The news of the disaster was first received in the Capital with
incredulity and amazement, then with consternation. Throughout the night
President Lincoln received spectators of the battle and listened in
silence to their descriptions of the engagement.
“For a few days,” writes Channing, “the North was dazed, stocks went
down, money went up, and people sat around with their hands folded in
despair. Then, almost as by magic, the scene shifted and stern resolve
took the place of the hysteria of the Hundred Days since Sumter. Lincoln
called for volunteers. The best blood of the North in all ranks of
society, in the East, in the Ohio Valley, and on the shores of the Great
Lakes responded. The new men went into the conflict with a determination
and a spirit that has seldom been seen and never excelled.”
In the South, the news of the victory was received with great elation.
Thanksgiving sermons were preached from the pulpits while public
officials commemorated the event with congratulatory proclamations. In
the ill-considered opinion of many Southerners the war was over, yet
seldom if ever has so complete a victory borne such meager results. An
overweening confidence and a false sense of security developed in the
South a paralysis of enterprise more damaging to it than was the
disaster of defeat for the North.
The battle, however, as the English historian Fuller points out, was to
have a profound influence on the grand strategy of the war. “First, it
imbued the Southern politicians with an exaggerated idea of the prowess
of their soldiers and so led them to under-estimate the fighting
capacity of their enemy; secondly, it so terrified Lincoln and his
Government that from now onwards until 1864, east of the Alleghanies,
the defence of Washington became the pivot of Northern strategy.”
Though the men of each army had fought with flashes of steadiness and
exceptional courage, there was ample evidence to show the costly result
of inadequate training.
FEDERAL CONFEDERATE
Strength, approximate 35,000 32,000
CASUALTIES
Killed 460 387
Wounded 1,124 1,582
Captured or missing 1,312 13
Total 2,896 1,982
_Winter’s Lull_
Following the conclusion of the first Manassas campaign, the war in
Virginia “languished” until the spring of 1862. The North, smarting from
the humiliating defeat suffered at Bull Run, now turned with grim
determination to the mobilization of its resources and to the training
of the great land forces necessary to subjugate the South. Maj. Gen.
George B. McClellan, fresh from victories in western Virginia, was
immediately called to the command of the Federal forces around
Washington. Soldierly in bearing and engaging in manner, McClellan
proved a popular choice with the Nation and the army. With marked
success he initiated a program of organization and training of the great
Army of the Potomac. Recruits now streamed into Washington by the
thousand. By December, there were 150,000 in training; by spring, over
200,000.
Meanwhile, the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston remained
encamped at Centreville with outposts along the Potomac. Jackson, with a
detachment, was stationed at Winchester. It was during this time that
Johnston established a very strongly fortified position consisting of an
L-shaped line of earthwork forts and batteries connected by infantry
trenches that extended along the eastern and northern crests of
Centreville for a distance of approximately 5 miles. Gradually, on the
approach of winter, log or board huts were constructed for winter
quarters for the troops. These were so located as to permit the troops
easy access to the fortifications.
[Illustration: Quaker guns at Centreville. Confederate winter quarters
are shown in background. Wartime photograph. Courtesy National
Archives.]
With the worsening condition of the roads the problem of supply became
increasingly difficult. It was then that Johnston built a branch
railroad from his base at Manassas Junction. This was one of the first
railroads ever to be used solely for military purposes.
_Preliminary Operations to Second Manassas_
McClellan’s failure to move against Johnston resulted in a restive
public and press. Richmond, rather than Centreville, now became the
immediate Federal objective. Learning of an anticipated movement against
Richmond via Urbanna, Johnston, on March 9, fell back from Centreville
to take up a position south of the Rappahannock, with his right resting
at Fredericksburg and his left at Culpeper Court House. This forced a
modification of McClellan’s original plan. He thereupon decided to make
the movement by water to Fortress Monroe and from there advance up the
Peninsula upon Richmond.
On March 17, the Federal army embarked from Alexandria. McClellan had
anticipated the use of a force of about 155,000 men. The brilliant
operations of “Stonewall” Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley during the
next 4 months, however, so alarmed President Lincoln as to cause him to
immobilize nearly 40,000 of McDowell’s troops at Fredericksburg to
secure the defenses of Washington. This, together with the detention of
Banks’ expected reinforcements in the Valley, reduced McClellan’s force
to approximately 100,000, thereby materially minimizing his chances of
success. Seldom has so small a force as that of Jackson (approximately
16,000) so largely influenced the final outcome of a major military
operation.
Johnston, in the meantime, had reinforced Magruder at Yorktown. On May 4
the town was evacuated, and the next day a successful rearguard action
was fought at Williamsburg, covering the Confederate withdrawal to
Richmond. The Federal army followed by land and water to White House on
the Pamunkey where, on May 16, McClellan set up his headquarters. The
next day the Federal forces resumed their advance on Richmond.
Gathering a force of some 63,000 men, Johnston then determined to
attack. On May 31, in the Battle of Seven Pines, followed by the Battle
of Fair Oaks the next day, the Confederates were repulsed, and Johnston
was severely wounded. The command of the Army of Northern Virginia now
devolved upon Robert E. Lee, a command that he was not to relinquish
until the end of the war. Within 2 weeks the defenses of Richmond had
been strengthened and the morale of the troops greatly improved.
By June 25, Lee had assembled a force of about 90,000 men, including
Jackson’s victorious command from the Valley. The next day he launched
his great counteroffensive. In a series of desperately contested
operations, known as the Seven Days’ Battles before Richmond, McClellan
was forced back upon Harrison’s Landing on the James. Though the
campaign was costly in Confederate casualties, Lee saved Richmond and
cloaked his army with a sense of invincibility.
[Illustration: Maj. Gen. John Pope, in command of the Federal Army,
Second Battle of Manassas. Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: Gen. Robert E. Lee, in command of the Army of Northern
Virginia. Courtesy National Archives.]
_Pope Concentrates Behind the Rapidan_
The failure of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell in the Shenandoah Valley
convinced President Lincoln of the desirability of consolidating their
armies under a single head. By order of June 26 the “Army of Virginia”
was created, and Maj. Gen. John Pope, who had won recent successes in
the West, was given the command. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Henry W.
Halleck was recalled from the West to be made general in chief of the
Federal armies.
To Pope was entrusted the responsibility for covering Washington,
protecting the Shenandoah Valley, and so operating against the
Confederate communications at Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to
draw off heavy detachments from Richmond, thereby relieving the pressure
on McClellan. On July 14, Pope ordered an advance on Gordonsville. Lee,
anticipating the movement, had ordered Jackson to this point the day
before.
On August 7, Jackson, having been reinforced by A. P. Hill, moved toward
Culpeper in the hope of capturing the town and using it in a series of
operations against Pope. Two days later he fell upon Banks at Cedar
Mountain in a sharp but indecisive encounter.
Lee now learned that McClellan had been ordered to evacuate the
Peninsula and reinforce Pope. Appreciating the necessity of striking
Pope before he could be joined by such heavy reinforcements, Lee moved
with Longstreet’s corps to reinforce Jackson. Pope’s force now numbered
about 47,000 effectives, while Lee had approximately 55,000.
_Lee’s Operations Along the Rapidan and Rappahannock_
Pope’s center was now at Cedar Mountain, his right at Robertson’s River,
and his left near Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan. Thus stationed, his army
was directly opposite Gordonsville where Jackson’s force had recently
arrived. On Clark’s Mountain (a high hill opposite Pope’s left) the
Confederates had established a signal station. From here, stretching for
miles, could be seen the white tents of the Federal encampment dotting
the Culpeper tablelands. Spurs from Clark’s Mountain paralleled the
Rapidan to Somerville Ford, located about 2 miles from Raccoon Ford.
Lee was quick to appreciate the advantage this topography afforded him.
Massing his troops behind Clark’s Mountain he might move under its
protecting screen, fall upon Pope’s left at Somerville Ford, and cut off
his retreat to Washington. The opportunity held bright possibilities of
success, and August 18 was set as the date for the initiation of the
movement. Unforeseen delays postponed the movement until the 20th. Worse
still for the Confederates, Stuart’s adjutant general was captured,
bearing a copy of Lee’s order.
Thus warned, Pope withdrew his army behind the Rappahannock. Lee
followed closely on the 20th, crossing to the north side of the river.
Pope took up an advantageous position where he stood fast during 5 days
of feints and demonstrations as Lee sought eagerly for an opening on the
right. In the meantime, Stuart had captured Pope’s headquarters. Thus,
Lee learned that 20,000 troops, composing the corps of Heintzelman and
Porter and the division of Reynolds, were within 2 days’ march of the
front. Within 5 days other expected reinforcements would swell Pope’s
numbers to about 130,000 men.
The situation was so desperate as to demand a bold expedient. Quickly,
Lee made his decision. Jackson, with Stuart’s cavalry comprising about
24,000 men, was to be sent on a wide flanking movement of Pope’s right
for the purpose of destroying his communications with Washington.
Commenting on this decision, Henderson, the English biographer of
Jackson, says “we have record of few enterprises of greater daring.”
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF FIRST MANASSAS, AUGUST 29-30, 1861]
[Illustration: ROUTE OF JACKSON’S TURNING MOVEMENT AGAINST POPE]
[Illustration: Jackson and his foot cavalry. From the painting by
Hoffbauer in Battle Abbey, Richmond, Va. Courtesy Virginia Historical
Society.]
With Lee and Longstreet covering the line of the Rappahannock, Jackson
began his march from Jeffersonton on August 25. He moved through
Amissville and Orlean to bivouac that night at Salem. The next day he
pushed on past Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Bristoe. Never did
the “foot cavalry” better deserve its name, for in 2 days it had covered
approximately 51 miles. That night Jackson sent Stuart and two regiments
to Manassas Junction to capture Pope’s great base of supplies. The task
was accomplished with little effort.
[Illustration: Jackson’s troops pillaging Federal supplies at Manassas
Junction just prior to the Second Battle of Manassas. From “Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War.”]
[Illustration: Manassas Junction, Va., as it looked after Jackson’s
raid. Wartime photograph. Courtesy National Archives.]
The next day Jackson left Ewell to cover the rear at Bristoe and moved
with the rest of his command to Manassas Junction. There then followed a
scene of feasting and plunder the like of which has seldom been
witnessed. Knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens were filled with articles
of every description. Added to vast quantities of quartermaster and
commissary supplies were innumerable luxuries from sutler stores,
including expensive liquors and imported wines. An eyewitness writes,
“To see a starving man eating lobster salad & drinking rhine wine,
barefooted & in tatters was curious; the whole thing is indescribable.”
What could not be eaten or carried away was finally put to the torch.
With the destruction of these supplies one of the chief objectives of
the campaign had been accomplished.
_Second Battle of Manassas_ (SEE MAP ON PAGES 28-29.)