American army inoculated.... General Heath moves to
Kingsbridge.... Returns to Peekskill.... Destruction of
stores at Peekskill.... At Danbury.... Expedition to Sagg
Harbour.... Camp formed at Middlebrook.... Sir William Howe
moves out to Somerset Court House.... Returns to Amboy....
Attempts to cut off the retreat of the American army to
Middlebrook.... Lord Cornwallis skirmishes with Lord
Stirling.... General Prescot surprised and taken.... The
British army embarks.
{1777}
The effect of the proclamation published by Lord and General Howe on
taking possession of New Jersey, was, in a great degree, counteracted
by the conduct of the invading army. Fortunately for the United
States, the hope that security was attainable by submission, was soon
dissipated. Whatever may have been the exertions of their General to
restrain his soldiers, they still considered and treated the
inhabitants rather as conquered rebels than returning friends.
Indulging in every species of licentiousness, the plunder and
destruction of property were among the least offensive of the injuries
they inflicted. The persons, not only of the men, but of that sex
through which indignities least to be forgiven, and longest to be
remembered, are received, were exposed to the most irritating outrage.
Nor were these excesses confined to those who had been active in the
American cause. The lukewarm, and even the loyalists, were the victims
of this indiscriminating spirit of rapine and violence.
The effect of such proceedings on a people whose country had never
before been the seat of war, and whose non-resistance had been
occasioned solely by the expectation of that security which had been
promised as the reward of submission to the royal authority, could not
fail to equal the most sanguine hopes of the friends of the
revolution. A sense of personal wrongs produced a temper which
national considerations had proved too weak to excite; and, when the
battles of Trenton and Princeton relieved the inhabitants from fears
inspired by the presence of their invaders, the great body of the
people flew to arms; and numbers who could not be brought into the
field to check the advancing enemy, and prevent the ravages which
uniformly afflict a country that becomes the seat of war, were prompt
in avenging those ravages. Small bodies of militia scoured the
country, seized on stragglers, behaved unexceptionably well in several
slight skirmishes, and were collecting in such numbers as to threaten
the weaker British posts with the fate which had befallen Trenton and
Princeton.
To guard against that spirit of enterprise which his adversary had
displayed to such advantage, General Howe determined to strengthen his
posts by contracting them. The position taken for the purpose of
covering the country were abandoned; and the British force in New
Jersey was collected at New Brunswick, on the Raritan, and at Amboy, a
small town at the mouth of that river.
Feeble as was the American army, this movement was not effected
without some loss. On the evacuation of Elizabeth town, General
Maxwell attacked the British rear, and captured about seventy men with
a part of their baggage.
The American troops had been so diminished by the extreme severity of
the service, that it was with much difficulty the appearance of an
army could be maintained. Fresh militia and volunteers arrived in
camp, whose numbers were exaggerated by report. These additions to his
small remaining regular force enabled the General to take different
positions near the lines of the enemy, to harass him perpetually,
restrain his foraging parties, and produce considerable distress in
his camp.
{January 12.}
While, with little more than an imaginary army, General Washington
thus harassed and confined his adversary, he came to the hazardous
resolution of freeing himself and his troops from the fear of a
calamity which he found it impossible to elude, and which had proved
more fatal in his camp than the sword of the enemy.
[Sidenote: American army inoculated.]
Inoculation having been rarely practised in the western world, the
American youth remained liable to the small pox. Notwithstanding the
efforts to guard against this disease, it had found its way into both
the northern and middle army, and had impaired the strength of both to
an alarming degree. To avoid the return of the same evil, the General
determined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. With
the utmost secrecy, preparations were made to give the infection in
camp; and the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered to
carry all the southern troops, as they should arrive, through the
disease. Similar orders were also given to the physicians at other
places; and thus an army exempt from the fear of a calamity which had,
at all times, endangered the most important operations, was prepared
for the ensuing campaign. This example was followed through the
country; and this alarming disease was no longer the terror of
America.
As the main body of the British army was cantoned in Jersey, and a
strong detachment occupied Rhode Island, General Washington believed
that New York could not be perfectly secure. His intelligence
strengthened this opinion; and, as an army, respectable in point of
numbers, had been assembled about Peekskill, he ordered General Heath
to approach New York for the purpose of foraging, and, should
appearances favour the attempt, of attacking the forts which guarded
the entrance into the island. The hope was entertained that General
Howe, alarmed for New York, might either withdraw his troops from
Jersey, or so weaken his posts in that state as to endanger them.
Should this hope be disappointed, it was believed that something
handsome might be done, either on York or Long Island.
[Sidenote: General Heath moves down to Kingsbridge, but returns to
Peekskill without effecting anything.]
In pursuance of this plan, General Heath marched down to West Chester,
and summoned fort Independence to surrender; but, the garrison
determining to hold the place, a council of war deemed it unadviseable
to risk an assault. An embarkation of troops which took place, about
that time, at Rhode Island, alarmed General Heath for his rear, and
induced him to resume his ground in the Highlands.
Though this attempt entirely failed, the Commander-in-chief still
meditated important operations during the winter. All the intelligence
from Europe demonstrated the necessity of these operations, and the
fallacy of the hope, still extensively cherished, that the war would
be abandoned by Great Britain. The administration was still supported
by great majorities in parliament; and the nation seemed well disposed
to employ all its means to reannex to the empire, what were still
denominated, revolted colonies. It was not to be doubted that large
reinforcements would arrive in the spring; and the safety of the
nation would be in hazard should General Howe remain in full force
till they should be received. The utmost efforts were made by the
Commander-in-chief to collect a sufficient number of troops to enable
him to give a decisive blow to some one of the positions of his enemy.
The state sovereignties, where the real energies of government
resided, were incessantly urged to fill their regiments, and to bring
their quotas into the field; and congress, at his instance, passed
resolutions authorizing him to draw the troops from Peekskill, and to
call out the militia of the neighbouring states. "It being," these
resolutions proceed to say, "the earnest desire of congress, to make
the army under the immediate command of General Washington
sufficiently strong, not only to curb and confine the enemy within
their present quarters, and prevent their drawing support of any kind
from the country, but, by the divine blessing, totally to subdue them
before they can be reinforced."
These resolves were communicated to the general, in a letter,
manifesting the confident expectation of congress that the desire
expressed in them would soon be realized. But the energy displayed in
their passage could not be maintained in their execution.
Many causes concurred to prevent the collection of a force competent
to those vigorous operations which the enterprising genius of the
Commander-in-chief had provisionally planned, and the sanguine temper
of congress had anticipated. Some of the state assemblies did not even
complete the appointment of officers till the spring; and then, bitter
contests concerning rank remained to be adjusted when the troops
should join the army. After these arrangements were made, the
difficulty of enlisting men was unexpectedly great. The immense
hardships to which the naked soldiers had been exposed, during a
winter campaign, in the face of a superior enemy; the mortality
resulting from those hardships, and probably from an injudicious
arrangement of the hospital department which was found to be the tomb
of the sick; had excited a general disgust to the service; and a
consequent unwillingness to engage in it.
From these causes the army continued so feeble that the general,
instead of being able to execute the great designs he had meditated,
entertained serious fears that Sir William Howe would take the field
during the winter, force his positions, cross the Delaware on the ice,
and proceed to Philadelphia. In the apprehension of this attempt, and
to avoid that confusion which would result from the removal of stores
in the crisis of military operations, he had taken the precaution, as
soon as the armies were in winter quarters, to convey those which were
most valuable, to a distance from the route which it was supposed the
British army would pursue.
{March 4.}
The real condition of the army is exhibited in a letter from the
Commander-in-chief to congress, in answer to that which enclosed the
resolutions already mentioned, and which expressed the brilliant
schemes of victory formed by the government. "Could I," said the
general, "accomplish the important objects so eagerly wished by
congress; confining the enemy within their present quarters,
preventing their getting supplies from the country, and totally
subduing them before they are reinforced, I should be happy indeed.
But what prospect or hope can there be of my effecting so desirable a
work at this time? The enclosed return,[56] to which I solicit the
most serious attention of congress, comprehends the whole force I have
in Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion on the scale
of numbers to that of the enemy. Added to this, the major part is made
up of militia. The most sanguine in speculation can not deem it more
than adequate to the least valuable purposes of war."
[Footnote 56: See note No. VIII. at the end of the volume.]
[Sidenote: Skirmishes.]
Though unable to act with the vigour he wished, the American general
kept up a war of skirmishes through the winter. In the course of it,
the British loss was believed to be considerable; and hopes were
entertained that, from the scarcity of forage, neither their cavalry
nor draft horses would be in a condition to take the field when the
campaign should open. Their foraging parties were often attacked to
advantage. Frequent small successes, the details of which filled the
papers throughout the United States, not only increased the confidence
of the American soldiers, but served greatly to animate the people.
[Sidenote: State of the army.]
The hope of collecting a sufficient force during the winter to make
any valuable impression on the British army being disappointed, the
views of the General were directed to the next campaign.
As the new army was to be raised by the authority of the state
governments, he urged on them the necessity of bringing a respectable
force into the field early in the spring, with all the earnestness
which was suggested by his situation, and zeal for the service.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the country was laid off into
districts, each of which was required, by a given day, to furnish a
soldier enlisted for three years, or during the war; in default of
which, one person, from those capable of bearing arms, was to be
drafted to serve until the first of the ensuing January. The
Commander-in-chief, though still deprecating the introduction of men
into the army whose terms of service would be of short duration, felt
the necessity of submitting to this expedient, as the most eligible
which could now be adopted.
In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended enlistments, it was
proposed by the executive to fill the regiments with volunteers, who
should engage to serve for six months. This plan was submitted to
General Washington by Governor Henry, and his opinion asked upon it.
"I am under the necessity of observing," said the General in reply,
"that the volunteer plan which you mention will never answer any
valuable purpose, and that I can not but disapprove the measure. To
the short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed
almost every misfortune that we have experienced."
In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, enforcing earnestly the
necessity of bringing a sufficient army into the field, though
coercive measures should be adopted, some alternatives were suggested,
which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of various
experiments to furnish the quota of troops required from that state.
As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties,
growing out of the organization of the American system, unfolded
themselves. As every state was exposed to invasion, and the command of
the ocean enabled the British general to transfer the war, at
pleasure, to any part of the Union, the attention of each was directed
exclusively to its particular situation. Each state in the
neighbourhood of the great theatre of action, contemplating its own
danger, claimed the protection which is due from the whole to its
parts. Although the object of the confederation was the same with that
pursued by each of its members, the spirit incident to every league
could not be controlled in an empire where, notwithstanding the
existence of a head, the essentials of government resided in the
members. It was displayed in repeated efforts to give to the energies
of the army such various directions, as would leave it unable to
effect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy might
form. The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampled
confidence placed by all the state governments in the
Commander-in-chief, prevented the mischiefs this spirit is so well
calculated to generate. His representations made their proper
impression; and the intention of retaining continental troops for
local defence was abandoned, though with some reluctance. The burden,
however, of calling militia from their domestic avocations, at every
threat of invasion, to watch every military post in each state, became
so intolerable, that the people cast about for other expedients to
relieve themselves from its weight. The plan of raising regular corps,
to be exclusively under state authority, and thus be a perpetual
substitute for the yeomanry of the country, presented itself as the
most effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts from
insult.
During the winter, General Howe kept his troops in their quarters,
attending to their comfort. As the season for more active operations
approached, his first attention was directed to the destruction of the
scanty supplies prepared by the Americans for the ensuing campaign. A
small place on the Hudson called Peekskill, about fifty miles above
New York, was generally the residence of the officer commanding in the
Highlands, and was used for the reception of stores, to be distributed
into the neighbouring posts as occasion might require. Its strength,
like that of all others depending for defence on militia, was subject
to great fluctuation. As soon as the ice was out of the river, General
Howe took advantage of its occasional weakness, to carry on an
expedition against it, for the purpose of destroying the stores there
deposited, or of bringing them away.
{March 23.}
[Sidenote: Destruction of stores at Peekskill.]
Colonel Bird was detached up the river on this service, with about
five hundred men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels.
General M'Dougal, whose numbers did not at that time exceed two
hundred and fifty men, received timely notice of his approach, and
exerted himself for the removal of the stores into the strong country
in his rear. Before this could be effected, Colonel Bird appeared; and
M'Dougal, after setting fire to the remaining stores and barracks,
retired into the strong grounds in the rear of Peekskill. The British
detachment completed the conflagration, and returned to New York.
During their short stay, a piquet guard was attacked by Colonel
Willet, and driven in with the loss of a few men; a circumstance,
believed by General M'Dougal, to have hastened the re-embarkation of
the detachment.
[Sidenote: At Danbury.]
{April.}
Military stores to a considerable amount had likewise been deposited
at Danbury, on the western frontier of Connecticut. Although this
place is not more than twenty miles from the Sound, yet the roughness
of the intervening country, the frequent passage of troops from the
eastward through the town, and the well known zeal of the neighbouring
militia, were believed sufficient to secure the magazines collected at
it. Against Danbury an expedition was projected; and two thousand men
under the command of Governor Tryon, major general of the provincials
in the British service, assisted by Brigadiers Agnew and Sir William
Erskine, were employed in it.
{April 28.}
On the 25th of April the fleet appeared off the coast of Connecticut;
and in the evening the troops were landed without opposition between
Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then casually in that part of
the country, immediately despatched expresses to assemble the militia.
In the mean time Tryon proceeded to Danbury, which he reached about
two the next day. On his approach, Colonel Huntingdon, who had
occupied the town with about one hundred and fifty men, retired to a
neighbouring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was
consumed by fire. General Arnold, who was also in the state
superintending the recruiting service, joined General Silliman at
Reading, where that officer had collected about five hundred militia.
General Wooster, who had resigned his commission in the continental
service, and been appointed major general of the militia, fell in with
them at the same place, and they proceeded in the night through a
heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury. Having heard
next morning that Tryon, after destroying the town and magazines, was
returning, they divided their troops; and General Wooster, with about
three hundred men, fell in his rear, while Arnold, with about five
hundred, crossing the country, took post in his front at Ridgefield.
Wooster came up with his rear about eleven in the morning, attacked it
with great gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which he was
mortally wounded,[57] and his troops were repulsed. Tryon then
proceeded to Ridgefield, where he found Arnold already intrenched on a
strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his passage. A warm
skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour. Arnold was at length
driven from the field; after which he retreated to Paugatuck, about
three miles east of Norwalk. At break of day next morning, after
setting Ridgefield on fire, the British resumed their march. About
eleven in the forenoon, they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers
increased during the day to rather more than one thousand men; among
whom were some continental troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up
until five in the afternoon, when the British formed on a hill near
their ships. The Americans attacked them with intrepidity, but were
repulsed and broken. Tryon, availing himself of this respite,
re-embarked his troops, and returned to New York.
[Footnote 57: Congress voted a monument to his memory.]
The loss of the British amounted to about one hundred and seventy men.
That of the Americans, was represented by Tryon, as being much more
considerable. By themselves, it was not admitted to exceed one
hundred. In this number, however, were comprehended General Wooster,
Lieutenant Colonel Gould, and another field officer, killed; and
Colonel Lamb wounded. Several other officers and volunteers were
killed. Military and hospital stores to a considerable amount, which
were greatly needed by the army, were destroyed in the magazines at
Danbury; but the loss most severely felt was rather more than one
thousand tents, which had been provided for the campaign about to
open.
Not long afterwards this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A
British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting
forage and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposed
this part of the country to be so completely secured by the armed
vessels which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided the
protection of the stores, deposited at a small port called Sagg
Harbour, to a schooner with twelve guns, and a company of infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of Colonel Meigs to Sagg Harbour.]
{May.}
{May 24.}
General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinking
it practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design of
surprising this party, and other adjacent posts, the execution of
which was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer,
who had accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. He
embarked with about two hundred and thirty men, on board thirteen
whale boats, and proceeded along the coast to Guilford, where he was
to cross the Sound. With about one hundred and seventy of his
detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded across the
Sound to the north division of the island near South Hold, in the
neighbourhood of which a small foraging party, against which the
expedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie; but they had
marched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed across
the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which deeply
intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troops
re-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in the morning,
about four miles from Sagg Harbour, which place they completely
surprised, and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time, a
division of the detachment secured the armed schooner, and the vessels
laden with forage, which were set on fire, and entirely consumed. Six
of the enemy were killed, and ninety taken prisoners. A very few
escaped under cover of the night.
The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man,
Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as
was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon
celerity, as to have transported his men, by land and water, ninety
miles in twenty-five hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented
to him, and passed a resolution expressing the high sense entertained
of his merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valour, displayed by
himself and his party.
The exertions made by the Commander-in-chief through the winter to
raise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign, had not been
successful. The hopes respecting its strength which the flattering
reports made from every quarter had authorized him to form, were
cruelly disappointed; and he found himself not only unable to carry
into effect the offensive operations he had meditated, but unequal
even to defensive war. That steady and persevering courage, however,
which had supported himself and the American cause through the gloomy
scenes of the preceding year, did not forsake him; and that sound
judgment which applies to the best advantage those means which are
attainable, however inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan
of operations was adapted to that which he believed his enemy had
formed. He was persuaded either that General Burgoyne would endeavour
to take Ticonderoga, and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which event
General Howe would co-operate with him by moving up that river, and
attempting to possess himself of the forts and high grounds commanding
its passage; or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New York by
sea; after which the combined armies would proceed against
Philadelphia.
To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to
defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,
and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him,
in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such
an arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to
aid each other, without neglecting objects of great, and almost equal
magnitude which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect
these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided
between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North
Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed
in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that weak quarter of
the union for its protection.
[Sidenote: Camp formed at Middlebrook.]
These arrangements being made, and the recruits collected, the camp at
Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army
assembled at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of strong and
commanding heights, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and
about ten miles from Brunswick.
This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, was
rendered still more defensible by intrenchments. The heights in front
commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to
Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of
the country between that place and Amboy; so as to afford a full view
of the most interesting movements of the enemy.
The force brought into the field by America required all the aid which
could be derived from strong positions, and unremitting vigilance. On
the 20th of May, the total of the army in Jersey, excluding cavalry
and artillery, amounted to only eight thousand three hundred and
seventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. The
effective rank and file were only five thousand seven hundred and
thirty-eight.
Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its
inferiority, in point of numbers, must have limited its operations to
defensive war; and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of
any place, whose defence would require a battle in the open field. But
more than half the troops[58] were unacquainted with the first
rudiments of military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face.
As an additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of the
soldiers, especially from the middle states, were foreigners, many of
them servants, in whose attachment to the American cause full
confidence could not be placed.
[Footnote 58: The extreme severity of the service, aided
perhaps by the state of the hospitals, had carried to the
grave more than two-thirds of the soldiers who had served
the preceding campaign, and been engaged for more than one
year.]
General Washington, anticipating a movement by land towards
Philadelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders for assembling
on the western bank of the Delaware, an army of militia, strengthened
by a few continental troops, the command of which was given to General
Arnold, who was then in Philadelphia, employed in the settlement of
his accounts.
The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of General
Howe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march
through Jersey; and, after securing the submission of that state, to
cross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for
the purpose, and proceed by land to that city. If, in the execution of
this plan, the Americans could be brought to a general action on equal
ground, the advantages of the royal army must insure a victory. But
should Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over the
Delaware, the object would be as certainly obtained.
Had Sir William Howe taken the field before the continental troops
were assembled, this plan might probably have been executed without
any serious obstruction; but the tents and camp equipage expected from
Europe did not arrive until General Washington had collected his
forces, and taken possession of the strong post on the heights of
Middlebrook. It would be dangerous to attack him on such advantageous
ground; for, although his camp might be forced, victory would probably
be attended with such loss, as to disable the victor from reaping its
fruits.
If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at
Middlebrook, an attempt to cross the Delaware, in the face of an army
collected on its western bank, while that under General Washington
remained unbroken in his rear, was an experiment of equal danger. It
comported with the cautious temper of Sir William Howe to devise some
other plan of operation to which he might resort, should he be unable
to seduce the American general from his advantageous position.
The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the
alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manoeuvre
General Washington out of his present encampment.
{June.}
{June 12.}
The plan of the campaign being settled, and some small reinforcements
with the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, General
Howe, leaving a garrison in New York, and a guard in Amboy, assembled
his army at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to
penetrate through the country to the Delaware, and reach Philadelphia
by land.
Believing this to be his real design, Washington placed a select corps
of riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, an officer who had
distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and
in whom those peculiar qualities which fit a man for the command of a
partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy,
were eminently united.
He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's Bridge on the Raritan,
just above its confluence with the Millstone River, to watch the left
flank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it.
[Sidenote: Sir William Howe moves out to Somerset Court House in great
force.]
Early in the morning of the 14th, Sir William Howe, leaving two
thousand men under the command of General Matthews at Brunswick,
advanced in two columns towards the Delaware. The front of the first,
under Lord Cornwallis, reached Somerset Court House, nine miles from
Brunswick, by the appearance of day; and the second, commanded by
General de Heister, reached Middlebush about the same time.
This movement was made with the view of inducing General Washington to
quit his fortified camp, and approach the Delaware,[59] in which
event, the British general expected to bring on an engagement on
ground less disadvantageous than that now occupied by the American
army. But that officer understood the importance of his position too
well to abandon it. On the first intelligence that the enemy was in
motion, he drew out his whole army, and formed it, to great advantage,
on the heights in front of his camp. This position was constantly
maintained. The troops remained in order of battle during the day;
and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended. In the mean
time the Jersey militia, with an alacrity theretofore unexampled in
that state, took the field in great numbers. They principally joined
General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton, behind the Sourland
hills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability was
forming, which could readily co-operate with that under the immediate
inspection of the Commander-in-chief.
[Footnote 59: General Howe's letter.]
The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend his camp, but
not to hazard a general action on other ground. He had therefore
determined not to advance from the heights he occupied, into the open
country, either towards the enemy, or the Delaware.
The object of General Howe seems to have been, by acting on his
anxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from the strong ground about
Middlebrook, and tempt him to approach the Delaware, in the hope of
defending its passage. Should he succeed in this, he had little doubt
of being able to bring on an engagement, in which he counted with
certainty on victory. The considerations which restrained General Howe
from attempting to march through Jersey, leaving the American army in
full force in his rear, had determined Washington to allow him to
proceed to the Delaware, if such should be his intention. In that
event, he had determined to throw those impediments only in the way of
the hostile army which might harass and retard its march; and,
maintaining the high and secure grounds north of the road to be taken
by the enemy, to watch for an opportunity of striking some important
blow with manifest advantage.
He was not long in penetrating the designs of his adversary. "The
views of the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the
17th, "must be to destroy this army, and get possession of
Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not
move that way until they have endeavoured to give a severe blow to
this army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river,
when they must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front, and
would have such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly be
successful, but the probability would be infinitely against them.
Should they be imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep
close upon their heels, and will do every thing in my power to make
the project fatal to them.
"But, besides the argument in favour of their intending, in the first
place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure,
every appearance contributes to confirm the opinion. Had their design
been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have
made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken
our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them.
Instead of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to
facilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are most
exposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light
as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and
bridges, at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the idea of their
intending to push for the Delaware."
[Sidenote: Returns to Amboy.]
Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position,
General Howe determined to waste no more time in threatening
Philadelphia by land, but to withdraw from Jersey, and to embark his
army as expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware.
On the night of the 19th he returned to Brunswick, and on the 22d to
Amboy, from which place, the heavy baggage and a few of his troops
passed into Staten Island, on the bridge which had been designed for
the Delaware.
General Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick, and had
made arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was
detached with three brigades to annoy the British rear; and Sullivan
and Maxwell were ordered to co-operate with him. In the mean time the
army paraded on the heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as
circumstances might require.
About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a piquet guard, soon after
which that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharp
skirmishing took place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but
the hope of gaining any important advantage was entirely disappointed;
and the retreat to Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss.
{June 24.}
In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the British
flank and rear, General Washington advanced six or seven miles, to
Quibbletown on the road to Amboy; and Lord Stirling's division was
pushed still farther, to the neighbourhood of the Metucking Meeting
House, for the purpose of co-operating with the light parties, should
the retreat to Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at the
rear.
[Sidenote: Endeavors to cut off the retreat of the American army to
Middlebrook, but is disappointed.]
Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement, and probably
hoping to turn the left of the American army, and gain the heights in
its rear, General Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troops
from Staten Island; and, early next morning, made a rapid movement, in
two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of Lord
Cornwallis, took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch Plains; and the
left, led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by Metucking Meeting
House, to fall into the rear of the right column. It was intended that
the left should take a separate road, soon after this junction, and
attack the left flank of the American army at Quibbletown; while Lord
Cornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp at
Middlebrook. Four battalions with six pieces of cannon were detached
to Bonhamtown.[60]
[Footnote 60: General Howe's letter.]
[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis skirmishes near the Scotch Plains with Lord
Stirling.]
{June 30.}
About Woodbridge, the right column fell in with one of the American
parties of observation which gave notice of this movement. General
Washington discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly in
motion, and regained the camp at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell in
with Lord Stirling, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the
Americans were driven from their ground with the loss of three field
pieces, and a few men. They retreated to the hills about the Scotch
Plains, and were pursued as far as Westfield. Perceiving the passes in
the mountains on the left of the American camp to be guarded, and the
object of this skilful manoeuvre to be, consequently, unattainable,
his lordship returned through Rahway to Amboy; and the whole army
crossed over to Staten Island.
{July 2.}
General Washington was now again left to his conjectures respecting
the plan of the campaign. Before Sir William Howe had, in any degree
disclosed his views, intelligence was received of the appearance of
Burgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This
intelligence strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be
to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command
of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet he
could not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as
to make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia.
His army therefore maintained its station at Middlebrook; but
arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which
defended the Hudson.
Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops
having relieved the American general from his apprehensions of a
sudden march to Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to
Pompton Plains, on the way to Peekskill; and proceeded with the main
body of his army, to Morristown;--thus approaching the highlands of
New York, without removing so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to
regain that camp should General Howe indicate an intention to seize
it.
Meanwhile, the British General prosecuted, diligently, his plan of
embarkation, which was, necessarily, attended with circumstances
indicating a much longer voyage than that up the North River. These
circumstances were immediately communicated to the eastern states, and
congress was earnestly pressed to strengthen the fortifications on the
Delaware, and to increase the obstructions in that river.
{July 16.}
In the midst of these appearances, certain intelligence was received
that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing
against Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the
main object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the
North River. Under this impression, General Washington ordered
Sullivan to Peekskill, and advanced, himself, first to Pompton Plains,
and afterwards to the Clove, where he determined to remain until the
views of the enemy should be disclosed.
While the General thus anxiously watched the movements of his
adversary, an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was
received from New England. The command of the British troops in Rhode
Island had devolved on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly
secure in an island, the water surrounding which was believed to be
entirely guarded by his cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly
superior to any force then collected in that department, he indulged
himself in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp; and was
remiss with respect to the guards about his person. Information of
this negligence was communicated to the main, and a plan was formed to
surprise him. This spirited enterprise was executed, with equal
courage and address, by Lieutenant Colonel Barton of the Rhode Island
militia.
[Sidenote: General Prescot surprised and taken.]
On the night of the 10th, he embarked on board four whale boats, at
Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty persons,
including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other officers.
After proceeding about ten miles by water, unobserved by the British
guard-boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter, he
landed on the west of the island, about midway between Newport and
Bristol ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot,
dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The
general himself was taken out of bed, and conveyed to a place of
safety.
The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy
throughout America, because it was supposed to secure the liberation
of General Lee, by enabling General Washington to offer an officer of
equal rank in exchange for him.
Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of Colonel
Barton, and his party; and presented him with a sword as a mark of
approbation.
As the fleet fell down towards Sandy Hook, General Washington withdrew
slowly from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions,
so as to march to any point which might be attacked.
[Sidenote: The British army embarks.]
At length, the embarkation was completed, and the fleet put to sea.