Matters had not gone any better at other sections of the beach. Half a

company of the Dublins landed east of Sedd-el-Bahr for the purpose of

flanking the Turkish defenses, failed to accomplish its purpose and

lost all except twenty-five of its men. In the afternoon the landing

at V Beach was definitely accepted as a failure and plans made for the

diversion of the troops not yet landed to one of the other beaches. It

was first thought that Y Beach would be the best point, but it was

decided that it would be too late to effect the issue there and the

troops were finally diverted to W Beach, where, despite the heavy

cost, the Lancashire landing had led to some real results.

As nightfall approached there was a momentary thrill of hopefulness

among those who remained on V Beach because of the fact that some of

the Worcestershire and Lancashire Fusiliers succeeded in working their

way across country from W Beach and threatened to make untenable the

Turkish positions. The few hundred men on V Beach and the thousand or

more cooped up in the _River Clyde_ could hear the fight coming closer

and closer and, cheered by their officers, their spirits rose. But the

men from W Beach were stopped finally by the frequent lines of

barbed-wire obstructions that had been stretched by the Turk at right

angles to the shore, between the two beaches, in preparation for just

such an eventuality as this.

Night came, but with it not much relief from the constant vigilance of

the Turks. There was in the perfect sky not a cloud to screen the

moon's rays. A successful attempt was made, however, to land the

infantry from the _River Clyde_, and subsequently the force then

ashore, numbering close upon 1,500 men, tried to clear the ruins of

the fort and the outskirts of the village. All these efforts were in

vain, however, and finally the troops returned to the protection of

the escarpment along the shore. From there the task of removing the

wounded to the protection of the _River Clyde_ was proceeded with

under a heavy fire.

In comparison with the sanguinary affairs at the four other beaches,

the landing at S Beach was a minor affair, costing only about fifty

casualties. This beach was located at the extreme eastern end of Morto

Bay, close by Eski Hissarlik Point, and the work was delegated to the

Second South Wales Borderers under Lieutenant Colonel Casson. The

chief difficulty of this landing was found in the powerful current

which delayed it for several hours beyond the appointed time. However,

the men were finally got ashore and easily drove out the small Turkish

force that had been posted in the neighborhood.

CHAPTER LXXIV

FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING--FAILURE TO TAKE KRITHIA

Meanwhile the French were carrying on a disastrous operation at Kum

Kale, on the Asiatic shore, directly south of S Beach. About 2,800 men

had been landed after a preliminary bombardment by the French fleet.

Before they reembarked next morning they had lost more than a quarter

of their effectives. After landing they stormed the ruined castle of

Kum Kale and then drove inland with the object of clearing the village

of Yeni Shehr. The Turks were in force, however, at that point and

held the French midway between Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr. Finally it

became apparent that further advance was impossible without

reenforcements and the French intrenched for the night. All through

the darkness the Turks launched a counterattack upon the landing force

and morning found the French preparing to reembark. Under the guns of

the French warships this was accomplished without any great further

loss.

Thus of the seven landings that had been attempted by the allied

forces two, that at Kum Kale and that at Y Beach, had been definitely

abandoned. Of the remaining five only two had been successful in

linking up--that at Beach X and that at Beach W. Farther up the Gulf

of Saros, near the lines known by the name of Bulair, a force of the

Royal Naval Reserve made a demonstration but did not effect a landing.

The Australians and the New Zealanders on the cliffs above Gaba Tepe

were fighting desperately against the constant Turkish counterattacks,

but, assisted by the fleet under Admiral Thursby, successfully

resisted all attempts to drive them into the sea. Already the little

cove in which the landing had been made had been christened "Anzac

Cove," "Anzac," of course, was formed by taking the first letters of

the official designation of the colonial forces--Australian and New

Zealand Army Corps. The spirits of the men were high, despite the

awful experience they had gone through, and they frequently exchanged

cheery messages with the gunners of the warships who were pounding

away at the Turkish positions, although not accomplishing any great

damage in their blind firing.

It had been intended to organize an immediate resumption of the

advance from Anzac Cove with daybreak of April 26. But the Turks were

constantly bringing up reenforcements. Watchers on the warships could

see them creeping over the crest of Sari Bair and although the naval

guns were turned on them, their loss was comparatively small because

of their open formation and their cleverness in making use of every

bit of cover.

During the early morning the Anzacs had hauled heavy field guns up the

face of the steep cliffs and had, in many other ways, strengthened

their positions. This was all the more necessary as it became apparent

that the Turks were massing for a great attack shortly after nine

o'clock. About noon the battle reached its height. The Turks attacked

bravely and although they suffered great losses, never wavered.

Despite their efforts, however, the Anzacs held fast. By this time

reenforcements were beginning to arrive and a more permanent character

was given to the trenches. An attempt was made to organize for an

advance as headquarters were constantly impressing upon the individual

commands the necessity of making good as much ground as possible

before the Turks were able to bring into action their undoubted

superiority in forces.

The constant attacks of the Turks, however, made any real attempt at

advance impossible, although a little ground was gained on the 26th by

counterattacks. It soon became apparent, too, that, although the

operation at Anzac Cove was part and parcel of the general attack, it

had, through its inability to make progress, become a separate affair

and had been so conducted for the rest of the campaign--or at least

until a much greater advance had been made in all quarters.

At the tip of the peninsula the chief events of the second day of the

landing, April 26, 1915, occurred at V Beach, where the _River Clyde_

had been run ashore. About 1,500 men were left, composed of the

survivors of the Dublins and the Munsters and two companies of the

Hampshires, under cover of the escarpment on the beach. There Colonel

Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford rallied them on the morning of the

26th and covered by a heavy bombardment by the warships set out to

clear the village. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting followed and the

casualties were appalling. Most of the houses contained squads of

riflemen and the more important machine guns. Each had to be carried

separately. By noon, however, the town had been cleared. Captain

Walford had fallen, bravely leading his troops in a way that earned

him the Victoria Cross.

Colonel Doughty-Wylie called a halt and collected the survivors of the

attack. Under cover of some empty houses he rallied them, re-formed

them as best he could, called upon them for one last effort and

walked out into the open at the head of his troops for the assault

upon the old Castle, and Hill 141.

Carrying a light cane, the figure of Colonel Doughty-Wylie was a

conspicuous one. Yet he survived almost to the end and to victory. He

reached the slope leading up to Hill 141, urging his men forward. He

was in the lead when a bullet killed him instantly. Fired by his

splendid example which earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross, the

Dublins, Munsters, and Hampshires swept on and carried the summit. By

two o'clock the commanding position was in the hands of the British.

At the same time the Lancashire Landing force had linked up with the

landing at V Beach. Also, the French Expeditionary force, after its

hard experience at Kum Kale, was successfully landed at V Beach.

Additional troops were landed at S Beach to prevent the South Wales

Borderers being wiped out in their isolation.

On the morning of April 27, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton looked over the

positions. He found that, although he had several beaches securely in

his grasp, he lacked room in which to maneuver. Also his force was

beginning to suffer from lack of water. Accordingly he decided that an

immediate advance was necessary.

Sir Ian Hamilton set his men the task of clearing the comparatively

low ground at the tip of the peninsula--a distance of about two miles

from the extreme southwestern point of the land. He drew a straight

line from the position held by the South Wales Borderers near the

ruined De Tott's Battery to Y Beach. After some hard fighting this was

accomplished with the exception of the extreme left wing, which got

only as far as Y 2 Beach, where the Turks were in force.

On the following day, April 27th, despite the fact that his forces

were almost exhausted, Sir Ian Hamilton called upon them for a supreme

effort. He intended, he said, to capture the Village of Krithia and,

from that point, carry Achi Baba, the first main objective in the

campaign to open the Narrows.

The advance was ordered for eight o'clock in the morning. The

Twenty-ninth Division, under Major General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston,

was to move on Krithia, the French force was to move along the right

flank of the Twenty-ninth to the Kereves Dere, which ran from the base

of Achi Baba, and there await the capture of Krithia and the assault

upon the main height.

The leading units of the Twenty-ninth Division advanced almost without

opposition for a couple of miles, but was then heavily attacked by the

enemy. Despite all further attempts the British troops were able to

make no further advance at this point and intrenched for the night. A

little to the right, other units eventually got within three-quarters

of a mile of Krithia, but finally were compelled to fall back in line

with the force on its left. Still farther to the right the

Eighty-eighth Brigade had been brought to a halt and found itself

running short of ammunition.

The Eighty-sixth Brigade, which had been held in reserve, came into

action shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. It was ordered to

move through the Eighty-eighth Brigade and carry Krithia. A few units

got within sight of Krithia, but the main body of the Eighty-sixth

Brigade was unable to force a way beyond the line reached by the

Eighty-eighth.

The French, meanwhile, were having an equally hard time. At one time

they were within a mile of Krithia, but ultimately they, in company

with the whole allied line, had to give way before strong Turkish

counterattacks. Masses of Turkish troops advanced against the British

center and right and against the whole line of the French and drove

them back with the bayonet. An almost successful attempt was made to

pierce the allied line at the point where the French linked up with

the British. The French gave way and uncovered the right flank of the

Eighty-eighth Brigade. The Fourth Worcesters suffered cruelly and had

it not been for the reenforcements of the Eighty-sixth Brigade a

serious situation might have ensued.

In speaking of this critical moment Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently

wrote:

"The men were exhausted and the few guns landed at the time were

unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of

transports available did not suffice to maintain the supply of

munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to

push them up from the landing places."

The situation was now becoming serious and it became apparent that

Krithia could not be carried. Accordingly, the allied forces were

ordered to dig in as rapidly as possible and hold their ground at all

costs. Thus ended the Battle of the Landings, extending over three

days. The results obtained fell far short of expectations. Krithia and

Achi Baba had not been carried, the Australians and New Zealanders had

been unable to advance along the road to Maidos and, indeed, were

hanging on to a thin strip of shore by their very teeth. It became

more apparent with each new attempt that the difficulties before the

attackers in the Gallipoli Peninsula were far beyond anything that had

been conceived.

In speaking of his failure to reach Krithia, Sir Ian Hamilton said:

"Had it been possible to push in reenforcements in men, artillery and

munitions during the day, April 27, Krithia should have fallen, and

much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

"Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon

with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have

received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual

choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I

have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have

answered my purpose."

CHAPTER LXXV

KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED--HEROIC WORK OF "ANZACS"

On April 28, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to send reenforcements in

force to Anzac Cove. Despite the constant landing of fresh troops

there the Australians and New Zealanders, because of their heavy

losses and the increasing pressure of the Turkish attacks, had been

almost continually in the firing line. They had been able to enjoy

little or no rest or sleep, and things began to look serious.

Accordingly four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent to

General Birdwood. On the following day two more naval battalions were

landed and as well a company of the Motor Maxim Section.

These fresh units moved into the Anzac trenches and held them against

renewed Turkish attacks. Meanwhile the Australian and New Zealand

battalions were being reorganized behind the line and after three and

a half days' rest took their places again in the front-line trenches.

From the evening of the 27th of April until May 1 there was

comparative quiet on what might be called the Krithia front, at the

tip of the peninsula. Fresh forces were landed by the French and the

English, the latter bringing into line the Twenty-ninth Indian

Infantry Brigade. Heavy artillery was brought ashore and moved up to

positions inland, and the whole organization of the allied force was

re-formed and strengthened.

At 10 p. m. on the evening of May 1 opened what is known as the first

battle of Krithia. It was elaborately organized by the German staff of

the Turkish forces and took the allied troops by surprise. Indeed, the

first line of the attacking force, creeping up on its hands and knees,

got into the trenches of the Eighty-sixth Brigade and bayoneting most

of the defenders opened up what Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently

described as "an ugly gap." Thanks to the fine conduct of some

territorial units, however, the Turks were not able to press home this

temporary advantage and the hole was soon closed.

Along the rest of the British front the attack of the Turks was not

serious. Instead they concentrated on the left of the French line,

held by a Senegalese brigade. After several attacks the African troops

began to give way. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the two

companies of the Worcesters moved across from the British right and

saved the day. Some hours later, the extreme French right was hard

pressed, and it was necessary to bring up a battalion of the Royal

Naval Division from the reserves to strengthen it.

The following morning, the allied troops moved out of their trenches

in a counterattack. It at first met with great success. As Sir Ian

Hamilton wrote in his dispatch to London: "Had it not been for those

inventions of the devil--machine guns and barbed wire--which suit the

Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have

stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba."

By 7.30 in the morning the British left had advanced more than 500

yards, while the center and the right and the French left had also

registered promising advances. The rest of the French line, however,

was held up by strong Turkish forces posted along the Kereves Dere and

the more advanced sections of the British left came under heavy

cross-fire. In the end it was necessary to relinquish all the ground

gained and to retire to the original trenches.

Although the Turks made night attacks against the French line on May 2

and 3, 1915, and in the end inflicted such heavy losses that it was

necessary to shorten the line held by General d'Amade's troops, it was

not until May 6, 1915, that heavy fighting occurred again along the

whole line. On May 5 the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East

Lancashire Territorial Division, which had been training in Egypt,

arrived and was placed in reserve, behind the British left.

At this time it was calculated that the British total losses, killed,

wounded and missing since the initial operations of the landing, had

been just short of 14,000 men. This of course did not include the sick

who must have numbered 10,000 or the French losses, which were not

revealed. These were heavy and serious and more than counterbalanced

the reenforcements that had arrived.

Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make a fresh attempt against Krithia and

Achi Baba on May 6, 1915. This battle was important because it marked

the turning point in the character of the campaign carried on by the

allied troops in Gallipoli. Although an advance was registered none of

the main positions of the Ottoman troops were carried or even reached,

and it became apparent that the task of reducing the Dardanelles was

not one likely to be solved by rush frontal attacks. Rather, as in

other fields of the world war, the problem became one of siege

tactics, and from the date of the end of this second battle of Krithia

the operations in Gallipoli resolved themselves into variations of the

methods that were being forced upon the troops of all the belligerent

countries in Europe.

For his grand attack upon Krithia and Achi Baba, Sir Ian Hamilton

brought down from Anzac Cove the Second Australian Infantry Brigade

and the New Zealand Brigade. With two brigades of the Royal Naval

Reserve he formed them into a reserve division. The Twenty-ninth

Division held the British line, and was ordered forward about 11 a. m.

of May 6, 1915, with orders to go as far as Krithia if possible, but

at all events to seize as much of the ground around that point as

possible. At the same time the French corps were to attempt to wrest

from the Turks the crest above the Kereves Dere.

The advance was extremely slow. At the end of two hours the

Twenty-ninth Division had progressed less than three hundred yards and

had not yet come into touch with any of the main Turkish positions.

Three hours more of desperate fighting showed many fluctuations but no

more progress. Finally they were ordered to intrench where they were

for the night.

The French had succeeded in reaching the crest aimed at, but found it

by no means a comfortable position. They could not go forward and they

dared not go back. Yet they were subject to a raking fire that cost

them hundreds of casualties. Time and time again the Senegalese troops

were sent against the Turkish trenches and machine gun positions, but

each time they were beaten back with cruel losses. To make matters

even worse, the French could not, in the heavy fire maintained by the

Turks, intrench until after nightfall, and they had to spend hours in

the exposed position.

[Illustration: Embarking the stores at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, two days

before the British and French forces evacuated their positions at this

part of the peninsula and removed the troops to Salonica.]

The following morning May 7, 1915, the allied warships opened a

furious bombardment of the ground around Krithia. Every few feet of

the difficult country was searched out by the destroying lyddite of

the Allies' shells, until it seemed that not a living creature could

have survived. But when the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade moved out

to the attack a few minutes later it soon became apparent that the

naval bombardment had by no means exterminated or demoralized the

Turks.

The British troops were greeted by a perfect hurricane of fire from

rifles and machine guns. Hundreds of the men went down and, brave as

the remainder were, they were compelled to abandon the attempt to

cross the open ground that lay between the British front and Krithia.

Some progress was made on the right, however, where a clump of fir

trees which had been holding up the advance for some time was finally

carried by the Fifth Royal Scots. Early in the afternoon the Turks

recaptured the firs and such of the ground they had lost and shortly

after four o'clock when Sir Ian Hamilton relieved the situation, the

British were in the position of being absolutely "stuck." The British

commander decided to make another desperate attempt, however, and

called upon the French for cooperation. The whole allied line advanced

to the attack just as evening was closing in but the Turks by this

time had brought up some additional batteries and poured in on the

French and the British a smothering fire of deadly shrapnel. So heavy

was the punishment of the French that the line literally melted away

and General d'Amade was compelled to throw his last reserve into the

front line. At nightfall the allied attack subsided.

During the night, word came to Sir Ian Hamilton that heavy Turkish

reenforcements were on their way and he decided to make one last

attempt to carry Krithia and Achi Baba before they arrived in the

morning. Accordingly, the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade which had been

particularly roughly handled was withdrawn from the line, and their

places taken by the New Zealand Brigade. After another naval

bombardment the New Zealanders were ordered forward shortly after 10

a. m. of May 8, 1915. By 1.30 they were two hundred yards closer to

Krithia than any allied troops had been up to that time. There,

however, they were heavily checked. Other units were unable to

advance, and the French sent word that they were unable to go any

farther unless the British line could move.

There was a long pause. Finally word was passed along the line that

the final desperate effort was to be made--namely to carry Krithia and

Achi Baba by a combined bayonet attack. Every man in the line was

ordered to fix bayonets and not to stop short of the objectives. At

5.30 in the afternoon came the order to advance, after a bombardment

by the fleet. Almost immediately all central control was lost, and

each unit was fighting desperately for itself in the hills and gullies

of that difficult, almost uncharted, country. Not for many hours

afterward, indeed, in some cases not for days, was it possible to

piece the story together.

The New Zealand troops got well past the Turkish machine guns without

discovering them, with the consequence that their supports were mown

down by a hail of fire from unexpected quarters. Nevertheless, they

got within a few yards of the Turkish trenches and proceeded to dig

themselves in. The Second Australian Infantry Brigade actually won

about 400 yards of ground and stuck to it with a tenacity warmly

praised by Sir Ian Hamilton. To the left the Eighty-seventh Brigade

had suffered terribly from machine-gun fire while the French had been

severely handled. The French troops were steady enough, but the

Senegalese broke in. At one point General d'Amade rallied the troops

in person.

Nightfall came and still Krithia and Achi Baba were far away. Thus

ended the second battle of Krithia, the supreme attempt of the allied

troops to carry the Turkish positions by a maneuver battle. Some

little ground had been gained, but the losses had been all out of

proportion to the advantage wrested from the brave and tenacious

Ottoman troops. The only consolation found in the situation by the

higher commands was in the assurance that the enemy had suffered

equally heavy losses, but as they were largely on the defensive this

statement is open to a very large measure of doubt.

While all this fighting was going on at the tip of the peninsula, the

Anzacs, or that part of them left on the cliffs overlooking the cove,

were having a hard time to maintain their positions. The Turks were

aware of the withdrawal of the two brigades to assist in the second

battle of Krithia, and they made a heavy demonstration to prevent the

departure of any further troops. To understand how vital a matter this

was one has only to read the dispatches of the period. Indeed, it has

often since been pointed out by military writers that, had the troops

landed from first to last at Anzac Cove been available at the tip of

the peninsula, Krithia and Achi Baba would undoubtedly have been

carried in the early days of the fighting, thus altering the whole

course of the campaign. This dispersal of forces would appear to have

been one of the major blunders of the Dardanelles campaign.

For five days, beginning May 6, 1915, the Anzacs were in almost

constant action. The fortunes fluctuated, gains were made by both

forces, but in the end, aside from heavy losses by both, there was

practically no change in the relative positions. The allied troops

still held a strip of land on the top of the cliffs, of a radius of

about 1,100 yards. As illustrating the intense character of the combat

at this period, it was calculated that during one bombardment no less

than 1,400 Turkish shells fell on this small strip of land in one

hour.

It has been said that the task of the Anzacs at this period was to

keep open this door to the vitals of the Turkish army and to hold as

many of the Turks as possible, and thus relieve the pressure on the

Krithia front. It can be said with equal force that the task of the

Turks arrayed against them was to hold as many of the Anzacs on this

front as possible. Judged from these angles, both Turks and Britons

were successful.

In the following week both the British and the French received

substantial reenforcements. On May 14 General d'Amade, in command of

the French forces at the Dardanelles, was relieved by General Gouraud,

who, at the age of 47, was the youngest officer of his rank in the

French army. He had enjoyed conspicuous success in northern France,

and had been nicknamed by his soldiers, the "Lion of the Argonne." It

was believed that his experience in the country of the Argonne and the

style of fighting that had developed there would make him especially

valuable to Sir Ian Hamilton, who, of course, had had no previous

experience with the new style of warfare.

On May 18, 1915, began the second battle of Anzac. Elaborate

preparations were made by General Liman von Sanders, the German

commander in chief of the Ottoman forces. Fully 30,000 troops are said

to have been gathered for the attack upon the Colonial troops. The

latter were fully prepared, warned of the concentration by the

observers on the warships and the aerial scouts.

About midnight of that day the attack began. After a preliminary

bombardment of the British positions, successive infantry attacks in

massed formation were launched against the trenches. For six hours the

battle waged, but the Anzacs' positions were not shaken. In the end

the ground in front of the trenches was literally covered with the

dead and wounded. An actual observer wrote of the scene:

"The ground presents an extraordinary sight when viewed through the

trench periscopes. Two hundred yards away, and even closer in some

places, are the Turkish trenches, and between them and our lines the

dead lie in hundreds. There are groups of twenty or thirty massed

together, as if for mutual protection, some lying on their faces, some

killed in the act of firing; others hung up in the barbed wire. In one

place a small group actually reached our parapet, and now lie dead on

it, shot at point-blank range or bayoneted. Hundreds of others lie

just outside their own trenches, where they were caught by rifle or

shrapnel when trying to regain them. Hundreds of wounded must have

perished between the lines."

There was a lull after this terrible slaughter, during which the Turks

made unsuccessful overtures to obtain an armistice to bury their dead.

On May 20, 1915, toward evening, the Turks again attacked,

concentrating on Quinn's Point, a strong Anzac redoubt at the outer

edge of the Australian trenches. No results were obtained and finally,

out of sheer necessity for reasons of health, an opportunity was given

the Turks to bury their slain.

There was some additional fighting on this line during the remaining

days of May, but nothing of real importance occurred. It was

calculated, at the end of the month, that the total British losses,

killed, wounded and missing and not including sick, was just short of

40,000 men. The figures for the sick were not given out, but reports

made later make it tolerably certain that they must have numbered

between 30,000 and 35,000 additional. The intensity of the struggle at

the Dardanelles will be realized when it is pointed out that the total

British casualties in the three years of the South African War were

only 38,156.

During the last two weeks of May the British and French troops on the

Krithia fronts made elaborate preparations for an attack upon the

Turkish lines. Miners had been brought out from England and France,

and mining and sapping had been conducted on a large scale. On June 4,

1915, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered the attack. It was preceded by the

usual heavy naval and artillery bombardment. Finally, at noon, the

mines were exploded, and the troops advanced along the whole line with

fixed bayonets.

It is calculated that the British had no less than 24,000 men on a

front of less than 4,000 yards. Their attack was delivered with

tremendous power and was brilliantly successful. At one point,

however, where the French line linked up with the British, the Turks

discovered a weak spot. By noon about a third of a mile had been

gained over a front of four miles, but soon afterward the French began

to weaken and subsequently were compelled to retreat. This exposed the

right wing of the British, which was enfiladed by the Turkish riflemen

and machine gun batteries and suffered terrible losses. The

Collingwood battalion of the Royal Naval Reserve, according to Sir Ian

Hamilton, having gone forward in support when the right wing was hard

pressed, was practically wiped out.

The attack slackened in the afternoon and nightfall found almost all

the gains of the morning lost to the heavy Turkish counterattacks. So

exhausted were the British and French troops that it was impossible to

renew the battle on the following day.

On June 21, 1915, the French force fought probably its most successful

action since the landing. About noon of that day, the Second Division

stormed two lines of Turkish trenches and captured what had been

called the "Haricot" redoubt, a strong Turkish position which had

twice changed hands. On the right, the First Division was unable to

make corresponding progress until General Gouraud made a last

inspiring appeal. Before night the whole of the Turkish first line

trenches above Kereves Dere were in the hands of the French troops.

The cost had been terrible, no less than 2,500 soldiers of the

Republic falling in the assault. More important still, General Gouraud

was so seriously injured that he had to return to France. On the way

his right arm was amputated. He was succeeded in command of the French

Expeditionary force by General Bailloud.

A week of comparative inaction was followed by an action on the

British right, which became known as the battle of the Gully Ravine.

This was a successful attempt to capture the ground originally

included in Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions for the second day of the

Battle of the Landings, near Beach Y, where the Turks had maintained

themselves in force, on June 28, by a strong British force, including

the overworked Twenty-ninth Division, which at this time had but few

of the officers who commanded at the landing on April 25, 1915, the

156th Brigade of the Lowland Division, and the Indian Brigade. Several

of the Turkish trenches could be easily enfiladed from the sea and

H.M.S. _Talbot_, guarded by a ring of destroyers against the German

submarines which had given effective evidence of their presence in the

Gulf of Saros, did terrible execution and played a large part in the

success of the British attack.

By nightfall, five lines of Turkish trenches along the coast had been

captured, 200 prisoners had been taken and several guns and much

ammunition had fallen to the British troops. The Turks made

counterattacks on the two succeeding nights but never regained the

ground they had lost.

While this was going on, Enver Pasha directed in person a determined

attack upon the troops at Anzac Cove. On the night of June 29, 1915,

after artillery preparation, two unsuccessful attempts were made by

the Ottoman troops to carry the British lines.

On July 4, 1915, the Turks launched another attack, starting from the

neighborhood of Achi Baba, against the whole allied front,

concentrating on the point where the French and British lines joined

up. They had a momentary success when they penetrated into one of the

British trenches, but in the end they were driven out.

On July 12, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered an attack which won about

400 yards in the direction of Achi Baba, but at heavy loss to one of

the Territorial Brigades, which broke through a couple of the Turkish

trench lines, but was unable to establish a connection with the French

on their right. Finally some local points and a few trenches were

carried, but as the Turks had something like fifty miles of trenches

in Gallipoli, it became apparent that at this rate the allied troops

would be wiped out long before they came within sight of the Narrows.

CHAPTER LXXVI

RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS

The Russo-Turkish campaign which had developed in Transcaucasia, the

Caucasus and Persia at the beginning of 1915, proved to be little more

than a futile dissipation of energy for the best part of a year. To

Russia it was more of an inconvenience than otherwise, while for the

Turks it was the only point besides Egypt where their geographical

position permitted them to strike a blow against the enemies of

Germany. Her two nearest neighbors--Greece and Bulgaria--were both

neutral at the time. The most interesting feature of this campaign is

the fact that it largely influenced the allied operations at the

Dardanelles.

On August, 1915, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in

Petrograd, published the following statement in an interview which

appeared in the Russian press: "When Turkey declared war Russia turned

to Great Britain with a request that she would divert a portion of the

Turkish troops from the Caucasus by means of a counterdemonstration

at some other point. The operations at the Dardanelles were undertaken

with a double object--on the one hand, of reducing the pressure of the

Turks in the Caucasus, and, on the other, of opening the straits and

so making it possible for Russia to export her grain and receive

foreign products of which she stands in need."

The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus, as we found in Volume II, began

in the middle of December, 1914, and reached its farthest point toward

the end of the year. Although it was subsequently broken by Russia,

its renewal was expected when the weather became more favorable. That

it was not renewed during the summer of 1915, and that Tiflis was in

consequence relieved from further menace, was due entirely to the

British attack on the Dardanelles, to which all available Turkish

troops were immediately dispatched. Russia had her hands full enough

at the time to maintain her long front of 900 miles--from the Baltic

through the Polish salient and through the Carpathian line of Galicia.

She could therefore ill afford to spare any considerable part of her

forces for an extended Transcaucasian campaign.

Turkey's first plan of action in the Great War appears to have been an

attempt to recover Ardahan and Kars, both of which places, as well as

Batum, had been taken from Turkey and handed over to Russia by the

Treaty of Berlin in 1878. To forestall any such aspirations Russian

troops had entered Asia Minor on November 4, 1914, and advanced for

seventeen miles along the road to Erzerum in Armenia, and on November

8 they successfully resisted an attack by the Turks, armed with heavy

German artillery, at Kuprikeui, from which place several mountain

paths lead to Erzerum. Further attacks had also been made by the Turks

during the rest of the month and in December likewise in the Euphrates

Valley without any notable result, until they had reached Ardahan and

Sarikamish in an attempt to regain Kars.

In a three days' battle with the Russians, January 1-4, 1915, they

were driven back with enormous losses, the whole of one Turkish army

corps (the Ninth) surrendering. (See Volume II, Turkey in the War.)

The Turks did not get within thirty miles of Kars. In numerical

strength the Turks were estimated at three to one against the

Russians. Fighting in the deep snow at altitudes of 8,000 to 10,000

feet in a severe winter is an enormously difficult undertaking for the

attacking side, and it is evident that the Turkish forces suffered

terrible hardships in their attempt to retain a footing on Russian

territory.

At the end of January and the beginning of February furious fighting

raged in the neighborhood of Sarikamish, when the Russians inflicted

another defeat on the Turks. During a blinding snowstorm the former

had crossed a mountain and, after heavy fighting, captured the

commanding general and the staff of the Thirtieth Turkish Division and

a large quantity of war material. The roaring of the wind was so great

that the Russian approach could not be heard, while the thickly

blowing snow rendered the troops invisible.

At the same time the Russian squadron bombarded the Turkish barracks

at Trebizond and Rizah from the Black Sea, also sinking some Turkish

sailing vessels used as transports. Under the superintendence of

German engineers the Turks hurriedly set about constructing a branch

railroad from Angora to Sivas, Asia Minor, intended to replace the

Trebizond water route as a line of communication for the Turkish

troops on the Caucasus front. Meanwhile another Russian column pushed

out from Julfa along the Tabriz road to force battle upon the Turkish

army invading the Persian province of Azerbaijan. The Turks advanced

northward from Tabriz to Marand, where a stubborn battle was fought.

They were commanded by Djevet Pasha, who was considered one of their

best tacticians and most aggressive fighters, but after a series of

unsuccessful frontal onslaughts his army broke in disorder, abandoning

cannon, colors (standards), and all their dead and wounded. To the

Russians the victory was more of political than military value, for it

dealt a severe blow at Turkish and German influence in Persia.

On February 8, 1915, the Turkish cruiser _Midirli_ (formerly the

German warship _Breslau_) fired upon the Russian port of Jalta on the

Crimean Peninsula, opposite Balaklava. The Russian fleet retaliated

by again bombarding Trebizond on the other side of the Black Sea.

About February 20-21, 1915, several small engagements were fought in

the vicinity of Chorokh, as a result of which the Turks were driven

beyond the river.

On February 22, 1915, news came from Petrograd to the effect that the

Turks had indulged in cruel atrocities during their occupation of

Ardanuten in Transcaucasia, near the Armenian frontier. The Tiflis

correspondent of the "Russkoye Slovo" (the "Russian Word") stated that

at first the Turks confined themselves to pillage and killed only

fifteen civilians, but that after December 30, 1914, when news of the

Russian occupation of Ardaham was received, the local Mussulmans had

organized a systematic massacre. A hundred and fifty Armenians were

led out into the streets and killed.

Fifty Armenians were removed from prisons, stripped naked, and

compelled to leap into the abyss of Jenemdere, the "Devil's Gap,"

until one victim carried a Turk with him, when the remainder were

shot. At Tamvot 250 Armenians were massacred and the women carried

into captivity. The Turks did not permit the burial of the corpses,

which were left to be devoured by dogs till the arrival of the

Russians. Again, it was reported from Urumiah, northwestern Persia,

that prior to the evacuation of towns between Julfa and Tabriz the

Turks and Kurds, who were retiring before the Russian advance,

plundered and burned the villages and put to death some of the

inhabitants. At Salnac, Pagaduk, and Sarna orders were said to have

been given by the Turkish commissioner for the destruction of the

towns. All the Armenian inhabitants of Antvat were collected and,

according to this message, 600 males were put to death, and the women,

after being compelled to embrace the Islamic faith, were divided into

parties and sent to various interior towns.

On March 19, 1915, the Armenian Red Cross fund in London issued some

details supplied by an Armenian doctor named Derderian, who testified

that the whole plain of Alashgerd was virtually covered with the

bodies of men, women, and children. When the Russian forces had

retreated from this district the Kurds fell upon the helpless people

and shut them up in mosques. The men were killed and the women were

carried away to the mountains. The Armenian Red Cross fund stated that

there were 120,000 destitute Armenians in the Caucasus at that time.

As war in itself is not far removed from being a wholesale, organized

atrocity on a large scale, it is always advisable to accept such

accusations with extreme reserve and to consider the probability of

their having been perpetrated. In the case of Turk and Kurd _versus_

Armenian, however--and unfortunately--there is little reason to doubt

even the most gruesome stories that could possibly be written. It is a

feud as old as the hills, and no historic battle field of the world

was ever so liberally drenched with human blood as the soil of

Armenia.

Having expelled the Turks from the Transcaucasian region toward the

end of February, 1915, the Russians again moved forward on the Asiatic

front, sweeping aside, destroying and capturing detachments of Turks

that opposed their advance.

By March 1, 1915, the Russians were approaching Oltichai along one of

the main highroads toward Erzerum from the west. Another column

advancing from the east encountered some Turks in the mountain passes

south of Alashkort. These they defeated, capturing two guns. On

February 28, 1915, the Russian troops operating in the coast region

occupied the port of Khopa on the Black Sea, eighteen miles southwest

of Batum. This port was of great military value to the Turks.

On March 3, 1915, the Russian Army of the Caucasus, driving the

Turkish forces before it, had reached the River Khopachas, the estuary

of the Chorokh in Armenia. This move severed the route of Turkish

reenforcements and supplies from Constantinople to the Caucasian

frontier through Khlopa, Turkish Armenia, thereby isolating a big

portion of Turkish territory. From Batum Russian troops advanced near

the Turkish border, the Turks opposing them step by step. Russian

warships from the Black Sea sprayed their shells over the shore and

cleared a fifteen-mile strip of coast of Turkish barracks and troops,

successively cutting off several lines of their communications by sea

until, after a three days' battle, the last route was effectively

closed. A number of Turkish coasting vessels, laden with ammunition

and supplies, were also sunk.

According to an official Russian report issued on March 3, 1915, the

number of Turkish prisoners who had passed through Pyatigorsk on their

way to the interior of Russia (since Turkey entered the war) up to

February 13, 1915, amounted to 527 officers and 49,000 men.

During February, 1915, the Turks had been nibbling at Egypt through

the Sinai Peninsula. On the 25th of that month the allied squadrons

had begun heavy firing on the Dardanelles. This decided the supreme

Turkish war council early in March to recall most of the troops from

Egypt and the Caucasus to defend the straits. By March 16, 1915, the

Turks had lost so many important points in the Chorokh region that

they completely abandoned to the Russians what positions they still

held on the river.

On March 20, 1915, Petrograd announced that the Russian advance to the

sea had deprived the enemy of all means of operating in the

Transchorokh region or of transporting troops and munitions to

Erzerum, and that the Turks had been put to flight near Olti. The road

between Archava and Khopa, to the eastward, was strongly defended by

the Turks in a series of stubbornly contested battles. The Russian

advance created a panic throughout the Chorokh Valley; the inhabitants

fled to the mountains, abandoning farms and villages. The mountain

heights in the district of Ardanuch, however, were strongly fortified

and still in Turkish possession. These fortifications had been built

under German supervision, and the defense thereof was conducted by a

German officer.

Hostilities were resumed in Persia during the last week in March,

1915, and on the 25th the Russians defeated the Turks in a violent,

sanguinary battle at Atkutur, north of Bilman in northwestern Persia.

The Turks were stated to have lost 12,000 in killed, wounded, and

prisoners, as well as many guns. Preceding the Russian occupation of

Salmac Plains in Azerbaijan province, northwest of Urumiah, hundreds

of native Christians were rounded up by the Turks in the village of

Haftdewan and massacred. Many of them were dragged out from the homes

of friendly Mohammedans, who tried to hide them. The Russians on

entering the village found 720 bodies, mostly naked and mutilated. The

recovery of bodies from wells, pools, and ditches, and their interment

kept 300 men busy for three days. The wailing of women intensified the

horror of the scene. Surviving widows who were able to identify the

bodies of their husbands insisted upon digging graves and burying the

bodies. "Some of the victims had been shot. In other cases they were

bound to ladders, and their heads, protruding through, were hacked

off. Eyes were gouged out and limbs chopped off."

Messages from Urumiah confirmed earlier reports that more than 800

persons had already been killed in the neighborhood, and that more

than 2,000 had died of disease.

A dispatch from Tiflis, Transcaucasia, dated April 24, 1915, stated

that refugees who had reached the Russian line reported that the

massacre of Armenians was being continued on an even greater scale.

All the inhabitants of ten villages near Van were stated to have been

killed. On being advised of massacres at Erzerum, Berjan, and Zeitun,

and of the conditions at Van, the Katolikos, head of the Armenian

Church at Etchmiadzin, near Erivan, cabled to President Wilson an

appeal to the people of the United States to act on behalf of the

Armenians.

The village governments or relief committees had managed to issue

eight pounds of flour to each refugee in six weeks. A journey through

Salmac three weeks after the outrages revealed unmistakable signs of

the slaughter. Pools of blood still marked the "execution" places in

Haftdewan. The caps of thirty-six victims lay where a mud wall had

been toppled over them. A young Armenian named Hackatur related the

story of his escape from a well in which the bodies of the dead had

been crammed. He had fallen with the others and was flung into the

well, but he managed to wriggle through the bodies lying on top of

him, and escaped at nightfall.

At the end of April, 1915, after a slight lull, fresh activity broke

out again in various regions of the Caucasian front. The campaign had

almost come to a standstill owing to typhus. On the average, 150 men

succumbed daily. The epidemic raged for a while under indescribably

awful conditions. Every available doctor was hurried out, and several

of them died of the disease. The Russians had cleared the Kurds out of

the Alashkart valley and were now pushing forward in the direction of

Olti. The fight for the valley centered on the possession of

Klichgjaduk Pass, which would have been extremely useful to the Turks,

could they have held it securely for a few days to enable them to

complete a junction with their separated forces. The Russians "lay

low" in strongly protected positions. The Turks came on, first

obviously for reconnaissance, and were easily repulsed without the

Russians making much display of force. Whatever may be said of the

Turkish soldier, he is at all times a brave and self-reliant fighter.

They advanced to make the real attack, supported by some mountain

guns. But the Russian artillery continued to lie silent, and the

Turkish attack developed with misplaced confidence and swept boldly up

to the line of the Russian wire entanglements. Only sixty yards

separated the combatants when, suddenly, a perfect tornado of fire

rattled out from the Russian intrenchments. Maxims, mountain guns and

rifles poured a deadly shower of shells and bullets into the closely

packed thousands of Turks. With extraordinary courage the Osmanli

still rushed into the trap, uttering fierce shouts of "Allahoo Akbar!"

The Russians then broke from cover and some terrible bayonet work

completed the task of securing the pass for the Russians.

By May 10, 1915, the Turks had been driven back to the southwest,

leaving a large quantity of tents and munitions behind them. Farther

south, from Sarikamish, a number of insignificant conflicts were kept

up. Turkish stragglers formed partnerships with local professionals

and organized companies of banditti; the Russians were kept busy

clearing out the villages where these bands had established their

headquarters, driving them into the hills. To the southeast, the

pursuit of Halil Bey's defeated army continued during the first week

in May. The battle had begun at Hantahta, near Urumiah, on April 29,

1915. Both sides lost heavily. In the beginning the Russians had held

the Turks at bay, but the latter received reenforcements and on April

30, 1915, the Russians had to withdraw from Dilman. They intrenched

themselves at Magonzhio, the first village on the way to Khori, whence

they battered the Turks with their heavy artillery until the arrival

of Russian reenforcements.

On May 14, 1915, it was announced from Washington that replies were

being prepared at the State Department to a flood of communications

from various parts of the country urging that steps be taken to

protect Christians in Armenia and other regions under Turkish control.

Assurance was given that the Department was doing all in its power to

aid the Armenians. Mr. Morgenthau, our Ambassador at Constantinople,

was instructed to make representations to the Turkish Government. It

was at his request that Turkish regular troops were sent to Urumiah,

Persia, to keep order.

The Russian consul at that place reported on May 15, 1915, that 6,000

Armenians had been massacred at Van, which has been the scene of so

many similar outrages during the last twenty years. On May 23, 1915, a

detachment of Russian soldiers occupied the town of Van, in Asiatic

Turkey, thus bringing the eagerly expected relief to the Armenians,

who were besieged by the Turks--besieged in their own country by their

own countrymen. Upon the arrival of the Russians the Turks retreated

in the direction of Bitlis.

The Russian successes in the Van region included the occupation of

Baslan; in the capture of Van itself they took twenty-six guns, a

great quantity of war materials and provisions, as well as the

Government Treasury. A considerable part of the town was destroyed by

fire. All the foreigners residing there were reported as safe. By June

6, 1915, the Russians had the whole Van region and part of the Sanjak

of Mush in their hands. They had practically annihilated Halil Bey's

original corps and cleared the Turkish troops out for many miles

around. A Turkish offensive in the Province of Azerbaijan ended in a

complete breakdown. On their right wing the Russians occupied Turkish

territory between the old frontier and the line of the rivers Chorokh

and Tortun and the mountain range of Tchakhir Baba. A violent

counterattack made by the Turks at Zinatcher was repulsed. In the

course of an engagement in the valley of Oltichai 200 Cossacks charged

on horseback to the trenches, where they dismounted. Leaving their

well-trained horses to look after themselves, the Cossacks dashed into

the Turks and put them to the sword. Two days later a Turkish official

report from Constantinople via wireless to Berlin and London very

briefly announced: "On the Caucasian front we occupied enemy positions

in the district of Olti, on the Russian border of Transcaucasia."

The operations in the Dardanelles apparently had but little effect on

Turkish activity in the Caucasus, for by June 19, 1915, they had

replaced the Ninth Army Corps which had been captured by the Russians

at Sarikamish, and had also restored and supplied with ammunition the

Tenth and Eleventh Corps, which were seriously reduced in numbers by

fighting and disease. The main Turkish concentration was taking place

about this time against Olti, Melo, and Kiskin, outside of which line

the First and Sixth Corps and the remainder of Halil Bey's army were

drawn up. Here the Turks undertook some cautious offensive maneuvers,

besides attempting to prevent the Russians from outflanking Erzerum.

Some of the Kurdish leaders who were responsible for the Armenian

massacres in the Van district voluntarily surrendered to the Russians

and were deported to the interior with their dependents.

On June 20, 1915, in a battle near Olti, fifty-five miles west of

Kars, 200 Russians were killed and prisoners and war materials were

taken. By June 24, 1915, the Russians had occupied Gob, a town

twenty-five miles north of Lake Van. A general movement of Russian

troops toward Bitlis, where the armies of two Turkish commanders were

concentrated, pointed to a favorable situation in the Caucasus from

the Russian standpoint. Gob and Bitlis are connected by several

comparatively good roads. But matters now began to quiet down

somewhat--activities on both sides decreased. Russian sentiment had

grown strong in North and Central Persia, a fact accentuated by the

spirit displayed among the Moslem sects. Various isolated mountain

tribes met the Russians with declarations of allegiance--obviously the

safest policy to adopt with a powerful conqueror. Disease and famine

stalked through the smoldering district of Van; only one doctor was

available for 40,000 people--a large number of them in dire need of

medical assistance.

In the first week of July, 1915, lively fighting was reported to have

occurred north and south of Lake Van and south of Olti. A Turk force

of 30,000 men, concentrated to the east of Bitlis, were being hard

pressed by the Russians. Organized massacre of Armenians in Bitlis was

regarded as an indication that the Turks intended to retreat from that

point. They had also distributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in the Mush

Valley for use against Armenians.

Up to July 6, 1915, there had been only an artillery duel in the coast

region, and a Russian motor boat sank a Turkish sailing vessel. South

of the Kara Dagh range a Russian detachment encountered a regiment of

Turkish infantry with artillery, machine guns, and two squadrons of

cavalry. The Turks were again reported as coming off second best with

considerable damage inflicted upon them. A Turkish offensive west of

Ahlavat also failed.

After the Russians penetrated to Mush (eighty-three miles south of

Erzerum), and Plian, Halil Bey, commander of the Turkish forces in the

Caucasus, reorganized his army, bringing its strength up to 90,000,

including six divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and a large body

of Kurds. General Eudenitch, the Russian commander, thus found himself

confronted with the alternative of hastily attempting to concentrate

his forces in the face of a strong Turkish army, or to retreat and

thus expose a large Armenian population to Turk and Kurdish revenge.

The main Russian army withdrew along the right bank of the Euphrates,

the Turks occupying the left bank, July 22-25, 1915, being held in

partial check by rear-guard actions.

On August 1, 1915, Halil Bey's forces came into contact with a

considerable body of Russians at Palantchen, on the left bank of the

Euphrates, twelve miles southwest of Kara Kilissa. The Russians had

taken positions on a line extending from the northeast to the

southwest from Darabi, six miles north of Kara Kilissa, to Djamschato,

six miles southwest of the important Akhtunski Pass, covering the

roads to Erivan, in Transcaucasia. In opposing this front the Turks

exposed their communications, then 150 miles long, to attack from the

direction of Sarikamish. The violent and picturesque fighting that

developed during the first week of August will be described in the

next volume.

The Turkish and Persian borders had meanwhile settled down to

comparative quiet. Up to this stage the Russian commander had made no

attempt to advance to Erzerum, though there were strong grounds for

belief that the defenses of that fortress were by no means so strong

as had been supposed or represented.

Russia was waiting her time in this theatre of war: her object was

merely to hold the gate. She had just suffered severe reverses in

Galicia and the Carpathians, and was now fighting desperately to avoid

the great enveloping movement engineered by all the skill and weight

of Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen on her own territory of Poland and

Russia itself.

PART XI--THE WAR IN AFRICA

CHAPTER LXXVII

THE CAMEROONS

The war in Africa smoldered and flamed during the second period from

February to August, 1915. The fight for the colonial possessions

became a struggle for existence.

During the spring of 1915 the fighting in the Cameroons was generally

favorable to the allied arms. In April the advance of the French and

British troops forced the Germans to transfer their seat of Government

from Buea to Yaunde. In this month, Colonel Mayer's French column

succeeded in pushing its way over the River Kele, while about the same

time a British detachment seized a bridge across Ngwa.

On May 11, 1915, the station of Escha was taken. The Germans who

occupied a strong position at Njoke were driven out, and the place was

occupied by the British on May 29, 1915.

In the hinterland, along the Sanga River, the French columns had met

with continued success in harrying and driving out the enemy. The

Germans displayed great bravery, and offered stubborn resistance, but

were forced to fall back on fortified Monso. Here they held out for

some days, when they were forced to capitulate, and considerable

stores of guns and ammunition fell to the victors.

The French troops continued their successful drive by taking Assobam

and Besam on June 25, 1915, and then occupied the important post of

Lomji, in the capture of which, the Belgian soldiers furnished

invaluable assistance, proving themselves to be skillful and fearless

fighters.

What especially contributed to make the Allies' successes easier in

this section of the war area was the revolt of the natives against

their German masters. The Germans during their retreat had burned

villages and destroyed a vast amount of property which so enraged the

natives that many deserted. Having a perfect knowledge of the country

it was easy for them to escape capture. It was stated that many hung

around the German flanks and took revenge on their former masters by

hindering their retreat and by occasionally sniping the German

officers.

The natives of the Cameroons were not generally trusted by the

Germans, and were forbidden to fish in the streams of the country,

lest they should furnish information to the enemy.

Countercharges of British cruelty were brought at this time by certain

German missionaries of the Basle Mission, on the Sanga River. It was

claimed that British troops promised to reward natives for delivering

Germans into their hands, and for killing them. A number of Germans,

it was stated, had been cut to pieces, while others had been tortured

and delivered to the British. It was charged against the French

military authorities that German prisoners had been deported to French

Dahomey where they were forced to labor under black overseers. These

charges were denied by the accused in each instance.

During April and May, 1915, there was sharp fighting on the Nigeria

frontier. The large native town of Gurin, just inside British

territory, was attacked by a German force from Garua in April. The

contingent numbered sixteen Europeans, and about 350 natives. It was

equipped with some large guns and Maxims. For the defense of the town

there was only a small garrison of forty native troops commanded by

Lieutenant Pawle. For seven hours the garrison held off the enemy,

when he was forced to retire. During the struggle Lieutenant Pawle,

the gallant commander of the garrison, was killed. The news of this

engagement was carried by native soldiers who escaped from Gurin, to

Colonel F. G. Cunliffe at Yola, who immediately set off with a

detachment of the African Frontier Force, arriving on the scene of the

siege the day following. After being joined by a body of French

troops, he moved on to capture Garua where the British had met with

disastrous defeat in August, 1914.

Since that time the four forts of the town had been greatly

strengthened and every preparation was now made for a stout

resistance. The British and French having intrenched themselves, the

British guns began a vigorous bombardment of the forts. During the

night sapping and mining went on steadily, enabling the British to

move their trenches gradually nearer their objective.

The siege lasted from May 31 to June 10, 1915, when the forts

surrendered. The allied troops entered Garua on June 11, taking over

thirty-seven German, and 270 native prisoners, while great quantities

of arms, ammunition and stores became their prizes. It was said that

the garrisons of the forts might have held out much longer if they had

not lost their nerve and become panic-stricken, which caused many

desertions. It was a remarkable feature of this spirited struggle that

the Allies did not lose a man.

Leaving Garua, the British and French troops now moved on Ngaundere,

capital of the Adamawa District, which was taken with insignificant

losses to the Allies on July 29, 1915. The retiring Germans were

closely pursued to Tangere, which stands on a plateau nearly 4,000

feet high. This place was captured by the allied forces July 12, and

attempts made by the Germans to regain it eleven days later were

repulsed.

Early in August, 1915, the British captured Gaschaka and Koncha, when

the heavy rains suspended for the time any further military

operations. Meanwhile the French force had been working its way toward

Yaunde, occupying the station of Dume on the way. The arrival of

French troops at this town seems to have surprised and dismayed the

Germans, who hastily abandoned several fortified places and destroyed

their transport. They continued, however, to hold the hill above Dume

for some time, but were driven out by a French detachment after a

short struggle. From Dume a French column was dispatched against

Abong-Mbong.

At the beginning of the fall of 1915, the Germans still held Yaunde,

and a district in the center of the country, but the Cameroons could

no longer be considered a German possession.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

BRITISH CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA

Our attention is now drawn to Southwest Africa. In the first week of

February, 1915, the Germans made a determined effort to break through

the encircling armies that were closing in on them. Kakamas on the

Orange, where a British garrison was stationed to protect Schuit

Drift, was fiercely attacked on February 5 by about 600 Germans, well

equipped with Maxims and machine guns. They were beaten off after a

short engagement with a loss of nine men killed, twenty-two wounded,

and fifteen taken prisoners. On the Union side the casualties were one

killed, and two wounded.

On February 22, 1915, General Botha's army being ready, he moved out

of Swakopmund, and on the following day occupied the stations of

Nonidas and Goanikontes, meeting with only slight resistance. Nearly a

month was now spent in preparing for the advance on the capital,

Windhoek. Careful reconnoitering of the enemy's positions was made,

and an advanced base was established.

On the night of March 19, 1915, two mounted brigades left the post at

Husab to clear the railway line. General Botha accompanied the first

brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Brits, their object being

Riet, an important place south of the railway, where it was known that

the enemy was strongly prepared. Riet was of utmost importance to the

Union force for it commanded the highway to Windhoek. It was planned

that while Colonel Brits's brigade attacked Riet the Bloemhof

Commando was to execute a flank movement and seizing Schwarze Kopje to

endeavor to cut off the enemy's retreat.

At daybreak on March 20, 1915, the brigade reached the German

position. The right rested on the Swakop stream; the left on the

foothills of Langer Heinrichberg, while the artillery was effectively

placed so as to command the river and highway. Assisted by the guns of

the Transvaal Horse Artillery a frontal attack was made, and the

fighting became general. With varying fortunes it continued until the

evening when the Germans were finally driven out and dispersed.

The second brigade commanded by Colonel Celliers had been directed to

cut the railway line between Jakalswater and Sphinx. He was to attack

the former place after blocking the way, in case any reenforcements

should be sent by the enemy from Windhoek. Celliers succeeded in

cutting the railway and seized a train containing supplies for the

Germans, but his attack on Jakalswater was a failure, and the enemy

made forty-three of his men prisoners.

General Botha was so confident of the ultimate success of his

campaign, that he was not disposed to imperil his chances by any hasty

operations, and so his progress toward Windhoek was at first

necessarily slow. The nature of the country afforded the enemy many

natural advantages and unfortunately the Union forces were not

provided with aeroplanes, which would have proved invaluable in

scouting.

Pforto, a station on the line where the Germans occupied a strong

position, was surrounded by a column led by Colonel Alberts. The enemy

had two large guns and a number of Maxims. A charge by the Union force

and the effective work of their battery soon silenced the enemy's

artillery. The Germans had lost twenty killed, of whom three were

officers, when they surrendered unconditionally. There were 210

prisoners taken, four guns and a large quantity of ammunition.

General Botha was engaged in April and May, 1915, clearing the railway

system of the enemy. To prevent any flank attacks it was necessary to

hold the two main lines, which run from Swakopmund north to

Grootfontein, Tsumeb, and to Windhoek. This line being cleared for

fifty miles, Colonel Skinner and the Kimberley Regiment were stationed

at Trekopje, which became the Union railhead.

On April 26, 1915, about 700 Germans and a dozen guns vigorously

assailed this encampment and for four hours the fight raged with

varying consequences. The Germans under a withering fire from their

batteries tried to surround the Union trenches to enfilade them, but

were forced to retire, when they had got within 150 feet of their

objective, leaving twenty-five killed and wounded behind them. The

Union force lost eleven men, of whom three were officers, and forty

wounded.

Meanwhile, the southern army was actively engaged. Sir Duncan

Mackenzie's column had dispersed the Germans and taken some booty from

one or two places near Luederitz Bay, and had seized many miles of

railway. On February 22, 1915, his advance guard occupied Garub, a

station seventy miles inland. Here a company of Union scouts pushed

after the retiring Germans, and in a skirmish with mounted men

protecting a troop train their leader was wounded. They were forced to

retire, leaving one of their comrades a prisoner in the hands of the

enemy. The British camp at Garub was also attacked by a hostile

aeroplane which dropped hand grenades and shells, but there were no

casualties.

Aus, an important station fifteen miles from Garub, was next occupied

by Mackenzie. The place was evacuated without a struggle, but it

showed that much work had been done to fortify it, and that the enemy

had intended to resist. Owing to the rapid movements of the British

force the Germans had abandoned everything, though several mines

exploded when the town was occupied.

Turning now to the movements of General Smut's army in the south.

Colonel Van der Venter, who commanded an important section of the

army, crossed the Orange River and occupied a group of stations,

including Nabas, Velloor, Ukamas, Jerusalem, and Heirachabis.

On the last day of March, 1915, Van der Venter's force was engaged in

several skirmishes in which one man was killed and two wounded, while

six of the enemy were killed and twenty-eight taken prisoners. At this

price the stations of Platbeen and Geitsaud which yielded a great

quantity of supplies and horses and live-stock were occupied.

On April 30, 1915, Van der Venter occupied Warmbad, the railway

terminus, without opposition and pushing forward along the line his

men entered Kabus, a station sixty-five miles to the north, two days

later.

General Smut met Van der Venter at Kalkfontein on April 11, 1915,

where plans were laid to drive the Germans from Karas Mountains where

they occupied some strong positions. The enemy was attacked in three

columns, advancing from different points. Finding themselves

threatened on all sides, the Germans made no resistance and abandoned

everything.

On April 17, 1915, Van der Venter entered Seeheim, the Germans fleeing

in such hot haste that they could not stop to destroy the bridge over

the Great Fish River. Colonel Berrange's force which had set out from

Kimberley was now in touch with Van der Venter's column. At Hasnur

near Rietfontein, Berrange took an intrenched position with slight

losses and after frequent skirmishes and hard fighting joined Van der

Venter's forces near Keetmanshoop, which surrendered to the combined

forces April 20, 1915.

Sir Duncan Mackenzie's column left at Aus now struck out to the

northeast with his mounted men and occupied the towns of Bethany and

Berseba without meeting resistance and April 24, 1915, reached

Aritetis on the railway, seventy miles north of Keetmanshoop, General

Mackenzie could now act in conjunction with Van der Venter against the

Germans retreating from Seeheim and Keetmanshoop. At Kabus, twenty

miles north, in an indecisive engagement with the enemy, the Union

forces lost twenty-two men taken prisoners, while the Germans

numbering about 600, continued their retreat, their objective being

Gibeon, where they hoped to entrain for the capital, Windhoek. General

Mackenzie therefore sent a small party to destroy the railway to the

north of Gibeon, while the Ninth Brigade was to engage the enemy. This

body was defeated by the Germans with severe loss. They took some

seventy prisoners and forced the Ninth Brigade to fall back on the

main body.

On the morning of April 28, 1915, Mackenzie led his whole force

against the Germans in a dashing attack that drove them from the

field, and his cavalry continued to pursue them over twenty miles of

country. The rocky and irregular character of the ground in this

neighborhood made it difficult for cavalry operations, and the Germans

made good their escape. The British lost three officers and twenty men

killed; the wounded numbered fifty-five, of whom eight were officers.

Among the killed was Major J. H. Watt of the Natal Light Horse. The

British captured from the enemy seven officers, and about 200 men.

They also released seventy of their own soldiers who had been made

prisoners by the Germans on the previous day.

The booty that fell to the victors included field guns and Maxims,

transport wagons, and large numbers of live stock. It was at Gibeon,

where this battle was fought, that Sir George Farrar was killed in a

railroad accident on May 18, 1915. His important services in the

Commissariat Department during the invasion of the colony had

contributed to making the successes of the Union forces possible. His

career had been full of adventure. He was sentenced to death for the

part he had taken in the Jamieson raid, and had fought against the

Boers in 1899-02.

While General Mackenzie was successfully operating around Gibeon,

General Botha's troops were active in the north; but nothing of

importance occurred until May 1, 1915, when Kubas was hurriedly

evacuated by the Germans and occupied by General Brits. Here, it was

discovered that the Germans had made elaborate preparations for

resistance, but--became panic-stricken by the sudden and unexpected

arrival of Union forces. Miles of intrenchments surrounded the place,

and a hundred contact mines were discovered and removed. From this

point Colonel Brits continued his advance, and encountered the enemy

at Otyimbigue, sixty-one miles from the capital of Windhoek. After a

spirited skirmish the place was taken, the Germans losing twenty-eight

men as prisoners. Continuing their victorious advance the Union forces

captured Karibib, an important railroad junction, and Johann

Albrechtshoehe and Wilhelmstal were next occupied.

With General Botha threatening the capital from the west, and all the

colony south of Gibeon in British hands, the greatest difficulties in

the way of the invaders had been successfully overcome, and the end

seemed to be near.

On May 10, 1915, General Botha was informed that Windhoek, the

capital, was prepared to surrender. He set out at once for the town in

a motor car accompanied by a small escort, and arranged with the

Burgomaster of Windhoek the terms of capitulation.

On May 12, 1915, General Myburgh and a detachment of Union forces

entered the town which contained at the time about 3,000 Europeans and

some 12,000 natives.

Before the courthouse, in the presence of the town officials, and

Union officers and men, a proclamation by General Botha in Dutch,

English, and German was read, which placed the conquered districts

under martial law, and which further expressed the hope that there

would be no attempts to resist the Union forces as they must prove

futile. The great wireless station at the capital, which kept the

colony in touch with Berlin, was found to be uninjured, and with its

capture the Germans lost their last wireless station outside of

Europe. Thousands of cases of ammunition and parts of guns were among

the prizes taken, while on the railway a number of locomotives and

quantities of rolling stock were seized.

It now became the immediate business of General Botha's army to deal

with those German straggling forces which remained still under arms in

the north. In a few days following the occupation of the capital,

Colonel Mentz found part of the enemy at Seeis, and without losing a

man took 252 prisoners and a great quantity of booty. General Botha

meanwhile occupied Omaruru, a station on the railway, and in the same

week took possession of Kalkfield which was strongly intrenched, but

which the Germans were compelled to abandon owing to Botha's adroit

flanking movements. The Germans declining to make a stand, Botha's

army swept victoriously onward.

In the last week in June, 1915, all the districts around Waterberg

were cleared of the enemy. Leaving Okaputu in the evening of June 30,

1915, General Manie Botha with the Fifth Brigade got in touch with the

Germans at dawn the next day near Osib, after a forced march of

forty-two miles in sixteen hours. The Germans were driven off, and

before nightfall Otavi was occupied. Here a good supply of water was

found and as the country around is arid and like a desert, the loss of

the town was a serious one to the enemy.

General Lukin with another brigade had set out from Omarasa at the

same time as Manie Botha, and between them came General Botha and the

Headquarters Staff.

The fight at Otavi was the last stand of importance made by the

Germans. They had shown great bravery, but supplies were failing, they

had been driven into the most inhospitable part of the colony, the

natives were not always friendly, and during the first days of July,

1915, they made preparations to surrender.

The Union troops under General Myburgh, having left the railway,

encountered a body of Germans sixteen miles south of Tsumeb and in the

skirmish that followed lost one man and took eighty-six prisoners.

At Tsumeb, which Myburgh entered on July 8, 1915, some 600 more

prisoners were taken, while he was able to release a number of Union

comrades who had been left behind by the Germans in their hurried

retreat. Colonel Brits had by this time reached the German port of

Namutoni, where he took 150 prisoners, and released some Union

captives, the last that remained in German hands.

Dr. Seitz, the Governor of German Southwest Africa, now opened

communications with General Botha concerning a surrender, and received

the Union officer's terms in the form of an ultimatum. Botha stated

that he and his troops stood ready to fight, if need be, another

battle, but his terms were accepted before the time limit he had fixed

expired.

[Illustration: Conquest of German Southwest Africa by Union Troops

under General Botha.]

At two o'clock in the morning of July 9, 1915, at a spot called Kilometre

500, General Botha, Dr. Seitz the Governor, and Colonel Francke,

commander of the German troops in Southwest Africa, signed the terms of

capitulation. All the Germans surrendered unconditionally. Officers were

released on parole, and were free to live where they pleased in the

country. The regular troops were permitted to retain their rifles, but no

ammunition, and were interned for the remainder of the war in charge of

one of their officers. The Landwehr and Landsturm of the reserve forces

were permitted to retain their horses, but no arms, and were released on

parole, and could return to their homes.

The formal surrender of the prisoners was held at Otavi, July 11,

1915, where General Lukin who was in charge of the details took over

204 officers, and 3,293 of other ranks; thirty-seven field guns and

twenty-two machine guns. By the conquest of German Southwest Africa

322,450 square miles of territory, 113,670 more miles than all

Germany, came under the British flag.

The suppression of the rebellion at home, and the invasion and

conquest of this large territory had been accomplished by the Union

forces with comparatively small loss of life considering the great

number of engagements that were fought in a most difficult country for

military operations. The best estimate gives 1,612 for both campaigns.

The killed numbered 406, of whom ninety-six were killed in action by

the Germans and ninety-eight by the rebels, fifty-eight died of

wounds, and 153 by disease, accident, and other causes, and 606 were

taken prisoners. The losses to the rebels were 190 killed and between

300 and 350 wounded. The Germans lost 103 killed, and 195 wounded.

Before the surrender the Union forces held 890 German prisoners in

Southwest Africa.

While it is true that the Union troops greatly outnumbered the

Germans, General Botha's conquest of the colony was none the less a

brilliant military achievement. The most dangerous foe that the Union

soldiers encountered was not the Germans, but the deadly climate; the

stretches of burning desert veld from eighty to a hundred miles wide,

that had to be crossed in a heat that rose at times to 120 deg. Fahrenheit

in the shadow of the tents. All the supplies, the provisions for the

men, and much of the water for their consumption had to be brought

from Cape Town. The care taken in the commissariat department, and

especially in the water supply, in a country where the enemy had

polluted the wells, accounted for the general good health of the

invading army. That 30,000 men should have been able to fight in such

a difficult country for five months at a cost of less than 2,000

casualties was an experience rare in military annals, and reflects

lasting credit on General Botha who planned the entire invasion.

The Germans, outmatched and outnumbered, avoided engagements whenever

possible, but offered a stubborn resistance and fought with great

bravery when there was no alternative. Once the Union forces were

ready to advance, their rapid movements and forced marches took the

Germans by surprise in the midst of their preparations, and baffled

and bewildered them. Cut off entirely from help from the outside, and

running short of ammunition which could not be replaced, their

struggle could only result in one conclusion.

CHAPTER LXXIX

OTHER AFRICAN OPERATIONS

The fighting along the African coast during this period was minor but

picturesque. On February 26, 1915, the British military authorities

announced that the coast of German East Africa would be blockaded on

February 28, four days being allowed for the departure of neutral

vessels. Some minor successes, chiefly naval, were obtained by the

British during the month of March, when they occupied Shirati on Lake

Victoria Nyanza and established there a base for armed steamers.

It was here on March 6, 1915, that the _Muanza_, the only German

armed steamer that remained on the lake, was destroyed by the British

steamer _Winifred_.

In April, 1915, Major General Tighe, who had won distinction in the

Indian Service, was appointed to command the British troops in German

East Africa. During this month there was some desultory fighting along

the edges of Kilmanjaro, and repeated but ineffectual attempts were

made to cut the Uganda Railway line; otherwise there were no hostile

movements worthy of note in this region.

On March 9, 1915, a German column, marching along the Maru River to

invade the Karungu district on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria

Nyanza, was defeated and scattered, after a short engagement, by a

force of British troops under Colonel Hickson.

Along the region between the Uganda Railroad and the German frontier

there were frequent skirmishes during May between British patrols and

German troops, in which the losses were trifling on either side. The

German forces had been operating for some time from the fortified port

of Bukoba, and it was important to the future movements of the British

that the place should be destroyed. On June 20 an expedition was

dispatched by steamer from the British port at Kisumu, 240 miles away

on the eastern shore; at the same time it was planned that British

troops on the Kagora River were to cross the thirty miles that divided

them from the German fortified port.

On June 25, 1915, Brigadier General J. A. Stewart, commanding

detachments of the First Loyal North Lancashires, King's African

Rifles, and the Twenty-fifth Royal Fusiliers reached Bukoba. The port

was attacked by land and water. The British were in superior numbers,

having only about 400 against them, but the Germans fought intrepidly,

and their Arab allies showed great bravery. The British success was

not easily won. The Germans lost most of their artillery and there

were heavy casualties. The wireless station was ruined, boats in the

harbor were sunk or captured, and the destruction wrought by the

British on the port was complete.

The capture of Bukoba was important to the British, for as a direct

result the Uganda borders were kept clear of the enemy for the greater

part of the summer of 1915.

The German town of Sphynxhaven on the eastern shore of Lake Nyassa was

attacked on May 30, 1915, by a British naval force under Lieutenant

Commander Dennistoun, supported by field artillery and a landing party

of King's African Rifles. During the sharp, short engagement that

followed the place was bombarded from the water, the enemy was driven

out, and great quantities of rifles, ammunition, and military stores

fell to the British.

The climatic conditions in the low-lying Nyassaland and Uganda borders

in the summertime caused the British soldiers more suffering and

deaths than their enemies. Insect pests like the tsetse fly swarm

around Lake Victoria Nyanza, while different fevers of peculiarly

malignant varieties lie in wait to attack the European. There is the

terrible sleeping sickness that spares neither white nor black race.

The great lake cannot be bathed in without danger for its abounds in

crocodiles and hippopotami.

Guerrilla warfare was kept up during most of the summer of 1915 along

the northeastern borders of Rhodesia and in Nyassaland. On June 28 the

Germans were driven off when they attacked in two bands on the Saisa

River, near Abercorn. A month later, having gathered 2,000 men, they

besieged the place for six days, when British reenforcements arriving

they were driven off. During these skirmishes and engagements the

Belgian troops were of great service to the British in defending the

frontier between Lake Mweru and Lake Tanganyika, and especially the

western shore of the latter lake.

It was in this summer of 1915, during the early days of July, that the

German cruiser, the _Koenigsberg_, met her end. Late in October of 1914

she was in shelter at a point some distance up the Rufiji River, where

the water was so shallow that a ship of ordinary draft could not

approach. When the British discovered the location of the cruiser they

sank a collier across the mouth of the river to prevent the German

boat from reaching the sea. The _Koenigsberg_, surrounded by forests

and thick jungle growth, was exactly located by British aircraft. On

July 4, 1914, Vice Admiral King Hall, commander in chief of the Cape

station, entered the river with the monitors _Severn_ and _Mersey_ and

opened fire.

The crew of the _Koenigsberg_ had been active in fortifying their

position during the time the cruiser had been sheltering in the river.

They had established shore batteries with German thoroughness that

commanded all the turnings of the river, and there were observation

towers from which they could get the range of any vessel attacking.

The British could not get a clear view of the enemy because of the

dense jungle, but their aeroplanes were of great service in directing

the action of the guns. There was never any doubt of what the ultimate

fate of the _Koenigsberg_ would be.

On July 4, 1915, the British bombarded the cruiser for six hours, when

she was seen to be on fire. The attack for some reason was not renewed

until July 11, 1915, when the cruiser was found to be completely

destroyed, whether as the result of the British shells or because she

was blown up by her own crew was not discovered at the time. The

annals of naval warfare offer no more curious story than this of the

German cruiser, which lay for so many months helpless in a jungle

river, surrounded by steaming swamps, while far beyond lay the

longed-for open sea.

PART XII--WAR IN ARABIA, MESOPOTAMIA AND EGYPT

CHAPTER LXXX

MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA

The flames of war were sweeping across Mesopotamia and Arabia. In the

last days of January, 1915, Lord Hardinge, Viceroy and Governor

General of India, made a tour of the conquered territory around the

Persian Gulf, and at Basra was received by the native community with

an address of welcome, which expressed the hope of permanent British

occupation.

Owing to the overflow of the Tigris and Euphrates in February and

March, when the surrounding country is flooded, there was little

fighting in those regions. But on March 3 the enemy appeared near

Ahwaz, on the Karun River, where the British had a small garrison to

protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipe line.

A contingent sent out from the town to discover the strength of the

Turkish force, located them at Ghadir. The enemy was found to be about

12,000 strong, having been joined by a body of tribesmen from Arabia

and Persia. As the British troops only numbered 1,000 men, there was

imminent danger of them being cut off, and a hurried retreat was

ordered. The Turks seemed determined that their enemy should not

escape them, and used every effort to prevent a successful retreat.

There was much hand-to-hand fighting before the British could struggle

back to Ahwaz. As the Turks did not continue to attack it was to be

supposed that they had lost heavily. The Anglo-Indian force had lost

about 200. The colonel of the Seventh Rajputs was wounded, and four

of their white officers were killed.

On this day, March 3, 1915, a body of British cavalry reconnoitering

toward Nakaila, about twenty-five miles northwest of Basra, was

attacked while on their way back to camp by some 1,500 mounted Turks.

The British pretending to retire, maneuvered to lure them on to a

position where they had concealed infantry with machine guns and

artillery. The Turks, quite unsuspecting a ruse came on, were met by a

withering fire from the guns that sent them shattered and broken

flying back to Nakaila. In this little fight the British had four

officers killed and several severely wounded.

Reenforcements had been sent from India in anticipation of the end of

the flood season, and Ahwaz and Kurna were greatly strengthened.

Lieutenant General Sir J. E. Nixon, K. C. B., accompanied the new

troops, and on his arrival took command of the entire force of between

30,000 and 40,000 men.

The Turks, who had also been largely reenforced with soldiers probably

from Bagdad, on April 11 attacked the three British positions at

Kurna-Ahwaz and Shaiba, the last a fort protecting Basra. Kurna was

bombarded for two days, with small result. A bridge across the Tigris

was partly destroyed, but they inflicted no casualties. Guns from the

shore and those in H.M.S. _Odin_ did effective work in scattering such

of the enemy as appeared in boats. At Ahwaz large bodies of hostile

cavalry could be seen against the sky line surrounding the British

positions, but they did not attack.

[Illustration: Mesopotamia--The British Operations from the Persian

Gulf.]

The main object of the Turks was evidently to capture Basra, their

attempts on Kurna and Ahwaz being merely feints to keep the British

occupied while they struck a real blow at Shaiba. On April 12, 1915,

an action began that lasted three days--one of the most notable fights

in the history of this campaign. The attacking force was estimated at

between 18,000 and 22,000 men. Perhaps 11,000 were regular infantry

and cavalry from Bagdad, and 12,000 irregular levies of Kurds and

Arabs. The Turkish infantry after some irregular artillery fire,

commanded by German officers, advanced in the early morning of the

12th toward the south-southwest, and west of the British lines. For

three hours they were pressing forward, and then when the artillery

fire fell off began to dig themselves in. An attack from the south was

made in the afternoon, but was beaten off by the British before making

much progress. The Turks were busy during the night of the 12th

keeping up a spirited fire from rifles and machine guns, and by

morning were found to have occupied some houses on a rising ground to

the north of the British position. An Anglo-Indian force easily

dislodged them from this place, and a counterattack made by the Turks

from the west was repulsed with a loss to them of several hundred

prisoners. The British also captured eighteen officers and two guns.

The British had repulsed all attacks, but the most difficult part of

their task now lay before them, for the Turks were strongly intrenched

near Basra some four miles from the British lines. On April 14, 1915,

the Anglo-Indian force moved from camp toward Zobeir to the south, and

driving off the Turks from their advanced position found themselves in

front of their main lines. Some 15,000 Turkish soldiers and six big

guns occupied well-concealed trenches in a tamarisk wood. The

Anglo-Indian troops began their advance toward the enemy at 11.30 in

the morning, and continued for five hours across a bare plain under a

fierce sun and a pitiless heat. Not an enemy could be sighted, but a

continuous fire, too accurate to be pleasant to the advancing host,

came from the concealed trenches. At about 4.30 p. m. the 117th

Mahrattas and Dorsets had led the way into the trenches, and, the

whole line uniting in a great charge, the Turks were driven out at the

point of the bayonet and dispersed. The Anglo-Indian troops however

had purchased their victory dearly. There were some 700 casualties.

Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Rosher of the Dorsets, Lieutenant Colonel T.

A. Britten of the 110th Mahrattas, and Major J. C. M. Wheeler of the

Seventh Lancers were among the seventeen British officers killed.

The routed Turks had fled toward Nakaila, and were vigorously pursued

by the victors. They tried to escape by land and water. A dozen boat

loads of fugitives were overhauled or sunk. The Turks lost about

2,500, of whom 700 were prisoners in British hands. Great quantities

of stores, ammunition and guns were also captured. The region around

Basra was now cleared of Turkish soldiers for a distance of fifty

miles.

On April 17 the Anglo-Indian cavalry occupied Nakaila. The rout of the

Turks was complete, and it was said that in their retreat they were

attacked by their former allies the Arabs, who turned on them as soon

as the tide of battle went against them.

During the greater part of the month of May the British were occupied

in clearing the territory of the Turks that remained. At Kurna and

Ahwaz and their neighborhood the enemy had gathered in sufficient

numbers to give some trouble. A British contingent was dispatched to

drive them out of the Ahwaz locality, but the Kharked River was in

flood, and severe sand storms hindered progress, so that before the

Turkish camp could be reached the enemy had vacated Persian soil and

fallen back to Amara.

General Gorringe, who commanded the British troops, now set about

punishing those tribes which had been assisting the enemy. Some

surrendered and gave up a number of rifles and arms. Others were

disposed to show resistance, but the British easily defeated them,

cleared out their strongholds, and destroyed some of their property.

On May 31, 1915, the Turks had become threatening in the vicinity of

Kurna, and a British expedition consisting of soldiers and sailors set

out at 1.30 a. m. to attack them. By wading and in boats the British

surprised the enemy's position, two miles from the town, and soon

silenced his guns by superior artillery work. The heights were won by

midday, and the Turks took to flight, leaving three guns and about 250

prisoners behind them. They retreated to Amara as the force from Ahwaz

had done. Their flight was so precipitate, that tents were left

standing, as they took to mahalas and steamers on the river to escape.

The British naval flotilla carrying General Townshend and Sir Percy

Cox, Chief British Resident of the Gulf, was in pursuit of the fleeing

Turks. Their gunboat _Marmaris_ was sunk, and the transport _Masul_

captured. Two lighters containing field guns, mines, and military

stores were also taken, and about 300 prisoners.

Amara, the important business town on the Tigris about sixty miles

from Kurna to which the Turks had fled, surrendered to the British

June 3, 1915, its garrison of 1,000 becoming prisoners of war. In the

town and vicinity 80 officers and some 2,000 men were also captured,

and large quantities of ammunition, 13 guns, 12 steel barges, and 4

river steamers.

The whole of the country between Amara and the sea was now in British

hands, and the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia had been partly destroyed

and so demoralized that it was unlikely that they would soon take the

offensive again.

In the last weeks of July, 1915, they again became troublesome. On

July 24 the British, under General Gorringe, advanced to attack

Nasiriyeh. The town was shelled by gunboats, and after a prolonged

struggle the enemy retired, and the British occupied the place on the

following day. They had captured during the fight 1,000 prisoners and

13 guns, while the dead Turks numbered about 500. The British

casualties were between 300 and 400. During this engagement the

fiercest foe the British had to contend against was the excessive

heat, which registered as high as 113, and caused great suffering and

some deaths.

Along the Euphrates, between Sukh-es-Sheyukh and Nasiriyeh, operations

now began that lasted for twenty days. The country around here is

peculiarly difficult for military movements, presenting a network of

marshes and canals. The Turks occupied intrenched positions at the

entrance of Kut-el-Hai Channel on the main line of communication

between the Tigris and Bagdad. A British force was dispatched from

Kurna to attack these positions. The expedition was supported by

extemporized gunboats, and took the waterway of the Euphrates and

Hamar Lake. Their progress was fiercely opposed by the Turks, who

hovered about their flanks. The river had overflowed it banks, and

inundated the neighboring country so that marching was difficult. It

was necessary to drag boats over the land in some places along the

advance. But the British troops were successful when reaching their

objective. One regiment outflanked the enemy's gun position on the

right bank, and during the engagement the Turks lost 7 officers and 83

regular troops and Arabs. The British casualties were 109. There were

25 killed.

CHAPTER LXXXI

SYRIA AND EGYPT

After the declaration of war against Turkey, the allied war vessels

were concentrated in the Levant and Red Sea to watch the coasts of

southern Asia Minor, Syria, and Turkish Arabia. On the Syrian coast

there was only one point where a naval force could effectively attack

communications between Constantinople and the Turkish forces. This was

the little town of Alexandretta, and the shore north to Payaz, a small

village. The Turks, if they wished to reenforce their Syrian army must

move their men, guns, and stores up a mountainous road over the Amanus

from Baghche to Radju, or risk great losses by the coast route between

Payaz and Alexandretta. The Turks took this chance, and were

successful, for there was no allied warship in the Gulf of

Alexandretta to oppose their progress. On December 17, 1914, H.M.S.

_Doris_, a protected cruiser, appeared off Alexandretta and destroyed

four bridges on the road and railway between that town and Payaz. The

captain of the _Doris_ sent an ultimatum to the Turkish commandant of

Alexandretta demanding the surrender of the town, failing which he

threatened bombardment of the place. To this the Turks paid no

attention. A second ultimatum brought forth a telegraphic message from

Djemal Pasha at Damascus, threatening to execute allied subjects

interned in that city if any Ottoman noncombatants were killed at

Alexandretta by the British guns. The captain of the _Doris_ promptly

replied that Djemal Pasha would be held responsible for the execution

of allied subjects, if he dared to carry out what he proposed. Thanks

to the influence brought to bear on the Porte by the American Embassy

at Constantinople, the Ottoman military authorities in Syria became

more reasonable, and finally agreed to blow up the two railway engines

at Alexandretta themselves, much of the war material having been

removed from the town while negotiations were pending.

During the first three months of 1915 there was only one fight of any

importance on the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta. On February 6 a

landing party from H.M.S. _Philomel_ was subjected to heavy fire from

a concealed trench where eighty Turks were located. Six of the British

and New Zealanders who formed the crew of the _Philomel_ were wounded,

three mortally. The cruiser promptly avenged their death by steaming

in and opening a point-blank fire on the trenches with her 4.7-inch

guns. More than fifty of the Turks were killed or badly wounded, the

high-explosive shells shattering some to pieces. After this salutary

lesson the Turks at Alexandretta did not seek any further encounters

with the sailors of allied war vessels.

The British cruisers were late in arriving in the Gulf of

Alexandretta, and had lost some opportunities to injure the enemy by

their delay, but now they did valiant duty in preventing the Turks

from sending any number of men or stores to Aleppo for the Caucasus,

Mesopotamia, or the Egyptian border by the coast route, which would

greatly have facilitated their movements. They were forced, owing to

the vigilance of British warships, to send their troops and munitions

over the Giaur Dagh by the pass called the Syrian Gates, between

Cilicia and northern Syria, a rough, mountainous region, with bad

roads, that made progress extremely difficult.

At the beginning of the allied operations against the Dardanelles, the

observation of the Syrian coast was taken over entirely by the French

fleet.

On April 19, 1915, the Turkish intrenchments at El Arish were

bombarded by the French battleship _St. Louis_. The Turks had some

fifteen or twenty field guns, and replied vigorously, but only one

shell hit the battleship, which did no damage. The Turks suffered some

losses. In the early part of May the big camp at Gaza, where numbers

of Ottoman soldiers were gathered to be reviewed by Djemal Pasha, was

shelled by the _St. Louis_, when some fifty Turks were killed by

French shrapnel, and perhaps as many more wounded.

On April 29, 1915, the cruiser _D'Entrecasteaux_ worked effectively on

the Cilician coast, shelling the trenches at Taruss, while her

hydroplane, dropping a bomb on the railway tracks, blew up trucks

laden with high explosives and wrecked the railway station. On May 10

the Turks at El Arish were again shelled by the guns of the _Jeanne

D'Arc_.

On Ascension Day, Alexandretta was the scene of some spirited work, in

which the cruiser _D'Estrees_ played the leading part. M. de la

Passadiere, her commander, demanded of the Kaimakam that the German

flag should be hauled down that was flying over the German Consulate.

The Turkish commander sent no reply, and it was pretended that he was

ill or absent. M. de la Passadiere having fixed a time limit when the

flag must be hauled down, cleared his decks for action and trained the

ship's guns on the consulate building. At the expiration of the time

limit he opened fire, and the consulate was reduced to ruins. The only

casualties were three Turkish soldiers, who, in spite of warning, had

remained near the building.

The captain of the _D'Estrees_ on May 14, 1915, destroyed a petrol

depot which might be used to supply hostile submarines, and which

contained over 1,000 cases. A few days earlier a much larger depot

containing some 20,000 cases at Makri on the southern coast of Cilicia

had been destroyed by the cruiser _Jeanne D'Arc_.

[Illustration: The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal.]

Budrum on the southwest coast of Asia Minor in the Gulf of

Halicarnassus was bombarded for a serious act of Turkish treachery.

The captain of the _Dupleix_ had sent two boat crews to parley with

the authorities, when they were fired upon by armed Turkish civilians

and some soldiers. About twenty French soldiers were killed or

captured as a result of this treacherous act, concerning which the

Ottoman authorities published a communique in which they described the

incident as the repulse of a landing force. The French losses were

quickly avenged, for the _Dupleix_ at once began a bombardment of

the Moslem quarter of the town, and continued firing for three hours

during which great damage was done.

Armed Turkish inhabitants perpetrated a similar outrage on boat

parties on May 18, 1915, at Banias, near Latakia; a tug and a boat

belonging to the _D'Estrees_ were fired on from roofs and landing

places while chasing a merchantman belonging to the enemy that was

seeking refuge in the port. As a punishment for the treachery of the

civilians, who had posed as peaceable inhabitants until the French

boats came into port, part of the town was destroyed by the shells of

the _D'Estrees_.

In February, 1915, toward the close of the month, in the Red Sea, the

French armored cruiser _Desaix_ landed a reconnoitering party near

Akaba, and found the Turks occupying a neighboring village. After

receiving reenforcements from the cruiser, the French sailors drove

out the fifty or sixty Turks hiding among the houses of the village,

killing and wounding a dozen of them, their only casualty being one

man, who was slightly wounded. The Red Sea was now patrolled by

vessels of the Indian Marine, which were frequently successful in

making captures, and in removing mines from the Gulf of Akaba.

On March 21, 1915, H.M.S. _Dufferin_ at Mutweilah on coast of Midian,

where an old Turkish fort is located, was the victim of the white-flag

trick. Through this treacherous act one British sailor was killed, and

an officer and nine other men were wounded. In the middle of May,

H.M.S. _Northbrook_ captured a dhow, having on board six German

officers belonging to the merchant marine, and ten men who were trying

to reach one of the Turkish Red Sea ports to the north. In these

waters and in the Levant there were many incidents of this character,

insignificant in themselves, but important in the aggregate, since

they kept the enemy worried, and created a wholesome fear of allied

vigilance.

In the last week of January, 1915, the three Turkish columns advancing

on Egypt, the northern marching toward Kantara, the central and main

advance headed for Ismailia, and the southern, whose objective was

Suez, had been located, and were under surveillance of allied

aeroplanes. By January 26 advanced guards of the central and southern

columns were discovered near the canal. The central column was at Moia

Harab, and some thousand men were also discovered at Wadi Um Muksheib.

The southern column was found to be located at Bir Mabeiuk. On this

same date British troops engaged the northern Turkish column a few

miles east of El Kantara, losing in the skirmish five men and one

officer. It was now evident to the British that the Turks were about

to begin the main attack on the canal. Consequently the Auckland and

Canterbury Battalions were dispatched to Ismailia; the Otago and

Wellington Battalions were sent to El Kubri, and the New Zealand

Infantry Brigade was sent up by rail from Cairo.

While this was transpiring on land, H.M.S. _Ocean_, _Swiftsure_,

_Clio_, and _Minerva_ joined the French warship _D'Entrecasteaux_ and

H.M.S. _Hardinge_ and two torpedo boats already stationed in the

canal. For three or four days following there were numerous skirmishes

between enemy outposts and British patrols, the most effective work

being wrought by allied aeroplanes and hydroplanes, which dropped

bombs on the Turks as they swept over them and killed many camels and

men. Lieutenant Patridge of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and a

French pilot lost their machine outside the British lines through the

engine breaking down, and on returning to camp at night were shot and

killed by a British picket.

On February 1, 1915, Djemel Pasha's main force occupied Katayib el

Kheil, some low hills east of the southern end of Lake Timsah. The

Turkish commander had every reason to feel satisfied with the progress

he made in bringing his army across the desert in good condition, and

with only the loss of a few deserters from among the irregulars. As

many Tripolitan, Algerian, and Indian pilgrims had been forced to join

the army by the persuasion of the leaders of the irregular troops, the

Turkish force had increased in numbers.

Djemel Pasha's plan was to attack the canal with the main force, made

up of the Twenty-fifth Division, and all, or part of the Twenty-third

Division, which were to force their way between Serapeum and Tussum,

while his right wing by a feint attack was to hold the British force

at the Ismailia Ferry bridgehead. El Kantara was to be attacked by the

northern column, while at the same time to prevent reenforcements from

arriving, a demonstration was to be made at Ferdan. The southern

column was directed to carry out the same tactics at Kubri, near Suez,

which, as was subsequently shown, they did most ineffectually.

In the morning of February 2, 1915, an Indian reconnoitering force met

the Turks about four miles east of the Ismailia Ferry. In the

desultory action that followed, the British troops tried ineffectually

to draw the Turks within range of their main position, and a violent

sand storm arising in the afternoon, the engagement ended. The Turks

retired and intrenched themselves about 2-1/2 miles southeast of the

Ferry post. On this same afternoon the Twenty-fifth Division of the

Turkish army had arrived at a point within four or five miles of the

canal. Their scouts were already established on the eastern bank,

which is backed by trees, brushwood, and sand hills, affording

excellent cover for infantry. A narrow sandy beach, not more than 9

feet wide extends along the foot of the eastern bank. The Turkish

advance was made after night had set in, the Twenty-fifth Division,

with pontoon companies and engineers of the Fourth and Fifth Army

Corps, being first to reach the canal. They brought with them some

twenty pontoons, and five or six rafts constructed out of kerosene

cans fastened in wooden frames.

The first comers were followed by a part of the Seventy-fifth

Regiment, old fighters from Tripoli and the Balkans; "Holy Warriors"

as the Arabs called them. About 3 a. m. they had gained the openings

along the canal bank, the most northerly of which being within a few

hundred yards of the Tussum bridgehead. The remainder of the

Seventy-fifth Regiment covered them from the left. Toward Serapeum,

some distance south, the Seventy-fourth Regiment was stationed.

The night was dark and thickly clouded, and from the silence on the

western bank of the canal the Turks must have believed it to be

unoccupied. That they were entirely confident of success was shown in

a letter afterward found on a dead Turkish officer and dated February

2. After describing the hard march across the desert, he concluded,

"And to-morrow we shall be across the canal on our way to Cairo!"

The Turks crowded on the narrow strip of beach or in the gaps in the

banks, and suffered heavily from the fire of this mountain battery. A

number of their boats which left the shore were sunk. The Sixty-second

Punjabis left their cover under a withering fire, and pluckily charged

down the bank to repel the Turkish attempts to make a landing. Toward

Tussum, farther south, a field battery belonging to the East

Lancashire Division, supported by New Zealanders of the Canterbury

Battalion, opened a rattling fire, to which the Turks immediately

replied with machine guns and rifles. The small torpedo boat _O-43_

with its crew of thirteen now took part in the fray by dashing up the

canal and landing a few men at a point south of Tussum.

At the first gray light of dawn the action became general, and fresh

forces entered the conflict. The Turks on the eastern bank who had

occupied the day line of the Tussum post now advanced, protected by

artillery, against the bridgehead, while the Serapeum post was

assailed by another body of troops. On the canal and Lake Timsah the

allied warships opened fire, and continued it for some time. From the

slopes of Katayib el Kheil three batteries of Turkish field guns

replied, doing considerable damage to every visible target. But they

had not taken careful observations of the British positions, and the

carefully masked Territorial battery between Tussum and Serapeum was

not discovered. This battery, aided by the New Zealanders, almost

silenced the Turkish fire from the eastern bank, and enabled them to

attend to the reserves of the enemy now seen advancing on the desert

to the east. Four of the Territorial gunners were wounded by the

Turkish batteries. A pontoon which the Turks had pushed across the

canal in the dark was sunk, but until daybreak those who had

engineered this work managed to keep afloat, and continued sniping

with some damage to British artillery horses until they were rounded

up and taken prisoners by some Indian cavalry.