IN THE EAGLE'S TALONS.
Many British military and naval writers had ridiculed the idea of a
surprise invasion without any attempt on the part of the enemy to gain
more than a partial and temporary control of the Channel. Although an
attack on territory without having previously command of the sea had
generally been foredoomed to failure, it had been long ago suggested by
certain military officers in the course of lectures at the United
Service Institution, that under certain conditions such invasion was
possible, and that France might ere long be ruled by some ambitious
soldier who might be tempted to try a sudden dash on _le perfide
Albion_. They pointed out that at worst it would entail on France the
loss of three or four army corps, a loss no greater than she would
suffer in one short land campaign. But alas! at that time very little
notice was taken of such criticisms and illustrations, for Britons had
always been prone to cast doubts upon the power of other nations to
convey troops by sea, to embark them, or to land them. Thus the many
suggestions directed towards increasing the mobility and efficiency of
the Army were, like other warnings, cast aside, the prevailing opinion
in the country being that sudden invasion was an absolute impossibility.
Predictions of prophets that had so long been scorned, derided, and
disregarded by an apathetic British public were rapidly being fulfilled.
Coming events had cast dark shadows that had been unheeded, and now the
unexpected bursting of the war cloud produced panic through our land.
General Sir Archibald Alison struck an alarming note of warning when he
wrote in _Blackwood_ in December 1893: "No one can look carefully into
the present state of Europe without feeling convinced that it cannot
continue long in its present condition. Every country is maintaining an
armed force out of all proportion to its resources and population, and
the consequent strain upon its monetary system and its industrial
population is ever increasing, and must sooner or later become
unbearable."
It had never been sufficiently impressed upon the British public, that
when mobilised for war, and with all the Reserves called out, Russia had
at her command 2,722,000 officers and men, while France could put
2,715,000 into the field, making a total force of the Franco-Russian
Armies of 5,437,000 men, with 9920 field guns and 1,480,000 horses.
This well-equipped force was almost equal to the combined Armies of the
Triple Alliance, Germany possessing 2,441,000, Austria 1,590,000, and
Italy 1,909,000, a total of 5,940,000 officers and men, with 8184 field
guns and 813,996 horses.
Beside these enormous totals, how ridiculously small appeared the
British Army, with its Regular forces at home and abroad amounting to
only 211,600 of all ranks, 225,400 Volunteers, and 74,000 Reserves, or
511,000 fighting men! Of these, only 63,000 Regulars remained in England
and Wales, therefore our Reserves and Volunteers were the chief
defenders of our homes.
What a mere handful they appeared side by side with these huge European
Armies!
Was it not surprising that in such circumstances the constant warnings
regarding the weakness of our Navy--the force upon which the very life
of our Empire depended--should have been unheeded by the too confident
public?
When we were told plainly by a well-known authority that the number of
our war vessels was miserably inadequate, that we were 10,000 men and
1000 officers short, and, among other things, that a French cruiser
had, for all practical purposes, three times the fighting efficiency of
an English cruiser, no one troubled. Nor was any one aroused from his
foolishly apathetic confidence in British supremacy at sea. True, our
Navy was strengthened to a certain extent in 1894, but hard facts,
solemn warnings, gloomy forebodings, all were, alas! cast aside among
the "scares" which crop up periodically in the press during a
Parliamentary recess, and which, on the hearing of a murder trial, or a
Society scandal, at once fizzle out and are dismissed for ever.
On this rude awakening to the seriousness of the situation, Service men
now remembered distinctly the prophetic words of the few students of
probable invasion. Once they had regarded them as based on wild
improbabilities, but now they admitted that the facts were as
represented, and that critics had foreseen catastrophe.
Already active steps had been taken towards the defence of London.
Notwithstanding the serious defects in the mobilisation scheme, the 1st
Army Corps, formed at Aldershot under Sir Evelyn Wood, and three cavalry
brigades, were now in the field, while the other army corps were being
rapidly conveyed southwards.
Independently of the Field Army, the Volunteers had mobilised, and were
occupying the lines north and south of the metropolis. This force of
Volunteer infantry consisted of 108,300 officers and men, of whom
73,000, with 212 guns, were placed on the line south of the Thames.
It stretched along the hills from Guildford in Surrey to Halstead in
Kent, with intermediate concentration points at Box Hill and Caterham.
At the latter place an efficient garrison had been established,
consisting of 4603 of all ranks of the North London Brigade, 4521 of the
West London, 5965 of the South London, 5439 of the Surrey, and 6132 of
the Lancashire and Cheshire. This force was backed by eleven 16-pounder
batteries of the 1st Norfolk from Yarmouth, the 1st Sussex from
Brighton, the 1st Newcastle and the 2nd Durham from Seaham, and ten
40-pounder batteries of the 3rd and 6th Lancashire from Liverpool, the
9th Lancashire from Bolton, the 1st Cheshire from Chester, the 1st
Cinque Ports from Dover, and the 2nd Cinque Ports from St. Leonards. At
Halstead, on the left flank, there were massed about 20,470 Volunteer
infantry, these being made up of the South Wales Brigade 4182, Welsh
Border 5192, the North Midland 5225, and the South Midland 5970. The
eleven 16-pounder batteries came from the Woolwich Arsenal, Monmouth,
Shropshire, and Stafford Corps, and five 40-pounder batteries from the
Preston Corps.
To Guildford 4471 infantry in the Home Counties Brigade and 4097 in the
Western Counties were assigned, while the guns consisted of four
40-pounder batteries from the York and Leeds Corps, the 16-pounder
batteries of the Fife, Highland, and Midlothian Corps being unable, as
yet, to get south on account of the congested state of all the northern
railways.
For this same reason, too, the force at Box Hill, the remaining post in
the south line of defence, was a very weak one. To this the Volunteers
assigned were mostly Scottish.
Of the Glasgow Brigade 8000 of all ranks arrived, with 4000 from the
South of Scotland Brigade; but the Highland Brigade of 4400 men, all
enthusiastically patriotic, and the 16-pounder batteries from Ayr and
Lanark, were compelled, to their chagrin, to wait at their headquarters
for several days before the railways--every resource of which was
strained to their utmost limits--could move them forward to the seat of
war.
The five heavy batteries of the Aberdeen and North York Corps succeeded
in getting down to their place of concentration early, as likewise did
the 16-pounder battery from Galloway. Volunteers also undertook the
defences north of the metropolis, and a strong line, consisting of a
number of provincial brigades, stretched from Tilbury to Brentwood and
Epping.
The British Volunteer holds no romantic notions of "death or glory," but
is none the less prepared to do his duty, and is always ready "to do
anything, and to go anywhere." Every officer and every man of this great
force which had mounted guard north and south of the Thames was resolved
to act his part bravely, and, if necessary, lay down his life for his
country's honour.
At their posts on the Surrey Hills, ready at any moment to go into
action, and firmly determined that no invader should enter the vast
Capital of the World, they impatiently awaited the development of the
situation, eager to face and annihilate their foreign foe.
Britannia had always been justly proud of her Volunteer forces, although
their actual strength in time of invasion had never before been
demonstrated. Now, however, the test which had been applied showed that,
with an exception of rarest occurrence, every man had responded to this
hasty call to arms, and that on active service they were as fearless and
courageous as any body of Regulars ever put in the field.
Every man was alive to Britain's danger; every man knew well how
terrible would be the combat--the struggle that must result in either
victory or death.
The double-headed Eagle had set his talons in British soil!