doctrine supposes, it is not easy to see how piety has come to make him
her special object, or dogmatism to lay down special propositions
concerning him. Consistent Rationalists have in fact admitted, that
what the orthodox dogma calls Christology, forms no integral part of
the rationalistic system, since this system consists indeed of a
religion which Christ taught, but not of a religion of which he is the
object; that, viewing Christology as the doctrine of the Messiah, it is
merely an accommodation to the Jewish mind,—that even taken in a more
noble sense, as the doctrine of the life, the actions, and the fate of
Jesus as a divine messenger, it does not belong to a system of faith,
for the universal truths of religion are as little connected with our
ideas concerning the person of him who first enunciated them, as are
the philosophical propositions in the systems of Leibnitz and Wolf, of
Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, with the opinions we may happen to form of
the persons of their authors; that what relates to the person and work
of Jesus belongs, not to religion itself, but to the history of
religion, and must either be prefixed to a system of religious doctrine
as an historical introduction, or appended to it as an elucidatory
sequel. [2223] Accordingly Henke, in his Lineaments, has removed
Christology from its wonted position as an integral part of systematic
theology, and has placed it as a subdivision under the head of
anthropology.
Thus, however, Rationalism enters into open war with the Christian
faith, for it seeks to thrust into the background, nay, to banish from
the province of theology, that which is its essential point, and
corner-stone. But this very opposition is decisive of the insufficiency
of the rationalistic system, proving that it does not perform what is
demanded from every system of religious doctrine: namely, first, to
give adequate expression to the faith which is the object of the
doctrine; and secondly, to place this expression in a relation, whether
positive or negative, to science. Now the Rationalists, in the effort
to bring the faith into harmony with science, restrict its expression;
for a Christ who is only a distinguished man, creates indeed no
difficulty to the understanding, but is not the Christ in whom the
Church believes.
§ 148.
THE ECLECTIC CHRISTOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER.
It is the effort of this theologian to avoid both these ungrateful
results, and without prejudice to the faith, to form such a conception
of the doctrine of the Christ as may be proof against the attacks of
science. [2224] On the one hand, he has adopted in its fullest extent
the negative criticism directed by Rationalism against the doctrine of
the Church, nay, he has rendered it even more searching; on the other
hand, he has sought to retain what Rationalism had lost, the essential
part of positive Christianity: and thus he has saved many in these days
from the narrowness of Supranaturalism, and the emptiness of
Rationalism. This simplification of the faith Schleiermacher effects in
the following manner: he does not set out, with the Protestant, from
the doctrine of Scripture, nor with the Catholic from the decision of
the church, for in both these ways he would have to deal with a
precise, developed system, which, having originated in remote
centuries, must come into collision with the science of the present
day; but he sets out from the consciousness of the Christian, from that
internal experience resulting to the individual from his connexion with
the Christian community, and he thus obtains a material which, as its
basis is feeling, is more flexible, and to which it is easier to give
dialectically a form that satisfies science.
As a member of the Christian church—this is the point of departure in
the Christology of Schleiermacher [2225]—I am conscious of the removal
of my sinfulness, and the impartation of absolute perfection: in other
words, in communion with the church, I feel operating upon me the
influence of a sinless and perfect principle. This influence cannot
proceed from the Christian community as an effect of the reciprocal
action of its members on each other; for to every one of these sin and
imperfection are inherent, and the co-operation of impure beings can
never produce anything pure as its result. It must be the influence of
one who possessed that sinlessness and perfection as personal
qualities, and who moreover stands in such a relation to the Christian
community, that he can impart these qualities to its members: that is,
since the Christian church could not exist prior to this impartation,
it must be the influence of its founder. As Christians, we find
something operated within us; hence, as from every effect we argue to
its cause, we infer the influence of Christ, and from this again, the
nature of his person, which must have had the powers necessary to the
exertion of this influence.
To speak more closely, that which we experience as members of the
Christian church, is a strengthening of our consciousness of God, in
its relation to our sensuous existence; that is, it is rendered easier
to us to deprive the senses of their ascendancy within us, to make all
our impressions the servants of the religious sentiment, and all our
actions its offspring. According to what has been stated above, this is
the effect wrought in us by Christ, who imparts to us the strength of
his consciousness of God, frees us from the bondage of sensuality and
sin, and is thus the Redeemer. In the feeling of the strengthened
consciousness of God which the Christian possesses by his communion
with the Redeemer, the obstructions of his natural and social life are
not felt as obstructions to his consciousness of God; they do not
interrupt the blessedness which he enjoys in his inmost religious life;
what has been called evil, and divine chastisement, is not such for
him: and as it is Christ who by receiving him into the communion of his
blessedness, frees him therefrom, the office of expiation is united to
that of redemption.
In this sense alone is the doctrine of the church concerning the
threefold office of Christ to be interpreted. He is a prophet, in that
by the word—by the setting forth of himself, and not otherwise,—he
could draw mankind towards himself, and therefore the chief object of
his doctrine was his own person; he is at once a high priest and a
sacrifice, in that he, the sinless one, from whose existence,
therefore, no evil could be evolved, entered into communion with the
life of sinful humanity, and endured the evils which adhere to it, that
he might take us into communion with his sinless and blessed life: in
other words, deliver us from the power and consequences of sin and
evil, and present us pure before God; lastly, he is a king, in that he
brings these blessings to mankind in the form of an organized society,
of which he is the head.
From this which Christ effects, we gather what he is. If we owe to him
the continual strengthening of the consciousness of God within us, this
consciousness must have existed in him in absolute strength, so that
it, or God in the form of the consciousness, was the only operative
force within him, and this is the sense of the expression of the
church—God became man in Christ. If, further, Christ works in us a more
and more complete conquest over sensuality, in himself there must have
been an absolute conquest over it; in no moment of his life can the
sensual consciousness have disputed the victory with his consciousness
of God; never can a vacillation or struggle have had place within him:
in other words, the human nature in him was sinless, and in the
stricter sense, that, in virtue of the essential predominance within
him of the higher powers over the lower, it was impossible for him to
sin. By this peculiarity of his nature he is the Archetype, the
actualization of the ideal of humanity, which his church can only
approach, never surpass; yet must he,—for otherwise there could be no
true fellowship between him and us,—have been developed under the
ordinary conditions of human life: the ideal must in him have been
perfectly historical, each phasis of his actual life must have borne
the impress of the ideal; and this is the proper sense of the church
formula, that the divine and human nature were in him united into one
person.
Only thus far can the doctrine of the Christ be deduced from the
experience of the Christian, and thus far, according to Schleiermacher,
it is not opposed to science: whatever in the dogma of the church goes
beyond this,—as, for example, the supernatural conception of Jesus, and
his miracles, also the facts of the resurrection and ascension, and the
prophecies of his second coming to judge the world,—ought not to be
brought forward as integral parts of the doctrine of the Christ For he
from whose influence upon us comes all the strengthening of our
consciousness of God, may have been the Christ, though he should not
have risen bodily from the dead, and ascended into heaven, etc.: so
that we believe these facts, not because they are involved in our
internal experience, but only because they are stated in Scripture; not
so much, therefore, in a religious and dogmatical, as in an historical
manner.
This Christology is undeniably a beautiful effort of thought, and as we
shall presently see, does the utmost towards rendering the union of the
divine and the human in Christ conceivable; but if its author supposed
that he kept the faith unmutilated and science unoffended, we are
compelled to pronounce that he was in both points deceived. [2226]
Science opens its attack on the proposition, that the ideal man was
historically manifested in the person of Christ. It did not escape
Schleiermacher himself that this was a dangerous point. No sooner has
he put forth the above proposition, than he reflects on the difficulty
of supposing that the ideal should be realized in one historical
individual; since, in other cases, we never find the ideal realized in
a single appearance, but only in an entire cycle of appearances, which
reciprocally complete each other. It is true that this theologian does
not hold the character of Christ, as the ideal man, to extend to the
manifold relations of human life, so as to be the archetype for all the
science, art, and policy, that are developed in human society; he
confines it to the domain of the consciousness of God. But, as Schmid
has justly observed, this does not alter the case, for the
consciousness of God also, being, in its development and manifestation,
subject to the conditions of finiteness and imperfection; the
supposition that even in this department exclusively, the ideal was
manifested in a single historical individual, involves a violation of
the laws of nature by a miracle. This, however, is far from alarming
Schleiermacher; on the contrary, he maintains that this is the place,
and the only place, in which the Christian doctrine must necessarily
admit a miracle, since the originating of the person of Christ can only
be conceived as the result of a special divine act of creation. It is
true, he limits the miraculous to the first introduction of Christ into
the series of existences, and allows the whole of his further
development to have been subject to all the conditions of finite
existence: but this concession cannot repair the breach, which the
supposition only of one miracle makes in the scientific theory of the
world. Still less can any help be derived from vague analogies like the
following: as it is still possible that matter should begin to
agglomerate and thence to revolve in infinite space; so science must
admit, that there may be in the domain of spiritual life an appearance,
which in like manner we can only explain as the commencement, the first
point, in a higher process of development. [2227]
This comparison suggests the observation made by Braniss, namely, that
it would be contrary to the laws of all development to regard the
initial member of a series as the greatest—to suppose that in Christ,
the founder of that community, the object of which is the strengthening
of the consciousness of God, the strength of this consciousness was
absolute, a perfection which is rather the infinitely distant goal of
the progressive development of the community founded by him.
Schleiermacher does indeed attribute to Christianity perfectibility in
a certain sense: not as a capability of surpassing Christ in his
nature, but solely in the conditions of its manifestation. His view is
this: the limitation, the imperfection of the relations of Christ, the
language in which he expressed himself, the nationality within which he
was placed, modified his thoughts and actions, but in their form alone;
their essence remained nevertheless the perfect ideal. Now if
Christianity in its progressive advancement in doctrine and practice,
rejects more and more of those temporal and national limitations by
which the actions and teaching of Jesus were circumscribed; this is not
to surpass Christ, it is rather to give a more perfect expression of
his inner life. But, as Schmid has satisfactorily shown, an historical
individual is that which appears of him, and no more; his internal
nature is known by his words and actions, the condition of his age and
nation are a part of his individuality, and what lies beneath this
phenomenal existence as the essence, is not the nature of this
individual, but the human nature in general, which in particular beings
operates only under the limitations of their individuality, of time,
and of circumstances. Thus to surpass the historical appearance of
Christ, is to rise nearer, not to his nature, but to the idea of
humanity in general; and if we are to suppose that it is still Christ
whose nature is more truly expressed, when with the rejection of the
temporal and national, the essential elements of his doctrine and life
are further developed: it would not be difficult, by a similar
abstraction, to represent Socrates, as the one who in this manner
cannot be surpassed.
As neither an individual in general, nor, in particular, the commencing
point in an historical series, can present the perfect ideal: so, if
Christ be regarded decidedly as man, the archetypal nature and
development which Schleiermacher ascribes to him, cannot be brought to
accord with the laws of human existence. Impeccability, in the sense of
the impossibility of sinning, as it is supposed to exist in Christ, is
a quality totally incompatible with the human nature; for to man, in
consequence of his agency being liable to guidance by the motives of
the senses as well as of the reason, the possibility of sinning is
essential. And if Christ was entirely free from inward conflict, from
all vacillation of the spiritual life between good and evil, he could
not be a man of like nature with us; for the action and re-action
between the spiritual nature in general and the external world, and, in
particular, between the superior religious and moral powers, and the
operations of the mind in subordination to the senses, necessarily
manifests itself as a conflict. [2228]
If, on the one side, the Christology in question is far from satisfying
science, it is equally far, on the other side, from satisfying the
faith. We will not enter into those points in which, instead of the
decisions of the church, it at least offers acceptable substitutes
(concerning which, however, it may be doubted whether they are a full
compensation). [2229] Its disagreement with the faith is the most
conspicuous in the position, that the facts of the resurrection and
ascension do not form essential parts of the Christian faith. For the
belief in the resurrection of Christ is the foundation stone, without
which the Christian church could not have been built; nor could the
cycle of Christian festivals, which are the external representation of
the Christian faith, now suffer a more fatal mutilation than by the
removal of the festival of Easter: the Christ who died could not be
what he is in the belief of the church, if he were not also the Christ
who rose again.
Thus the doctrine of Schleiermacher concerning the person and
conditions of Christ, betrays a twofold inadequacy, not meeting the
requirements either of the faith of the church, or of science. It is
clear, however, from his doctrine of the work of Christ, that in order
to satisfy the former so far as is here done, such a contradiction of
the latter was quite unnecessary, and an easier course might have been
pursued. For resting merely on a backward inference from the inward
experience of the Christian as the effect, to the person of Christ as
the cause, the Christology of Schleiermacher has but a frail support,
since it cannot be proved that that inward experience is not to be
explained without the actual existence of such a Christ. Schleiermacher
himself did not overlook the probable objection that the church,
induced merely by the relative excellence of Jesus, conceived an ideal
of absolute perfection, and transferred this to the historical Christ,
from which combination she continually strengthens and vivifies her
consciousness of God: but he held this objection to be precluded by the
observation, that sinful humanity, by reason of the mutual dependence
of the will and the understanding, is incapable of conceiving an
immaculate ideal. But, as it has been aptly remarked, if Schleiermacher
claims a miracle for the origination of his real Christ, we have an
equal right to claim one for the origination of the ideal of a Christ
in the human soul. [2230] Meanwhile, it is not true that sinful human
nature is incapable of conceiving a sinless ideal. If by this ideal be
understood merely a general conception, then the conception of the
perfect and the sinless is as necessarily co-existent with the
consciousness of imperfection and sinfulness as the conception of
infinity with that of finiteness; since the two ideas conditionate one
another, and the one is not possible without the other. If, on the
other hand, by this ideal be meant a concrete image, the conception of
a character in which all the individual features are portrayed, it may
be admitted that a sinful individual or age cannot depict such an image
without blemish; but of this inability the age or individual itself is
not conscious, not having any superior standard, and if the image be
but slightly drawn, if it leave room for the modifications of increased
enlightenment, it may continue to be regarded as immaculate even by a
later and more clear-sighted age, so long as this age is inclined to
view it under the most favourable light.
We may now estimate the truth of the reproach, which made
Schleiermacher so indignant, namely, that his was not an historical,
but an ideal Christ. It is unjust in relation to the opinion of
Schleiermacher, for he firmly believed that the Christ, as construed by
him, really lived; but it is just in relation to the historical state
of the facts, because such a Christ never existed but in idea; and in
this sense, indeed, the reproach has even a stronger bearing on the
system of the church, because the Christ therein presented can still
less have existed. Lastly, it is just in relation to the consequence of
Schleiermacher’s system, since to effect what Schleiermacher makes him
effect, no other Christ is necessary, and, according to the principles
of Schleiermacher respecting the relation of God to the world, of the
supernatural to the natural, no other Christ is possible, than an ideal
one:—and in this sense the reproach attaches specifically to
Schleiermacher’s doctrine, for according to the premises of the
orthodox doctrine, an historical Christ is both possible and necessary.
§ 149.
CHRISTOLOGY INTERPRETED SYMBOLICALLY. KANT. DE WETTE.
The attempt to retain in combination the ideal in Christ with the
historical, having failed, these two elements separate themselves: the
latter falls as a natural residuum to the ground, and the former rises
as a pure sublimate into the ethereal world of ideas. Historically,
Jesus can have been nothing more than a person, highly distinguished
indeed, but subject to the limitations inevitable to all that is
mortal: by means of his exalted character, however, he exerted so
powerful an influence over the religious sentiment, that it constituted
him the ideal of piety; in accordance with the general rule, that an
historical fact or person cannot become the basis of a positive
religion until it is elevated into the sphere of the ideal. [2231]
Spinoza made this distinction when maintaining, that to know the
historical Christ is not necessary to felicity, but only to know the
ideal Christ, namely, the eternal wisdom of God, which is manifested in
all things, in the human mind particularly, and in a pre-eminent degree
in Jesus Christ—that wisdom which alone teaches man what is true and
false, good and bad. [2232]
According to Kant, also, it ought not to be made a condition of
salvation to believe, that there was once a man who by his holiness and
merit gave satisfaction for himself and for all others; for of this the
reason tells us nothing; but it is the duty of men universally to
elevate themselves to the ideal of moral perfection deposited in the
reason, and to obtain moral strength by the contemplation of this
ideal. Such moral faith alone man is bound to exercise, and not
historical faith. [2233]
Taking his stand on this principle, Kant proceeds to interpret the
doctrines of the Bible and the church as symbols of the ideal. It is
humanity, or the rational part of this system of things, in its entire
moral perfection, that could alone make a world the object of divine
Providence, and the end of creation. This idea of a humanity
well-pleasing to God, has existed in God from all eternity; it proceeds
from his essence, and is therefore no created thing, but his eternal
Son, the Word, through whom, that is, for whose sake, all things were
created, and in whom God loved the world. As this idea of moral
perfection has not man for its author, as it has been introduced into
him even without his being able to conceive how his nature can have
been susceptible of such an idea, it may be said to have come down to
us from heaven, and to have assumed the human nature, and this union
with us may be regarded as an abasement of the Son of God. This ideal
of moral perfection, so far as it is compatible with the condition of a
being dependent on necessities and inclinations, can only be conceived
by us under the form of a man. Now just as we can obtain no idea of the
amount of a force, but by calculating the degree of resistance which it
can overcome, so we can form no estimate of the strength of the moral
disposition, but by imagining hard conflicts in which it can triumph:
hence the man who embodies the perfect ideal must be one who would
voluntarily undertake, not only to perform every duty of man on his own
behalf, and by precept and example to disseminate the good and the true
around him as extensively as possible; but also, though tempted by the
strongest allurements, to submit to all sufferings, even to the most
ignominious death, for the welfare of mankind.
In a practical relation this idea has its reality completely within
itself, and it needed no exemplification in experience in order to
become a model binding on us, since it is enshrined as such in our
reason. Nay, this ideal remains essentially confined to the reason,
because it cannot be adequately represented by any example in outward
experience, since such an example would not fully disclose the inward
disposition, but would only admit of our forming dubious inferences
thereon. Nevertheless, as all men ought to be conformed to this ideal,
and consequently must be capable of such conformity, it is always
possible in experience that a man may appear, who in his teaching,
course of life, and sufferings, may present an example of a man
well-pleasing to God: but even in this manifestation of the God-man, it
would not properly be that which is obvious to the senses, or can be
known by experience, which would be the object of saving faith; but the
ideal lying in the reason, which we should attribute to this
manifestation of the God-man, because he appeared to us to be conformed
to it—that is, indeed, so far only as this can be concluded from
outward experience. Inasmuch as all of us, though naturally generated
men, feel bound, and consequently able, ourselves to present such an
example, we have no reason to regard that exemplification of the ideal
man as supernaturally generated, nor does he need the attestation of
miracles; for besides the moral faith in the idea, nothing further is
requisite than the historical conviction that his life was conformed to
that idea, in order to accredit him as its personification.
He who is conscious of such a moral disposition, as to have a
well-founded confidence, that under temptations and sufferings similar
to those which are attributed to the ideal man, as a touchstone of his
moral disposition, he would adhere unalterably to this exemplar, and
faithfully follow his steps, such a man alone is entitled to consider
himself an object of the divine complacency. To elevate himself to such
a state of mind, man must depart from evil, cast off the old man,
crucify the flesh; a change which is essentially connected with a
series of sorrows and sufferings. These the former man has deserved as
a punishment, but they fall on the new: for the regenerated man, who
takes them on himself, though physically and in his empirical
character, as a being determined by the senses, he remains the former
man; is morally, as an intellectual being, with his changed
disposition, become a new man. Having by this change taken upon him the
disposition of the Son of God, that which is strictly a substitution of
the new man for the old, may be represented, by a personification of
the idea, as a substitution of the Son of God, and it may be said, that
the latter himself, as a substitute, bears for man, for all who
practically believe in him, the guilt of sin; as a redeemer, satisfies
supreme justice by suffering and death; and as an intercessor, imparts
the hope of appearing justified before the judge: the suffering which
the new man, in dying to the old, must perpetually incur through life,
being conceived in the representative of mankind, as a death suffered
once for all. [2234]
Kant, like Schleiermacher (whose Christology in many respects recalls
that of Kant), [2235] carries his appropriation of the Christology of
the church no further than the death of Christ: of his resurrection and
ascension, he says, that they cannot be available to religion within
the limits of pure reason, because they would involve the materiality
of all existences. Still, in another light, he employs these facts as
symbols of the ideas of the reason; as images of the entrance into the
abode of blessedness, that is, into communion with all the good: while
Tieftrunk has yet more decidedly given it as his opinion, that without
the resurrection, the history of Jesus would terminate in a revolting
catastrophe; that the eye would turn away with melancholy and
dissatisfaction from an event, in which the pattern of humanity fell a
victim to impious rage, and in which the scene closed with a death as
unmerited as sorrowful; that the history requires to be crowned with
the fulfilment of the expectation towards which the moral
contemplations of every one are irresistibly drawn—with the passage
into a compensating immortality. [2236]
In the same manner, De Wette ascribed to the evangelical history, as to
every history, and particularly to the history of religion, a
symbolical, ideal character, in virtue of which it is the expression
and image of the human mind and its various operations. The history of
the miraculous conception of Jesus represents the divine origin of
religion; the narratives of his miracles, the independent force of the
human mind, and the sublime doctrine of spiritual self-reliance; his
resurrection is the image of the victory of truth, a fore-shadowing of
the future triumph of good over evil; his ascension, the symbol of the
eternal majesty of religion. The fundamental religious ideas which
Jesus enunciated in his teaching, are expressed with equal clearness in
his history. This history is an expression of devoted enthusiasm, in
the courageous ministry of Jesus, and in the victorious power of his
appearance; of resignation, in his contest with the wickedness of men,
in the melancholy of his premonitory discourses, and above all in his
death. Christ on the cross is the image of humanity purified by
self-sacrifice; we ought all to crucify ourselves with him, that we may
rise with him to new life. Lastly, the idea of devotion was the
key-note in the history of Jesus, every moment of his life being
dedicated to the thought of his heavenly Father. [2237]
At an earlier period, Horst presented this symbolical view of the
history of Jesus with singular clearness. Whether, he says, all that is
narrated of Christ happened precisely so, historically, is a question
indifferent to us, nor can it now be settled. Nay, if we would be
candid with ourselves, that which was once sacred history for the
Christian believer, is, for the enlightened portion of our
cotemporaries, only fable: the narratives of the supernatural birth of
Christ, of his miracles, of his resurrection and ascension, must be
rejected by us as at variance with the inductions of our intellect. Let
them however only be no longer interpreted merely by the understanding
as history, but by the feelings and imagination, as poetry; and it will
be found that in these narratives nothing is invented arbitrarily, but
all springs from the depths and divine impulses of the human mind.
Considered from this point of view, we may annex to the history of
Christ all that is important to religious trust, animating to the pure
dispositions, attractive to the tender feelings. That history is a
beautiful, sacred poem of the human race—a poem in which are embodied
all the wants of our religious instinct; and this is the highest honour
of Christianity, and the strongest proof of its universal
applicability. The history of the gospel is in fact the history of
human nature conceived ideally, and exhibits to us in the life of an
individual, what man ought to be, and, united with him by following his
doctrine and example, can actually become. It is not denied that what
to us can appear only sacred poetry, was to Paul, John, Matthew and
Luke, fact and certain history. But it was the very same internal cause
which made the narratives of the gospel sacred fact and history to
them, which makes those narratives to us a sacred mythus and poetry.
The points of view only are different: human nature, and in it the
religious impulse, remains ever the same. Those first Christians needed
in their world, for the animating of the religious and moral
dispositions in the men of their time, history and fact, of which,
however, the inmost kernel consisted of ideas: to us, the facts are
become superannuated and doubtful, and only for the sake of the
fundamental ideas, are the narratives of those facts an object of
reverence. [2238]
This view was met immediately on the part of the church by the
reproach, that instead of the riches of divine reality which faith
discovers in the history of Christ, it palmed upon us a collection of
empty ideas and ideals; instead of a consolatory work effected, an
overwhelming obligation. For the certainty, that God once actually
united himself with human nature, the admonition that man ought to
obtain divine dispositions, offers a poor compensation: for the peace
which the redemption completed by Christ brings to the believer, it is
no equivalent to put before him the duty of freeing himself from sin.
By this system, man is thrust out of the reconciled world in which
Christianity places him, into an unreconciled world, out of a world of
happiness into a world of misery; for where reconciliation has yet to
be effected, where happiness has yet to be attained, there is at
present enmity and unhappiness. And, in truth, the hope of entire
deliverance from these conditions, is, according to the principles of
this system, which only admits an infinite approximation towards the
idea, a deceptive one; for that which is only to be reached in an
endless progression, is in fact unattainable.
But not the faith alone, science also in its newest development, has
found this system unsatisfactory. Science has perceived that to convert
ideas simply into an obligatory possibility, to which no reality
corresponds, is in fact to annihilate them; just as it would be to
render the infinite finite, to represent it as that which lies beyond
the finite. Science has conceived that the infinite has its existence
in the alternate production and extinction of the finite; that the idea
is realised only in the entire series of its manifestations; that
nothing can come into existence which does not already essentially
exist; and, therefore, that it is not to be required of man, that he
should reconcile himself with God, and assimilate his sentiments to the
divine, unless this reconciliation and this assimilation are already
virtually effected.
§ 150.
THE SPECULATIVE CHRISTOLOGY.
Kant had already said that the good principle did not descend from
heaven merely at a particular time, but had descended on mankind
invisibly from the commencement of the human race; and Schelling laid
down the proposition: the incarnation of God is an incarnation from
eternity. [2239] But while the former understood under that expression
only the moral instinct, which, with its ideal of good, and its sense
of duty, has been from the beginning implanted in man; the latter
understood under the incarnate Son of God the finite itself, in the
form of the human consciousness, which in its contradistinction to the
infinite, wherewith it is nevertheless one, appears as a suffering God,
subjected to the conditions of time.
In the most recent philosophy this idea has been further developed in
the following manner. [2240] When it is said of God that he is a
Spirit, and of man that he also is a Spirit, it follows that the two
are not essentially distinct. To speak more particularly, it is the
essential property of a spirit, in the distribution of itself into
distinct personalities, to remain identical with itself, to possess
itself in another than itself. Hence the recognition of God as a spirit
implies, that God does not remain as a fixed and immutable Infinite
encompassing the Finite, but enters into it, produces the Finite,
Nature, and the human mind, merely as a limited manifestation of
himself, from which he eternally returns into unity. As man, considered
as a finite spirit, limited to his finite nature, has not truth; so
God, considered exclusively as an infinite spirit, shut up in his
infinitude, has not reality. The infinite spirit is real only when it
discloses itself in finite spirits; as the finite spirit is true only
when it merges itself in the infinite. The true and real existence of
spirit, therefore, is neither in God by himself, nor in man by himself,
but in the God-man; neither in the infinite alone, nor in the finite
alone, but in the interchange of impartation and withdrawal between the
two, which on the part of God is revelation, on the part of man
religion.
If God and man are in themselves one, and if religion is the human side
of this unity: then must this unity be made evident to man in religion,
and become in him consciousness and reality. Certainly, so long as man
knows not that he is a spirit, he cannot know that God is man: while he
is under the guidance of nature only, he will deify nature; when he has
learned to submit himself to law, and thus to regulate his natural
tendencies by external means, he will set God before him as a lawgiver.
But when, in the vicissitudes of the world’s history, the natural state
discloses its corruptions, the legal its misery; the former will
experience the need of a God who elevates it above itself, the latter,
of a God who descends to its level. Man being once mature enough to
receive as his religion the truth that God is man, and man of a divine
race; it necessarily follows, since religion is the form in which the
truth presents itself to the popular mind, that this truth must appear,
in a guise intelligible to all, as a fact obvious to the senses: in
other words, there must appear a human individual who is recognised as
the visible God. This God-man uniting in a single being the divine
essence and the human personality, it may be said of him that he had
the Divine Spirit for a father and a woman for his mother. His
personality reflecting itself not in himself, but in the absolute
substance, having the will to exist only for God, and not at all for
itself, he is sinless and perfect. As a man of Divine essence, he is
the power that subdues nature, a worker of miracles; but as God in a
human manifestation, he is dependent on nature, subject to its
necessities and sufferings—is in a state of abasement. Must he even pay
the last tribute to nature? does not the fact that the human nature is
subject to death preclude the idea that that nature is one with the
divine? No: the God-man dies, and thus proves that the incarnation of
God is real, that the infinite spirit does not scorn to descend into
the lowest depths of the finite, because he knows how to find a way of
return into himself, because in the most entire alienation of himself,
he can retain his identity. Further, the God-man, in so far as he is a
spirit reflected in his infinity, stands contrasted with men, in so far
as they are limited to their finiteness: hence opposition and contest
result, and the death of the God-Man becomes a violent one, inflicted
by the hands of sinners; so that to physical degradation is added the
moral degradation of ignominy and accusation of crime. If God then
finds a passage from heaven to the grave, so must a way be discoverable
for man from the grave to heaven: the death of the prince of life is
the life of mortals. By his entrance into the world as God-man, God
showed himself reconciled to man; by his dying, in which act he cast
off the limitations of mortality, he showed moreover the way in which
he perpetually effects that reconciliation: namely, by remaining,
throughout his manifestation of himself under the limitations of a
natural existence, and his suppression of that existence, identical
with himself. Inasmuch as the death of the God-man is merely the
cessation of his state of alienation from the infinite, it is in fact
an exaltation and return to God, and thus the death is necessarily
followed by the resurrection and ascension.
The God-man, who during his life stood before his cotemporaries as an
individual distinct from themselves, and perceptible by the senses, is
by death taken out of their sight; he enters into their imagination and
memory: the unity of the divine and human in him, becomes a part of the
general consciousness; and the church must repeat spiritually, in the
souls of its members, those events of his life which he experienced
externally. The believer, finding himself environed with the conditions
of nature, must, like Christ, die to nature—but only inwardly, as
Christ did outwardly,—must spiritually crucify himself and be buried
with Christ, that by the virtual suppression of his own sensible
existence, he may become, in so far as he is a spirit, identical with
himself, and participate in the bliss and glory of Christ.
§ 151.
LAST DILEMMA.
Thus by a higher mode of argumentation, from the idea of God and man in
their reciprocal relation, the truth of the conception which the church
forms of Christ appears to be confirmed, and we seem to be reconducted
to the orthodox point of view, though by an inverted path: for while
there, the truth of the conceptions of the church concerning Christ is
deduced from the correctness of the evangelical history; here, the
veracity of the history is deduced from the truth of those conceptions.
That which is rational is also real; the idea is not merely the moral
imperative of Kant, but also an actuality. Proved to be an idea of the
reason, the unity of the divine and human nature must also have an
historical existence. The unity of God with man, says Marheineke,
[2241] was really and visibly manifested in the person of Jesus Christ;
in him, according to Rosenkranz, [2242] the divine power over nature
was concentrated, he could not act otherwise than miraculously, and the
working of miracles, which surprises us, was to him natural. His
resurrection, says Conradi, [2243] is the necessary sequel of the
completion of his personality, and so little ought it to surprise us,
that, on the contrary, we must rather have been surprised if it had not
happened.
But do these deductions remove the contradictions which have exhibited
themselves in the doctrine of the church, concerning the person and
work of Christ? We need only to compare the structures, which
Rosenkranz in his Review has passed on Schleiermacher’s criticism of
the Christology of the church, with what the same author proposes as a
substitute in his Encyclopædia, in order to perceive, that the general
propositions on the unity of the divine and human natures, do not in
the least serve to explain the appearance of a person, in whom this
unity existed individually, in an exclusive manner. Though I may
conceive that the divine spirit in a state of renunciation and
abasement becomes the human, and that the human nature in its return
into and above itself becomes the divine; this does not help me to
conceive more easily, how the divine and human natures can have
constituted the distinct and yet united portions of an historical
person. Though I may see the human mind in its unity with the divine,
in the course of the world’s history, more and more completely
establish itself as the power which subdues nature; this is quite
another thing, than to conceive a single man endowed with such power,
for individual, voluntary acts. Lastly, from the truth, that the
suppression of the natural existence is the resurrection of the spirit,
can never be deduced the bodily resurrection of an individual.
We should thus have fallen back again to Kant’s point of view, which we
have ourselves found unsatisfactory: for if the idea have no
corresponding reality, it is an empty obligation and ideal. But do we
then deprive the idea of all reality? By no means: we reject only that
which does not follow from the premises. [2244] If reality is ascribed
to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this
equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been
once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one
individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself;
it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be
niggardly towards all others [2245]—to express itself perfectly in that
one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather loves to
distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which
reciprocally complete each other—in the alternate appearance and
suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realization
of the idea? is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human
natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race
of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a
realization? is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one
than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time.
This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the
predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an
individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not
in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the
properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict
themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is
the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting
itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude;
it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature
and Spirit; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of
human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature,
both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert
matter on which he exercises his active power; [2246] it is the sinless
existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one,
pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race
or its history. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven,
for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a
higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a
personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the
infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in
his death and resurrection, man is justified before God; that is, by
the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual man
participates in the divinely human life of the species. Now the main
element of that idea is, that the negation of the merely natural and
sensual life, which is itself the negation of the spirit (the negation
of negation, therefore), is the sole way to true spiritual life. [2247]
This alone is the absolute sense of Christology: that it is annexed to
the person and history of one individual, is a necessary result of the
historical form which Christology has taken. Schleiermacher was quite
right when he foreboded, that the speculative view would not leave much
more of the historical person of the Saviour than was retained by the
Ebionites. The phenomenal history of the individual, says Hegel, is
only a starting point for the mind. Faith, in her early stages, is
governed by the senses, and therefore contemplates a temporal history;
what she holds to be true is the external, ordinary event, the evidence
for which is of the historical, forensic kind—a fact to be proved by
the testimony of the senses, and the moral confidence inspired by the
witnesses. But mind having once taken occasion by this external fact,
to bring under its consciousness the idea of humanity as one with God,
sees in the history only the presentation of that idea; the object of
faith is completely changed; instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it
has become a spiritual and divine idea, which has its confirmation no
longer in history but in philosophy. When the mind has thus gone beyond
the sensible history, and entered into the domain of the absolute, the
former ceases to be essential; it takes a subordinate place, above
which the spiritual truths suggested by the history stand
self-supported; it becomes as the faint image of a dream which belongs
only to the past, and does not, like the idea, share the permanence of
the spirit which is absolutely present to itself. [2248] Even Luther
subordinated the physical miracles to the spiritual, as the truly great
miracles. And shall we interest ourselves more in the cure of some sick
people in Galilee, than in the miracles of intellectual and moral life
belonging to the history of the world—in the increasing, the almost
incredible dominion of man over nature—in the irresistible force of
ideas, to which no unintelligent matter, whatever its magnitude, can
oppose any enduring resistance? Shall isolated incidents, in themselves
trivial, be more to us than the universal order of events, simply
because in the latter we presuppose, if we do not perceive, a natural
cause, in the former the contrary? This would be a direct contravention
of the more enlightened sentiments of our own day, justly and
conclusively expressed by Schleiermacher. The interests of pity, says
this theologian, can no longer require us so to conceive a fact, that
by its dependence on God it is divested of the conditions which would
belong to it as a link in the chain of nature; for we have outgrown the
notion, that the divine omnipotence is more completely manifested in
the interruption of the order of nature, than in its preservation.
[2249] Thus if we know the incarnation, death and resurrection, the
duplex negatio affirmat, as the eternal circulation, the infinitely
repeated pulsation of the divine life; what special importance can
attach to a single fact, which is but a mere sensible image of this
unending process? Our age demands to be led in Christology to the idea
in the fact, to the race in the individual: a theology which, in its
doctrines on the Christ, stops short at him as an individual, is not
properly a theology, but a homily.
In what relation, then, must the pulpit stand to theology,—nay, how is
the continuance of a ministry in the church possible when theology has
reached this stage? This is the difficult question which presents
itself to us in conclusion.
§ 152.
RELATION OF THE CRITICAL AND SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY TO THE CHURCH.
Schleiermacher has said, that when he reflected on the approaching
crisis in theology, and imagined himself obliged to choose one of two
alternatives, either to surrender the Christian history, like every
common history, as a spoil to criticism, or to hold his faith in fee to
the speculative system; his decision was, that for himself, considered
singly, he would embrace the latter, but that, regarding himself as a
member of the church, and especially as one of its teachers, he should
be induced rather to take the opposite course. For the idea of God and
of man on which, according to the speculative system, the truth of the
Christian faith rests, is indeed a precious jewel, but it can be
possessed only by a few, and he would not wish to be that privileged
individual in the church, who alone among thousands held the faith on
its true grounds. As a member of the church, he could have no
satisfaction but in perfect equality, in the consciousness that all
receive alike, both in kind and manner, from the same source. And as a
teacher and spokesman to the church, he could not possibly attempt the
task of elevating old and young, without distinction, to the idea of
God and of man: he must rather attack their faith as a groundless one,
or else endeavour to strengthen and confirm it while knowing it to be
groundless. As thus in the matter of religion an impassable gulf would
be fixed between two parties in the church, the speculative theology
threatens us with the distinction of an esoteric and exoteric doctrine,
which ill accords with the declaration of Christ, that all shall be
taught of God. The scientific alone have the foundation of the faith:
the unscientific have only the faith, and receive it only by means of
tradition. If the Ebionitish view, on the contrary, leave but little of
Christ, yet this little is equally attainable by all, and we are
thereby secured from the hierarchy of speculation, which ever tends to
merge itself in the hierarchy of Rome. [2250]
Here we see presented, under the form of thought belonging to a
cultivated mind, the same opinion which is now expressed by many in a
less cultivated fashion: namely, that the theologian who is at once
critical and speculative, must in relation to the church be a
hypocrite. The real state of the case is this. The church refers her
Christology to an individual who existed historically at a certain
period: the speculative theologian to an idea which only attains
existence in the totality of individuals; by the church the evangelical
narratives are received as history: by the critical theologian, they
are regarded for the most part as mere mythi. If he would continue to
impart instruction to the church, four ways are open to him:
First, the attempt already excluded by the above observations of
Schleiermacher, namely, to elevate the church to his own point of view,
and for it, also, to resolve the historical into the ideal:—an attempt
which must necessarily fail, because to the Church all those premises
are wanting on which the theologian rests his speculative conclusions;
and upon which, therefore, only an enthusiast for interpretation would
venture.
The second and opposite measure would be, to transport himself to the
point of view of the church, and for the sake of imparting edification
ecclesiastically, to descend from the sphere of the ideal into the
region of the popular conception. This expedient is commonly understood
and judged too narrowly. The difference between the theologian and the
church is regarded as a total one; it is thought, that in answer to the
question, whether he believes in the history of Christ, he ought to say
exactly, no; whereas he says, yes: and this is a falsehood. It is true,
that if in the discourses and instructions of the spiritual teacher,
the main interest were an historical one, this would be a correct
representation of the case: but, in fact, the interest is a religious
one,—it is essential religion which is here communicated under the form
of a history; hence he who does not believe in the history as such, may
yet appreciate the religious truths therein contained, equally with one
who does also receive the history as such: the distinction is one of
form merely, and does not affect the substance. Hence it is an evidence
of an uncultivated mind, to denounce as a hypocrite a theologian who
preaches, for example, on the resurrection of Christ, since, though he
may not believe in the reality of that event as a single sensible fact,
he may, nevertheless, hold to be true the representation of the process
of spiritual life, which the resurrection of Christ affords. Strictly
considered, however, this identity of the substantial truth, exists
only in the apprehension of him who knows how to distinguish the
substance from the form of religion, i.e., of the theologian, not of
the church, to whom he speaks. The latter can conceive no faith in the
dogmatical truth of the resurrection of Christ, for example, apart from
a conviction of its historical reality: and if it come to discover that
the theologian has not this conviction, and yet preaches on the
resurrection, he must appear in the eyes of the church a hypocrite, and
thus the entire relation between the theologian and the church would be
virtually cancelled.
In this case, the theologian, though in himself no hypocrite, would
appear such to the church, and would be conscious of this
misconstruction. If notwithstanding this, he should continue to
instruct the church under the form of its own conceptions, he would
ultimately appear a hypocrite to himself also, and would be driven to
the third, desperate course, of forsaking the ministerial office. It
avails nothing to say, he has only to descend from the pulpit, and
mount the professor’s chair, where he will not be under the necessity
of withholding his scientific opinions from such as are destined to
science; for if he, whom the course of his own intellectual culture has
obliged to renounce the ministerial office, should by his instructions
lead many to the same point, and thus render them also incapable of
that office, the original evil would only be multiplied. On the other
hand, it could not be held good for the church, that all those who
pursue criticism and speculation to the results above presented, should
depart from their position as teachers. For no clergyman would any
longer meddle with such inquiries, if he thus ran the risk of being led
to results which would oblige him to abandon the ministerial office;
criticism and philosophy would fall into the hands of those who are not
professed theologians, and to the theologian nothing would remain but
the faith, which then could not possibly long resist the attacks of the
critical and speculative laity. But where truth is concerned, the
possible consequences have no weight; hence the above remark ought not
to be made. Thus much, however, may be maintained in relation to the
real question: he whom his theological studies have led to an
intellectual position, respecting which he must believe, that he has
attained the truth, that he has penetrated into the deepest mysteries
of theology, cannot feel either inclined or bound just at this point in
his career to abandon theology: on the contrary, such a step would be
unnatural, nay, impossible.
He will therefore seek another expedient; and as such there presents
itself a fourth, which is not, like the two first, one-sided, nor like
the third, merely negative, but which offers a positive mode of
reconciling the two extremes—the consciousness of the theologian, and
that of the church. In his discourses to the church, he will indeed
adhere to the forms of the popular conception, but on every opportunity
he will exhibit their spiritual significance, which to him constitutes
their sole truth, and thus prepare—though such a result is only to be
thought of as an unending progress—the resolution of those forms into
their original ideas in the consciousness of the church also. Thus, to
abide by the example already chosen, at the festival of Easter, he will
indeed set out from the sensible fact of the resurrection of Christ,
but he will dwell chiefly on the being buried and rising again with
Christ, which the Apostle himself has strenuously inculcated. This very
course every preacher, even the most orthodox, strictly takes, as often
as he draws a moral from the evangelical text on which he preaches: for
this is nothing else than the transition from the externally historical
to the inward and spiritual. It is true, we must not overlook the
distinction, that the orthodox preacher builds his moral on the text in
such a way, that the latter remains as an historical foundation;
whereas, with the speculative preacher, the transition from the
biblical history or the church doctrine, to the truth which he thence
derives, has the negative effect of annihilating the former. Viewed
more closely, however, the transition of the orthodox preacher from the
evangelical text to the moral application, is not free from this
negative tendency; in proceeding from the history to the doctrine he
implies at least thus much: the history is not enough, it is not the
whole truth, it must be transmuted from a past fact into a present one,
from an event external to you, it must become your own intimate
experience: so that with this transition, the case is the same as with
the proof of the existence of God, in which the cosmical existence,
which is the point of departure, apparently remains as a foundation,
but is in fact negatived as a true existence, and merged in the
absolute. Nevertheless, there remains a marked distinction between
these two propositions: since, and in so far as, this has happened, so
and so is your duty and your consolation—and: this is indeed related as
having happened once, but the truth is, that it always so happens, and
both in and by you ought to happen. At least, the community will not
receive both as identical; and thus, here again, in every excess or
diminution which the more or less spontaneous relation of the teacher
to critical theology, together with the variety in the degrees of
culture of the community, introduces,—the danger is incurred that the
community may discover this difference, and the preacher appear to it,
and consequently to himself, a hypocrite.
In this difficulty, the theologian may find himself driven either
directly to state his opinions, and attempt to elevate the people to
his ideas: or, since this attempt must necessarily fail, carefully to
adapt himself to the conception of the community; or, lastly, since,
even on this plan, he may easily betray himself, in the end to leave
the ministerial profession.
We have thus admitted the difficulty with which the critical and
speculative views are burthened, with reference to the relation of the
clergyman to the church; we have exhibited the collision into which the
theologian falls, when it is asked, what course remains for him in so
far as he has adopted such views? and we have shown that our age has
not arrived at a certain decision on this subject. But this collision
is not the effect of the curiosity of an individual; it is necessarily
introduced by the progress of time and the development of Christian
theology; it surprises and masters the individual, without his being
able to guard himself from it. Or rather he can do this with slight
labour, if he abstain from study and thought, or, if not from these,
from freedom of speech and writing. Of such there are already enough in
our day, and there was no need to make continual additions to their
number through the calumniation of those who have expressed themselves
in the spirit of advanced science. But there are also a few, who,
notwithstanding such attacks, freely declare what can no longer be
concealed—and time will show whether by the one party or the other, the
Church, Mankind, and Truth are best served.
THE END.
NOTES
[1] [This passage varies slightly from the original, a subsequent
amplification by Dr. Strauss being incorporated with it.—Tr.]
[2] Plato, de Republ. ii. p. 377. Steph.; Pindar, Nem. vii. 31.
[3] Diog. Laërt. L. ii. c. iii. No. 7.
[4] Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 10. 15. Comp. Athenag. Legat. 22. Tatian, c.
Græc. Orat. 21. Clement. homil. 6, 1 f.
[5] Diodor. Sic. Bibl. Fragm. L. vi. Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 42.
[6] Hist. vi. 56.
[7] Döpke, die Hermeneutik der neutestamentlichen Schriftsteller, s.
123. ff.
[8] Gfrörer. Dähne.
[9] Homil. 5. in Levit. § 5.
[10] Homil. 2. in Exod. iii.: Nolite putare, ut sæpe jam diximus,
veterum vobis fabulas recitari, sed doceri vos per hæc, ut agnoscatis
ordinem vitæ.
[11] Homil. 5. in Levit. i.: Hæc omnia, nisi alio sensu accipiamus quam
literæ textus ostendit, obstaculum magis et subversionem Christianæ
religioni, quam hortationem ædificationemque præstabunt.
[12] Contra Cels. vi. 70.
[13] De principp. L. iv. § 20: πᾶσα μὲν (γραφὴ) ἔχει τὸ πνευματικὸν, οὐ
πᾶσα δὲ τὸ σωματικόν.
[14] Comm. in Joann., Tom. x. § 4:—σωζομένου πολλάκις τοῦ ἀλπθοῦς
πνευματικοῦ ἐν τῷ σωματικῷ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ψεύδει.
[15] De principp. iv. 15: συνύφηνεν ἡ γραφὴ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον,
πὴ μὲν μὴ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, πὴ δὲ δυνατὸν μὲν γενέσθαι, οὐ μὴν
γεγενημένον. De principp. iv. 16: καὶ τί δεῖ πλείω λέγειν· τῶν μὴ πάνυ
ἀμβλέων μυρία ὅσα τοιαῦτα δυναμένων συναγαγεῖν, γεγραμμένα μὲν ὡς
γεγονότα, οὐ γεγενημένα δὲ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν.
[16] De principp. iv. 16.
[17] Homil. 6, in Gen. iii.: Quæ nobis ædificatio erit, legentibus,
Abraham, tantam patriarcham, non solum mentitum esse Abimelech regi,
sed et pudicitiam conjugis prodidisse? Quid nos ædificat tanti
patriarchæ uxor, si putetur contaminationibus exposita per conniventiam
maritalem? Hæc Judæi putent et si qui cum eis sunt literæ amici, non
spiritus.
[18] De principp. iv. 16: οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῶν πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας ταῦτα
τὸ πνεῦμα ᾠκονόμησεν, ἀλλ’, ἅτε τὸ αὐτὸ τυνχάνον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς θεοῦ,
τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν εὐαγγελίων πεποίηκε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων, οὐδὲ
τούτων πάντῃ ἄκρατον τὴν ἱστορίαν τῶν προσυφασμένων κατὰ τὸ σωματικὸν
ἐχόντων μὴ γεγενημένων.
[19] Contra Celsum, i. 40.
[20] Comm. in Matth., Tom. xvi. 26.
[21] Comm. in Joann., Tom. x. 17.
[22] De principp. iv. 19. After Origen, that kind of allegory only
which left the historical sense unimpaired was retained in the church;
and where, subsequently, a giving up of the verbal meaning is spoken
of, this refers merely to a trope or a simile.
[23] In his Amyntor, 1698. See Leland’s View of the Deistical Writers.
[24] See Leland.
[25] In his work entitled The Moral Philosopher.
[26] Posthumous Works, 1748.
[27] Chubb, Posthumous Works, i. 102.
[28] Ibid., ii. 269.
[29] The Resurrection of Jesus Considered, by a Moral Philosopher,
1744.
[30] Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour. Published singly,
from 1727–1729.
[31] Schröckh, Kirschengesch, seit der Reform. 6 Th. s. 191.
[32] Fragmente des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten von G. E. Lessing
herausgegeben.
[33] Recension der übrigen, noch ungedruckten Werke des Wolfenbütteler
Fragmentisten, in Eichhorns allgemeiner Bibliothek, erster Band 1tes u.
2tes Stück.
[34] Paulus’s Commentar über das neue Testament.
[35] Eichhorn’s Urgeschichte, herausgegeben von Gabler, 3 Thl. s. 98.
ff.
[36] Allgem. Biblioth. 1 Bd. s. 989, and Einleitung in das A. T. 3 Thl.
s. 82.
[37] Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, drittes
Stück. No. VI.: Der Kirchenglaube hat zu seinem höchsten Ausleger den
reinen Religionsglauben.
[38] Ad. Apollod. Athen. Biblioth. notæ, p. 3 f.
[39] Hebraische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments. G. L. Bauer,
1802.
[40] Institutiones Theol. Chr. Dogm. § 42.
[41] Ammon, Progr. quo inquiritur in narrationum de vitæ Jesu Christi
primordiis fontes, etc., in Pott’s and Ruperti’s Sylloge Comm. theol.
No. 5, und Gabler’s n. theol. Journal, 5 Bd. s. 83 und 397.
[42] Ueber Mythen, historische Sagen und Philosopheme der ältesten
Welt. In Paulus Memorabilien, 5 stuck. 1793.
[43] Vid. die Abhandlung über Moses und die Verfasser des Pentateuchs,
im 3ten. Band des Comm. über den Pent. s. 660.
[44] Kritik der Mosaischen Geschichte. Einl. s. 10. ff.
[45] Einleit. in das N. T. 1, s. 408. ff.
[46] Antiquit. xix. viii. 2.
[47] Die verschiedenen Rücksichten, in welchen und für welche der
Biograph Jesu arbeiten kann. In Bertholdt’s krit. Journal, 5 Bd. s.
235. ff.
[48] Recens-von Paulus Commentar, im neuesten theol. Journal 7, 4, s.
395 ff. (1801).
[49] Hebräische Mythologie. 1 Thl. Einl. § 5.
[50] Ist es erlaubt, in der Bibel, und sogar im N.T., Mythen
anzunehmen? Im Journal für auserlesene theol. Literatur, 2, 1, s. 49
ff.
[51] Ueber den Täufer Johannes, die Taufe und Versuchung Christi, in
Ullmann’s u. Umbreit’s theol. Studien u. Kritiken, 2, 3, s. 456 ff.
[52] Beitrag zur Erklärung der Versuchungsgeschichte, in ders.
Zeitschrift, 1832, 4. Heft.
[53] Einleitung in das N. T. 1, s. 422 ff. 453 ff.
[54] Besonders durch Gieseler, über die Entstehung und die frühsten
Schicksale der schriftlichen Evangelien.
[55] Vid. den Anhang der Schulz’schen Schrift über das Abendmahl, und
die Schriften von Sieffert und Schneckenburger über den Ursprung des
ersten kanonischen Evangeliums.
[56] In den Probabilien.
[57] Geschichte der hebräischen Nation, Theil. i. s. 123.
[58] In Henke’s Magazin, 5ten Bdes. 1tes Stück. s. 163.
[59] Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der
Wunder. In Henke’s Museum, i. 3. 1803.
[60] Kaiser’s biblische Theologie, 1 Thl.
[61] Gabler’s Journal für auserlesene theol. Literatur. ii. 1. s. 46.
[62] Gabler’s neuestes theolog. Journal, 7 Bd.
[63] Bertholdt’s Krit. Journal, v. s. 235.
[64] Ullmann, Recens. meines L. J., in den Theol. Studien u. Kritiken
1836. 3.
[65] George, Mythus und Sage; Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen
Entwicklung dieser Begriffe und ihres Verhältnisses zum christlichen
Glauben, s. 11. ff. 108. ff.
[66] Work cited, § 8, note 4. Hase, Leben Jesu, § 32. Tholuck, s. 208.
ff. Kern, die Hauptsachen der evangelischen Geschichte, 1st Article,
Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, 1836, ii. s. 39.
[67] Comp. Kuinöl, Prolegom. in Matthæum, § 3; in Lucam, § 6.
[68] e.g. Ammon, in der Diss.: Ascensus J. C. in cœlum historia
biblica, in seinen Opusc. nov.
[69] In Bertholdt’s Krit. Journ. v. Bd. s. 248.
[70] Gabler’s neuestes theol. Journal, Bd. vii. s. 395.
[71] Encyclopädie der theol. Wissenschaften, s. 161.
[72] In Gabler’s neuestem theolog. Journal, Bd. vi. 4tes Stück. s. 350.
[73] Gränzbestimmung dessen, was in der Bibel Mythus, u. s. f., und was
wirkliche Geschichte ist. In seiner Bibliothek der heiligen Geschichte,
ii. Bd. s. 155. ff.
[74] Meyer, Apologie der geschichtlichen Auffassung der historischen
Bucher des A. T., besonders des Pentateuchs, im Gegensatz gegen die
blos mythische Deutung des letztern. Fritzsche. Kelle.
[75] Exegetisches Handbuch, i. a. s. 1, 71.
[76] Greiling in Henke’s Museum, i. 4. s. 621. ff.
[77] See the quotations given by De Wette in his “Einleitung in d. N.
T.” § 76.
[78] Euseb. H. E., iii. 39.
[79] Ullman, Credner, Lücke, De Wette.
[80] Hieron. de vir. illustr. 3.
[81] Contra Celsum, ii. 16. v. 56.
[82] Euseb. H. E. iii. 39.
[83] This is clearly demonstrated by Griesbach in his “Commentatio, quâ
Marci Evangelium totum e Matthæi et Lucæ commentariis decerptum esse
demonstratur.”
[84] Chap. xvi. 10–17; xx. 5–15; xxi. 1–17; xxvii. 1–28; xxviii. 10–16.
[85] Euseb. H. E. v. 20, 24.
[86] De Wette, Gieseler.
[87] Ad. Autol. ii., 22.
[88] See Schleiermacher.
[89] This same want of distinction has led the Alexandrians to
allegorize, the Deists to scoff, and the Supernaturalists to strain the
meaning of words; as was done lately by Hoffmann in describing David’s
behaviour to the conquered Ammonites. (Christoterpe auf 1838, s. 184.)
[90] Heydenreich, über die Unzulässigkeit, u. s. f. 1 stück. Compare
Storr, doctr. christ. § 35. ff.
[91] If the Supranatural view contains a theological contradiction, so
the new evangelical theology, which esteems itself raised so far above
the old supranatural view, contains a logical contradiction. To say
that God acts only mediately upon the world as the general rule, but
sometimes, by way of exception, immediately,—has some meaning, though
perhaps not a wise one. But to say that God acts always immediately on
the world, but in some cases more particularly immediately,—is a flat
contradiction in itself. On the principle of the immanence or immediate
agency of God in the world, to which the new evangelical theology lays
claim, the idea of the miraculous is impossible. Comp. my
Streitschriften, i. 3, s. 46 f.
[92] In this view essentially coincide Wegscheider, instit. theol.
dogm. § 12; De Wette, bibl. Dogm., Vorbereitung; Schleiermacher,
Glaubensl. § 46 f.; Marheineke, Dogm. § 269 ff. Comp. George, s. 78 f.
[93] To a freedom from this presupposition we lay claim in the
following work; in the same sense as a state might be called free from
presupposition where the privileges of station, etc., were of no
account. Such a state indeed has one presupposition, that of the
natural equality of its citizens; and similarly do we take for granted
the equal amenability to law of all events; but this is merely an
affirmative form of expression for our former negation. But to claim
for the biblical history especial laws of its own, is an affirmative
proposition, which, according to the established rule, is that which
requires proof, and not our denial of it, which is merely negative. And
if the proof cannot be given, or be found insufficient, it is the
former and not the latter, which is to be considered a presupposition.
See my Streitschriften i. 3. s. 36 ff.
[94] Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie, s. 110 ff.
With this Ullmann, and J. Müller in their reviews of this work,
Hoffmann, s. 113 f., and others are agreed as far as relates to the
heathen mythi. Especially compare George, Mythus und Sage, s. 15 ff.
103.
[95] The words of Baur in his review of Müller’s Prolegomena, in Jahn’s
Jahrbüchern f. Philol. u. Pädag. 1828. 1 Heft, s. 7.
[96] I. 19.
[97] Midrasch Koheleth f. 73, 3 (in Schöttgen, horæ hebraicæ et
talmudicæ, 2, S. 251 f.). R. Berechias nomine R. Isaaci dixit:
Quemadmodum Goël primus (Moses), sic etiam postremus (Messias)
comparatus est. De Goële primo quidnam scriptura dicit? Exod. iv. 20:
et sumsit Moses uxorem et filios, eosque asino imposuit. Sic Goël
postremus, Zachar. ix. 9: pauper et insidens asino. Quidnam de Goële
primo nosti? Is descendere fecit Man, q. d. Exod. xvi. 14: ecce ego
pluere faciam vobis panem de cælo. Sic etiam Goël postremus Manna
descendere faciet, q. d. Ps. lxxii. 16: erit multitudo frumenti in
terra. Quomodo Goël primus comparatus fuit? Is ascendere fecit puteum:
sic quoque Goël postremus ascendere faciet aquas, q. d. Joel iv. 18: et
fons e domo Domini egredietur, et torrentem Sittim irrigabit.
[98] Tanchuma f. 54, 4. (in Schöttgen, p. 74): R. Acha nomine R.
Samuelis bar Nachmani dixit: Quæcumque Deus S. B. facturus est לעתיך
לבא (tempore Messiano) ea jam ante fecit per manus justorum בעולם
הזה (seculo ante Messiam elapso). Deus S. B. suscitabit mortuos, id
quod jam ante fecit per Eliam, Elisam et Ezechielem. Mare exsiccabit,
prout per Mosen factum est. Oculos cæcorum aperiet, id quod per Elisam
fecit. Deus S. B. futuro tempore visitabit steriles, quemadmodum in
Abrahamo et Sarâ fecit.
[99] The Old Testament legends have undergone many changes and
amplifications, even without any reference to the Messiah, so that the
partial discrepancy between the narratives concerning Jesus with those
relating to Moses and the prophets, is not a decisive proof that the
former were not derived from the latter. Compare Acts vii. 22, 53, and
the corresponding part of Josephus Antiq. ii. & iii. with the account
of Moses given in Exodus. Also the biblical account of Abraham with
Antiq. i. 8, 2; of Jacob with i. 19, 6; of Joseph with ii. 5, 4.
[100] George, s. 125: If we consider the firm conviction of the
disciples, that all which had been prophesied in the Old Testament of
the Messiah must necessarily have been fulfilled in the person of their
master; and moreover that there were many blank spaces in the history
of Christ; we shall see that it was impossible to have happened
otherwise than that these ideas should have embodied themselves, and
thus the mythi have arisen which we find. Even if a more correct
representation of the life of Jesus had been possible by means of
tradition, this conviction of the disciples must have been strong
enough to triumph over it.
[101] Compare O. Müller, Prolegomena, s. 7, on a similar conclusion of
Grecian poets.
[102] The comparison of the first chapter of this book with the history
of Joseph in Genesis, gives an instructive view of the tendency of the
later Hebrew legend and poetry to form new relations upon the pattern
of the old. As Joseph was carried captive to Egypt, so was Daniel to
Babylon (i. 2); like Joseph he must change his name (7). God makes the
שַׂר הַסָּרִיסִים favourable to him, as the סָרִים שַׂר הַטַבָּחִים to Joseph (9);
he abstains from polluting himself with partaking of the king’s meats
and drinks, which are pressed upon him (8); a self-denial held as
meritorious in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, as that of Joseph with
regard to Potiphar’s wife; like Joseph he gains eminence by the
interpretation of a dream of the king, which his חַרְטֻמִּים were unable
to explain to him (ii.); whilst the additional circumstance that Daniel
is enabled to give not only the interpretation, but the dream itself,
which had escaped the memory of the king, appears to be a romantic
exaggeration of that which was attributed to Joseph. In the account of
Josephus, the history of Daniel has reacted in a singular manner upon
that of Joseph; for as Nebuchadnezzar forgets his dream, and the
interpretation according to Josephus revealed to him at the same time,
so does he make Pharaoh forget the interpretation shown to him with the
dream. Antiq. ii. 5, 4.
[103] Thus J. Müller, theol. Studien u. Kritiken, 1836, iii. s. 839 ff.
[104] It may here be observed, once for all, that whenever in the
following inquiry the names “Matthew,” “Luke,” etc., are used, it is
the author of the several Gospels who is thus briefly indicated, quite
irrespective of the question whether either of the Gospels was written
by an apostle or disciple of that name, or by a later unknown author.
[105] See Kuinöl Comm. in Luc., Proleg., p. 247.
[106] Paulus, exeget. Handbuch, 1 a. s. 78 f. 96. Bauer, hebr. Mythol.,
2 Bd. s. 218 f.
[107] Here Michael is called one of the chief princes.
[108] Here Raphael is represented as one of the seven angels which go
in and out before the glory of the holy One; (Tobit, xii. 15), almost
the same as Gabriel in Luke i. 19, excepting the mention of the number.
This number is in imitation of the Persian Amschaspands. Vid. De Wette,
bibl. Dogmatik, § 171 b.
[109] Hieros. rosch haschanah f. lvi. 4. (Lightfoot, horæ hebr. et
talmud. in IV. Evangg., p. 723): R. Simeon ben Lachisch dicit: nomina
angelorum ascenderunt in manu Israëlis ex Babylone. Nam antea dictum
est: advolavit ad me unus τῶν Seraphim, Seraphim steterunt ante eum,
Jes. vi.; at post: vir Gabriel, Dan. ix. 21, Michaël princeps vester,
Dan. x. 21.
[110] Olshausen, biblischer Commentar zum N.T., 1 Thl. s. 29 (2te
Auflage). Comp. Hoffmann, s. 124 f.
[111] Olshausen, ut sup. Hoffmann, s. 135.
[112] Ut sup. s. 77.
[113] Geschichte der drei letzten Lebensjahre Jesu, sammt dessen
Jugendgeschichte. Tübingen, 1779. 1 Bd. s. 12.
[114] Bibl. Comm. 1, s. 115.
[115] Hebr. Mythol. ii. s. 218.
[116] Bauer, ut sup. i. s. 129. Paulus, exeget. Handbuch, i. a, 74.
[117] Paulus, Commentar, i. s. 12.
[118] Bauer, ut sup.
[119] Glaubenslehre, 1 Thl. § 42 und 43 (2te Ausgabe).
[120] Binder, Studien der evang. Geistlichkeit Würtembergs, ix. 2, 5.
11 ff.
[121] Compare my Dogmatik, i. § 49.
[122] Bibl. Comm., 1. Thl. s. 119.
[123] Ut sup. s. 92.
[124] Hess, Geschichte der drei letzten Lebensjahre Jesu u. s. w., 1.
Thl. s. 13, 33.
[125] Horst in Henke’s Museum, i. 4. s. 733 f. Gabler in seinem neuest.
theol. Journal, vii. 1. s. 403.
[126] Briefe über die Bibel im Volkstone (Ausg. Frankfurt und Leipzig,
1800), 1tes Bändchen, 6ter Brief, s. 51 f.
[127] Bahrdt, ut sup. s. 52.
[128] Exeget. Handb. 1, a. s. 74 ff.
[129] Bahrdt, ut sup. 7ter Brief, s. 60.—E. F. über die beiden ersten
Kapitel des Matthäus und Lukas, in Henke’s Magazin, v. 1. s. 163.
Bauer, hebr. Mythol. 2, s. 220.
[130] Exeget. Handb. 1, a. s. 77–80.
[131] Ut sup. s. 73.
[132] Comp. Schleiermacher über die Schriften des Lukas, s. 25.
[133] Horæ hebr. et talmud., ed. Carpzov. p. 722.
[134] Ut sup. s. 26.
[135] Examples borrowed from Aulus Gellius, v. 9, and from Valerius
Maximus, i. 8, are cited.
[136] Ut sup. s. 26.
[137] Ut sup. s. 72 f.
[138] Ut sup. s. 69.
[139] In Schmidt’s Bibliothek für Kritik und Exegese, iii. 1, s. 119.
[140] Paulus, ut sup.
[141] Comp. De Wette, exeg. Handb., 1. 2, s. 9.
[142] Über die Schriften des Lukas, s. 23.
[143] Paulus und Olshausen z. d. St., Heydenreich a. a. O. 1, s. 87.
[144] Comp. Horst, in Henke’s Museum, i. 4, s. 705; Vater, Commentar
zum Pentateuch, 3, s. 597 ff.; Hase L. J., § 35; auch George, s. 33 f.
91.
[145] E. F. über die zwei ersten Kapitel u. s. w. in Henke’s Magazin,
v. 1, s. 162 ff., und Bauer hebr. Mythol., ii. 220 f.
[146] The adoption of this opinion is best explained by a passage—with
respect to this matter classical—in the Evangelium de nativitate Mariæ,
in Fabricius codex apocryphus N. Ti. 1, p. 22 f., and in Thilo 1, p.
322, “Deus”—it is here said,—cum alicujus uterum claudit, ad hoc facit,
ut mirabilius denuo aperiat, et non libidinis esse, quod nascitur, sed
divini muneris cognoscatur. Prima enim gentis vestræ Sara mater nonne
usque ad octogesimum annum infecunda fuit? et tamen in ultimâ
senectutis ætate genuit Isaac, cui repromissa erat benedictio omnium
gentium. Rachel quoque, tantum Domino grata tantumque a sancto Jacob
amata diu sterilis fuit, et tamen Joseph genuit, non solum dominum
Ægypti, sed plurimarum gentium fame periturarum liberatorem. Quis in
ducibus vel fortior Sampsone, vel sanctior Samuele? et tamen hi ambo
steriles matres habuere.—ergo—crede—dilatos diu conceptus et steriles
partus mirabiliores esse solere.
[147] Neuestes theol. Journal, vii. 1, s. 402 f.
[148] In Henke’s Museum, i. 4, s. 702 ff.
[149] Hase in his Leben Jesu makes the same admission; compare § 52
with § 32.
[150] Wetstein zu Luke i. 11, s. 647 f. adduces passages from Josephus
and from the Rabbins recording apparitions seen by the high priests.
How readily it was presumed that the same thing happened to ordinary
priests is apparent from the narrative before us.
[151]
Judges xiii. 14 (LXX.): Luc. i. 15.:
καὶ οἶνον καὶ σίκερα (al. μέθυσμα, καὶ οἶνον καὶ σίκερα οὐ μὲ
hebr. שֵׁכָר) μὴ πιέτω. πίῃ.
[152]
Judg. xiii. 5: Luc. i. 15.:
ὅτι ἡγιασμένον ἔσται τῷ θεῷ (al. Ναζὶρ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου
θεοῦ ἔσται) τὸ παιδάριον οὐκ τῆς πλησθήσεται ἔτι ἐκ κοιλίας
γαστρός (al. ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίας). μητρός αὐτοῦ.
[153]
Judg. xiii. 24 f.: Luc. i. 80:
καὶ ηὐλόγησεν αὐτὸν Κύριος, καὶ η τὸ δὲ παιδίον ηὔξανε καὶ
’ξήθη (al. ἡδρύνθη) τὸ παιδάριον· καὶ ἐκραταιοῦτο πνεύματι, κὰι ἦν ἐν
ἤρξατο πνεῦμα Κυρίου συμπορεύεσθαι ταῖς ἐρήμοις, ἕως ἡμέρας
αὐτῷ ἐν παρεμβολῇ Δὰν, ἀναμὲσον Σαρὰ ἁναδείξεως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν
καὶ ἀναμέσον Ἐσθαόλ. Ἰσραήλ.
Comp. Gen. xxi. 20.
[154]
Gen. xvi. 11. (LXX.): Luc. i. 13:
καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἰσμαήλ. καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ
Ἰωάννην.
xvii. 19: — — Ἰσαάκ.
[155] Olshausen, bibl. Commentar, 1. s. 116. Hoffmann, s. 146.
[156] With this view of the passage compare De Wette, Exeg. Handbuch
zum N. T., 1, 2, s. 12.
[157] Kuinöl, Comm. in Matth. Proleg., p. xxvii. f.
[158] Paulus, p. 292.
[159] Hieron. in Daniel. init.
[160] See Wetstein.
[161] e.g. Fritzsche, Comm. in Matth., p. 13.
[162] Exegt. Handbuch, i. 1, s. 12 f.
[163] The expedient of Kuinöl, Comm. in Matth. p. 3, to distinguish the
Rahab here mentioned from the celebrated one, becomes hence
superfluous, besides that it is perfectly arbitrary.
[164] Hoffmann, s. 154, according to Hug, Einl., ii. s. 271.
[165] Compare Fritzsche, Comm. in Matth., p. 19; Paulus, exeget.
Handbuch, i. s. 289; De Wette, exeg. Handb. in loco.
[166] Fritzsche in Matth., p. 11.
[167] Paulus, s. 292.
[168] Bibl. Comm., p. 46, note.
[169] See Schneckenburger, Beiträge zur Einleitung in das N. T., s. 41
f., and the passage cited from Josephus, B. j. vi. 8. Also may be
compared the passage cited by Schöttgen, horæ hebr. et talm. zu Matth.
i. from Synopsis Sohar, p. 132, n. 18. Ab Abrahamo usque ad Salomonem
XV. sunt generationes; atque tunc luna fuit in plenilunio. A Salomone
usque ad Zedekiam iterum sunt XV. generationes, et tunc luna defecit,
et Zedekiæ effossi sunt oculi.
[170] De Wette has already called attention to the analogy between
these Old Testament genealogies and those of the Gospels, with regard
to the intentional equality of numbers. Kritik der mos. Geschichte, s.
69. Comp. s. 48.
[171] See Chrysostom and Luther, in Credner, Einleitung in d. N. T., 1,
s. 143 f. Winer, bibl. Realwörterbuch, 1., s. 659.
[172] Orig. homil. in Lucam 28.
[173] Luther, Werke, Bd. 14. Walch. Ausg. s. 8 ff.
[174] De consensu Evangelistarum, ii. 3, u. c. Faust., iii. 3; amongst
the moderns, for example, E. F. in Henke’s Magazin 5, 1, 180 f. After
Augustine had subsequently become acquainted with the writing of
Africanus, he gave up his own opinion for that of the latter. Retract,
ii. 7.
[175] Eusebius, H. E. i. 7, and lately e.g. Schleiermacher on Luke, p.
53.
[176] S. 53. Comp. Winer, bibl. Realwörterbuch, 1 Bd. s. 660.
[177] Comp. Michaelis, Mos. Recht. ii. s. 200. Winer, bibl.
Realwörterb. ii. s. 22 f.
[178] Thus e.g. Spanheim, dubia evang. p. 1. s. 13 ff. Lightfoot,
Michaelis, Paulus, Kuinöl, Olshausen, lately Hoffmann and others.
[179] Epiphanius, Grotius. Olshausen, s. 43.
[180] Testament XII. Patriarch., Test. Simeon c. 71. In Fabric. Codex
pseudepigr. V. T. p. 542: ἐξ αὐτῶν (the races of Levi and Juda)
άνατελεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ σωτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἀνασήσει γὰρ Κύριος ἐκ τοῦ Αευῒ ὡς
ἀρχιερέα, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἰουδα ὡς βασιλέα κ.τ.λ.
[181] Comp. Thilo, cod. apocr. N.T. 1, s. 374 ff.
[182] Thus e.g. the Manichæan Faustus in Augustin. contra Faust. L.
xxiii. 4.
[183] Protevangel. Jacobi c. 1 f. u. 10. and evangel. de nativitate
Mariæ c. 1. Joachim and Anna, of the race of David, are here mentioned
as the parents of Mary. Faustus on the contrary, in the above cited
passage, gives Joachim the title of Sacerdos.
[184] Dial. c. Tryph. 43. 100. (Paris, 1742.)
[185] Paulus. The Jews also in their representation of a Mary, the
daughter of Heli, tormented in the lower world (see Lightfoot), appear
to have taken the genealogy of Luke, which sets out from Heli, for that
of Mary.
[186] e.g. Lightfoot, horæ, p. 750; Osiander, s. 86.
[187] Juchasin f. 55, 2. in Lightfoot s. 183, and Bava bathra, f. 110,
2. in Wetstein s. 230 f. Comp. Joseph. Vita, 1.
[188] Thus Eichhorn, Einl. in das N. T. 1 Dd s. 425. Kaiser, bibl.
Theol. 1, s. 232. Wegscheider, Institut. § 123, not. d. de Wette, bibl.
Dogm. § 279, and exeget. Handbuch 1, 2, s. 32. Winer, bibl.
Realwörterb. 1, s. 660 f. Hase, Leben Jesu, § 33. Fritzsche, Comm. in
Matt, p. 35. Ammon, Fortbildung des Christenthums zur Weltreligion 1,
s. 196 ff.
[189] See De Wette, bibl. Dogm. and exeg. Handb. 1, 1, s. 14; Hase, L.
J. Eusebius gives a not improbable explanation of this disagreement
(ad. Steph. quæst. iii., pointed out by Credner, 1, p. 68 f.) that
besides the notion amongst the Jews, that the Messiah must spring from
the royal line of David, another had arisen, that this line having
become polluted and declared unworthy of continuing on the throne of
David (Jerem. xxii. 30), by the wickedness of its later reigning
members, a line more pure though less famed was to be preferred to it.
[190] The farther considerations on the origin and import of these
genealogies, which arise from their connexion with the account of the
miraculous birth of Jesus, must be reserved till after the examination
of the latter point.
[191] Fabricius, Codex apocryphus N. T. 1, p. 19 ff. 66 ff.; Thilo, 1,
p. 161 ff. 319 ff.
[192] Gregory of Nyssa or his interpolator is reminded of this mother
of Samuel by the apocryphal Anna when he says of her: Μιμεῖται τοίνυν
καὶ αὕτη τὰ περὶ τῆς μετρὸς τοῦ Σαμουὴλ διηγήματα κ.τ.λ. Fabricius, 1,
p. 6.
[193] Evang. de nativ. Mar. c. 7: cunctos de domo et familia David
nuptui habiles, non conjugatos.
[194] Protev. Jac c. 8: τοὺς χηρεύοντας τοῦ λαοῦ.
[195] It is thus in the Evang. de nativ. Mariae vii. and viii.; but
rather different in the Protev. Jac. c. ix.
[196] Protev. c. 9: πρεσβύτης. Evang. de nativ. Mar. 8.: grandaevus.
Epiphan. adv. haeres. 78, 8: λαμβάνει τὴν Μαρίαν χῆρος, κατάγων ἡλικίαν
περί που ὀγδοήκοντα ἐτῶν καὶ πρόσω ὁ ἀνήρ.
[197] Παράλαβε αὐτὴν εἰς τήρησιν σεαυτῷ. c. ix. Compare with Evang. de
nativ. Mar. viii. and x.
[198] See the variations in Thilo, p. 227, and the quotations from the
Fathers at p. 365 not.
[199] Numb. v. 18.
[200] Protev. Jac. x.–xvi. The account in the Evang. de nativ. Mar. is
less characteristic.
[201] “Die natürliche Geschichte des grossen Propheten von Nazaret,”
1ter Band, s. 119 ff.
[202] Augustin, de consens. evangelist. ii. 5.
[203] Paulus, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Comm. in Matth. p. 56.
[204] Comp. de Wette’s exeg. Handbuch, i. 1, s. 18. Schleiermacher,
Ueber die Schriften des Lukas, s. 42 ff.
[205] Protev. Jac. c. 12: Μαριὰμ δέ ἐπελάθετο τῶν μυστηρίων ὧν εἶπε
πρὸς αὐτὴν Γαβριήλ. When questioned by Joseph she assures him with
tears: οὐ γινώσκω, πόθεν ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἐν τῇ γαστρί μου. c. 13.
[206] Geschichte der drei letzten Lebensjahre Jesu u. s. w. 1. Thl. s.
36. Comp. Hoffmann, s. 176 f.
[207] Ch. viii.–x.
[208] Paulus, exeg. Handb. 1 a, s. 121. 145.
[209] To this opinion Neander inclines, L. J. Ch. s. 18.
[210]
Gen. xvii. 19; LXX. (Annunciation of Matt. i. 21.
Isaac):
(μὴ φοβηθῆς παραλαβεῖν Μαριὰμ
ἰδοὺ Σάῤῥα ἡ γυνή σου τέξεται σοι τὴν γυναῖκα σου—) τέξεται δὲ
υἱὸν, καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ υἱὸν, καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα
Ἰσαάκ. αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦν· αὐτὸς γὰρ σώσει
τὸν λαὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπὸ· τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν
Judg. xiii. 5. (Annunciation of αὐτῶν.
Samson):
Luke i. 30 ff.
καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρξεται σῶσαι τὸν Ἰσραὴλ
ἐκ χειρὸς φυλιστιΐμ. καὶ εἶπεν ὁ ἄγγελος αὐτῇ—ἰδοὺ
συλλήψῃ ἐν γαστρὶ, καὶ τέξῃ
Gen. xvi. 11 ff. (Annunciation of υἱὸν, καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα
Ishmael): αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦν. Οὗτος ἔσται.——.
καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῆ ὁ ἄγγελος Κυρίου·
ἰδοὺ σὺ ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχεις, καὶ τέξη
υἱὸν καὶ καλέσεις τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ
Ἰσμαήλ. Οὗτος ἔσται — —.
[211] Comp. de Wette, Kritik der mos. Geschichte, s. 86 ff.
[212] The vision which, according to Matthew, Joseph had in his sleep,
had besides a kind of type in the vision by which, according to the
Jewish tradition related by Josephus, the father of Moses was comforted
under similar circumstances, when suffering anxiety concerning the
pregnancy of his wife, although for a different reason. Joseph. Antiq.
II. ix. 3. “A man whose name was Amram, one of the nobler sort of
Hebrews, was afraid for his whole nation, lest it should fail, by the
want of young men to be brought up hereafter, and was very uneasy at
it, his wife being then with child, and he knew not what to do.
Hereupon he betook himself to prayer to God.... Accordingly God had
mercy on him, and was moved by his supplication. He stood by him in his
sleep, and exhorted him not to despair of his future favours.... For
this child of thine shall deliver the Hebrew nation from the distress
they are under from the Egyptians. His memory shall be famous while the
world lasts.”
[213] Comp. Ammon, Fortbildung des Christenthums, i. s. 208 f.
[214] Ueber die Schriften des Lukas, s. 23.
[215] Compare Gesenius and Hitzig. Commentaren zum Jesaia; Umbreit,
Ueber die Geburt des Immanuel durch eine Jungfrau, in den theol.
Studien u. Krit., 1830, 3. Heft, s. 541 ff.
[216] This explanation does away with the importance of the controversy
respecting the word עָלְמָה. Moreover it ought to be decided by the fact
that the word does not signify an immaculate, but a marriageable young
woman (see Gesenius). So early as the time of Justin the Jews
maintained that the word עָלְמָה ought not to be rendered by παρθένος
but by νεᾶνις. Dial c. Tryph. no. 43. p. 130 E. Comp. Iren. adv. haer.
iii. 21.
[217] Christologie des A. T. s. 1, b, s. 47.
[218] See Winer, Grammatik des neutest. Sprachidioms, 3te Aufl. s. 382
ff. Fritzsche, Comm. in Matth. p. 49. 317 und Excurs. 1, p. 836 ff.
[219] See the Introduction, § 14.
[220] See Bleek in den theol. Studien u. Kritiken, 1835, 2, s. 441 ff.
[221] The whole rationalistic interpretation of Scripture rests upon a
sufficiently palpable paralogism, by which it stands or falls:
The New Testament authors are not to be interpreted as if they said
something irrational (certainly not something contrary to their own
modes of thinking).
Now according to a particular interpretation their assertions are
irrational (that is contrary to our modes of thinking).
Consequently the interpretation cannot give the original sense, and a
different interpretation must be given.
Who does not here perceive the quaternio terminorum and the fatal
inconsequence, when Rationalism takes its stand upon the same ground
with supernaturalism; that, namely, whilst with regard to all other men
the first point to be examined is whether they speak or write what is
just and true, to the New Testament writers the prerogative is granted
of this being, in their case, already presupposed?
[222] Conjugial. præcept. Opp. ed. Hutton, Vol. 7. s. 428.
[223] Irenäus, adv. haer. 1, 26: Cerinthus, Jesum subjecit non ex
virgine natum, impossibile enim hoc ei visum est.
[224] In Henke’s neuem Magazin, iii. 3, s. 369.
[225] Homil. in Lucam xiv. Comp. my Streitschriften, i. 2, s. 72 f.
[226] Olshausen, Bibl. Comm. s. 49. Neander, L. J. Ch. s. 16 f.
[227] e.g. by Eichhorn, Einleitung in das N. T. 1. Bd. s. 407.
[228] Glaubenslehre, 2 Thl. § 97. s. 73 f. der zweiten Auflage.
[229] This side is particularly considered in der Skiagraphie des
Dogma’s von Jesu übernatürlicher Geburt, in Schmidt’s Bibliothek, i. 3,
s. 400 ff.; in den Bemerkungen über den Glaubenspunkt: Christus ist
empfangen vom heil. Geist, in Henke’s neuem Magazin, iii. 3, 365 ff.;
in Kaiser’s bibl. Theol. 1, s. 231 f.; De Wette’s bibl. Dogmatik, §
281; Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre, 2 Thl. § 97.
[230] Brought to bear upon this point by Neander, L. J. Ch. s. 12.
[231] Augustinus contra Faustum Manichaeum, L. 23. 3. 4. 8.
[232] See Schmidt, Schleiermacher, and Wegscheider, Instit. § 123 (not.
d).
[233] Eichhorn thinks this probable, Einl. in das N. T. i. s. 425, De
Wette possible, exeg. Handb. i. 1, s. 7.
[234] Justin Mart. Dial. cum Tryphone, 48; Origines contra Celsum, L.
5, 61. Euseb. H. E. 3, 27.
[235] Epiphan. haeres. 30, 14.
[236] Haeres. 29, 9.
[237] Credner, in den Beiträgen zur Einleitung in das N. T. 1, s. 443.
Anm.
[238] Orig. ut sup.
[239] See Neander, K. G. 1, 2, s. 615 f.
[240] Credner, über Essener, und einen theilweisen Zusammenhang beider,
in Winer’s Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1. Bd. 2tes and
3tes Heft; see Baur, Progr. de Ebionitarum origine et doctrinâ ab
Essenis repetendâ, und christl. Gnosis, s. 403.
[241] De carne Christi, c. 14: Poterit haec opinio Hebioni convenire,
qui nudum hominem, et tantum ex semine David, i.e. non et Dei filium,
constituit Jesum, ut in illo angelum fuisse edicat.
[242] Neander and Schneckenburger are of the latter, Gieseler and
Credner of the former opinion.
[243] I here refer to the account of Hegesippus in Eusebius, H. E. iv.
22.
[244] Homil. 3, 23–27.
[245] Epiphan. haeres. 30, 18. comp. 15.
[246] That these were the traits in David’s character which displeased
the Christian sect in question, is sufficiently evident from a passage
in the Clementine Homilies, though the name is not given: Homil. 3, 25;
ἕτι μὴν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ θης τούτου (τοῦ Καΐν) διαδοχης προεληλυθότες πρωτοι
μοιχοὶ ἐγένοντο, καὶ ψαλτήρια, καὶ κιθάραι, καὶ χαλκεῖς ὅπλων πολεμικῶν
ἐγένοντο. Δὶ ὃ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐγγὁνων προφητεία, μοιχῶν καὶ ψαλτηρίων
γέμουσα, λανθανόντως διὰ τῶν ἡδυπαυειων ὡς τοὺς πολέμους ἐγείρει.
[247] Epiphan. haer. 30, 14. 16. 34.
[248] Homil. 3, 17.
[249] Schneckenburger, über das Evang. der Aegypter, s. 7; Baur,
christl. Gnosis, s. 760 ff. See on the other side Credner and Hoffmann.
[250] Orig. Comm. in Matth. T. 16, 12. Tertullian, De carne Christi,
14, s. Anm. 13 (a passage in which indeed the speculative and ordinary
Ebionites are mingled together).
[251] Clement, homil. 18, 13. They referred the words of Matth. xi. 27:
οὐδεὶς ἔγνω τὸν πατέρα, εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱὸς κ.τ.λ. to τοὺς πατέρα νομίζοντας
χριστοῦ τὸν Δαβὶδ, καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν χριστὸν υἱὸν ὄντα, καὶ υἱὸν θεοῦ μὴ
ἐγνωκότας, and complained that αἰτὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν Δαβὶδ πάντες ἔλεγον.
[252] Haeres. 30, 14: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κήρινθος καὶ Κάρποκρας τῷ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι
παρ’ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Ἑβιωναίοις) εὐαγγελίῳ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχις τοῦ κατὰ
Ματθαῖον εὐαγγελίου διὰ τῆς γενεαλογίας Βούλονται παριστᾷν ἐκ σπέρματος
Ἰωσὴφ καὶ Μαρίας εἶναι τὸν χριστόν.
[253] Dial. c. Tryph. 100. 120.
[254] Br..., die Nachricht, dass Jesus durch den heil. Geist und von
einer Jungfrau geboren sei, aus Zeitbegriffen erläutert. In Schmidt’s
Bibl. 1, 1. s. 101 ff.—Horst, in Henke’s Museum 1, 4, 497 ff., über die
beiden ersten Kapitel in Evang. Lukas.
[255] Bemerkungen über den Glaubenspunkt: Christus ist empfangen vom
heil. Geist. In Henke’s neuem Magazin, 3, 3, 399.
[256] Schleiermacher, über den Lukas, s. 26 f.
[257] Im neuesten theol. Journal, 7. Bd. 4. Stück, s. 407 f.
[258] Antiq. xviii. 3, 4.
[259] Iter Theil, s. 140 ff.
[260] The legend has undergone various modifications, but the name of
Panthera or Pandira has been uniformly retained. Vid. Origenes c. Cels.
1, 28., 32. Schöttgen, Horæ 2, 693 ff. aus Tract. Sanhedrin u. A.;
Eisenmenger, entdecktes Judenthum, 1, s. 105 ff. aus der Schmähschrift:
Toledoth Jeschu; Thilo, cod. apocr. s. 528. Comp. my Abhandlung über
die Namen Panther, Pantheras, Pandera, in jüdischen und patristischen
Erzählungen von der Abstammung Jesu. Athenäum, Febr. 1839, s. 15 ff.
[261] Orig. c. Celsus i. 32.
[262] Ibid. vi. 8.
[263] Ibid. i. 37.
[264] Gabler, in seinem neuesten theol. Journal, 7, 4. s. 408 f.;
Eichhorn, Einleitung in das N. T. 1, s. 428 f.; Bauer, hebr. Mythol. 1,
192 e ff.; Kaiser, bibl. Theologie, 1, s. 231 f.; Wegscheider, Instit.
§ 123; De Wette, bibl. Dogmat. § 281, und exeg. Handb. 1, 1, s. 18 f.,
Ammon, Fortbildung des Christenth. s. 201 ff.; Hase, L. J. § 33;
Fritzsche, Comment. in Matth. s. 56. The latter justly remarks in the
title to the first chapter: non minus ille (Jesus) ut ferunt doctorum
Judaicorum de Messiâ sententiæ, patrem habet spiritum divinum, matrem
virginem.
[265] Jamblich. vita Pythagoræ. cap. 2, ed. Kiessling.
[266] Adv. Jovin. 1, 26. Diog. Laërt., 3, 1, 2.
[267] Glaubwürdigkeit, s. 64.
[268] Apologie des L. J. s. 92.
[269] Diog. Laërt a. a. O.: Σπεύσιππος (Sororis Platonis filius,
Hieron.) δ’· ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Πλάτωνος περδείπνῳ καὶ Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ
Πλάτωνος ἐγκωμίῳ καὶ Ἀναξιλίδης ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ φιλοσόφων, φασὶν,
Ἀθήνησιν ἦν λόγος, κ.τ.λ.
[270] Neander, L. J. Ch. s. 10.
[271] Antiq. 15. 2. 6.
[272]
Gen. xviii., 14 Sept. Luke i. 37.
μὴ ἀδυνατήσει παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ῥῆμα; ὅτι οὐκ ἀδυνατήσει παρὰ τῷ θεῷ πᾶν
ῥῆμα.
[273] De Wette, Exeg. Handb. 1, 1, s. 17.
[274] They are to be found however in the more modern Rabbins, s.
Matthæi, Religionsgl. der Apostel 2, a. s. 555 ff.
[275] Bibl. Comm. 1, s. 47. Also Daub. 2 a. s. 311 f; Theile, § 14.
Neander, s. 9.
[276] Diog. Laërt. a. a. O. See Origenes c. Cels. 1, 37.
[277] Demonax, 29.
[278] S. Origenes in Matthæum, Opp. ed. de la Rue, Vol. 3. s. 463.
[279] The Arian Eunomius according to Photius taught τὸν Ἰωσὴφ μετὰ τὴν
ἄφραστον κυοφορίαν συνάπτεσθαι τῇ παρθένῳ. This was also, according to
Epiphanius, the doctrine of those called by him Dimaerites and
Antidicomarianites, and in the time of Jerome, of Helvidius and his
followers. Compare on this point the Sammlung von Suicer, im Thesaurus
ii., s. v. Μαρία, fol. 305 f.
[280] Comp. Hieron. adv. Helv. 6, 7, Theophylact and Suidas in Suicer,
1, s. v. ἔως, fol. 1294 f.
[281] Hieron. z. d. St.
[282] See Orig. in Matth. Tom. 10, 17; Epiphan. haeres. 78, 7; Historia
Josephi, c. 2; Protev. Jac. 9. 18.
[283] Chrysostomus, hom. 142, in Suicer, s. v. Μαρία, most repulsively
described in the Protev. Jac. xix. and xx.
[284] Hieron. ad Matth. 12, und advers. Helvid. 19.
[285] Die Brüder Jesu. In Winer’s Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche
Theologie, 1, 3. s. 364 f.
[286] Biblisches Realwörterbuch, 1 Bd. s. 664, Anm. De Wette, z. d. St.
Neander L. J. Ch., s. 34.
[287] Comment. in Matth. s. 53 ff., vgl. auch s. 835.
[288] Olshausen is exceedingly unhappy in the example chosen by him in
support of his interpretation of ἕως οὗ. For when it is said, we waited
till midnight but no one came, certainly this by no means implies that
after midnight some one did come, but it does imply that after midnight
we waited no longer; so that here the expression till retains its
signification of exclusion.
[289] On this subject compare in particular Clemen, die Brüder Jesu, in
Winer’s Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol. 1, 3, s. 329 ff.; Paulus, Exeg.
Handbuch, 1 Bd. s. 557 ff.; Fritzsche, a. a. O. s. 480 ff.; Winer,
bibl. Realwörterbuch, in den A. A.; Jesus, Jacobus, Apostel.
[290] See the different names assigned them in the legend in Thilo,
Codex apocryphus N.T., 1. s. 360 note.
[291] Euseb. H. E. 2, 1.
[292] Euseb. H. E. 3, 11.
[293] Fritzsche, Comm. in Matth. p. 482.
[294] Theile, Biographie Jesu, § 18.
[295] Paulus, exeg. Handb. 1. a, s. 120 ff.
[296] S. Olshausen und de Wette, z. d. St.
[297] Hess, Geschichte Jesu, 1, s. 26; Olshausen, bibl. Comm. z. d.
St.; Hoffmann, s. 226; Lange, s. 76 ff.
[298] Compare Luke i. 47 with 1 Sam. ii. 1.
,, i. 49 ,, ,, ii. 2.
,, i. 51 ,, ,, ii. 3, 4.
,, i. 52 ,, ,, ii. 8.
,, i. 53 ,, ,, ii. 5.
Particularly Compare Luke i. 48 with 1 Sam. i. 11.
Luke i. 50 Deut. vii. 9.
,, i. 52 Ecclesiasticus x. 14.
,, i. 54 Ps. xcviii. 3.
[299] 5 Band, 1. Stück, s. 161. f.
[300] In Henke’s Museum, 1, 4, s. 725.
[301] Ueber den Lukas, s. 23 f.
[302] Olshausen, Paulus, Kuinöl.
[303] Tholuck, s. 194 ff. Neander, s. 19.
[304] Cassiodor. Variarum, 3, 52. Isidor. Orig. 5, 36.
[305] To refer here to the Monumentum Ancyranum, which is said to
record a census of the whole empire in the year of Rome 746 (Osiander,
p. 95), is proof of the greatest carelessness. For he who examines this
inscription will find mention only of three assessments census civium
Romanorum, which Suetonius designates census populi, and of which Dio
Cassius speaks, at least of one of them, as ἀπογραφὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ
κατοικούντων. See Ideler, Chronol. 2, s. 339.
[306] In the authoritative citations in Suidas are the words taken from
Luke, αὔτη ἡ ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο.
[307] Hoffmann, s. 231.
[308] Joseph. Antiq. 17, 13, 2. B. j. 2, 7, 3.
[309] Antiq. 17, 13, 5. 18, 1, 1. B. j. 2, 8, 1.
[310] Paulus, exeg. Handb. 1, a, s. 171. Winer, bibl. Realwörterbuch.
[311] Tacit. Annal. 1, 11. Sueton. Octav. 191. But if in this document
opes publicæ continebantur: quantum civium sociorumque in armis; quot
classes, regna, provinciæ, tributa aut vectigalia, et necessitates ac
largitiones: the number of troops and the sum which the Jewish prince
had to furnish, might have been given without a Roman tax being levied
in their land. For Judea in particular Augustus had before him the
subsequent census made by Quirinus.
[312] Ὅτι, πάλαι χρώμενος αὐτῷ φιλω, νῦν ὑπηκόῳ χρήσεται. Joseph.
Antiq. 16, 9, 3. But the difference was adjusted long before the death
of Herod. Antiq. 16, 10, 9.