SEISTAN AND THE McMAHON MISSION
Westwards of the Kandahar district is the region of Seistan, to which
unusual political interest attaches. Roughly speaking, it is divided
between Persia and Afghanistan, the Helmund river demarcating the
mutual spheres of interest and occupation. Geographically, it belongs
to the watershed of Afghanistan. Its extensive areas, situated along
the borders of Afghanistan, Persia and Baluchistan, are drained by
the Hamun lake, which also receives the waters of the Helmund, Farah,
Khash and Harud rivers. The area of this depression, which is broken up
into three subsidiary basins--those of the Farah, the Helmund and the
Zirreh,--is 125,000 square miles. The first of these consists of the
two-fold lagoon formed by the Harud and Farah rivers flowing from the
north, and by the Helmund and the Khash or Kushk Rud flowing from the
south and east respectively. These are connected by a thick reed-bed
called the Naizar, which, according to the amount of water that the
lakes contain, is either a marsh or a cane-brake. In flood-time these
waters, ordinarily distinct, unite to pour over the Naizar into the
second great depression, known by the generic title of Hamun Lake.
In times of abnormal flood the Hamun will itself overflow. On such
occasions the water, draining southwards through the Sarshela ravine,
inundates the third depression, which is known as the Gaud-i-Zirreh.
The Hamun Lake, like the Gaud-i-Zirreh, is one of those seasonable
phenomena which are invariably met in regions where the water system
is irregular. At certain periods quite dry, at others it possesses a
measurement of 100 miles in length, 15 miles in breadth, with a mean
depth of 4 feet and a maximum of 10 feet. The waters of the Hamun are
sweet. Fish are very plentiful, providing food for an aboriginal
colony which frequents the lake. It is, also, the haunt of many
varieties of wild geese, duck and other water-fowl.
[Illustration: CAMEL BAZAAR, NASRATABAD]
It is better, before proceeding to study further the value of Seistan,
to describe exactly of what Seistan consists. Sir Frederic Goldsmid,
for purposes of more accurate definition of the region, divided its
areas into two parts: Seistan Proper and Outer Seistan. In this he
may be said to have given Seistan Proper[20] to Persia and Outer
Seistan[21] to Afghanistan. The former lies between the Naizar on the
north and the main lateral canal, which waters the lands around Sekuha
and the neighbouring villages on the south. It extends along the old
bed of the Helmund, from a mile above the dam at Kohak, to its mouth
on the east, and to the fringe of the Hamun and the Kuh-i-Khwajah on
the west. The population numbers 45,000, of whom 10,000 were nomads of
mixed descent. Of the larger total, 20,000 are returned as Seistanis
and 15,000 as Persian-speaking settlers, the average number of persons
to the square mile being roughly 15--figures which are eight times in
excess of the proportional result found elsewhere in Persia. Outer
Seistan comprises the country stretching along the right bank of the
Helmund, from its lake mouth on the north to Rudbar in the south. The
inhabitants are Seistanis, Baluchi nomads and Afghans, together with a
certain proportion of Sanjuranis and Joktis--the term Seistani applying
particularly to that portion of the inhabitants possessing permanent
settlements, irrespective of descent and nationality. The combined
areas of the Seistan basin aggregate some 7006 square miles and the
joint population is returned at 205,000, or 34 to the square mile.
It is the Helmund river, the chief tributary to the Hamun, that has
been the greatest obstacle to the successful demarcation of the Seistan
region. Hitherto the boundary defining the respective limits of the
two States has been the one arranged in 1872 by the Goldsmid Award.
Under that instrument a line was drawn from Siah-koh to where the then
main bed of the Helmund river entered the Naizar swamp. The frontier
then proceeded to Kohak. From this point it followed a south-westerly
direction to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, thus leaving the two banks of the
Helmund below Kohak to Afghanistan. Since then the Helmund has changed
its course, and in that portion of the frontier which was affected
by the vagaries of the stream, considerable confusion arose, while
local Perso-Afghan relations became very much inflamed. The question
as between the two races depended upon the future division of the new
bed of the Helmund, the point of dispute dealing specifically with
the divergence of the main stream from the channel which was selected
as the frontier line by the Mission of 1872. The Afghans, who were
the principal gainers by the alteration of the course of the river,
claimed that the new bed formed the frontier: the Persians, on the
other hand, endeavoured to maintain the strict interpretation of the
old agreement.
[Illustration: LAKESIDE DWELLERS]
Unfortunately Seistan possessed interest for others than those who
were dependent upon the course of the Helmund, and Russia had already
secured the Shah’s assent to the appointment of a Russian consul at
Nasratabad. As soon as the dispute promised local unpleasantness
between Persia and Afghanistan, and political difficulties for
Great Britain with Teheran, this individual, M. Miller, interfered.
Exclaiming against the presumption of the Afghans, he offered to
provide a force to resist their so-called aggression. Happily,
before matters had reached the crisis which would have made Russian
interference possible, the Shah, in accordance with the terms of the
Treaty of Paris, requested the British Government to arbitrate on the
question of the Helmund waters and, at the same time, to establish a
permanent boundary line in place of the vague provisions made by the
Goldsmid Mission.
In agreeable accord with this request, the Imperial Government at
the end of 1902 appointed as British Commissioner, Major McMahon,
who had already demarcated the whole of the southern boundary of
Afghanistan--a distance of 800 miles. It so happened that his new
duties commenced at Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, the point at which his former
work finished. The mission consisted of eleven British officers,
numerous survey and irrigation experts, an escort of 200 native
infantry, 60 cavalry, with a large supply of transport, including
the 58th Camel Corps--in all a total of 1500 men, 200 horses and
2200 camels. As the base was at Quetta, 500 miles across an almost
waterless desert, whence all stores except grain and fodder and a
few local commodities had to be imported, the task of feeding the
mission can be well appreciated. Starting from Quetta, the mission
proceeded through Afghan territory to Khwaja-ali on the Helmund and
then followed the river, with the object of commencing work in the
middle of the boundary.[22] This march of 500 miles over uninhabited
waterless country occupied five weeks. The temperature was very low,
with the thermometer at 4 degrees above zero; and frightful blizzards
were encountered. During this period three men were frozen to death
and a number of animals lost. On reaching Seistan, Colonel McMahon
was met by the Afghan Commissioner and by two Persian Commissioners,
each with a large escort. The Amir, who was known personally to the
British Commissioner, kindly despatched from Kandahar for his private
protection a force of 100 cavalry and 200 infantry.
[Illustration:
1 2
THE NATIVE STAFF ATTACHED TO THE MISSION
1. Mir Shumsha Khan Bahadur, first Native Commissioner.
2. Kazi Khan.]
Political difficulties for the Mission commenced at the very outset.
Attempting to cross into Persian Seistan it was refused admission
by the Persians, who had been thoroughly frightened by Russian
misrepresentation as to its object. The cool assertion was made
that no boundary was in dispute, and that any attempt to pass into
Persian territory would be met by force. For a whole month the Mission
contented itself with travelling along the Afghan side of the Helmund,
collecting information in regard to the frontier line. Throughout this
time there was no meeting with the Persian officials. Further work at
last necessitated an entry into Persian territory. Notwithstanding
Persia’s protests and her objection to the erection of a bridge for
the purpose of crossing the Helmund, the Mission crossed, receiving
the customary compliments and being welcomed with bands and guards of
honour.
The actual work of demarcation was very difficult. South of the
Helmund for 90 miles the line lay through an arid desert where water
was brought from long distances. North of this section the boundary
traversed country liable to inundation in which pillars of a massive
permanent nature had to be erected, while the last 20 miles of the
frontier ran up the waterless, glacial slopes of the Siah-koh. By the
decision agreed upon the old bed of the Helmund was retained as the
new frontier, the present boundary being so fixed that it continues
irrespective of further changes in the course of the river. This
arrangement reconstitutes the 1872 line. Considerable delay marked its
acceptance both in Kabul and Teheran, the findings being delivered in
April 1904. Demarcation work, proceeding in accordance with McMahon’s
report, was not completed until the close of 1904, by which time
Persian objections to the decision upon the boundary had been overcome,
the first part of the work of the Mission being settled absolutely
when the final adhesion of the two Governments to the verdict of the
Mission was notified in September 1904. The appropriation of the
Helmund waters between Persia and Afghanistan was the second part of
the business of the Mission. The difficulties of the question were
increased by Russian exertions to thwart a satisfactory solution.
Nevertheless, after most scrupulous pains and exhaustive inquiries into
existing rights and practice, the Commissioners’ award upon partition
of the waters was handed, in May 1905, to the Persian and Afghan
representatives for communication to their respective Governments. The
Amir of Afghanistan at once accepted the judgment of Colonel McMahon,
while the people on the spot also warmly espoused the settlement. But
Persia, inspired by the laboured concoctions of the Russian officials
in Teheran, refused to ratify the protocol and, after great delay,
confirmed her dissatisfaction at the distribution of the waters by
direct representations to the British Minister at Teheran. Unhappily
on February 26, 1906, in spite of previous official intimations from
the Foreign Office that Persia had acquiesced in the results of the
Mission, the Shah’s Government formally notified Sir Edward Grey of its
inability to accept and consequent rejection of the decision in respect
of the McMahon division of the waters of the Helmund. In a similar
manner, it may be remembered, Persia appealed against the decision
of the Goldsmid Mission with the result that its original terms were
confirmed. No genuine objection exists in this instance.
[Illustration:
2 1 3
OFFICERS OF THE MCMAHON MISSION
1. Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
2. Captain Ramsay, Personal Assistant to Colonel McMahon.
3. Captain Bell, C.I. Horse, Commanding Camel Corps.]
It is perhaps to be regretted that the most prominent result revealed
by the McMahon Mission was the pronounced antagonism of the Germans and
Russians to British interests in Persia. From the very beginning and
with deliberate intent, M. Miller wrongly described the intentions
and aims of the Mission, his ingenious fabrications ultimately finding
sympathetic shelter in the columns of the German Press. Germany’s
share in the persecution with which the Mission was followed has
passed unnoticed in this country. But at a moment when stupid people
are encouraging others of greater foolishness to commit the British
Government to very undesirable rapprochements with Berlin, it is
as well to reflect upon the real character of the niceties which
underlie German policy where Anglo-German interests are concerned.
Unfortunately, it is not always realised in Great Britain how much
weight a venal Press can give to the indefatigable inventions of
scurrilous, political gossipers. It may be, therefore, necessary to
say that not a particle of truth attaches to the many statements about
the McMahon Mission which appeared abroad in print. Ingenuous as the
mendacity and duplicity of M. Miller may be, it is incomprehensible
that any diplomatic official would circulate, without specific orders,
such lies and travesties of fact as were current in Seistan during
the sojourn of the Mission there. Whatever may appear to have been
the gist of M. Miller’s instructions from the Russian Minister in
Teheran, it is to be admitted that he acted up to the fullest limit of
his opportunities. Happily the malicious untruths and slanders, which
became so prominent a feature of the Russo-German press campaign, have
recoiled upon the Russian policy; and, while the arch purveyor of the
trash has been removed, Russian prestige itself has temporarily fallen
very low.
With the disappearance of M. Miller from the scene in Seistan, the
emissaries of the Russian authorities went further afield. Articles,
breathing the engaging candour of a regular crusade, appeared in the
Press of St. Petersburg and Berlin, lengthy extracts being received in
Teheran itself through the kindly offices of the Official Telegraph
Agency in St. Petersburg. The organ of the Russian authorities in
Central Asia--_The Russian Trans-Caspian Gazette_, published at
Askhabad--was perhaps the most industrious agent in circulating
grotesque details of the wrongs inflicted upon the poor Seistanis
by the brutal decisions of the British Mission. In respect of these
statements it happens that the share in the Hamun lake, allotted
originally by the Goldsmid Convention, remains absolutely unaltered.
The remark that Persian Seistan was in danger of becoming a desert
because Persia had been mulcted in two-thirds of its water supply is
a lying absurdity, divulged by M. Miller or the Russian Minister in
Teheran for no other purpose than to sow distrust of Great Britain
in the Persian mind and throughout Europe. Again, the touching
descriptions of the homeless Seistanis dispossessed of their lands
through the heartless insistence of the British Commissioner, which
only needed to appear in the _Russian Trans-Caspian Gazette_ to be
commented upon by German newsmongers with characteristic insolence, are
conspicuously false insomuch that neither Persian nor Afghan villages
were removed, nor any single individual evicted. The statement, too,
that the McMahon Mission had laid out upon Persian soil an extensive
fortified camp, within battlemented mud walls is equally untrue. This
“extensive fortified camp” consisted of the mud-huts used by the
Mission; the walls were the mud-walls of the tennis-court, while “the
armed guard,” left in charge of these “fortifications,” resolved itself
into one of three watchmen, who had been given the custody of certain
property pending orders as to its removal. In this direction it is
of interest to know that upon the day following the departure of the
Mission an attempt by the Russians to occupy the camp was prevented
only by the presence of these men.
Full inquiries into the pernicious activity which distinguished the
Russian officials of course should be made by the British Government.
There is no doubt that M. Miller abused the privileges attaching
to his diplomatic position in proclaiming that the British Mission
would not be permitted by the Russians to enter Persia; and when,
as the representative of Russia in Seistan, he went the length of
arranging riots against the British Consul on his Majesty’s birthday,
he committed a serious offence against a friendly country. At such an
affront Sir Arthur Hardinge, our Minister in Teheran, might well have
intervened; but, in spite of the mob demonstrating before the British
Consulate and demanding the expulsion of the Consul and the withdrawal
of the Mission, it was left to the Mission itself to secure its own
protection. This was not impossible; eventually the ringleaders of
the movement, which included the majority of the Russian agents in
Seistan, were apprehended and summarily flogged. There could have been
no objection if the stronger action, which the circumstances warranted,
had been more directly applied.
[Illustration: BALUCHISTAN CAMEL CORPS]
While the course of the Imperial Government in respect of Afghanistan
cannot be defined with certainty, there is an equal lack of decision
in respect of our policy towards Persia. The condition of our affairs
in Mid-Asia, Persia and Afghanistan, which our lamentable lack of
foresight has precipitated, is altogether disastrous; our difficulties
increasing precisely as the integrity of Persia and the dependence of
Afghanistan disappear. In consequence of the serious defects in our
policy, coupled with most inadequate representation at Teheran, Great
Britain has been almost completely ousted from north-east Persia.
The success of the Boundary Mission in Seistan cannot be regarded
as introducing any permanent factor in nor effecting any radical
alteration of the situation. In view of the significant hold over
Persia which Russia possesses and since Russian movement in Khorassan
in the future cannot but affect Seistan, the present occasion is one
where a firm stand against Russian pretensions undoubtedly should be
made.
The trials of the mission in Seistan were of a distinctly unpleasant
order. During the winter 1904-05 the jackals with which the district
abounds, for some unknown cause went mad, attacking men and animals.
Four members of the Mission were bitten, one of whom died of
hydrophobia. The disease also spread to the wolves, who played great
havoc. One wild night, March 25, 1905, during a blizzard blowing at a
velocity of 88 miles an hour, two mad wolves raided the lines of the
Camel Corps and worried seventy-eight camels and one horse. Forty-eight
of the camels and the horse died of hydrophobia. On another occasion a
horde of these creatures tried unsuccessfully to rush the main camp.
The Seistanis themselves were so overcome by terror that they actually
killed off all but a few of their dogs on whom they depend for safety
and security at night.
[Illustration:
1 2 3
BALUCHI CHIEFS WHO ACCOMPANIED COLONEL MCMAHON
1. Jalal Khan.
2. Bungle Khan of Zhob.
3. Merab Khan, son of Chief of the Buchtie tribe.]
One of the most tragic experiences was the death of an Indian surveyor
while on duty in the waterless Dasht-i-Margo. He ventured too far from
water and, owing to the intense heat, was unable either to move forward
or to retrace his steps. He and seven of his followers paid the penalty
with their lives. This incident was marked by the heroism of one of
his men who, seeing the surveyor die, determined to rescue the map,
to secure which so many lives had been given. He cut it off from the
board of the plane table and, knowing that he could not long retain
consciousness, wound it under his waistcloth round his body. Then he
blindly started northward in the hope of reaching water. The four men
who commenced this journey with him collapsed, he himself remembers
no more than regaining consciousness at night-time lying by a pool in
the Krash river. Here he was found by a wandering Afghan, who carried
him on his back to a native village where, after receiving careful
attention, his life was saved. The bodies of his unfortunate companions
were subsequently discovered in a completely mummified condition.
Seistan resembles other parts of Central Asia and almost every centre
of importance in Afghanistan, insomuch that its existence depends upon
irrigation. The canals which branch off from the Helmund, bearing the
waters of that river throughout the heart of the country, date back
to a period which itself is long prior to either Persian or Afghan
conquest. The systems in vogue to-day are hardly an improvement upon
those earlier waterworks; there is no doubt that the region might be
made the centre of an exceptionally fertile oasis if there were any
enduring qualities in the local government, security for trade or
opening for agricultural activity. Life in Seistan does not entail
elaborate preparations. Provisions are cheap; and sheep and oxen are
abundant. Rice comes from Herat, vegetables are scarce, while wheat and
barley may be purchased in large quantities.
The feature of Seistan is the Helmund. Indeed, this region is as
dependent upon the Helmund as Egypt is upon the Nile, and in recent
years agricultural conditions have much improved. The gross revenue
is now 100,000 kharwars of grain, with an additional 7100 tomans as
the value of other products. Of this latter return the Amir of Seistan
takes one-fifth, 1420 tomans; with levies upon forage and firewood from
each village and the proceeds from the sales of permits to collect
taxes on cows and sheep, the cash revenue amounts to 14,095 tomans. The
tax on cows is 2½ krans per 100 cows, and the impost on sheep 1 kran
for 20 sheep. There is no levy on ploughing bullocks. Of the 100,000
kharwars of grain the Amir receives 30,000 kharwars at the value of
5 tomans per kharwar. The net receipts are, therefore, 164,095, of
which the Persian Government require 2600 tomans in cash and 24,012
kharwars in grain, of which 9812 kharwars are remitted in allowances to
officials, priests and troops.[23] In place of the payment in grain,
too, the Persian Government usually accepts a cash equivalent at the
rate of 7 krans per kharwar, 9940 tomans, the aggregate cash payment
contributed by Seistan to Teheran amounting to 12,540 tomans, or £2500.
The prices ruling in the Nasratabad Bazar are:[24]
Wheat, 25 krans, or about 10s., per kharwar of 649 lbs.
Barley, 20 krans, or about 8s., per kharwar of 649 lbs.
Bhusa, 4 krans per kharwar of 649 lbs.
Firewood (tamarisk), 4 krans per kharwar of 649 lbs.
Bread, 1 kran per 2 mans or 13 lbs.
Ghee, 4 krans per 1 man or 6½ lbs.
Milk, 1 kran per 2 mans or 13 lbs.
Sugar, 6½ krans per 1 man or 6½ lbs.
Fowls, 2 or 3 for a kran.
Eggs, 40 for a kran.
The capital of Seistan is divided into two sections--northern and
southern; although so long the centre of local government, it reflects
at first a somewhat cheerless and dilapidated appearance. The absence
of roads about the city and the generally neglected condition of
Husseinabad, the southern town, set up a feeling of disappointment in
those who see the place for the first time. Beyond these two towns
have sprung up in the last few years the neat buildings of the British
Consulate, which may be said to constitute a third part of the capital,
with Captain Macpherson in charge of Anglo-Indian interests. Separated
from the rest of the city by a broad stretch of level ground, some
acres in extent, it occupies an admirable site and has the advantage
of room for extension, should it, at any time, be thought advisable to
embark upon enlargement. Between two rows of buildings is a wide space,
more nearly a square than a street, at the end of which the Union Jack
flies. Behind the main block on the south side of the square is a
mosque. The principal premises cover a space of about 150 yards by 70
yards, the whole site consisting roughly of about 13 acres. Alongside
the consulate stand the imposing premises of the British bank, a branch
of the Imperial Bank of Persia, comprising several excellent houses and
a well-kept garden.
Husseinabad is little more than a collection of small-domed mud-houses,
built, irrespective of ground plan, wheresoever fancy dictated and
placed in the middle of a vast plain. Here and there a windmill of
curious shape--usually stationary in the winter months, but wanting
only the fierce blasts of the _Bad-i-sad-o-bist roz_ or wind of 120
days, which blows unceasingly in the summer months, to rouse it to a
state of wild activity--stands conspicuously among the surrounding
houses. Beyond this the residences of the Russian Consul and the
Chief Mullah are the only other objects likely to attract attention.
The former, no longer the largest house in the town, is also badly
situated, being enclosed on three sides by houses and on the fourth
by a graveyard, which stretches from the Consulate to the walls of
Nasratabad. The Russian Consulate itself, a rectangular building
enclosing two courtyards opening into one another, has been, in
reality, converted from native houses. It rejoices in an upper storey;
a cluster of domes--each room possessing a separate dome--forms the
roof, above which stands a sorry-looking flagstaff.
[Illustration: GATES OF NASRATABAD]
Nasratabad, the northern town, though in itself insignificant, is
by far the more imposing half. It is surrounded by walls 30 feet in
height, about 350 yards in length from north to south and 400 yards
from east to west, with buttresses at intervals of about 40 yards. An
additional rectangular enclosure projecting from the north-east corner
contains the arc or citadel, in which is situated the palace of the
Amir. In the centre of the southern wall, supported on either side
by buttresses, stands one of the two gateways of the city. From here
the central street traverses the length of the city, terminating in a
similar gateway in the centre of the north wall. Running all round is a
protected way which is loopholed; there is also a deep ditch, sometimes
filled with water. The place possesses from fifty to one hundred
shops; with one exception they are insignificant and mainly occupied
by soldiers who, during their term of service in Seistan, devote
themselves to trade and are scarcely ever taken away from the fort.
The open spaces in the city have been cultivated, and little patches
of grain may occasionally be seen. As is always the case with Persian
towns donkeys are everywhere to the fore.
[Illustration: THE WALLS OF NASRATABAD]
Nasratabad is garrisoned by two Kain regiments,[25] one of which is
disbanded at home, while the other supplies shopkeepers to the capital
in the intervals of military duties. The nominal strength is 1000,
but less than 800 men are mobilised. They are armed with the useless
jezail, although at Birjand there is a store of Werndl rifles; they are
supposed to receive a new uniform every second year. Service is for
life and is hereditary in the families supplying the soldiers. Their
pay is twenty krans--twelve shillings--and 7½ mans of wheat yearly; on
service in Seistan they are given rations. As may be supposed, they do
not constitute a formidable body of fighting men. In addition to the
infantry there are 20 gunners hailing from Tabriz, who hold a position
of which they take the fullest advantage. They carry on the business
of moneylenders, charging 500 per cent. as a minimum!
It has long been recognised in Seistan that, while Indian commerce can
achieve no compensating return in the markets of Khorassan against the
trade of Russia and a dam of prohibitory tariffs blocks any little
trickle from India entering Central Asia, something might be gained
by concentrating attention upon Seistan itself. Accordingly, when
in 1896 the laying-out of a route between Nushki and Nasratabad was
begun and the construction of a railway between Quetta and Nushki was
mooted, two important steps in the right direction were indicated. The
distance from Quetta to Nasratabad along the route which was adopted
is 565 miles. The five stages out of Quetta down to Nushki, a distance
of 93 miles, pass through mountainous country. The road descends 2564
feet from the Quetta plateau to the great tableland which stretches
away to Seistan at a height of 3000 feet. Across it lies the track,
fairly level and admirably adapted for the passage of caravans. The
hills tower in rough fantastic forms along the road to Nushki, and
in crossing from valley to valley vistas of the mountain scenery of
Baluchistan open out in constant succession. The altitude of the
country above the sea and the dry bracing atmosphere create, in winter,
a pleasant feeling of exhilaration. The heat in summer is intense, but
the temperature varies between the extremes of heat and cold.
[Illustration: BAZAAR SCENE, NASRATABAD]
The hills are the great feature of Quetta. To the east, within a mile
or two of the bazaar, the Mardar range rises to a height of 11,000
feet, forming a splendid background to the cantonment. To the north,
west and south the plain stretches out to the foot of the Zarghim,
Tuckatoo and Chiltan hills. Bare and rugged are their slopes, for the
juniper groves are tucked away in clefts on the hill-sides. Chill and
forbidding are their summits, save at sunset when they flush scarlet as
sin; then deepening gradually to purple pale to amethyst as twilight
falls. As the night darkens, too, the fires of the charcoal-burners
in the juniper valleys flash out, and the lowing of cattle from a
distant bazaar reverberates in the still air. The atmosphere is very
clear and distances are most deceptive. Dust-storms are frequent and
the tiny dust-devil may be seen across the plain twirling rapidly in
the radiant sunlight. Near Quetta there are a few mud-walled villages.
They contain mostly a mixed population, the Baluchis proper being
nomads and living in black blanket-tents. Even of these there are very
few except at harvest time, when beside every threshing-floor, dotted
amongst the golden mounds of _bhusa_, are ragged shelters. Each tent is
composed simply of a couple of coarse goats’-hair blankets stretched,
one to the windward and one overhead, across some forked sticks. Inside
swarm a mass of men, women and children. The women wear long-sleeved,
red cotton shirts reaching to the ankles, full cotton trousers and
_chaddas_ of indigo blue cotton. They do not appear to veil themselves
among their own people; upon the approach of the white man a corner of
the _chadda_ is caught quickly across the mouth. The _chadda_ falls
straight down from the crown of the head to the heels and the frayed,
soil-worn tail is left to drag among the dust heaps. The long black
tresses of the women are thickly plaited and ornamented with blue beads
and white cowries. Sometimes a mass of coins is worn like a fringe over
the forehead. Their shirts are finely worked in green and gold on the
hems, at the sleeves, neck, skirt and down the opening at the throat
with the Russian cross stitch.
The Baluchi is a wild-looking man with long, black, well-oiled locks,
which he keeps hanging in heavy curls round his neck and shoulders.
He wears flowing cotton trousers, a cotton shirt, a waistcoat and a
variety of coats according to his means. His apparel is of the dirtiest
and his bare feet are thrust into heavy ammunition boots with never a
lace in them. In spite of certain defects in his attire, he is a very
dignified-looking man and a born leader--of camels! Moreover, he does
not set too high value upon his womenfolk; labour is divided, and in
ploughing his wife and a camel are usually harnessed together. The
price of a spouse is calculated in so many goats, sheep, donkeys or
camels.
From Quetta a good driving road runs as far as Samungli, 8 miles
distant, where there is a small caravansary. From this point a _kutcha_
road bears off south-west circling round the northern foot of Chiltan
in the valley of Girdi Tallao, near the middle of which is the next
halting-place. Here there is a caravansary built in the Persian
fashion--a square courtyard with leans-to for cattle and camel-men and
in one corner quarters, consisting of a mud _rez-de-chaussée_ and a
wooden _chappar khaneh_, for travellers of a better class.
From Girdi Tallao the road proceeds to Tilleri through a cultivated
valley, always bordered by the bare hills. At Tilleri there is another
rest-house built on the same pattern, but possessing the luxury of
windows in the lower storey. After leaving Tilleri the road is level
for the first few miles as far as the Sherinab stream. It then rises
gradually for the ascent of the Barak pass, where there is a litter
of rubble and stones and the ground is very much broken. Beyond the
pass, in the vicinity of Murad Khan Killah, the valley spreads out
to a level plain with sandy, well-cultivated soil--for Baluchistan.
Up to this point in this stage there is not a vestige of a tree nor
yet a camel-thorn bush; even the water is brackish. Moreover signs of
agricultural activity do not continue. Soon after leaving Murad Khan
the route lies across stony, uneven ground until the Kishingi valley is
reached. Here the soil is once more sandy; camel-thorn abounds, and in
spring there is the glow of crimson tulips. Beyond Kishingi, the road
descends into the Nushki plain by a long, steep pass.
It has not been possible for Nushki to avoid the prosperity which
follows in the train of the caravan. At the present moment it is an
active but unfortunate settlement. Built at the foot of the hills which
bound it on the north and only 2 or 3 miles from the range separating
it from Kishingi, the winds from the west, sweeping along the plain to
the hills and then eddying back again carrying clouds of dust, catch
Nushki both ways. Although very seriously exposed and lying on the edge
of the desert which stretches away westwards to the Helmund, there are
evidences in the country around of attempts at agriculture. Irrigation
is practised and the trickle of water from the Kaisar stream has been
augmented by the careful sinking of wells, until the present state
of Nushki is in near relation with that which seems to have existed
many generations ago. On the top of a low spur of hills which runs
south across the valley, where was once a Baluchi fort, now stands an
ugly mud-coloured, flat-roofed bungalow, the traveller’s rest-house.
The hill on which it is built is very stony and absolutely bare of
vegetation. On its southern aspect is a pebbly water-course into
which the water, after running close to the bazaar and supplying two
cattle-fords, dribbles scantily. The water-course is a favourite place
for the disposal of dead camels and donkeys; while the unwholesome
little river, the germ-bearer of many maladies, serves to turn three
rather primitive waterwheels for the grinding of wheat and barley.
In the clay soil along the edges of the stream myriads of tiny mauve
irises grow during spring, with here and there scarlet and yellow
tulips.
The bazaar is somewhat uninteresting, for it has been built by a
British officer in uncompromisingly straight lines. Of course it is all
made of mud; the roofs are flat and there are no balconies or verandahs
because wood is scarce. So also there are no white Hindu temples and
shady peepul trees, no domed mosques and stately-arched gateways, no
strings of chillies strung across the shop fronts crimsoning in the
sun. There is no touch of colour anywhere; even the people seem to be
clad in dirty white or dusty indigo-blue.
A wide street leads through the centre of the bazaar, and upon it
are set two rows of one-storey mud-shops. Nearly all belong to Hindu
bunnias from Shikarpur. Their effects are chiefly sacks of grain and
Manchester cotton goods, a few native-made long overcoats, waistcoats
broidered with gold or silver thread and the peaked Afghan kullah or
semi-conical cap, worn in the centre of the puggaree. At the end of
this thoroughfare are the police lines, post office and some attempts
at a military cantonment in which the local levy is quartered. The
population is liable to fluctuation. Three years ago there were 250
people and rather more than 200 houses, of which 120 were shops; but
any estimate to-day would need to be much greater, as the numbers of
the population have doubled. This increase is due primarily to the
growing popularity of the Nushki-Seistan route and an influx of people
who were concerned in the construction of the Quetta-Nushki railway.
The completion of this work, which was opened to traffic on November
15, 1905, when a tri-weekly service was initiated, will probably cause
the abandonment of the present position which Nushki occupies. The soil
there has been infected by epidemics of cholera, and enteric is endemic
among the villagers.
The actual terminus of the line has been placed 10 miles further on
in the open valley, where there is both water and a better situation.
There is little doubt that ultimately the preference of the caravans
and the merchants will be given to the spot where the station premises
are already located.
Work upon the railway began in the summer of 1902, when the
difficulties which it presented were not formidable. The cost of
construction has been but little more than half a million sterling. The
line, which is 83 miles in length, branches off from the North-Western
railway to Quetta above the Bolan pass, 3 miles from Shezand station
and 12 miles short of Quetta itself, at a height of 5864 feet. The
stations constructed on the line are very well appointed, far better
than those upon the Bolan or Humai systems. They reflect the greatest
credit on the engineers. They are as follows:
1. Nishpa East.
2. Nishpa West.
3. Tiri Walikhan.
4. Dhinger.
5. Sheikh Wazil.
6. Khurd Barak.
7. Kardagap.
8. Galangur Kotal.
9. Kishingi.
10. Nushki.
In general, Mr. Woodside may be congratulated upon the successful
termination of his labours. Certain features in the construction are
novel and create a somewhat daring precedent, as bridges have been
built only over the large streams. Across the smaller streams the line
runs, so that in heavy storms it may be washed away and the service
dislocated. The experiment may prove troublesome, and it will be
interesting to see how the system answers; with small traffic it may
be a success. For a long time there will be little traffic beyond the
Mastang district, although there is likely to be a large trade from
there during the hot weather. The investigations of the engineers have
proved that in all the valleys water is everywhere within practicable
distance, under 150 feet generally. Where there was desolation before,
and where it was not believed possible to find water, plentiful springs
have been tapped.
Splendid work has been done by two young engineers, fresh from
Scotland, Mr. Slee and Mr. Young. In two years or less these young
men have learned the languages generally spoken by the workmen, and
in dealing with the tribesmen, who numbered some thousands, they have
had neither difficulty nor opposition. Their lives cannot be said to
have been lonely. Day and night they were busy, orders or instructions
being incessantly solicited, while their words were law in settling the
disputes that so frequently arose between the tribesmen.
With the advent of the railway to Nushki, that place now becomes the
starting-point of the great Indo-Perso overland caravan route. Prior
to 1896, the existence of certain questions of a political nature
prevented any definite steps being taken towards the construction of a
trade-way between Seistan and Nushki. The Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur
Rahman, whose fiscal policy was well calculated to stifle trade, was in
occupation of the Chageh district, through which lay the direct route
from Nushki to Seistan. It was eminently desirable that a change should
be effected in the ownership of this district. In accordance with the
Agreement of 1893, drawn up between Sir Mortimer Durand and Abdur
Rahman, the Chageh district was assigned to the British sphere. In the
following years, 1894-6, a Boundary Commission under Captain McMahon
occupied itself in demarcating the frontier of Afghanistan south of the
Helmund and up to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah; in 1895, by agreement with the
Shah, a second Commission under Colonel Holdich proceeded to define
the Perso-Baluch frontier between Kohak and Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah--a
distance of 300 miles. So soon as these two missions had completed
their labours, Captain Webb Ware was appointed the Assistant Political
Officer and was placed in charge of the stretch of country which had
accrued to the Government of India as the result of the demarcation,
Major Trench proceeding to Seistan. Captain Webb Ware at once set
himself to work upon plans for the creation of a trade route between
Seistan and Nushki, the good fortune which had attended his earlier
efforts being carried a stage further in 1900, when the interests of
the Khan of Kelat in the Nushki district were bought out at a perpetual
quit-rent of 9000 rupees per annum. Success has been pronounced; and
both the character and complexion of this barren region have been
transformed. No more difficult country could have been found for
development. In the days before the road was started the region was the
home of roving parties of Baluchi and Afghan ruffians who periodically
sallied forth to plunder passing caravans. Further, heat, the absence
of water and the dangers of the journey to India over long desert
stretches, militated against its adoption. Only at rare intervals did a
caravan attempt the venture.
These defects are now, in the main, surmounted, and an excellent trade
route is established between Nushki and Nasratabad, the marches being
divided into twenty-one stages. Between Nushki and Robat a _kutcha_
road, varying in breadth between 10 feet and 20 feet, is laid out. Dâk
bungalows have also been established at regularly appointed stations
and[26] telegraphic communication exists. Around the several bungalows
there are now tiny settlements where itinerant traders exist on the
proceeds of their business with the caravans. Marauding bands have
ceased to worry, as their leaders have been made responsible for the
safe custody of travellers between the different stages. At each post
there is a small levy-guard and quarters for the camel-dâk, which
carries the mail between India and Seistan in nine and a half days.
Although it is impossible to avoid the heat, the water difficulty is no
longer insuperable. Wells have been sunk and, since the abolition of
all tolls and duties on the route--which wise precaution was made an
essential preliminary to the inauguration of the service--an increasing
stream of camels passes to and fro, between India and Khorassan.
_Value of Imports and Exports by the Nushki-Seistan route for the
years 1896-1905._
_Year._ _Rupees._
March 1, 1896, to March 1, 1897 1½ lakhs.
” 1897 ” 1898 5 ”
” 1898 ” 1899 7 ”
” 1899 ” 1900 12 ”
” 1900 ” 1901 15 ”
” 1901 ” 1902 20 ”
” 1902 ” 1903 18 ”
” 1903 ” 1904 18 ”
” 1904 ” 1905 24 ”
_List of Marches between Nushki rail head and Nasratabad._
1. [27]Nushki to Mull 25
2. [27]Mull to Padag 30
3. Padag to Yadgar Chah 24
4. Yadgar Chah to Dalbandin 31
5. [27]Dalbandin to Jujaki 30
6. Jujaki to Meroi 21
7. [27]Meroi to Chah Sandan 21
8. Chah Sandan to Tratoh 24
9. Tratoh to Kundi 22
10. Kundi to Mashki Chah 22
11. [27]Mashki Chah to Ware Chah 26
12. Ware Chah to Makak Karez 23
13. Makak Karez to Sainduk 11
14. [27]Sainduk to Kirtaka 17
15. Kirtaka to Chah Mohammed Reza 17
16. Chah Mohammed Reza to Killa Robat 28
17. [27]Killa Robat to Hormak 17
18. Hormak to Nowad Chah 24
19. Nowad Chah to Girdi Thana 7
20. Girdi Thana to Asak Chah 22
21. Asak Chah to Sayed Khan’s _khel_ 10
22. Sayed Khan’s _khel_ to Nasratabad 20
Quetta to Nushki 93
----
Total 565
The road follows two sides of a triangle, skirting the whole of
Southern Afghanistan before entering Persia at Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah.
The distance from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah and thence direct to
Meshed is just 1000 miles. To aid traders using this route a rebate
of seven-eighths of the Indian Customs duty is allowed. As the sea is
free to Bunder Abbas, this concession should be increased so that the
starting-points of the caravans--_i.e._, Nushki and Bunder Abbas--might
be on a footing of equality. “Drawbacks” of 33 per cent. are granted
by the North-Western railway on all goods sent by it and destined for
Persia. Additional facilities have also been arranged for the trade
using this new route; in order to avoid the difficulty of having to
go 150 miles out of their way to Nasratabad for Customs examination,
hitherto experienced by merchants proceeding by the Nushki route
to Khorassan, a first-class Customs Bureau has been established at
Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah. This enables _kafilas_ to proceed direct to Kain
and Khorassan _viâ_ the Palankoh route and to avoid the detour through
Seistan. Furthermore, a British Consular Agent has been deputed to
Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, one of whose principal duties it will be to watch
the interests of British traders using the route and to assist them
in their dealings with the Customs authorities. As regards traffic,
since the opening of the Quetta-Nushki railway a considerable flow of
trade has set in from the Helmund direction _viâ_ Chageh, as caravans
for Herat and Afghan traders naturally prefer to follow the Helmund to
a point north-west of Chageh and then to turn southwards. A stretch
of desert still has to be crossed; but it is less in extent than that
between Nushki and the Persian frontier at Robat.
In order to encourage traders a revised schedule of rates for the hire
of camels along the Nushki-Seistan-Meshed route has been issued by
the Government of India. By these changes the hire for single camels
carrying 400 pounds has been reduced from 57 rs. 8 a. for the single
journey to 55 rs.; for the double journey from 100 to 95 rs., the time
having been decreased from 105 to 85 days: this latter is a distinct
advance. The charge per kharwar has been reduced from 370 krans to 359
krans 11 shahis, or 89 rs. 6 a. This concession does not yet equal the
average rate of hire from Bunder Abbas to Meshed, which is 300 krans
per kharwar. Goods must be packed in gunny bags, boxes or leather
cases, no package weighing more than 2½ maunds. Special rates are
quoted for wood-work and iron materials. The periods allowed for the
journey are:
Quetta to Seistan 45 days.
Seistan to Meshed 40 ”
Nushki to Seistan 38 ”
Contractors will be held responsible for all loss and damage to goods
in transit obviously due to the neglect of the camel-men. They will
be at liberty to refuse goods for delivery if they are not properly
packed and secured. Loss through raids will be considered beyond the
contractors’ responsibility. Ten days’ notice must be given for any
number of camels required up to 40, 25 days for over 50 and up to 300,
50 days above 300 but not exceeding 1000. Express camels can be hired
at higher rates, the journey from Quetta to Seistan being then made in
30 days.
The evident success of the new route has been the more remarkable
because M. Naus, the head of the Belgian administration that conducts
the Persian Customs, has devised special means to check the expansion
of Indian trade, two Customs officers being appointed to Nasratabad
to deal with it. To give zest to their existence these men imposed
many novel regulations upon caravans.[28] The camel-men are fined for
the non-observance of arbitrary rules which are purposely varied so
that confusion may be created; the men are thrown into prison, the
animals seized and the goods confiscated. In addition, the Customs
barrier in Seistan is reinforced by a plague cordon between Seistan and
Khorassan against caravans from India, in spite of the fact that the
period of any possible incubation has expired long before a caravan
from Quetta can reach Seistan, and that the limits of time, within
which quarantine is permissible, have been laid down by the decision
of the Venice Sanitary Congress. The headquarters of this latest pest
are at Turbat-i-Haidari and Karez. Meanwhile the Russian and Belgian
authorities encourage the circulation of alarmist rumours about the
mortality from Indian plague in Seistan, the doctor at the Russian
legation in Teheran recently having spread a statement that 99 per
cent. of deaths from plague had occurred in the Naizar district of
Seistan. While these reports are very greatly exaggerated in respect of
Indian plague, an epidemic of this disease nevertheless ravaged Seistan
during the spring of 1906. At Nasratabad the population was reduced
through it from 2500 to rather more than 300. The efforts of Dr. Kelly,
the medical officer attached to the British Consulate in Nasratabad,
however, did much to arrest it, over 500 inoculations having been
made and an excellent impression created by the recovery of a man who
had been seized after being inoculated by him. None-the-less, its
existence prepares the way for more vigorous precautions against Indian
caravans, the measures of the plague officials being directed against
the development of Indian commercial relations with Northern Persia and
Northern Afghanistan in the hope that Persian and Afghan merchants may
frequent the Meshed emporium. At the present moment these preventive
measures have achieved conspicuous success, and Russian commercial
activity has entirely subjugated Khorassan province. No headway appears
to be possible for British trade; while the rapid growth of Russian
commercial influence, under this system of pernicious assistance,
threatens to reduce Seistan to the position of a commercial base from
which the markets of India can be attacked by articles of Russian
manufacture. A precisely similar state of things prevails at Meshed in
respect of Afghanistan.
[Illustration: DÂK BUNGALOW ON THE NUSHKI ROUTE]
It is of value to compare the Nushki-Seistan route to Meshed
with others, viz., the Bunder Abbas-Narmashir-Neh-Turbat route;
the Bunder Abbas-Yezd-Turbat route; the Bushire-Yezd-Turbat
route; the Basra-Baghdad-Kermanshah-Teheran route; and the
Trebizond-Tabriz-Teheran route.
2. The Bunder Abbas-Narmashir-Neh-Turbat route.--The distance is about
900 miles and the time taken to traverse it is from 80 to 120 days. The
cost of transport is about £5 per 650 lbs. It is needless to say that
owing to Bunder Abbas being in direct communication with London, goods
reach it at a cheaper rate and more quickly than _viâ_ Nushki, which
is not as yet a commercial centre of any great importance. At Bunder
Abbas, too, there is a large and old-established colony of British
Indian merchants, in addition to the agents of more than one British
firm. This route, moreover, possesses certain inherent attractions. The
Customs examination takes place at the point of landing, before the
caravan journey commences; while goods destined for export are only
examined at Bunder Abbas. Further, there are alternative markets at Bam
and Kerman, and alternative routes _viâ_ those centres. Supplies also
are cheaper and not so scanty; and the grazing is better. At the same
time, the Nushki route is quite secure as far as the British frontier
and comparatively safe in Persian territory. No route in Southern
Persia is ever permanently safe.
3. The Bunder Abbas-Yezd-Turbat route.--An alternative route from
Bunder Abbas of less importance, but still the second largest artery of
trade from the south as regards Khorassan, runs _viâ_ Yezd, to which
centre much trade is attracted by the presence of a large number of
merchants and the prospect of choice of markets. Several Khorassan
merchants, indeed, make their purchases in Yezd; although every year
the tendency is to go further afield and establish direct relations
elsewhere. The smaller merchants from lack of capital continue to
depend upon the credit afforded them by the wealthier members of the
fraternity and are thus tied to the home mart.
4. The Bushire-Yezd-Turbat route.--Bushire is 932 miles distant from
Meshed and a certain quantity of goods reaches Khorassan from that
port, perhaps to the extent of 4 per cent. of its total imports. As a
rule, the trade is not direct, but applies to that class of traffic
which is done by merchants who do business solely with Yezd.
5. The Basra-Baghdad-Kermanshah-Teheran route.--The distance from
Baghdad is over 1000 miles. The time taken is about four to five
months, the cost being about £8 10_s._ per 650 lbs. Goods in transit by
this route pay a penalty of 1 per cent. to the Turkish Customs. Owing
to the lack of water-carriage on the Tigris there is frequently much
delay at Basra before goods are forwarded; and, as everything breaks
bulk at Basra and again at Baghdad, the route is bound to be expensive.
It is preferred for heavy articles such as pianos and machinery.
[Illustration: INFANTRY WITH THE PERSIAN COMMISSIONER]
This route, as far as Khorassan is concerned, is chiefly used for the
importation of British, Austro-Hungarian and German manufactures, such
as cloth, gold and silver thread and lace. These goods, as a rule,
are destined primarily for Teheran; but, when conditions are more
promising at Meshed, they are forwarded for sale to that market. Yet
another aspect of this route is that Baghdad, owing to its proximity
to Kerbela, is a great pilgrim centre. Consequently, merchants not
infrequently combine a little profit with a pilgrimage. The figures
for 1904-1905 on this route are £14,491 as against £20,800 in 1903-1904.
6. The Trebizond-Tabriz-Teheran route.--Trebizond is the most westerly
port of entry with which the trade of Khorassan and the commercial
centres of Meshed and Seistan is concerned. The distance to Meshed is
some 1400 miles and the time taken is seldom less than five months. The
cost is about £12 per 650 lbs. This route exists owing to the fact that
goods using it pay no Customs in Turkey; but it is a terribly long and
expensive journey to Khorassan, while the strict application of the
new Persian Customs rules is reacting unfavourably on its prosperity.
The advent of the Russian rail-head within a few miles of Tabriz will
also press it very hard. At the same time certain classes of goods,
not affected by Russian competition, will continue to use this route.
The total for the year 1904-1905 was returned at £17,770, as against
£21,780 for 1903-1904.
To summarise: Route No. 1 is an artificial route called into being on
account of the fiscal barriers erected around Afghanistan, otherwise
the Kandahar-Herat route is shorter and cheaper. Routes 2 and 3 are
the most natural, but receive little assistance from the Persian
Government in the suppression of brigandage or in other ways. Their
desert nature also constitutes a grave disadvantage. These routes are
the main arteries of commerce from the south. Routes 5 and 6 are not
primarily intended to serve Khorassan, but occasionally the market is
more promising at Meshed than Teheran.
A table of these trade routes is appended:
_Table of Routes, Freights, etc., to Meshed._
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Distance Cost of Length
Route. in miles Carriage of Nature of Value
to per Journey Transport. of
Meshed Kharwar in Days. Trade.
(650 lbs.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
£ s. £
1. Nushki, _viâ_ Turbat 1000 6 0 85 Mainly 22,654
Camels
2. Bunder Abbas, _viâ_
Narmashir and Neh
and Turbat 900 5 0 80-120 ” -
3. Bunder Abbas, _viâ_ Yezd
and Turbat 1020 6 0 100-140 ” -
4. Bushire, _viâ_ Yezd and
Turbat 932 6 10 100-140 Mainly 35,592
5. Baghdad, _viâ_ Kermanshah Mules
and Teheran 1050 8 10 120-150 Mules and 14,491
6. Trebizond, _viâ_ Tabriz Camels
andTeheran 1380 12 0 150-180 Mainly 17,770
Camels
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Illustration: THE PERSIAN COMMISSIONER]
It is, however, a question of politics more than of trade, and the
Nushki-Nasratabad route is of less significance beside the political
considerations which attach to the future state of Seistan. In this way
the importance of the latter is as great as the value which attaches
to Herat, because the occupation of Khorassan by Russia would imply a
dominating control of Seistan. Moreover, any movement across Khorassan
upon Seistan places the road to Kandahar from Herat, together with the
strategical points of Sabzawar and Farah, at the mercy of Russia, a
contingency which is certainly to be avoided in the present disordered
condition of our own house in Asia. Seistan is equally related to the
strategic positions of Russia in Central Asia and India, insomuch
that if Russia were to become installed there the obstacle to an
advance upon India, which is presented by Afghanistan, would have
been surmounted and the road to the Gulf opened. Although she might
not make any actual forward movement from Seistan towards India,
countless opportunities would occur to her to foment disturbances
among the Baluchi peoples and to spread an actively hostile propaganda
throughout the trans-frontier region. Such a forward movement, too,
an actual advance of 300 miles, would impose upon the Government of
India many additional outlays of money, besides keeping India in a
continuously unsettled and anxious state. It will be seen that the
interests of Russia and India in Seistan proceed on identical lines. If
India were able to control Outer Seistan an important position would
be established from which she could frustrate Russia’s designs along
the Perso-Afghan border and in the direction of the Persian Gulf. To
do this it is not so much the interests of Seistan as our position in
Afghanistan and Persia which require to be considered. The advantage
with respect to Persia rests just now with the Russians, whose activity
can only be countered with effect by a permanent understanding with the
Amir and the strengthening of Persia in some enduring fashion. With
Kandahar linked up by railway with India, Afghanistan definitely united
in arms with us, and Persia, freed from the wiles of Russia, once more
dependant upon us, our position along the Perso-Afghan border would be
endowed with such strength that the combination well might serve to
check any further Russian activities in the Middle East.
NOTE.--The names of the officers on the Seistan Mission were as follows:
_Political._--Colonel A. H. (now Sir Henry) McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.;
Capt. Ramsay (Personal Assistant).
_Irrigation Officer._--Mr. Ward, C.I.E.
_Survey Officer._--Mr. Tate.
_Infantry Escort._--Major H. F. Walters, 124th Baluchistan Infantry;
Lieut. A. E. Stewart, 124th Baluchistan Infantry; Lieut. Brett, 124th
Baluchistan Infantry.
_Cavalry Escort._--Lieut. C. P. Landon.
_Commanding Camel Corps._--Capt. R. C. Bell, Central India Horse.
_Doctor._--Major W. Irvine, I.M.S.
[20] The area of Seistan Proper is 3847 square miles.
[21] The area of Outer Seistan is 3159 square miles.
[22] Sir H. McMahon before the Royal Geographical Society.
April 1906.
[23] “Sport and Politics under an Eastern Sky.” Earl of
Ronaldshay.
[24] “On the Outskirts of Empire in Asia.” Earl of
Ronaldshay.
[25] “Khurasan and Sistan.” Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Yate.
[26] The telegraph stations are Nushki, Mull, Dalbandin,
Meroi, Mashki Chah, Sainduk, Killa Robat.
[27] Telegraph stations.
[28] “The Middle Eastern Question.” Valentine Chirol.
[Illustration: A CARAVAN OF PACK-PONIES]