2. That the gods who were dreaded were, with the vulgar, who alone
dreaded them, merely impersonations of the powers of nature.
3. That it was physical injury which these gods were expected to
inflict.
But he himself agrees with this theory of mine; for he says shortly
after, that not only philosophers, but even the ancient Romans, had
separated superstition from religion; and that the word was first applied
to those who prayed all day ut liberi sui sibi superstites essent--might
survive them. On the etymology no one will depend who knows the
remarkable absence of any etymological instinct in the ancients, in
consequence of their weak grasp of that sound inductive method which has
created modern criticism. But if it be correct, it is a natural and
pathetic form for superstition to take in the minds of men who saw their
children fade and die; probably the greater number of them beneath
diseases which mankind could neither comprehend nor cure.
The best exemplification of what the ancients meant by superstition is to
be found in the lively and dramatic words of Aristotle's great pupil,
Theophrastus.
The superstitious man, according to him, after having washed his hands
with lustral water--that is, water in which a torch from the altar had
been quenched, goes about with a laurel-leaf in his mouth, to keep off
evil influences, as the pigs in Devonshire used, in my youth, to go about
with a withe of mountain ash round their necks to keep off the evil eye.
If a weasel crosses his path, he stops, and either throws three pebbles
into the road, or, with the innate selfishness of fear, lets some one
else go before him, and attract to himself the harm which may ensue. He
has a similar dread of a screech-owl, whom he compliments in the name of
its mistress, Pallas Athene. If he finds a serpent in his house, he sets
up an altar to it. If he pass at a four-cross-way an anointed stone, he
pours oil on it, kneels down, and adores it. If a rat has nibbled one of
his sacks he takes it for a fearful portent--a superstition which Cicero
also mentions. He dare not sit on a tomb, because it would be assisting
at his own funeral. He purifies endlessly his house, saying that
Hecate--that is, the moon--has exercised some malign influence on it; and
many other purifications he observes, of which I shall only say that they
are by their nature plainly, like the last, meant as preservatives
against unseen malarias or contagions, possible or impossible. He
assists every month with his children at the mysteries of the Orphic
priests; and finally, whenever he sees an epileptic patient, he spits in
his own bosom to avert the evil omen.
I have quoted, I believe, every fact given by Theophrastus; and you will
agree, I am sure, that the moving and inspiring element of such a
character is mere bodily fear of unknown evil. The only superstition
attributed to him which does not at first sight seem to have its root in
dread is that of the Orphic mysteries. But of them Muller says that the
Dionusos whom they worshipped "was an infernal deity, connected with
Hades, and was the personification, not merely of rapturous pleasure, but
of a deep sorrow for the miseries of human life." The Orphic societies
of Greece seem to have been peculiarly ascetic, taking no animal food
save raw flesh from the sacrificed ox of Dionusos. And Plato speaks of a
lower grade of Orphic priests, Orpheotelestai, "who used to come before
the doors of the rich, and promise, by sacrifices and expiatory songs, to
release them from their own sins, and those of their forefathers;" and
such would be but too likely to get a hearing from the man who was afraid
of a weasel or an owl.
Now, this same bodily fear, I verily believe, will be found at the root
of all superstition whatsoever.
But be it so. Fear is a natural passion, and a wholesome one. Without
the instinct of self-preservation, which causes the sea-anemone to
contract its tentacles, or the fish to dash into its hover, species would
be extermined wholesale by involuntary suicide.
Yes; fear is wholesome enough, like all other faculties, as long as it is
controlled by reason. But what if the fear be not rational, but
irrational? What if it be, in plain homely English, blind fear; fear of
the unknown, simply because it is unknown? Is it not likely, then, to be
afraid of the wrong object? to be hurtful, ruinous to animals as well as
to man? Any one will confess that, who has ever seen a horse inflict on
himself mortal injuries, in his frantic attempts to escape from a quite
imaginary danger. I have good reasons for believing that not only
animals here and there, but whole flocks and swarms of them, are often
destroyed, even in the wild state, by mistaken fear; by such panics, for
instance, as cause a whole herd of buffalos to rush over a bluff, and be
dashed to pieces. And remark that this capacity of panic, fear--of
superstition, as I should call it--is greatest in those animals, the dog
and the horse for instance, which have the most rapid and vivid fancy.
Does not the unlettered Highlander say all that I want to say, when he
attributes to his dog and his horse, on the strength of these very
manifestations of fear, the capacity of seeing ghosts and fairies before
he can see them himself?
But blind fear not only causes evil to the coward himself: it makes him a
source of evil to others; for it is the cruellest of all human states. It
transforms the man into the likeness of the cat, who, when she is caught
in a trap, or shut up in a room, has too low an intellect to understand
that you wish to release her; and, in the madness of terror, bites and
tears at the hand which tries to do her good. Yes; very cruel is blind
fear. When a man dreads he knows not what, he will do he cares not what.
When he dreads desperately, he will act desperately. When he dreads
beyond all reason, he will behave beyond all reason. He has no law of
guidance left, save the lowest selfishness. No law of guidance: and yet
his intellect, left unguided, may be rapid and acute enough to lead him
into terrible follies. Infinitely more imaginative than the lowest
animals, he is for that very reason capable of being infinitely more
foolish, more cowardly, more superstitious. He can--what the lower
animals, happily for them, cannot--organise his folly; erect his
superstitions into a science; and create a whole mythology out of his
blind fear of the unknown. And when he has done that--Woe to the weak!
For when he has reduced his superstition to a science, then he will
reduce his cruelty to a science likewise, and write books like the
Malleus Maleficarum, and the rest of the witch-literature of the
fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries; of which Mr. Lecky has
of late told the world so much, and told it most faithfully and most
fairly.
But, fear of the unknown? Is not that fear of the unseen world? And is
not that fear of the spiritual world? Pardon me: a great deal of that
fear--all of it, indeed, which is superstition--is simply not fear of the
spiritual, but of the material; and of nothing else.
The spiritual world--I beg you to fix this in your minds--is not merely
an invisible world which may become visible, but an invisible world which
is by its essence invisible; a moral world, a world of right and wrong.
And spiritual fear--which is one of the noblest of all affections, as
bodily fear is one of the basest--is, if properly defined, nothing less
or more than the fear of doing wrong; of becoming a worse man.
But what has that to do with mere fear of the unseen? The fancy which
conceives the fear is physical, not spiritual. Think for yourselves.
What difference is there between a savage's fear of a demon, and a
hunter's fear of a fall? The hunter sees a fence. He does not know what
is on the other side: but he has seen fences like it with a great ditch
on the other side, and suspects one here likewise. He has seen horses
fall at such, and men hurt thereby. He pictures to himself his horse
falling at that fence, himself rolling in the ditch, with possibly a
broken limb; and he recoils from the picture he himself has made; and
perhaps with very good reason. His picture may have its counterpart in
fact; and he may break his leg. But his picture, like the previous
pictures from which it was compounded, is simply a physical impression on
the brain, just as much as those in dreams.
Now, does the fact of the ditch, the fall, and the broken leg, being
unseen and unknown, make them a spiritual ditch, a spiritual fall, a
spiritual broken leg? And does the fact of the demon and his doings,
being as yet unseen and unknown, make them spiritual, or the harm that he
may do, a spiritual harm? What does the savage fear? Lest the demon
should appear; that is, become obvious to his physical senses, and
produce an unpleasant physical effect on them. He fears lest the fiend
should entice him into the bog, break the hand-bridge over the brook,
turn into a horse and ride away with him, or jump out from behind a tree
and wring his neck--tolerably hard physical facts, all of them; the
children of physical fancy, regarded with physical dread. Even if the
superstition proved true; even if the demon did appear; even if he wrung
the traveller's neck in sound earnest, there would be no more spiritual
agency or phenomenon in the whole tragedy than there is in the parlour
table, when spiritual somethings make spiritual raps upon spiritual wood;
and human beings, who are really spirits--and would to heaven they would
remember that fact, and what it means--believe that anything has happened
beyond a clumsy juggler's trick.
You demur? Do you not see that the demon, by the mere fact of having
produced physical consequences, would have become himself a physical
agent, a member of physical Nature, and therefore to be explained, he and
his doings, by physical laws? If you do not see that conclusion at first
sight, think over it till you do.
It may seem to some that I have founded my theory on a very narrow basis;
that I am building up an inverted pyramid; or that, considering the
numberless, complex, fantastic shapes which superstition has assumed,
bodily fear is too simple to explain them all.
But if those persons will think a second time, they must agree that my
base is as broad as the phenomena which it explains; for every man is
capable of fear. And they will see, too, that the cause of superstition
must be something like fear, which is common to all men: for all, at
least as children, are capable of superstition; and that it must be
something which, like fear, is of a most simple, rudimentary, barbaric
kind; for the lowest savage, of whatever he is not capable, is still
superstitious, often to a very ugly degree. Superstition seems, indeed,
to be, next to the making of stone-weapons, the earliest method of
asserting his superiority to the brutes which has occurred to that
utterly abnormal and fantastic lusus naturae called man.
Now let us put ourselves awhile, as far as we can, in the place of that
same savage; and try whether my theory will not justify itself; whether
or not superstition, with all its vagaries, may have been, indeed must
have been, the result of that ignorance and fear which he carried about
with him, every time he prowled for food through the primeval forest.
A savage's first division of nature would be, I should say, into things
which he can eat, and things which can eat him; including, of course, his
most formidable enemy, and most savoury food--his fellow-man. In finding
out what he can eat, we must remember, he will have gone through much
experience which will have inspired him with a serious respect for the
hidden wrath of nature; like those Himalayan folk, of whom Hooker says,
that as they know every poisonous plant, they must have tried them
all--not always with impunity.
So he gets at a third class of objects--things which he cannot eat, and
which will not eat him; but will only do him harm, as it seems to him,
out of pure malice, like poisonous plants and serpents. There are
natural accidents, too, which fall into the same category, stones,
floods, fires, avalanches. They hurt him or kill him, surely for ends of
their own. If a rock falls from the cliff above him, what more natural
than to suppose that there is some giant up there who threw it at him? If
he had been up there, and strong enough, and had seen a man walking
underneath, he would certainly have thrown the stone at him and killed
him. For first, he might have eaten the man after; and even if he were
not hungry, the man might have done him a mischief; and it was prudent to
prevent that, by doing him a mischief first. Besides, the man might have
a wife; and if he killed the man, then the wife would, by a very ancient
law common to man and animals, become the prize of the victor. Such is
the natural man, the carnal man, the soulish man, the [Greek text] of St.
Paul, with five tolerably acute senses, which are ruled by five very
acute animal passions--hunger, sex, rage, vanity, fear. It is with the
working of the last passion, fear, that this lecture has to do.
So the savage concludes that there must be a giant living in the cliff,
who threw stones at him, with evil intent; and he concludes in like wise
concerning most other natural phenomena. There is something in them
which will hurt him, and therefore likes to hurt him: and if he cannot
destroy them, and so deliver himself, his fear of them grows quite
boundless. There are hundreds of natural objects on which he learns to
look with the same eyes as the little boys of Teneriffe look on the
useless and poisonous _Euphorbia canariensis_. It is to them--according
to Mr. Piazzi Smyth--a demon who would kill them, if it could only run
after them; but as it cannot, they shout Spanish curses at it, and pelt
it with volleys of stones, "screeching with elfin joy, and using worse
names than ever, when the poisonous milk spurts out from its bruised
stalks."
And if such be the attitude of the uneducated man towards the permanent
terrors of nature, what will it be towards those which are sudden and
seemingly capricious?--towards storms, earthquakes, floods, blights,
pestilences? We know too well what it has been--one of blind, and
therefore often cruel, fear. How could it be otherwise? Was
Theophrastus's superstitious man so very foolish for pouring oil on every
round stone? I think there was a great deal to be said for him. This
worship of Baetyli was rational enough. They were aerolites, fallen from
heaven. Was it not as well to be civil to such messengers from above?--to
testify by homage to them due awe of the being who had thrown them at
men, and who though he had missed his shot that time, might not miss it
the next? I think if we, knowing nothing of either gunpowder, astronomy,
or Christianity, saw an Armstrong bolt fall within five miles of London,
we should be inclined to be very respectful to it indeed. So the
aerolites, or glacial boulders, or polished stone weapons of an extinct
race, which looked like aerolites, were the children of Ouranos the
heaven, and had souls in them. One, by one of those strange
transformations in which the logic of unreason indulges, the image of
Diana of the Ephesians, which fell down from Jupiter; another was the
Ancile, the holy shield which fell from the same place in the days of
Numa Pompilius, and was the guardian genius of Rome; and several more
became notable for ages.
Why not? The uneducated man of genius, unacquainted alike with
metaphysics and with biology, sees, like a child, a personality in every
strange and sharply-defined object. A cloud like an angel may be an
angel; a bit of crooked root like a man may be a man turned into
wood--perhaps to be turned back again at its own will. An erratic block
has arrived where it is by strange unknown means. Is not that an
evidence of its personality? Either it has flown hither itself, or some
one has thrown it. In the former case, it has life, and is
proportionally formidable; in the latter, he who had thrown it is
formidable.
I know two erratic blocks of porphyry--I believe there are three--in
Cornwall, lying one on serpentine, one, I think, on slate, which--so I
was always informed as a boy--were the stones which St. Kevern threw
after St. Just when the latter stole his host's chalice and paten, and
ran away with them to the Land's End. Why not? Before we knew anything
about the action of icebergs and glaciers, that is, until the last eighty
years, that was as good a story as any other; while how lifelike these
boulders are, let a great poet testify; for the fact has not escaped the
delicate eye of Wordsworth:
"As a huge stone is sometimes seen to lie
Couched on the bald top of an eminence;
Wonder to all who do the same espy,
By what means it could thither come, and whence,
So that it seems a thing endued with sense;
Like a sea-beast crawled forth, that on a shelf
Of rock or sand reposeth, there to sun itself."
To the civilised poet, the fancy becomes a beautiful simile; to a savage
poet, it would have become a material and a very formidable fact. He
stands in the valley, and looks up at the boulder on the far-off fells.
He is puzzled by it. He fears it. At last he makes up his mind. It is
alive. As the shadows move over it, he sees it move. May it not sleep
there all day, and prowl for prey all night? He had been always afraid
of going up those fells; now he will never go. There is a monster there.
Childish enough, no doubt. But remember that the savage is always a
child. So, indeed, are millions, as well clothed, housed, and policed as
ourselves--children from the cradle to the grave. But of them I do not
talk; because, happily for the world, their childishness is so overlaid
by the result of other men's manhood; by an atmosphere of civilisation
and Christianity which they have accepted at second-hand as the
conclusions of minds wiser than their own, that they do all manner of
reasonable things for bad reasons, or for no reason at all, save the
passion of imitation. Not in them, but in the savage, can we see man as
he is by nature, the puppet of his senses and his passions, the natural
slave of his own fears.
But has the savage no other faculties, save his five senses and five
passions? I do not say that. I should be most unphilosophical if I said
it; for the history of mankind proves that he has infinitely more in him
than that. Yes: but in him that infinite more, which is not only the
noblest part of humanity; but, it may be, humanity itself, is not to be
counted as one of the roots of superstition. For in the savage man, in
whom superstition certainly originates, that infinite more is still
merely in him; inside him; a faculty: but not yet a fact. It has not
come out of him into consciousness, purpose, and act; and is to be
treated as non-existent: while what has come out, his passions and
senses, is enough to explain all the vagaries of superstition; a vera
causa for all its phenomena. And if we seem to have found a sufficient
explanation already, it is unphilosophical to look further, at least till
we have tried whether our explanation fits the facts.
Nevertheless, there is another faculty in the savage, to which I have
already alluded, common to him and to at least the higher
vertebrates--fancy; the power of reproducing internal images of external
objects, whether in its waking form of physical memory--if, indeed, all
memory be not physical--or in its sleeping form of dreaming. Upon this
last, which has played so very important a part in superstition in all
ages, I beg you to think a moment. Recollect your own dreams during
childhood; and recollect again that the savage is always a child.
Recollect how difficult it was for you in childhood, how difficult it
must be always for the savage, to decide whether dreams are phantasms or
realities. To the savage, I doubt not, the food he eats, the foes he
grapples with, in dreams, are as real as any waking impressions. But,
moreover, these dreams will be very often, as children's dreams are wont
to be, of a painful and terrible kind. Perhaps they will be always
painful; perhaps his dull brain will never dream, save under the
influence of indigestion, or hunger, or an uncomfortable attitude. And
so, in addition to his waking experience of the terrors of nature, he
will have a whole dream-experience besides, of a still more terrific
kind. He walks by day past a black cavern mouth, and thinks, with a
shudder--Something ugly may live in that ugly hole: what if it jumped out
upon me? He broods over the thought with the intensity of a narrow and
unoccupied mind; and a few nights after, he has eaten--but let us draw a
veil before the larder of a savage--his chin is pinned down on his chest,
a slight congestion of the brain comes on; and behold he finds himself
again at that cavern's mouth, and something ugly does jump out upon him:
and the cavern is a haunted spot henceforth to him and to all his tribe.
It is in vain that his family tell him that he has been lying asleep at
home all the while. He has the evidence of his senses to prove the
contrary. He must have got out of himself, and gone into the woods. When
we remember that certain wise Greek philosophers could find no better
explanation of dreaming than that the soul left the body, and wandered
free, we cannot condemn the savage for his theory. Now, I submit that in
these simple facts we have a group of "true causes" which are the roots
of all the superstitions of the world.
And if any one shall complain that I am talking materialism: I shall
answer, that I am doing exactly the opposite. I am trying to eliminate
and get rid of that which is material, animal, and base; in order that
that which is truly spiritual may stand out, distinct and clear, in its
divine and eternal beauty.
To explain, and at the same time, as I think, to verify my hypothesis,
let me give you an example--fictitious, it is true, but probable fact
nevertheless; because it is patched up of many fragments of actual fact:
and let us see how, in following it out, we shall pass through almost
every possible form of superstition.
Suppose a great hollow tree, in which the formidable wasps of the tropics
have built for ages. The average savage hurries past the spot in mere
bodily fear; for if they come out against him, they will sting him to
death; till at last there comes by a savage wiser than the rest, with
more observation, reflection, imagination, independence of will--the
genius of his tribe.
The awful shade of the great tree, added to his terror of the wasps,
weighs on him, and excites his brain. Perhaps, too, he has had a wife or
a child stung to death by these same wasps. These wasps, so small, yet
so wise, far wiser than he: they fly, and they sting. Ah, if he could
fly and sting; how he would kill and eat, and live right merrily. They
build great towns; they rob far and wide; they never quarrel with each
other: they must have some one to teach them, to lead them--they must
have a king. And so he gets the fancy of a Wasp-King; as the western
Irish still believe in the Master Otter; as the Red Men believe in the
King of the Buffalos, and find the bones of his ancestors in the Mammoth
remains of Big-bone Lick; as the Philistines of Ekron--to quote a
notorious instance--actually worshipped Baal-zebub, lord of the flies.
If they have a king, he must be inside that tree, of course. If he, the
savage, were a king, he would not work for his bread, but sit at home and
make others feed him; and so, no doubt, does the wasp-king.
And when he goes home he will brood over this wonderful discovery of the
wasp-king; till, like a child, he can think of nothing else. He will go
to the tree, and watch for him to come out. The wasps will get
accustomed to his motionless figure, and leave him unhurt; till the new
fancy will rise in his mind that he is a favourite of this wasp-king: and
at last he will find himself grovelling before the tree, saying--"Oh
great wasp-king, pity me, and tell your children not to sting me, and I
will bring you honey, and fruit, and flowers to eat, and I will flatter
you, and worship you, and you shall be my king."
And then he would gradually boast of his discovery; of the new mysterious
bond between him and the wasp-king; and his tribe would believe him, and
fear him; and fear him still more when he began to say, as he surely
would, not merely--"I can ask the wasp-king, and he will tell his
children not to sting you:" but--"I can ask the wasp-king, and he will
send his children, and sting you all to death." Vanity and ambition will
have prompted the threat: but it will not be altogether a lie. The man
will more than half believe his own words; he will quite believe them
when he has repeated them a dozen times.
And so he will become a great man, and a king, under the protection of
the king of the wasps; and he will become, and it may be his children
after him, priest of the wasp-king, who will be their fetish, and the
fetish of their tribe.
And they will prosper, under the protection of the wasp-king. The wasp
will become their moral ideal, whose virtues they must copy. The new
chief will preach to them wild eloquent words. They must sting like
wasps, revenge like wasps, hold all together like wasps, build like
wasps, work hard like wasps, rob like wasps; then, like the wasps, they
will be the terror of all around, and kill and eat all their enemies.
Soon they will call themselves The Wasps. They will boast that their
king's father or grandfather, and soon that the ancestor of the whole
tribe, was an actual wasp; and the wasp will become at once their eponym
hero, their deity, their ideal, their civiliser; who has taught them to
build a kraal of huts, as he taught his children to build a hive.
Now, if there should come to any thinking man of this tribe, at this
epoch, the new thought--Who made the world? he will be sorely puzzled.
The conception of a world has never crossed his mind before. He never
pictured to himself anything beyond the nearest ridge of mountains; and
as for a Maker, that will be a greater puzzle still. What makers or
builders more cunning than those wasps of whom his foolish head is full?
Of course, he sees it now. A Wasp made the world; which to him entirely
new guess might become an integral part of his tribe's creed. That would
be their cosmogony. And if, a generation or two after, another savage
genius should guess that the world was a globe hanging in the heavens, he
would, if he had imagination enough to take the thought in at all, put it
to himself in a form suited to his previous knowledge and conceptions. It
would seem to him that The Wasp flew about the skies with the world in
his mouth, as he carries a bluebottle fly; and that would be the
astronomy of his tribe henceforth. Absurd enough; but--as every man who
is acquainted with old mythical cosmogonies must know--no more absurd
than twenty similar guesses on record. Try to imagine the gradual
genesis of such myths as the Egyptian scarabaeus and egg, or the Hindoo
theory that the world stood on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise,
the tortoise on that infinite note of interrogation which, as some one
expresses it, underlies all physical speculations, and judge: must they
not have arisen in some such fashion as that which I have pointed out?
This, I say, would be the culminating point of the wasp-worship, which
had sprung up out of bodily fear of being stung.
But times might come for it in which it would go through various changes,
through which every superstition in the world, I suppose, has passed or
is doomed to pass.
The wasp-men might be conquered, and possibly eaten, by a stronger tribe
than themselves. What would be the result? They would fight valiantly
at first, like wasps. But what if they began to fail? Was not the wasp-
king angry with them? Had not he deserted them? He must be appeased; he
must have his revenge. They would take a captive, and offer him to the
wasps. So did a North American tribe, in their need, some forty years
ago; when, because their maize-crops failed, they roasted alive a captive
girl, cut her to pieces, and sowed her with their corn. I would not tell
the story, for the horror of it, did it not bear with such fearful force
on my argument. What were those Red Men thinking of? What chain of
misreasoning had they in their heads when they hit on that as a device
for making the crops grow? Who can tell? Who can make the crooked
straight, or number that which is wanting? As said Solomon of old, so
must we--"The foolishness of fools is folly." One thing only we can say
of them, that they were horribly afraid of famine, and took that means of
ridding themselves of their fear.
But what if the wasp-tribe had no captives? They would offer slaves.
What if the agony and death of slaves did not appease the wasps? They
would offer their fairest, their dearest, their sons and their daughters,
to the wasps; as the Carthaginians, in like strait, offered in one day
200 noble boys to Moloch, the volcano-god, whose worship they had brought
out of Syria; whose original meaning they had probably forgotten; of whom
they only knew that he was a dark and devouring being, who must be
appeased with the burning bodies of their sons and daughters. And so the
veil of fancy would be lifted again, and the whole superstition stand
forth revealed as the mere offspring of bodily fear.
But more; the survivors of the conquest might, perhaps, escape, and carry
their wasp-fetish into a new land. But if they became poor and weakly,
their brains and imagination, degenerating with their bodies, would
degrade their wasp-worship till they knew not what it meant. Away from
the sacred tree, in a country the wasps of which were not so large or
formidable, they would require a remembrancer of the wasp-king; and they
would make one--a wasp of wood, or what not. After a while, according to
that strange law of fancy, the root of all idolatry, which you may see at
work in every child who plays with a doll, the symbol would become
identified with the thing symbolised; they would invest the wooden wasp
with all the terrible attributes which had belonged to the live wasps of
the tree; and after a few centuries, when all remembrance of the tree,
the wasp-prophet and chieftain, and his descent from the divine wasp--aye,
even of their defeat and flight--had vanished from their songs and
legends, they would be found bowing down in fear and trembling to a
little ancient wooden wasp, which came from they knew not whence, and
meant they knew not what, save that it was a very "old fetish," a "great
medicine," or some such other formula for expressing their own ignorance
and dread. Just so do the half-savage natives of Thibet, and the
Irishwomen of Kerry, by a strange coincidence--unless the ancient Irish
were Buddhists, like the Himalayans--tie just the same scraps of rag on
arise, and show men that they are not the puppets of Nature, but her
lords; and that they are to fear God, and fear naught else.
And so ends my true myth of the wasp-tree. No, it need not end there; it
may develop into a yet darker and more hideous form of superstition,
which Europe has often seen; which is common now among the Negros; {256}
which, we may hope, will soon be exterminated.
This might happen. For it, or something like it, has happened too many
times already.
That to the ancient women who still kept up the irrational remnant of the
wasp-worship, beneath the sacred tree, other women might resort; not
merely from curiosity, or an excited imagination, but from jealousy and
revenge. Oppressed, as woman has always been under the reign of brute
force; beaten, outraged, deserted, at best married against her will, she
has too often gone for comfort and help--and those of the very darkest
kind--to the works of darkness; and there never were wanting--there are
not wanting, even now, in remote parts of these isles--wicked old women
who would, by help of the old superstitions, do for her what she wished.
Soon would follow mysterious deaths of rivals, of husbands, of babes;
then rumours of dark rites connected with the sacred tree, with poison,
with the wasp and his sting, with human sacrifices; lies mingled with
truth, more and more confused and frantic, the more they were
misinvestigated by men mad with fear: till there would arise one of those
witch-manias, which are too common still among the African Negros, which
were too common of old among the men of our race.
I say, among the men. To comprehend a witch-mania, you must look at it
as--what the witch-literature confesses it unblushingly to be--man's
dread of Nature excited to its highest form, as dread of woman.
She is to the barbarous man--she should be more and more to the civilised
man--not only the most beautiful and precious, but the most wonderful and
mysterious of all natural objects, if it be only as the author of his
physical being. She is to the savage a miracle to be alternately adored
and dreaded. He dreads her more delicate nervous organisation, which
often takes shapes to him demoniacal and miraculous; her quicker
instincts, her readier wit, which seem to him to have in them somewhat
prophetic and superhuman, which entangle him as in an invisible net, and
rule him against his will. He dreads her very tongue, more crushing than
his heaviest club, more keen than his poisoned arrows. He dreads those
habits of secresy and falsehood, the weapons of the weak, to which savage
and degraded woman always has recourse. He dreads the very medicinal
skill which she has learnt to exercise, as nurse, comforter, and slave.
He dreads those secret ceremonies, those mysterious initiations which no
man may witness, which he has permitted to her in all ages, in so many--if
not all--barbarous and semi-barbarous races, whether Negro, American,
Syrian, Greek, or Roman, as a homage to the mysterious importance of her
who brings him into the world. If she turn against him--she, with all
her unknown powers, she who is the sharer of his deepest secrets, who
prepares his very food day by day--what harm can she not, may she not do?
And that she has good reason to turn against him, he knows too well. What
deliverance is there from this mysterious house-fiend, save brute force?
Terror, torture, murder, must be the order of the day. Woman must be
crushed, at all price, by the blind fear of the man.
I shall say no more. I shall draw a veil, for very pity and shame, over
the most important and most significant facts of this, the most hideous
of all human follies. I have, I think, given you hints enough to show
that it, like all other superstitions, is the child--the last born and
the ugliest child--of blind dread of the unknown.
SCIENCE: A lecture delivered at the Royal Institution.
I said, that Superstition was the child of Fear, and Fear the child of
Ignorance; and you might expect me to say antithetically, that Science
was the child of Courage, and Courage the child of Knowledge.
But these genealogies--like most metaphors--do not fit exactly, as you
may see for yourselves.
If fear be the child of ignorance, ignorance is also the child of fear;
the two react on, and produce each other. The more men dread Nature, the
less they wish to know about her. Why pry into her awful secrets? It is
dangerous; perhaps impious. She says to them, as in the Egyptian temple
of old--"I am Isis, and my veil no mortal yet hath lifted." And why
should they try or wish to lift it? If she will leave them in peace,
they will leave her in peace. It is enough that she does not destroy
them. So as ignorance bred fear, fear breeds fresh and willing
ignorance.
And courage? We may say, and truly, that courage is the child of
knowledge. But we may say as truly, that knowledge is the child of
courage. Those Egyptian priests in the temple of Isis would have told
you that knowledge was the child of mystery, of special illumination, of
reverence, and what not; hiding under grand words their purpose of
keeping the masses ignorant, that they might be their slaves. Reverence?
I will yield to none in reverence for reverence. I will all but agree
with the wise man who said that reverence is the root of all virtues. But
which child reverences his father most? He who comes joyfully and
trustfully to meet him, that he may learn his father's mind, and do his
will: or he who at his father's coming runs away and hides, lest he
should be beaten for he knows not what? There is a scientific reverence,
a reverence of courage, which is surely one of the highest forms of
reverence. That, namely, which so reveres every fact, that it dare not
overlook or falsify it, seem it never so minute; which feels that because
it is a fact, it cannot be minute, cannot be unimportant; that it must be
a fact of God; a message from God; a voice of God, as Bacon has it,
revealed in things; and which therefore, just because it stands in solemn
awe of such paltry facts as the Scolopax feather in a snipe's pinion, or
the jagged leaves which appear capriciously in certain honeysuckles,
believes that there is likely to be some deep and wide secret underlying
them, which is worth years of thought to solve. That is reverence; a
reverence which is growing, thank God, more and more common; which will
produce, as it grows more common still, fruit which generations yet
unborn shall bless.
But as for that other reverence, which shuts its eyes and ears in pious
awe--what is it but cowardice decked out in state robes, putting on the
sacred Urim and Thummim, not that men may ask counsel of the Deity, but
that they may not? What is it but cowardice, very pitiable when
unmasked; and what is its child but ignorance as pitiable, which would be
ludicrous were it not so injurious? If a man comes up to Nature as to a
parrot or a monkey, with this prevailing thought in his head--Will it
bite me?--will he not be pretty certain to make up his mind that it may
bite him, and had therefore best be left alone? It is only the man of
courage--few and far between--who will stand the chance of a first bite,
in the hope of teaching the parrot to talk, or the monkey to fire off a
gun. And it is only the man of courage--few and far between--who will
stand the chance of a first bite from Nature, which may kill him for
aught he knows--for her teeth, though clumsy, are very strong--in order
that he may tame her and break her in to his use by the very same method
by which that admirable inductive philosopher, Mr. Rarey, used to break
in his horses; first, by not being afraid of them; and next, by trying to
find out what they were thinking of. But after all, as with animals, so
with Nature; cowardice is dangerous. The surest method of getting bitten
by an animal is to be afraid of it; and the surest method of being
injured by Nature is to be afraid of it. Only as far as we understand
Nature are we safe from it; and those who in any age counsel mankind not
to pry into the secrets of the universe, counsel them not to provide for
their own life and well-being, or for their children after them. But how
few there have been in any age who have not been afraid of Nature. How
few have set themselves, like Rarey, to tame her by finding out what she
is thinking of. The mass are glad to have the results of science, as
they are to buy Mr. Rarey's horses after they are tamed: but for want of
courage or of wit, they had rather leave the taming process to some one
else. And therefore we may say that what knowledge of Nature we have--and
we have very little--we owe to the courage of those men--and they have
been very few--who have been inspired to face Nature boldly; and say--or,
what is better, act as if they were saying--"I find something in me which
I do not find in you; which gives me the hope that I can grow to
understand you, though you may not understand me; that I may become your
master, and not as now, you mine. And if not, I will know: or die in the
search."
It is to those men, the few and far between, in a very few ages and very
few countries, who have thus risen in rebellion against Nature, and
looked it in the face with an unquailing glance, that we owe what we call
Physical Science.
There have been four races--or rather a very few men of each four
races--who have faced Nature after this gallant wise.
First, the old Jews. I speak of them, be it remembered, exclusively from
an historical, and not a religious point of view.
These people, at a very remote epoch, emerged from a country highly
civilised, but sunk in the superstitions of nature-worship. They invaded
and mingled with tribes whose superstitions were even more debased,
silly, and foul than those of the Egyptians from whom they escaped. Their
own masses were for centuries given up to nature-worship. Now among
those Jews arose men--a very few--sages--prophets--call them what you
will, the men were inspired heroes and philosophers--who assumed towards
nature an attitude utterly different from the rest of their countrymen
and the rest of the then world; who denounced superstition and the dread
of nature as the parent of all manner of vice and misery; who for
themselves said boldly that they discerned in the universe an order, a
unity, a permanence of law, which gave them courage instead of fear. They
found delight and not dread in the thought that the universe obeyed a law
which could not be broken; that all things continued to that day
according to a certain ordinance. They took a view of Nature totally new
in that age; healthy, human, cheerful, loving, trustful, and yet
reverent--identical with that which happily is beginning to prevail in
our own day. They defied those very volcanic and meteoric phenomena of
their land, to which their countrymen were slaying their own children in
the clefts of the rocks, and, like Theophrastus' superstitious man,
pouring their drink-offerings on the smooth stones of the valley; and
declared that, for their part, they would not fear, though the earth was
moved, and though the hills were carried into the midst of the sea;
though the waters raged and swelled, and the mountains shook at the
tempest.
The fact is indisputable. And you must pardon me if I express my belief
that these men, if they had felt it their business to found a school of
inductive physical science, would, owing to that temper of mind, have
achieved a very signal success. I ground that opinion on the remarkable,
but equally indisputable fact, that no nation has ever succeeded in
perpetuating a school of inductive physical science, save those whose
minds have been saturated with this same view of Nature, which they
have--as an historic fact--slowly but thoroughly learnt from the writings
of these Jewish sages.
Such is the fact. The founders of inductive physical science were not
the Jews: but first the Chaldaeans, next the Greeks, next their pupils
the Romans--or rather a few sages among each race. But what success had
they? The Chaldaean astronomers made a few discoveries concerning the
motions of the heavenly bodies, which, rudimentary as they were, still
prove them to have been men of rare intellect. For a great and a patient
genius must he have been, who first distinguished the planets from the
fixed stars, or worked out the earliest astronomical calculation. But
they seem to have been crushed, as it were, by their own discoveries.
They stopped short. They gave way again to the primeval fear of Nature.
They sank into planet-worship. They invented, it would seem, that
fantastic pseudo-science of astrology, which lay for ages after as an
incubus on the human intellect and conscience. They became the magicians
and quacks of the old world; and mankind owed them thenceforth nothing
but evil. Among the Greeks and Romans, again, those sages who dared face
Nature like reasonable men, were accused by the superstitious mob as
irreverent, impious, atheists. The wisest of them all, Socrates, was
actually put to death on that charge; and finally, they failed. School
after school, in Greece and Rome, struggled to discover, and to get a
hearing for, some theory of the universe which was founded on something
like experience, reason, common sense. They were not allowed to
prosecute their attempt. The mud-ocean of ignorance and fear in which
they struggled so manfully was too strong for them; the mud-waves closed
over their heads finally, as the age of the Antonines expired; and the
last effort of Graeco-Roman thought to explain the universe was
Neoplatonism--the muddiest of the muddy--an attempt to apologise for, and
organise into a system, all the nature-dreading superstitions of the
Roman world. Porphyry, Plotinus, Proclus, poor Hypatia herself, and all
her school--they may have had themselves no bodily fear of Nature; for
they were noble souls. Yet they spent their time in justifying those who
had; in apologising for the superstitions of the very mob which they
despised: just as--it sometimes seems to me--some folk in these days are
like to end in doing; begging that the masses might be allowed to believe
in anything, however false, lest they should believe in nothing at all:
as if believing in lies could do anything but harm to any human being.
And so died the science of the old world, in a true second childhood,
just where it began.
The Jewish sages, I hold, taught that science was probable; the Greeks
and Romans proved that it was possible. It remained for our race, under
the teaching of both, to bring science into act and fact.
Many causes contributed to give them this power. They were a personally
courageous race. This earth has yet seen no braver men than the
forefathers of Christian Europe, whether Scandinavian or Teuton, Angle or
Frank. They were a practical hard-headed race, with a strong
appreciation of facts, and a strong determination to act on them. Their
laws, their society, their commerce, their colonisation, their migrations
by land and sea, proved that they were such. They were favoured,
moreover, by circumstances, or--as I should rather put it--by that divine
Providence which determined their times, and the bounds of their
habitation. They came in as the heritors of the decaying civilisation of
Greece and Rome; they colonised territories which gave to man special
fair play, but no more, in the struggle for existence, the battle with
the powers of Nature; tolerably fertile, tolerably temperate; with
boundless means of water communication; freer than most parts of the
world from those terrible natural phenomena, like the earthquake and the
hurricane, before which man lies helpless and astounded, a child beneath
the foot of a giant. Nature was to them not so inhospitable as to starve
their brains and limbs, as it has done for the Esquimaux or Fuegian; and
not so bountiful as to crush them by its very luxuriance, as it has
crushed the savages of the tropics. They saw enough of its strength to
respect it; not enough to cower before it: and they and it have fought it
out; and it seems to me, standing either on London Bridge or on a Holland
fen-dyke, that they are winning at last. But they had a sore battle: a
battle against their own fear of the unseen. They brought with them, out
of the heart of Asia, dark and sad nature-superstitions, some of which
linger among our peasantry till this day, of elves, trolls, nixes, and
what not. Their Thor and Odin were at first, probably, only the thunder
and the wind: but they had to be appeased in the dark marches of the
forest, where hung rotting on the sacred oaks, amid carcases of goat and
horse, the carcases of human victims. No one acquainted with the early
legends and ballads of our race, but must perceive throughout them all
the prevailing tone of fear and sadness. And to their own superstitions,
they added those of the Rome which they conquered. They dreaded the
Roman she-poisoners and witches, who, like Horace's Canidia, still
performed horrid rites in grave-yards and dark places of the earth. They
dreaded as magical the delicate images engraved on old Greek gems. They
dreaded the very Roman cities they had destroyed. They were the work of
enchanters. Like the ruins of St. Albans here in England, they were all
full of devils, guarding the treasures which the Romans had hidden. The
Caesars became to them magical man-gods. The poet Virgil became the
prince of necromancers. If the secrets of Nature were to be known, they
were to be known by unlawful means, by prying into the mysteries of the
old heathen magicians, or of the Mohammedan doctors of Cordova and
Seville; and those who dared to do so were respected and feared, and
often came to evil ends. It needed moral courage, then, to face and
interpret fact. Such brave men as Pope Gerbert, Roger Bacon, Galileo,
even Kepler, did not lead happy lives; some of them found themselves in
prison. All the medieval sages--even Albertus Magnus--were stigmatised
as magicians. One wonders that more of them did not imitate poor
Paracelsus, who, unable to get a hearing for his coarse common sense,
took--vain and sensual--to drinking the laudanum which he himself had
discovered, and vaunted as a priceless boon to men; and died as the fool
dieth, in spite of all his wisdom. For the "Romani nominis umbra," the
shadow of the mighty race whom they had conquered, lay heavy on our
forefathers for centuries. And their dread of the great heathens was
really a dread of Nature, and of the powers thereof. For when the
authority of great names has reigned unquestioned for many centuries,
those names become, to the human mind, integral and necessary parts of
Nature itself. They are, as it were, absorbed into it; they become its
laws, its canons, its demiurges, and guardian spirits; their words become
regarded as actual facts; in one word, they become a superstition, and
are feared as parts of the vast unknown; and to deny what they have said
is, in the minds of the many, not merely to fly in the face of reverent
wisdom, but to fly in the face of facts. During a great part of the
middle ages, for instance, it was impossible for an educated man to think
of Nature itself, without thinking first of what Aristotle had said of
her. Aristotle's dicta were Nature; and when Benedetti, at Venice,
opposed in 1585 Aristotle's opinions on violent and natural motion, there
were hundreds, perhaps, in the universities of Europe--as there certainly
were in the days of the immortal 'Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum'--who were
ready, in spite of all Benedetti's professed reverence for Aristotle, to
accuse him of outraging not only the father of philosophy, but Nature
itself and its palpable and notorious facts. For the restoration of
letters in the fifteenth century had not at first mended matters, so
strong was the dread of Nature in the minds of the masses. The minds of
men had sported forth, not toward any sound investigation of facts, but
toward an eclectic resuscitation of Neoplatonism; which endured, not
without a certain beauty and use--as let Spenser's 'Faery Queen' bear
witness--till the latter half of the seventeenth century.
After that time a rapid change began. It is marked by--it has been
notably assisted by--the foundation of our own Royal Society. Its causes
I will not enter into; they are so inextricably mixed, I hold, with
theological questions, that they cannot be discussed here. I will only
point out to you these facts: that, from the latter part of the
seventeenth century, the noblest heads and the noblest hearts of Europe
concentrated themselves more and more on the brave and patient
investigation of physical facts, as the source of priceless future
blessings to mankind; that the eighteenth century, which it has been the
fashion of late to depreciate, did more for the welfare of mankind, in
every conceivable direction, than the whole fifteen centuries before it;
that it did this good work by boldly observing and analysing facts; that
this boldness toward facts increased in proportion as Europe became
indoctrinated with the Jewish literature; and that, notably, such men as
Kepler, Newton, Berkeley, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Descartes, in whatsoever
else they differed, agreed in this, that their attitude towards Nature
was derived from the teaching of the Jewish sages. I believe that we are
not yet fully aware how much we owe to the Jewish mind, in the gradual
emancipation of the human intellect. The connection may not, of course,
be one of cause and effect; it may be a mere coincidence. I believe it
to be a cause; one of course of very many causes: but still an integral
cause. At least the coincidence is too remarkable a fact not to be
worthy of investigation.
I said, just now--The emancipation of the human intellect. I did not
say--Of science, or of the scientific intellect; and for this reason:
That the emancipation of science is the emancipation of the common mind
of all men. All men can partake of the gains of free scientific thought,
not merely by enjoying its physical results, but by becoming more
scientific men themselves.
Therefore it was, that though I began my first lecture by defining
superstition, I did not begin my second by defining its antagonist,
science. For the word science defines itself. It means simply
knowledge; that is, of course, right knowledge, or such an approximation
as can be obtained; knowledge of any natural object, its classification,
its causes, its effects; or in plain English, what it is, how it came
where it is, and what can be done with it.
And scientific method, likewise, needs no definition; for it is simply
the exercise of common sense. It is not a peculiar, unique,
professional, or mysterious process of the understanding: but the same
which all men employ, from the cradle to the grave, in forming correct
conclusions.
Every one who knows the philosophic writings of Mr. John Stuart Mill,
will be familiar with this opinion. But to those who have no leisure to
study him, I should recommend the reading of Professor Huxley's third
lecture on the origin of species.
In that he shows, with great logical skill, as well as with some humour,
how the man who, on rising in the morning, finds the parlour window open,
the spoons and teapot gone, the mark of a dirty hand on the window-sill,
and that of a hob-nailed boot outside, and comes to the conclusion that
some one has broken open the window and stolen the plate, arrives at that
hypothesis--for it is nothing more--by a long and complex train of
inductions and deductions, of just the same kind as those which,
according to the Baconian philosophy, are to be used for investigating
the deepest secrets of Nature.
This is true, even of those sciences which involve long mathematical
calculations. In fact, the stating of the problem to be solved is the
most important element in the calculation; and that is so thoroughly a
labour of common sense that an utterly uneducated man may, and often
does, state an abstruse problem clearly and correctly; seeing what ought
to be proved, and perhaps how to prove it, though he may be unable to
work the problem out, for want of mathematical knowledge.
But that mathematical knowledge is not--as all Cambridge men are surely
aware--the result of any special gift. It is merely the development of
those conceptions of form and number which every human being possesses;
and any person of average intellect can make himself a fair mathematician
if he will only pay continuous attention; in plain English, think enough
about the subject.
There are sciences, again, which do not involve mathematical calculation;
for instance, botany, zoology, geology, which are just now passing from
their old stage of classificatory sciences into the rank of organic ones.
These are, without doubt, altogether within the scope of the merest
common sense. Any man or woman of average intellect, if they will but
observe and think for themselves, freely, boldly, patiently, accurately,
may judge for themselves of the conclusions of these sciences, may add to
these conclusions fresh and important discoveries; and if I am asked for
a proof of what I assert, I point to 'Rain and Rivers,' written by no
professed scientific man, but by a colonel in the Guards, known to fame
only as one of the most perfect horsemen in the world.
Let me illustrate my meaning by an example. A man--I do not say a
geologist, but simply a man, squire or ploughman--sees a small valley,
say one of the side-glens which open into the larger valleys in the
Windsor forest district. He wishes to ascertain its age.
He has, at first sight, a very simple measure--that of denudation. He
sees that the glen is now being eaten out by a little stream, the product
of innumerable springs which arise along its sides, and which are fed
entirely by the rain on the moors above. He finds, on observation, that
this stream brings down some ten cubic yards of sand and gravel, on an
average, every year. The actual quantity of earth which has been removed
to make the glen may be several million cubic yards. Here is an easy sum
in arithmetic. At the rate of ten cubic yards a year, the stream has
taken several hundred thousand years to make the glen.
You will observe that this result is obtained by mere common sense. He
has a right to assume that the stream originally began the glen, because
he finds it in the act of enlarging it; just as much right as he has to
assume, if he finds a hole in his pocket, and his last coin in the act of
falling through it, that the rest of his money has fallen through the
same hole. It is a sufficient cause, and the simplest. A number of
observations as to the present rate of denudation, and a sum which any
railroad contractor can do in his head, to determine the solid contents
of the valley, are all that are needed. The method is that of science:
but it is also that of simple common sense. You will remember,
therefore, that this is no mere theory or hypothesis, but a pretty fair
and simple conclusion from palpable facts; that the probability lies with
the belief that the glen is some hundreds of thousands of years old; that
it is not the observer's business to prove it further, but other persons'
to disprove it, if they can.
But does the matter end here? No. And, for certain reasons, it is good
that it should not end here.
The observer, if he be a cautious man, begins to see if he can disprove
his own conclusion; moreover, being human, he is probably somewhat awed,
if not appalled, by his own conclusion. Hundreds of thousands of years
spent in making that little glen! Common sense would say that the longer
it took to make, the less wonder there was in its being made at last: but
the instinctive human feeling is the opposite. There is in men, and
there remains in them, even after they are civilised, and all other forms
of the dread of Nature have died out in them, a dread of size, of vast
space, of vast time; that latter, mind, being always imagined as space,
as we confess when we speak instinctively of a space of time. They will
not understand that size is merely a relative, not an absolute term; that
if we were a thousand times larger than we are, the universe would be a
thousand times smaller than it is; that if we could think a thousand
times faster than we do, time would be a thousand times longer than it
is; that there is One in whom we live, and move, and have our being, to
whom one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. I
believe this dread of size to be merely, like all other superstitions, a
result of bodily fear; a development of the instinct which makes a little
dog run away from a big dog. Be that as it may, every observer has it;
and so the man's conclusion seems to him strange, doubtful: he will
reconsider it.
Moreover, if he be an experienced man, he is well aware that first
guesses, first hypotheses, are not always the right ones; and if he be a
modest man, he will consider the fact that many thousands of thoughtful
men in all ages, and many thousands still, would say, that the glen can
only be a few thousand, or possibly a few hundred, years old. And he
will feel bound to consider their opinion; as far as it is, like his own,
drawn from facts, but no further.
So he casts about for all other methods by which the glen may have been
produced, to see if any one of them will account for it in a shorter
time.
1. Was it made by an earthquake? No; for the strata on both sides are
identical, at the same level, and in the same plane.
2. Or by a mighty current? If so, the flood must have run in at the
upper end, before it ran out at the lower. But nothing has run in at the
upper end. All round above are the undisturbed gravel beds of the
horizontal moor, without channel or depression.
3. Or by water draining off a vast flat as it was upheaved out of the
sea? That is a likely guess. The valley at its upper end spreads out
like the fingers of a hand, as the gullies in tide-muds do.
But that hypothesis will not stand. There is no vast unbroken flat
behind the glen. Right and left of it are other similar glens, parted
from it by long narrow ridges: these also must be explained on the same
hypothesis; but they cannot. For there could not have been
surface-drainage to make them all, or a tenth of them. There are no
other possible hypotheses; and so he must fall back on the original
theory--the rain, the springs, the brook; they have done it all, even as
they are doing it this day.
But is not that still a hasty assumption? May not their denuding power
have been far greater in old times than now?
Why should it? Because there was more rain then than now? That he must
put out of court; there is no evidence of it whatsoever.
Because the land was more friable originally? Well, there is a great
deal to be said for that. The experience of every countryman tells him
that bare or fallow land is more easily washed away than land under
vegetation. And no doubt, when these gravels and sands rose from the
sea, they were barren for hundreds of years. He has some measure of the
time required, because he can tell roughly how long it takes for sands
and shingles left by the sea to become covered with vegetation. But he
must allow that the friability of the land must have been originally much
greater than now, for hundreds of years.
But again, does that fact really cut off any great space of time from his
hundreds of thousands of years? For when the land first rose from the
sea, that glen was not there. Some slight bay or bend in the shore
determined its site. That stream was not there. It was split up into a
million little springs, oozing side by side from the shore, and having
each a very minute denuding power, which kept continually increasing by
combination as the glen ate its way inwards, and the rainfall drained by
all these little springs was collected into the one central stream. So
that when the ground being bare was most liable to be denuded, the water
was least able to do it; and as the denuding power of the water
increased, the land, being covered with vegetation, became more and more
able to resist it. All this he has seen, going on at the present day, in
the similar gullies worn in the soft strata of the South Hampshire coast;
especially round Bournemouth.
So the two disturbing elements in the calculation may be fairly set off
against each other, as making a difference of only a few thousands or
tens of thousands of years either way; and the age of the glen may fairly
be, if not a million years, yet such a length of years as mankind still
speak of with bated breath, as if forsooth it would do them some harm.
I trust that every scientific man in this room will agree with me, that
the imaginary squire or ploughman would have been conducting his
investigation strictly according to the laws of the Baconian philosophy.
You will remark, meanwhile, that he has not used a single scientific
term, or referred to a single scientific investigation; and has observed
nothing and thought nothing which might not have been observed and
thought by any one who chose to use his common sense, and not to be
afraid.
But because he has come round, after all this further investigation, to
something very like his first conclusion, was all that further
investigation useless? No--a thousand times, no. It is this very
verification of hypotheses which makes the sound ones safe, and destroys
the unsound. It is this struggle with all sorts of superstitions which
makes science strong and sure, and her march irresistible, winning ground
slowly, but never receding from it. It is this buffeting of adversity
which compels her not to rest dangerously upon the shallow sand of first
guesses, and single observations; but to strike her roots down, deep,
wide, and interlaced into the solid ground of actual facts.
It is very necessary to insist on this point. For there have been men in
all past ages--I do not say whether there are any such now, but I am
inclined to think that there will be hereafter--men who have tried to
represent scientific method as something difficult, mysterious, peculiar,
unique, not to be attained by the unscientific mass; and this not for the
purpose of exalting science, but rather of discrediting her. For as long
as the masses, educated or uneducated, are ignorant of what scientific
method is, they will look on scientific men, as the middle age looked on
necromancers, as a privileged, but awful and uncanny caste, possessed of
mighty secrets; who may do them great good, but may also do them great
harm.
Which belief on the part of the masses will enable these persons to
instal themselves as the critics of science, though not scientific men
themselves: and--as Shakespeare has it--to talk of Robin Hood, though
they never shot in his bow. Thus they become mediators to the masses
between the scientific and the unscientific worlds. They tell them--You
are not to trust the conclusions of men of science at first hand. You
are not fit judges of their facts or of their methods. It is we who
will, by a cautious eclecticism, choose out for you such of their
conclusions as are safe for you; and them we will advise you to believe.
To the scientific man, on the other hand, as often as anything is
discovered unpleasing to them, they will say, imperiously and e
cathedra--Your new theory contradicts the established facts of science.
For they will know well that whatever the men of science think of their
assertion, the masses will believe it; totally unaware that the speakers
are by their very terms showing their ignorance of science; and that what
they call established facts scientific men call merely provisional
conclusions, which they would throw away to-morrow without a pang were
the known facts explained better by a fresh theory, or did fresh facts
require one.
This has happened too often. It is in the interest of superstition that
it should happen again; and the best way to prevent it surely is to tell
the masses--Scientific method is no peculiar mystery, requiring a
peculiar initiation. It is simply common sense, combined with uncommon
courage, which includes uncommon honesty and uncommon patience; and if
you will be brave, honest, patient, and rational, you will need no
mystagogues to tell you what in science to believe and what not to
believe; for you will be just as good judges of scientific facts and
theories as those who assume the right of guiding your convictions. You
are men and women: and more than that you need not be.
And let me say that the man of our days whose writings exemplify most
thoroughly what I am going to say is the justly revered Mr. Thomas
Carlyle.
As far as I know he has never written on any scientific subject. For
aught I am aware of, he may know nothing of mathematics or chemistry, of
comparative anatomy or geology. For aught I am aware of, he may know a
great deal about them all, and, like a wise man, hold his tongue, and
give the world merely the results in the form of general thought. But
this I know; that his writings are instinct with the very spirit of
science; that he has taught men, more than any living man, the meaning
and end of science; that he has taught men moral and intellectual
courage; to face facts boldly, while they confess the divineness of
facts; not to be afraid of Nature, and not to worship nature; to believe
that man can know truth; and that only in as far as he knows truth can he
live worthily on this earth. And thus he has vindicated, as no other man
in our days has done, at once the dignity of Nature and the dignity of
spirit. That he would have made a distinguished scientific man, we may
be as certain from his writings as we may be certain, when we see a fine
old horse of a certain stamp, that he would have made a first-class
hunter, though he has been unfortunately all his life in harness.
Therefore, did I try to train a young man of science to be true, devout,
and earnest, accurate and daring, I should say--Read what you will: but
at least read Carlyle. It is a small matter to me--and I doubt not to
him--whether you will agree with his special conclusions: but his
premises and his method are irrefragable; for they stand on the
"voluntatem Dei in rebus revelatam"--on fact and common sense.
And Mr. Carlyle's writings, if I am correct in my estimate of them, will
afford a very sufficient answer to those who think that the scientific
habit of mind tends to irreverence.
Doubtless this accusation will always be brought against science by those
who confound reverence with fear. For from blind fear of the unknown,
science does certainly deliver man. She does by man as he does by an
unbroken colt. The colt sees by the road side some quite new object--a
cast-away boot, an old kettle, or what not. What a fearful monster! What
unknown terrific powers may it not possess! And the colt shies across
the road, runs up the bank, rears on end; putting itself thereby, as many
a man does, in real danger. What cure is there? But one; experience. So
science takes us, as we should take the colt, gently by the halter; and
makes us simply smell at the new monster; till after a few trembling
sniffs, we discover, like the colt, that it is not a monster, but a
kettle. Yet I think, if we sum up the loss and gain, we shall find the
colt's character has gained, rather than lost, by being thus disabused.
He learns to substitute a very rational reverence for the man who is
breaking him in, for a totally irrational reverence for the kettle; and
becomes thereby a much wiser and more useful member of society, as does
the man when disabused of his superstitions.
From which follows one result. That if science proposes--as she does--to
make men brave, wise, and independent, she must needs excite unpleasant
feelings in all who desire to keep men cowardly, ignorant, and slavish.
And that too many such persons have existed in all ages is but too
notorious. There have been from all time, goetai, quacks, powwow men,
rain-makers, and necromancers of various sorts, who having for their own
purposes set forth partial, ill-grounded, fantastic, and frightful
interpretations of nature, have no love for those who search after a
true, exact, brave, and hopeful one. And therefore it is to be feared,
or hoped, science and superstition will to the world's end remain
irreconcilable and internecine foes.
Conceive the feelings of an old Lapland witch, who has had for the last
fifty years all the winds in a sealskin bag, and has been selling fair
breezes to northern skippers at so much a puff, asserting her powers so
often, poor old soul, that she has got to half believe them
herself,--conceive, I say, her feelings at seeing her customers watch the
Admiralty storm-signals, and con the weather reports in the 'Times.'
Conceive the feelings of Sir Samuel Baker's African friend, Katchiba, the
rain-making chief, who possessed a whole housefull of thunder and
lightning--though he did not, he confessed, keep it in a bottle as they
do in England--if Sir Samuel had had the means, and the will, of giving
to Katchiba's Negros a course of lectures on electricity, with
appropriate experiments, and a real bottle full of real lightning among
the foremost.
It is clear that only two methods of self-defence would have been open to
the rain-maker: namely, either to kill Sir Samuel, or to buy his real
secret of bottling the lightning, that he might use it for his own ends.
The former method--that of killing the man of science--was found more
easy in ancient times; the latter in these modern ones. And there have
been always those who, too good-natured to kill the scientific man, have
patronised knowledge, not for its own sake, but for the use which may be
made of it; who would like to keep a tame man of science, as they would a
tame poet, or a tame parrot; who say--Let us have science by all means,
but not too much of it. It is a dangerous thing; to be doled out to the
world, like medicine, in small and cautious doses. You, the scientific
man, will of course freely discover what you choose. Only do not talk
too loudly about it: leave that to us. We understand the world, and are
meant to guide and govern it. So discover freely: and meanwhile hand
over your discoveries to us, that we may instruct and edify the populace
with so much of them as we think safe, while we keep our position
thereby, and in many cases make much money by your science. Do that, and
we will patronise you, applaud you, ask you to our houses; and you shall
be clothed in purple and fine linen, and fare sumptuously with us every
day. I know not whether these latter are not the worst enemies which
science has. They are often such excellent, respectable, orderly, well-
meaning persons. They desire so sincerely that everyone should be wise:
only not too wise. They are so utterly unaware of the mischief they are
doing. They would recoil with horror if they were told they were so many
Iscariots, betraying Truth with a kiss.
But science, as yet, has withstood both terrors and blandishments. In
old times, she endured being imprisoned and slain. She came to life
again. Perhaps it was the will of Him in whom all things live, that she
should live. Perhaps it was His spirit which gave her life.
She can endure, too, being starved. Her votaries have not as yet cared
much for purple and fine linen, and sumptuous fare. There are a very few
among them who, joining brilliant talents to solid learning, have risen
to deserved popularity, to titles, and to wealth. But even their
labours, it seems to me, are never rewarded in any proportion to the time
and the intellect spent on them, nor to the benefits which they bring to
mankind; while the great majority, unpaid and unknown, toil on, and have
to find in science her own reward. Better, perhaps, that it should be
so. Better for science that she should be free, in holy poverty, to go
where she will and say what she knows, than that she should be hired out
at so much a year to say things pleasing to the many, and to those who
guide the many. And so, I verily believe, the majority of scientific men
think. There are those among them who have obeyed very faithfully St.
Paul's precept, "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs
of this life." For they have discovered that they are engaged in a war--a
veritable war--against the rulers of darkness, against ignorance and its
twin children, fear and cruelty. Of that war they see neither the end
nor even the plan. But they are ready to go on; ready, with Socrates,
"to follow reason withersoever it leads;" and content, meanwhile, like
good soldiers in a campaign, if they can keep tolerably in line, and use
their weapons, and see a few yards ahead of them through the smoke and
the woods. They will come out somewhere at last; they know not where nor
when: but they will come out at last, into the daylight and the open
field; and be told then--perhaps to their own astonishment--as many a
gallant soldier has been told, that by simply walking straight on, and
doing the duty which lay nearest them, they have helped to win a great
battle, and slay great giants, earning the thanks of their country and of
mankind.
And, meanwhile, if they get their shilling a day of fighting-pay, they
are content. I had almost said, they ought to be content. For science
is, I verily believe, like virtue, its own exceeding great reward. I can
conceive few human states more enviable than that of the man to whom,
panting in the foul laboratory, or watching for his life under the tropic
forest, Isis shall for a moment lift her sacred veil, and show him, once
and for ever, the thing he dreamed not of; some law, or even mere hint of
a law, explaining one fact; but explaining with it a thousand more,
connecting them all with each other and with the mighty whole, till order
and meaning shoots through some old Chaos of scattered observations.
Is not that a joy, a prize, which wealth cannot give, nor poverty take
away? What it may lead to, he knows not. Of what use it may become, he
knows not. But this he knows, that somewhere it must lead; of some use
it will be. For it is a truth; and having found a truth, he has
exorcised one more of the ghosts which haunt humanity. He has left one
object less for man to fear; one object more for man to use. Yes, the
scientific man may have this comfort, that whatever he has done, he has
done good; that he is following a mistress who has never yet conferred
aught but benefits on the human race.
What physical science may do hereafter I know not; but as yet she has
done this:
She has enormously increased the wealth of the human race; and has
therefore given employment, food, existence, to millions who, without
science, would either have starved or have never been born. She has
shown that the dictum of the early political economists, that population
has a tendency to increase faster than the means of subsistence, is no
law of humanity, but merely a tendency of the barbaric and ignorant man,
which can be counteracted by increasing manifold by scientific means his
powers of producing food. She has taught men, during the last few years,
to foresee and elude the most destructive storms; and there is no reason
for doubting, and many reasons for hoping, that she will gradually teach
men to elude other terrific forces of nature, too powerful and too
seemingly capricious for them to conquer. She has discovered innumerable
remedies and alleviations for pains and disease. She has thrown such
light on the causes of epidemics, that we are able to say now that the
presence of cholera--and probably of all zymotic diseases--in any place,
is usually a sin and a shame, for which the owners and authorities of
that place ought to be punishable by law, as destroyers of their fellow-
men; while for the weak, for those who, in the barbarous and
semi-barbarous state--and out of that last we are only just emerging--how
much has she done; an earnest of much more which she will do? She has
delivered the insane--I may say by the scientific insight of one man,
more worthy of titles and pensions than nine-tenths of those who earn
them--I mean the great and good Pinel--from hopeless misery and torture
into comparative peace and comfort, and at least the possibility of cure.
For children, she has done much, or rather might do, would parents read
and perpend such books as Andrew Combe's and those of other writers on
physical education. We should not then see the children, even of the
rich, done to death piecemeal by improper food, improper clothes, neglect
of ventilation and the commonest measures for preserving health. We
should not see their intellects stunted by Procrustean attempts to teach
them all the same accomplishments, to the neglect, most often, of any
sound practical training of their faculties. We should not see slight
indigestion, or temporary rushes of blood to the head, condemned and
punished as sins against Him who took up little children in His arms and
blessed them.
But we may have hope. When we compare education now with what it was
even forty years ago, much more with the stupid brutality of the monastic
system, we may hail for children, as well as for grown people, the advent
of the reign of common sense.
And for woman--What might I not say on that point? But most of it would
be fitly discussed only among physicians and biologists: here I will say
only this--Science has exterminated, at least among civilised nations,
witch-manias. Women--at least white women--are no longer tortured or
burnt alive from man's blind fear of the unknown. If science had done no
more than that, she would deserve the perpetual thanks and the perpetual
trust, not only of the women whom she has preserved from agony, but the
men whom she has preserved from crime.
These benefits have already accrued to civilised men, because they have
lately allowed a very few of their number peaceably to imitate Mr. Rarey,
and find out what nature--or rather, to speak at once reverently and
accurately, He who made nature--is thinking of; and obey the "voluntatem
Dei in rebus revelatam." This science has done, while yet in her
infancy. What she will do in her maturity, who dare predict? At least,
in the face of such facts as these, those who bid us fear, or restrain,
or mutilate science, bid us commit an act of folly, as well as of
ingratitude, which can only harm ourselves. For science has as yet done
nothing but good. Will any one tell me what harm it has ever done? When
any one will show me a single result of science, of the knowledge of and
use of physical facts, which has not tended directly to the benefit of
mankind, moral and spiritual, as well as physical and economic--then I
shall be tempted to believe that Solomon was wrong when he said that the
one thing to be sought after on earth, more precious than all treasure,
she who has length of days in her right hand, and in her left hand riches
and honour, whose ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are
peace, who is a tree of life to all who lay hold on her, and makes happy
every one who retains her, is--as you will see if you will yourselves
consult the passage--that very Wisdom--by which God has founded the
earth; and that very Understanding--by which He has established the
heavens.