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THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: _A great war Zeppelin on a bomb-dropping expedition is
sailing over an enemy city. High above it are the city's defending
aircraft--a biplane and a monoplane--ready to attack the raider with
their machine guns_]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
NEUVE CHAPELLE . BATTLE
OF YPRES . PRZEMYSL
MAZURIAN LAKES . ITALY
ENTERS WAR . GORIZIA
THE DARDANELLES
VOLUME III
P . F . Collier & Son . New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
PART I.--RUSSIAN AND TURKISH CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER Page
I. Campaign in the Caucasus 9
II. Turkish Advance Against Egypt 15
III. Failure of "Holy War" Propaganda 21
IV. Results of First Six Months of Turkish Campaign 25
V. The Dardanelles--Strategy of the Campaign 27
VI. Fortifications and Strength--First Movements 34
PART II.--JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
VII. Why Japan Joined the Allies 40
VIII. Military and Naval Situation in the Far East 46
IX. Beginning of Hostilities--Attacks On Tsing-Tau Forts 52
X. Capture of Tsing-Tau 60
PART III.--THE WAR IN AFRICA
XI. Campaign in Togoland and the Cameroons 62
XII. German Southwest Africa--Rebellion in Union of South
Africa 68
PART IV.--THE WESTERN FRONT
XIII. Preparations for an Offensive 79
XIV. Battle of Neuve Chapelle Begins 83
XV. Operations Following Neuve Chapelle 92
XVI. Beginning of Second Battle of Ypres 99
XVII. The Struggle Renewed 106
XVIII. Other Actions on the Western Front 115
XIX. Campaign in Artois Region 121
XX. British Forward Movement--Battle of Festubert 128
XXI. Sir John French Attempts a Surprise 134
XXII. Attacks at La Bassee 140
XXIII. Operations Around Hooge 146
XXIV. Franco-German Operations Along the Front 151
XXV. Campaign in Argonne and Around Arras 158
XXVI. Belgo-German Operations 166
PART V.--NAVAL OPERATIONS
XXVII. The War Zone 170
XXVIII. Attack on the Dardanelles 174
XXIX. German Raiders and Submarines 179
XXX. Italian Participation--Operations in Many Waters 186
XXXI. Story of the Emden 193
XXXII. Summary of the First Year of Naval Warfare 206
XXXIII. Fights of the Submarines 209
XXXIV. Sinking of the Lusitania 222
PART VI.--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
XXXV. The Carpathian Campaign--Review of the Situation 235
XXXVI. Battle of the Passes 241
XXXVII. Battle of Koziowa--Operations in the Bukowina 244
XXXVIII. Fall of Przemysl 249
XXXIX. New Russian Offensive--Austro-German Counteroffensive 258
XL. Campaign in Galicia and Bukowina--Battle of the Dunajec 264
XLI. Russian Retreat 276
XLII. Austro-German Reconquest of Western Galicia 281
XLIII. Campaign in Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina 289
XLIV. Russian Change of Front--Retreat to the San 293
XLV. Battle of the San 297
XLVI. Recapture of Przemysl 301
XLVII. Capture of Lemberg 306
PART VII.--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN
XLVIII. Winter Battles of the Mazurian Lakes 313
XLIX. The Russians Out of Germany 317
L. Tightening of the Net--Report of the Booty 319
LI. Battles of Przasnysz--Before Mlawa 324
LII. Fighting Before the Niemen and Bobr--Bombardment of
Ossowetz 329
LIII. Russian Raid on Memel 334
LIV. German Invasion of Courland--Capture of Libau 337
V. Russian Offensive from Kovno--Forest Battles in May
and June 342
LVI. Campaign in Southern Poland--Movement upon Warsaw 345
LVII. Battle of Krasnik--Capture of Przasnysz 348
LVIII. Grand Offensive on the Warsaw Salient 356
LIX. Beginning of the End 361
LX. Warsaw Falls 366
PART VIII.--THE BALKANS
LXI. Diplomacy in the Balkans 369
PART IX.--ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
LXII. Spirit of the Italian People--Crisis of the Government 379
LXIII. The Decision Made--Italian Strategy 382
LXIV. Strength of Italian Army and Navy 388
LXV. First Engagements 392
LXVI. Fighting in the Mountains 402
LXVII. Attacks in Gorizia 408
LXVIII. Fighting in the Alps--Italian Successes 416
LXIX. More Mountain Fighting--Results of First Campaign 419
PART X.--THE DARDANELLES AND TURKEY
LXX. Beginning of Operations 423
LXXI. Preparations for Landing--Composition OF Forces 429
LXXII. Plans of Sir Ian Hamilton--First Landing Made 437
LXXIII. The British in Danger--Bitter Fighting 446
LXXIV. Further Efforts at Landing--Failure to Take Krithia 454
LXXV. Krithia Again Attacked--Heroic Work of "Anzacs" 459
LXXVI. Russo-Turkish Operations 469
PART XI.--THE WAR IN AFRICA
LXXVII. The Cameroons 481
LXXVIII. British Conquest of Southwest Africa 484
LXXIX. Other African Operations 493
PART XII.--WAR IN ARABIA, MESOPOTAMIA, AND EGYPT
LXXX. Mesopotamia and Arabia 497
LXXXI. Syria and Egypt 503
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Zeppelin Attacked by Aeroplanes _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
Belgians Re-forming for a Fresh Attack 78
Prayer in a French Church Used for a Hospital 158
Great Liner Lusitania 222
Grand Duke Nicholas 270
Triumphal Entry of Austrians into Przemysl 302
Prince Leopold of Bavaria in Warsaw 366
Cloud of Poisonous Gas Released by Italian Troops 414
Stores at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli 462
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Strategic Railway System in Eastern Germany Which Made
Quick Concentration Possible (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Gallipoli 29
Kiao-Chau (Tsing-Tau) 43
German Possessions in Africa 65
Western Battle Line, January 1, 1915 81
Neuve Chapelle, Battle at 88
Ypres, Gas Battle of 113
Fighting in Alsace-Hartmannsweilerkopf 119
Artois, Battles in 126
German Submarine War Zone 172
Emden Landing Party, Cruise of 195
Carpathian Passes and Russian Battle Line 237
Przemysl, Detail Maps of the Forts of 248
Galician Campaign from Tarnow to Przemysl 279
Galician Campaign from Przemysl TO Bessarabia 291
Riga, German Advance on 338
Warsaw, German Attempts to Reach, in 1914 358
Warsaw, Advance and Capture of 367
Coasts of Italy and Austria, Showing the Naval Raid in
May, 1915 395
Austria, Italian Attack on 410
Dardanelles, Pictorial Map of, Showing Where the Allies
Landed 439
German Southwest Africa, Conquest of 491
Mesopotamia--The British Operations from the Persian Gulf 499
Suez Canal, Turkish Attack on 506
PART I--RUSSIAN AND TURKISH CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS
Disquieting as was the British offensive in Mesopotamia, the Turkish
General Staff were not to be drawn by it from considerations of larger
strategy. Acting in agreement with the German and Austrian General
Staffs, plans were rapidly pushed for an aggressive offensive in the
Caucasus, that old-time battling ground of the Russians and the Turks.
Germany was being hotly pressed in France by the armies of Belgium,
France, and England, and feared an offensive on the part of the
Russian army.
Across the great isthmus separating the Caspian and Black Seas run the
Caucasus Mountains. Parallel to this range of towering mountains, the
highest in Europe, runs the frontier line of Russia and Turkey and
Russia and Persia, winding in and out among the Trans-Caucasian
Mountains. About two hundred miles from the Russo-Turkish frontier
stands Tiflis, the rich and ancient capital of Georgia, and one of the
prime objectives of any Turkish offensive. One of the few railroads of
this wild country runs from Tiflis through the Russian fortress of
Kars, forty-five miles from the Turkish frontier, to Sarikamish,
thirty miles nearer. On the Turkish side the fortress of Erzerum
stands opposed to Kars, but suffering in comparison by the lack of
railroad communication with the interior of Turkey.
Despite all these discouraging circumstances, however, the Turkish
General Staff, dominated by the indefatigable and ambitious Enver
Pasha, was not to be deterred. A brilliant and daring plan of
campaign, aiming at the annihilation or capture of the entire Russian
Caucasian army, the seizure of Kars and Tiflis, and the control of the
immensely valuable and important Caspian oil fields, was prepared. The
unwelcome task of carrying this plan to completion and success was
intrusted to Hassan Izzet Pasha, under the general guidance of Enver
Pasha and his staff of German advisers.
The heroic efforts of the Turkish troops, their grim but hopeless
battle against equally brave troops, appalling weather conditions, and
insuperable obstacles, their failure and defeat when on the very verge
of complete success, make an intensely interesting story.
Stationed at Erzerum, Turkey had the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps.
In addition, the Thirty-seventh Arab division had been brought up from
Bagdad to strengthen the Eleventh Corps. At Trebizond two divisions of
the First Corps had been brought from Constantinople by sea. These
forces totaled about 140,000 troops. At and about Kars, General
Woronzov, the Russian commander, had between 100,000 and 110,000
troops at his disposal from first to last. But although weaker in
numbers he had the inestimable advantage of operating with a line of
railroad at his back, whereas the Turkish commander had to depend
entirely upon road transit, 500 miles from the nearest railroad.
The conditions absolutely necessary for the success of the Turkish
plan were the holding of the Russian force beyond Sarikamish, and the
accurate timing of the flanking attacks, otherwise the Russian
commander would be able to deal with each force separately and defeat
and perhaps destroy them.
The campaign opened on November 20, 1914. The Russians, advancing
across the frontier from Sarikamish, took Koprikeui, within thirty
miles of Erzerum. There, for some time, they remained while the
Turkish command prepared for their great coup.
About the middle of December, 1914, the Eleventh Corps of the Turkish
army moved out of Erzerum, engaged the Russians at Koprikeui, defeated
them after a short, sharp struggle, and drove them in disorder a dozen
miles to Khorasan. While the Eleventh Corps was thus engaged the
Ninth and Tenth Corps, marching forty miles to the north in terrible
weather, succeeded in crossing the high mountains that guard the
Russian frontier. On Christmas Day they looked down on the town of
Sarikamish and the vital railway that stretched away to the eastward.
At the same time the two divisions of the First Corps, stationed at
Trebizond, making a wider sweep, had, by forced marches through a
blinding blizzard that threatened to make necessary the abandonment of
the artillery, reached the vicinity of Ardahan.
The Tenth Corps had reached and was threatening the railway east of
Sarikamish on the road to Kars. Its defeat was absolutely necessary to
the safety of the Russian army. It was therefore the object of General
Woronzov's first attack. During four days every available man and gun
he could bring up on the railway were thrown against the rapidly
dwindling ranks of the Tenth Corps. The Turks fought bravely, but
weight of numbers and superiority of communications told in the end,
and the Ottoman forces were driven into the mountains to the north.
The defeat and retreat of the Tenth Corps exposed the left flank of
the Ninth, commanded by Iskan Pasha. General Woronzov took full
advantage of the situation. Iskan and his 40,000 troops were soon
fighting a desperate battle against an enveloping movement that
threatened to encompass them.
Of the 40,000 troops of the Ninth Corps, a bare 6,000 struggled out of
the mountains to the vicinity of Sarikamish, where they were rallied
by Iskan Pasha. For six days and nights this heroic band made a
determined attempt to capture the town held by a comparatively weak
Russian garrison. Finally, when, surrounded by overwhelming Russian
forces, it became apparent that no Turkish relief could reach him,
Iskan Pasha and the remnant of his once proud corps surrendered.
Sarikamish was defended against Iskan's 6,000 by a mere handful of
soldiers. Time and time again urged by their German officers, the
Turks hurled themselves against the thin Russian line. It bent but did
not break, as step by step, fighting fiercely all the way, it
retreated before weight of numbers. And when relief did come to the
defenders, and Iskan and his force were compelled to surrender, the
brave little Russian band was completely exhausted.
In their pursuit of the remnants of the Tenth Corps the Russians met
with some of the difficulties that had been the undoing of the Turks.
Furthermore, although the Ninth Corps had been hemmed in so that no
relief could reach it, the Turkish command had by no means lost the
power of effective counteraction. The Eleventh Corps at Khorasan
carried on an energetic campaign against the Russian front, gained a
local and tactically important success, and drove the enemy back as
far as Kara-Urgan, less than twenty miles from Sarikamish. Indeed, so
serious became the threat to the Russian forces that General Woronzov,
much against his wishes, was compelled to call off the pursuit of the
Tenth Corps and strengthen the Sarikamish front with the troops that
had been operating farther to the east.
In the second week of January, 1915, between these forces and the
Eleventh Corps of the Turkish army a fierce battle, lasting several
days, opened. The struggle was of the utmost intensity, at times
developing into a hand-to-hand combat between whole regiments. On
January 14 the Fifty-second Turkish Regiment was put to the bayonet by
the Russians. At Genikoi a regiment of Cossacks charged, during an
engagement with a portion of the Thirty-second Turkish Division, and
killed and wounded more than 300.
It must be remembered in judging the terrible nature of the struggle
that the armies were fighting in difficult country. The battle of
Kara-Urgan, furthermore, was waged in a continual snowstorm. Thousands
of dead and wounded were buried in the rapidly falling snow and no
effort was made to recover them. By the end of this week, January 16,
1915, owing largely to their superior railway communications and the
possibility of reenforcements, the Russians had not only checked the
Turkish offensive, but had decisively defeated the Eleventh Corps.
Pressing their advantage the Russians pursued the beaten Turks toward
Erzerum, but the heavy snows prevented them gaining the full fruits of
their victory.
If the Eleventh Corps had not won a victory it had, however,
accomplished its object in that it had relieved the pressure on the
Tenth and enabled it to make good its escape to the north, where it
proceeded to effect a junction with the First Corps. The experience of
this First Corps had not been a happy one. We left it on Christmas
Day, 1914, overlooking Ardahan. A week later it entered the city and
prepared to carry out its role in the general offensive by advancing
upon the Russian right flank at Kars. It met serious opposition,
however, when it attempted to move out of Ardahan, was itself
compelled to retreat, and finally sought safety beyond the ridges to
the west. There, in the valley of the Choruk, it joined up with the
Tenth Corps. Together they continued their retreat upon Trebizond.
Subsequently they tried a new offensive in the Choruk valley which was
undecisive, however, and at the end of January, 1914, the situation
had developed into a deadlock.
The Turkish troops in their operation in the Caucasus appeared to have
suffered from the difficulty of keeping open their sea communications
with Constantinople. Lacking railways they relied too much upon
supplies arriving at Trebizond. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea was
active, however, and upset the Turkish calculations. In the first week
of January, 1915, at Sinope a Russian cruiser discovered the Turkish
cruiser _Medjidieh_ convoying a transport. After a short engagement
the _Medjidieh_ was put to flight, and the transport sunk.
On January 6, 1915, the Russian Black Sea fleet ran into the _Breslau_
and the _Hamidieh_ and damaged them both in a running fight. A week
later Russian torpedo boats sank several Turkish supply boats near
Sinope.
While this fighting was taking place in the north, farther to the
south toward the Persian frontier the Russians were attempting a
turning movement against the Turkish right flank. At the same time
that the Russian force in the north crossed the Turkish frontier the
Russian column entered Turkey fifty miles farther southeast. On
November 8, 1914, this force entered the Turkish town of Kara Kilissa.
A week later, making its way southwest for a distance of twenty miles,
it engaged, near the village of Dutukht, a Turkish force composed
largely of Arab troops of the Thirteenth Corps. At the outset the
Russians met with a measure of success, but on November 22, 1914, the
Turks, having been reenforced by troops from Bagdad, began a fierce
offensive. After indecisive fighting in the Alashgird valley the
Turks, about the middle of December, 1914, almost caught the Russians
in a bold enveloping movement north of Dutukht. In order to escape the
Russians were compelled to retreat hurriedly and thus ended their
offensive operation in this section.
Still farther to the south, in Persia, the Turks and Russians also
battled. Not only because of political conditions, but because of the
nature of the country, it was easier for Russia and Turkey to attack
each other through Persia than directly across other frontiers, just
as it was easier for Germany and France to reach each other across
Belgium. At the outbreak of war both Turkey and Russia, recognizing
these circumstances, were occupants of Persian territory. Early in
November two Russian columns marched across the northwest corner of
Persia and into Turkey by the Kotur and Khanesur passes, evidently
with the important city of Van, on the lake of that name, as an
objective. At a point near Dilman, and again at Serai, they drove the
Turkish troops back toward Van, but were checked by reenforcements.
Meanwhile the Turks had a more considerable success to the south.
Apparently taking the Russian higher command completely by surprise,
Turkish troops advanced almost unopposed to Tabriz, the most important
of the cities of northern Persia. Alarmed by this, Russia sent a
strong force which, on January 30, 1915, succeeded in recapturing the
city.
Thus, up to the end of January, 1915, nothing decisive had been
accomplished on the Caucasian front by either Turkey or Russia. The
Battle of Sarikamish, resulting in a Turkish loss estimated by the
Russian authorities at 50,000, while decisive enough locally, seems to
have had no appreciable effect upon the situation as a whole. For
reasons resting very largely in the difficulty of finding the troops
necessary, as well as in the conditions of the country and the
weather, the Russians had been unable to follow up their success.
Indeed, the offensive appears to have continued in the hands of the
Turks.
It is probably the case that Russia was unwilling to detach any
considerable number of troops from her Polish and Galician front,
where important events were brewing. Her General Staff rightly
regarded the Caucasian front as of secondary importance--and like
Austria on her Italian frontier, determined to fight a defensive
campaign.
However that may be, conditions after the first few months of
campaigning settled down into a stalemate. Engagements on a relatively
small scale were reported from time to time, but the balance of
advantage remained fairly even. Both countries had fronts where
victories would bring larger returns and more immediate effect upon
the ultimate outcome of the war.
CHAPTER II
TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT
To the Turk no operation of the war appeared more important than did
the campaign against Egypt. That in the early days of the struggle in
1914 he contented himself with what amounted to little more than a
demonstration designed to hold as many British troops in Egypt as
possible was due primarily to considerations of larger strategy.
Undoubtedly, by his incursion into the Sinai Peninsula and his
half-hearted attempt with a hopelessly small force to cross the Suez
Canal, he learned many lessons invaluable in any future and more
ambitious campaign. Considered as a diversion the early advance upon
the Suez was a success: as a serious military operation, resting on
its own legs, it was a fiasco.
No operation the Turks might have conducted could have been so
unwelcome to the British as was that against Egypt. For weeks in
advance it was discussed by English writers and, while they all,
naturally, agreed that it was foredoomed to failure, there was an
undercurrent of apprehension in official circles. It was realized that
many untried problems and theories would be put to a severe test by
such a campaign, if undertaken in a serious way by a large and
well-equipped force. Of a purely Turkish force, commanded and
organized by Turkish officers, there was no fear, but such wonderful
organizers had the Germans proved themselves to be that the
combination of Teuton brains and Turkish fighting qualities and
endurance was regarded as formidable.
It was realized in England also that any measure of success that might
come to an invading force would have two very serious results. It
would not only threaten, and perhaps sever, the shortest route to the
east and so seriously embarrass the trade, military and naval
efficiency of the Allies, but it would have a grave and perhaps
decisive effect upon Mohammedan malcontents in Egypt and India.
The exact truth of the conditions in India and Egypt will possibly
never be known, so rigorous were the operations of the censorship set
up by the British War Office. One thing is certain, however: in both
countries political conditions were serious before the war and they
could not, by any stretch of optimism, be conceived as improving with
the coming of a great struggle aimed at the only remaining independent
Mohammedan power.
For many months previous to August, 1914, the Indian office in London
had been apprehensive of rebellion in India. In Egypt the circumstance
that at the beginning of the war the British authorities announced
that they would make no use of the native Egyptian army speaks for
itself. It was believed in Constantinople and in Berlin that both
Egypt and India were ripe for a terrible revolt against the rule of
the British Raj: the uprisings of millions of fanatical natives that
would forever sweep British control from these two key places to the
trade of the world and would institute a Turkish suzerainty, backed
and controlled by Berlin. This was thought all the more likely as
thousands of the British regular troops had been withdrawn from India
and Egypt for service in France, being replaced by raw levies from
England and the Colonies.
These, then, were the major considerations that prompted the early
offensive against Egypt. It was based upon sound political and
military strategy. Just how near it came to complete success, just how
much additional worry and effort it added to the burden of Great
Britain and France, only a complete revelation of the progress of
events in all fields will tell.
In the attack upon the canal the Turks operated primarily from their
base at Damascus. As preparations progressed the troops that were to
take part in the actual advance were concentrated between Jerusalem
and Akabah. Under command of Djemel Pasha, Turkish Minister of Marine,
there were gathered some 50,000 troops consisting mostly of first line
troops of the best quality, reenforced by about 10,000 more or less
irregular Arab Bedouins.
During November and early December, 1914, the force was moved forward
by slow and methodical stages, until by December 15 it was awaiting
orders to advance, encamped on the confines of the great desert that
separated it from its objective.
Here it is well that the reader should have a good idea of the
difficulties of the task the Turkish higher command had imposed upon
Djemel Pasha and his troops.
The two chief difficulties to be met by the invaders of the Sinai were
lack of transport facilities and lack of water. Three routes were
possible for the Turkish army, all artificial obstacles being for the
moment ignored; two by land, across the Sinai desert, and the third by
sea, across the Mediterranean. The latter, however, must be ruled out
because the seas were controlled by the Anglo-French fleet. For the
same reason, the northern land route had many disadvantages, because
it could be commanded for a part of its length by warships. However,
it is instructive to examine it in detail.
The whole region crossed by the sea road is desert of the most
difficult and forbidding character. By this road all the great
invasions--the Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, and French--have been
made. The road enters the desert at El Arish and from there to El
Kantara on the Suez Canal, the probable point of attack of an army
moving by this route, is 100 miles. Over this whole distance there are
only three places, once an army has left El Arish, where water can be
had. The first is a matter of a day's march, at El Maza, thirty mile
away; the second is at Bir-El-Abd, another day's march; and the third
at Katieh, within striking distance of the canal. Without the
construction of a special railway the transport of a force large
enough to efficiently control the canal by this route seems to be out
of the question.
The southern route, known as the Hadj, or Pilgrim's Road, running from
Akaba to Suez, besides being longer is even worse off in the matter of
water. This was the traditional path of pilgrims traveling from Egypt
to Mecca, and still is much in use for that purpose.
Something like 150 miles separate Akaba and Suez, yet only two
watering places are to be found in the whole distance. The first is
three days' march from the former place, at a point called Nakhl,
where modern cisterns had been built and an adequate supply of water
for a large force probably was obtainable. The next watering place is
another three days' march, at Ayun Mousa, or Well of Moses, within a
short distance of the canal.
But tremendous as were the problems facing a considerable body of men
in attempting to cross the Sinai desert and arrive at the Suez Canal
in condition to fight a strong, fresh and fully prepared foe, they
were not to be compared to the difficulties that would face such an
army when the canal had been reached. We have seen how great an
obstacle a wide river, such as the Vistula, proved to be to an army
when attempting to cross in the face of a prepared enemy. In the case
of the Suez Canal, although there were no strong currents, a force
attempting to cross it had to contend with two added difficulties: The
Suez Canal could not, in the circumstances be turned, as was the
Vistula by the Germans. Furthermore its defensive value was
immeasurably increased by the circumstance that it could and did carry
warships of the largest type which not only had the value of
fortresses mounting the heaviest of guns, but were mobile as well.
And finally, because of the nature of the shores of the canal, it was
possible for an attacking force to cross it at but few points.
The question of crossing the canal or dominating it in any sense was
for the Turks largely a question of bringing to bear a superior force
of artillery--a task that had only to be stated to reveal its
difficulties. No force with smaller or fewer guns would hope to cross
the Suez in the face of the concentration of artillery and naval
gunfire that the British could bring to bear at any threatened point.
The defenders on the western side of the canal had the additional
advantage of railway communication running along the entire canal from
Suez to Port Said, and connecting with interior bases.
There were five points from which, once having conquered the desert
and reached the canal, the invaders could advantageously launch an
attack or attacks upon the canal defenses. The first is just south of
El Kantara, where the old sea road crosses the Suez. Just south of
Ismailia a group of heights on the east bank provides a second
opportunity. The third is found at the point called the Plateau of
Hyena. The fourth is just north of the Bitter Lake, and the fifth is
to the south of the same body of water.
Late in December, 1914, Djemel Pasha began active preparations for an
advance upon the canal. This campaign the Turks later called a
reconnaissance in force and as, of their total strength of 50,000 men,
only 12,000 at the outside and possibly less were used, the limited
term seems justified. Although the southern route was used by the main
force, a small force eluded the watchfulness of the Anglo-French naval
patrol operating along the shore commanding the first day's march of
the northern, or sea road, and ultimately struck at El Kantara.
Furthermore, sometime before one of these two forces--the larger, or
southern--reached the vicinity of the canal, it split and conducted an
independent attack at Suez.
There had been much speculation among military writers all over the
world as to the possibility or probability of the construction by the
Turks of a light railway running a part of the distance across the
Sinai Desert and linking up with the line to Mecca. It was realized
that such a railway would be an enormous help to Djemel Pasha and his
army, especially in the transport of supplies, ammunitions, and
artillery. Indeed, it was held that only by the construction of such a
railway, extending almost to the canal, could the absolutely essential
artillery be brought into action. There was serious doubt of the
ability of the Turks to build such a line. The strength of the German
"stiffening" in the army based upon Damascus was believed to be
slight. Djemel Pasha is said to have seriously opposed any great
number of Teuton officers, especially in the higher commands. Thus the
assistance the Turks could expect from the Germans in the organization
and construction of such a railway would be small. Whether or not the
scheme was feasible at that time it is impossible to say. At any rate
the Turks, for reasons best known to themselves, did not put it to a
test.
The British force in Egypt was well supplied with aeroplanes and kept
the Turkish army under constant observation. With the exception of the
use of the first section of the road, covering a couple of days of
time, there was probably no element of surprise in the Turkish attack
upon the canal. Realizing the limited possibilities of attack from the
east shore, the British, taking their lesson from experience in
France, had constructed an elaborate system of trenches to the east of
the canal at the five points where attacks would possess some
likelihood of successful conclusion.
It was the end of January, 1915, before the Turkish army, marching in
easy stages across the desert reached the vicinity of the canal. Their
German mentors had constructed for them elaborate carriages with the
wheels of enormous width to carry the artillery and the heavy supplies
across the soft sands. Also, in preparation of a crossing of the
canal, the Turks brought a supply of ready-assembled pontoon bridges,
running on wheels and similar to those used by the German army in
Europe, except that they were much lighter.
In the transport of all this material the Turks were dependent upon
camels, suited as are no other animals for work in the desert. In
thousands, they had been collected at Hadj, the cooperation of the
Arab Bedouins being specially valuable in this work. The consideration
of these events in the campaign which begins in February, 1915, will
be found in Volume III of this work.
CHAPTER III
FAILURE OF "HOLY WAR" PROPAGANDA
One of the most interesting of the various phases of the war, so far
as the participation of Turkey was concerned, was the religious
development. Countless pages of learned speculation had been written
for years before the struggle in an attempt to forecast the outcome of
exactly the conditions that had arisen. It must be said at once that
in the first six months of the war reality failed to live up to
prophecy. The cataclysm that was expected by many to involve the
revolt of millions and a vast change in the political color of much of
the earth's surface did not appear. Any change that took place
operated so quietly and on so comparatively small a scale that it was
lost to view beside the greater interest of the struggle on the battle
fields of France and Poland.
It is desirable, however, that the situation be examined. Abbas II,
Khedive of Egypt, had early in the war openly shown his lack of
sympathy with the British in Egypt. By his actions he left no doubt
regarding his attitude. He not only vehemently expressed his adherence
to Constantinople but left Cairo, and journeyed to Turkey, safe from
British official pressure or persuasion. Whereupon the British
Government called upon him to return, threatened him with deposition,
and finally took that extreme step, setting up another in his place on
December 18, 1914.
Furthermore, the day before, Great Britain declared Egypt a British
protectorate independent of Constantinople. In this action Great
Britain relied not upon any legal right to take such action, but
merely upon the right of actual possession. Since Great Britain had
taken over the government of Egypt in 1883, she had acknowledged the
sultan's rights of suzerainty and had countenanced the payment to that
ruler of certain considerable yearly sums from the Egyptian exchequer.
Indeed, Great Britain was in Egypt merely by virtue of an
international understanding and on a definite agreement to release her
control of the country when certain conditions of political and
financial stability had been restored. The other nations had,
willingly, or unwillingly, become resigned to her possession of this
strategically important land. Great Britain a decade before the war,
at the beginning of that rapprochement with France which led up to the
Entente and which had so many fateful consequences for the whole
world, sought to legalize her position in Egypt--at least so far as
the other great north African power was concerned. A bargain was
struck with France by which the English occupation of Egypt for an
indefinite period was recognized in exchange for a free hand in
Morocco. Great Britain could now urge that the coming of war, and
especially the entry of Turkey into the struggle, placed her
administration in Egypt in a position impossible to maintain. In
theory she was, so long as she acknowledged the suzerainty of the
sultan, in the country merely on that ruler's sufferance. She admitted
his ultimate authority and especially the loyalty and duty of the
Egyptian army and khedive to him. Strictly she could make no move to
prevent an armed occupation of the country by the sultan's troops nor
could she call upon the khedive and his cabinet to repudiate
Constantinople's sway. To put an end to this condition of affairs was
the most legitimate reason for England's action.
Although the native Egyptian is in religion allied to the Turk, his
religious fervor was not great enough to induce him to rise against
British control. Among the better educated of the Egyptians and
especially among those who had traveled, there was a strong
"Nationalist" movement. At times, even in the period of peace, this
movement had threatened to make matters extremely unpleasant for the
British rulers. For some years before the war, German and Turkish
agents had been working among these ardent Egyptian patriots,
encouraging and advising them, and when war with Turkey came England
was seriously alarmed. Using the country as a central base for her
Turkish, Persian, and Balkan operations, Great Britain imported
thousands upon thousands of troops into Egypt. Just how many hundreds
of thousands of armed men passed in and out of the country from first
to last only the records of the British war office would show, but it
can be said that England never had a force of less than 90,000 trained
men in Egypt at any one time.
Any chance of effective action that the Egyptian nationalists might
have had was neutralized by the indifference and lack of interest in
the vast body of their countrymen. There were more than 10,000,000
Mohammedans in Egypt, but only a small minority of them, under the
most promising of circumstances, could have been counted upon to pay
the least heed to the call of Constantinople. The Egyptian fellah is
anything but a fighter. Lazy, unlearned, unambitious, he is content to
accept his daily lot, perhaps conscious that the British rule has
brought a certain amount of comparative prosperity even to him.
On the other hand, there were in Egypt something like 600,000 nomads,
a very large proportion of whom could be depended upon to follow the
lead of Constantinople. The males of these wild tribespeople were
remarkable fighters, subject to no control, hating the English sway,
and so independent of roads and transport that they could keep busy an
even larger force of less mobile troops. Their chief weakness was
their lack of cohesion and the impossibility of any concerted action
on their part.
This, then, was the native situation in Egypt. In other parts of the
world, where Great Britain maintained sway over large numbers of
Mohammedans, the situation was equally complicated. With the issue of
a call for a Holy War by the Sheik-ul-Islam, the religious ruler of
the Mohammedan world, many well-informed observers looked for a large
measure of trouble in India. So many were the elements of
dissatisfaction, and even open revolt, in India that it was believed
the Sheik-ul-Islam's call would be the match applied to the powder
magazine.
The attitude of the various Indian potentates was uncertain. Some of
them were known to be only outwardly loyal to the British authority.
The now famous incident at the visit of King George to India, some
years before the war, when one of the richest and most important of
the native princes refused to bend the knee, was indicative of very
widespread dissatisfaction. Innumerable cases of individual and even
concerted violence against British rule immediately preceded the war,
and several of these were openly encouraged by native princes.
So far as definite action was concerned, the opening of the war with
Turkey and the months that immediately followed falsified all these
predictions of disaster to British rule in India. Many of the native
princes were effusive in their professions of loyalty to the British
Empire, and several offered personal service at the front or financial
contributions to the huge cost of the struggle.
Notable, and perhaps decisive, was the open adherence to Britain of
the Agar Khan, the immensely powerful ruler of millions of Indian
Mohammedans. The Agar Khan had spent many of the years previous to the
war in England in daily association with English high society and
official circles. At the outbreak of the war with Turkey, in October,
1914, at the request of the British Government, he visited Egypt, and
it was largely upon his advice that the former khedive was deposed and
the new one elevated to the post. Indeed, at one time there were
strong rumors, afterward energetically denied by the British
Government, that the Agar Khan had advised a Mohammedan repudiation of
the authority of the caliph and the elevation of another to his place
under a British guarantee. In support of this plan it was pointed out
that Great Britain, judged by the number of adherents under her rule,
was the world's greatest Mohammedan power. It was intolerable to many
English people, especially to those of strong imperialistic
tendencies, that the real control, even in theory, of so large and
important a section of the people of the British Empire should be in
Constantinople, safe from the "influence" and "persuasion" of the
British Government. By these people it was held that the sultan's
lineal claim was weak, and that an even better claim to the headship
of the Moslems could be established for any one of several other men
who might have been named. However, the plan was never achieved.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF TURKISH CAMPAIGN
What was the situation as a whole, so far as Turkey and her military
actions against the Allies were concerned, as to the outcome of these
various operations in three fields--the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, and
Egypt--during the first six months of the war? The military narrative
is recorded in the chapter following. It will be seen that all of them
were inconclusive. Indeed, from what we knew of the circumstances
surrounding them, all we are justified in saying is that none of them
was serious in the sense that they were not intended to have any
decisive effect, directly, upon the progress of the war. Of them all
it might be urged by a military authority that they were subsidiary
operations, dangerous and wasteful in that they withdrew valuable men,
munitions, brains, and energy from the decisive fronts. Their only
justification is that they imposed similar action on the part of both
armies, and so, in just that degree, scattered their forces. For the
Turk it can be urged that at least two of the campaigns were forced
upon him by his German mentors, while the third was imposed upon him
by a British offensive. Furthermore, the Turk was entirely cut off
from his Austro-German allies, and there was no possibility of his
bringing his weight to bear in one of the main fields. From that point
of view it is possible to justify the Turkish offensives as sound
strategy.
Aside from a desire to protect the oil supply in Persia, it is hardly
as easy to justify the British offensive in Mesopotamia. As events
subsequently demonstrated, it was possible for the Turks to throw an
overwhelming number of troops into Bagdad and to the south, and,
furthermore, they were fighting under vastly more advantageous
conditions than were the invaders. Only on the assumption that the
Turks were hopelessly demoralized and disorganized, and that as
fighting men they would belie all their past history, was it possible
to visualize success for the British operations in Mesopotamia.
Turkey had definitely come to grips with England and with Russia. She
had in none of these fields measured swords with France, although she
was equally at war with that country. The exact apportionment of the
actual work to be done by the individual powers of the Entente seems
to have led to considerable disagreement, and resulted at times in
serious delay. Such arrangements depend, of course, upon each
country's idea of its spheres of influence. Obviously, no country, if
it can help it, is going to waste its men or its efforts in a field in
which it has only a minor political or commercial interest. So far as
France was concerned, the Caucasus, Egypt--aside from the possibility
of the closing of the canal--and Mesopotamia were not of enough
importance to justify her in participating in the struggle with the
Turks even were it physically possible. All these remarks, of course,
are subject to modifications imposed by considerations of the larger
strategy of the Entente Powers; but for many months of the war the
agreement of the Entente Powers in the matter of general strategy was
conspicuous by its absence.
With her neighbors in the Balkans Turkey had maintained remarkably
good relations considering the bitterness engendered, not only by
centuries of strife, but by the recent events of the two Balkan wars.
Bulgaria, smarting under the loss of territory through the attack upon
her by Serbia, Greece, and Rumania in the Second Balkan War, was
openly conducting friendly negotiations with Turkey for the
acquisition of valuable territory--a compact that could mean only one
thing. Greece, frightened by the menace of the German power, had
resisted up to the moment all the blandishments of the Entente Powers,
who urged her to active participation in the struggle. Rumania,
largely isolated from the Entente Powers, menaced on the north by
Austro-German forces, on the south by a revengeful Bulgaria, borrowed
heavily from Britain, the universal money bag, but straddled the
fence.
Thus Turkey, which in different circumstances might have been in a
precarious military situation, felt reasonably secure, despite her
isolation. In the early part of the war, however, events moved rapidly
and not exactly to her liking. For they threatened to sweep the whole
Balkans into the whirl of war, and no man could tell exactly how the
various petty states, under the stress of sympathy, military and naval
considerations and dynastic control, would align themselves. With
these events came, too, the first participation of France in the war
against Turkey in the campaign in the Dardanelles, now to be
described.
CHAPTER V
THE DARDANELLES--STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN
The beginning of the bombardments in the Dardanelles opens a
remarkable chapter in military and naval warfare. The desperate
campaign to batter down the fortifications which lead to
Constantinople and the disastrous attempt to conquer the most strongly
barricaded city in the world, probably excited more world-wide
interest or put to the test more theories of warfare than did the
Dardanelles campaign undertaken by Great Britain with the assistance
of France. It was fiercely attacked by military critics almost from
the start. It was, however, a boldly conceived operation, calculated
to have a most important effect upon the war as a whole--certainly
upon the war in the southeast corner of Europe.
The Dardanelles campaign was largely conceived and controlled by the
Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, the remarkable and able British
Secretary of the Admiralty. He has been widely condemned for his share
of the operation, but revelations that have been made would appear to
clear him of a great measure of the blame.
What were the considerations that weighed with the British admiralty
in deciding to undertake one of the most difficult operations in the
whole world? Primarily it seems to have had the idea of relieving the
pressure on Russia. The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus had come to
grief about the end of December but a resumption was momentarily
expected and feared. Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg in East
Prussia had been a terrible blow to Russia and she had no troops to
spare for defense in the Caucasus.
Furthermore, Constantinople, besides being one of the objectives of
the war, was Russia's only warm sea gate into Europe. It must have
been apparent to the Russian military authorities that the existing
supplies of munition and guns of the czar's army would not suffice to
withstand a hard German-Austrian drive. In other words the condition
that resulted in the defeat of the Russian army in Galicia and Poland
in the summer of 1915 were foreseen. Russia called upon England and
France to force the Dardanelles. One can find it easy to condemn the
operation but few can be found who will deny that it was a glorious
failure. One that added luster to the glory of the British army, navy,
and many unmatched pages to the story of their bravery. And no less
credit and glory did it bring to the Turkish armies.
In addition to the question of war supplies there were other reasons
for opening the Dardanelles as soon as possible. Russia's ability to
finance a war of the magnitude of the one there being fought,
especially where large foreign purchases were made, depended very
largely upon the maintenance of foreign commerce. Russia was buying
from all the neutral world as well as from her Entente partners.
England, for instance, was not only making for her millions of
dollars' worth of war supplies, but she was, for the moment, financing
many of Russia's purchases abroad.
[Illustration: Gallipoli.]
In return for all this it was important that Russia should export as
freely as possible. Now one of her most valuable commodities and one
in high demand not only in England, but in other countries, was wheat.
Millions upon millions of bushels of Russian wheat were stored in her
great Black Sea ports waiting to be shipped through Constantinople
when the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were commanded by Entente guns
and ships. Greece, under the leadership of Premier Venizelos was
hesitating on the brink of a plunge into the struggle as an ally of
the Entente and not only agreed to the use of Greek islands but
actually considered a proposal to send a Greek force of not less than
20,000 and possibly as many as 40,000 over to the Dardanelles.
Bulgaria was in that state where a striking victory in the Turkish
peninsula would have swept her off her feet. Italy was at loggerheads
with Austria, her ally, and about to break.
Then from the English point of view there was the possible effect upon
the Mohammedan throughout the British Empire. Possibly not for many
years, if ever, will the world know the truth of the conditions in
India during the war. One thing is certain. In one way and another
there was much disaffection, much open rebellion and much fear of an
even wider spread of revolt. The need for the maintenance and even
strengthening of British prestige must have been constantly before the
British ruler and no other campaign could possibly serve this end so
efficaciously as a successful assault upon Constantinople and the
temporal power of the sultan. It would clinch probably for generations
to come Britain's claim to be the great Mohammedan power of the world
and would destroy the one condition that for years before and at that
time especially had contained the seeds of rebellion against the
British yoke.
In beginning the campaign which Great Britain and France carried on in
the Dardanelles there reappeared a very old problem of war--the
question of Warships versus Forts or land fortifications. It appears
to have been the consensus of opinion among all except the more
extreme exponents of battleships that land fortifications would
possess an undoubted advantage in a contest against purely naval
forces.
This it seems had been the opinion of the American naval authorities
in the Spanish-American War, when the American commander, Admiral
Sampson, was expressly warned not to risk his ships against the shore
defenses of Santiago Harbor. It also appears to have been the opinion
of many British admirals who have placed their views on record.
Indeed, there was in existence the views of several competent naval
authorities as to the possibilities of a purely naval attack upon this
very system of defenses.
It was not by any means the first time that an attempt had been made
to force the Dardanelles. Many such attempts had proved this narrow
neck of water running between high banks to be one of the great
natural defensive spots of the world. The realization of that obvious
and oft-proved fact had made Constantinople through the ages one of
the most fought for and schemed for cities of the whole world.
It is necessary to study these attempts in order to understand clearly
the difficulties which faced the British and French Allies in 1914. Of
the previous attacks that had been made to force a way through the
Dardanelles and so up to the city of Constantinople, that of the
famous Admiral Hornby in 1877 was one of the most interesting as well
as one of the most instructive. Ordered by the British Government to
take his fleet past the forts that lined the approaching banks, he
proceeded to carry out his orders, but wrote a warning in which he
pointed out that, while it might be possible for his fleet to make its
way into the Sea of Marmora, once there it would be helpless if the
land defenses were controlled by the enemy. Out of coal, ammunition,
and food, the ships would be at the mercy of the Turks. "Although the
forts might not prevent a strong fleet passing through the
Dardanelles, they certainly," wrote Admiral Hornby, "could sink armed
and unarmed transports and supply ships." In view of these
considerations, Hornby urged the British Government to provide a land
force of sufficient strength to carry and hold the land defenses. His
superiors, however, did not agree with him, for they told him to go
ahead with a purely naval operation. His ideas were never put to a
real test because the Turks offered no resistance to his passage of
the straits.
The situation in the Great War of 1914 presented Constantinople as the
same perplexing military problem. If we go back another three-quarters
of a century to 1807, the experience of Admiral Duckworth throws some
light on the subject, although conditions had changed radically.
Duckworth, with his sailing ships, ran past the forts in the
Dardanelles and anchored in front of Constantinople. It was hoped that
a threat of bombardment would bring the Turks to their knees, but the
latter refused to be intimidated. In the end, the British admiral ran
out of food and water and was compelled to leave without
accomplishing anything.
The student of the War of 1914 also must consider that during the war
between Italy and Turkey, the Italian General Staff is known to have
worked out an elaborate plan for an attack upon the Dardanelles.
However, at the critical moment, the European powers interfered and
forced upon Italy an agreement that the war should not be extended to
the mainland of Europe. In the Balkan War, the Bulgarians threatened
the lines of Bulair, the narrow neck which connects the Gallipoli
peninsula to the mainland, but never launched the attack.
When in 1914 the British and French determined to press a purely naval
attack upon the Dardanelles, they appear to have been influenced by
two major considerations. At the time there was not ready a sufficient
number of troops to make a land campaign successful and, at the last
moment, King Constantine of Greece repudiated a personal agreement
made by Venizelos, the Greek Premier, with the Allies by which Greece
was to provide at least 20,000 troops to assist the France-British
fleet. Even after the fall of Venizelos it was still determined to
push the naval attack because of the second consideration. In the
opinion of the British admiralty the full power of modern naval guns
of 11-and 12-inch had never been tested and in their opinion they
would suffice to reduce the Dardanelles defenses in a comparatively
short time. Furthermore, the British authorities appear to have relied
largely upon the new 15-inch guns of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and her
sister vessels, then nearing completion in British yards. So
tremendous was the power of these new guns and so great their range
that it was believed the _Queen Elizabeth_ and her sister ships could
stand miles out of range of the heaviest of the Dardanelles guns and
quickly smash them to an unrecognizable mass of ruins.
It was evident that the British naval command held these views even in
spite of the experience of British warships off the coast of Belgium
earlier in the war. For a while in 1914 British monitors and
battleships bombarded almost at will the German troops posted along
the coast running from the Dutch frontier line almost to Nieuport.
Finally, however, the Germans brought up heavy army and naval guns
and, mounting them in concealed spots among the sand dunes, soon drove
off the British naval force.
But Turkish guns were not German guns, Turkish gunners were not German
gunners, and above all, the munition supply of the Turkish army was
not fed by factories able to turn out a quarter of a million shells a
day. Some such considerations as these appear to have convinced the
British higher command that there was a difference in the two tasks.
The command of the Dardanelles forts at the entrance to Constantinople
and the Black Sea is similar, except that it is perhaps more sure as
to the command of the entrance to the Baltic by Copenhagen, the
Mediterranean by Gibraltar, and, in a lesser degree, of the North Sea
by Dover.
The narrow passage of water called the Dardanelles separates the
peninsula of Gallipoli and the Asiatic shore of Turkey. It connects
the AEgean Sea and the Sea of Marmora, which in turn, through the
Bosphorus, connects with the Black Sea. Curiously enough this
tremendously important waterway, the only warm sea outlet of Russia,
had been closed against that country by the action of the very powers
now fighting desperately to smash it open. The Black Sea was a Turkish
lake in the seventeenth century but in the century following the
growth of Russia in that part of Europe made the question of the
control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles one of supreme importance
to her. Thus we find, in the so-called "will" of Peter the Great,
among other injunctions he lays upon his successors, an admonition
never to rest until Constantinople had been wrested from the Turk. But
whether this "will" is authentic or not, Russian policy has steadily
kept that object in view.
The Crimean War was an attempt by France and England to stem the
almost resistless tide of Russian expanse toward the southwest.
Russian control of Constantinople was regarded as the chief danger
that threatened the western powers and, in 1856, by the Treaty of
Paris, not only was the strength of the Russian Black Sea fleet
expressly limited, but the Dardanelles were closed against the
passage of Russia's warships into the Mediterranean. France and
England revived what they called "an ancient rule of the Ottoman
Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for
ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles
and of the Bosphorus."
Turkey was of no mind to leave the enforcement of this "ancient rule"
to the powers. She began the construction of more elaborate
fortifications commanding both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
German advice, especially after the Franco-Prussian War, was asked and
obtained and Krupp sent some of his gigantic pieces for the defense of
the narrow waters. This German cooperation with the Turks in the
strengthening of those positions through all the years that have
intervened is significant.
CHAPTER VI
FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH--FIRST MOVEMENTS
Let us inspect the fortifications in the Dardanelles at the beginning
of the war in 1914. The Dardanelles, from end to end, have a length of
forty-seven miles. From the town of Gallipoli to the AEgean, however,
the full distance of the narrow section of the waterway, is a matter
of thirty-three miles. At one point the passage is less than 1,400
yards wide and at no point is it more than 7,000. Although there is a
good depth in much of the channel, shallows are to be met with in most
unexpected places. To make navigation even more difficult, there is a
swift and powerful surface current running through the Narrows, on
some occasions at a speed of eight knots an hour. In addition there is
not only a strong undercurrent, but, as well, many cross currents. At
certain seasons of the year the wind and weather make navigation of
large vessels almost impossible.
Both sides of the Dardanelles offered natural positions of enormous
advantage to a defending force. On the Gallipoli side were a tangled
mass of rocks and hills, almost devoid of vegetation except for stubby
yellow bushes. In a few of the little valleys, stray clusters of olive
trees relieved the monotony of the view. Heights rose upon heights and
along the shores of the peninsula nearly perpendicular cliffs made
landings almost out of the question.
This whole peninsula was a difficult country to traverse even in times
of peace. No large maps existed of its intricate paths, there were few
roads, and those that did exist were so commanded by heights and
concealed positions for guns and infantry that the progress of an
attacking force would inevitably be most difficult and costly.
Water was almost nonexistent. Most of the available supply was so
protected that an attacking force would in no case be able to use it
until its task of conquest was complete. As such a force advanced
inland, these difficulties as well as those of the country would
constantly and rapidly increase. From Cape Hellas, at the tip of the
peninsula where a sandy beach made a landing possible, if difficult,
the ground rapidly rose to a height of 140 feet. Hill country then led
to ridges standing 600 feet, while a mile and a half beyond stood 600
feet in the air the commanding peak of Achi Baba, destined to play so
large and so tragic a part in the struggle for the peninsula of
Gallipoli. At the narrowest part of the Narrows, the real key position
to the straits, stood the Kilid Bahr plateau, 700 feet, while to the
northwest, almost 300 feet higher, stood the precipitous eminence of
Sari Bair, a dense mass of trackless ravines and thickets.
Where the peninsula of Gallipoli joined the mainland is, comparatively
speaking, a narrow neck of land. Even this, however, presented
tremendous potential difficulties to any force. A hill almost 500 feet
in height rose in the center and marshes on either side prevented a
turning movement. Furthermore, the difficulties of landing a force in
the face of an enemy strongly intrenched on the heights were not
lessened by the circumstance that the cliffs rose to a height of 300
feet, almost straight from the water's edge. In short nature seems to
have designed the country in every way as a protection against an
armed force seeking to force its way either in or out of the Black
Sea. To just what extent these natural advantages had been utilized by
the Turks it is impossible to say. It is not likely, however, that
they, or their German mentors, had been idle, in view of the
importance the Allies were known to attach to the straits.
In September, 1914, and probably for some time before, the Turks were
known to be busy strengthening the forts. Subsequent events led to the
conclusion that they, or their German advisers, were alive to the
lessons of the early days of the war in France and Belgium and had
made elaborate arrangements for the placing of heavy guns in concealed
positions. In addition they perfected the mobility of even the
heaviest of pieces, so that it became impossible for observation from
the Franco-British ships or from aeroplanes to locate them with any
certitude.
The Turks also seem to have secured a plentiful supply of sea mines,
with which the waters approaching the Dardanelles and the actual
passage of the straits were strewn along the shores. Toward the
Narrows were constructed shore batteries for the launching of
torpedoes, as well as for the launching of floating mines. The strong
current of the straits could be depended upon to carry these latter
engines of destruction among the allied ships of war should they
venture within the narrow, confined waters of the Dardanelles.
This was the condition of affairs, then, on November 3, 1914, when a
joint Anglo-French squadron sailed in close to the tip of the
Gallipoli peninsula and opened a bombardment of the outer defenses of
the Dardanelles. For this and subsequent naval operations against the
Turkish position, England was able to detach from her main theatre of
naval activity--the North Sea--a considerable number of old, but still
extremely powerful, battleships and battle cruisers. These boats, with
the exception of the _Queen Elizabeth_, which later appeared on the
scene, were all built previous to the introduction of the dreadnought
and were to a considerable extent made obsolete by that vessel. At any
rate they could not engage the more modern ships of the German navy
and could not be attached to the grand fleet of England because of
their lack of high speed and the heaviest of guns. For these reasons,
although their loss in any engagement against the Turkish defenses
would not be relished by the British authorities, still such a
disaster would not be decisive in any war. As Winston Churchill
subsequently pointed out, many of them would have, in the ordinary
course of events, but a few more years of life in the British navy, so
rapidly were modern battleships deteriorating under the rapid advance
of naval science.
At the entrance to the straits the Turks had erected two major
positions and several minor ones. On the Asiatic shore stood the Kum
Kale Fort, known as the "New Castle of Asia." There the main battery
consisted of four 10.2-inch guns. A short distance down the coast
stood Yeni Shehr, where a main battery of two 9.2-inch guns and a
short battery of smaller pieces had been erected. On the European
side, opposite Kum Kale, stood Sedd-el-Bahr, with six 10-inch and two
5.9-inch guns. At Cape Hellas, the extreme point of the Gallipoli
Peninsula, was the Erteghrul Battery, mounting two 9.2-inch guns and
some minor pieces.
Each of the attacking warships fired about a score of shells at these
forts and an attempt was made to determine just how much damage had
been done. None of the forts were silenced, however, and it was
finally decided by the commander of the Anglo-French naval force, Vice
Admiral Carden, that conditions were not propitious for pushing home
the attack and the vessels retired out to sea, where they maintained a
tight blockade of the Dardanelles. Then there followed a long period
of naval inactivity, at least so far as the larger vessels were
concerned.
About a month later, however, on December 13, 1914, the commander of a
British submarine accomplished a feat in the Sea of Marmora that not
only aroused his countrymen to enthusiasm but as well won for him the
coveted Victoria Cross, the first instance of the winning of that
decoration by a naval officer since the beginning of the war.
Lieutenant Holbrook was in command of the _B-11_, a 316-ton submarine
launched as far back as 1906. It was in no sense to be compared to the
giant underwater crafts that were being launched and used at the
outbreak of the war, some of them measuring 800 feet. The _B-11_
carried only sixteen men in all--two officers and fourteen men.
Early in the morning of December 13, 1914, she started through the
straits. Evidently her commander had knowledge of the disposition of
the Turkish mine field, for Lieutenant Holbrook successfully navigated
his ship through it, dived under five rows of mines, any one of which
would have blown his frail craft into a thousand pieces, and came up
under the side of the Turkish battleship _Messudiyeh_. The
_Messudiyeh_, in any other navy, would have been retired long before,
but Turkey had none too many ships and probably had been saving her to
fight against the equally ancient vessels of some other minor power.
Launched as far back as 1874, she had been reconstructed and rearmed
in 1901. She was lying in the Sea of Marmora, guarding the very mine
field under which Holbrook had dived his craft.
Holbrook observed the _Messudiyeh_ through the periscope of the
_B-11_, maneuvered for position, dived, came up again and launched his
torpedo. It struck home and the ancient sides of the _Messudiyeh_
gaped wide. Slowly she sank while Holbrook dived to safety. For nine
and a half hours the latter felt his way out of the straits and when
he returned to the fleet his little vessel and its daring crew
received an enthusiastic demonstration from the soldiers of the larger
warships. Besides the Victoria Cross, received by Holbrook himself,
his second in command, Lieutenant Sydney T. Winn, received the
Distinguished Service Order, and each of the fourteen members of the
crew received the Distinguished Service Medal.
On the next day, December 14, 1914, the British submarine _B-9_
attempted to repeat the feat, but the Turks were prepared. When she
came to the surface mines were exploded all around her, and she had
all she could do to make good her escape.
On January 15, 1915, not content that the British should have all the
danger, or the glory, the French submarine, _Saphir_, entered the
straits. Near Nagara Point she struck the bottom in one of those
shallow spots that abound in the Dardanelles, was compelled to come
to the surface in a disabled condition and was quickly shot to pieces
by the Turkish shore batteries.
The movement against the forts in the Dardanelles was now begun. This
campaign, which was begun with so much confidence of ultimate success,
was destined to become one of the greatest repulses that the Allies
had encountered thus far during the war.
PART II--JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
CHAPTER VII
WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES
The battle lines of the Great War on land and sea were now beginning
to encircle the earth. While the gigantic armies on the battle grounds
of Europe were engaged in the greatest test of "the survival of the
fittest" that the world had ever witnessed, while the sharp encounters
on the seas were carrying the war around the globe, the outbreaks in
the Far East were bringing the Orient and the Occident--the two
competitive systems of civilization--into a strange alignment. The
Moslem world was dividing against itself as had the Christian world.
The followers of Buddha and the Brahmins were in direct conflict.
It is important, therefore, to consider in this chapter the
development of events in the Far East, which have been only outlined
in the preceding narratives. Of all the powers that joined the
coalition against Germany in August, 1914, none could state a clearer
cause of action than Japan. From the first outbreak of hostilities
there was never any question of whether the "England of the East"
would enter the war, and on which side she would be aligned. Japan
decided promptly and, having decided, acted with characteristic
energy.
For a _casus belli_ the Japanese statesmen had only to hold up to the
eyes of the world the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been signed
on August 12, 1905. The object of this agreement was the maintenance
of the general peace in eastern Asia and India, the preservation of
the common interests of all powers in China, by insuring the
independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in
China, the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high
contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and
the defense of their special interests in the said regions. If these
rights and interests were jeopardized, Japan and Great Britain agreed
to discuss fully and frankly what measures should be pursued for
defense, and to act in common in case of unprovoked attack or
aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other power or
powers.
Thus, in those critical days of August, 1914, one of the first acts of
the British Government, when war was declared on Germany, and the
empire was reaching out for every possible means of defense and
aggression, was to ask Japan for assistance under the terms of this
alliance. And Japan did not hesitate--she threw herself vigorously
into the Great War. The Japanese Emperor in his declaration of war
against Germany did not suggest that Japan acted in response to her
ally's direct request for assistance, but the Japanese Foreign
Minister, Baron Kato, in his speech explaining the situation to the
Diet, laid emphasis upon the treaty as the most important factor in
the situation.
"German warships and armed vessels," said the foreign minister, "are
prowling around the seas of eastern Asia, menacing our commerce and
that of our ally, while Kiao-chau was carrying out operations
apparently for the purpose of constituting a base for warlike
operations in eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus felt for the
maintenance of peace in the Far East.
"As all are aware," he continued, "the agreement and alliance between
Japan and Great Britain has for its object the consolidation and
maintenance of general peace in eastern Asia, and the maintenance of
the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of
equal opportunities for commerce and industry for all nations in that
country, and the maintenance and defense respectively of territorial
rights and special interests of contracting parties in eastern Asia.
Therefore, inasmuch as we are asked by our ally for assistance at a
time when commerce in eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain
regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to a
constant menace, Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding
principle of her foreign policy, could not but comply to the respect
to do her part."
The Japanese statesman offered this explanation to his people:
"Germany's possession of a base for powerful activities in one corner
of the Far East was not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of
a permanent peace, but also threatened the immediate interests of the
Japanese Empire. The Japanese Government, therefore, resolved to
comply with the British request, and, if necessary, to open
hostilities against Germany."
Baron Kato's speech was delivered after Japan had declared war. The
Western world, when it found time to turn its attention from the
absorbing drama already being enacted in Belgium to the minor crisis
in the Far East, was not left long in doubt regarding the intentions
of Great Britain's ally. War was declared on August 24, 1914, nine
days after Japan had dispatched to Germany an ultimatum, which Germany
scornfully ignored.
The text of the ultimatum was as follows: "We consider it highly
important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to
remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to
safeguard general interests as contemplated in the agreement of
alliance between Japan and Great Britain.
"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aim of the agreement, the Japanese
Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the
German Government to carry out the following two propositions:
"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the
German warships and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm those
which cannot be withdrawn.
"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Japanese
authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased
territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the
same to China.
"The Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event
of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the
German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above
advice offered by the Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled
to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation."
[Illustration: Kiao-Chau (Tsing-Tau).]
The intervention of Japan in the war, welcome as it was to Great
Britain, created special problems for that empire. The British in
China, and the people of Australia, New Zealand, and western North
America had long been uneasy regarding the commercial and political
policy of Japan. On the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada
a strong anti-Japanese sentiment had developed. British statesmen were
apprehensive lest the entry of Japan into the war might be used to
alienate American sympathy from the Allies and diminish the zeal of
the Canadian and Australasian colonies for the war.
To meet this situation, the British Government issued a formal
statement which said: "It is understood that the action of Japan shall
not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Sea, except in so far
as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the
Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to
any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the
continent of eastern Asia." This declaration went far toward allaying
uneasiness, especially in the United States.
The Japanese people accepted the situation calmly. There were few
noisy demonstrations. Germans living in Japan were not molested,
notwithstanding the action of Germany, which immediately after the
ultimatum was issued arrested every Japanese subject in Germany and
seized funds of the Japanese Government deposited in the Deutsche Bank
of Berlin. In Tokyo the chief of police told the people that although
the two Governments had entered into hostilities, the people
individually were not to cultivate hostility. The German Ambassador
remained at the Japanese capital until August 30, 1914. A number of
Germans who decided to stay in Japan were allowed to continue their
regular occupations.
When no answer came from Germany up to the time of the expiration of
Japan's ultimatum, the imperial rescript declaring the existence of a
state of war was issued next day.
The emperor said: "We hereby declare war against Germany and we
command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that empire
with all their strength, and we also command all our competent
authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective
duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of
nations.
"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous
effect of which we view with grave concern, we, on our part, have
entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the
maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at
length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against
that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in
China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels,
cruising the seas of eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce and
that of our ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.
"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after
a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such
measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general
interests contemplated in the agreement of alliance, and we on our
part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means,
commanded our Government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the
Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose,
however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their
advice.
"It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion
to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially
at this early period of our reign, and while we are still in mourning
for our lamented mother.
"It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful
subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the empire
enhanced."
CHAPTER VIII
MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST
We now pass to the first fighting ground in the Far East. Unlike the
campaigns in the west, the war in eastern Asia developed along lines
which any observer, possessing the least knowledge of history and
international politics and military strategy, could foresee. From both
military and commercial standpoints none of Germany's possessions in
the Far East could compare in importance with the little tip of the
Shantung Peninsula leased for a term of ninety-nine years from China
in 1898. This concession, about fifteen miles long and ten miles
across, was designated Kiao-chau. In the sixteen years since their
tenure began, the Germans had laid out at Tsing-tau, situated at the
extreme southern end of the peninsula, a city which was rapidly
growing to foremost importance among the ports of the Chinese coast. A
large part of the native population was induced to migrate, hills were
leveled, roads constructed, trees planted, and waterworks and sewers
laid out along the most up-to-date lines.
The Great War found Tsing-tau a modern city, almost European in
appearance, with a magnificent harbor, where natural advantages had
been enhanced by the construction of immense piers and breakwaters.
One line of railway connected the port with Chi-nan, capital of
Shantung Province, and Germany held concessions for the construction
of two new lines. The census of 1913 showed a total population of
58,000, of which Germans, exclusive of the garrison, numbered 2,500.
Non-German Europeans, Americans, and Japanese numbered but 630. The
European quarter was distinctly Teutonic.
The attack on Tsing-tau was a foregone conclusion. As a naval base and
a seat of menace to the commerce of hostile nations, Tsing-tau
occupied an unexcelled situation, almost equidistant from Nagasaki and
Shanghai, in virtually the same latitude as Tokyo, San Francisco, and
Gibraltar. Its defenses were second in strength only to those of Port
Arthur and Hongkong.
Kiao-chau was under the administration of the German admiralty. The
German fleet seized it in 1897 ostensibly to secure reparation for the
murder of two German missionaries in Shantung. The ninety-nine-year
lease subsequently arranged gave Germany the right to fortify the new
concession, and the thoroughness with which this privilege was
exercised was proved by the stout resistance the garrison was able to
make against far superior forces of besiegers. The whole concession
occupied 117 square miles.
Although Kiao-chau was the kaiser's only continental colony in Asia
the outbreak of the war found Germany in possession of several islands
and groups of islands in the Pacific. These included German New
Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline, Pelew Marrana, Solomon
and Marshall Islands and a portion of the Samoan group. But the
strongly fortified port on the Shantung Peninsula was the naval base
for the protection of all these ocean possessions; and the Japanese
statesmen rightly concluded that with Tsing-tau in their grasp the
reduction of the other German colonies would be only a formal task of
seizure. Therefore the 27th of August, 1914, four days after the
declaration of war, saw a Japanese fleet blockading Tsing-tau and
Japanese transports carrying troops for landing expeditions in
cooperation with the warships.
Germany began the concentration of all available forces inside the
Tsing-tau fortifications on August 8, 1914. But she was able to gather
there when the siege began only 5,000 men, a handful compared with the
great force Japan could muster for the reduction of the fortress. The
garrison of peace times was augmented by reservists, who came from
treaty ports along the Chinese coast, from Japan, Siberia, and from
every part of the Far East near enough to enable German veterans to
reach the city before communication was cut off.
The crew of the Austrian cruiser _Kaiserin Elizabeth_, more than 300
men, who had left Tsing-tau by railroad before Austria decided to join
her ally in the Far East as well as in Europe, hurried back in small
groups and in civilian clothes to escape detection. Squads of the
Landsturm, the last reserve, middle-aged men who had left their
families and their business in all parts of China joined the ranks and
went to drilling in preparation for the hard fighting expected as soon
as the invading fleet passed the outer defenses of the harbor.
Altogether the defenders mustered three artillery and infantry
regiments and four troops of cavalry. They had three aeroplanes and a
few machine guns and in the harbor were four small gunboats in
addition to the _Kaiserin Elizabeth_.
Tsing-tau's principal points of defense were Mount Moltke, Mount
Bismarck and Mount Iltis. The rugged slopes of these positions
commanded the plain. Beyond the plain the important outer line of
defense was along the Litsum River, which flows into Kiao-chau Bay and
then through the mountains to the sea, a line about eight miles long
and about ten miles distant from the city. Preparations to oppose a
landing of hostile troops were made at points along the coast of the
leased territory for a distance of twenty miles. At the entrance of
the bay shore batteries and mines made a bombardment by the Japanese
fleet impracticable, except with the support of land forces.
The first line of defense comprised five forts connected by trenches
and barbed wire entanglements. The shore defenses consisted of five
forts, called respectively: "The Kaiser's," armed with two large guns
mounted upon unsheltered platforms and two cannon of medium caliber
sheltered; "August Point," a square closed fort with unsheltered gun
platforms, and two guns of large medium caliber; "Taisichen,"
unsheltered with four large cannon; "Kaiser Northeast," unsheltered
four cannon; "Yunuisan Point," two cannon of medium caliber. The main
line of defense was for both land and sea work; "Fort Moltke" at the
base of the German left wing had a shelter trench and guns of medium
caliber; "Fort Bismarck" had three heavy gun platforms in addition to
a platform for rapid fire guns of large caliber. From this the guns
could be turned in any direction. "Fort Iltis" mounted four heavy guns
of large and medium caliber besides mitrailleuse of large size. Two
heavy guns were mounted in the summit of Mount Iltis.
In command of the German forces was the Governor General of Kiao-chau,
Admiral Meyer-Waldeck, a naval officer of experience and reputation.
The defenses of both land and sea were under his control.
This entrance of Japan into the war introduced a factor fraught with
unknown possibilities. Unlike the other enemies of the Teutonic
alliance, Japan had nothing to fear for her home territory or her
possessions. Secure from attack, she was able to devote all her
energies to the task of driving the Germans out of the Far East. By
this accomplishment she not only fulfilled the terms of her alliance
with Great Britain, but strengthened her own supremacy in that quarter
of the globe.
Tsing-tau, since its occupation by the Germans, had been like a mailed
fist brandished in her face. Since Japan's victory over Russia no
other European power had occupied a position on the Asiatic coast that
offered a threat comparable to this German stronghold. Also, it was
only human that the Japanese remembered how Germany compelled them to
abandon many of their fruits of victory in their last war with China.
The unknown factor of her participation was just how far Japan would
go in aiding her new allies. The military and naval potentialities of
the Island Kingdom when the war started were greater than ever before.
She was twice as strong as when she went to war with Russia. Her navy
was sufficiently formidable to resist, in home waters at least, that
of any other power except England. Her army, twice proved during
recent years against the soldiers of Russia and China, was steadily
increasing its size and equipment. Her predominant position in the Far
East was absolutely assured.
The Japanese army, based to a certain extent upon the German model,
numbered at the outbreak of the war somewhat over 250,000 men of all
ranks. This was its peace strength. Military service was obligatory
upon all able-bodied males between the ages of seventeen and forty.
This law made available each year 550,000 men, but in practice during
times of peace the annual conscription amounted to only 120,000 men
taken by ballot from among the number eligible. The total effective
military strength of the Empire was estimated at a million and a half
trained soldiers.
The army was divided into nineteen divisions, four independent cavalry
brigades, three independent field artillery brigades, six regiments of
heavy field artillery and a communication brigade. Each divisional
unit consisted of two infantry brigades of six battalions each, a
cavalry regiment (three squadrons of 120 men each), a field artillery
regiment (six batteries of six guns), and a battalion of army service
corps. A battalion of mountain guns was attached to certain divisions.
Thus the army on a peace footing consisted of seventy-six infantry
regiments (228 battalions), twenty-seven regiments of cavalry. 150
field batteries, nine mountain batteries, nineteen battalions of
garrison artillery and nineteen battalions of engineers. When the
reserves were summoned to the colors the Japanese system provided for
an indefinite increase in the number of battalions for each regiment.
The Japanese navy had weathered a storm which at one time threatened
to interfere seriously with its steady growth, and the year 1914 found
it at a formidable climax of strength and efficiency. The war with
Russia had left the nation on the verge of bankruptcy and the annual
budgets from 1907 to 1910 contained no appropriations for naval
increases. The lull in naval construction, however, was of short
duration. The wisest statesmen realized, from the time when Japan
first emerged from her Oriental seclusion and eagerly set out to learn
the lessons of western civilization, that their country's insular
situation made a strong navy the first requisite of national
independence. It was the warships of the western world that forced the
Japanese to open their door to the foreigner. Fifteen years after the
Japanese had seen the foreign men-of-war riding dominant in their
harbors, their antiquated collection of war junks had been replaced by
an up-to-date navy, manned and officered by sea fighters trained upon
the best western models. In 1910 the Japanese began to compare their
naval equipment with that of Germany, and from that time their
shipbuilding program was designed to make them secure against the
chance of German aggression, ever present since the leasing of
Kiao-chau.
At the outbreak of the Great War the Japanese navy had nearly doubled
its strength since the close of the war with Russia. It included two
battleships of the dreadnought class, the _Kawachi_ and the _Settsu_,
both over 21,000 tons, with a speed of twenty knots, two dreadnought
battle cruisers of 27,500 tons each and a speed of twenty-seven knots,
the _Kongo_ and the _Hiyei_; two semi-dreadnought battleships, the
_Aki_ and _Satsuma_, between 19,000 and 20,000 tons each and a speed
of twenty and eighteen and a quarter knots, respectively; four
first-class battle cruisers with speeds ranging from twenty to
twenty-three knots and averaging 14,000 tons; six battleships of
slightly heavier displacement and slightly less speed; six first-class
coast defense ships, averaging 13,000 tons and seventeen and a half
knots; nine first-class cruisers ranging from 7,300 to 9,800 tons and
twenty to twenty-one knots; thirteen second-class cruisers, some of
which had a speed of twenty-six knots; seven second-class coast
defense ships; nine gunboats, two first-class destroyers capable of
thirty-five knots an hour; two second-class destroyers with a speed of
thirty-three knots; and forty-six other destroyers of varying speeds;
thirty-one torpedo boats and thirteen submarines, besides auxiliary
craft, hospital ships, dispatch boats, etc.
Although the Japanese air fleet gave a good account of itself during
the operations before Tsing-tau it developed no surprises, and
accomplished no exploits to confirm rumors prevailing before the war
that in Japan naval aviation had reached a special and advanced stage.
The Japanese Flying Corps conducted itself upon lines made familiar by
the British, German and French aviators in Europe.
CHAPTER IX
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES--ATTACKS ON TSING-TAU FORTS
Having reviewed the military and naval situation in the Far East at
the outbreak of war, we come now to the beginning of actual
belligerent operations.
Japan's declaration of war against Germany was dated August 23, 1914.
The morning of the preceding day witnessed the departure from Japanese
war ports of the greatest fleet of warships and transports the Empire
had sent to sea since the Russian War. It comprised the Second
Squadron, embracing battleships, cruisers, destroyers and
hydro-aeroplanes, a dozen in all. The transports carried land forces
numbering 22,980 officers and men and 142 guns to be put ashore as
soon as the landing forces had ground for their advantageous location.
The Japanese troops included the Eighteenth Division, under Lieutenant
General Mitsuomi Kamio, who was Commander in Chief of the expedition;
the Twenty-third Brigade of Infantry (Major General B. Horiuchi); the
Twenty-fourth Brigade of Infantry, commanded by Major General Hanzo
Yamanashi, Chief of Staff, and other divisional troops. The
Twenty-ninth Brigade of Infantry (Major General G. Joholi). Siege
Artillery Corps (Major General Y. Watanebe), the Miyama Heavy
Artillery Regiment, the Yokosuka Heavy Artillery Regiment, the
Shimonosoki Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the Tadanoumi Heavy
Artillery Battalion. Detachments of Engineers and Army Service Corps
from the Sixth and Twelfth Divisions. Two Railway Battalions. Railway
Guard Troops, the Eighth Infantry Regiment. Detachment of the Flying
Corps. Marine Artillery Detachment. Being intended for siege work this
army carried no cavalry, horse artillery or light field artillery.
In command of the fleet was Vice Admiral Hikonojo Kamimura, whose
reputation as one of Japan's war idols was established when his
squadron had defeated three Russian warships, the _Rurik_, _Gromoboi_
and _Rossia_, off the east coast of Korea. Later his squadron had
taken a commanding part in the great battle in the Japan Sea, which
put an end to Russia's naval power in the East. Admiral Kamimura was
sixty-five years old, and had spent the greater part of his life in
naval service. After the final Russian defeat he was rewarded with the
title of Baron and invested with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun
and the first-class of the Golden Kite.
On September 23, 1914, the Japanese were joined by a British force of
1,369 men under command of Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Walter
Barnardiston, commander of the British forces in North China,
including Wei-hai-wei. Although the British did not arrive until a
month after the forces sailed from Japan, the distance that separated
Laoshan Bay, where the former made their landing on the original
leased territory and thus avoided the breach of neutrality against
China committed by the Japanese, was so much shorter and the landing
place presented so much less difficulty than the Japanese encountered
in their preliminary advance, that the British really arrived on the
scene of actual operations just as the Japanese were finishing their
first engagements in force, on September 28, 1914.
Colonel Barnardiston's command consisted of 910 noncommissioned
officers and men of the Second Battalion South Wales Borderers, and
450 noncommissioned officers and men of the Thirty-sixth Sikhs,
besides nine staff officers.
The bombardment of the Tsing-tau forts began on August 26, 1914, and
on September 1, 1914, the Japanese bluejackets seized several small
islands in Kiao-chau Bay, which the Germans were unable to defend
except by long range fire from their shore batteries, and by mines
with which the harbor had been thickly sown. Mine sweeping therefore
occupied the first activities of the fleet. This operation was
signalized by one of the many acts of patriotism and bravery that
characterized the siege on both sides. One hundred Japanese women who
made their living by diving for pearls in these waters offered to
enter the water and release the mines from their moorings so that they
would be carried away by the tides. Their courageous offer was
declined, not because the Japanese admiral believed it could not be
carried out, but because the Japanese law expressly prohibited the
employment of women in warlike operations. When one of the small boats
that acted as mine sweepers was blown up during the dragging that
followed the women renewed their offer, but again it was declined.
The first landing on the Shantung Peninsula was made September 2,
1914. Ten thousand troops were put ashore; but it was not until
September 25, 1914, that the invaders made their first capture of a
German outpost, Weihsien. The check on the Japanese advance, however,
was due less to the defenders of Tsing-tau than to the torrential
rains, which swelled the streams and for a time effectively barred
further movements. The Japanese artillery was compelled to return to
Lung-chow, their original base on the mainland.
The Japanese leaders proceeded with deliberation and caution. They had
the enemy penned up with no hope of reenforcement, and nothing was to
be gained by haste or the unnecessary waste of men and equipment. On
September 19, 1914, to facilitate the movement of their troops behind
the beleaguered city, they seized the railway connecting Tsing-tau
with the Chinese province of Shantung, and China, prompted by Berlin,
protested against the act as a violation of neutrality. This was the
second Chinese protest, the first having been sent to Tokyo after the
Japanese made their first landing on Chinese territory at Lung-chow.
To the former objection Japan had no answer except to set forth that
the landing was a military necessity and made with no intention of
permanent occupancy. To the second protest, however, she replied
without hesitation that possession of the railway line was justified
since it was owned by Germans. The wide area covered by the Japanese
investment campaign is shown by the fact that by September 13, 1914,
they had established guards at the railway station of Kiao-chau--a
town having the same name as the whole German concession--twenty-two
miles distant from Tsing-tau.
While the Japanese infantry and engineers waited for the floods the
naval airmen were not idle. The first damage inside the city was
inflicted by two seaplanes which dropped bombs upon the railway
station and barracks. Although one of the planes was hit several times
by the German guns, both made a safe return. This raid was the
forerunner of a systematic air campaign, designed as much to strike
terror and discouragement into the hearts of the garrison and the
civil population as to gain any military end by the actual destruction
of defense works. Bombs were dropped also upon ships in the harbor.
Occasionally the Japanese flyers scattered circulars calling upon the
defenders to surrender and pointing out the uselessness of further
resistance.
The first serious losses on either side were naval. On August 28,
1914, two days after the first bombardment a typhoon swept the
Japanese fleet, causing havoc among the little destroyers and sending
one to the bottom. Five days later another destroyer ran aground in
Kiao-chau Bay. A German merchant ship in the harbor was set afire by
the Japanese aerial bombs and destroyed. The greatest naval losses
suffered during the whole engagement were the destruction of the
Austrian cruiser _Kaiserin Elizabeth_ and of the Japanese cruiser
_Takachiho_. The _Kaiserin Elizabeth_ was sunk by the naval
bombardment; but the loss of the _Takachiho_ was due to the German
torpedo boat _S-90_.
It was September 26, 1914, before the floods subsided sufficiently to
permit the Japanese to resume their advance. On that day they drove
the Germans from the high ground between the rivers Pai-sha and
Li-tsun, and next day they pushed forward to a point seven miles
northeast of Tsing-tau, between the Li-tsun and the Chang-tsun. The
following morning found them established within five miles of the
fortress. Their casualties were reported as three killed and twelve
wounded.
These two days saw the heaviest fighting thus far during the siege.
While the land forces were pushing up to the main German forts the
fleet carried on a general bombardment, having by this time moved in
close enough to make gun fire effective and having learned the range.
The Japanese warships were assisted by the British battleship
_Triumph_, which had joined them a short time before with the British
destroyer _Usk_. These British boats remained throughout the
investment, the _Triumph_ was a favorite mark for the German gunners,
but escaped with comparatively slight damage.
By September 30, 1914, the Germans were driven in from their outer
fortifications and Tsing-tau itself was completely surrounded. On that
day the defenders made a desperate attempt to regain some of their
lost positions, but they were repulsed, and the Japanese settled back
for a few days to await the bringing up of their heavy siege guns.
It is said that the failure of this assault, in which the Germans
apparently concentrated all their resources, convinced General Kamio
that the capture of the city would not prove the long, arduous task
that had been expected, and he abandoned forthwith his plans for a
long, slow siege and made preparations to take the place by assault.
At the same time the Japanese commander showed no disposition to
sacrifice his men unnecessarily, and while waiting for their big guns
the Japanese worked like beavers with pick and shovel protecting their
positions and digging saps and zigzag trenches up to the very face of
the German defenses. They labored under a storm of shells but so
little exposed that losses under the bombardment were small compared
with the casualties of the actual assault operations.
For eight days the Germans poured projectiles into the enemy's works;
but for the most part their shooting was a waste of ammunition. Just
why the defenders of Tsing-tau were so prodigal of ammunition at this
time never has been satisfactorily explained. Military correspondents
estimated that during one period of twenty-four hours the forts on the
three hills containing the main defensive positions fired more than
2,000 shells without inflicting any loss whatever.
But by October 8, 1914, the German fire slackened perceptibly. They
had found that they were wasting their resources and that several
positions were almost out of ammunition. The warfare of that period is
described in a letter written by an officer with the British
expeditionary force:
"That night," he said, "we were working in trenches along a river bed
at the bottom of the slope, where the others had been wounded, and
_sans doute_ most darnation close to the enemy. A beginning had been
made on this trench the night before, so there was a little cover. The
two redoubts were about 800 yards on our right and left respectively,
the enemy's trenches about 350 yards to our front.
"Well, for the first hour after getting down we were left severely
alone. Then they started throwing star rockets and sort of Roman
candle things which lit up the place like day, and at the same time
they peppered us with Maxims, pompoms, and rifle fire from all three
places. We had some men hit further back in the communication trench,
but funnily enough none in the forward line.... We were entertained by
a certain amount of shell fire during the rest of the night. Next
night we were due to leave for the forward trenches at dusk to carry
on, having had our usual entertainment in the afternoon from the
Germans, when suddenly they began throwing shrapnel at our trench. For
about half an hour it was all over us, and I'm blest if I know why
nobody was hit. It was the overhead cover, I fancy, that saved us this
time. We came out like a lot of rabbits when it was over and proceeded
to get down below.
"The Japanese artillery was supporting us that night, as we were
working on the enemy's side of the river, within 200 yards of their
advance trenches. Never have I felt a more comforting sensation then
when watching those Japanese shells bursting just over our heads, a
little in advance, the shrapnel from them going slap into the Germans
every time. I must say it was a magnificent sight when the Japanese
guns were going, the German rockets, etc., and their machine guns and
rifles joining in when they could get their heads up. One had to shout
to make oneself heard, and those who saw it from the top of Heinrich
Hill in rear said it was very fine."
During the early days of the siege life in the beleaguered city went
on about as usual. A large part of the civil population had withdrawn
while there was yet time, but enough shops remained open to supply the
needs of those who remained. Cafes continued business and meals were
served without interruption at the German Club throughout the siege,
although toward the end the number of those who gathered at the
club's tables dwindled to a few administrative officers and civilians.
In a proclamation the day before the expiration of the Japanese
ultimatum, Governor Meyer-Waldeck had expressed the spirit of the
little garrison in the following words:
"Never shall we surrender the smallest bit of ground over which the
war flag is flying. From this place, which we with love and success
have endeavored during the last seventeen years to shape into a little
Germany across the seas, we shall not retreat. If the enemy wants
Tsing-tau, he must come and take it."
Few, if any, military men in Tsing-tau doubted the outcome of the
siege; but every resource was prepared for a desperate resistance. The
city did not lack food; and after the surrender it was found that
enough still remained to provision the garrison for more than three
months longer. The supply of running water ceased about the middle of
October. News from the outside world came in until November 5, and
invariably it told of German successes.
"I remember one evening," said the Tsing-tau correspondent of the
Associated Press, and the only foreign press representative in the
city during the siege, "the roar of laughter that went up in the
German Club when the news was read that England had asked Portugal for
assistance. For two or three days it looked, according to the news,
that the British Empire was going to pieces. We heard of revolutions
in India, riots in Alexandria, mutiny and martial law in South Africa
and even disaffection in Sarawak and North Borneo."
When it became clear that the end was drawing near preparations were
made that as few war munitions as possible should fall into the hands
of the enemy. The warships in the harbor that had escaped the
bombardment were blown up. When the big guns in the forts had fired
their last shots the gunners under orders destroyed them. In many
cases this was done because without ammunition the guns were useless.
October 31, 1914, the anniversary of the emperor's birthday, was
selected by the Japanese and English for their final bombardment. From
142 guns now occupying commanding positions came a deluge of shells
that continued for seven days. The gunners by this time had the exact
ranges and wasted no ammunition. The staffs of the two expeditionary
forces gathered on Prince Heinrich Hill to watch the final act of the
passing of German rule in the Far East. The warships ranged in the
harbor joined in, and after an hour or two it became evident that the
German defenses would be swept away by mere weight of metal. Under
cover of this terrific gunfire the Allies' troops drove their saps and
trenches up the very edge of the defense works, where they waited
orders to take the place by storm.
The Germans replied bravely. A great cloud of smoke and dust arose
over the doomed city visible far out at sea. In the city the
noncombatants took refuge in their cellars and helped care for the
wounded. Almost every German position, except the bomb-proof casements
where the guns stood, was hammered to pieces. The electric power
station was destroyed, so that during the last few nights the city was
in darkness.
The last handbills dropped into Tsing-tau by the Japanese aviators
contained the following appeal: "To the honored officers and men in
the fortress: It is against the will of God, as well as the principles
of humanity, to destroy and render useless arms, ships of war, and
merchantmen, and other works and constructions, not in obedience to
the necessity of war, but merely out of spite, lest they fall into the
hands of the enemy. Trusting, as we do, that, as you hold dear the
honor of civilization, you will not be betrayed into such base
conduct, we beg you, however, to announce to us your own view as
mentioned above.
(Signed) "The Besieging Army."
It is needless to say that the enemy's plea was not heeded. By
November 6, 1914, only spasmodic fire from widely scattered positions
answered the Allies' bombardment. That night the Japanese and English
charged across open ground and took the middle fort in the first line
of defense with surprising ease, capturing 200 prisoners. The charge
was led by General Yoshimi Yamada at the head of companies of infantry
and engineers. At one point they surprised a squad of Germans in
charge of a searchlight. To have fired upon them would have betrayed
the advance to the defenders of the adjacent fort; so, the story says,
the Germans were quietly and quickly dispatched by the engineers with
picks and shovels.
CHAPTER X
CAPTURE OF TSING-TAU
Tsing-Tau fell early on the morning of the next day, November 7, 1914.
Encouraged by the unexpected successes of the night, the Japanese
commander gave the order for a final grand assault. Nobody was more
surprised than the Japanese themselves. They had expected a last-ditch
resistance and feared they would have to sacrifice a thousand men
before gaining these positions commanding the city. But the Germans,
their ammunition almost gone, stunned by the continuous rain of shells
and broken by long fighting, had decided that further resistance was
useless.
The Japanese infantry occupied the central positions on the main line
of defense soon after midnight. Just before dawn they captured the
north battery on Shaotan Hill, then the east battery of Tahtungehin
and the Chungchiawa fort on the west. The heaviest loss suffered by
any of the Japanese detachments in the final assault fell upon a
company that was caught by machine-gun fire in an attack upon Redoubt
No. 2. Out of 250 men only 87 escaped. The total Japanese casualties
in the final assault were 450 killed and wounded. The British
casualties were slight.
Daylight found the Japanese and British in possession of every
position commanding the city and nearly 20,000 men were awaiting the
signal to charge the last line of defenses when a white flag appeared
on the Tsing-tau military observatory. Within the next hour flags of
surrender were flying from all the other German forts. So unexpected
was the sudden collapse of the defense that at six o'clock, when the
Governor sent Major von Kayser, his adjutant, with a white flag to
make terms, the signal of surrender was not observed and the
Japanese, far from suspecting the German officer's purpose, opened
fire, killing Von Kayser's trumpeter and shooting his horse under him.
The formal capitulation of Tsing-tau came at 7.50 o'clock on the
evening of November 7, 1914, when both sides signed the Japanese
terms. The Germans surrendered unconditionally, but were accorded the
honors of war. On November 10, 1914, at 10 a. m., Governor
Meyer-Waldeck formally transferred possession to General Kamio, and
German's last foothold in Asia passed from her possession.
News of the fall of Tsing-tau, although not unexpected, caused great
rejoicing throughout Japan and among her allies, and profoundly
stirred the German world.
The German attitude was expressed by an editorial in the Berlin
"Lokalanzeiger," which said: "Never shall we forget the bold deed of
the yellow robbers, or of England that set them on to do it. We know
that we cannot yet settle with Japan for years to come. Perhaps she
will rejoice over her cowardly robbery. Here our mills can grind but
slowly. Even if the years pass, however, we shall certainly not often
speak of it, but as certainly always think of it."
The Japanese and British forces made formal entry into the captured
city on November 16, 1914. The Germans had done all in their power to
destroy supplies, nevertheless the spoils of victory included 100
machine guns, 2,500 rifles, 30 field guns, a small amount of
ammunition, about $6,000 in cash, 15,000 tons of coal, 40 motor cars,
and a large quantity of provisions. Prisoners taken numbered 4,043,
including the governor general and 201 German officers and 3,841
noncommissioned officers and men.
The casualties on both sides, considering the length of the siege and
the intensity of the gunfire in both directions, were remarkably
small. The Japanese had 236 killed and 1,282 wounded, the British had
12 killed and 63 wounded, including two officers. The Germans
estimated their losses in killed and wounded at about 1,000 men. To
the Allies' losses must be added 10 killed and 56 wounded, all
Japanese, by the explosion of German land mines several days after the
surrender.
PART III--THE WAR IN AFRICA
CHAPTER XI
CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND THE CAMEROONS
The first shots of the Great War had hardly detonated across Europe
when their echoes were heard in Africa. The war fever began to hover
over Germany's colonial possessions in Africa--Togoland, the
Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and, greatest of all, German East
Africa. Each of these colonies became in turn the scene of armed
invasions and fierce conflicts, as important to the small forces
involved as the great campaigns on the continent across the seas.
When Great Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914, and the
news flashed across the world to the official representatives of the
warring nations in Africa, the British acting governor of the Gold
Coast and the French governor of Dahomey planned a concerted campaign
by land in cooperation with the warships to be found in African
waters.
The first blow was struck on August 8, 1914, in Togoland, a country
about the size of Ireland, lying between French Dahomey and the
British Gold Coast. It is populated by a million Hausas and about 400
whites. At the beginning of the war the military force of Togoland
could not have exceeded 250 whites and 3,000 natives. Hemmed in on
three sides by French and British territory, with a coast line easily
approached by warships, the colony was not in a position to offer much
resistance if attacked.
On August 8, 1914, a British cruiser appeared before Lome, the capital
of Togoland, and the town was surrendered without a shot being fired.
But before the British force landed, the little German army of about
60 Europeans and 400 natives fell back to Atakpame, 100 miles in the
interior.
While this was happening at Lome an expeditionary force composed of
the Gold Coast Regiment, with British officers and commanded by
Captain F. C. Bryant, R. A., crossed the frontier in motor cars on
August 8, or 9, 1914, and a French force entered Togoland from the
other side. A few days later the Allies had possession of all the
southern part of Togoland, and advanced together toward Atakpame to
capture an important German wireless station at Kamina in the same
region.
The only real fighting in this campaign took place on August 25, 1914,
when Captain Bryant and his forces had crossed the Monu River. The
Allies drove the enemy from his intrenchments, seized the wireless
station, and occupied Atakpame. Their losses were two officers and 21
men killed and about 50 wounded.
On August 26, 1914, the Germans surrendered unconditionally, and the
Allies came into possession of three Maxim guns, 1,000 rifles and
320,000 rounds of ammunition. It was stated at the time that the
Germans offered such a feeble resistance because many natives, on whom
they had counted, refused to take up arms against the British.
Togoland having fallen to the Allies, it was arranged between the
officials of Great Britain and France that the colony should be
jointly governed, each to control that part of Togoland nearest her
possessions. In a few months' time normal trade was resumed in the
Allies' colony, and since private property had been respected during
the invasion, there was nothing left to show that the country had
recently been the scene of small but decisive conflicts, far-reaching
in their effects.
The action in the African war drama now shifts to the Cameroons
(German Kamerun Colony), which Germany took possession of in 1884. It
has a seacoast of about 200 miles on the Bight of Biafra. To the
northeast and south are the British Protectorate of Nigeria and French
Equatorial Africa. The country is largely mountainous and is 290,000
square miles in extent. Before the war there were less than 2,000
whites among a population of 2,500,000 negroes, principally of the
Bantu race.
The Cameroons, though surrounded by territory of the Allies, was a
more difficult country to conquer than Togoland, owing to its natural
advantages and the difficulties of communication over great distances.
The first moves of the Allies met with disaster. It was in the African
rainy season and misadventures multiplied as the invading troops
marched through a wild and badly mapped country. It was decided
between the Allies that two French columns should move from French
Congo, while British columns entered at different points on the
frontier of Nigeria.
On August 8, 1914, a detachment of mounted infantry of the West
African Frontier Force left Kano and, marching 400 miles in seventeen
days through West Africa, got in touch with the Germans at Tepe, a
frontier station just inside the Cameroons. In the fierce engagement
that followed the Germans were repulsed, losing five officers and
suffering other casualties.
On August 29, 1914, the river station of Garua was attacked, and here
one of the most disastrous battles of the campaign was fought. On
August 31, 1914, Lieutenant Colonel Maclear, commanding the Royal
Dublin Fusiliers and native troops, left their intrenchments 400 yards
from the German forts and advanced to attack. The German gunners
having perfect range, poured a murderous fire from machine guns on the
British forces. The native troops wavered and fled, leaving British
officers in the trenches, and these in turn were soon forced to fly to
escape complete annihilation. Lieutenant Colonel Maclear was killed,
and of the 31 other officers only 10 escaped, while 40 per cent of the
native troops were lost. The remainder of the British force retreated
into Nigeria in such an exhausted condition that had the Germans
followed up their victory not a man would have escaped.
[Illustration: German Possessions in Africa.]
The second British expedition which entered the Cameroons from a more
westerly point along the Nigerian frontier occupied, after slight
resistance, the German station of Nsanakong a few miles from the
border, where a week later the Germans attacked in force at two
o'clock in the morning. The British resisted stubbornly, but, having
exhausted their ammunition, the garrison tried to cut their way out
with the bayonet. The British lost three officers, while large numbers
of native soldiers were killed or made prisoners. The remainder,
escaping to the bush, after many hardships found their way back to
Nigeria. Another British expedition from Calabar, near the coast,
occupied Archibong, August 29, 1914, while about the same time a
German force took possession of the Nigerian station of Okuri.
The British had failed by land; they were more successful on the sea,
as will be seen in the chapter on Naval Operations. On September 4,
1914, an attempt was made by the Germans to wreck the British gunboat
_Dwarf_, which with the cruiser _Cumberland_ was watching German ships
in the Cameroon estuary. The German merchantman _Nachtigal_ tried
later to ram the same gunboat and wrecked herself with a loss of 36
men. Further attempts to destroy the _Dwarf_ also failed.
The British now taking the offensive cleared the channel for three
miles, where the Germans had sown mines and sunk 10 or 12 steamboats
to obstruct the waterway to Duala, the capital of the Cameroons.
H.M.S. _Challenger_ and five troopships joined the _Dwarf_ and
_Cumberland_ on September 26, 1914, and, moving on Duala, bombarded
the town.
On September 27, 1914, the Germans offered to surrender Duala
unconditionally, and on September 28, 1914, Brigadier General C. M.
Dobell came ashore and took it over. About the same time a battalion
landing at Bonaberi, across the river from Duala, capitulated after
some desultory fighting. The wireless station at Duala was found to
have been wrecked, but the British took several hundred prisoners,
captured 8 merchantmen with valuable cargoes and the German gunboat
_Soden_, which was at once put into commission in the British navy.
While the British were successful around Duala, a French force by sea
from Libreville, French Congo, escorted by their warship _Surpris_,
attacked _Ukoko_ on Corisco Bay, south of the Cameroons, during which
the armed vessels _Khios_ and _Itolo_ were sunk.
The Allies had captured the chief port and controlled the coast, but
the most difficult work lay before them in the mountainous and almost
roadless region still to be conquered. The retreating Germans
occupied a defensive position on a river at Japona, where on October
8, 1914, a French column came up with them, forced a bridge, and
compelled them to continue their retreat.
On October 8, 1914, Colonel E. H. Gorges, commanding a British naval
and military force and four field guns, sailed up the Wuri in launches
and found the enemy intrenched near Jabassi. The British made a
spirited attack, but were driven back by the accurate fire of the
enemy. After a flank attack failed, the order was given to retreat,
and the British returned to Duala.
The Allies reenforced, and with two 6-inch guns resumed the attack on
October 14, 1914, when the German batteries were soon silenced. After
a brisk engagement the infantry occupied Jabassi, taking ten European
prisoners. Minor successes won by the Allies at this time were the
defeat of the Germans at Susa, and the occupation of the region around
Mora, near Lake Chad by a Nigerian Regiment which had entered the
colony from the northeast.
Two columns of Anglo-French troops under Brigadier General Dobell,
with Colonel Mayer commanding the French colonial infantry, followed
the retreating Germans to Edea on the Sanaga River, some fifty miles
from Duala. Part of the road led through a thick forest where snipers
were concealed, who harassed the expedition at every step and were
dislodged with great difficulty.
On October 26, 1914, Edea was taken without resistance, and the enemy
retired to Yaunde, a station far in the interior. Mujuka, a station
about fifty miles from Duala, was occupied by the British a few weeks
later.
Early in November, 1914, General Dobell planned an attack on the
German capital of Buea, and its seaport Victoria. The latter place was
bombarded by the French cruiser _Bruix_ and the yacht _Ivy_; marines
were landed, and after a short and spirited fight it was taken, while
the enemy, who had concentrated on the hills leading to Buea, were
scattered by the Allies' forces advancing from different directions.
The Germans made a determined effort to regain Edea, but were forced
to retire with a loss of 20 Europeans and 54 natives. Meanwhile, in
the hinterland, the French General, Aymerich, with a force of men and
a steamer loaned by the authorities of the Belgian Congo drove the
enemy from the Congo-Ubanghi region, which had been given to Germany
in 1911. After two days of strenuous fighting the German posts of
Numen and Nola were taken, and some officers, guns, and ammunition.
The greatest campaign in December, 1914, was the capture of the entire
northern railway line, with rolling stock, locomotives, two
aeroplanes, and about sixty white men. Mendawi, Bare, and Nkongsamba
were other posts taken at this period.
At the close of the year the Cameroons were not conquered, but the
Germans had been driven into the interior, could not secure supplies,
and it was only a question of time when they must surrender or be
annihilated. The allied forces were constantly harrying their enemy.
The Allies' next movement was an advance in three columns against
Yaunde, where they fought two little battles January 27-28, 1915, and
seized the post of Bersona. Near the coast some important operations
were successful.
CHAPTER XII
GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA--REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
German Southwest Africa, to which we will now turn, was in a different
situation at the outbreak of the war from that of the German colonies
of the east and west. Over the frontier was a self-governing dominion,
the Union of South Africa, with an independent parliament made up of a
strange mixture of different parties. The irreconcilables in the Dutch
population who had dreamed of a greater Afrikander Republic, would
they not take this opportunity to side with Germany who promised to
further their ambitions? Great Britain expected some trouble from this
element in the Union, and prepared for the worst, while Germany was
equally active, and there was much intriguing to persuade the Dutch
to cast in their lot with them. In other parts of Africa, Germany had
to fight her battles unaided, but here in the enemy's camp there was
every hope of gaining powerful assistance. Until the situation in the
Union became clear, it was Germany's part to defend her colony in
Southwest Africa, hoping by a brave display of arms to win over the
Dutch, who were bitter against England.
German Southwest Africa enjoys many natural advantages. Her capital is
far in the interior. Between her railway on the south, which almost
reaches the Cape frontier, and her border spreads out the desert of
Kalahari and the arid, waterless plains of northwest Cape Colony. The
branch railways are separated by about 200 miles from German
territory, and on the northern line Kimberley was a little less than
400 miles distant. British forces entering the colony by land must
encounter many difficulties, especially in the desert region, which
the Germans left undefended because they believed it could not be
crossed by troops.
Before the war, according to the official returns, the colony had a
force of 3,500 men, mainly whites; but with reserves and volunteers
from among the population of German blood it has been variously
estimated that an army of from 6,000 to 10,000 men could be gathered
together. The Germans were believed to be strong in artillery, and
were known to have sixty-six batteries of Maxims. There was also a
camel corps 500 strong.
After the declaration of war in August, 1914, Dr. Seitz, the German
Governor, began to carry out his plan of defense. In the second week
of August, 1914, the Germans abandoned Swakopmund and Luederitz Bay,
their principal stations on the coast, and after destroying the jetty
and tugs in harbor, retired with their military stores to Windhoek,
the inland capital. In the last weeks in August they made short dashes
into British territory, intrenching themselves in some places, and
occasionally engaged in a skirmish with farmers on the frontier.
Thus, when the Union Parliament met September 8, 1914, it was informed
by General Botha, the Premier, that Germany had begun hostilities
against the British colonies. On the following day, as a challenge to
the pro-German party, he moved a resolution to convey to King George
an address, assuring him of the loyal support of the Union. Upon this
General Hertzog moved an amendment to the effect that attacking German
territory in South Africa was against the interests of the Union and
the empire. But the victory was with General Botha's Government when
the questions were voted on. Only 12 of the 104 votes cast were in
favor of Hertzog's amendment.
It was evident that many burghers living in districts on the borders
of German Southwest Africa shared Hertzog's opinion, and were opposed
to taking offensive measures against the German colony as long as the
Union was left in peace. From the time that Hertzog had been dropped
from Botha's cabinet he had posed as a martyr. His adherents believed
that he had been "sacrificed to please the English," and that Botha
was merely a tool in the hands of the British Government.
The spirit of rebellion in the Union did not show itself openly for
some time, but the leaders--Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, and Kemp--were
busy conspiring and stirring up disaffection among the burghers who
had never become reconciled to the Union.
De Wet, because of his world-wide fame during the Boer War, has been
given undue prominence for the part he played in the rebellion. He was
not the head and front of the movement, though his name was one to
conjure with among the disaffected Boers, and he proved to be a
valuable recruiting agent. His operations during the rebellion, as
will be subsequently shown, were generally ineffective in the field,
and terminated ingloriously, before he could work any great harm.
General Beyers, the most dangerous foe the Union had in the rebellion,
was a direct contrast to the rude and unlettered De Wet. He was young
and brave, and had shown himself one of the ablest soldiers the
British had to fight against during the Boer War. He looked the
dashing officer that he was--tall, straight, black bearded, and with
his pleasant manners and easy speech he was just the man to inspire
enthusiasm in others.
Colonel Maritz and Colonel Kemp, the other chief leaders in the
rebellion, had never been as prominent in South African affairs as
Beyers and De Wet. Maritz had shown ability as a leader in the Boer
War, had held various military positions since, and at the beginning
of the European War was in command of the South African border between
the Union and German Southwest Africa, to which he had been appointed
by Beyers, who was commandant general of the citizen forces. General
Smuts, the Minister of Defense, may have suspected some sinister
motives in this appointment, for Maritz had many friends in the German
colony, but for the present he had to keep his suspicions to himself
and await some overt act of offense.
Colonel Kemp, the remaining chief leader, had never done anything to
give him special prominence. He had proved himself an efficient
soldier during the Boer War, and appears to have been in command of a
training camp in the western Transvaal when the rebellion was started.
Under these four leaders, acting independently, or in conjunction with
them, were subleaders, an indefinite number, members of the
Government, and men connected with the church and army, whose part in
the rebellion was to stir up the people.
An interesting character among the somewhat nebulous subleaders in the
rebellion was Van Rensburg, sometimes called "Prophet" Lichtenberg,
from the place where he lived. During the Boer War he had predicted a
remarkable victory for the Boers, which had resulted in the capture of
Lord Methuen, and ever since the burghers of the Union had held him in
reverential awe. When the war with Germany broke out he made various
prophecies. He discovered that the events foretold in the Book of
Revelation would now take place. Germany, he said, had been divinely
ordained to conquer the world and purify it. Any attempt to resist
this divine ordinance would be punished by the righteous anger of an
offended deity. Nor was the "prophet" forgetful of local politics, for
he had another "vision" in which he predicted that Generals Delarey,
Beyers, and De Wet were divinely appointed leaders, who would restore
the old republic. These "prophecies" were spread broadcast throughout
the Union, were eagerly believed by the superstitious burghers, and
served to hearten up the disaffected who had some grudge against the
Government.
A great meeting of the burghers was summoned to meet August 15, 1914,
at Treurfontein. This date had been fixed because Van Rensburg in a
"vision" had seen "a dark cloud, with blood flowing from it, inscribed
with number 15, and General Delarey, the uncrowned king of western
Transvaal, returning home without his hat, followed by a carriage full
of flowers." Eight hundred burghers attended the meeting, but Delarey,
who spoke, had been warned by General Botha, and therefore spoke
calmly, urging the burghers to remain cool and await events. Such was
Delarey's influence over the assembly, who had come expecting to make
a fiery speech, that a resolution expressing confidence in the
Government was passed.
On September 15, 1914, General Christian Beyers resigned his position
of commandant general of the defense force in a letter which was
practically a declaration of war against the British Empire. It
developed that for some weeks he had been organizing rebellion. He was
secretly arranging a scheme of operations in which the German forces
were to take part, while making plans for the Union Government. He
hoped to win over General Delarey, leader of the Boers in the western
Transvaal, but this officer was accidentally killed by the police near
Johannesburg. The patrol out looking for the notorious Jackson gang of
bandits, then in the neighborhood, had orders to examine any motor car
and fire at once, if when summoned to stop their challenge was
ignored. The car bearing Generals Beyers and Delarey had been twice
challenged while passing through the town. The third time a policeman
fired at the wheel to disable the car, and the bullet ricocheted and
killed Delarey.
A thousand armed Boers at this time were encamped at Potchefstroom in
Delarey's district. Colonel Kemp, who had sent in his resignation to
the Union Government, and was working here for Delarey, had won over
their officers, and on parade urged the men to refuse to volunteer for
German Southwest Africa. He also collected in his tent such ammunition
as he could lay his hands upon.
The death of General Delarey disconcerted General Beyers, and his
fellow conspirators, and Colonel Kemp withdrew his resignation from
the Union army. Over the grave of Delarey General Beyers, in the
presence of General Botha, declared that he had no intention of
advising or causing a rebellion, yet the following day, with General
De Wet and others, he was urging the Boers who had come to the funeral
of their dead leader to revolt against active service should the
commandos be called out under the Defense Act.
Botha knew the men who were stirring up rebellion and acted quickly.
He called for volunteers, announcing that he would lead in person the
Union forces against the Germans, and the immediate response he
received was gratifying. The conspirators remained quiet for some
weeks, but General Beyers and De Wet were secretly at work against the
Government of the Union.
On September 26, 1914, Colonel Grant and a small force of African
Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery operating at Sandfontein near the
German border were trapped by two German battalions while on their way
to a water hole. From the heights the German guns swept the circular
basin below where the Union force was gathered. The advantage was all
in favor of the Germans. High explosive shells from ten guns wrought
havoc among the South African soldiers, but not until their ammunition
ran out and every man of their gun crews was either killed or wounded
would the little band of Boers and Britons surrender. It developed
later that Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz, a Boer leader commanding
Union forces in the Northwest territory, had turned traitor and
arranged the disaster. It was through General Beyers that he had been
appointed to an important command on the German border.
Maritz who was now ordered by General Smuts, Minister of Defense, to
report to headquarters and give up his command, sent a defiant reply
October 8, 1914. He stated that in addition to his own troops he had
German guns and men, and had signed an agreement with the Governor of
Southwest Africa ceding Walfish Bay (a British possession) and certain
portions of Union territory in return for a guarantee of the
independence of the South African Republic. All his officers and men
who were unwilling to join with him had been sent as prisoners into
German territory.
General Botha replied to the rebel by proclaiming martial law
throughout the Union. General Brits, with the imperial Light Horse,
was sent to capture Maritz, and in an engagement October 15, 1914, at
Ratedraai, near Upington, took seventy rebel prisoners.
On October 22, 1914, Maritz with 1,000 rebels and seventy German
gunners, attacked at dawn the post of Keimos, where there were only
150 loyalists. The little garrison held out until reenforcements
arrived and the battle then turned against Maritz, who offered to
surrender for a free pardon. This being refused, the fight went on,
and Maritz eventually fled wounded into German territory. Two days
later a party of rebels with German gunners were defeated at Kakamas.
General Hertzog, who had represented the pro-German party in the Union
Parliament, gathered a commando and broke out in revolt on October 21,
1914. He issued a manifesto complaining of English oppression, and
announced that he would tolerate it no longer. Three members of the
Union Parliament and a member of the Defense Council, Mr.
Wessel-Wessels, came out in arms. In the western Transvaal and the
northern Free State the rebel leaders had about 10,000 men in separate
groups. Their plan was to join their commandos with a force under
Maritz from German Southwest Africa.
The situation from a military point of view seemed to be serious for
the Union, but Generals Botha and Smuts were active and resourceful
and in a few weeks had 40,000 men in the field. The loyal Boers were
in a difficult position, for now they were asked to fight against
their own kith and kin for the British Empire. In battle the Dutch
generals showed that they were anxious to spare their own kinsmen, and
ordered their men to withhold firing to the last moment, hoping that
the rebels would surrender. The rebels were not allowed time to join
their forces, for General Botha gave them no rest night or day.
On October 27, 1914, General Beyers and his commando operating near
Rustenburg were driven in headlong flight all day long by General
Botha and a force of loyalists. Two days later General Beyers was a
fugitive. His scattered commandos were defeated by Colonel Alberts at
Lichtenburg and again at Zuitpansdrift on November 5, 1914. Meanwhile,
Colonel Kemp, who had been acting with General Beyers, now separated
from his chief, and with a large force started for German Southwest
Africa, pursued by Colonel Alberts. Beyers, trying to get in touch
with De Wet, entered the Orange Free State, closely followed by a
large loyalist force under Colonel Lemmer.
On November 7, 1914, Beyers's commando was attacked by Lemmer near the
Vet River and though Beyers led in person, he was defeated, and, 364
of his men being captured and about 20 killed or wounded, the fugitive
remnant returned to Hoopstad. De Wet, whom General Beyers had been
prevented from joining by the activity of the loyalist forces, had
gathered together in the northern districts of the Orange Free State a
poorly organized body of soldiers, but sufficient in numbers to cause
the South African Government some anxiety. Negotiations between the
Free State leaders and De Wet postponed for a time any military action
by the Government, but the old guerrilla captain was not to be
pacified. There had been a rivalry between him and Botha in the Boer
war, and he seemed anxious to measure strength now with a soldier whom
he considered his inferior.
De Wet's name was a power in the land, especially among the "poor
whites" and the squatter class, who without much intelligence or
education had not prospered under new conditions in the Union. They
were without hope for the future and felt that they were being crowded
out by the more active spirits in the country. They saw in the
rebellion a chance to improve their economic position. There was
little to lose and much might be won. A new Afrikander Republic would
bring back the old days for which they had never ceased to long for.
It was from this class of malcontents that De Wet drew the bulk of his
men. The rest were religious fanatics, disgruntled politicians,
wastrels and adventurers.
We have said previously that De Wet's recruits were poorly organized.
It was a weakness of this brilliant guerrilla fighter that he could
not maintain discipline when handling a large body of men, and the
sort of troops he was working with in the rebellion called for the
sternest kind of authority to make them effective soldiers. He only
enjoyed a month of freedom and covered considerable territory, but he
accomplished very little from a military point of view. He could not
follow the same tactics that he had employed in the Boer war with
equal success now. At home on the back of a horse, it was impossible
for him to slip through the enemy's lines as of old when there were
motor cars to pursue. He began his campaign with an action at Winburg
where he defeated a small loyalist commando under Cronje, and where
one of his sons was killed.
A battle of considerable importance was fought on November 12, 1914,
at Marquard to the east of Winburg. General Botha and his Transvaal
commando by a forced night march had reached Winburg the day before
and getting in touch with De Wet's forces encircled them on the east
and northeast. Colonel Brandt at the same time led his commando from
Winburg within easy reach of De Wet, while General Lukin and Colonel
Brits moving forward from the west completed the hemming in of the
enemy. General Botha's commando attacked De Wet's forces and defeated
them with great loss. If General Lukin and Colonel Brits had not been
delayed in taking up their positions all the rebels would have been
captured. The victory was especially of far-reaching importance
because it discouraged De Wet's hopes and strengthened the loyalist
cause. All of De Wet's stores of food and ammunition were taken, and a
hundred carts, wagons and motor cars, while the prisoners numbered
about 250.
De Wet, with a Boer commando in pursuit, now fled up the Vet River,
then turning south at Boshof, divided his decreasing force into two
divisions. Leading one of these he turned again north, reaching the
Vaal River with only 25 men remaining of the 2,000 he had fought with
at Marquard.
Beaten back by a loyal outpost he succeeded in crossing the Vaal on
November 21, 1914, closely pursued by Commandant Dutoit and a motor
car contingent from Witwatersrand. De Wet's followers had gradually
deserted, and he had only four men with him when he succeeded in
joining a small commando of fugitives gathered at Schweizer Renek. The
heavy rainstorms at this time favored him as he started with this
force to follow Colonel Kemp and join Maritz in German Southwest
Africa, for the motor cars in pursuit could make small progress over
the heavy roads. Crossing Bechuanaland on November 25, 1914, De Wet
was pursued by another loyalist force under Colonel Brits who in two
days captured half of the fugitives.
On December 1, 1914, at a farm at Waterburg, about a hundred miles
from Mafeking, De Wet and his party of 52 men surrendered to Colonel
Jordaan without firing a shot, and the one-time Commander in Chief of
the Orange Free State forces was imprisoned at Johannesburg to await
his trial for high treason.
In the Orange Free State, General Beyers and about seventy men harried
by loyal commandos divided his party, and leading one group made a
dash for the Vaal River pursued by Captain Uys and Cornet Deneker with
a small force. Trapped at daybreak on December 9, 1914, near the Vaal,
Beyers and a few men tried to swim the river to the Transvaal under a
fierce fire. Beyers was seen to fall from his horse, and was heard to
cry for help, but was drowned before anyone could come to the rescue.
General Botha's operations in the northern district of the Orange Free
State were made difficult because of the heavy fogs, but early in
December, 1914, the rebels were in sore straits, 500 being captured
while 200 surrendered to Commandant Kloppers a loyalist, who had been
taken a prisoner and was afterwards released.
General Maritz, Colonel Kemp, and the "Prophet" Litchtenburg had fled
west, and after some fighting at Kurumun, and two minor successes,
surprising two posts at Langklip and Onydas which they were forced to
abandon on the arrival of reenforcements, they retired toward the
German frontier where they were penned in by the Union forces.
On January 24, 1915, the rebels made their last sally, attacking
Colonel Van der Venter at Upington. The rebel force, about 1,200
strong and led by Maritz and Kemp, was easily repulsed. On February 3,
1915, Maritz, having fled to German territory, Colonel Kemp and his
commando of 43 officers and 486 men including the "Prophet"
Lichtenburg surrendered.
[Illustration: These Belgian soldiers are weary and covered with mud
from the trenches, but they are rallying for a fresh resistance to
German attacks.]
PART IV--THE WESTERN FRONT