ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS--_continued_
Upon the conclusion of the Tirah campaign the forward policy ceased
to be measured by the virulence of Anglo-Afghan amenities. Relations
between Kabul and Calcutta were dominated by the pleasant impressions
of his guest which Abdur Rahman had gathered when, as the Honourable
George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P., the incoming Viceroy had visited
Kabul in 1894. With much care this distinguished student had made an
elaborate examination of border politics, presenting the results of his
diligence in a series of scholarly and exhaustive studies of _Russia
in Central Asia, Persia and the Persian Question_, _The Pamirs and the
Source of the Oxus_, and _A Recent Journey in Afghanistan_. By reason
of these journeys across Asiatic Russia, the Pamirs, Afghanistan and
Persia, and through his remarkable opportunities for observation,
unrivalled powers of assimilation, grasp of subject, luminosity of
judgment and lucidity of expression, Mr. George Curzon was without a
peer as an authority on frontier problems. When this brilliant and
indefatigable mind was called to India as Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
the methods by which the forward policy had been regulated in the
closing decade of the nineteenth century had broken down, the labour of
reconstruction reverting to a man who at least was the foremost expert
of his time. Modifications were now essential; and Lord Curzon at
once put into execution a number of important reforms in the economic
and military control of the north-west frontier. The regular garrison
in Chitral was lessened by one third. The soldiers in Lower Swat and
the Malakand were reduced from 3550 men to one battalion and a half
of native infantry and a small detachment of cavalry, while regular
troops were withdrawn from the Gilgit Agency. Similarly, communication
with Malakand was strengthened by constructing a railway, 2 feet 6
inches in breadth from Nowshera to Dargai, to which four companies
were posted, while a very large cantonment was created at Nowshera.
In the Khyber the regular establishment, 3700 strong, was replaced by
two battalions (1250 in all) of the reorganised and enlarged Khyber
Rifles, with an increased number of British officers and an improved
scale of pay. The costly and extensive fortifications which at one time
it was proposed to build in the pass, and at its further extremity,
were abandoned in favour of a cheaper and improved scheme of defences,
constructed to meet the requirements of the Afridi garrison. The plan
of laying either the bed of a railway or a railway itself up the Khyber
pass was displaced by the extension of the existing north-west railway
from Peshawar to Jamrud, a distance of 10 miles.
[Illustration: JAMRUD FORT, KHYBER PASS]
Between Peshawar and Kohat, the amiable co-operation of the pass
tribes was secured in the peaceable construction of the long desired
cart-road through the Kohat pass, and a military road through the
Mullagori country in the Khyber region, serving as a safe alternative
road to that by way of Ali Masjid, was undertaken. At the same time a
narrow gauge line, linking Thall _viâ_ Kohat with Kushalgarh upon the
Indus and now converted to broad gauge, was projected; while, at a
later date Nushki was joined up with Quetta. The finishing touch to an
almost perfect system of frontier communications may be found in the
preparations recently made for carrying the line along the left bank of
the Kabul river to Dakka.
South of Kohat the Samana Rifles, a force of tribal militia 450 strong
under British officers and recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen,
was furnished as an extra battalion to the border military police,
and the strength of the regular garrisons, maintained on the Samana
range, reduced from 1700 to 600 men. In the Kurram valley, the Kurram
militia were reorganised in two battalions (1250 strong) under British
officers. In Waziristan, two battalions of Waziristan militia,
800 strong, were raised, the one for the Tochi valley or Northern
Waziristan, the other for the Gomul valley or Southern Waziristan, thus
releasing the services of 4000 regulars. These changes were rendered
possible by the organisation and training of border police, militia
and levies, the total strength of which is 10,000 men. The risk of
entrusting to these irregulars the garrisoning of advanced posts was
provided against by maintaining flying columns at Peshawar, Kohat,
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and minimised by the marked improvement
of road and railway communication with all strategic centres in the
North-West Province. While the financial saving was great, efficiency
was increased because regiments were no longer split up into
detachments. The number of regulars serving beyond the administrative
frontier was reduced from 10,200 in 1899 to 5000, while supporting
garrisons were increased from 22,000 in 1899 to 24,000.
[Illustration: CARAVANSARY AT DAKKA]
When the Viceroy of India was satisfied that these measures were
destined to reap their complement of success he supplemented his
experiments in frontier management by their concluding phase. On
August 27, 1900, after eighteen months’ patient inquiry and constant
observation, he drew up a Minute advocating the separation of the
administration of the north-west frontier from the control of the
Punjab Government. These proposals were supported by the signatures
of his colleagues in a covering despatch on September 13. Following
the lines of Lord Lytton’s celebrated Minute upon the creation of a
distinct Trans-Indus District, April 22, 1877, Lord Curzon embodied
in one of the most brilliant pieces of analysis ever placed before
the Imperial Government a temperate and lucid exposition of the
existing order of frontier administration. The acceptance of the views
enunciated in this Minute was notified by the Secretary of State for
India, Lord George Hamilton, on December 20, 1900, but it was not until
November 9, 1901, that the establishment of the new territory under the
name of the North-West Frontier Province was proclaimed.
While Lord Curzon during the first three years of his _régime_--January
1899 to November 1901--was occupied with repairing the fabric of Indian
frontier administration, Afghanistan, in the early spring of 1900,
became the cause of an exchange of diplomatic notes between the late
Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the late
Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, M. de Staal, acting under the
orders of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Mouravieff.
In a communication dated February 6, 1900, M. de Staal informed the
Foreign Office that the Russian Government were proposing that direct
relations should be established between Russia and Afghanistan with
regard to frontier matters; but that such relations should have no
political character as the Russian Government intended to maintain
their former engagements and would continue to consider Afghanistan
outside the sphere of Russian influence. An immediate reply to this
request was vouchsafed in which it was stated that, having regard to
the understanding by which Afghanistan is outside the sphere of Russian
influence,
... it would be impossible for the British Government to
take into consideration any change in existing arrangements
or to frame proposals to be brought before the Amir without
more precise explanation in regard to the method which
the Russian Government would desire to see adopted for
the exchange of such communications between the frontier
officials, the limitations to be placed on them and the
means of ensuring that those limitations would be observed.
To this intimation no reply at the moment was preferred by the
Russian authorities, and the study of Anglo-Afghan relations shifts
once more to the dominions of the Amir. Throughout the period in
which Lord Curzon was so engrossed with the machinery of frontier
and administrative reforms Abdur Rahman had not been in any way an
idle ruler. In spite of his failing powers, with great energy and
determination, he had concentrated his efforts upon the completion of
his life’s work. With that accomplished, assured of the good-will of
the Government of India shortly after Lord Curzon’s arrival in 1899 by
the release of the munitions of war which had been detained through
the outbreak of the Tirah troubles, he turned his hand to matters of
more domestic concern. Satisfied with the improvements in his military
establishment, content with the reforms which he had introduced in
the administrative economy of his state, and having established its
independence by elaborate artifices, he again sought the preservation
of his line. In an effort to prepare his people for the acceptance and
accession of Habib Ullah Khan at his demise he had, in 1891, delegated
to this son authority to hold the public Durbars in Kabul. At the
same time he had reserved to himself the control of foreign affairs,
manifesting in this direction a keen appreciation of the value to the
position of India which underlay the situation of Afghanistan. Menaced
by growing physical infirmity and with strange premonition of his
approaching end, at a special Durbar in the autumn of 1900 he informed
the assembled nobles and high officials of his inability to cope with
the increasing volume of affairs. Thereupon, amid a scene of singular
pathos, the old Amir indicated that his son, Habib Ullah, would be
given a still larger measure of authority.
A few months later, in May of 1901, a more emphatic warning of the
grave state of the Amir’s health was received. Intelligence came
through from Kabul to Peshawar that Abdur Rahman was no longer able
to walk, and that he was not expected to live through the approaching
winter. Incapacitated by a combination of Bright’s disease and gout
as he was, the mental faculties of the ruler of Afghanistan were
nevertheless unimpaired, and throughout the closing year of his
life he applied them constantly to the improvement of his country.
Interested in the South African War and grasping the salient lessons
of our unreadiness, the Amir laid out much money in 1900-1901 upon a
scheme of mobilisation; while in May 1901 he secured permission to
import from Germany some thirty howitzers and field guns. At the same
time, and without informing the Government of India, he ordered a
large number of castings for big guns, an order which was subsequently
repudiated by Habib Ullah. In August 1901 he personally directed the
preparations for the suppression of the threatened disaffection in
Khost, besides attending to the rising of the Tagis of Hariob on the
Peiwar in September. These events were the last affairs of a prominent
description to which Abdur Rahman was able to apply himself. Even while
engaged in the business attending the Tagis operations his Highness
began to show signs of decline and, on September 20, he was seized with
a stroke of paralysis which disabled his right side.
His native physicians had prepared a compound of rare medicines costing
several thousand rupees; but, as the paralytic seizure was kept
strictly secret in the palace, this concoction was not in readiness
and, when offered to the Amir, he could not take it. On September
28 his Highness, feeling his end approaching, summoned his sons,
the nobles, the principal civil and military officers and the chief
_raises_ of Kabul, Hindu and Mahommedan. One son only, Mahommed Afzul
Khan, a boy of thirteen, was absent. He was with his mother at Balkh,
that lady belonging to the Saids of Balkh. When all had assembled the
Amir by look acknowledged their homage and then addressed them in a
feeble, but distinct voice, saying:
You know when a king becomes old and infirm and near his
end he always desires to nominate a successor. I wish to
have my successor settled now. Consider among yourselves
whom you believe fit to succeed me.
The listeners were affected to tears by this speech. They declared
that the Shahzada Habib Ullah, who had managed the state affairs so
well for eight years, was the ruler whom they desired. On this the
dying Amir indicated that a sword with a belt set with precious stones
should be handed to Habib Ullah, together with a big volume containing
his will and instructions for the future management of the state. He
then ordered Nasr Ullah Khan to gird his brother with the sword, and
dismissed the audience. Abdur Rahman had always the presentiment that
he would die in the same year as our lamented sovereign Queen Victoria;
and, after this assemblage, his condition became rapidly worse and he
died on October 1. The news was kept secret until the morning of the
3rd, when, his precautions against disturbance having been completed,
Habib Ullah himself made it public. Later in the day, on October 3, at
a special Durbar Habib Ullah was formally accepted as Amir, whereupon
he issued the following proclamation to the high officers of state:
His Excellency is informed of the demise of my august
father, the light of religion and the kingdom (may his
abode be in Paradise) who (as the verse runs “Death is the
end of all and not a moment’s delay is possible when it
draws nigh”) welcomed the invitation of God, and took his
way to Paradise.
His Excellency is now given a detailed account of what
happened. His late Highness had been frequently unwell;
but notwithstanding his chequered health he was not for a
moment found lacking in the conduct of his kingly duties,
until the light of his life was put down. He breathed
his last on Thursday night dated 19th Jamadi-ul-Sani at
Kala Bagh, his summer residence. He gave his soul to the
Creator of the Universe (truly all things tend towards
God). On Friday 19th rumours got abroad and the news
was communicated to the capital for the information of
officials. The people of the country, subjects as well as
military, came together to convey condolence, one and all.
Beyond the possibility of doubt they considered the monarch
was their kind father and their gracious ruler. The people
of the territories of Herat, Kandahar and Turkestan, etc.,
who were present in the metropolis, attended the exalted
Court and My Presence (who am the slave of God) and praised
the Almighty. Great was the concourse and so large the
number of those who witnessed the _Fateha_[44] that it is
known to God and to God alone. All of them followed the
service with sincerity of heart and purity of mind. Then
they took the oath of allegiance with praises to Omnipotent
God. They said as follows: “We desire to make your Highness
our king so that we may not live in an uncivilised state.
We wish you to acknowledge our oath of allegiance; and
we beg your Highness to take the management of all the
affairs of state and that of our nation; and we ask you to
discharge your duties night and day like his Highness the
deceased ruler of ours and to give us rest and repose.”
After the close of the speech and prayer I too with the
Throne’s usual kindness and munificence accepted their
oath of allegiance and request; and I have given them such
entire satisfaction as lies in my power. On that very day
all of our brothers took their oath of allegiance and after
them all the members of the House Royal and persons of the
noble families of Mahommed Zai and other tribes, _saids_,
priests, gentry and all officials of state, civil and
military, took the oath; and I too for my reign and time
acknowledged the oath. Then all offered up their prayers
for the late monarch (may his abode be in Paradise) and
gave thanks to God for my reign. After the dismissal and
breaking up of all the aforesaid proceedings the officials
of state, civil as well as military, and all those who
could afford and spare time from matters temporal took
their road to Kala Bagh and, together with those who were
already present, joined the funeral procession of the late
ruler (Light of the Country and Religion). The blessed
corpse of that august and potent king, according to his
will, was carried to the royal cemetery with great pomp
and honour; and he was interred in the ground and placed
in the place which is the real and ultimate abode for man.
That august and potent monarch, that king of pleasing and
praiseworthy manners, expired and sank in the depth of the
kindness of God (may his abode be in Heaven).
His Excellency is now informed of all that has happened.
He is given an account for his full information; and a
separate report is despatched to His Excellency the Viceroy
of India on account of the alliance that exists between us.
A second Durbar was held on the 6th, when the commander-in-chief, the
principal military officers, the tribal chiefs then in Kabul, the
leading nobles and the chief mullahs renewed publicly their agreement,
made with the late Amir in the autumn of 1900, regarding the succession
of Habib Ullah. With the Koran before them they affixed their seals to
an oath which ran as follows:
We, all military officers, together with the army, all
Afghan tribal chiefs, sirdars, mullahs and other followers
of Islam in Afghanistan, do swear by the Koran to accept
Amir Habib Ullah as our King of Islam.
Habib Ullah replied:
You have appointed me as your king and I accept the office.
Please God I will be always a follower of the religion of
Mahomet the Prophet of God (may peace be on him) and I will
be guardian of the Mussalmans of Afghanistan who will obey
me as King of Islam.
The thousands of people assembled on the occasion of this Durbar
solemnly removed their turbans, loudly acclaiming Habib Ullah as their
new ruler. The leading Hindus of Kabul, headed by Dewan Harinjan,
afterwards presented their agreement to the Amir, who graciously
accepted it with the assurance that they should continue to live in
peace and quietude, and promising a reduction of the taxes hitherto
levied on their community. In Kabul on October 8, yet another Durbar
was held, whereat Sirdar Nasr Ullah Khan brought the Koran, the sword
and the flag belonging to the late Amir. Habib Ullah rose on the
approach of his brother. Placing the Koran upon his head and fastening
the sword round his waist, he raised the flag and took the oath to
rule Afghanistan as a true Mahommedan. He said his brothers, the whole
army and the people had appointed him king. He accepted the office and
publicly asked God to pardon all his sins. The Amir then declared that
he confirmed his brother, Nasr Ullah Khan, in the offices which he had
held under the late Amir, at the same time appointing Omar Khan to take
charge of the Revenue Department and Amin Ullah Khan to preside over
the Judicial Department.
Simultaneously with these announcements several acts of clemency and
generosity were proclaimed. In each of the important centres prisoners,
confined for minor offences, were released; while various sums of
money for charitable distribution, in all aggregating one lakh of
rupees, were remitted to the local authorities. Kabul naturally came
in for especial marks of grace. The trading community was advised of
the remission of the more oppressive taxes, and certain guilds were
notified that Treasury grants would be made to them. Five hundred
prisoners in the capital province were also set at liberty. In a
general way, since Abdur Rahman’s scheme of taking one able-bodied
man in eight for military service had given rise to discontent, Habib
Ullah advanced the pay of all ranks in the Regular and Irregular
establishments. The pay of the cavalry was increased from twenty rupees
to twenty-five rupees per month, the infantry from eight rupees to ten
rupees per month, and the levies from six rupees to eight rupees per
month. The officers enjoyed a proportionate increment. These evidences
of consideration secured the tranquillity of the people at a change
of ruler, although the perspicacity of the late Amir, in arranging
matrimonial alliances for Habib Ullah with the leading families in
the army and priesthood, had already secured the allegiance to his
successor of these two important factors in the state. The accession,
therefore, was undisturbed; and, while couriers bore the news far and
wide to officials, the issue of a fresh coinage, bearing the impression
in Turkish characters “Amir Habib Ullah Khan, Amir of Kabul, the Seeker
of God’s Help,” carried conviction in the market-place. At the same
time in India, October 14, was observed as an official Day of Mourning,
and Habib Ullah was informed that a Mahommedan deputation, charged
with the condolences of the Government of India and the personal
greetings of the Viceroy, would immediately set out for Kabul. A few
days later Habib Ullah’s preoccupation with the affairs of state passed
from the civil to the spiritual side, when the new ruler of Afghanistan
gave an ominous sign of that bigotry which has since distinguished
him. For the first time in the country’s history the head of the state
publicly performed the priestly functions in celebrating the Id at
the Idgah Mosque. The chief priest of Kabul immediately proclaimed
Habib Ullah to be the successor of Mahommed, whereupon the Amir of
Afghanistan delivered an address inspired throughout by a spirit of
intolerant ecclesiasticism. Among other things, he laid down that a
fine not exceeding ten Kabuli rupees would be inflicted on all who did
not offer prayers night and morning in the mosques. A register of the
daily attendance of all individuals in the various quarters was to be
kept; and a “box of justice” set up in each into which secret reports,
upon any who neglected their religious duties, could be dropped.
[Illustration: GROUNDS OF PALACE OCCUPIED BY THE DANE MISSION]
The visitation of Providence upon Abdur Rahman could hardly have come
at a more inopportune moment. Although the peace of the Indian frontier
in 1901 was disturbed only by the Mahsud-Waziri operations, resulting
from the legacy of hate which our activities on the Waziristan border
during Lord Elgin’s administration had bequeathed to Lord Curzon,
the action of Russia in the previous year in respect of Russo-Afghan
relations had made it quite clear that the harmony of Mid-Asia was
involved in the disastrous failure of British arms in the Transvaal.
Nothing had ever been more probable than that an irruption of disorder
throughout Afghanistan would attend the death of the late Amir. It was
upon this contingency that, in the past, much thought and no little
speculation had turned. Even if historical parallels were ignored,
there were so many claimants to the accession in the field that
the wiseacres of the chancelleries throughout the world had freely
prophesied the decease of Abdur Rahman to be the signal for a general
_mêlée_ in Asia, in which Russia and Great Britain would support the
rival factions. The Russians, no less than ourselves, shared these
premonitions; and, when the precarious condition of Abdur Rahman’s
health became actually alarming in the spring of 1901, there was a
wealth of suggestion in the silent preparation which took place along
the Russo-Afghan and Indo-Afghan borders. Under the watchful ægis of
Lord Curzon no sign of the apprehensions to which the death of Abdur
Rahman gave rise in the mind of the Government of India was permitted
to become public. While the first indication of a recrudescence of
Russian activity along the Afghan border had been given nearly two
years before, a fresh fillip to the situation was imparted by the
sudden departure for the Afghan frontier of the Russian Minister of
War, General Kuropatkin, who quitted St. Petersburg immediately after
the receipt of the tidings of the Amir’s demise. Almost the earliest
act of the former Governor-General of Asiatic Russia upon his arrival
in Trans-Caspia was to release from imprisonment at Merv, on October
19, 1901, six Afghans who had been charged with espionage. Summoning
them to his presence, he gave them the following message of good-will
to the new Amir:
A misfortune has befallen Afghanistan. The Amir Abdur
Rahman is dead and Habib Ullah, one of his sons, has
ascended the throne. We Russians have always considered
ourselves friends of Afghanistan and we wish to remain so
in the present change of Government. Therefore, in setting
you at liberty, I command you to report yourselves to your
nearest chieftain and to repeat to him the words you have
heard from the Russian Minister of War.
While General Kuropatkin moved from Merv to Tashkent, where he was
engaged in an inspection of the garrison, besides taking part in the
ceremonies attendant upon the turning of the first sod of the Tashkent
division of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, the Government of India
replied to his act of overt insolence by entrusting to the chief of
the Mahommedan Mission, which left Peshawar for Kabul on November 20,
1901, an invitation for his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan to visit
India. In spite of certain pre-occupation, General Kuropatkin, during
his visit to Central Asia, found time to devote considerable attention
to Abdur Rahman’s successor. Before December 11, when the deputation
of Indian Mahommedans quitted Kabul for their own homes, Habib Ullah
received from the Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif an intimation that the
Governor of Tashkent would send towards the close of the winter
1901-02 a deputation of Mahommedan officials from Russian Turkestan to
participate in the Nauroz festival on March 21 at Kabul. Accompanying
the escort were to be several batteries of field guns with supplies of
ammunition, intended as a gift to his Highness in commemoration of his
accession.
The significance of these circumstances was not lost upon Habib Ullah,
whose perception would indeed have been dim if the antagonism of
Anglo-Russian interests at the Court of Kabul had escaped his notice.
An inkling of his attitude towards foreign affairs had been given when,
in the very early days of his reign, he had ordered his people to
observe Abdur Rahman’s prohibition against any use of the Quetta-Chaman
extension between the first station on the southern side of the Khwaja
Amran tunnel and the terminus at its northern extremity. In view of
this, more than ordinary interest attached to the pronouncement which,
it was anticipated, Habib Ullah would make to the members of the Indian
Mission of Condolence.
At their first reception Habib Ullah’s attitude hardly commended itself
to the pleasure of his guests. Inquiring what were the intentions
of the Government of India in respect of his father’s subsidy, the
invitation from the Viceroy was handed to him. After expressing
satisfaction at the compliment which had been paid to him and alluding
to the difficulty of accepting the invitation for some time, he hinted
that the obligations contracted by Abdur Rahman were not binding
upon himself. Finally, he threw the delegates a crumb of comfort in
the assurance that he would follow in the footsteps of his lamented
father. At a later date, in full Durbar and attended by the Mission,
he expounded his policy, reiterating his intention to respect Abdur
Rahman’s prejudices in regard to the introduction of telegraphs,
the construction of railways, the reorganisation of the army, the
appointment of a European British agent to Kabul and the adoption of
Western customs--even the use of foreign medicines was banned. Schools
for instruction in the Persian and Arabic languages, and the Mahommedan
faith, would be opened, but the country would be jealously guarded
against every form of external aggression.
For reasons which did not transpire, but which would not be difficult
to determine, the visit of a Mahommedan deputation from Russian
Turkestan did not take place. Meanwhile, astonishment at the
promulgation of the recent ordinances had barely subsided when Habib
Ullah began to press attentions upon his former tutor and pestilential
frontier fanatic, Najib-ud-Din, the Mullah of Hadda, this action
at once introducing into the arena of Anglo-Afghan relations a
disquieting figure. Ostensibly with a view to honouring his former
teacher, Habib Ullah detached certain disciples from the mullah’s
entourage for a Mahommedan crusade in Kafiristan, increased his
sacerdotal powers by placing a large section of the frontier within
his religious jurisdiction, ordered a new mosque to be built for him
and invited him to participate in the Installation ceremonies at the
Nauroz, presenting him with the gift of an elephant and howdah for the
journey. Invitations to the Nauroz celebrations were issued to other
leading spirits in the frontier disturbances of 1897, including the
notorious Mullah Powindah from Waziristan, the troublesome fire-eater
Mullah Said Akbar from Tirah and the Safi Mullah. Following so closely
upon the semi-contemptuous rejection of the representations which
the Government of India had made through the deputation of Indian
Mahommedans, Habib Ullah’s predilection for the society of men who
had already incurred the displeasure of the Government of India made
manifest the fact that the impulse of bigotry was stronger in him than
the dictates of policy. The late Amir was accustomed to use the mullahs
to consolidate his own authority and to interpose a fretful hedge of
fanaticism between his kingdom and the outside world. But he knew
also how to curb their insolence when occasion required, and he made
them all--_kazis_, _imams_ and _muftis_--servants of the state. This
adroitness in professing a militant orthodoxy and in securing at the
same time the supremacy of the state over the church in Afghanistan,
has been described as one of the most remarkable proofs of Abdur
Rahman’s political genius.
Habib Ullah’s action in immersing himself in religious affairs so soon
as he had ascended the throne, belonged to a different category. It
gave rise to misgivings with regard to his capacity to hold the helm
of state with the same firmness and clearness of vision as had enabled
his father to descry the various shoals ahead. In any case since it
boded no good to the peace of the frontier, it drew down upon the Amir
a polite but unmistakable remonstrance. The effect of this was not lost
upon the throne; and when the aged mullah pleaded, in excuse of his
inability to attend the Nauroz, the difficulties of a journey across
the hills in March, the point was conceded by his late pupil. Moreover,
the Amir’s attitude at the Nauroz was circumspect and remarkable only
for a very colourless exposition of the divine character of the
_shariat_, the strict fulfilment of which he enjoined upon all good
Mahommedans. Five days after the celebration of the Nauroz, however,
the summons to the Hadda Mullah was repeated, but the Amir’s reception
of this distinguished prelate was sufficiently cool to disarm criticism.
Administrative and domestic difficulties beset Habib Ullah at an
early date in his career as Amir of Afghanistan. Before the summer
of 1902 had waned the discovery of a palace intrigue with extensive
ramifications induced him, at a Durbar on June 8, to order the
re-establishment of the Secret Intelligence Branch in Kabul, the
reports from which were to be presented to him each morning. At the
same time, in an interesting attempt to temper despotism with justice,
he ordained that an influential _rais_ from each tribe should be
associated with each local governor to assist in the disposal of tribal
cases. More important matters were to come before a Council of State
in Tribal Affairs, which he now proceeded to create. It was composed
of leading members of various tribes; and weekly meetings were to take
place in Kabul under his own presidency. Almost the first matter to
engage the consideration of this body was, in August 1903, a joint
protest from the Ghilzais, Duranis and Suliman Khels against the
application of Abdur Rahman’s scheme of calling up one man in eight
for military service. In preference to this measure the objectors
propounded the suggestion that musketry instructors should be appointed
to all large villages. Acceptance of any modification of Abdur Rahman’s
plan was deferred until the return of Nasr Ullah Khan from a tour of
inspection of the military conditions of the state, which the Amir had
projected.
As these events were occurring at Kabul, it became evident in Europe,
that although Russia had not returned to the charge in respect of her
communication to the Foreign Office on February 6, 1900, she had not
abandoned the purpose which she had in view. In the middle of August
1902 the Russian authorities, in defiance of their treaty limitations,
twice secretly addressed the Afghan Government, concealing this grave
breach of their obligations towards us by an impudent agitation in the
press for liberty of direct communication with Afghanistan. On August
31, the mouthpiece of the Russian Foreign Office, the _Novoe Vremya_,
contained the following startling observation:
... The necessity for closer intercourse has so increased
that it is impossible longer to observe the conditions of
the 1873 Agreement. The Russian Government have notified
England that the effort of two years ago to enter into
direct relations with Afghanistan continues. We cannot,
therefore, consider ourselves bound by any obligations
whatsoever on the question of having direct relations
with Afghanistan on any subject that might interest us.
By virtue of the proximity of the two countries, the
development of intercourse between the local populations
which goes on every year will undoubtedly call for the
adoption of measures for the establishment of normal
relations with Afghanistan as being the only ones possible
with a neighbouring state. Upon the progress of events
generally and the civilising effects over the local
populations of Russian influence will depend alone the time
when such measures will be adopted....
Four days later, on September 4, the _St. Petersburg Bourse Gazette_, a
paper in close relation with the Finance Ministry, said:
... The question which is ripe for settlement and will
not brook delay is the question of Russian diplomatic
representation at Kabul. Now that the Russian outposts have
been pushed to the Afghan frontier, it is unreasonable that
Kabul should remain inaccessible....
A message from the governor of Russian Turkestan to the governor of
Afghan Turkestan, requesting that direct commercial intercourse might
be established across the Oxus, had already been delivered when the
initiatory efforts of the _Novoe Vremya_ and the _St. Petersburg
Bourse Gazette_ were seconded by the _Viedomosti_ and the _Moscow
Bourse Gazette_. While the Russian press debated the character of
their obligations to us in respect of Afghanistan, the emissary of the
Russian Government, Sikandur Khan, a Turcoman from Ali Yurt, proceeded
to Kabul. Nearly two months elapsed before tidings of the arrival of
Sikandur Khan at Kabul on September 4, reached India. Proof of Russia’s
proceedings was then incontestable since, on September 5, at a State
Durbar which had been specially summoned, Habib Ullah read a letter
from the Russian Government to the following effect:
... In the opinion of the Russian Government the time
has now come for closer commercial relationship between
Afghanistan and Russia. The Afghans have nothing to
fear from Russian aggression, since the friendliness
existing between England and Russia would be endangered
if further annexations were made by the Government of
the Tsar in the direction of Badakshan and Wakhan. This
fact in itself becomes a permanent guarantee of peace.
In these circumstances it is an act of folly to continue
the attitude of suspicion and concealed hostility that
now exists between the Afghan and Russian commanders of
frontier posts. The Russian Government, therefore, invites
the Amir to throw open to Russian caravans the trade
routes between Khushk and Herat and Khushk and Kabul. The
Russian Government in return will allow Afghan traders to
enter freely and traverse without restrictions Russian
territory. The matter has already been laid before the
British Government, but this letter is addressed personally
to the Amir of Afghanistan because a favourable answer from
the Afghan Government would greatly strengthen the Russian
case....
When the reading of this document was finished the Amir asked for the
opinion of the Durbar, the temper of its members being illustrated by
Ali Yar Khan, who said:
“Let this Turki dog who carries messages for infidels be beaten on the
head with shoes till his hair falls off. That ought to be our answer to
the Russians.”
The Amir, greatly displeased at this remark, observed that, if
there were any shoebeating, it would be for him who suggested the
maltreatment of the messenger. Subsequently fifty rupees were given to
the Russian courier. After some public discussion the Durbar dispersed,
the Amir ordering the State Secretary to acknowledge receipt of the
Russian communication, and to say that, while he was willing to discuss
the matter, the interchange of views must in future be made through
the Government of India in accordance with the precedent established
by his father, the Amir Abdur Rahman. The Russian proceedings not
unnaturally attracted the attention of Parliament; and on October
21, Lord George Hamilton acquainted the British public for the first
time with the receipt of the proposal which had been transmitted by
the Russian Embassy to the Foreign Office nearly three years before.
The correctness of the Amir’s reply was in striking contrast with
the impropriety of the Russian communication, the despatch of which
had transgressed the limits of diplomatic etiquette. As far back as
1868-69, Prince Gortchakoff had assured Lord Clarendon that the Russian
Government regarded Afghanistan as completely outside her sphere of
influence. That engagement had been re-affirmed in 1875; extended,
according to the statement made by M. de Giers to Mr. Kennedy on
October 2, 1883, to include abstention from the transmission of letters
of ceremony, and constantly renewed in personal conversation upon a
variety of occasions since the original was enacted.
This action of Russia on the waters of the Oxus had drawn attention to
the vague, uncertain state of the relations subsisting between Kabul
and Calcutta. As matters stood all former agreements between India
and Afghanistan had automatically terminated with the death of Abdur
Rahman; and it remained for the succeeding Amir to adjust the situation
by calling upon the Government of India to renew the arrangements by
which Afghanistan had become a subsidised and protected state of India.
Although twelve months had passed since the decease of the late Amir
and many opportunities had been accorded him, Habib Ullah had given
no indication of any desire to enter into any undertaking with the
Government of India. Nevertheless he credited himself quite wrongfully
each month with the accretions of his subsidy and the balance of his
father’s monies which were lying, by the particular arrangement of the
late Amir, at the Treasury in India. There is, to the onlooker, the
greater piquancy in this regular remittance to India of debit cheques
against the Treasury, since Habib Ullah, from the outset of his reign,
had exhibited a most imperfect loyalty. The patronage which he extended
to the Hadda Mullah had already brought one rebuke upon him; its
continuation, in the face of such remonstrance, disclosed no sense of
responsibility to the Government of India. Again his procrastination
in dealing with the Viceroy’s invitation to a conference obviously
qualified those amiable expressions of regard for Lord Curzon which
Habib Ullah was at such pains to profess.
[Illustration: TAKHT-I-RAWAN]
Since his accession, in marked contrast with the policy of his father,
he had received numerous deputations from the Afridi zone, including
one from the most predatory of all the clans south of the Khyber, the
Zakka Khels, whose hostility to the British Government has always been
a prominent feature of the frontier. The good impression, created in
September, when he had invited the Hadda Mullah to return finally to
his own country, placing a _takht-i-rawan_ at his disposal for the
journey, was ruined by this foolish dalliance with Afridi tribes from
within the Durand border. At the moment, taking time by the forelock,
Habib Ullah was anxious to raise an Afridi bodyguard, composed of
men upon whose personal loyalty absolute reliance could be placed in
case of an _émeute_ in the palace. Knowledge of this fact acted as a
spur to the more disorderly border-elements, who wished to separate
the Afridis, as a tribe, from the control of the Indian Government.
Embodying their several schemes in one, they put forward a plan which
was presented to Habib Ullah by Khawas Khan, an Afridi _malik_, who,
in 1897, had fled before the avenging arm of the Indian Government to
Kabul. This worthy, now entirely dependent upon the benevolence of the
Amir’s Government, urged his protector to raise an Afridi contingent,
to which project Habib Ullah was foolish enough to assent. Robes of
honour were issued to the tribal chiefs and a rate of pay, double the
amount allowed to the Afghan soldiery, with a month’s advance, was
promised to all recruits. Two thousand Afridis came forward in the
first week, 500 of whom after receiving their rewards at once deserted.
The success of this new departure appeared to be assured, when the
corps was disbanded on account of the hostility which was displayed by
the Afghans themselves to the scheme, the men being permitted to retain
the clothing, modern breech-loading rifles and ammunition with which
they had been supplied. The moving influence in this salutary change
of mind on the part of Habib Ullah had been that of Nasr Ullah Khan;
and it was with the greater regret that, in a little time, the Amir of
Afghanistan was found to have broken away from the more masterful will
of his brother to toy once again with the questionable ministrations of
the Hadda Mullah. Early in November this holy, but tiresome, prelate
wrote and persuaded Habib Ullah to hold a special Durbar in order to
accept from the hands of the mullahs the title of Siraj-ul-Millat wa
ud-Din--“The Lamp of The Congregation and The Faith.” In view of this
it was generally felt that the happiest augury for the peace of the
Indo-Afghan border, at the end of 1902, was the death of the Hadda
Mullah on December 23, when the Afghan Government devoted a sum of
30,000 rupees towards the funeral obsequies of their sainted _protégé_.
The removal of the obstacles in the way of any cordial understanding
between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan was
not assisted when, on January 14, 1903, the Foreign Office in St.
Petersburg issued, in reference to the declaration made by Lord George
Hamilton, the following _communique_:
As regards Russia’s relations with Afghanistan, it is
necessary to declare that Russia addressed no request of
any sort to the British Cabinet, but simply notified it of
her desire and purpose to enter into direct relations with
Afghanistan in the future.
No further declarations were made on this subject.
If language is to have any meaning at all in diplomacy, as in ordinary
life, this utterance can only be characterised as one of the most
flagrant perversions of truth that have ever disgraced the history of
even Russian politics. Quite rightly the request of February 6, 1900,
had been interpreted as a veiled demand for the right to establish a
Russian representative at Kabul. The proposal admits of being supported
by the plausible contention that such an agency would be a convenient
means of settling disputes and avoiding collisions on the Russo-Afghan
border. It must not be forgotten that it was over almost an identical
question--the reception of the Stolietoff Mission by Shir Ali--that
Great Britain fought the Second Afghan War; and it can hardly be denied
that, if the concession demanded by the Note of 1900 were granted, the
result would be to set up an influence in Kabul hostile in spirit to
our own and from the first day of its existence there devoted to the
sapping of our position.
Great inconvenience of course attaches to a system by which the
smallest detail in the adjustment of any difficulty along the
Russo-Afghan frontier must be referred for settlement from the Oxus
to Tashkent, from Tashkent to St. Petersburg, from St. Petersburg to
London, from London to the Government of India, and from the Viceroy’s
Council to Kabul where, after much delay, the same process is repeated
over the return journey. Unfortunately, the maintenance of such a
cumbersome procedure is essential to the harmony of Anglo-Afghan
relations since, although Russia professes to require facilities for
frontier intercourse in commercial matters alone, similar protestations
reduced Manchuria to the level of a Russian protected State until Japan
intervened. Great Britain does not wish to embark upon a campaign in
Central Asia and there need be no war so long as Russia, observing the
pledges which she has given, tempers her desires with discretion. But
continuation of the mischievous interference in Persia and Afghanistan,
which has distinguished her actions hitherto, is a menace to the
world’s peace, as the indulgent nature of the British Government has
now been pushed to the limit of its endurance.
So far as Anglo-Afghan relations were concerned the New Year of
1903 held out little prospect of improvement. Possibly the mass of
business, associated with Habib Ullah’s installation as Siraj-ul-Millat
wa ud-Din, early in April, did prevent the Amir of Afghanistan from
visiting India in the spring of this year. But, aside from the
irregularity of the Amir’s behaviour, the incident of April 6, when
Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, commanding the 24th Baluchistan Infantry
Regiment and stationed at Chaman, was arrested by Afghan officials
for an innocent trespass beyond the Indo-Afghan border and removed
to the fort at Baldak Spin, may be regarded as throwing light upon
the precise quality of the bonds of amity which were uniting the two
countries. Again, serious exception could be taken at the manner in
which the Amirs of Afghanistan were employing the permission to import
munitions of war which had been granted by the Government of India. The
arrival of the thirty Krupp guns, acquired by Abdur Rahman on the eve
of his death, had revealed the presence of a large number of castings
for heavy ordnance which had been secretly obtained from Essen by the
late Amir. A small army of carts and camels, lent by the Government
of India, carried the thirty guns from Peshawar to Jelalabad, whence
forty elephants, sent by Habib Ullah for the purpose, bore them to
Kabul. Very properly transport was denied to that part of the purchase
which disclosed Abdur Rahman’s strange dereliction of his treaty
rights. Moreover, it was not difficult for Habib Ullah to recognise the
irregularity of his father’s procedure, the immediate consequence of
which was the repudiation of the order by the son. Unhappily, before
this particular incident could be considered to have closed an immense
consignment of rifle cartridges, numbering several millions of rounds,
many of which were found to be of the explosive character condemned by
the Hague Conference, arrived from the Amir’s agents in England. Since
it never had been intended that the right to import munitions of war
accorded to the late Amir of Afghanistan implied the power to amass
an unlimited amount of war _matériel_ in Kabul, no other course was
open to the Viceroy of India than to see that these other stores were
likewise detained by the frontier authorities.
Something more important than considerations of prestige, therefore,
was embroiled in the indifference which the Amir of Afghanistan
displayed towards India as the paramount state, making it incumbent
upon the Government to repeat their earlier representations. There
was no need, indeed the occasion had hardly arisen, for any violent
coercion. The situation required merely such tightening of the reins
as would bring to the ruler of Kabul a proper comprehension of the
actual ties between his country and India. In the correspondence which
ensued, the Amir claimed the right to import munitions of war under the
treaty which had given similar powers to Abdur Rahman. Unfortunately
Habib Ullah had no such right; nor was any moral obligation to honour
the debit notes which Habib Ullah had drawn every month against the
Indian Treasury attaching to the Government of India. These points
were made clear to the Amir who had neither the funds to pay for
nor the authority to order the armaments which were then waiting at
the frontier. The lesson had been driven home, and the loftiness of
tone, which the Amir of Afghanistan had adopted in the initiatory
letter, was hardly discernible in his concluding statement. Since
there was no malice in the attitude of the Government of India, the
Amir of Afghanistan was again invited to visit India for purposes of
a conference with the Viceroy. A visitation of cholera, which swept
through Kabul and North-eastern Afghanistan in 1903, the worst since
the epidemic of 1879, permitted an excuse to be offered at which no
exception could be taken. Before the scourge had subsided Russia had
repeated her designs against Afghanistan. This, in view of the explicit
denouncement of her treaty requirements, implied by the _communique_ of
January 1903, was not perhaps surprising. Their renewal was denied by
Lord Cranbourne in the House of Commons both in the spring and autumn
sessions of 1903. Nevertheless, in the middle of February, Sirdar Ali
Khan, the governor of Afghan Turkestan, had sent to Kabul four Russian
spies whom he had arrested near Mazar-i-Sharif; but the most flagrant
of these insidious encroachments upon a British preserve occurred
in the following August, when the governor of Russian Turkestan
sent back some deserters from the Afghan army who had escaped into
Russian territory. Obviously the note of defiance in the message which
accompanied them was addressed to the suzerain power.
It ran:
As the Tsar and the Amir are amicably disposed the one to
the other, His Imperial Majesty has given orders that every
effort shall be made to continue the friendly relations
existing between Russia and Afghanistan.
As representative of the Tsar I am directed to send back
all refugees and evil-doers who come to my territory from
Afghanistan. This is the reason why I send back to you
these eleven soldiers with their arms.
Please be kind enough to communicate this to the Amir.
In spite of these persistent endeavours to establish friendly
relations with Kabul there is little reason to believe that Habib
Ullah offered any encouragement to the Russian frontier officers.
Inveterate suspicion of foreign influence characterises every aspect
of his external policy and Russia and Great Britain are made to feel
impartially the effect of this attitude. Abdur Rahman accepted the
good faith of the Indian Government unquestioningly and understood his
northern neighbour sufficiently to realise that it was less a wish for
the friendship of Afghanistan than a desire to pin-prick India which
prompted her overtures. Habib Ullah has yet to learn how to stand where
his father strode with perfect confidence, a foolish mistrust sapping
the strength of the son. Under a less skilful statesman than Lord
Curzon it is conceivable that the patience of the Government of India
would long since have been exhausted. That exceptional familiarity with
the affairs of Asia, which preeminently distinguishes the late Viceroy,
enabling him to tread Oriental labyrinths with wise discrimination,
permitted him upon this occasion to bridge once more a crisis between
Afghanistan and India. Almost in defiance of Kabul obstruction, he
proceeded to the solution of difficulties which did not require any
personal discussion with a refractory potentate. Early in the winter
of 1903-04, the Government of India took up for consideration those
sections of the Afghan boundary which, ever since the withdrawal of
the Udny Mission eight years previously, had required demarcation.
Surprised into ruffled acquiescence, the Amir in January 1904 began to
make extensive preparations for a meeting between Major Roos-Keppel,
the chief of the British Commission, and his own representative.
Through the brief absence of Lord Curzon from the helm of state, the
vacillation of the Amir precipitated a collapse of these plans at
the last moment. Wilfully stupid, too, only a little later--in July
1904--was Habib Ullah’s order to Nasr Ullah Khan to select twenty-four
officers who were to be detailed as envoys to England, France, Germany,
Russia, Persia, China, Japan, Turkey and Egypt in the Old World, and
America in the New World.
If the break-down in the negotiations anent the Mohmand boundary had
increased the tension between Kabul and Calcutta, it was certainly
impossible to tolerate this more direct perversion of the principles
out of which the fabric of our relations with Afghanistan had been
woven. Concerned at the rupture which was threatening between India
and Afghanistan at a moment when Lord Curzon was absent from India
and too timid to insist upon the Amir’s acceptance of the Viceroy’s
invitation to a conference, the Imperial Government, as the only means
of renewing the Agreements upon which they were set which remained
to them, decided to despatch a Mission to Kabul. At the instance of
the Secretary of State for India, Mr. St. John Brodrick, the acting
Viceroy of India, Lord Ampthill, acquainted Habib Ullah with the wishes
of His Majesty’s Government. In reply His Highness, with the hope of
improving his position when the time came for diplomatic discussion
and as an act of conciliation towards the Viceroy, intimated his
willingness to send his son Inayat Ullah Khan--a charming, intelligent
boy of sixteen and a remarkable instance of that youthful precocity
which attains so abnormal a development in the Oriental--to meet
Lord Curzon upon his return to India. However pressing may have been
the questions outstanding between the Government of India and the
Amir of Afghanistan, the visit of a British Mission to Kabul--no
doubt desirable and in that sense opportune--was derogatory in a
Government whose invitations to the head of the country, which it was
proposed to honour in such an emphatic fashion, had been treated with
contumacy. Lord Curzon’s opposition to the project is well-known; but
with the exception of this distinguished statesman few were prepared
for the unfortunate set back which the mission received. A grievous
miscalculation undoubtedly was made. But the blunder, which determined
its existence and brought about a complete miscarriage of Anglo-Indian
policy, lay not so much in sending the mission as in His Majesty’s
Government not having decided, if the Amir proved recalcitrant, how far
and upon what ground the Cabinet should stand firm.
[Illustration: FESTIVAL IN HONOUR OF THE DANE MISSION]
As constituted, the Mission comprised Mr., now Sir, Louis Dane, Foreign
Secretary at Simla, Mr. H. R. Dobbs--who, together with Major Wanliss,
had recently returned from replacing the boundary pillars on the
Perso-Afghan border--Major W. Malleson, R.A., Captain Victor Brooke,
9th Lancers, and a British doctor. Leaving Peshawar on November 27, the
mission reached Dakka on November 29, and was met at Lundi Khana by
200 Afghan cavalry under the Sipah Salar Ghulam Hussein, the Sarhang
of Dakka, and Mahommed Hasan Khan. Major Roos-Keppel, political agent
for the Khyber, accompanied the party for a few miles beyond Lundi
Khana to Torkhana, where a guard of honour of the Khyber Rifles was
drawn up, the mission ultimately arriving at Kabul on December 10.
Elaborate gifts were conveyed by Mr. Dane for presentation to the
Amir, among many others a £700 motor-car and several cases of sporting
equipment. As a compliment to the ladies of the harem the Government
of India thoughtfully included a cinematograph, providing at the same
time the necessary operator. Among the presents to the Mission from his
Highness were a gold watch and a set of gold cuff links which Habib
Ullah had offered to Mr. Dane. The note struck by the negotiations was
scarcely in the same pitch as the festivities by which the withdrawal
of the Mission was celebrated, when seven gramophones simultaneously
discharged bursts of discordant revelry. Nevertheless, the din of
these instruments fell on the ears of those who had every cause to be
relieved at the peaceful termination of their labours, since the clouds
had hung low over Kabul throughout the Anglo-Afghan conferences of
1904-05.
Many things in our buffer state of course required to be improved as
much for the enhancement of its own interests as for the advantage of
India. There was the Amir’s perpetuation of Abdur Rahman’s objection
to Afghan subjects using the northern extremity of the Quetta-Chaman
railway to be discussed, as well as the projection of railways from
Chaman to Kandahar and from Peshawar to Kabul. Besides these important
subjects there were the prolongation of the Indian system of telegraphs
to Kabul and Kandahar; the provision of telegraphic communication
between Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat; Kabul and Kandahar; Kandahar
and Herat. The re-organisation of the Afghan army had also to be
considered, while the demarcation of the Mohmand boundary and the
Seistan border, the definition of the Amir’s control over border
tribes, the question of the subsidy and Habib Ullah’s powers in respect
of the importation of munitions of war were topics, the examination
of which would be, it was expected, to the mutual benefit of the
contracting parties in an Anglo-Afghan alliance. In India it was
understood that there might be a difficulty in the arrangement of the
terms which were to be secured from the Amir; but that ultimately, and
after protracted negotiations, our demands would be conceded. To this
end the chief of the Mission was provided with a treaty, drawn up under
the personal supervision of Lord Curzon during his brief residence in
London in 1904, which was designed to bring about a discussion of
every aspect of the old agreements with a view to removing previous
difficulties and arriving at a clear understanding for the future.
[Illustration: SCENE OF THE AUDIENCES BETWEEN HABIB ULLAH AND SIR
LOUIS DANE]
This treaty comprised three clauses, but Habib Ullah, simulating
annoyance at the terms of the clause which attempted to restrict the
importation of arms, would not enter into any discussion over it. After
the Mission had passed four months in the Afghan capital, the limit, to
which the Amir of Afghanistan would permit himself to go, reproduced
simply the formal renewal on both sides of the engagements entered into
between Abdur Rahman, the late Amir of Afghanistan, and the Government
of India.
The Dane Treaty therefore was as follows:
He is God, Extolled be His perfection,
His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, Amir Habib Ullah
Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and
its Dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr.
Louis William Dane, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty
Government of India and the Representative of the Exalted
British Government on the other part.
His said Majesty doth hereby agree to this, that in the
principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of
the Treaty regarding internal and external affairs, and
of the engagements which his Highness my late father,
that is, Zia-ul-millatwaud-Din, who has found mercy, may
God enlighten his tomb! Concluded and acted upon with the
Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting,
and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I
will not contravene them in any dealings or in any promise.
The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does
hereby agree to this, that as to the very agreement
and engagement which the Exalted British Government
concluded and acted upon with the noble father of his
Majesty Siraj-ul-millatwaud-Din, that is, his Highness
Zia-ul-millatwaud-Din, who has found mercy, regarding
internal and external affairs of principle or subsidiary
importance, I confirm them and write that they (the British
Government) will not act contrary to those agreements and
engagements in any way or at any time.
Made on Tuesday, the 14th day of Muharram-ul-haram of the
year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 21st day of March of
the year 1905 A.D. (Persian Seal of Amir Habib Ullah Khan.)
This is correct. I have sealed and signed.
AMIR HABIB ULLAH,
LOUIS W. DANE, Foreign Secretary,
Representing the Government of India.
Thus the situation upon the arrival of Mr. Dane from Kabul differed
in no way from that which had preceded his departure for the Afghan
capital, save that substantial concessions had been awarded to the Amir
of Afghanistan who, in return, had conceded nothing. In addition to an
astonishing and entirely unnecessary elevation in the style and title
of the ruler of Afghanistan--conveyed in the charge “Independent King
of the State of Afghanistan and its Dependencies,” and the reference
to “His Majesty,” which the precious instrument reveals--inevitable
corollaries of the transaction were the continuation of the annual
subsidy of eighteen lakhs to Abdur Rahman’s successor, the release
of the arrears--approximately amounting to £400,000--which had been
accumulating since a little previous to the demise of the late Amir,
and the right to an unrestricted importation of arms.
[Illustration: ESCORT OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE QUARTERS OCCUPIED BY
THE DANE MISSION]
It must not be supposed that the mere ratification of the engagements
was sufficient for the purposes of British policy in Central Asia. Much
more was needed; and, since facilities were deliberately withheld and
the Amir rejected consideration of our pledged responsibility, it is
evident that the subjugation of Afghanistan to the interests of India
is incomplete. It is of value perhaps to have ascertained that the
Amir is disaffected and untrustworthy. There was always a doubt but
it was hoped that the affront, which he offered so sedulously to the
British Government, was due to his own conspicuous vanity rather than
the manifestation of actual ill-will. The Kabul conference made that
point clear; but, as the Imperial Government have elected to observe
an impressive reticence upon the circumstances of this unfortunate
episode, it is no less incumbent upon others to do likewise. Nothing
can be gained by revealing to the world the details of a rebuff without
parallel in the history of Indian politics, unless such acknowledgment
were made to assist public opinion in appreciating the issues involved
in the absence of any satisfactory understanding between Kabul and
Calcutta. That this course formed no part of the late Government’s
policy was disclosed on June 21, 1905, by the debate in Parliament
upon the Indian budget and, at a later date, upon Mr. Balfour’s speech
on Imperial Defence. The Ministers, who spoke on these occasions,
concealed the truth rather than stated it, and their utterances cannot
be accepted as either correct or adequate. Mr. Balfour’s statement
that the construction “of strategic railways by Russia in Afghanistan”
would provoke Great Britain to war does not render the character of
Anglo-Afghan policy more intelligible, nor remove the disadvantages
from our position. On the contrary, the utterance was most misleading
since no such contingency, as the construction of Russian railways in
Afghanistan itself, is likely to occur until Russia is prepared to
strike with all her strength in Persia and Afghanistan. The question of
Anglo-Afghan relations, therefore, remains for solution, having given
rise to a situation which was regarded by the late Viceroy and every
member of his Council with the gravest apprehension.
[Illustration: THE WALLS OF BOKHARA]
[44] Funeral service.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
NAMES OF STATIONS ON THE ORENBURG-TASHKENT
RAILWAY
Name of Station and distance from Orenburg.
(1) Orenburg
(2) Myenovoi dvor
(3) Donguzskaya
(4) Mayatchnaya
(5) Iletsk (72 versts)
(6) Grigoryevskaya
(7) Ak Bulak
(8) Yaksha
(9) Yaisau
(10) Aksu
(11) Kara Tugai
(12) Kuraili
(13) Aktiubinsk (255 versts)
(14) Bish Mamak
(15) Tamdi
(16) Akkemir
(17) Kandagatch
(18) Temirskaya
(19) Ker
(20) Kuduk
(21) Emba
(22) Kirghizskaya
(23) Mugodjarskaya (400 versts)
(24) Rodniki
(25) Karaganda
(26) Kauldjir
(27) Solenaya
(28) Ulpan
(29) Tchelkar
(30) Biriuk
(31) Djilan
(32) Tuguz
(33) Kara-Tchokat
(34) Altin
(35) Saksaoulskaya
(36) Kontu
(37) Arabskoye Morye (790 v’sts)
(38) Sappak
(39) Andreevskaya
(40) Kamyshli Bash
(41) Bik Bauli
(42) Kazalinsk (942 versts)
(43) Bashkara
(44) Mai Libash (978 versts)
(45) Ak Suat
(46) Turatan
(47) Durmen Tubeh
(48) Khor Khut
(49) Karmakchi (1108 versts)
(50) Kizyl Tam
(51) Kara Ketkeu
(52) Ak-Su
(53) Teren Uzyak
(54) Kara Uzyak
(55) Perovski (1246 versts)
(56) Ber Kazau
(57) Solo Tubeh
(58) Tar Tugai
(59) Djulek (1343 versts)
(60) Skobelevo (1367 versts)
(61) Tumen Arik (1394 versts)
(62) Yani Kurgau
(63) Ak Kum
(64) Sauran
(65) Tchornak
(66) Turkestan (1514 versts)
(67) Ikan (1543 versts)
(68) Otrar (1558 versts)
(69) Kara Kungur
(70) Aris (1570 versts)
(71) Kabul Sai
(72) Uzun Sai
(73) Tchanak
(74) Sari Agatch
(75) Djilga
(76) Darbaza
(77) Keless (1740 versts)
(78) Tashkent (1762 versts)
APPENDIX II--(A)
LIST OF STATIONS FROM TASHKENT TO MERV, WITH
DISTANCES FROM KRASNOVODSK AND TASHKENT
Distance from Distance from
Name of Station. Krasnovodsk. Tashkent.
Versts. Versts.
(1) Tashkent 1747
(2) Kauffmanskaya 1721 26
(3) Vrevskaya 1698 51
(4) Syr-Darinskaya 1672 75
(5) Golodnaya Steppe 1637 110
(6) Chernaievo 1605 142
(7) Obrutchevo 1557 190
(8) Lomakino 1548 199
(9) Jizak 1522 225
(10) Milyutinskaya 1498 249
(11) Kuropatkino 1473 274
(12) Rostovtsevo 1445 302
(13) Samarkand 1415 332
(14) Djuma 1394 353
(15) Nagornaya 1365 382
(16) Katta-Kurgan 1343 404
(17) Zirabulak 1316 431
(18) Ziadin 1291 446
(19) Kermine 1269 478
(20) Malik 1243 504
(21) Kizil-Teppe 1223 524
(22) Kuyu-Mazar 1206 541
(23) Kagan 1182 565
(24) Murgak 1160 587
(25) Yakatut 1142 605
(26) Kara-Kul 1117 630
(27) Khodja-Davlet 1098 649
(28) Farab 1078 669
(29) Charjui 1070 677
(30) Barkhani 1038 709
(31) Karaul-Kuyu 1020 727
(32) Repetek 1003 744
(33) Pesski 970 777
(34) Utch-Adja 954 793
(35) Ravnina 924 823
(36) Annenkovo 904 843
(37) Kurban-Kala 885 862
(38) Bairam-Ali 869 878
(39) Merv 842 905
APPENDIX II--(B)
MURGHAB VALLEY RAILWAY
LIST OF STATIONS FROM MERV TO KUSHKINSKI POST
WITH DISTANCES FROM KRASNOVODSK AND MERV
Height above Distance from Distance from
Station. Caspian Sea. Merv. Krasnovodsk.
Sagenes. Versts. Versts.
Merv 118.01 -- 842
Talkhatan Baba 127.06 37 879
Yulatan 134.16 56 898
Sultan-i-Band 139.55 76 918
Imam Baba 148.60 120 962
Sari Yazi 155.57 157 999
Tash Kepri 164.00 197 1039
Kala-i-Mor 202.07 244 1086
Kushkinski Post 303.04 293 1135
APPENDIX III
_Kishlak_, a village of sedentary Turcomans, as opposed to _Aoul_,
the nomad village.
_Mekteb_, the lower-class Mussulman elementary school.
_Medresse_, university of a theological order.
_Arik_, canal or channel diverted from river for irrigation purposes.
TABLE OF MEASUREMENTS
1 _sagene_ = 7 ft.
1 _dessiatine_ (= 2400 _sq. sagenes_) = 432 sq. roods (2.70 acres)
1 _square sagene_ = 49 sq. ft.
1 _arshine_ = .77 yard (2.33 ft.)
1 _vershok_ = 1.75 in.
A _dessiatine_ (land measure) is a parallelogram having a length of
80 sagenes and a breadth of 30 sagenes, or it may be 40 by 60
sagenes, therefore the dessiatine is 2400 square sagenes, or
21,600 square arshines.
1 _verst_ = ⅔ of an English mile.
APPENDIX IV
THE TREATY OF GANDAMAK
Treaty between the British Government and his Highness Mahommed Yakub
Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak
on the 26th May, 1879, by his Highness the Amir Mahommed Yakub Khan
on his own part and on the part of the British Government by Major
(afterwards Sir Louis) P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I.
(1) From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the
present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship
between the British Government on the one part and his
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his
successors, on the other.
(2) His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies
engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to
publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects
from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces
during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of
whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that
account.
(3) His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies
agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in
accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government.
His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with
Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign
State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On
these conditions the British Government will support the Amir
against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops,
to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government
may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any
time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign
aggression, they will return to their stations in British
territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been
accomplished.
(4) With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate
relations now established between the British Government and his
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection
of the frontiers of his Highness’s dominion, it is agreed that
a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable
escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and
dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall
have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts
to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered
necessary by the British Government in the interests of both
States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an
Agent to reside at the Court of his Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British
India as may be similarly agreed upon.
(5) His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies
guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of
British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British
Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never
in any way interfere with the internal administration of his
Highness’s dominions.
(6) His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies
undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer
no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within
his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the
British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as
may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two
Governments.
(7) In order that the passage of trade between the territories
of the British Government and of his Highness the Amir of
Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, his Highness the Amir
of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the
protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods
along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These
roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the
two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general
convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as
may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements
made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads,
for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise
carried over these roads, and for the general protection and
development of trade with and through the dominions of his
Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be
concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state
of the country.
(8) With a view to facilitate communications between the allied
Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial
relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that
a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed
by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of
Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the protection of
this telegraph line.
(9) In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance
between the two States which has been attested and secured by
the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to
his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the
towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad with all the territory now in
possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of
Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan
and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of
Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined
in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection
and administrative control of the British Government: that is
to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned
districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed
from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these
districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration,
shall be paid to his Highness the Amir.
The British Government will retain in its own hands the
control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the
Peshawar and Jelalabad districts, and of all relations with the
independent tribes of the territory directly connected with
these passes.
(10) For the further support of his Highness the Amir in the
recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in
consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety
of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the
British Government agrees to pay to his Highness the Amir and to
his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.
Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with
the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani, 1296 A.H.
AMIR MAHOMMED YAKUB KHAN.
N. CAVAGNARI, _Major_.
_Letter, dated June 14, 1880, from_ MR. (_afterwards_ SIR LEPEL)
GRIFFIN _to_ ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN.
(After compliments.)
“I am commanded to convey to you the replies of the
Government of India to the questions you have asked.
“_First_, with regard to the position of the ruler of
Kabul in relation to Foreign Powers. Since the British
Government admit no right of interference by Foreign
Powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia
are pledged to abstain from all political interference
with Afghan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can
have no political relations with any Foreign Power except
the English: and if any such Foreign Power should attempt
to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference
should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler,
then the British Government will be prepared to aid him,
if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follows the
advice of the British Government in regard to his external
relations.
“_Secondly_, with regard to limits of territory, I am
directed to say that the whole province of Kandahar has
been placed under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi,
which are retained in British possession. Consequently,
the Government is not able to enter into any negotiations
with you on these points, nor in respect to arrangements
with regard to the north-west frontier, which were
concluded with the ex-Amir Mahommed Yakub Khan. With these
reservations, the British Government are willing that you
should establish over Afghanistan (including Herat, the
possession of which cannot be guaranteed to you, though
the Government are not disposed to hinder measures which
you may take to obtain possession of it) as complete and
extensive authority as has hitherto been exercised by any
Amir of your family. The British Government desires to
exercise no interference in the internal affairs of these
territories, nor will you be required to admit an English
Resident anywhere; although, for convenience of ordinary
and friendly intercourse between two adjoining States, it
may be advisable to station by agreement a Mahommedan agent
of the British Government at Kabul.”
_From_ AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN _to_ MR. GRIFFIN, _dated
June 22, 1880_.
(After compliments.)
“Regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan which were settled
by treaty with my most noble and respected grandfather,
Amir Dost Muhammad, these you have granted to me. And the
Envoy which you have appointed in Afghanistan you have
dispensed with, but what you have left to (be settled
according to) my wish is, that I may keep a Mussulman
Ambassador, if I please. This was my desire and that of my
people, and this you have kindly granted.
“About my friendly relations and communication with Foreign
Powers, you have written that I should not have any without
advice and consultation with you (the British). You should
consider well that if I have the friendship of a great
Government like yours, how can I communicate with another
Power without advice from and consultation with you? I
agree to this also.
“You have also kindly written that should any unwarranted
(improper) attack be made by any other Power on
Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford me
assistance; and you will not permit any other person to
take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also
is my desire, which you have kindly granted.
“As to what you have written about Herat. Herat is at
present in the possession of my cousin. So long as he does
not oppose me, and remains friendly with me, it is better
that I should leave my cousin in Herat, rather than any
other man. Should he oppose me, and not listen to my words
(advice) or those of my people, I will afterwards let you
know. Everything shall be done as we both deem it expedient
and advisable.
“All the kindness you have shown is for my welfare and that
of my people: how should I not accept it? You have shown
very great kindness to me and my people.”
_Letter from_ MR. GRIFFIN _to_ AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN,
_dated “July 1880_.”[45]
(After compliments.)
“His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council
has learnt with pleasure that your Highness has proceeded
toward Kabul, in accordance with the invitation of the
British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the
friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and
of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and people
from the establishment of a settled government under your
Highness’s authority, the British Government recognises
your Highness as Amir of Kabul.
“I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India, to inform your Highness that
the British Government has no desire to interfere in the
internal government of the territories in the possession
of your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident
should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For
the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such
as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be
advisable that a Mahommedan Agent of the British Government
should reside, by agreement, at Kabul.
“Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions
of the British Government with regard to the position of
the ruler at Kabul in relation to Foreign Powers should
be placed on record for your Highness’s information. The
Viceroy and Governor-General in Council authorises me to
declare to you that since the British Government admits no
right of interference by Foreign Powers within Afghanistan,
and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain
from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it
is plain that your Highness can have no political relations
with any Foreign Power except with the British Government.
If any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere in
Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to
unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness,
in that event the British Government would be prepared to
aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to
the British Government necessary, in repelling it; provided
that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the
British Government in regard to your external relations.”
_Letter from the_ VICEROY OF INDIA (MARQUIS OF RIPON)
_to the_ AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN.
(After compliments.)
“SIMLA, _June 16, 1883_.
“Your Highness will remember that, at Sir Lepel Griffin’s
interview with you at Zimma on July 31, 1880, he said
that the Government of India could only start your
administration by giving you a grant to pay your army and
officials and your immediate expenses; and that, having
recognised you as Amir, it was anxious to see you strong;
but after you had taken possession of Kabul, you must rely
on your own resources.
“I have always interested myself so much in your Highness’s
success, and have felt so great a desire for the
establishment of a strong and friendly Power under your
Highness’s auspices in Afghanistan, that I have on various
occasions gone beyond the determination then communicated
to you, and have from time to time aided your Highness
with sums of money and arms, besides devoting some lakhs a
year to the support of Afghan refugees and détenus, whose
presence in Afghanistan is, I understand, regarded by your
Highness as dangerous to your power. Still, my view of the
relations to each other of the two countries has throughout
been that, in matters of internal policy and finance, India
should not seek to interfere with Afghanistan, but should
confine herself to the part of a friendly neighbour and
ally. On these conditions, it would be in accordance with
the practice of nations that Afghanistan should regulate
her own finance and bear her own burdens, as she has always
done heretofore.
“As regards matters of external policy, your Highness was
informed in the communication from the Foreign Secretary
to the Government of India, dated July 20, 1880, and again
in my letter of February 22, 1883, that if any Foreign
Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if
such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on
the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British
Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and
in such manner as might appear to the British Government
necessary in repelling it; provided that your Highness
follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government
in regard to your external relations.
“On consideration, however, of your accounts of the
condition of your north-west frontier, I have been
satisfied that your Highness has to contend with
exceptional difficulties in that quarter. I have understood
that, owing to various untoward circumstances, your
Highness has not yet been able to reduce the important
frontier province of Herat to the orderly and secure
condition so essential for the protection of Afghanistan
as a whole; and therefore that, for the settlement of the
affairs of that frontier, some friendly assistance may be
needful to you. I further observe, with satisfaction, your
Highness’s assurances of good faith and loyalty to the
British Government; and your Highness’s language convinces
me that you realise how much it is to the interest of
Afghanistan to maintain friendly relations with the
Government of India.
“Impressed by these considerations, I have determined
to offer to your Highness personally, as an aid towards
meeting the present difficulties in the management of your
State, a subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees a year, payable
monthly, to be devoted to the payment of your troops, and
to the other measures required for the defence of your
north-western frontier. I feel that I may safely trust to
your Highness’s good faith and practised skill to devote
this addition to your resources to objects of such vital
importance as those which I have above mentioned.”
_The_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _to the_ VICEROY OF INDIA.
(Extract.)
(After compliments.)
“6th Ramazan, 1300 H. (_July 11, 1883_).
“I have announced the glad tidings of your Excellency’s
determination, which is calculated to conduce to the
well-being of the British Government and of the people of
Afghanistan, and to put in order and keep going my affairs,
to the people of Afghanistan at large, who all offered up
thanks, saying, ‘For many years we, the Afghan nation,
have been suffering from innumerable calamities. Thanks
be to God that a glorious Government like this (British
Government) has befriended us.’
“God willing, the people of Afghanistan will never allow
their heads to swerve from the line of friendship to the
illustrious British Government, and so long as I live I
will not think of making friends with any one but with
the illustrious British Government. I have offered my
prayers to God for the (increased) glory of that powerful
Government.”
_The_ AMIR’S _Speech at the Rawal Pindi Durbar_.
At the great Durbar held by Lord Dufferin on April 8, 1885, the Amir
Abdur Rahman spoke as follows:
“In return for this kindness and favour I am ready with my
arms and people to render any services that may be required
of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British Government
has declared that it will assist me in repelling any
foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan
should unite in the firmest manner and stand side by side
with the British Government.”
_Letter from_ SIR MORTIMER DURAND _to_ ABDUR RAHMAN,
_dated Kabul, November 11, 1893_.
(After compliments.)
“When your Highness came to the throne of Afghanistan, Sir
Lepel Griffin was instructed to give you the assurance
that, if any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere
in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to
unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in
that event the British Government would be prepared to aid
you to such extent and in such manner as might appear to
the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided
that your Highness followed unreservedly the advice of the
British Government in regard to your external relations.
“I have the honour to inform your Highness that this
assurance remains in force, and that it is applicable with
regard to any territory which may come into your possession
in consequence of the agreement which you have made with me
to-day in the matter of the Oxus frontier.
“It is the desire of the British Government that such
portion of the northern frontier of Afghanistan as has not
yet been marked out should now be clearly defined; when
this has been done, the whole of your Highness’s frontier
towards the side of Russia will be equally free from doubt
and equally secure.”
_Agreement signed at Kabul on November 12, 1893._
Whereas the British Government has represented to his
Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for
the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 between
Russia and England by which it was decided that the river
Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan from
Lake Victoria (Wood’s Lake) or Sarikul on the east to the
junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the
British Government considers itself bound to abide by the
terms of this Agreement, if the Russian Government equally
abides by them, his Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan,
G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, wishing
to show his friendship to the British Government and his
readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his
relations with Foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will
evacuate all the districts held by him to the north of
this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that
all the districts lying to the south of this portion of
the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be handed over to
him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
hereby declares on the part of the British Government that
the transfer to his Highness the Amir of the said districts
lying to the south of the Oxus is an essential part of this
transaction, and undertakes that arrangements will be made
with the Russian Government to carry out the transfer of
the said lands to the north and south of the Oxus.
H. M. DURAND.
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN.
KABUL, _November 12, 1893_.
_Agreement between_ AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., _and_
SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the
frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas
both his Highness the Amir and the Government of India
are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly
understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective
spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be
no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied
Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:
(1) The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness’s
dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow
the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.
(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise
interference in the territories lying beyond this line on
the side of Afghanistan, and his Highness the Amir will
at no time exercise interference in the territories lying
beyond this line on the side of India.
(3) The British Government thus agrees to his Highness
the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far
as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that
he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur,
or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The
British Government also agrees to leave to his Highness the
Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to
his Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the
Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes
his claim to Chageh.
(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in
detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable
and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners,
whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at
a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible
exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this
agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights
of villages adjoining the frontier.
(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir
withdraws his objection to the new British cantonment and
concedes to the British Government the rights purchased
by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the
frontier the line will be drawn as follows:
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha
Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line
will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman
and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass
half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan
outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line
will then pass half-way between the railway station
and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning
southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range,
leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the
road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in
Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise
any interference within half a mile of the road.
(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government
of India and his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and
satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion
which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both
the Government of India and his Highness the Amir undertake that any
differences of detail, such as those which will have to be
considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the
boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to
remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and
misunderstanding between the two Governments.
(7) Being fully satisfied of his Highness’s goodwill to the British
Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong,
the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and
import by his Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves
grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their
sense of the friendly spirit in which his Highness the Amir has
entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake
to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy
of twelve lakhs now granted to his Highness.
H. M. DURAND.
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN.
KABUL, _November 12, 1893_.
And on March 11, 1895, the following Agreement between the Governments
of Great Britain and Russia, with regard to the spheres of influence
of the two countries in the region of the Pamirs, and concerning the
position of Afghanistan in that region, was drawn up:
(1) The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to
the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) shall be divided by a
line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its
eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain
range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the
lake as far as the Bendersky and Orta Bel Passes.
From thence the line shall run along the same range while
it remains to the south of the latitude of the said lake.
On reaching that latitude, it shall descend a spur of
the range towards Kizil Rabat on the Aksu river, if that
locality is found not to be north of the latitude of Lake
Victoria, and from thence it shall be prolonged, in an
easterly direction, so as to meet the Chinese frontier.
If it should be found that Kizil Rabat is situated to
the north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of
demarcation shall be drawn to the nearest convenient point
on the Aksu river, south of that latitude, and from thence
prolonged as aforesaid.
(2) The line shall be marked out, and its precise
configuration shall be settled, by a Joint Commission of
a purely technical character, with a military escort not
exceeding that which is strictly necessary for its proper
protection.
The Commission shall be composed of British and Russian
delegates, with the necessary technical assistance.
Her Britannic Majesty’s Government will arrange with the
Amir of Afghanistan as to the manner in which his Highness
shall be represented on the Commission.
(3) The Commission shall also be charged to report any
facts which can be ascertained on the spot bearing on the
situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable
the two Governments to come to an agreement with the
Chinese Government as to the limits of Chinese territory in
the vicinity of the line, in such manner as may be found
most convenient.
(4) Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government
of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from
exercising any political influence or control, the former
to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of
demarcation.
(5) Her Britannic Majesty’s Government engage that the
territory lying within the British sphere of influence
between the Hindu Kush, and the line running from the east
end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier, shall form
part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan, that it
shall not be annexed to Great Britain, and that no military
posts or forts shall be established in it.
The execution of this agreement is contingent upon
the evacuation by the Amir of Afghanistan of all the
territories now occupied by his Highness on the right
bank of the Panjah, and on the evacuation by the Amir of
Bokhara of the portion of Darwaz which lies to the south
of the Oxus, in regard to which her Britannic Majesty’s
Government, and the Government of his Majesty the Emperor
of Russia, have agreed to use their influence respectively
with the two Amirs.
Agreement for laying down the Afghan Boundary from the Hindu Kush Range
to Nawa Kotal; and confirmed by his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan on
December 19, 1895.
AGREEMENT _dated Camp Nashagam, April 9, 1895
= 13th Shawal, 1312_
Forasmuch as, under Article (4) of the Convention concluded
at Kabul on November 12, 1893, between his Highness the
Amir of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand on behalf
of the Government of India, we the undersigned have been
appointed by our respective Governments for the purpose of
demarcating in concert the frontier of his Highness the
Amir’s dominions on the side of India in this neighbourhood
of Chitrar and Bajaur, it is hereby agreed as follows:
(1) That on the western side of the Kunar River, this
frontier will be the further or eastern watershed of the
stream which in the idiom of Afghans is notorious and known
as the Landai Sin pertaining to the limits of Kafiristan,
and which in the survey map is also written by the name
of Bashgal, so that all the country of which the drainage
falls into the Kunar River by means of this stream belongs,
and will belong, to Afghanistan, and the eastern drainage
of this watershed, which does not fall into the Landai Sin
stream, pertains to Chitrar.
(2) That on the eastern side of the Kunar River, from the
river bank up to the crest of the main range which forms
the watershed between the Kunar River and the country
(_lit._ direction) of Barawal and Bajaur, this frontier
follows the southern watershed of the Arnawai stream, which
falls into the Kunar River close to the village of Arnawai,
leaving to Chitrar all the country of which the drainage
falls into the Kunar River, by means of this stream, while
the southern drainage of this last-mentioned watershed,
which does not fall into the Arnawai stream, pertains to
Afghanistan.
(3) That this frontier line, on reaching the crest of
the main range, which in this neighbourhood forms the
watershed between the Kunar River and the country (_lit._
direction) of Barawal and Bajaur, turns southward along
this watershed, which it follows as far as a point in
the neighbourhood of the Nawa Kotal, leaving all the
country draining into the Kunar River within the limits of
Afghanistan, and all the country draining towards Barawal
and Bajaur outside the limits of Afghanistan; but beyond
the aforesaid point in the neighbourhood of the Nawa Kotal
the frontier has not at present been demarcated.
(4) That on both sides of the Kunar River this frontier,
as described in the three preceding articles, for the most
part requires no artificial demarcation, because it is a
natural boundary following the crests of mountain ranges;
but since, at present, inspection _in situ_ is impossible,
when the ground is examined on the spot, it is probable
that in the places where these mountain ranges abut on
the Kunar River from either side, demarcation by pillars
for a short distance from the water’s edge on both sides
of the river will be found desirable for the purpose
of separating the boundary of Afghanistan from Arnawai
pertaining to Chitrar and the limits of the Kafir country
(_lit._ Kafiristan) of the Landai Sin from Chitrar. In that
case these pillars will be erected along the line of the
watershed described in the first and second articles of
the present agreement, subject to any slight divergencies
from this line which may be necessary to protect the local
rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
(5) That the frontier pillars, wherever considered
desirable, will be erected hereafter by an officer of the
Government of India and an officer of his Highness the Amir
acting in concert.
(6) That these watersheds, forming the frontier agreed upon
as described in the first three articles of the present
agreement, have been marked by a red line on the survey
map attached to this agreement, which, like the agreement
itself, has been signed by us both. In three places--viz.
(i) for a short distance from either bank of the Kunar
River; (ii) in the neighbourhood of the Binshi Kotal; and
(iii) in the neighbourhood of the Frepaman Kotal--this
red line has been broken up into dots, because the exact
position of the watershed in these localities has not
been ascertained with perfect accuracy; but wherever the
watershed may lie the frontier will follow it, subject
only to any slight variations from the watershed which may
be considered necessary under Article (4) of the present
agreement.
(7) That, since on the map attached to the Convention the
Arnawai stream was drawn on the western side of the river
in the place of the Landai Sin of the Kafir country (_lit._
Kafiristan), which has been decided to pertain to the
Afghan Government, and, since after inquiry and inspection
of the same it was clearly ascertained by the survey party
that the aforesaid stream is situated on the eastern side
of the Kunar River, and falls into the river near the
village of Arnawai, and that the drawing of it on the
western side (of the river) in the place of the Landai Sin
was a mistake, this Arnawai stream has (now) been drawn and
marked on the present survey map in its own proper place,
and that stream, which was drawn in the Convention map on
the western side of the river, was the Landai Sin stream of
the Kafir country (_lit._ Kafiristan), which has now been
decided to pertain to the Government of Afghanistan and to
be included in the limits of Afghanistan. Accordingly, in
the present survey map it has been marked with the name
of Landai Sin and has also been written with the name of
Bashgal. Moreover, Sao and Nari and Birkot, and the village
of Arnawai, were not written on the map attached to the
Convention, (but) now in the new survey map the names of
all these four above-mentioned villages have been entered,
the village of Arnawai being written on the Chitrar side of
the boundary line, and Sao, Nari, and Birkot on the side of
the Government of Afghanistan.
(_Signed_) R. UDNY.
(_Signed_) GHULAM HAIDAR KHAN, _Sipah Salar_.
_Letter from_ SIR RICHARD UDNY, K.C.S.I., _Commissioner of Peshawar,
to_ ABDUR RAHMAN, _in respect of occurrences on August 7, 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I have received instructions by telegram from his
Excellency the Viceroy to inform your Highness that the
Government of India have received information from several
sources that large numbers of Afghan subjects have joined
the Mullah of Adda and taken an active part in the recent
attack on the British frontier post of Shabkaddar and
the burning of the British village of Shankargarh. It is
reported that, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted
on the Mullah’s gathering by the Border Military Police
holding the Shabkaddar post on the 7th August, and by
British troops on the 9th August, he is still being joined
by large parties of men from all parts of the Jelalabad
Valley, and that the villages of Chardeh, Ambarkhana,
Basawal, Girdi, Sarkani, and Lalpura are keeping rafts
ready for the passage of the various contingents. It has
also been stated that numbers of Afghan sepoys in plain
clothes and Ut Khels from Laughman have joined the Mullah.
It is unnecessary for the Viceroy to dilate upon the
seriousness of this information. His Excellency demands
that you will immediately take steps to recall your
subjects, prevent others from crossing your Highness’s
border with hostile intent, and render it impossible for
them to repeat an offence so exceedingly grave as this
deliberate violation of the British Indian frontier.
The Viceroy in his letter of May 2, 1896, called your
Highness’s attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah
Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan. It is impossible that Afghan
sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge
of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn
your Highness that if you do not control the Sipah Salar,
or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, your
Highness must be held responsible for his actions. For the
rest, may you continue to enjoy good health.
“_Dated August 13, 1897_.”
_Letter from the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _to the_ COMMISSIONER AND
SUPERINTENDENT, _Peshawar Division, dated Wednesday, 18th
Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H. = 18th August 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I received and perused your letter of the 13th August 1897
= 13th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H.
“I read your letter in order to acquaint myself with the
circumstances concerning Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan and
the people under the jurisdiction of Jelalabad about which
you have written. I now write to say that, as regards Sipah
Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan and the regular Afghan army, not
a single man is or will be with the followers of Mullah
Najm-ud-din, and hereafter, too, none will accompany him.
As regards tribesmen you know yourself that for fear of me
they can never openly join such a movement; if any one has
come, he must have gone secretly. You are aware yourself
that a few years ago Mullah Najm-ud-din fled from Kabul
and settled at Jarobi in the Peshawar district, that the
trusted officers of the British Government summoned him to
their presence on several occasions, and, though he did
not attend on them, he was keeping up correspondence with
them and had fled from my country. On account of the evil
acts he had committed, and the many disturbances which he
had created among the people, he was so much frightened at
his own misdeeds that he took refuge near Peshawar. The
Mohmands and the people of Jelalabad and of the mountain
districts of Jelalabad look upon him as their prophet,
and at his bidding and the bidding of the Mullah of Manki
thousands of men are their devoted disciples. Just as in
old days in Europe the Popes used to profess to be the sole
disposers of heaven and hell, and the people also accepted
the word of worthless priests, so, too, these Mullahs
claim to possess the same power; and during these last few
years they have stirred up my own Afghan subjects to rebel
against me, so that in every rising, whether at Kandahar or
in the case of Mullah Mushk-i-Alam or in the case of the
Uzbeg Mullahs who joined Ishak in Balkh, it was the Mullahs
on every occasion who created the disturbance. There is a
village called Hadda, which is inhabited by Chumars, or
leather-tanners, but because it is the residence of this
mischievous Mullah Najm-ud-din, his disciples have named
this impure village Hadda Sharif, that is to say, Hadda
the noble, and his pupils and disciples regard him as a
prophet. What calamities are there that they have not
suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed
by his senseless commands? He has now taken up his abode
in a country which is independent of Kabul and in the
neighbourhood of Peshawar, and has made himself a notable
personage. Under these circumstances, let the trusted
officers of the British Government themselves look at the
matter impartially and say in what way I could deal with
him, and how am I to arrange for him and his disciples,
who regard him as a prophet and gather round him secretly?
Every Mullah for many years denounced me in various ways
as a Kafir, and at their bidding their disciples fought
against me, and their houses were destroyed and they
themselves were killed. For fourteen years they raised
every part of Afghanistan against me, both in the plain
country and in the hills, till thousands of men perished on
both sides, and several of the Mullah agitators themselves
were killed with thousands of the disciples of these
turbulent priests. Every Mullah raised the people against
me as long as he could, and when he had failed he used to
take shelter within the limits of the British Government,
and, by the magnanimity of that Government, a morsel of
bread used to be given him, upon which these Mullahs used
to maintain themselves. These now are the very same Mullahs
who have fled from me and have settled in territory which
is independent of me near Peshawar. In what way, then,
can I manage them? As regards the Sipah Salar and the
regular army, you may rest assured that no such hostile
act shall ever be committed by them, but as it has been
or may have been reported to you that the regular army or
the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan is taking part in this
disturbance, this is all a fabrication, and I myself take
oath that neither the troops nor the trusted officers of
Afghanistan have any part in this matter. Every word that
may have reached the ears of the trusted officers of the
British Government is without foundation. On account of the
proximity to you of these Mullahs who are close to your
country, and have now according to the boundary demarcation
fallen within the limits of the British Government, what
more can I add in this matter to these arguments? For the
rest, by the grace of God, all is well. May the days of
honour be perpetual.”
_From_ HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _and its Dependencies
to the Address of_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, _dated the 19th
Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H., corresponding to the 19th August 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have
received a friendly letter from Mr. R. Udny, Commissioner,
Peshawar, dated the 13th August 1897 (corresponding to the
13th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H.).
“When I received the Commissioner’s letter, I wrote in
reply to him giving true particulars, and writing them to
him in a very sincere and friendly manner....
“If the false utterances and fabricated reports of
self-interested persons be investigated in a friendly
manner, God be pleased, the relations of union and
friendship between these two Governments will always be
considerably strengthened.
“Further, I have to state that I have secured a letter,
written by Mullah Najm-ud-din (of Hadda), which he has
issued as a notification to the people of Ningrahar, and
which is one of the letters of a similar kind which he has
sent to tribesmen in other parts of the country. I send
the original letter of notification issued by the Mullah
in a separate envelope, which is closed and bears on it
my handwriting, enclosed in this friendly letter to your
Excellency. My kind friend, no doubt he has sent such
letters, perhaps hundreds of them, to his disciples among
the tribesmen in Afghanistan. The people also regard him
as holding the position of their Prophet. Such are the
particulars of the Mullah and his disciples.”
_From_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
_to_ HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
_dated Simla, August 30, 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“It gave me pleasure to read the letter of your Highness to
the Commissioner of Peshawar, dated the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal,
1315 H. corresponding to the 18th August 1897. The denial
which your Highness has clearly expressed therein, of any
complicity on the part of your Highness’s officials and
sepoys of the regular army, was made in a still more marked
manner by the public utterances of your Highness at the
Durbar held on the previous day. Your Highness may rest
assured that I should not have suggested the possibility
of so grave a breach of the relations that must subsist
between friendly allies had I not had reason to think that
the complaints made to me were well founded. That your
Highness has taken thus early the opportunity to make
public an emphatic repudiation, on behalf of yourself and
your officials, of any complicity with the actions of the
Mullahs, who have been stirring up strife on the borders
of India, justifies the hope that the charges made can be
disproved, and that for the future no doubt will arise of
the loyalty of your Highness’s subjects and servants to the
alliance with the British Government which your Highness
has again so openly professed.
“It is right that I should tell your Highness the
information which I have received which indicates that
tribesmen from your Highness’s territories have joined the
Mullah of Hadda, and have, in other respects, committed
aggression against the British Government. Bodies of men
from Jelalabad district crossed the Kabul River openly
with flags flying and drums beating. After the fight at
Shabkaddar they returned in the same manner, carrying
their dead and helping their wounded. On the side of Khost
numbers of camels stolen from my troops in Dawar have been
taken across the border, and it is even reported that
these camels have been ordered to be collected by Sirdar
Sherindil Khan. Your Highness will no doubt recognise the
propriety of directing the restoration of camels belonging
to the Government of India, which have been stolen and
carried into Afghan territory.
“Your Highness has said that ‘tribesmen can never join such
a movement openly for fear of me. If any one has come he
must have gone secretly.’ What I now ask your Highness, in
accordance with those assurances of friendship which you
have so readily made, is that you will publicly announce
to the tribesmen through your local officers that, if they
cross the border and join in disturbances against the
British Government, they will incur your displeasure. The
belief is entertained by many misguided persons that they
will not incur your Highness’s displeasure by acting in a
hostile manner against the British Government, and this
belief can be dispelled if your Highness’s local officers
will keep watch along the Kabul River and at other places
in order to prevent your Highness’s subjects from crossing
the frontier with hostile intentions, whether secretly or
openly. I ask your Highness, therefore, to issue orders to
this effect.
“I mention, for your Highness’s information, the following
facts regarding the disturbances that have arisen among
the tribes. These disturbances were wholly unprovoked and
cannot be tolerated. I detailed a force of troops to punish
the tribesmen concerned in the attack upon Malakand and
Chakdarra. This force has visited the Upper Swat Valley and
received the submission of the tribesmen there.
“The circumstances of the Afridis are these; they have
been stirred up to break their engagements of many years’
standing with the British Government and to display
hostility. The men who are responsible for this are Mullah
Said Akbar, Aka Khel, and Mir Bashir, Malikdin Khel. Some
of the Afridi tribe in the Khyber have remained true to
their engagements, but they were unable to resist the
attack of the rest of the tribe. The posts have been
burned, and the road is now undefended and closed to the
passage of kafilas. In the present state of the frontier,
the carriage of valuable goods, and especially of warlike
stores, must necessarily be for the time discontinued.
“I shall deal with the Afridis and any other tribe which
attacks the British border or British posts in a manner to
make clear the supremacy of the British Government. I am
glad to learn that your Highness in Durbar characterised
as false and unfounded the story concocted by designing
persons that the troops assembled at Peshawar were intended
for an attack on Kabul. Your Highness is well aware
that, so long as your Highness on your part observes the
obligations you have undertaken to the Government of India,
the Government of India will honourably adhere to its
promise of supporting your Highness’s Government.”
From HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _and its Dependencies
to the address of_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, _dated 12th
Rabi-us-Sani, 1315 H., corresponding to the 10th September 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I have received your Excellency’s friendly letter, dated
the 30th August 1897, and understood the contents.
“As regards the report which your Excellency had received
to the effect that my subjects had openly collected
together and, forming themselves into separate bands, with
flags flying and drums beating, crossed the Kabul River
and joined Mullah Hadda’s party; that after the fight at
Shabkaddar they returned to their places carrying their
dead and helping their wounded; and as to your Excellency
asking me to order my local officers to prevent my subjects
from crossing the frontier and joining Mullah Hadda with
hostile intentions against the British Government, and
even to appoint guards along the Kabul River and at other
places, to prevent them from crossing, my dear friend,
after your Excellency wrote to me, such a thing has not
occurred, viz., that Afghan subjects openly collected in
such bands and crossed the frontier with flags flying. The
true state of affairs has been what I have communicated to
your Excellency in my former letter, _i.e_., that Mullah
Najm-ud-din, an inhabitant of Jarobi, having spread the net
of his cunning, has made numerous people from the different
Afghan tribes his disciples, and they obey his orders to
the utmost extent. During these times, when he became the
source of mischief and disturbances, he has sent letters
in every direction, and invites all people to join him.
I had secured one of his letters, which I sent for your
Excellency’s perusal, and which your Excellency must have
received some time ago.
“I have ordered the local officers to keep watch on
Afghan subjects to the best of their ability, and prevent
them from joining Mullah Hadda. Thus the inhabitants of
Lamkan (Laughman) had collected a large number of people,
numbering about 30,000 men, and prepared flags; but on
the officers receiving my orders, they used their best
endeavours and succeeded in dispersing them; and they all
returned to their homes. No doubt the news-writers on
the frontier must have communicated this report to your
Excellency.
“No tribesmen from my territories can do such an act in
an open manner. Some of them, however, have great faith
in Mullah Hadda, and it is possible that they may have
joined him during the night, travelling like thieves by
unfrequented roads. How is it possible to keep watch on
thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier?
“Your Excellency writes that guards should be appointed
along the Kabul River and on other roads, so that no one
might be allowed to cross over to the other side.
“My kind friend, such an arrangement could only be possible
by posting about ten thousand soldiers on all the mountain
tops and at all the fords in that district. Then they
will be able to execute properly such an arrangement,
otherwise how would it be possible to stop the people who
are familiar with the country? If the well-known roads be
guarded against them, they can, owing to their knowledge of
the country, find paths, over mountains and through desert
tracts, to cross the frontier. As far as possible, however,
the local officials have been watching and will watch any
open movements of the tribesmen.
“As regards the dead and the wounded whom your Excellency
writes that the tribesmen carried away with them after
the fight at Shabkaddar, I beg to state that, if they
have brought back their dead secretly, they have already,
according to their custom, buried them, and now no trace
can be obtained of them. As to the wounded, if questions be
asked, they explain that they are always engaged in tribal
feuds with one another, and they often kill and wound one
another, and that the wounded men have received their
wounds in such tribal feuds; and, as the witnesses belong
to the people concerned, it is difficult to prove anything
contrary to what they allege.
“Your Excellency has kindly informed me that the
disturbances which have broken out on the frontiers of
India have been wholly unprovoked; that a force of troops
was detailed to punish the tribesmen concerned in the
attack upon Malakand and Chakdarra; that the force visited
the Upper Swat Valley and received the submission of the
tribesmen there; that the Afridis, who have had engagements
for many years’ standing with the British Government, have
been stirred to hostility; that the men who are responsible
for this were Mullah Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, and Mir
Bashir, Malikdin Khel; that they have burned some of the
posts in the Khyber; that the road was undefended and
closed to the passage of kafilas; that in the present state
the carriage of valuable goods, and especially of warlike
stores, must necessarily be for the time discontinued;
and that the Afridis and other tribes, who have attacked
British Government posts, would be dealt with in a manner
to make clear the supremacy of the British Government.
“I have understood the facts of the circumstances which
your Excellency has detailed, and I feel certain that
the tribesmen, who have stirred up disturbances and who,
without possessing any warlike materials and appliances,
commenced hostilities against the Government, will be put
to flight and dispersed.
“I saw some of these people, and asked them by way of
advice why they were disobeying the illustrious British
Government, and exposing themselves to slaughter and
loss. They said that their proceedings were undertaken
owing to the hopeless circumstances in which they were
involved, and they gave the particulars as stated below,
_i.e_., that during former years a firm promise was given,
on behalf of the illustrious British Government, to the
frontier tribesmen that they would always be exempted from
the restrictions of Government laws, and would remain
independent in their own country; that when they received
such orders from the great Government, they lived with
perfect assurance of mind, and never paid any taxes to any
one; that subsequently the frontier British officials,
disregarding the orders of the Government of India issued
to them (tribesmen), began to make roads in their country,
and subsequently asked them for revenue and inflicted
fines, &c., upon them and generally treated them in the
same way as the old inhabitants of India were treated.
“That the people inhabiting hilly tracts are generally
poor and possess no property; that they have, therefore,
exposed themselves to destruction, and they desire that
the frontier officials should act in accordance with the
promise which the Government of India had given them.
“I then asked them to produce any Government ‘Sanad’ in
support of their statements, and they produced several
printed notifications, declaring the independence of those
tribesmen, issued by the Exalted Government of India.
“As I have heard the above-mentioned particulars from some
of the said tribesmen, and as I saw the notifications also
which they had in their possession, I have communicated
the above as a piece of information to your Excellency.
Apparently the complaints of these people are against the
local frontier officers of India. It is possible that your
Excellency may have received similar accounts.
“Further, as to the closure of the Khyber road owing to the
instigations of the Mullahs and its remaining unprotected,
your Excellency has informed me about the causes which
have led to the discontinuance of the carriage through the
pass of merchandise, and especially of valuable goods and
warlike stores.
“I am aware that those independent tribesmen do plunder.
Thus, some time ago Sartip Muhammad Hosein, stationed at
Dakka, had entrusted to the charge of the escort party
(Khyber) some packages of raisins and raw goat-skins, but
some mischievous people carried off the above goods. There
was another kafila carrying about six lakhs of rupees,
belonging to merchants, which subsequently reached Dakka;
but the money was called back from Dakka.
“I have, therefore, arranged that any articles which may
be required to be despatched urgently should be sent by
Karachi and Kandahar, until the Khyber road is made safe
again.
“Your Excellency writes further about the story concocted
by designing persons that the troops assembled at Peshawar
were intended for an attack on Kabul, and that the
Government of India will honourably adhere to its promise
of supporting my Government. My dear friend, many men with
interested motives and foolish prattle are to be found
everywhere, and they say whatever comes to their silly
thoughts. No importance has ever been attached to the
foolish statements of such persons who only look to the
surface, and who seek to create mischief.
“Peshawar is a country which is in the possession of the
British Government, who are free to adopt any arrangements
and measures which they may like in it. In this way both
our Governments have authority to adopt measures which they
consider it necessary to take in their own territories.
Further, up to the present, no such thing has occurred
as should lead to the entertainment of such unnecessary
thoughts. Supposing such a thing were to occur, the first
step would be to ask for the cause of it from the side
where it should occur.
“If the matter were such as to require an exchange of
correspondence, correspondence would no doubt take place,
so that the cause of it might come to light. Otherwise,
why should ear be given to the foolish talk of interested
persons?
“In the same way that your Excellency has written, so
long as the British Government retain sentiments of good
friendship and union in regard to friendship and alliance
with the God-granted Government, please God, I will,
with full confidence, adhere to the friendship of the
illustrious British Government in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.
“As regards the camels which the Waziri thieves stole
from the troops in Dawar, and brought to Khost where they
sold them to the inhabitants, I have to state that Sirdar
Sherindil Khan has ordered the owners of the camels to keep
them safe. If your Excellency considers it necessary that
the camels should be taken back from them, then, as the
inhabitants of Khost have bought the camels from the Waziri
thieves, the price current in the country should be given
to them and the camels taken back, so that the people of
Khost may not suffer loss.”
_From_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
_to_ HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
_dated Simla, September 6, 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I have already, in my letter to your Highness of the 30th
August, acknowledged your Highness’s letter of the 18th
Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H., corresponding to the 18th August
1897, to the Commissioner of Peshawar, in which your
Highness has denied any complicity with the disturbances
on the frontier of India. I have now to acknowledge the
receipt of your Highness’s further friendly letter on
the same subject, dated the 19th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1315 H.,
corresponding to the 19th August 1897, which was sent by
way of Quetta in Baluchistan.
“With this letter, your Highness has sent me a copy of the
proclamation issued by the Mullah of Adda to the people
of Ningrahar. I thank your Highness for taking so much
trouble to send me this information. I had already seen
this proclamation, and I was informed that the person from
whom my copy was obtained had himself received the Mullah’s
proclamation from your Highness’s Sartip of Dakka.
“I cordially agree with what your Highness writes that ‘the
false utterances and fabricated reports of self-interested
persons’ should be investigated in a friendly manner, and
with a view to forestalling any such report which might be
made to your Highness, I write this letter to inform you
that my troops are about to enter the Mohmand country in
order to search out the Mullah of Adda and his lashkar, and
to disperse and destroy them. In the letter written by your
Highness on the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal to the commissioner of
Peshawar, your Highness has stated that Mullah Najm-ud-din
‘has now taken up his abode in a country which is
independent of Kabul and in the neighbourhood of Peshawar.’
“Your Highness has also written, ‘what more can I add in
this matter to the foregoing arguments, having regard
to the proximity to you of these Mullahs who are close
to your country and have now, according to the boundary
demarcation, fallen within the limits of the British
Government.’
“It is, no doubt, true that the Mullah has committed
hostile acts within the territory which it has been
agreed falls within the limits of the British Government,
and if my troops meet him there his punishment will be
speedily accomplished. But I am informed that the Mullah
has established his abode in the village of Jarobi, and
though, as your Highness is aware, the country is wild and
unsurveyed, and no permanent boundary pillars have been
erected, it is understood that this village probably lies
within the territory which, according to the arrangement
proposed in my letter of the 12th November 1896, would
fall within the limits of Afghanistan. Your Highness
will agree with me that this man, who has given so much
trouble to your Highness’s Government as well as to the
British Government, must not escape the punishment for his
misdeeds, and if the Mullah retires before my troops to
Jarobi, or to any place similarly situated, my troops will
be authorised to follow him up and destroy him and his
habitation. I do not wish your Highness to regard any such
action on the part of my troops as indicating an intention
to vary or depart from what we have agreed upon as the
dividing-line in the Mohmand country. I have no intention
that my troops should stay in that country, and they will
certainly not go further into it than is necessary in
order to carry out the object with which they are being
despatched. On the other hand, if the Mullah should take
flight across the mountains into the Kunar Valley, my
troops have orders not to follow him beyond the watershed,
but I shall look to your Highness to give orders to your
officers to deal with him as he deserves, and to restrain
him from exciting the foolish tribesmen to further acts of
hostility.
“I have always endeavoured in my correspondence with
your Highness to write frankly and openly so that
misunderstandings may be avoided. Your Highness will, I
hope, recognise that this is my object on this occasion.”
_From the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _to the address of_ HIS EXCELLENCY
THE VICEROY, _dated September 12, 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“I beg to inform your Excellency that I have received
your friendly letter of the 6th instant. The Mullah will
not come to this country of mine, because he has acted
wrongly, and, should he still come, I will expel him from
my country, so that he may go towards Arabia, because he is
a very wicked person. Your Excellency’s troops, however,
should not advance too far (_lit._ should not make a great
advance), lest some confusion arise within the limits of
Kunar or among the troops which are in Kunar. The Mullah
is a great knave. He should not be allowed to (_lit._ let
it not be that he might) excite the people and troops of
Ningrahar. Precaution is necessary, so that the Army of the
Sublime Government may not raise commotion and tumult in
the neighbourhood, and the Mullah excite the people and be
the source of disturbances.
“As regards the remaining portion of the undemarcated
boundary of that district, your Excellency states that
Jarobi is possibly within Afghan limits. As up to this time
no decision has been come to in regard to those places, it
will, undoubtedly, be as your Excellency has written.”
_From_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
_to_ HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
_dated Simla, October 7, 1897_.
(After compliments.)
“Your Highness has probably already heard of the result of
the advance of my troops against the Adda Mullah, which
in my letter of the 6th September 1897, corresponding
to the 8th Rabi-us-Sani, 1315 H., I told your Highness
was about to be undertaken. The Mullah’s gathering has
been dispersed: my troops followed him to his home at
Jarobi, but he had already fled across the boundary into
your Highness’s territory, and, in accordance with my
promise, my troops did not pursue him further. It is now
for your Highness to fulfil the part which your Highness
in your letter of the 12th September 1897, announced the
intention of taking, in the event of the Mullah entering
Afghanistan. I look to your Highness to prevent him from
concocting further mischief from Afghan territory.
“As an instance of the mischief which the Adda Mullah has
been guilty of, I enclose in original a letter, dated
the 2nd September 1897, from Najm-ud-din to the Mian
Guls of Swat. The Mullah writes: ‘I had written to his
Highness the Amir, Zia-ul-millat-wad-din, on the subject
of jehad. His Highness replied that we should wait: that
his Highness would consult all the military officers,
Khans and Maliks of his Highness’s territory and then
write again in reply, telling me the arrangements and
preparations for jehad.’
“Further on, he adds: ‘Please God, his Highness the
Amir will make arrangements for the jehad and issue a
notification to that effect.’
“In this way, Najm-ud-din has tried to make mischief
between your Highness and the Government of India, and it
is not to be wondered at if, under such circumstances,
people believe that they will not incur your Highness’s
displeasure by acting in a hostile manner towards the
British Government.
“In my letter of the 30th August 1897, equivalent to the
1st Rabi-us-Sani, 1315 H., I informed your Highness of
the misdeeds of the Afridis, and of my intention to deal
with them in a manner to make clear the supremacy of the
British Government.
“I now have the honour to inform your Highness that a
punitive force under the command of General Sir William
Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., will shortly start to march
through the country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to
compel both tribes to submit to such terms as I decide to
impose upon them.
“I have received a letter from my Agent at Kabul,
enclosing copy of one sent to him by your Highness on
the 25th Rabi-us-Sani, 1315 H., corresponding to the
23rd September 1897. From this letter I learn that your
Highness has refused to receive or encourage, and has
turned back, the Afridis whose representatives were
on their way to Kabul. I thank your Highness for this
friendly act, which is exactly in accordance with what I
had proposed to ask your Highness to do.
“It is probable that, when the British troops advance, the
tribesmen will follow the example of the Adda Mullah’s
lashkar, and take flight into Afghan territory. I have,
indeed, been informed that they are already sending their
women and property into Ningrahar.
“Your Highness is aware that in December 1895 and in May
last I caused the Kaffir refugees to be disarmed, and took
measures to prevent their causing your Highness annoyance.
“I now ask your Highness to take similar action in regard
to the Orakzais and Afridis, by ordering your local
officers to disarm those who enter your limits and to
prevent them from making Afghan territory a base for
attacks upon my forces.”
From HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN _and its Dependencies
to the address of_ HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, _dated the 16th
Jamadi-ul-Awal, 1315 H., corresponding to the 13th October 1897
(received on October 20, 1897)_.
(After compliments.)
“I have received your Excellency’s friendly letter, dated
the 7th October 1897, enclosing a letter from Mullah
Najm-ud-din, the Fakir of Hadda, to the Mian Guls, which I
have perused. I have also understood the contents of your
Excellency’s letter.
“As to the escape of Mullah Hadda from his house before
the British troops reached it, and as to my promise that
I would turn him out from this side of the boundary if
he should enter my territory, I have now to inform your
Excellency that I have issued orders to search for the
said Mullah by day and night in view to arrest him. The
news-reporters appointed for the purpose report that the
Mullah has concealed himself and is secretly moving about.
I have also ordered that his whereabouts should be found
out and a report made. Please God, the said Mullah’s
mischief will be stopped, if he be within the limits of my
territory; but if this mischievous man move about in tracts
which have not been divided yet between the British and
Afghan Governments, the British officials should instruct
the Maliks of such tracts to make arrangements about the
said mischievous man. This man does not pass a single night
at one place. He is in motion like mercury: during night he
is at one place, and during day at another. Such are the
reports made by news-reporters. Notwithstanding this, I am
engaged in endeavouring to arrest him. Your Excellency may
rest assured that, if I succeed in arresting him, I will
turn him out from my territory.
“I have perused the letter which Mullah Najm-ud-din wrote
to the Mian Guls of Swat, and which your Excellency sent to
me. I write to say that whatever the Mullah has written,
he has done so with the object of deceiving the tribesmen.
His object is to excite people to rebel. Some years ago he
became hostile towards me, and excited all his disciples
to rise against me, and made them fight with my troops.
Now in this way he is making the distant people fight with
the British Government. He is mischievous; he says what is
advisable and beneficial in his own interests. If I had
given him the said promise, he was not distant from my
country, and at the outside my troops at Jelalabad were
only two stages away from his residence. Your Excellency
can see from the date of his letter what a lie he has
told. Liars tell lies, but wise persons should distinguish
(between truth and falsehood). I have known these Mullahs
well for years. They are like the priests of the time of
Peter the Great, who created great mischief in Russia.
These Mullahs pretend before the people that Paradise and
Hell are within their power and authority.
“I have understood what your Excellency kindly wrote
for my information about sending British troops for the
chastisement of the Orakzais and Afridis. I have also
learnt about the decision which the high officials of the
British Government have come to in regard to punishing the
said tribesmen and bringing them to obedience.
“I have further understood what your Excellency wrote
about the report which Maulavi Ghafur Khan made to your
Excellency regarding the arrival of the Afridi jirga at
Jelalabad, and my sending them back to their country from
that place; and your Excellency expressing thanks to me for
my action. As the people are seeking their own interests,
their statements cannot be relied upon.
“Your Excellency writes that, if at the time of the
British troops advancing against the Orakzais and Afridis
these tribesmen, being obliged to flee, should enter my
territory, they should be disarmed and prevented from
making any attack on British territory. My dear friend, I
will not, please God, to the best of my power, allow my
subjects to join the tribesmen who have rebelled, in view
to help them in their fights. But when they bring their
families to the houses of their own relatives I will take
no notice of the circumstance, because these people are
mutually related to one another. They have given thousands
of their daughters in marriage to one another. If I were
to prohibit this mutual intercourse and prevent them from
bringing their families to Jelalabad, the tribesmen would
become hostile to me, in the same way that they have become
hostile to the British Government. Their hostility to the
British Government cannot be of much account, because
the British Government is a Great Government. They have
appointed troops for their punishment, composed of English
soldiers, Sikhs, and Hindus. But all my troops consist of
these tribesmen. They will never agree to the destruction
of their own kith and kin; and they will again, under the
orders of the mischievous Mullahs, issue improper edicts
against me.