EXERTIONS TO FORM A NEW ARMY—CALLS ON THE DIFFERENT
STATES—INSUFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA—WASHINGTON’S CARE FOR THE
YEOMANRY—DANGERS IN THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENT—WINTER ATTACK ON
TICONDEROGA APPREHENDED—EXERTIONS TO REINFORCE SCHUYLER—PRECARIOUS
STATE OF WASHINGTON’S ARMY—CONJECTURES AS TO THE DESIGNS OF THE
ENEMY—EXPEDITION OF THE BRITISH AGAINST PEEKSKILL.
The early part of the year brought the annual embarrassments caused by
short enlistments. The brief terms of service for which the Continental
soldiery had enlisted, a few months perhaps, at most a year, were
expiring; and the men, glad to be released from camp duty, were
hastening to their rustic homes. Militia had to be the dependence until
a new army could be raised and organized; and Washington called on the
council of safety of Pennsylvania, speedily to furnish temporary
reinforcements of the kind.
All his officers that could be spared were ordered away, some to
recruit, some to collect the scattered men of the different regiments,
who were dispersed, he said, almost over the continent. General Knox was
sent off to Massachusetts to expedite the raising of a battalion of
artillery. Different States were urged to levy and equip their quotas
for the Continental army. “Nothing but the united efforts of every State
in America,” writes he, “can save us from disgrace, and probably from
ruin.”
Rhode Island is reproached with raising troops for home service before
furnishing its supply to the general army. “If each State,” writes he,
“were to prepare for its own defence independent of each other, they
would all be conquered, one by one. _Our success must depend on a firm
union, and a strict adherence to the general plan._”[10]
He deplores the fluctuating state of the army while depending on
militia; full one day, almost disbanded the next. “I am much afraid that
the enemy, one day or other, taking advantage of one of these temporary
weaknesses, will make themselves masters of our magazines of stores,
arms and artillery.”
The militia, too, on being dismissed, were generally suffered by their
officers to carry home with them the arms with which they had been
furnished, so that the armory was in a manner scattered over all the
world, and for ever lost to the public.
Then an earnest word is spoken by him in behalf of the yeomanry, whose
welfare always lay near his heart. “You must be fully sensible,” writes
he, “of the hardships imposed upon individuals, and how detrimental it
must be to the public to have farmers and tradesmen frequently called
out of the field, as militia men, whereby a total stop is put to arts
and agriculture, without which we cannot long subsist.”
While thus anxiously exerting himself to strengthen his own precarious
army, the security of the Northern department was urged upon his
attention. Schuyler represented it as in need of reinforcements and
supplies of all kinds. He apprehended that Carleton might make an attack
upon Ticonderoga, as soon as he could cross Lake Champlain on the ice;
that important fortress was under the command of a brave officer,
Colonel Anthony Wayne, but its garrison had dwindled down to six or
seven hundred men, chiefly New England militia. In the present destitute
situation of his department as to troops, Schuyler feared that Carleton
might not only succeed in an attempt on Ticonderoga, but might push his
way to Albany.
He had written in vain, he said, to the Convention of New York, and to
the Eastern States, for reinforcements, and he entreated Washington to
aid him with his influence. He wished to have his army composed of
troops from as many different States as possible; the Southern people
having a greater spirit of discipline and subordination, might, he
thought, introduce it among the Eastern people.
He wished also for the assistance of a general officer or two in his
department. “I am alone,” writes he, “distracted with a variety of
cares, and no one to take part of the burden.”[11]
Although Washington considered a winter attack of the kind specified by
Schuyler too difficult and dangerous to be very probable, he urged
reinforcements from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, whence they could
be furnished most speedily. Massachusetts, in fact, had already
determined to send four regiments to Schuyler’s aid as soon as possible.
Washington disapproved of a mixture of troops in the present critical
juncture, knowing, he said, “the difficulty of maintaining harmony among
men from different States, and bringing them to lay aside all
attachments and distinctions of a local and provincial nature, and
_consider themselves the same people, engaged in the same noble
struggle, and having one general interest to defend_.”[12]
The quota of Massachusetts, under the present arrangement of the army,
was fifteen regiments: and Washington ordered General Heath, who was in
Massachusetts, to forward them to Ticonderoga as fast as they could be
raised.[13]
Notwithstanding all Washington’s exertions in behalf of the army under
his immediate command, it continued to be deplorably in want of
reinforcements, and it was necessary to maintain the utmost vigilance at
all his posts to prevent his camp from being surprised. The operations
of the enemy might be delayed by the bad condition of the roads, and the
want of horses to move their artillery, but he anticipated an attack as
soon as the roads were passable, and apprehended a disastrous result
unless speedily reinforced.
“The enemy,” writes he, “must be ignorant of our numbers and situation,
or they would never suffer us to remain unmolested, and I almost tax
myself with imprudence in committing the fact to paper, lest this letter
should fall into other hands than those for which it is intended.” And
again: “It is not in my power to make Congress fully sensible of the
real situation of our affairs, and that it is with difficulty I can keep
the life and soul of the army together. In a word, they are at a
distance; they think it is but to say _presto, begone_, and every thing
is done; they seem not to have any conception of the difficulty and
perplexity of those who have to execute.”
The designs of the enemy being mere matter of conjecture, measures
varied accordingly. As the season advanced, Washington was led to
believe that Philadelphia would be their first object at the opening of
the campaign, and that they would bring round all their troops from
Canada by water to aid in the enterprise. Under this persuasion he wrote
to General Heath, ordering him to send eight of the Massachusetts
battalions to Peekskill instead of Ticonderoga, and he explained his
reasons for so doing in a letter to Schuyler. At Peekskill, he observed,
“they would be well placed to give support to any of the Eastern or
Middle States; or to oppose the enemy, should they design to penetrate
the country up the Hudson; or to cover New England, should they invade
it. Should they move westward, the Eastern and Southern troops could
easily form a junction, and this, besides, would oblige the enemy to
leave a much stronger garrison at New York. Even should the enemy pursue
their first plan of an invasion from Canada, the troops at Peekskill
would not be badly placed to reinforce Ticonderoga, and cover the
country around Albany.” “I am very sure,” concludes he, “the operations
of this army will in a great degree govern the motions of that in
Canada. _If this is held at bay, curbed and confined, the Northern army
will not dare attempt to penetrate._” The last sentence will be found to
contain the policy which governed Washington’s personal movements
throughout the campaign.
On the 18th of March he despatched General Greene to Philadelphia, to
lay before Congress such matters as he could not venture to communicate
by letter. “He is an able and good officer,” writes he, “who has my
entire confidence, and is intimately acquainted with my ideas.”
Greene had scarce departed when the enemy began to give signs of life.
The delay in the arrival of artillery, more than his natural indolence,
had kept General Howe from formally taking the field; he now made
preparations for the next campaign by detaching troops to destroy the
American deposits of military stores. One of the chief of these was at
Peekskill, the very place whither Washington had directed Heath to send
troops from Massachusetts; and which he thought of making a central
point of assemblage. Howe terms it “the port of that rough and
mountainous tract called the Manor of Courtlandt.” Brigadier-general
McDougall had the command of it in the absence of General Heath, but his
force did not exceed two hundred and fifty men.
As soon as the Hudson was clear of ice, a squadron of vessels of war and
transports, with five hundred troops under Colonel Bird, ascended the
river. McDougall had intelligence of the intended attack, and while the
ships were making their way across the Tappan Sea and Haverstraw Bay,
exerted himself to remove as much as possible of the provisions and
stores to Forts Montgomery and Constitution in the Highlands. On the
morning of the 23d, the whole squadron came to anchor in Peekskill Bay;
and five hundred men landed in Lent’s Cove, on the south side of the
bay, whence they pushed forward with four light field-pieces drawn by
sailors. On their approach, McDougall set fire to the barracks and
principal storehouses, and retreated about two miles to a strong post,
commanding the entrance to the Highlands, and the road to Continental
Village, the place of the deposits. It was the post which had been noted
by Washington in the preceding year, where a small force could make a
stand, and hurl down masses of rock on their assailants. Hence McDougall
sent an express to Lieutenant-colonel Marinus Willet, who had charge of
Fort Constitution, to hasten to his assistance.
The British, finding the wharf in flames where they had intended to
embark their spoils, completed the conflagration, beside destroying
several small craft laden with provisions. They kept possession of the
place until the following day, when a scouting party, which had advanced
towards the entrance of the Highlands, was encountered by Colonel
Marinus Willet with a detachment from Fort Constitution, and driven back
to the main body after a sharp skirmish, in which nine of the marauders
were killed. Four more were slain on the banks of Canopas Creek as they
were setting fire to some boats. The enemy were disappointed in the hope
of carrying off a great deal of booty, and finding the country around
was getting under arms, they contented themselves with the mischief they
had done, and re-embarked in the evening by moonlight, when the whole
squadron swept down the Hudson.