CHAPTER IX

POST-MEDIÆVAL GERMANY

We have in the preceding chapters sought to give a general view of the

social life, together with the inner political and economic movements,

of Germany during that closing period of the Middle Ages which is

generally known as the era of the Reformation. With the definite

establishment of the Reformation and of the new political and economic

conditions that came with it in many of the rising States of Germany,

the Middle Ages may be considered as definitely coming to an end,

notwithstanding that, of course, a considerable body of mediæval

conditions of social, political, and economic life continued to

survive all over Europe, and certainly not least in Germany.

We have now to take a general and, so to say, panoramic view embracing

three centuries and a half, dating from approximately the middle of

the sixteenth century to the present time. Our presentation, owing to

exigencies of space, will necessarily take the form of a mere sketch

of events and general tendencies, but a sketch that will, we hope, be

sufficient to connect periods and to enable the reader to understand

better than before the forces that have built up modern Germany and

have moulded the national character. In this long period of more than

three centuries there are two world-historic events, or rather series

of events, which stand out in bold relief as the causes which have

moulded Germany directly, and the whole of Europe indirectly, up to

the present day. These two epoch-making historical factors are (1) the

Thirty Years' War and (2) the Rise of the Prussian Monarchy.

Owing to the success of Protestantism, with its two forms of

Lutheranism and Calvinism in various German territories, the friction

became chronic between Catholic and Protestant interests throughout

the length and breadth of Central Europe. The Emperor himself was

chosen, as we know, by three ecclesiastical electors, the Archbishops

of Köln, Trier, and Mainz, and by four princes, the Pfalzgraf, called

in English the Elector Palatine, the Markgraves of Saxony and

Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia. The princes and other

potentates, owing immediate allegiance to the empire alone, were

practically independent sovereigns. The Reichstag, instituted in the

fifteenth century, attendance at which was strictly limited to these

immediate vassals of the empire, had proved of little effect. This was

shown when in the middle of the sixteenth century Protestantism had

established itself in the favour of the mass of the German peoples. It

was vetoed by the Reichstag, with its powerful contingent of

ecclesiastical members. Of course here the economic side of the

question played a great part. The ecclesiastical potentates and those

favourable to them dreaded the spread of Protestantism in view of the

secularization of religious domains and fiefs. This, notwithstanding

that there were not wanting bishops and abbots themselves who were not

indisposed, as princes of the empire, to appropriate the Church lands,

of which they were the trustees, for their own personal possessions.

After a short civil war an arrangement was come to at the Treaty of

Passau in 1552, which was in the main ratified by the Reichstag held

at Augsburg in 1555 (the so-called Peace of Augsburg); but the

arrangement was artificial and proved itself untenable as a permanent

instrument of peace.

During the latter part of the sixteenth century two magnates of the

empire, the Duke of Bavaria on the Catholic side and the Calvinist,

Christian of Anhalt, on the Protestant, played the chief rôle, the

Lutheran Markgrave of Saxony taking up a moderate position as

mediator. Of the Reichstag of Augsburg it should be said that it had

ignored the Calvinist section of the Protestant party altogether, only

recognizing the Lutheran. In 1608 the Protestant Union, which embraced

Lutherans and Calvinists alike, was founded under the leadership of

Christian of Anhalt. It was most powerful in Southern Germany. This

was countered immediately by the foundation under Maximilian, Duke of

Bavaria, of a Catholic League. The friction, which was now becoming

acute, went on increasing till the actual outbreak of the Thirty

Years' War in 1618. The signal for the latter was given by the

Bohemian revolution in the spring of that year.

The Thirty Years' War, as it is termed, which was really a series of

wars, naturally falls into five distinct periods, each representing in

many respects a separate war in itself. The first two years of the war

(1618-20) is occupied with the Bohemian revolt against the attempt of

the Emperor to force Catholicism upon the Bohemian people and with its

immediate consequences. It was accentuated by the attempt of the

Emperor Matthias to compel them to accept the Archduke Ferdinand as

King. This attempt was countered through the election by the Bohemians

of the Pfalzgraf, Friedrich V (the son-in-law of James I of England),

who was called the Winter King from the fact that his reign lasted

only during the winter months; for though the Protestant Union, led by

Count Thurn, had won several victories in 1618 and even threatened

Vienna, the Austrian power was saved by Tilly and the Catholic League

which came to its rescue. Many of the Protestant States, moreover,

were averse to the Palatine Friedrich's acceptance of the Bohemian

crown. The Bohemian movement was ultimately crushed by a force sent

from Spain, under the Spanish general Spinola. The final defeat took

place at the battle of the White Hill, near Prague, November 8, 1620.

The second period of the war was concerned with the attempt of the

Catholic Powers to deprive Friedrich of his Palatine dominions. Here

Count Mansfeld, with his mercenary army of free-lances, aided by

Christian of Brunswick and others on the side of Friedrich and the

Protestants, defeated Tilly in 1622. But later on Tilly and the

Imperialists by a series of victories conquered the Palatinate, which

was bestowed upon Maximilian of Bavaria. Mansfeld, notwithstanding

that he had some successes later in the year 1622, could not

effectually redeem the situation, Brunswick's army being entirely

routed by Tilly in the following year at the battle of Stadtlohn,

which virtually ended this particular campaign.

The third period of the war, from 1624 to 1629, is characterized by

the intervention of the Powers outside the immediate sphere of German

or Imperial interests. France, under Richelieu, became concerned at

the growing power of the Hapsburgs, while James I of England began to

show anxiety at his son-in-law's adverse fortunes, though without

achieving any successful intervention. The chief feature of this

campaign was the entry into the field of Christian IV of Denmark with

a powerful army to join Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick in

invading the Imperial and Austrian territories. But the savageries and

excesses of Mansfeld's troops had disgusted and alienated all sides.

It was at this time that Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland, was appointed

general of the Imperial troops, and soon after succeeded in completely

routing Mansfeld at the battle of Dessau Bridge in 1626. Four months

later Tilly completely defeated Christian IV and his Danes at Lutter.

Wallenstein, on his side, followed up his success, driving Mansfeld

into Hungary. Mansfeld, in spite of some fugitive successes in the

Austrian dominions in the course of his retreat, was compelled by

Wallenstein to evacuate Hungary, shortly after which he died. The

campaign ended with the Peace of Lubeck in 1629.

The action of the Emperor Ferdinand in attempting to enforce the

restitution of Church lands in North Germany was the proximate cause

of the next great campaign, which constitutes the fourth period of the

Thirty Years' War (1630-36). The immediate occasion was, however,

Wallenstein's seizure of certain towns in Mecklenburg, over which he

claimed rights by Imperial grant two years before. This, which may be

regarded as the greatest period of the Thirty Years' War, was

characterized by the appearance on the scene of Gustavus Adolphus, the

Swedish King. He was not in time, however, to prevent the sacking of

Magdeburg by the troops of Tilly and Poppenheim. The former,

nevertheless, was defeated by the Swedes at the important battle of

Breitenfeld in 1631. The following year the Imperial army was again

defeated on the Lach. Thereupon Gustavus occupied München, though he

was subsequently compelled by Wallenstein to evacuate the city. The

last great victory of Gustavus was at Lützen in 1632, at which battle

the great leader met his death. Wallenstein, who was now in favour of

a policy of peace and political reconstruction, was assassinated in

1634 with the connivance of the Emperor. On September 6th of the same

year the Protestant army, under Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, sustained an

overwhelming defeat at Nördlingen, and the Peace of Prague the

following year ended the campaign.

The fifth period, from 1636 to 1648, has, as its central interest, the

active intervention of France in the Central European struggle. The

Swedes, notwithstanding the death of their King, continued to have

some notable successes, and even approached to within striking

distance of Vienna. But Richelieu now became the chief arbiter of

events. The French generals Condé and Turenne invaded Germany and the

Netherlands. Victories were won by the new armies at Rocroi,

Thionville, and at Nördlingen, but Vienna was not captured. The

Imperial troops were, however, again defeated at Zumarshauen by Condé,

who also repelled an attempted diversion in the shape of a Spanish

invasion of France at the battle of Lens in the spring of 1648. The

Thirty Years' War was finally ended in October of the same year at

Münster, by the celebrated Treaty of Westphalia.

The above is a skeleton sketch in a few words of the chief features of

that long and complicated series of diplomatic and military events

known to history as the Thirty Years' War.[25]

The Thirty Years' War had far-reaching and untold consequences on

Germany itself and indirectly on the course of modern civilization

generally. For close upon a generation Central Europe had been ravaged

from end to end by hostile and plundering armies. Rapine and

destruction were, for near upon a third of the century, the common lot

of the Germanic peoples from north to south and from east to west.

Populations were as helpless as sheep before the brutal, criminal

soldiery, recruited in many cases from the worst elements of every

European country. The excesses of Mansfeld's mercenary army in the

earlier stages of the war created widespread horror. But the defeat

and death of Mansfeld brought no alleviation. The troops of

Wallenstein proved no better in this respect than those of Mansfeld.

On the contrary, with every year the war went on its horrors

increased, while every trace of principle in the struggle fell more

and more into the background. Everywhere was ruin.

The population became by the time the war had ended a mere fraction of

what it was at the opening of the seventeenth century. Some idea of

the state of things may be gathered from the instance of Augsburg,

which during its siege by the Imperialists was reduced from 70,000 to

10,000 inhabitants. What happened to the great commercial city of the

Fuggers was taking place on a scale greater or less, according to the

district, all over German territory. We read of towns and villages

that were pillaged more than a dozen times in a year. This terrific

depopulation of the country, the reader may well understand, had vast

results on its civilization. The whole great structure of Mediæval and

Renaissance Germany--its literature, art, and social life--was in

ruins. At the close of the seventeenth century the old German culture

had gone and the new had not yet arisen. But of this we shall have

more to say in the next chapter. For the present we are chiefly

concerned to give a brief sketch of the second great epoch-making

event, or rather train of events, which conditioned the foundation and

development of modern Germany. We refer, of course, to the rise of the

Prussian monarchy.

We should premise that the Prussians are the least German of all the

populations of what constitutes modern Germany. They are more than

half Slavs. In the early Middle Ages the Mark of Brandenburg, the

centre and chief province of the modern Prussian State, was an

outlying offshoot of the mediæval Holy Roman Empire of the German

nation, surrounded by barbaric tribes, Slav and Teuton. The chief Slav

people were the Borussians, from which the name "Prussian" was a

corruption. The first outstanding historic fact concerning these

Baltic lands is that a certain Adalbert, Bishop of Prague, at the end

of the tenth century went north on a mission of enterprise for

converting the Prussian heathen. The neighbouring Christian prince,

the Duke of Poland, who had presumably suffered much from incursions

of these pagan Slavs, offered him every encouragement. The adventure

ended, however, before long in the death of Adalbert at the hands of

these same pagan Slavs.

The first indication of the existence of a Mark of Brandenburg with

its Markgraves is in the eleventh century. There is, however, little

definite historical information concerning them. The first of these

Markgraves to attract attention was Albrecht the Bear, one of the

so-called Ascanian line, the family hailing from the Harz Mountains.

Albrecht was a remarkable man for his time in every way. Under him the

Markgravate of Brandenburg was raised to be an electorate of the

empire. The Markgrave thus became a prince of the empire. It was

Albrecht the Bear who first introduced a limited measure of peace and

order into the hitherto anarchic condition of the Mark and its

adjacent territories. The Ascanian line continued till 1319, and was

followed by a period of political anarchy and disturbance, until

finally Friedrich, Count of Hohenzollern, acquired the electorate, and

became known as the Elector Friedrich I. Meanwhile the Order of the

Teutonic Knights, who earlier began their famous crusade against the

Borussian heathens, had established themselves on the territories now

known as East and West Prussia. In spite of this fact and of the for

long time dominant power of their Polish neighbours, the Hohenzollern

rulers continued to acquire increased power and fresh territories.

At the Reformation Albrecht, a scion of the Hohenzollern family, who

had been elected Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, adopted

Protestantism and assumed the title of Duke of Prussia. Finally, in

1609, the then Elector of Brandenburg, John Sigismund, through his

marriage with Ann, daughter and heiress of Albrecht Friedrich, Duke of

Prussia, came into possession of the whole of Prussia proper, together

with other adjacent territories. The Prussian lands suffered much

through the Thirty Years' War during the reign of John Sigismund's

successor, George Wilhelm. But the latter's son, Friedrich Wilhelm,

the so-called Great Elector, succeeded by his ability in repairing the

ravages the war had made and raising the electorate immensely in

political importance. He left at his death, in 1688, the financial

condition of the country in a sound state, with an effective army of

38,000 men. Friedrich I, who followed him, held matters together and

got Prussia promoted to the rank of a kingdom in 1701. His son,

Friedrich Wilhelm I, by rigid economies succeeded in raising the

financial condition of the kingdom to a still higher level. The

military power of the monarchy he also developed considerably, and is

famous in history for his mania for tall soldiers.

We now come to the real founder of the Prussian monarchy as a great

European Power, Friedrich Wilhelm I's son, who succeeded his father in

1740 as Friedrich II, and who is known to history as Friedrich the

Great.

Friedrich no sooner came to the throne than he started on an

aggressive expansionist policy for Prussia. The opportunity presented

itself a few months after his accession by the dispute as to the

Pragmatic Sanction and Maria Theresa's right to the throne of Austria.

In the two wars which immediately followed, the Prussian army overran

the whole of Silesia, and the peace of 1745 left the Prussian King in

possession of the entire country. East Friesland had already been

absorbed the year before on the death of the last Duke without issue.

In spite of the exhaustion of men and money in the two Silesian wars,

Friedrich found himself ready with both men and money eleven years

later, in 1756, to embark upon what is known as the Seven Years' War.

Though without acquiring fresh territory by this war, the gain in

prestige was so great that the Prussian monarchy virtually assumed the

hegemony of North Germany, becoming the rival of Austria for the

domination of Central Europe, the position in which it remained for

more than a century afterwards. Nevertheless, after this succession of

wars the condition of the country was deplorable. It was obvious that

the first thing to do was the work of internal resuscitation. The

extraordinary ability and energy of the King saved the internal

situation. Agriculture, industry, and commerce were re-established and

reorganized. It was now that the cast-iron system of bureaucratic

administration, where not actually created, was placed on a firm

foundation. But in external affairs Prussia continued to earn its

character as the robber State of Europe _par excellence_.

In 1772 Friedrich joined with Austria in the first partition of

Poland, acquiring the whole of West Prussia as his share. A few years

later Friedrich formed an anti-Austrian league of German princes,

under Prussian leadership, which was the first overt sign of the

conflict for supremacy in Germany between Prussia and Austria, which

lasted for wellnigh a century. By the time of his death--August 7,

1786--Friedrich had increased Prussian territory to nearly 75,000

square miles and between five and six millions of population.

Under Friedrich's nephew, Friedrich Wilhelm II, while the rigour of

bureaucratic administration, controlled by a monarchical absolutism,

continued and was even accentuated, the absence of the able hand of

Friedrich the Great soon made itself apparent. As regards external

policy, however, Prussia, while allowing territories on the left bank

of the Rhine to go to France, eagerly saw to the increase of her own

dominions in the east to the extent of nearly doubling her superficial

area by her participation in the second and third partitions of

Poland, which took place in 1783 and 1795 respectively. These external

successes, or rather acts of spoliation, were, notwithstanding,

counter-balanced at home by a degeneracy alike of the civil

bureaucracy and of the army. The country internally, both as regards

morale and effectiveness, had sunk far below its level under Friedrich

the Great. This showed itself during the great Napoleonic wars, when

Prussia had to undergo more than one humiliation at the hands of

Buonaparte, culminating in October 1806 with the collapse of the

Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstädt. The entry of Napoleon in

triumph into Berlin followed. At the Peace of Tilsit, in 1807,

Friedrich-Wilhelm had to sign away half his kingdom and to consent to

the payment of a heavy war indemnity, pending which the French troops

occupied the most important fortresses in the country.

Following upon this moment of deepest national humiliation comes the

period of the Ministers Stein and Hardenberg, of the enthusiastic

adjurations to patriotism of Fischer and others, and of the activity

of the "League of Virtue" (_Tugendbund_). It is difficult to

understand the enthusiasm that could be aroused for the rehabilitation

of an absolutist, bureaucratic, and militarist State, such as Prussia

was--a State in which civil and political liberty was conspicuous by

its absence. But the fact undoubtedly remains that the men in question

did succeed in pumping up a strong patriotic feeling and desire to

free the country from the yoke of the foreigner, even if that only

meant increased domestic tyranny. It must be admitted, however, that

as a matter of fact not inconsiderable internal reforms were owing to

the leading men of this time. Stein abolished serfdom, and in some

respects did away with the legal distinction of classes, thereby

paving the way for the rise of the middle class, which at that time

meant a progressive step. He also conferred rights of self-government

upon municipalities. Hardenberg inaugurated measures intended to

ameliorate the condition of the peasants, while Wilhelm von Humboldt

established the thorough if somewhat mechanical education system which

was subsequently extended throughout Germany. He also helped to found

the University of Berlin in 1809.

But at the same time the curse of Prussia--militarism--was riveted on

the people through the reorganization of the Prussian army by those

two able military bureaucrats, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. In 1813

Prussia concluded at Kalicsh an alliance with Russia, which Austria

joined. In the war which followed Prussia was severely strained by

losses in men and money. But at the Congress of Vienna the Prussian

kingdom received back nearly, but not quite, all it lost in 1807. The

acquirement, however, of new and valuable territories in Westphalia

and along the Rhine, besides Thuringia and the province of Saxony,

more than compensated for the loss of certain Slav districts in the

east, as thereby the way was prepared for the ultimate despotism of

the Prussian King over all Germany. The success of Prussian diplomacy

in enslaving these erstwhile independent German lands in 1815 was

crucial for the subsequent direction of Prussian policy.

It is time now to return once more to the internal conditions in the

Prussian State now dominant over a large part of Northern Germany. A

Constitution had been more than once talked of, but the despotism with

its bureaucratic machinery had remained. Now, after the conclusion of

the Napoleonic wars and the re-drawing of the Prussian frontier lines

by the peace of 1815, the matter assumed an urgency it had not had

before. Following upon proclamations and promises, a patent was

addressed to the new Saxon provinces granting a national _Landtag_, or

Diet, for the whole country. The drawing up of the Constitution thus

proclaimed in principle gave rise to heated conflicts. There was, as

yet, no proletariat proper in Prussia, and for that matter hardly any

in the rest of Germany. The handicraft system of production, and even

the mediæval guild system, slightly modified, prevailed throughout the

country. The middle class proper was small and unimportant, and hence

Liberalism, the theoretical expression of that class, only found

articulate utterance through men of the professions.

The new Prussian territories in the west were largely tinctured with

progressive ideas originating in the French Revolution, while the east

was dominated by reactionary feudal landowners, the notorious Junker

class--a class special to East Prussian territories, including the

eastern portion of the Mark of Brandenburg--whom the moderate

Conservative Minister Stein himself characterized as "heartless,

wooden, half-educated people, only good to turn into corporals or

calculating-machines." This class then, as ever since, opposed an

increase of popular control and the progress of free institutions with

might and main. Friction arose between the Government and Liberal

gymnastic societies and students' clubs. This culminated in the

festival on the Wartburg in October 1818, when a bonfire was made of a

book of police laws and Uhlan stays and a corporal's stick. It was

followed the next year by the assassination of the dramatist and

political spy Kotzebue by the student Sand.

Panic seized the reactionists, and the Austrian Minister Metternich,

one of the chief pillars of absolutist principles in Europe, induced

the King to commit himself to the Austrian system of repression. In

1821 the Reactionary party succeeded in getting the projected

Constitution abandoned and the bureaucratic system of provincial

estates established by royal warrant two years later (1823). The

Prussian police with their spies then became omnipotent, and a

remorseless persecution of all holding Liberal or democratic views

ensued, the best-known writers on the popular side no less than the

rank and file being arbitrarily arrested and kept in prison on any or

no pretext. The amalgamation of the new districts into the Prussian

bureaucratic system was not accomplished without resistance. The Rhine

provinces especially, accustomed to easy-going government and light

taxation under the old ecclesiastical princes, kicked vigorously

against the Prussian jack-boot. The discontent was so widespread

indeed that some concessions had to be made, such as the retention of

the Code Napoléon. What created most resentment, however, was the

enactment of 1814, which enforced compulsory universal military

service throughout the monarchy. Friedrich Wilhelm also undertook to

dragoon his subjects in the matter of religion, amalgamating the

Lutherans with other reformed bodies, under the name of the

"Evangelical Church."

In foreign politics, in the earlier part of the nineteenth century,

during the Napoleonic wars, Prussia, as yet hardly recovered from her

defeats under Buonaparte, almost entirely followed the lead of

Austria. But perhaps the most important measure of the Prussian

Government at this time was the foundation of the famous Zollverein or

Customs Union of various North German States in 1834. The far-reaching

character of this measure was only shown later, being, in fact, the

means and basis by and on which the political and military ascendancy

of Prussia over all Germany was assured. Friedrich Wilhelm III, who

died on June 7, 1840, was succeeded by his son, Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

The new reign began with an appearance of Liberalism by a general

amnesty for political offences. Reaction, however, soon raised its

head again, and Friedrich Wilhelm IV, in spite of his varnish of

philosophical and literary tastes, was soon seen to be _au fond_ as

reactionary as his predecessors. The conflict between the reaction of

the Government and the now widely spread Liberal and democratic

aspirations of the people resulted in Prussia (as it did under similar

circumstances in other countries) in the outbreak of the revolution of

1848.

It is necessary at this stage to take a brief survey of the political

history of the Germanic States of Europe generally from the time of

the Peace of Vienna, in 1815, onwards, in order to understand fully

the rôle played by the Prussian monarchy in German history since 1848;

for from this time the history of Prussia becomes more and more bound

up with that of the German peoples as a whole. During the Napoleonic

wars Germany, as every one knows, was, generally speaking, in the grip

of the French Imperial power. To follow the vicissitudes and

fluctuations of fortune throughout Central Europe during these years

lies outside our present purpose. We are here chiefly concerned with

the political development from the Treaty of Vienna, as signed on June

9, 1815, onward. The Treaty of Vienna completed the work begun by

Napoleon--represented by the extinction of the mediæval "Holy Roman

Empire of the German nation" in 1806--in making an end of the

political configuration of the German peoples which had grown up

during the Middle Ages and survived, in a more or less decayed

condition, since the Peace of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty

Years' War. The three hundred separate States of which Germany had

originally consisted were now reduced to thirty-nine, a number which,

by the extinction of sundry minor governing lines, was before long

further reduced to thirty-five. These States constituted themselves

into a new German Confederation, with a Federal Assembly, meeting at

Frankfurt-on-the-Main. The new Federal Council, or Assembly, however,

soon revealed itself as but the tool of the princes and a bulwark of

reaction.

The revolution of 1848 was throughout Germany an expression of popular

discontent and of democratic and even, to a large extent, of

republican aspirations. The princely authorities endeavoured to stem

the wave of popular indignation and revolutionary enthusiasm by

recognizing a provisional self-constituted body, and sanctioning the

election of a national representative Parliament at Frankfurt in place

of the effete Federal Council. The Archduke of Austria, who was

elected head of the new, hastily organized National Government, was

not slow to use his newly acquired power in the interests of reaction,

thereby exciting the hostility of all the progressive elements in the

Parliament of Frankfurt. When after some months it became obvious that

the anti-Progressive parties had gained the upper hand alike in

Austria and Prussia, the friction between the Democratic and

Constitutional parties became increasingly bitter.

The Prussian Government meanwhile took advantage of the state of

affairs to stir up the Schleswig-Holstein question, so-called, driving

the Danes out of Schleswig, an insurrectionary movement in Holstein

having been already suppressed by the Danish King. Prussia, alarmed

by the attitude of the Powers, agreed to withdraw her troops from the

occupied territories without consulting the Frankfurt Parliament, an

act which involved Friedrich Wilhelm in conflict with the latter. The

issues arising out of this dispute made it plain to every one that the

Parliament of all Germany was impotent to enforce its decrees against

one of the German Powers possessed of a preponderating military

strength. By the end of 1848 the revolution in Vienna was completely

crushed and a strongly reactionary Government appointed by the new

Emperor. Meanwhile in Berlin the Junkers and the reactionaries

generally had already again come into power, a crisis having been

caused by the attempt of the democratic section of the Prussian

National Assembly, convened by the King in March, to reorganize the

army on a popular democratic basis. We need scarcely say the Prussian

army has been the tool of Junkerdom and reaction ever since.

The last despairing attempt of the Frankfurt Parliament to give effect

to the national Germanic unity, which all patriotic Germans professed

to be eager for, was the offer of the Imperial crown to the King of

Prussia. Against this act, however, nearly half the members--i.e. all

the advanced parties in the Assembly--protested by refusing to take

any part in it They had also declined to be associated with a previous

motion for the exclusion of German Austria from the new national

unity, in the interest of Prussian ascendancy. Both these reactionary

proposals, as we all know, at a later date became the corner-stones of

the new Prusso-German unity of Bismark's creation. On this occasion,

however, the Prussian King refused to accept the office at the hands

of the impotent Frankfurt Assembly, which latter soon afterwards broke

up and eventually "petered out." Meanwhile Prussian troops, led by the

reactionary military caste, were employed in the congenial task of

suppressing popular movements with the sword in Baden, Saxony, and

Prussia itself.

The two rival bulwarks of reaction, Prussia and Austria, were now so

alarmed at the revolutionary dangers they had passed through that, for

the nonce forgetting their rivalry, they cordially joined together in

reviving, in the interests of the counter-revolution, the old

reactionary Federal Assembly, which had never been formally dissolved,

as it ought to have been on the election of the Frankfurt Parliament.

Reaction now went on apace. Liberties were curtailed and rights gained

in 1848 were abolished in most of the smaller States. Henceforth the

Federal Assembly became the theatre of the two great rival powers of

the Germanic Confederation. Both alike strove desperately for the

hegemony of Germany. The strength of Prussia, of course, lay generally

in the north, that of Austria in the south. Austria had the advantage

of Prussia in the matter of prestige. Prussia, on the other hand, had

the pull of Austria in the possession of the machinery of the Customs

Union. In general, however, the dual control of the Germanic

Confederation was grudgingly recognized by either party, and on

occasion they acted together. This was notably the case in the

Schleswig-Holstein question, which had been smouldering ever since

1848, and which came to a crisis in the Danish war of 1864, in which

Austria and Prussia jointly took part.

Among the most reactionary of the Junker party in the Prussian

Parliament of 1848 was one Count Otto Bismarck von Schönhausen,

subsequently known to history as Prince Bismarck (1815-98). This man

strenuously opposed the acceptance of the Imperial dignity by the King

of Prussia at the hands of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849, on the

ground that it was unworthy of the King of Prussia to accept any

office at the hands of the people rather than at those of his peers,

the princes of Germany. In 1851 Count von Bismarck was appointed a

Prussian representative in the revived princely and aristocratic

Federal Assembly. Here he energetically fought the hegemony hitherto

exercised by Austria. He continued some years in this capacity, and

subsequently served as Prussian Minister in St. Petersburg and again

in Paris. In the autumn of 1862 the new King of Prussia, Wilhelm I,

who had succeeded to the throne the previous year, called him back to

take over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of the

Cabinet. Shortly after his accession to power he arbitrarily closed

the Chambers for refusing to sanction his Army Bill. His army scheme

was then forced through by the royal fiat alone. On the reopening of

the Schleswig-Holstein question, owing to the death of the King of

Denmark, German nationalist sentiment was aroused, which Bismarck knew

how to use for the aggrandisement of Prussia. The Danish war, in which

the two leading German States collaborated and which ended in their

favour, had as its result a disagreement of a serious nature between

these rival, though mutually victorious, Powers.

In all these events the hand of Bismarck was to be seen. He it was who

dominated completely Prussian policy from 1862 onwards. Full of his

schemes for the aggrandisement of Prussia at the expense of Austria,

he stirred up and worked this quarrel for all it was worth, the

upshot being the Prusso-Austrian War (the so-called Seven Weeks' War)

of the summer of 1866. The war was brought about by the arbitrary

dissolution of the German Confederation--i.e. the Federal Assembly--in

which, owing to the alarm created by Prussian insolence and

aggression, Austria had the backing of the majority of the States.

This step was followed by Bismarck's dispatching an ultimatum to

Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse Cassel respectively, all of which had voted

against Prussia in the Federal Assembly, followed, on its

non-acceptance, by the dispatch of Prussian troops to occupy the

States in question. Hard on this act of brutal violence came the

declaration of war with Austria.

At Königgratz the Prussian army was victorious over the Austrians, and

henceforth the hegemony of Central Europe was decided in favour of

Prussia. Austria, under the Treaty of Prague (August 20, 1866), was

completely excluded from the new organization of German States, in

which Prussia--i.e. Bismarck--was to have a free hand. The result was

the foundation of the North German Confederation, under the leadership

of Prussia. It was to have a common Parliament, elected by universal

suffrage and meeting in Berlin. The army, the diplomatic

representation, the control of the postal and telegraphic services,

were to be under the sole control of the Prussian Government. The

North German Confederation comprised the northern and central States

of Germany. The southern States--Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg,

etc.--although not included, had been forced into a practical alliance

with Prussia by treaties. The Customs Union was extended until it

embraced nearly the whole of Germany. Prussian aggression in Luxemburg

produced a crisis with France in 1867, though the growing tension

between Prussia and France was tided over on this occasion. But

Bismarck only bided his time.

The occasion was furnished him by the question of the succession to

the Spanish throne, in July 1870. By means of a falsified telegram

Bismarck precipitated war, in which Prussia was joined by all the

States of Germany. The subsequent course of events is matter of recent

history. The establishment of the new Prusso-German empire by the

crowning of Wilhelm I at Versailles, with the empire made hereditary

in the Hohenzollern family, completed the work of Bismarck and the

setting of the Prussian jack-boot on the necks of the German peoples.

The Prussian military and bureaucratic systems were now extended to

all Germany--in other words, the rest of the German peoples were made

virtually the vassals and slaves of the Prussian monarch. This time

the King of Prussia received the Imperial crown at the hands of the

kings, princes, and other hereditary rulers of the various German

States. Bismarck was graciously pleased to bestow unity and internal

peace--a Prussian peace--upon Germany on condition of its abasement

before the Prussian corporal's stick and police-truncheon. Such was

the united Germany of Bismarck. Germany meant for Bismarck and his

followers Prussia, and Prussia meant their own Junker and military

caste, under the titular headship of the Hohenzollern.

Yet, strange to say, the peoples of Germany willingly consented, under

the influence of the intoxication of a successful war, to have their

independence bartered away to Prussia by their rulers. In this united

Germany of Bismarck--a Germany united under Prussian despotism--they

naïvely saw the realization of the dream of their thinkers and poets

since the time of the Napoleonic wars--which had become more than ever

an inspiration from 1848 onwards--of an ideal unity of all

German-speaking peoples as a national whole. It is unquestionable that

many of these thinkers and poets would have been horrified at the

Prusso-Bismarckian "unity" of "blood and iron," It was not for this,

they would have said, that they had laboured and suffered.

As a conclusion to the present chapter I venture to give a short

summary of the internal, and especially of the economic, development

of Prussia since the Franco-German War from an article which appeared

in the _English Review_ for December 1914, by Mr. H.M. Hyndman and the

present writer:--

"From 1871 onwards Prussianized Germany, by far the best-educated, and

industrially and commercially the most progressive, country in Europe,

with the enormous advantage of her central position, was, consciously

and unconsciously, making ready for her next advance. The policy of a

good understanding with Russia, maintained for many years, to such an

extent that, in foreign affairs, Berlin and St. Petersburg were almost

one city, enabled Germany to feel secure against France, while she was

devoting herself to the extension of her rural and urban powers of

production. Never at any time did she neglect to keep her army in a

posture of offence. All can now see the meaning of this.

"Militarism is in no sense necessarily economic. But the strength of

Germany for war was rapidly increased by her success in peace. From

the date of the great financial crisis of 1874, and the consequent

reorganization of her entire banking system, Germany entered upon that

determined and well-thought-out attempt to attain pre-eminence in the

trade and commerce of the world of which we have not yet seen the end.

From 1878, when the German High Commissioner, von Rouleaux,

stigmatized the exhibits of his countrymen as 'cheap and nasty,'

special efforts were made to use the excellent education and admirable

powers of organization of Germany in this field. The Government

rendered official and financial help in both agriculture and

manufacture. Scientific training, good and cheap before, was made

cheaper and better each year. Railways were used not to foster foreign

competition, as in Great Britain, by excessive rates of home freight,

but to give the greatest possible advantage to German industry in

every department. In more than one rural district the railways were

worked at an apparent loss in order to foster home production, from

which the nation derived far greater advantage than such apparent

sacrifice entailed. The same system of State help was extended to

shipping until the great German liners, one of which, indeed, was

actually subsidized by England, were more than holding their own with

the oldest and most celebrated British companies.

"Protection, alike in agriculture and in manufacture, bound the whole

empire together in essentially Imperial bonds. Right or wrong in

theory--which it is not here necessary to discuss--there can be no

doubt whatever that this policy entirely changed the face of Germany,

and rendered her our most formidable competitor in every market.

Emigration, which had been proceeding on a vast scale, almost entirely

ceased. The savings banks were overflowing with deposits. The position

of the workers was greatly improved. Not only were German Colonies

secured in Africa and Asia, which were more trouble than they were

worth, but very profitable commerce with our own Colonies and

Dependencies was growing by leaps and bounds, at the expense of the

out-of-date but self-satisfied commercialists of Old England. Hence

arose a trade rivalry, against which we could not hope to contend

successfully in the long run, except by a complete revolution in our

methods of education and business, to which neither the Government nor

the dominant class would consent.

"This remarkable advance in Germany, also, was accompanied by the

establishment of a system of banking, specially directed to the

expansion of national industry and commerce, a system which was clever

enough to use French accumulations, borrowed at a low rate of

interest, through the German Jews who so largely controlled French

financial institutions, in order still further to extend their own

trade. It was an admirably organized attempt to conquer the

world-market for commodities, in which the Government, the banks, the

manufacturers and the shipowners all worked for the common cause.

Meanwhile, both French and English financiers carefully played the

game of their business opponents, and the great English banks devoted

their attention chiefly to fostering speculation on the Stock

Exchange--a policy of which the Germans took advantage, just before

the outbreak of war, to an extent not by any means as yet fully

understood.

"Thus, at the beginning of the present year, in spite of the

withdrawal, since the Agadir affair, of very large amounts of French

capital from the German market, Germany had attained to such a

position that only the United States stood on a higher plane in regard

to its future in the world of competitive commerce. And this great and

increasing economic strength was, for war purposes, at the disposal of

the Prussian militarists, if they succeeded in getting the upper hand

in politics and foreign affairs."

FOOTNOTES:

[25] Works on the Thirty Years' War are numerous. Many scholarly and

exhaustive treatises on various aspects of the subject are, as might be

expected, to be found in German. For general popular reading Schiller's

excellent piece of literary hack work (translated in Bonn's Library) may

still be consulted, but perhaps the best short general history of the

war with its entanglement of events is that by the late Professor S.R.

Gardiner, of Oxford, which forms one of the volumes of Messrs. Longman,

Green & Co.'s series entitled "Epochs of Modern History."

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