hereafter, apprised
Washington about this time that a correspondence, derogatory to his
military character and conduct, was going on between General Conway and
General Gates. It was a parallel case with Lee’s correspondence of the
preceding year; and Washington conducted himself in it with the same
dignified forbearance, contenting himself with letting Conway know, by
the following brief note, dated November 9th, that his correspondence
was detected.
“SIR—A letter which I received last night contained the following
paragraph—‘In a letter from General Conway to General Gates, he says,
“_Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak general and
bad counsellors would have ruined it._”’
“I am, sir, your humble servant,
“GEORGE WASHINGTON.”
The brevity of this note rendered it the more astounding. It was a
hand-grenade thrown into the midst of the cabal. The effect upon other
members we shall show hereafter: it seems, at first, to have prostrated
Conway. An epistle of his friend Mifflin to Gates intimates, that Conway
endeavored to palliate to Washington the censorious expressions in his
letter, by pleading the careless freedom of language indulged in
familiar letter writing; no other record of such explanation remains,
and that probably was not received as satisfactory. Certain it is, he
immediately sent in his resignation. To some he alleged, as an excuse
for resigning, the disparaging way in which he had been spoken of by
some members of Congress; to others he observed, that the campaign was
at an end, and there was a prospect of a French war. The real reason he
kept to himself, and Washington suffered it to remain a secret. His
resignation, however, was not accepted by Congress; on the contrary, he
was supported by the cabal, and was advanced to further honors, which we
shall specify hereafter.
In the mean time, the cabal went on to make invidious comparisons
between the achievements of the two armies, deeply derogatory to that
under Washington. Publicly, he took no notice of them; but they drew
from him the following apology for his army, in a noble and
characteristic letter to his friend, the celebrated Patrick Henry, then
governor of Virginia. “The design of this,” writes he, “is only to
inform you, and with great truth I can do it, strange as it may seem,
that the army which I have had under my immediate command, has not, at
any one time, since General Howe’s landing at the Head of Elk, been
equal in point of numbers to his. In ascertaining this, I do not confine
myself to Continental troops, but comprehend militia. The disaffected
and lukewarm in this State, in whom unhappily it too much abounds,
taking advantage of the distraction in the government, prevented those
vigorous exertions, which an invaded State ought to have
yielded. * * * * * I was left to fight two battles, in order, if
possible, to save Philadelphia, with less numbers than composed the army
of my antagonist, whilst the world has given us at least double. This
impression, though mortifying in some points of view, I have been
obliged to encourage; because, next to being strong, it is best to be
thought so by the enemy; and to this cause, principally, I think is to
be attributed the slow movements of General Howe.
“How different the case in the Northern Department! There the States of
New York and New England, resolving to crush Burgoyne, continued pouring
in their troops, till the surrender of that army; at which time not less
than fourteen thousand militia, as I have been informed, were actually
in General Gates’s camp, and those composed, for the most part, of the
best yeomanry in the country, well armed, and in many instances supplied
with provisions of their own carrying. Had the same spirit pervaded the
people of this and the neighboring States, we might before this time
have had General Howe nearly in the situation of General
Burgoyne. * * * * * *
“My own difficulties, in the course of the campaign, have been not a
little increased by the extra aid of Continental troops, which the
gloomy prospect of our affairs in the North immediately after the
reduction of Ticonderoga, induced me to spare from this army. But it is
to be hoped that all will yet end well. IF THE CAUSE IS ADVANCED,
INDIFFERENT IS IT TO ME WHERE OR IN WHAT QUARTER IT HAPPENS.”
We have put the last sentence in capitals, for it speaks the whole soul
of Washington. Glory with him is a secondary consideration. Let those
who win, wear the laurel—sufficient for him is the advancement of the
cause.
NOTE.
We subjoin an earnest appeal of Washington to Thomas Wharton,
President of Pennsylvania, on the 17th of October, urging him to keep
up the quota of troops demanded of the State by Congress, and to
furnish additional aid. “I assure you, sir,” writes he, “it is a
matter of astonishment to every part of the continent to hear that
Pennsylvania, the most opulent and populous of all the States, has but
twelve hundred militia in the field, at a time when the enemy are
endeavoring to make themselves completely masters of, and to fix their
quarters in, her capital.” And Major-general Armstrong, commanding the
Pennsylvania militia, writes at the same time to the Council of his
State:—“Be not deceived with wrong notions of General Washington’s
numbers; be assured he wants your aid. Let the brave step forth, their
example will animate the many. You all speak well of our
commander-in-chief at a distance; don’t you want to see him, and pay
him one generous, one martial visit, when kindly invited to his camp
near the end of a long campaign? There you will see for yourselves the
unremitting zeal and toils of all the day and half the night,
multiplied into years, without seeing house or home of his own,
without murmur or complaint; but believes and calls this arduous task
the service of his country and of his God.”