SCHUYLER ON THE POINT OF RESIGNING—COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY REPORT IN HIS
FAVOR—HIS MEMORIAL TO CONGRESS PROVES SATISFACTORY—DISCUSSIONS
REGARDING THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENT—GATES MISTAKEN AS TO HIS
POSITION—HE PROMPTS HIS FRIENDS IN CONGRESS—HIS PETULANT LETTER TO
WASHINGTON—DIGNIFIED REPLY OF THE LATTER—POSITION OF GATES
DEFINED—SCHUYLER REINSTATED IN COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT—GATES
APPEARS ON THE FLOOR OF CONGRESS—HIS PROCEEDINGS THERE.
The time was at hand for the committee of inquiry on General Schuyler’s
conduct to make their report to Congress, and he awaited it with
impatience. “I propose in a day or two to resign my commission,” writes
he to Washington on the 3d of May. “As soon as I have done it, I shall
transmit to your Excellency my reasons for such a step.”
Washington was grieved at receiving this intimation. He had ever found
Schuyler a faithful coadjutor. He knew his peculiar fitness for the
Northern department from his knowledge of the country and its people;
his influence among its most important citizens; his experience in
treating with the Indians; his fiery energy; his fertility in
expedients, and his “sound military sense.” But he knew also his
sensitive nature, and the peculiar annoyances with which he had had to
contend. On a former occasion he had prevented him from resigning, by an
appeal to his patriotism; he no longer felt justified in interfering. “I
am sorry,” writes he, “that circumstances are such as to dispose you to
a resignation; but you are the best judge of the line of conduct most
reconcilable to your duty, both in a public and personal view; and your
own feelings must determine you in a matter of so delicate and
interesting a nature.”[22]
Affairs, however, were taking a more favorable turn. The committee of
inquiry made a report which placed the character of Schuyler higher than
ever as an able and active commander, and a zealous and disinterested
patriot.
He made a memorial to Congress explaining away, or apologizing for, the
expressions in his letter of the 4th of February, which had given
offence to the House. His memorial was satisfactory; and he was
officially informed that Congress now “entertained the same favorable
sentiments concerning him, that they had entertained before that letter
was received.”
There were warm discussions in the House on the subject of the Northern
department. Several of the most important of the New York delegates
observed that General Gates misapprehended his position. He considered
himself as holding the same command as that formerly held by General
Schuyler. Such was not the intention of Congress in sending him to take
command of the army at Ticonderoga. There had been a question between
sending him to _that post_, or giving him the adjutancy general, and it
had been decided for the former.
It would be nonsense, they observed, to give him command of the Northern
department, and confine him to Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, where
he could not have an extensive idea of the defence of the frontier of
the Eastern States; but only of one spot, to which the enemy were not
obliged to confine their operations, and, as it were, to knock their
heads against a single rock. The affairs of the north-east, it was
added, and of the State of New York in particular, were in a critical
condition. Much disaffection prevailed, and great clashing of interests.
There was but one man capable of keeping all united against the common
enemy, and he stood on the books as commander-in-chief of the Middle,
or, as it was sometimes called, the Northern department. His presence
was absolutely necessary in his home quarters for their immediate
succor, but if he returned, he would be a general without an army or a
military chest; and why was he thus disgraced?
The friends of Gates, on the other hand, who were chiefly delegates from
New England, pronounced it an absurdity, that an officer holding such an
important post as Ticonderoga, should be under the absolute orders of
another one hundred miles distant, engaged in treaties with Indians, and
busied in the duties of a provedore. The establishment of commands in
departments was entirely wrong; there should be a commander-in-chief,
and commanders of the different armies.
We gather these scanty particulars from a letter addressed to Gates by
Mr. Lovell. The latter expresses himself with a proper spirit. “I wish,”
writes he, “some course could be taken which would suit you both. It is
plain all the Northern army cannot be intended for the single garrison
of Ticonderoga. Who then has the distribution of the members? This must
depend on one opinion, or there can be no decision in the defence of the
Northern frontiers. It is an unhappy circumstance that such is the
altercation at the opening of the campaign.”
This letter produced an anxious reply: “Why,” writes Gates, “when the
argument in support of General Schuyler’s command was imposed upon
Congress, did not you or somebody say, ’the second post upon this
continent next campaign will be at or near Peekskill. There General
Schuyler ought to go and command, that will be the curb in the mouth of
the New York tories, and the enemy’s army. He will then be near the
convention, and in the centre of the colony, have a military chest, and
all the insignia of office. This command in honor could not be refused,
without owning there is something more alluring than command to General
Schuyler, by fixing him at Albany. By urging this matter home you would
have proved the man. He would have resigned all command, have accepted
the government of New York, and been fixed to a station where he must do
good, and which could not interfere with, or prevent any arrangement
Congress have made, or may hereafter make. Unhappy State! That has but
one man in it who can fix the wavering minds of its inhabitants to the
side of freedom! How could you sit patiently, and, uncontradicted,
suffer such impertinence to be crammed down your throats?”
“Why is it nonsense,” pursues Gates, “to station the commanding general
in the Northern department at Ticonderoga? Was it not the uniform
practice of the royal army all last war? Nothing is more certain than
that the enemy must first possess that single rock before they can
penetrate the country. * * * It is foolish in the extreme, to believe
the enemy this year can form any attack from the northward but by
Ticonderoga. Where, then, ought the commanding general to be posted?
Certainly at Ticonderoga. If General Schuyler is solely to possess all
the power, all the intelligence, and that particular favorite, the
military chest, and constantly reside at Albany, I cannot, with any
peace of mind, serve at Ticonderoga.”[23]
This letter was despatched by private hand to Philadelphia.
While Gates was in this mood, his aide-de-camp, Major Troup, reported an
unsuccessful application to the commander-in-chief for tents. In the
petulance of the moment, Gates addressed the following letter to
Washington. “Major Troup, upon being disappointed in procuring tents at
Fishkill, acquaints me that he went to head-quarters to implore your
Excellency’s aid in that particular for the Northern army. He says your
Excellency told him you should want every tent upon the continent for
the armies to the southward, and that you did not see any occasion the
Northern army could have for tents, for, being a fixed post, they might
hut. Refusing this army what you have not in your power to bestow, is
one thing,” adds Gates, “but saying that this army has not the same
necessities as the Southern armies, is another. I can assure your
Excellency the service of the northward requires tents as much as any
service I ever saw.”[24]
However indignant Washington may have felt at the disrespectful tone of
this letter, and the unwarrantable imputation of sectional partiality
contained in it, he contented himself with a grave and measured rebuke.
“Can you suppose,” writes he, “if there had been an ample supply of
tents for the whole army, that I should have hesitated one moment in
complying with your demand? I told Major Troup that on account of our
loss at Danbury there would be a scarcity of tents; that our army would
be a moving one, and that consequently nothing but tents would serve our
turn; and that, therefore, as there would be the greatest probability of
your being stationary, you should endeavor to cover your troops with
barracks and huts. Certainly this was not a refusal of tents, but a
request that you should, in our contracted situation, make every shift
to do without them, or at least with as few as possible.
“The Northern army is, and ever has been, as much the object of my care
and attention as the one immediately under my command. * * * * I will
make particular inquiry of the quartermaster-general, concerning his
prospect and expectations as to the article of tents; and if, as I said
before, there appears a sufficiency for the whole army, you shall most
willingly have your share. But, if there is not, surely that army whose
movement is uncertain, must give up its claims for the present to that
which must inevitably take the field the moment the weather will admit,
and must continue in it the whole campaign.”[25]
Notwithstanding this reply, Gates persisted in imputing sectional
partiality to the commander-in-chief, and sought to impart the same idea
to Congress. “Either I am exceedingly dull or unreasonably jealous,”
writes he to his correspondent Mr. Lovell, “if I do not discover by the
style and tenor of the letters from Morristown, how little I have to
expect from thence. Generals are so far like parsons, they are all for
christening their own child first; but, let an impartial moderating
power decide between us, and do not suffer Southern prejudices to weigh
heavier in the balance than the Northern.”[26]
A letter from Mr. Lovell, dated the 23d of May, put an end to the
suspense of the general with respect to his position. “Misconceptions of
past resolves and consequent jealousies,” writes he, “have produced a
definition of the Northern department, and General Schuyler is ordered
to take command of it. The resolve, also, which was thought to _fix_
head-quarters at Albany, is repealed.”
Such a resolve had actually been passed on the 22d, and Albany,
Ticonderoga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, were thenceforward to
be considered as forming the Northern department. The envoy of Gates,
bearing the letter in which he had carved out a command for Schuyler at
Peekskill, arrived at Philadelphia too late. The general was already
provided for.
Schuyler was received with open arms at Albany, on the 3d of June. “I
had the satisfaction,” writes he, “to experience the finest feelings
which my country expressed on my arrival and reappointment. The day
after my arrival, the whole county committee did me the honor in form to
congratulate me.”
Gates was still in Albany, delaying to proceed with General Fermois to
Ticonderoga until the garrison should be sufficiently strengthened.
Although the resolve of Congress did but define his position, which had
been misunderstood, he persisted in considering himself degraded,
declined serving under General Schuyler, who would have given him the
post at Ticonderoga in his absence; and obtaining permission to leave
the department, set out on the 9th for Philadelphia, to demand redress
of Congress.
General St. Clair was sent to take command of the troops at Ticonderoga,
accompanied by Gen. de Fermois. As the whole force in the Northern
department would not be sufficient to command the extensive works there
on both sides of the lake, St. Clair was instructed to bestow his first
attention in fortifying Mount Independence, on the east side, Schuyler
considering it much the most defensible, and that it might be made
capable of sustaining a long and vigorous siege.
“I am fully convinced,” writes he, “that between two and three thousand
men can effectually maintain Mount Independence and secure the pass.”
It would be imprudent, he thought, to station the greater part of the
forces at Fort Ticonderoga; as, should the enemy be able to invest it,
and cut off the communication with the country on the east side, it
might experience a disaster similar to that at Fort Washington.
The orders of Schuyler to officers commanding posts in the department,
are characterized by his Dutch attention to cleanliness as to the
quarters of the soldiers, their bedding, clothing, and equipments.
All officers mounting guard, were to have their hair dressed and
powdered. The adjutants of the several corps were to be particularly
careful that none of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers mount
guard without having their hair dressed and powdered, their persons
perfectly clean, and their arms and accoutrements in the most complete
order.
While Schuyler was thus providing for the security of Ticonderoga, and
enforcing cleanliness in his department, Gates was wending his way to
Philadelphia, his bosom swelling with imaginary wrongs. He arrived there
on the 18th. The next day at noon, Mr. Roger Sherman, an Eastern
delegate, informed Congress that General Gates was waiting at the door,
and wished admittance.
“For what purpose?” it was asked.
“To communicate intelligence of importance,” replied Mr. Sherman.
Gates was accordingly ushered in, took his seat in an elbow chair, and
proceeded to give some news concerning the Indians; their friendly
dispositions, their delight at seeing French officers in the American
service, and other matters of the kind; then, drawing forth some papers
from his pocket, he opened upon the real object of his visit; stating
from his notes, in a flurried and disjointed manner, the easy and happy
life he had left to take up arms for the liberties of America; and how
strenuously he had exerted himself in its defence; how that some time in
March he had been appointed to a command in the Northern department; but
that a few days ago, without having given any cause of offence, without
accusation, without trial, without hearing, without notice, he had
received a resolution by which he was, in a most disgraceful manner,
superseded in his command. Here his irritated feelings got the better of
his judgment, and he indulged in angry reproaches of Congress, and
recitals of a conversation which had taken place between him and Mr.
Duane, a member of the House, whom he considered his enemy. Here Mr.
Duane rose, and addressing himself to the president, hoped the general
would observe order, and cease any personal observations, as he could
not, in Congress, enter into any controversy with him upon the subject
of former conversations.
Other of the members took fire; the conduct of the general was
pronounced disrespectful to the House, and unworthy of himself, and it
was moved and seconded that he be requested to withdraw. Some of the
Eastern delegates opposed the motion, and endeavored to palliate his
conduct. A wordy clamor ensued, during which the general stood, his
papers in his hand, endeavoring several times to be heard, but the
clamor increasing, he withdrew with the utmost indignation. It was then
determined that he should not again be admitted on the floor; but should
be informed that Congress were ready and willing to hear, by way of
memorial, any grievances of which he might have to complain.[27]