HERAT AND THE WESTERN BORDER
The inception of the policy by which our relations with Afghanistan are
controlled at the present time is due to the reflective intuition of
Alexander Burnes[11] who, in 1831, when attached to the Teheran Mission
under Sir John Macdonald, felt the necessity of combating the growing
influence of Russia in Afghanistan. Circumstances, emanating from the
presence of the Russian Mission under Prince Menzikoff at Teheran in
1826, disclosed the policy of Russia towards Persia and Afghanistan to
be following two channels: the one, real, immediate and acquisitive;
the other, remote, artificial and aiming at intimidation. The influence
of these two methods of approach was inimical alike to Persia and
Afghanistan, as also to the interests of India; to their existence
may be traced the causes of the Russo-Persian War. The results of
this campaign with Russia, in which the Shah was engaged from 1826 to
1828, left Persia smarting under its loss of prestige, broken up into
a number of petty principalities and ready to attempt armed incursions
across the frontier by way of restoring its good name. Khiva and then
Herat in turn were considered, selection finally falling upon Herat
as the object of attack. The expedition was begun; but owing to the
death of Abbas Mirza, the father of the Prince Royal Mahomed Mirza
who conducted the expedition, it was withdrawn and for the time being
further action was deferred. In the meantime, affairs in Persia had
attracted the attention of India; and, as the weakness of the Persian
state increased, Russian diplomacy became more active. Distinguished by
a marked hostility to England, the policy of Russia aimed at stirring
up the tribes of Afghanistan. With this end in view Russian advice
counselled Mahomed Mirza Shah to resume the operations against Herat
at the same time that a Russian Mission was despatched to Kabul. The
intimate association with the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan, which
distinguished the position of Russia at this date, is interesting
since it reveals how closely our Afghan and our Persian policies
were interwoven, the one re-acting on the other with sympathetic
consequence. There is, also, equal evidence of the influence exercised
over India by the machinations of Russian diplomacy.
The existence of Russian influence at Kabul and behind the Herat
expedition of 1837-38 synchronised with the formal enunciation of
the policy by which, since 1838 down to 1906, our relations with
Afghanistan have been governed. Indeed, no sooner was the Persian
expedition of 1837-38 launched against Herat than the Government of
India awoke to the urgency of the situation. Lord Auckland, embodying
in more concrete shape the spirit of the idea put forward by Alexander
Burnes in 1831, proclaimed upon November 8, 1838, the necessity of
establishing a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon
our north-west frontier. A treaty of alliance was made with Ranjit
Singh and Shah Shujah and an expedition, ostensibly prepared for the
relief of Herat but not without the intention of checking the growing
influence of Russia in Persia and Afghanistan, crossed the Indus under
the leadership of General Keane. Kandahar was occupied and Kabul
entered in 1839, when Shah Shujah was proclaimed. Unfortunately, owing
to one of those singular mistakes of judgment which, by their very
frequency, confirm the impression that our success in Asia is more by
good fortune than good management, Kabul was evacuated in the winter
of 1841-42 and the beneficial possibilities of the occupation of Kabul
dissipated in a disgraceful and signally disastrous retirement.
In respect of Herat, Persian designs upon the fortress were by no
means crushed by the effect of the campaign--the first Afghan War of
1838-1842. Within ten years--in 1851--disturbances, arising out of
the death of the Khan of Herat, caused the new ruler to throw himself
once more upon the support of Persia. This situation gave rise to the
Anglo-Persian Convention January 1853, by which the independence of
Herat and its continuation in Afghan hands was assured. This step,
although indicating the importance which the Government of India
attached to Herat and giving direct confirmation to the pronouncement
of Lord Auckland in 1838, was not sufficient to secure immunity to the
Herat Khanate from Persian interference. Three years later--March
1856--the Government of Persia, taking advantage of a rupture of
relations with Great Britain which had occurred in the previous
December, despatched a force to Herat. The occupation of the city
which followed was short-lived, an _émeute_ occurring in which the
Persian flag was replaced by that of the British. Within a few months
the espousers of the English cause, receiving no encouragement from
the Imperial Government, hauled down their flag and Herat passed once
more into Persian hands. Surrendered to Persia on October 25, 1856, it
was evacuated finally and restored to Afghanistan July 27, 1857, under
pressure of the expeditionary column which disembarked at Karachi in
the Persian Gulf on December 4, 1856.
This war, concluded by a treaty of peace signed in Paris March 4,
1857, marks an important epoch in our history with Afghanistan. It
denoted the resumption of relations which had been in abeyance since
1842, preparing the way for that treaty of alliance which was signed
at Peshawar with Dost Mahommed on January 27, 1857. By this engagement
the assistance of the Afghans, in return for a monthly subsidy during
the continuation of the war of 1856, was secured against the Persians.
As events proved no such help was required. Although hostilities ceased
within six weeks of the date of the agreement the monthly subsidy,
beginning in the autumn of 1856, was continued until September 30,
1858, the accidence of the Indian mutiny dictating the prudence of
preserving friendly relations with Kabul until the very disquieting
influences, which were then at work, had been allayed. Relations with
Afghanistan continued until 1863 to follow a course more or less
overshadowed by the growing importance of Russian intrigue in Central
Asia.
While our activities in Persia and Afghanistan demonstrated merely
political expansion, a change of quite another order was beginning to
define the position of Russia in Central Asia. From this it became
evident that a severe test would be imposed upon our trans-border
policy. By successive stages, Russian aggrandisement had subjugated
the several States which were lying between her territories and the
frontiers of Afghanistan when the principles of our policy in regard
to that country were announced in 1838. One by one the Turcoman tribes
were conquered until, by the capture of Samarkand in 1868 and the
submission of the Amir of Bokhara, Russia gained direct approach to
the waters of the Oxus, with the right to furnish its bank with armed
posts. The moment was rapidly arriving against which all the energies
of Indo-Afghan policy in the past should have been directed. In the
interval, before the Russian domination of Central Asia was complete,
the aim of British policy to bring about a strong Afghanistan had
seemed upon the point of realisation when, in 1863, Dost Mahommed died.
None could foresee the developments of the future. The activity of the
Russians in Central Asia boded no good; and with the death of Dost
Mahommed it was recognised that the resulting situation contained a
challenge to the principles of the policy by which, in years gone by,
we had proposed to guarantee the inviolability of Afghan territory.
Indeed, an attitude of non-intervention was no longer politic; but,
instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the death of Dost
Mahommed and occupying the territories of Afghanistan for ourselves,
we hesitated. Yet, if the passing visit of a Russian mission to Kabul
in 1838 had been accounted sufficient warranty for the invasion of
Afghanistan, how much more the massing of Russian forces upon its
northern and north-western frontiers should have propelled us to a
renewed display of energy in 1863. Unfortunately for ourselves, the
logic of our position was destroyed irretrievably by the train of
hostile circumstance which our supineness had set in motion. Whilst our
politicians debated Russia had acted; and Shir Ali, Khan of Herat and
son of Dost Mahommed, spurred by Russian promises and intrigues, began
a movement against Azim, Khan of Kabul. Varying fortunes distinguished
the efforts of the rival factions between 1863-1868; but at length,
in 1868, Shir Ali prevailed and he became recognised as _de facto_
ruler of Afghanistan. For the moment the situation showed improvement,
as Shir Ali veered from Russia to India. Practical assistance, in
the shape of money and materials of war, was at once accorded him
by the Government of India, between whose supreme chief, Lord Mayo,
and himself as the ruler of Afghanistan a conference was arranged at
Umballa in March of 1869. The outcome of this meeting, not by any
means so definite as the interests of a trans-border policy demanded,
was held to be sufficient to dispel the feelings of alarm which the
prolonged military activities of Russia in the Trans-Caspian region
had aroused. None the less, while the Russians were occupied with the
conquest of Khiva and Shir Ali had been disappointed at the aloofness
of the Indian Government, four momentous years 1869-1873 were passing.
Their close revealed only the further and more complete estrangement
of the Amir of Kabul through the amazing ineptitude with which the
advisers of the Indian Government dealt with his difficulties. Bitter,
indifferent, and relying upon the Russian promises of assistance of
1872, Shir Ali became openly defiant, repudiating all suggestions for
any formal treaty of alliance, 1876-1877. At the same time, 1877,
he flatly declined to admit to Kabul any British officers as the
accredited representatives of the Government of India, although in 1878
he himself received a Russian mission there. With the failure of our
own attempt (1878) to force a mission upon him, the Second Afghan War,
1878-1880, began.
[Illustration: GANDAMAK BRIDGE, WHERE THE FAMOUS TREATY WAS SIGNED]
Kandahar was occupied by Sir Donald Stewart, January 8, 1879; and,
while a second force moved into position against the capital, a third
under Sir Frederick Roberts marched against Paiwar Kotal. Shir Ali,
flying before these operations, died at Mazar-i-Sharif in February
1879, the first chapter of the second war closing with the installation
of his son Yakub Khan on the Kabul throne and the despatch of the
Cavagnari mission to Kabul. The treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879,
had barely put the seal upon certain rights, which might have led
ultimately to the definite establishment of British authority in
Afghanistan, when, in the following September, the sudden massacre
of the entire mission occurred. The second phase of the Afghan War
of 1878-1880 opened with the operations of Sir Frederick Roberts.
Defeating the Afghans at Charasia, he entered Kabul in October
causing the overthrow of Yakub Khan and paving the way for the
eventual recognition of the late Amir Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul.
Throughout this occupation of Kabul the temper of the surrounding
tribes became slowly inflamed until, in December 1879, a rebellion
against the British was proclaimed. The tribes rising, the forces in
Kabul were placed in jeopardy by the interruption of communications
with India. Action by Sir Donald Stewart, who had come up with forces
from Kandahar, stemmed the torrent, the situation growing more complex
when Abdur Rahman, who had retired across the Oxus on his defeat by
Shir Ali in the war for succession, 1863-1868, reappeared in March
of 1880 to establish himself in north-western Afghanistan. Both the
Government of India and the bulk of the population welcomed his return,
and withdrawing the territories of the Kandahar province from his rule
he was recognised as Amir of Afghanistan with certain reservations
in respect of foreign policy and dealings with Russia. Unfortunately
the disasters which hitherto had followed British intervention in
Afghanistan were to continue; in July 1880, but a few months after the
proclamation of Abdur Rahman as the new Amir, the news of the defeat
at Maiwand of General Burrows was received. Ayub Khan, Khan of Herat
and youngest son of Shir Ali, marching upon Kandahar and defeating the
British force sent to check his advance, had succeeded in investing the
city. Sir Frederick Roberts was now once more to come upon the scene.
Taking 10,000 men from Sir Donald Stewart’s garrison at Kabul he set
out to the relief of Kandahar, accomplishing by a series of forced
efforts an extraordinarily rapid march of 313 miles and, on September
1, 1880, routing Ayub Khan’s army. A little later, in 1881, British
troops once again retired to India from Afghanistan; but a sudden
attack by Ayub Khan’s adherents in July, 1881, secured the re-capture
of Kandahar, Ayub Khan remaining there until, on September 22, he was
totally vanquished by Abdur Rahman, losing all his possessions and
retreating to Persia, from where subsequently he surrendered to the
Government of India.
[Illustration: PLAN OF HERAT]
[Illustration: A STREET SHRINE.]
During this long pre-occupation with Afghan affairs Russia had made
considerable improvement in her own position in Central Asia, where
but little more than the final touches remained to be given. These
appeared with the seizure of Merv in 1884 and the completion of the
Central Asian railway between Krasnovodsk and Samarkand 1800-1888.
The slow, yet faltering, steps with which Russia had maintained
her advance towards Afghanistan, in contradiction of all treaties,
in abuse of all frontiers and in contempt of our own inaction, at
last forced home upon the British Government the fruits of its own
miscalculations. In 1884 along the Afghan north-western frontier as
also in 1896 on the Pamirs, Boundary Commissions were assembled to meet
the exigencies of the situation. The former of these took the field
under the leadership of Sir Peter Lumsden, with whom were associated
Colonel Sir West Ridgeway and numerous officers attached for political,
survey, military, geological and medical duties, including Major E.
L. Durand, Major C. E. Yate, Major T. H. Holdich, Captain St. George
Gore, Captain Peacocke, Captain the Honourable M. C. Talbot, Captain
Maitland, and Lieutenant A. C. Yate. The Pamirs Mission was under the
presidency of Major-General M. G. Gerard, with whom were Colonel T. H.
Holdich, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Wahab, Captain E. F. H. McSwiney, and
Surgeon-Captain A. W. Alcock. Russia was represented by Major-General
Povalo Shveikovski, Colonel Galkin, Captain Krutorogin, Lieutenant
Orakolow, Monsieur Panafidine, and Doctor Welman.[12]
The province of Herat extends from near the sources of the Hari Rud
on the east to the Persian frontier on the west, and from the Russian
southern boundary to the northern limits of Seistan. The area is 300
miles from east to west and 200 miles from north to south. North,
south and west there are tracts of unproductive country, presenting
facilities for development only over restricted surfaces. In the east
the upper reaches of the Hari Rud valley stretch away to the mountain
regions of the Koh-i-Baba. It has been estimated that the valley of the
Hari Rud is capable of furnishing supplies for an army of occupation
which should not exceed 150,000 men. It is this fact, coupled with
the value of its position as the converging point of roads from the
Caspian, Merv, Meshed, Bokhara, and from India through Kandahar,
which has invested Herat with the title of The Key of India. The Hari
Rud oasis presents a wonderful appearance of fertility; near the
city groves of pistachia and mulberry trees, blackberry bushes, wild
roses and innumerable settlements abound. The Hari Rud, flowing in a
single channel 100 to 140 feet in width which diminishes as the summer
wanes, has been the means of converting into a smiling paradise the
surrounding wilderness. Flood-water in this river lasts from the close
of January until the end of March, when fords are dangerous to cross.
The subsidence of flood-water in April makes it more readily passable,
the average depth of the fords then measuring 4 feet. Later, when the
warmer weather appears, the permanent channel breaks up into long
lakes, fed by springs and underground continuations of supplementary
streams. The northern extremity of the river, which waters the Tejend
oasis and the Sarakhs region, preserves in the main the characteristics
of the upper stream. The undulating country between the Hari Rud and
the Murghab, extending from the northern slopes of the Paropamisus to
the edge of the Kara Kum, is called Badghis. At one time this district
included the oasis of Yulatan and, even now, it embraces Pendjeh.
Across it, along the banks of the Murghab and through the valley of the
Kushk, runs the direct road from Merv to Herat. From the levels of
valleys within Russian jurisdiction, which are about 2000 feet above
sea-level, the road rises throughout a distance of 35 miles until it
pierces the Paropamisus range by the Ardewan pass, 4700 feet above
sea-level. From these mountains, it descends across the broken slopes
of the Koh-i-Mulla Khwaja until it meets at last the alluvial flats of
the Hari Rud plain, wherein the city of Herat stands, 2600 feet above
sea-level.
The city of Herat, built entirely of mud with certain outworks lying
beyond its walls, stands in a hollow. It forms a quadrangle 1600 yards
by 1500 yards. On the western, southern and eastern faces the wall is
a straight line, the only projecting points being the gateways and
the bastions. On the northern face, the line is broken by the old Ark
or citadel, which stands back about 200 yards from the main wall and
is situated upon a high, artificial mound, which is 250 feet in width
and between 50 and 60 feet in height. Above this the walls of the city
rise an additional 30 feet. There are five gates--the Kutabchak near
the north-east angle of the wall and the Malik gate at the re-entering
angle formed by the wall of the Ark and the continuation of the north
wall. The other gates are on the western, southern and eastern faces,
the names respectively being the Irak, Kandahar and Kushk. Four
streets, running from the centre of each face, meet at the Charsu, a
domed square covered with beams and matting in the heart of the city. A
wide, road encircles the walls on the inside, although its upkeep has
been sadly neglected. The defences of the city are contained by the
wall which stands above the mound. On its outer slope there were at one
time two parallel trenches, covered by low parapets; but the trenches,
like the moat at the foot of the mound, are now choked up. There are
25 bastions on each wall. The gates, defended by works differing from
one another in shape, are of irregular design. They resemble redans,
with sides of unequal length and project about 200 feet beyond the main
wall. The defences of the gateways are of a lower profile than those
of the main works. At the apex of the projection a small rectangular
traverse screens the postern.
The northern wall is irregular. Near its centre, thrown back about 200
yards from the main wall and standing on a mound of its own, is the
position of the old citadel. A “return” in the wall, leading down on
this work from the eastern portion of the north face, terminates on
the counterscarp of its ditch. The western face, retired about 100
yards behind the eastern face, connects with the north-west angle of
the citadel by a slight bend. There are two gateways on this front, the
one about 200 yards to the westward of the north-east angle and the
other in the main wall. This latter is unprovided with the irregular
projecting work attached to the others.
The wall of the fort is about 14 feet thick at the base, 9 feet thick
at the top and 18 feet high, exclusive of the parapet. The parapet is
2½ feet thick at the base, 9 inches at the crest and 7½ feet in height.
It is loop-holed and crowned with the ruins of small battlements which,
like so much attaching to Herat, have been permitted to crumble away.
In several places the walls have broken down, the repairs subsequently
effected adding to the general insecurity of what has remained rather
than improving the original breaches. The width of the pathway behind
the parapet is 6 feet; but there are many gaps, and continuity of
communication is preserved only by the severe physical exertion
of flying leaps. Their condition renders them ill-adapted to the
employment of artillery, while the ramps leading up to this pathway are
barely broad enough to admit the passage of a single man.
At one time this wall was flanked by small exterior towers, placed at
intervals of 100 feet. They varied in size and are now so generally
in ruin that it is difficult to estimate their dimensions. In their
original state they were probably from 40 to 60 feet in diameter,
the larger towers being 30 feet in width and projecting 25 feet. In
contrast with the containing wall of the city the wall of the fort
possesses an outward inclination, equal perhaps to one-seventh of its
height. The slope of the towers is generally greater; many of them are
splayed at the base to accommodate their foundations to the sloping
surface upon which they rest. The whole work appears originally to have
been constructed of sun-dried brick, backed with layers of moist earth.
Some of the towers have foundations and facings of rough stone or burnt
brick, laid in mud. The wall itself is a very old one; stone, brick
and earth have been used indiscriminately, so that it now presents a
patchwork appearance.
[Illustration: THE IRAK GATE]
The interior slope of the mound, upon which the walls stand, is steep
and from the base of the wall drops perpendicularly into the town.
No attention whatever appears to have been paid to this part of the
fortifications. The inhabitants of the city have been for several
generations in the habit of removing earth from it for the construction
or repair of their dwellings. At one time, too, houses were erected
close to the foot of the rampart and also upon it, the slope being
excavated to admit of the walls being erected against it. A partial
collapse of the mound has followed, the fallen masses of earth serving
as a convenient resting-place for the dead.
The old citadel is a brick structure 150 yards long from east to west
and 50 yards wide. It occupies an elevation of its own, and, when
erected, stood nearly in the centre of the north face of the city. It
was flanked by several towers, differing greatly in size; those at
the angles were the largest, while those on the north-east angle were
the most imposing. The interior, in part occupied by Feramorz Khan,
the Commander-in-Chief, is divided into three courts. The inhabited
portion is a lofty building, supported by four bastions along its face,
with the entrance gate facing the main street to the Charsu. It fills
a space 110 yards in length by 60 yards in breadth. The Ark, from its
massive appearance, is very dignified, but it is not calculated to
withstand protracted defence if the town itself were captured. Its
walls, thickly built but of inferior masonry, are exposed from base to
parapet, and a few shells dropped behind them would create great havoc.
The Ark-i-nao, or new citadel, serves as a parade-ground for the
garrison. Weak both in plan and profile, it is constructed in advance
of the mound, but 80 feet below it and upon a level with the country.
It consists of 4 straight walls 300 yards in length. The face is
flanked by 5 semi-circular towers, each possessing a diameter of 30
feet. The walls are 13 feet thick at the base and 8 feet at the top,
crowned on their outer edge by a parapet 6 feet high and 1½ feet thick.
There was once a ditch 30 feet in width and 15 feet in depth at a
distance of 60 feet from its base, but it is now a general receptacle
for the refuse of the city.
[Illustration: HERAT CITADEL]
Within recent years the fortifications of Herat have undergone
radical alteration. At one time, prior to the Pendjeh crisis, the
city could not be said to possess an esplanade nor any free field of
fire. Detached buildings, even small villages, surrounded it, while
cultivation extended close to the walls; and where agriculture ended
the cemeteries of the city began. Mosques, tombs and reservoirs stood
opposite the gateways, some of them lying within 100 yards of the
walls. Vast mounds of earth were also close at hand. Many of these
defects were removed[13] under the guidance of the British officers
who were assisting in the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan boundary in
1884-87; in 1903-04, under the supervision of Feramorz Khan, additional
improvements were made and a number of mountain and field batteries
installed.
In general the Herati is not a fighting man and cares little for
military appearances. Indeed, if choice were left to the Heratis they
would sooner surrender at once to the Russians than run the risk of
future disturbances. The garrison is not generally drawn from the
locality and seldom includes many Herati, Hazara or Taimani recruits.
Commanded by Feramorz Khan, it is composed mainly of regiments from
Kandahar and Kabul, whose men lounge through the streets in unkempt
undress or clad in dirty linen and to whom belongs such little martial
spirit as may be detected in the city. In this direction nothing can
be more marked than the difference between the Herati and the Afghan
soldier. The former, a peasant pure and simple, is unversed in military
science, while it is a rare sight to see the soldiers without an
extraordinary number and variety of weapons attached to their persons.
Each carries, as a rule, two pistols, a sword, rifle and many knives,
their swagger and overbearing disposition causing them to be hated by
the wretched population. The position of the city to-day as between
Russia and India is rather that of a woman whose wares are put up to
the highest bidder. It is not particularly partial to the rule of
the Amir, to the overtures of Russia or to the influence of India.
One might say that it were indifferent alike to each of these three
interested parties and that it is merely a question of price which
will determine its surrender. It must be confessed that the fortress
occupies an unfortunate position. Whatever the garrison might attempt
in support of the huge earthworks which the place boasts, there is no
doubt that the sympathies of the population--if the history of the past
goes for anything--would be given to any who contrived to evict the
Afghans; and, as all reports concur in alluding to the lavish manner in
which Russian roubles have circulated in the province, the statement
may be hazarded that, under certain contingencies, the tribes on the
north-western border of Afghanistan would declare for the Russians.
Upon this aspect of the situation various changes introduced by the
Amir into the administration of Herat province, and concerning equally
all posts along the banks of the Oxus and the western border, have
direct bearing. Although there is practically no intercourse between
the Afghan and Russian posts on either bank of the Amu Daria, indeed
the ferry station at Chushka Guzar is constantly sniped from the
Afghan bank by Pathan pickets, there has been an insidious growth of
association between the Herat officials and the Russians. Quite lately
the Kazi Saad-ud-Din, Governor of Herat, was recalled, the Shahgassi
Mahomed Sarwar Khan taking his place, while a warning was administered
to the commander-in-chief. There is no doubt that these officials
accepted complimentary gifts from the Russian officials at Merv, and
the transference of the one and the rebuke of the other may check the
propensity of the native to find in the efficacious application of
the Russian rouble a panacea for all evils. In respect of the soldiers
themselves, orders have been issued from Kabul that all detachments on
frontier duty are to be relieved monthly. Obviously Herat is too close
to the Russian border not to have been intimidated by the spectacle
of Russia’s strength in Central Asia. A similar state of things might
not be expected to prevail in Kabul and Kandahar. Kabul is too much
under the personal sway of the Amir to express any active interest in
Russia or India, while Kandahar has been associated too closely with
the reverses which British arms have experienced in Afghanistan to have
over much respect for the greatness of Hindustan. Russia is really
the supreme and dominating factor in Afghanistan, not only along the
northern, eastern and western frontiers, but throughout the kingdom.
[Illustration: KITCHEN IN NATIVE HOUSE]
Herat is a dirty town. The small lanes, crooked and narrow which
branch from the main thoroughfares, are roofed and their gloom offers
safe harbourage for the perpetration of every possible offence. The
breadth of the streets is only 12 feet, but in their narrowest parts
even this space is reduced. Pools of stagnant water left by the rains,
piles of refuse thrown from the houses, together with dead cats, dogs
and the excrement of human beings, mingle their effluvia in these low
tunnels. Much of the city has been abandoned and various travellers,
in reporting their experiences, agree that the bazaars are of a very
inferior order. On either side of the streets there are spacious serais
where the merchants have their depôts. The western face of the city
is the least populated, the buildings in this quarter being a mass
of ruins. The houses are constructed usually in the form of hollow
squares. They are commonly of one storey, built of brick and mud, with
very thick walls. The roofs are vaulted and composed, equally with
the walls, of mud; the entrances are low and winding. These houses
are quite incombustible. The larger establishments have stable and
servants’ courts attached to them, and every courtyard has, in its
centre, a well or small reservoir for the reception of water. All the
houses are more or less capable of resisting men armed with rifles, and
a determined garrison might, by barricading the streets leading to the
ramparts and loopholing the adjacent houses, protract the defence of
the place for some time after the walls had been gained by the enemy.
There are several spacious caravansaries in the town, all of which
open upon the street leading from the Kandahar Gate to the citadel and
would serve, in emergency, for the accommodation of troops. At the time
of Connolly there were:
Houses 4000
Shops 1200
Baths 20
Colleges 6
Caravansaries 17
Although the city has been almost entirely destroyed since his day, his
estimate is of some value for purposes of comparison.
[Illustration: HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS]
The principal building in Herat is the Masjid-i-Jama, which comprises
an area of 800 yards square. It was built at the end of the fifteenth
century, in the reign of Shah Husein by his relative Prince Shibali.
When perfect it was 465 feet long and 275 feet wide; it had 408
cupolas, 130 windows, 444 pillars, 6 entrances and was adorned in the
most magnificent manner with gilding, carving, precious mosaic and
other elaborate and costly embellishments. It stands in the north-east
quarter of the city, about 300 yards from the east walls.
The palace of Chahar Bagh is situated to the west of the Masjid-i-Jama
and was originally the winter residence of the chiefs of Herat.
It is now the residence of the Governor of the city, but has been
considerably enlarged and improved. A fine garden has been laid out
with flower-beds and a fountain. It is enclosed on either side.
The inhabitants of Herat, who are mostly Shiah Mahommedans, comprise
Afghans, Hazaras, Jamshidis and Tiamanis, with 700 Hindus and some 400
families of Jews. Its population has always been subject to constant
fluctuation. When Christie visited it in 1809 the population stood at
100,000 souls. Connolly considers these figures too high, reducing them
himself to 45,000. According to Ferrier, again, prior to the siege of
1838 the number of inhabitants was, at least, 70,000; when the siege
was raised these numbers had dwindled to between 6000 to 7000, a total
which, he considered, had increased in 1845 to 22,000. As under the
severe but secure rule of Jan Mahommed life was safe, it is probable
that before the investment of 1857 it again approached Connolly’s
total. Its siege and capture by Dost Mahommed in 1863 must have once
more reduced its numbers; when Vambéry visited it two months afterwards
he was met by a scene of utter desolation and devastation, from which,
according to the estimate of A. C. Yate[14] in 1885, the city had never
recovered. Citing the previous census, which gave the population at
1700 families, the latter returned it at 10,000. The existing number is
now a little less than 18,000 people, exclusive of the garrison, which
in peace numbers five regiments of regular infantry, twenty squadrons
of cavalry, one battalion of sappers and eight batteries.
[Illustration: A CARAVANSARY COMPOUND]
The city has declined considerably from its quondam opulence. There is
scarcely any trade and the houses are deserted. It is, nevertheless,
famous for its fruit and its breed of horses; but the Heratis have
endured too many of “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”
to be able to withstand adversity and bad seasons. Wars and sieges,
pestilence and famine have had their effect; and the scene, which
Vambéry described so brightly, is now sombre and melancholy. No longer
is Herat the great central market between India and Persia. It still
receives a certain amount of merchandise from Kabul, such as shawls,
indigo, sugar, chintz, muslin, bafta, kincob, hides and leather. These
are exported to Meshed, Yezd, Teheran, Baghdad and Kirman, and exchanged
for tea, sugar-candy, china-ware, broadcloth, chintz, silk, copper,
pepper, dates, shawls, numnahs, carpets and all kinds of spices. Silk
is obtainable in the vicinity of Herat, and lambs’ fleeces and
sheep-skins are made up locally into caps and cloaks. There are, too,
a number of native craftsmen who work in silk and metals, leather,
iron and wood; but there are few opportunities for their skill and no
money with which to pay for it. The carpets of Herat, once so famed for
softness and for the brilliance and permanence of their colours, are
no longer in demand. At one time they were made in all sizes, ranging
in price from 10 to 1000 rupees; but their day is gone. Indeed, in
its present impoverished state, the city is eloquent only of a bygone
grandeur. Everything is decayed and decrepit.
[Illustration: RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL ON THE PERSO-AFGHAN BORDER]
In relation to future developments in the military position along the
western frontier Herat, the immediate objective of Russia, has been
for many years the pivot of our trans-border policy. Lying within 80
miles of Kushkinski Post, itself only eighteen hours by train from
Merv, it would not be long after the outbreak of hostilities that a
Russian force would be before its walls. The passage of reinforcements
from Merv, in support of such detached or independent flying column,
would be divided between Kushkinski Post and Tanur Sangi, which, when
considered from Merv, the main depôt of supplies in Trans-Caspia, rank
practically as ultimate bases, with an immediate base at Pendjeh. The
position of Herat would be no worse than Maimana, Balkh, Kunduz and
Andkhui, upon which an equally rapid concentration would be made. At
such a time the forts established at Kala Khum, Chushka Guzar, Kelif
and Termes--where, by order of Kuropatkin, a strong work has been
placed to cover the debouchure opposite Patta Hissar of the road from
Takht-a-pul, the central cantonment of Northern Afghanistan--would
be sufficient to repel attack if the Afghans were rash enough to
cross. Again, between the Oxus and the chain of main bases established
along the Central Asian railway--Askhabad, Merv, Samarkand, Khokand
and Margelan, with Tashkent as the great centre of arterial
distribution--there would be a line of auxiliary depôts, such as
Sharisabz and Hissar and no doubt possessing by the time war occurred
railway communication with the Central Asian system on the one hand and
the Oxus on the other, to serve as intermediate bases of supply to the
ultimate frontier and fighting zone.
In the situation along the extreme eastern frontier, the
Badakshan-Wakhan region, the same preponderating strength and advantage
of position would be detected in the Russian dispositions. The
existence of the several elevated areas composing the Pamirs and acting
as a containing rampart to the Russian left flank renders the Russian
sphere between Kala Khum and Langar Kisht sufficiently impervious
to serious attack. As a precaution against sporadic forays from the
Afghan posts on the opposite bank a number of permanent forts, usually
included within the Pamir military district, would be available.
On the right bank, between the upper waters of the Oxus and Charog,
there is the post of Langar Kisht where the Russians maintain one
company of thirty men with a maxim gun. Charog itself, which is
opposite Kala Bar Panja, is the principal post of the Russians in
the region of the Pamirs. Here the strength of the garrison varies
according to the season of the year. During the winter months the
muster is fifty Cossacks with four officers and a maxim detachment.
Two maxims and a single mountain gun have been mounted on the ramparts
covering the river. Charog is connected with Fort Murghabi by a road
along the Alichur Pamir and the banks of the Ghund Daria; built of
clay, wood and stone, it possesses earthworks of an enduring character.
Additional accommodation is in course of construction, as it is
intended to establish quarters there for one battalion of troops. The
winter strength of the Russian force in the Pamirs is 500 men; this
will be raised to 1000 men so soon as the requisite barracks have been
erected at Charog and Fort Murghabi. The probable disposition of the
force will put 300 men into each of the three forts at Tashkurgan,
Charog and Murghabi, the remaining 100 being detailed by companies to
the smaller posts of Langar Kisht, Aktash and Kizil Rabat. At Kala Wanj
there was an establishment of 300 levies from the native army of the
Amir of Bokhara, a further detachment from the same establishment and
similar in strength, being in garrison at Kala Wamar. At Kala-Khum,
occupied by 1000 men, there was one native regiment. Along the reach
of the Middle Oxus the same arrangement held good, native troops being
distributed among all ferry and customs posts, constituting a useful
supplement to the Russian troops in the riverine areas. Hitherto the
employment of the Bokharan levies for garrison and frontier duty in
Darwaz, Shignan and Roshan has been quite a feature of the Russian
disposition along the Oxus. Drilled by Russian instructors and armed
with modern weapons these territorial troops are regarded by the
Russians as the equal of the Afghan soldiery. In war, they would be
expected to relieve the regular forces of a multitude of fatigues and
thus leave the energies and numbers of the Russian command unimpaired
by that slow process of attrition by which, in the main, the fighting
strength of an army becomes so quickly exhausted. Quite lately these
posts have been taken over by the regular forces, the native troops
being withdrawn for service in the Khanate. It has been always unlikely
that, in the event of hostilities, the Russians would permit levies to
take the field against the Afghan forces.
[Illustration: AFGHAN POST AT KALA PANJA
_Photo, Olufsen_]
On the left bank of the stream the Afghan authorities maintain posts
at Kala Panja, which is opposite Langar Kisht, Kala Bar Panja, which
confronts Charog, and Ishkashim. No works of special importance have
been constructed to observe Kala Wamar and Kala Wanj, the work at
Kala Bar Panja being the central Afghan position on the Upper Oxus. As
a fort it compares not unfavourably with the Russian one at Charog;
in point of size it is larger than the original Russian structure
there. It is in the form of a square; the walls, constructed of clay
and stone, are 200 yards in length, about 12 inches thick and 15 to 20
feet in height. It has capacity for about 1000 men and, along one wall,
provision for a small force of cavalry.
Possession of these works did not quite equalise the situation and
within the last few months many changes have taken place in the
Eastern, Northern and Western commands, the raising of 20,000 recruits
having been sanctioned by the Amir for the Eastern and Western
divisions at the request of the commanding officers. Leading chiefs
bringing 1000 men to the colours were to receive the rank of regimental
commanders; those who raised 100 men would become company officers.
It was further promised that the pay of these new regiments would be
issued monthly. The strengthening process has been also applied to the
Home or Central command, 10,000 men having been raised in the Shinwari
district and sworn in by the Governor of Jelalabad; while enlistment
among the Sufi tribal levies has been started for the Kabul garrison.
Further, the Governors of Maimana and Faizabad were instructed to
entrench their cities, to throw up the necessary watch towers and to
place all approaches in a condition of defence. Two new forts were
located on the Oxus at Kala Panja and Ishkashim in Wakhan, a third at
Boharac and a fourth at Faizabad.
These fresh works possess nominal accommodation for 1000 men, although
there is ample space for double or even treble this number. Built in
the form of a square, the walls are 6 feet thick at the top and 18 feet
at the base. Artillery emplacements have been prepared in the watch
towers at each corner and a shooting-gallery runs round the defences
a few feet below their parapet. Quarters have been placed along three
walls, each wall taking twenty houses, the fourth wall holding the
stable, transport and commissariat arrangements. Pathan regiments from
Faizabad were detailed to these positions and also to the support
of the Badakshan-Wakhan border; new regiments, fashioned from the
reinforcements which had been despatched to Faizabad, taking their
place. The normal strength of the Eastern command is represented by
seven regiments of Pathan infantry, four squadrons of cavalry and five
batteries.
Similarly there has been much activity in the Northern command, the
Governor of Afghan Turkestan, Sirdar Ghulam Ali Khan a son of Abdur
Rahman, having completed his development of the scheme of defences
at Dehdadi which the late Amir created. That stronghold has now been
incorporated with Takht-a-Pul, which lies between Mazar-i-Sharif and
Balkh and where an important fortified cantonment has been established,
possessing a permanent strength of several thousand men. Habib Ullah
has full confidence in his brother Ghulam Ali Khan and, in view of
the delays which occur in the passage of supplies from the Kabul
arsenals to the Herat and Turkestan garrisons, the Amir has sanctioned
a proposal to construct in Herat and Takht-a-Pul, small-arms ordnance
works, tanning-yards and boot factories, so that these two important
commands may be independent of Kabul for these elemental accessories
to their efficiency. Powers of control over these projects have been
invested in Ghulam Ali Khan, who has appointed an assistant to the
Herat branch of the undertaking.
[Illustration: A WATER-SELLER.]
[11] “England and Russia in the East.” Rawlinson.
[12] This study of Anglo-Afghan relations is continued in
Chapters xvi. and xvii.
[13] “The Indian Borderland.” Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich.
[14] “England and Russia.” A. C. Yate, 1886.