Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York....
Circular letter of Lord Howe.... State of the American
Army.... The British land in force on Long Island.... Battle
of Brooklyn.... Evacuation of Long Island.... Fruitless
negotiations.... New York evacuated.... Skirmish on the
heights of Haerlem.... Letter on the state of the army.
{1776}
While congress was deliberating in Philadelphia on the great question
of independence, the British fleet appeared before New York.
[Sidenote: Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York.]
On evacuating Boston, General Howe had retired to Halifax; where he
purposed to remain till reinforcements should arrive from England. But
the situation of his army in that place was so uncomfortable, and the
delays in the arrival of the troops from Europe were so great, that he
at length resolved to sail for New York, with the forces already under
his command.
{June 10.}
{July 3 & 4.}
In the latter end of June, he arrived off Sandy Hook, in the Grey
Hound; and, on the 29th of that month, the first division of the fleet
from Halifax reached that place. The rear division soon followed; and
the troops were landed on Staten Island, on the third and fourth of
July. They were received with great demonstrations of joy by the
inhabitants, who took the oaths of allegiance to the British crown,
and embodied themselves under the authority of the late Governor
Tryon, for the defence of the island. Strong assurances were also
received from Long Island, and the neighbouring parts of New Jersey,
of the favourable dispositions of a great proportion of the people to
the royal cause.
It was foreseen that the provisions remaining on the small islands
about New York, must fall into the possession of the invading army,
and General Washington had intended to remove them to a place of
safety; but, the existing state of public opinion requiring the
co-operation of the several committees, this measure of wise
precaution could not be completely executed; and General Howe, on his
arrival, obtained ample supplies for his army.
The command of the fleet destined for the American service was
intrusted to Lord Howe, the brother of the general; and they were both
constituted commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies, and
granting pardons, with such exceptions as they should think proper to
make. He arrived at Staten Island on the twelfth of July.
{July 12.}
The difficulty of closing the Hudson against an enemy possessing a
powerful fleet was soon demonstrated. Two frigates passed the
batteries without injury, and took a station which enabled them to cut
off the communication by water, between the army at New York, and that
at Ticonderoga. An attempt to set these frigates on fire failed in its
execution, and only a tender was burnt;--soon after which these
vessels returned to the fleet.
[Sidenote: Circular letter of Lord Howe.]
{July 14.}
Lord Howe was not deterred by the declaration of Independence from
trying the influence of his powers for pacification. He sent on shore,
by a flag, a circular letter, dated off the coast of Massachusetts,
addressed severally to the late governors under the crown, enclosing a
declaration, which he requested them to make public. This declaration
announced his authority to grant pardons to any number or description
of persons, who, during the tumult and disorders of the times, might
have deviated from their just allegiance, and who might be willing, by
a speedy return to their duty, to reap the benefits of the royal
favour; and to declare any colony, town, port, or place, in the peace
and under the protection of the crown, and excepted from the penal
provisions of the act of parliament prohibiting all trade and
intercourse with the colonies. Assurances were also given that the
meritorious services of all persons who should aid and assist in
restoring public tranquillity in the colonies, or in any parts
thereof, would be duly considered.
{July 19.}
These papers were immediately transmitted by the Commander-in-chief to
congress, who resolved that they should "be published in the several
gazettes, that the good people of the United States might be informed
of what nature were the commissioners, and what the terms, with the
expectation of which, the insidious court of Britain had sought to
amuse and disarm them; and that the few who still remained suspended
by a hope, founded either in the justice or moderation of their late
king, might now, at length, be convinced, that the valour alone of
their country is to save its liberties."
About the same time, Lord Howe sent, with a flag, a letter addressed
to "George Washington, esquire," which the General refused to receive,
as "it did not acknowledge the public character with which he was
invested by congress, and in no other character could he have any
intercourse with his lordship." In a resolution approving this
proceeding, congress directed, "that no letter or message be received
on any occasion whatever from the enemy, by the Commander-in-chief, or
others, the commanders of the American army, but such as shall be
directed to them in the characters they respectively sustain."
{July 20.}
The commissioners felt some difficulty in recognizing either the civil
or military character conferred on individuals by the existing powers
in America; and yet it was desirable, either for the purpose of
effecting a pacification, or, if that should be impracticable, of
increasing the divisions already existing, to open negotiations, and
hold out the semblance of restoring peace. They cast about for means
to evade this preliminary obstacle to any discussion of the terms they
were authorized to propose; and, at length, Colonel Patterson,
adjutant general of the British army, was sent on shore by General
Howe, with a letter directed to George Washington, &c. &c. &c. He was
introduced to the general, whom he addressed by the title of
"Excellency;" and, after the usual compliments, opened the subject of
his mission, by saying, that General Howe much regretted the
difficulties which had arisen respecting the address of the letters;
that the mode adopted was deemed consistent with propriety, and was
founded on precedent, in cases of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries,
where disputes or difficulties had arisen about rank; that General
Washington might recollect he had, last summer, addressed a letter to
"the honourable William Howe;" that Lord, and General Howe, did not
mean to derogate from his rank, or the respect due to him, and that
they held his person and character in the highest esteem;--but that
the direction, with the addition of &c. &c. &c. implied every thing
which ought to follow. Colonel Patterson then produced a letter which
he said was the same that had been sent, and which he laid on the
table.
The General declined receiving it, and said, that a letter directed to
a person in a public character, should have some description or
indication of that character; otherwise it would be considered as a
mere private letter. It was true the _etceteras_ implied every thing,
and they also implied any thing; that the letter to General Howe,
alluded to, was an answer to one received from him under a like
address; which, having been taken by the officer on duty, he did not
think proper to return, and therefore answered in the same mode of
address; and that he should absolutely decline any letter relating to
his public station, directed to him as a private person.
Colonel Patterson then said, that General Howe would not urge his
delicacy farther, and repeated his assertions that no failure of
respect was intended.
After some conversation relative to the treatment of prisoners,
Colonel Patterson said, that the goodness and benevolence of the king
had induced him to appoint Lord Howe, and General Howe, his
commissioners to accommodate the unhappy dispute at present
subsisting: that they had great powers, and would derive much pleasure
from effecting the accommodation; and that he wished this visit to be
considered as the first advance towards so desirable an object.
General Washington replied, that he was not vested with any powers on
this subject; but he would observe that, so far as he could judge from
what had yet transpired, Lord Howe and General Howe were only
empowered to grant pardons; that those who had committed no fault,
wanted no pardon; and that the Americans were only defending what they
deemed their indubitable rights. This, Colonel Patterson said, would
open a very wide field for argument: and, after expressing his fears
that an adherence to forms might obstruct business of the greatest
moment and concern, he took his leave.
The substance of this conversation was communicated to congress, who
directed its publication.
{August.}
The reinforcements to the British army, of whom about four hundred and
fifty had been captured by the American cruisers, were now arriving
daily from Europe; and General Howe had also been joined by the troops
from Charleston. His strength was estimated at twenty-four thousand
men.
[Sidenote: State of the American army.]
To this army, alike formidable for its numbers, its discipline, and
its equipments,--aided in its operations by a numerous fleet, and
conducted by commanders of skill and experience, was opposed a force,
unstable in its nature,--incapable, from its structure, of receiving
discipline,--and inferior to its enemy, in numbers, in arms, and in
every military equipment. It consisted, when General Howe landed on
Staten Island, of ten thousand men, who were much enfeebled by
sickness. The diseases which always afflict new troops, were increased
by exposure to the rain and night air, without tents. At the instance
of the General, some regiments, stationed in the different states,
were ordered to join him; and, in addition to the requisitions of men
to serve until December--requisitions not yet complied with--the
neighbouring militia were called into service for the exigency of the
moment. Yet, in a letter written to congress on the 8th of August, he
stated that "for the several posts on New York, Long, and Governor's
Island, and Paulus Hook, the army consisted of only seventeen thousand
two hundred and twenty-five men, of whom three thousand six hundred
and sixty-eight were sick; and that, to repel an immediate attack, he
could count certainly on no other addition to his numbers, than a
battalion from Maryland under the command of Colonel Smallwood." This
force was rendered the more inadequate to its objects by being
necessarily divided for the defence of posts, some of which were
fifteen miles distant from others, with navigable waters between them.
"These things," continued the letter, "are melancholy, but they are
nevertheless true. I hope for better. Under every disadvantage, my
utmost exertions shall be employed to bring about the great end we
have in view; and, so far as I can judge from the professions and
apparent dispositions of my troops, I shall have their support. The
superiority of the enemy, and the expected attack, do not seem to have
depressed their spirits. These considerations lead me to think that
though the appeal may not terminate so happily as I could wish, yet
the enemy will not succeed in their views without considerable loss.
Any advantage they may gain, I trust will cost them dear."
Soon after this letter, the army was reinforced by Smallwood's
regiment, and by two regiments from Pennsylvania, with a body of New
England and New York militia, which increased it to twenty-seven
thousand men, of whom one fourth were sick.
A part of the army was stationed on Long Island, under the command of
Major General Sullivan. The residue occupied different stations on
York Island, except two small detachments, one on Governor's Island,
and the other at Paulus Hook; and except a part of the New York
militia under General Clinton, who were stationed on the Sound,
towards New Rochelle, and about East and West Chester, in order to
oppose any sudden attempt which might be made to land above
Kingsbridge, and cut off the communication with the country.
{July 2.}
Expecting daily to be attacked, and believing that the influence of
the first battle would be considerable, the Commander-in-chief
employed every expedient which might act upon that enthusiastic love
of liberty, that indignation against the invaders of their country,
and that native courage, which were believed to animate the bosoms of
his soldiers; and which were relied on as substitutes for discipline
and experience. "The time," say his orders issued soon after the
arrival of General Howe, "is now near at hand, which must determine
whether Americans are to be freemen or slaves; whether they are to
have any property they can call their own; whether their houses and
farms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and themselves consigned to a
state of wretchedness from which no human efforts will deliver them.
The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage
and conduct of this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us
only the choice of a brave resistance, or the most abject submission.
We have therefore to resolve to conquer or to die. Our own, our
country's honour, call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion; and
if we now shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the whole
world. Let us then rely on the goodness of our cause, and the aid of
the Supreme Being, in whose hands victory is, to animate and encourage
us to great and noble actions. The eyes of all our countrymen are now
upon us, and we shall have their blessings and praises, if happily we
are the instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated against
them. Let us therefore animate and encourage each other, and show the
whole world that a freeman contending for liberty, on his own ground,
is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth."
To the officers, he recommended coolness in time of action; and to the
soldiers, strict attention and obedience, with a becoming firmness and
spirit.
He assured them that any officer, soldier, or corps, distinguished by
any acts of extraordinary bravery, should most certainly meet with
notice and rewards; whilst, on the other hand, those who should fail
in the performance of their duty, would as certainly be exposed and
punished.
{July 21.}
Whilst preparations were making for the expected engagement,
intelligence was received of the repulse of the British squadron which
had attacked fort Moultrie. The Commander-in-chief availed himself of
the occasion of communicating this success to his army, to add a
spirit of emulation to the other motives which should impel them to
manly exertions. "This glorious example of our troops," he said,
"under the like circumstances with ourselves, the General hopes, will
animate every officer and soldier to imitate, and even to out-do them,
when the enemy shall make the same attempt on us. With such a bright
example before us of what can be done by brave men fighting in defence
of their country, we shall be loaded with a double share of shame and
infamy, if we do not acquit ourselves with courage, and manifest a
determined resolution to conquer or die."
As the crisis approached, his anxiety increased. Endeavouring to
breathe into his army his own spirit, and to give them his own
feeling, he thus addressed them. "The enemy's whole reinforcement is
now arrived; so that an attack must, and will soon be made. The
General, therefore, again repeats his earnest request that every
officer and soldier will have his arms and ammunition in good order;
keep within his quarters and encampments as far as possible; be ready
for action at a moment's call; and when called to it, remember, that
liberty, property, life, and honour, are all at stake; that upon their
courage and conduct rest the hopes of their bleeding and insulted
country; that their wives, children, and parents, expect safety from
them only; and that we have every reason to believe, that heaven will
crown with success so just a cause.
"The enemy will endeavour to intimidate by show and appearance; but
remember, they have been repulsed on various occasions by a few brave
Americans; their cause is bad; and if opposed with firmness and
coolness on their first onset, with our advantage of works, and
knowledge of the ground, the victory is most assuredly ours. Every
good soldier will be silent and attentive, wait for orders, and
reserve his fire until he is sure of doing execution; of this the
officers are to be particularly careful."
He directed explicitly that any soldier who should attempt to conceal
himself, or retreat without orders, should instantly be shot down; and
solemnly promised to notice and reward those who should distinguish
themselves. Thus did he, by infusing those sentiments which would
stimulate to the greatest individual exertion, into every bosom,
endeavour to compensate for the want of arms, of discipline, and of
numbers.
As the defence of Long Island was intimately connected with that of
New York, a brigade had been stationed at Brooklyn, a post capable of
being maintained for a considerable time. An extensive camp had been
marked out and fortified at the same place. Brooklyn is a village on a
small peninsula made by East river, the Bay, and Gowan's Cove. The
encampment fronted the main land of the island, and the works
stretched quite across the peninsula, from Whaaleboght Bay in the East
river on the left, to a deep marsh on a creek emptying into Gowan's
Cove, on the right. The rear was covered and defended against an
attack from the ships, by strong batteries on Red Hook and on
Governor's Island, which in a great measure commanded that part of the
bay, and by other batteries on East river, which kept open the
communication with York Island. In front of the camp was a range of
hills covered with thick woods, which extended from east to west
nearly the length of the island, and across which were three different
roads leading to Brooklyn ferry. These hills, though steep, are every
where passable by infantry.
[Sidenote: The British land in force on Long Island.]
The movements of General Howe indicating an intention to make his
first attack on Long Island, General Sullivan was strongly reinforced.
Early in the morning of the twenty-second, the principal part of the
British army, under the command of General Clinton, landed under cover
of the guns of the fleet, and extended from the ferry at the Narrows,
through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village of Flatland.[38]
[Footnote 38: General Howe's letter.]
{July 23.}
Confident that an engagement must soon take place, General Washington
made still another effort to inspire his troops with the most
determined courage. "The enemy," said he, in addressing them, "have
now landed on Long Island, and the hour is fast approaching, on which
the honour and success of this army, and the safety of our bleeding
country depend. Remember, officers and soldiers, that you are freemen,
fighting for the blessings of liberty--that slavery will be your
portion and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit yourselves
like men." He repeated his instructions respecting their conduct in
action, and concluded with the most animating and encouraging
exhortations.
{July 25.}
Major General Putnam was now directed to take command at Brooklyn,
with a reinforcement of six regiments; and he was charged most
earnestly by the Commander-in-chief, to be in constant readiness for
an attack, and to guard the woods between the two camps with his best
troops.
General Washington had passed the day at Brooklyn, making arrangements
for the approaching action; and, at night, had returned to New York.
The Hessians under General De Heister composed the centre of the
British army at Flatbush; Major General Grant commanded the left wing
which extended to the coast, and the greater part of the British
forces under General Clinton. Earl Percy and Lord Cornwallis turned
short to the right, and approached the opposite coast of Flatland.[39]
[Footnote 39: General Howe's letter.]
The two armies were now separated from each other by the range of
hills already mentioned. The British centre at Flatbush was scarcely
four miles distant from the American lines at Brooklyn; and a direct
road led across the heights from the one to the other. Another road,
rather more circuitous than the first, led from Flatbush by the way of
Bedford, a small village on the Brooklyn side of the hills. The right
and left wings of the British army were nearly equi-distant from the
American works, and about five or six miles from them. The road
leading from the Narrows along the coast, and by the way of Gowan's
Cove, afforded the most direct route to their left; and their right
might either return by the way of Flatbush and unite with the centre,
or take a more circuitous course, and enter a road leading from
Jamaica to Bedford. These several roads unite between Bedford and
Brooklyn, a small distance in front of the American lines.
The direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn was defended by a fort which
the Americans had constructed in the hills; and the coast and Bedford
roads were guarded by detachments posted on the hills within view of
the British camp. Light parties of volunteers were directed to patrol
on the road leading from Jamaica to Bedford; about two miles from
which, near Flatbush, Colonel Miles of Pennsylvania was stationed with
a regiment of riflemen. The convention of New York had ordered General
Woodhull, with the militia of Long Island, to take post on the high
grounds, as near the enemy as possible; but he remained at Jamaica,
and seemed scarcely to suppose himself under the control of the
regular officer commanding on the island.
{July 27.}
About nine at night, General Clinton silently drew off the van of the
British army across the country, in order to seize a pass in the
heights, about three miles east of Bedford, on the Jamaica road. In
the morning, about two hours before day-break, within half a mile of
the pass, his patrols fell in with and captured one of the American
parties, which had been stationed on this road. Learning from his
prisoners that the pass was unoccupied, General Clinton immediately
seized it; and, on the appearance of day, the whole column passed the
heights, and advanced into the level country between them and
Brooklyn.[40]
[Footnote 40: General Howe's letter.]
Before Clinton had secured the passes on the road from Jamaica,
General Grant advanced along the coast at the head of the left wing,
with ten pieces of cannon. As his first object was to draw the
attention of the Americans from their left, he moved slowly,
skirmishing as he advanced with the light parties stationed on that
road.[41]
[Footnote 41: General Howe's letter.]
This movement was soon communicated to General Putnam, who reinforced
the parties which had been advanced in front; and, as General Grant
continued to gain ground, still stronger detachments were employed in
this service. About three in the morning, Brigadier General Lord
Stirling was directed to meet the enemy, with the two nearest
regiments, on the road leading from the Narrows. Major General
Sullivan, who commanded all the troops without the lines, advanced at
the head of a strong detachment on the road leading directly to
Flatbush; while another detachment occupied the heights between that
place and Bedford.
About the break of day, Lord Stirling reached the summit of the hills,
where he was joined by the troops which had been already engaged, and
were retiring slowly before the enemy, who almost immediately appeared
in sight. A warm cannonade was commenced on both sides, which
continued for several hours; and some sharp, but not very close
skirmishing took place between the infantry. Lord Stirling, being
anxious only to defend the pass he guarded, could not descend in force
from the heights; and General Grant did not wish to drive him from
them until that part of the plan, which had been entrusted to Sir
Henry Clinton, should be executed.
[Sidenote: Battle of Brooklyn and evacuation of Long Island.]
In the centre, General De Heister, soon after day-light, began to
cannonade the troops under General Sullivan; but did not move from his
ground at Flatbush, until the British right had approached the left
and rear of the American line. In the mean time, in order the more
effectually to draw their attention from the point where the grand
attack was intended, the fleet was put in motion, and a heavy
cannonade was commenced on the battery at Red Hook.
About half past eight, the British right having then reached Bedford,
in the rear of Sullivan's left, General De Heister ordered Colonel
Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill; following,
himself, with the centre of the army. The approach of Clinton was now
discovered by the American left, which immediately endeavoured to
regain the camp at Brooklyn. While retiring from the woods by
regiments, they encountered the front of the British. About the same
time, the Hessians advanced from Flatbush, against that part of the
detachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn.[42] Here,
General Sullivan commanded in person; but he found it difficult to
keep his troops together long enough to sustain the first attack. The
firing heard towards Bedford had disclosed the alarming fact that the
British had turned their left flank, and were getting completely into
their rear. Perceiving at once the full danger of their situation,
they sought to escape it by regaining the camp with the utmost
possible celerity. The sudden rout of this party enabled De Heister to
detach a part of his force against those who were engaged near
Bedford. In that quarter, too, the Americans were broken, and driven
back into the woods; and the front of the column led by General
Clinton, continuing to move forward, intercepted and engaged those who
were retreating along the direct road from Flatbush. Thus attacked
both in front and rear, and alternately driven by the British on the
Hessians, and by the Hessians back again on the British, a succession
of skirmishes took place in the woods, in the course of which, some
parts of corps forced their way through the enemy, and regained the
lines of Brooklyn, and several individuals saved themselves under
cover of the woods; but a great proportion of the detachment was
killed or taken. The fugitives were pursued up to the American works;
and such is represented to have been the ardour of the British
soldiers, that it required the authority of their cautious commander
to prevent an immediate assault.
[Footnote 42: General Howe's letter.]
The fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the American
right, that the enemy had gained their rear. Lord Stirling perceived
the danger, and that he could only escape it by retreating instantly
across the creek. This movement was immediately directed; and, to
secure it, his lordship determined to attack, in person, a British
corps under Lord Cornwallis, stationed at a house rather above the
place at which he intended to cross the creek. About four hundred men
of Smallwood's regiment were drawn out for this purpose, and the
attack was made with great spirit. This small corps was brought up
several times to the charge; and Lord Stirling stated that he was on
the point of dislodging Lord Cornwallis from his post; but the force
in his front increasing, and General Grant also advancing on his rear,
the brave men he commanded were no longer able to oppose the superior
numbers which assailed them on every quarter; and those who survived
were, with their General, made prisoners of war. This attempt, though
unsuccessful, gave an opportunity to a large part of the detachment to
save themselves by crossing the creek.
The loss sustained by the American army in this battle could not be
accurately ascertained by either party. Numbers were supposed to have
been drowned in the creek, or suffocated in the marsh, whose bodies
were never found; and exact accounts from the militia are seldom to be
obtained, as the list of the missing is always swelled by those who
return to their homes. General Washington did not admit it to exceed a
thousand men; but in this estimate he must have included only the
regular troops. In the letter written by General Howe, the amount of
prisoners is stated at one thousand and ninety-seven; among whom were
Major General Sullivan, and Brigadiers Lord Stirling and Woodhull, by
him named Udell. He computes the loss of the Americans at three
thousand three hundred men; but his computation is probably excessive.
He supposes, too, that the troops engaged on the heights, amounted to
ten thousand; but they could not have much exceeded half that number.
His own loss is stated at twenty-one officers, and three hundred and
forty-six privates; killed, wounded, and taken.
As the action became warm, General Washington passed over to the camp
at Brooklyn, where he saw, with inexpressible anguish, the destruction
in which his best troops were involved, and from which it was
impossible to extricate them. Should he attempt any thing in their
favour with the men remaining within the lines, it was probable the
camp itself would be lost, and that whole division of his army
destroyed. Should he bring over the remaining battalions from New
York, he would still be inferior in point of numbers; and his whole
army, perhaps the fate of his country, might be staked on the issue of
a single battle thus inauspiciously commenced. Compelled to behold the
carnage of his troops, without being able to assist them, his efforts
were directed to the preservation of those which remained.
{July 28.}
Believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were in reality,
and unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, General Howe made no
immediate attempt to force their lines. He encamped in front of them;
and, on the twenty-eighth at night, broke ground in form, within six
hundred yards of a redoubt on the left.
{July 29.}
In this critical state of things, General Washington determined to
withdraw from Long Island. This difficult movement was effected on the
night of the twenty-eighth, with such silence, that all the troops and
military stores, with the greater part of the provisions, and all the
artillery, except such heavy pieces as could not be drawn through the
roads, rendered almost impassable by the rains which had fallen, were
carried over in safety. Early next morning, the British out-posts
perceived the rear guard crossing the East river, out of reach of
their fire.
From the commencement of the action on the morning of the
twenty-seventh, until the American troops had crossed the East river
on the morning of the twenty-ninth, the exertions and fatigues of the
Commander-in-chief were incessant. Throughout that time, he never
closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback.
The manner in which this critical operation was executed, and the
circumstances under which it was performed, added greatly to the
reputation of the American general, in the opinion of all military
men. To withdraw, without loss, a defeated, dispirited, and
undisciplined army from the view of an experienced and able officer,
and to transport them in safety across a large river, while watched by
a numerous and vigilant fleet, require talents of no ordinary kind;
and the retreat from Long Island may justly be ranked among those
skilful manoeuvres which distinguish a master in the art of war.
The attempt to defend Long Island was so perilous in itself, and so
disastrous in its issue, that it was condemned by many at the time,
and is yet represented as a great error of the Commander-in-chief.
But, in deciding on the wisdom of measures, the event will not always
lead to a correct judgment. Before a just opinion can be formed, it is
necessary to consider the previous state of things--to weigh the
motives which induced the decision--and to compare the value of the
object, and the probability of securing it, with the hazards attending
the attempt.
It was very desirable to preserve New York, if practicable; or, if
that could not be done, to consume the campaign in the struggle for
that place. The abandonment of Long Island, besides giving the enemy
secure and immediate possession of an extensive and fertile country,
would certainly facilitate the success of his attempt upon New York.
It was therefore to be avoided, if possible.
The impossibility of avoiding it was not evident until the battle was
fought. It is true, that the American force on the island could not
have been rendered equal, even in point of numbers, to that of the
British; but, with the advantage of the defencible country through
which the assailants were to pass, and of a fortified camp which could
be attacked only on one side, hopes might be entertained, without the
imputation of being oversanguine, of maintaining the position for a
considerable time; and, ultimately, of selling it at a high price.
This opinion is supported by the subsequent movements of General Howe,
who, even after the victory of the twenty-seventh, was unwilling to
hazard an assault on the American works, without the co-operation of
the fleet; but chose rather to carry them by regular approaches. Nor
would the situation of the troops on Long Island have been desperate,
even in the event of a conjoint attack by land and water, before their
strength and spirits were broken by the action of the twenty-seventh.
The East river was guarded by strong batteries on both sides, and the
entrance into it from the bay was defended by Governor's Island, which
was fortified, and in which two regiments were stationed. The ships
could not lie in that river, without first silencing those
batteries--a work not easily accomplished. The aid of the fleet,
therefore, could be given only at the point of time when a storm of
the works should be intended; and when that should appear practicable,
the troops might be withdrawn from the island.
There was then considerable hazard in maintaining Long Island; but not
so much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post of
such great importance, without a struggle.
With more appearance of reason, the General has been condemned for not
having guarded the road which leads over the hills from Jamaica to
Bedford.
The written instructions given to the officer commanding on Long
Island, two days previous to the action, directed that the woods
should be well guarded, and the approach of the enemy through them
rendered as difficult as possible. But his numbers were not sufficient
to furnish detachments for all the defiles through the mountains; and
if a corps, capable of making an effectual resistance, had been posted
on this road, and a feint had been made on it, while the principal
attack was by the direct road from Flatbush, or by that along the
coast, the events of the day would probably have been not less
disastrous. The columns marching directly from Flatbush must, on every
reasonable calculation, have been in possession of the plain in the
rear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica, so as to
intercept its retreat to the camp. So great is the advantage of those
who attack, in being able to choose the point against which to direct
their grand effort.
The most adviseable plan, then, appears to have been, to watch the
motions of the enemy so as to be master of his designs; to oppose with
a competent force every attempt to seize the heights; and to guard all
the passes in such a manner as to receive notice of his approach
through any one of them, in sufficient time to recall the troops
maintaining the others.
This plan was adopted--and the heavy disasters of the day are
attributable, principally, to the failure of those charged with the
execution of that very important part of it which related to the
Jamaica road. The letter of General Howe states that an American
patrolling party was taken on this road; and General Washington, in a
private and confidential communication to a friend, says, "This
misfortune happened, in a great measure, by two detachments of our
people who were posted in two roads leading through a wood, to
intercept the enemy in their march, suffering a surprise, and making a
precipitate retreat."
The events of this day, too, exhibited a practical demonstration of a
radical defect in the structure of the army. It did not contain a
single corps of cavalry. That miscalculating economy which refuses the
means essential to the end, was not sufficiently relaxed to admit of
so expensive an establishment. Had the General been furnished with a
few troops of light-horse, to serve merely as videts, it is probable
that the movement so decisive of the fate of the day could not have
been made unnoticed. The troops on the lines do not appear to have
observed the column which was withdrawn, on the evening of the
twenty-sixth, from Flatbush to Flatland. Had this important manoeuvre
been communicated, it would, most probably, have turned the attention
of General Putnam, more particularly, to the Jamaica road. It is to
the want of videts, that a failure to obtain this important
intelligence is to be ascribed. The necessity of changing the officer
originally intrusted with the command, was also an unfortunate
circumstance, which probably contributed to the event which happened.
Whatever causes might have led to this defeat, it gave a gloomy aspect
to the affairs of America. Heretofore, her arms had been frequently
successful, and her soldiers had always manifested a great degree of
intrepidity. A confidence in themselves, a persuasion of superiority
over the enemy, arising from the goodness of their cause, and their
early and habitual use of fire arms, had been carefully encouraged.
This sentiment had been nourished by all their experience preceding
this event. When they found themselves, by a course of evolutions in
which they imagined they perceived a great superiority of military
skill, encircled with unexpected dangers, from which no exertions
could extricate them, their confidence in themselves and in their
leaders was greatly diminished, and the approach of the enemy inspired
the apprehension that some stratagem was concealed, from which
immediate flight alone could preserve them.
{September 2.}
In a letter from General Washington to congress, the state of the army
after this event was thus feelingly described: "Our situation is truly
distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo,
has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their
minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling
forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order
to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to
return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost
by whole regiments; in many, by half ones and by companies, at a time.
This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a
well appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force,
would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when it is added, that their
example has infected another part of the army; that their want of
discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and
government, have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole;
and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination
necessary for the well doing of an army, and which had been before
inculcated as well as the nature of our military establishment would
admit of; our condition is still more alarming, and with the deepest
concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the
generality of the troops.
"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained,
and which I, more than once, in my letters, took the liberty of
mentioning to congress, that no dependence could be placed in a
militia, or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer
period than our regulations have hitherto prescribed. I am persuaded,
and am as fully convinced as of any one fact that has happened, that
our liberties must, of necessity, be greatly hazarded, if not entirely
lost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent army."
[Sidenote: Fruitless negotiations.]
The first use made by Lord Howe of the victory of the 27th of August,
was to avail himself of the impression it had probably made on
congress, by opening a negotiation in conformity with his powers as a
commissioner. For this purpose, General Sullivan was sent on parole to
Philadelphia, with a verbal message, the import of which was, "that
though he could not at present treat with congress as a political
body, yet he was very desirous of having a conference with some of its
members, whom he would consider, for the present, only as private
gentlemen, and meet them as such at any place they would appoint.
"That, in conjunction with General Howe, he had full powers to
compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America, on terms
advantageous to both; the obtaining of which detained him near two
months in England, and prevented his arrival in New York before the
declaration of independence took place.
"That he wished a compact might be settled at this time, when no
decisive blow was struck, and neither party could allege being
compelled to enter into such agreement.
"That in case congress were disposed to treat, many things which they
had not as yet asked, might, and ought to be granted them; and that
if, upon the conference, they found any probable ground of an
accommodation, the authority of congress must be afterwards
acknowledged--otherwise the compact would not be complete."
This proposition was not without its embarrassments. Its rejection
would give some countenance to the opinion, that, if independence were
waved, a restoration of the ancient connexion between the two
countries, on principles formerly deemed constitutional, was still
practicable; an opinion which would have an unfavourable effect on the
public sentiment. On the other hand, to enter into a negotiation under
such circumstances, might excite a suspicion, that their determination
to maintain the independence they had declared, was not immoveable;
and that things were in such a situation, as to admit of some
relaxation in the measures necessary for the defence of the country.
The answer given to Lord Howe, through General Sullivan, was, "that
congress, being the representatives of the free and independent States
of America, can not, with propriety, send any of its members to confer
with his Lordship in their private characters; but that, ever desirous
of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee
of their body to know whether he has any authority to treat with
persons authorized by congress for that purpose, on behalf of America;
and what that authority is;--and to hear such propositions as he shall
think proper to make, respecting the same."
The President was, at the same time, directed to communicate to
General Washington the opinion of congress, that no propositions for
making peace "ought to be received or attended to, unless the same be
made in writing, and addressed to the representatives of the United
States in congress, or persons authorized by them: And if applications
on that subject be made to him by any of the commanders of the British
forces, that he inform them, that these United States, who entered
into the war only for the defence of their lives and liberties, will
cheerfully agree to peace on reasonable terms, whenever such shall be
proposed to them in manner aforesaid."
It is worthy of remark, that, in these resolutions, congress preserves
the appearance of insisting on the independence of the United States,
without declaring it to be the indispensable condition of peace.
Mr. Franklin, Mr. John Adams, and Mr. Edward Rutledge, all zealous
supporters of independence, were appointed "to receive the
communications of Lord Howe."
They waited on his Lordship; and, on their return, reported, that he
had received them on the 11th of September, on Staten Island, opposite
to Amboy, with great politeness.
He opened the conversation by acquainting them, that though he could
not treat with them as a committee of congress, yet, as his powers
enabled him to confer and consult with any private gentlemen of
influence in the colonies, on the means of restoring peace between the
two countries, he was glad of this opportunity of conferring with them
on that subject; if they thought themselves at liberty to enter into a
conference with him in that character. The committee observed to his
Lordship, that, as their business was to hear, he might consider them
in what light he pleased, and communicate to them any propositions he
might be authorized to make for the purpose mentioned; but that they
could consider themselves in no other character than that in which
they were placed by order of congress. His Lordship then proceeded to
open his views at some length. He offered peace only on the condition
that the colonies should return to their allegiance and obedience to
the British crown. He made no explicit propositions as inducements to
this measure, but gave assurances that there was a good disposition in
the king and his ministers to make the government easy to them, with
intimations that, in case of submission, the offensive acts of
parliament would be revised, and the instructions to the Governors
reconsidered; so that, if any just causes of complaint were found in
the acts, or any errors in government were found to have crept into
the instructions, they might be amended or withdrawn.
The committee gave it as their opinion to his Lordship, that a return
to the domination of Great Britain was not now to be expected. They
mentioned the repeated humble petitions of the colonies to the king
and parliament, which had been treated with contempt, and answered
only by additional injuries; the unexampled patience which had been
shown under their tyrannical government; and that it was not until the
late act of parliament, which denounced war against them, and put them
out of the king's protection, that they declared their independence;
that this declaration had been called for by the people of the
colonies in general, and that every colony had approved it when
made,--and all now considered themselves as independent states, and
were settling, or had settled, their governments accordingly; so that
it was not in the power of congress to agree for them that they should
return to their former dependent state; that there was no doubt of
their inclination for peace, and their willingness to enter into a
treaty with Britain, that might be advantageous to both countries;
that though his Lordship had, at present, no power to treat with them
as independent states, he might, if there was the same good
disposition in Britain, much sooner obtain fresh powers from his
government, for that purpose, than powers could be obtained by
congress, from the several colonies, to consent to a submission.
His Lordship then expressed his regret that no accommodation was like
to take place, and put an end to the conference.
These fruitless negotiations produced no suspension of hostilities.
The British army, now in full possession of Long Island, was posted
from Bedford to Hurlgate; and thus fronted and threatened York Island
from its extreme southern point, to the part opposite the northern
boundary of Long Island, a small distance below the heights of
Haerlem; comprehending a space of about nine miles.
The two armies were divided only by the East river, which is generally
less than a mile wide.
{September 4.}
Immediately after the victory at Brooklyn, dispositions were made by
the enemy to attack New York, and a part of the fleet sailed round
Long Island, and appeared in the Sound. Two frigates passed up the
East river, without receiving any injury from the batteries, and
anchored behind a small island which protected them from the American
artillery. At the same time, the main body of the fleet lay at anchor
close in with Governor's Island, from which the American troops had
been withdrawn, ready to pass up either the North or East river, or
both, and act against any part of York Island.
These movements indicated a disposition, not to make an attack
directly on New York, as had been expected, but to land near
Kingsbridge, and take a position which would cut off the communication
of the American army with the country.
Aware of the danger of his situation, General Washington began to
remove such stores as were not immediately necessary; and called a
council of general officers for the purpose of deciding, whether New
York should be evacuated without delay, or longer defended.
In his letter communicating to congress the result of this council,
which was against an immediate evacuation, he manifested a conviction
of the necessity of that measure, though he yielded to that necessity
with reluctance. Speaking of the enemy, he observed, "It is now
extremely obvious from their movements, from our intelligence, and
from every other circumstance, that, having their whole army upon Long
Island, except about four thousand men who remain on Staten Island,
they mean to enclose us in this island, by taking post in our rear,
while their ships effectually secure the front; and thus, by cutting
off our communication with the country, oblige us to fight them on
their own terms, or surrender at discretion; or, if that shall be
deemed more adviseable, by a brilliant stroke endeavour to cut this
army to pieces, and secure the possession of arms and stores, which
they well know our inability to replace.
"Having their system unfolded to us, it becomes an important
consideration how it could be most successfully opposed. On every side
there is a choice of difficulties, and experience teaches us, that
every measure on our part (however painful the reflection) must be
taken with some apprehension, that all our troops will not do their
duty.
"In deliberating upon this great question," he added, "it was
impossible to forget that history, our own experience, the advice of
our ablest friends in Europe, the fears of the enemy, and even the
declarations of congress, demonstrate that, on our side, the war
should be defensive;--(it has ever been called a war of posts;)--that
we should, on all occasions, avoid a general action, nor put any thing
to the risk, unless compelled by necessity, into which we ought never
to be drawn."
After communicating the decision which had been made by the council of
officers, he stated the opinion of those who were in favour of an
immediate evacuation with such force, as to confirm the belief that it
remained his own.
The majority, who overruled this opinion, did not expect to be able to
defend the city, permanently, but to defer the time of losing it, in
the hope of wasting so much of the campaign, before General Howe could
obtain possession of it, as to prevent his undertaking any thing
farther until the following year. They therefore advised a middle
course between abandoning the town absolutely, and concentrating their
whole strength for its defence. This was, to form the army into three
divisions; one of which should remain in New York; the second be
stationed at Kingsbridge, and the third occupy the intermediate space,
so as to support either extreme. The sick were to be immediately
removed to Orange Town. A belief that congress was inclined to
maintain New York at every hazard, and a dread of the unfavourable
impression which its evacuation might make on the people, seem to have
had great influence in producing the determination to defend the place
yet a short time longer.
{September 10.}
This opinion was soon changed. The movements of the British general
indicated clearly an intention either to break their line of
communication, or to enclose the whole army in York Island. His
dispositions were alike calculated to favour the one or the other of
those objects. The general, who had continued to employ himself
assiduously in the removal of the military stores to a place of
safety,[43] called a second council to deliberate on the farther
defence of the city, which determined, by a large majority, that it
had become not only prudent, but absolutely necessary to withdraw the
army from New York.
[Footnote 43: He had, on the first appearance of the enemy
in force before New York urged the removal of the women and
children, with their most valuable effects, to a place of
safety.]
{September 12.}
In consequence of this determination, Brigadier General Mercer, who
commanded the flying camp on the Jersey shore, was directed to move up
the North river, to the post opposite fort Washington; and every
effort was used to expedite the removal of the stores.
On the morning of the fifteenth, three ships of war proceeded up the
North river as high as Bloomingdale; a movement which entirely stopped
the farther removal of stores by water. About eleven on the same day,
Sir Henry Clinton, with a division of four thousand men who had
embarked at the head of New Town bay, where they had lain concealed
from the view of the troops posted on York Island, proceeded through
that bay into the East river, which he crossed; and, under cover of
the fire of five men of war, landed at a place called Kipp's bay,
about three miles above New York.
[Sidenote: New York evacuated.]
The works thrown up to oppose a landing at this place, were of
considerable strength, and capable of being defended for some time;
but the troops stationed in them abandoned them without waiting to be
attacked, and fled with precipitation. On the commencement of the
cannonade, General Washington ordered the brigades of Parsons and
Fellowes to the support of the troops posted in the lines, and rode
himself towards the scene of action. The panic of those who had fled
from the works was communicated to the troops ordered to sustain them;
and the Commander-in-chief had the extreme mortification to meet the
whole party retreating in the utmost disorder, totally regardless of
the great efforts made by their generals to stop their disgraceful
flight. Whilst General Washington was exerting himself to rally them,
a small corps of the enemy appeared; and they again broke and fled in
confusion. The only part to be taken was immediately to withdraw the
few remaining troops from New York, and to secure the posts on the
heights. For this latter purpose, the lines were instantly manned; but
no attempt was made to force them. The retreat from New York was
effected with an inconsiderable loss of men, sustained in a skirmish
at Bloomingdale; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of
the baggage, provisions, and military stores, much of which might have
been saved had the post at Kipp's bay been properly defended, were
unavoidably abandoned. In this shameful day, one colonel, one captain,
three subalterns, and ten privates were killed: one lieutenant
colonel, one captain, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates were
missing.
The unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was not
attributable to a want of personal courage, but to other causes. The
apprehensions excited by the defeat on Long Island had not yet
subsided; nor had the American troops recovered their confidence
either in themselves or in their commanders. Their situation appeared
to themselves to be perilous; and they had not yet acquired that
temper which teaches the veteran to do his duty wherever he may be
placed; to assure himself that others will do their duty likewise; and
to rely that those, who take into view the situation of the whole,
will not expose him to useless hazard; or neglect those precautions
which the safety and advantage of the whole may require.
Unfortunately, there existed in a great part of the army, several
causes, in addition to the shortness of enlistments and reliance on
militia, which were but too operative in obstructing the progress of
these military sentiments. In New England, whence the supplies of men
had been principally drawn, the zeal excited by the revolution had
taken such a direction, as in a great degree to abolish those
distinctions between the platoon officers and the soldiers, which are
indispensable to the formation of an army suited to all the purposes
of war. It has been already said that these officers, who constitute
an important part of every army, were, in many companies, elected by
the privates. Of consequence, a disposition to associate with them on
the footing of equality, was a recommendation of more weight, and
frequently conduced more to the choice, than individual merit.
Gentlemen of high rank have stated that, in some instances, men were
elected, who agreed to put their pay in a common stock with that of
the soldiers, and divide equally with them. It is not cause of wonder,
that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitary
practices should frequently prevail; and that the privates should not
respect them sufficiently, to acquire habits of obedience and
subordination. This vital defect had been in some degree remedied, in
new modelling the army before Boston; but it still existed to a fatal
extent.
{September 15.}
Having taken possession of New York, General Howe stationed a few
troops in the town; and, with the main body of his army, encamped on
the island near the American lines. His right was at Horen's Hook on
the East river, and his left reached the North river near
Bloomingdale; so that his encampment extended quite across the island,
which is, in this place, scarcely two miles wide; and both his flanks
were covered by his ships.
The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge, both
sides of which had been carefully fortified. M'Gowan's Pass, and
Morris's Heights were also occupied in considerable force, and
rendered capable of being defended against superior numbers. A strong
detachment was posted in an intrenched camp on the heights of Haerlem,
within about a mile and a half of the British lines.
The present position of the armies favoured the views of the American
General. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a series of
successful skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field; and he
persuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a strong intrenched
camp to be immediately in their rear, would engage without
apprehension, would soon display their native courage, and would
speedily regain the confidence they had lost.
Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded.
The day after the retreat from New York, the British appeared in
considerable force in the plains between the two camps; and the
General immediately rode to his advanced posts, in order to make in
person such arrangements as this movement might require. Soon after
his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who, at the
head of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party, came
in, and stated their numbers on conjecture at about three hundred men;
the main body being concealed in a wood.
The General ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and Major
Leitch with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which had
joined the army only the preceding day, to gain their rear, while he
amused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack their
front.
[Sidenote: Skirmish on the heights of Haerlem.]
This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill, in order to
possess themselves of some fences and bushes, which presented an
advantageous position against the party expected in front; and a
firing commenced--but at too great a distance to do any execution. In
the mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not being precisely acquainted with
their new position, made his attack rather on their flank than rear;
and a warm action ensued.
In a short time, Major Leitch, who had led the detachment with great
intrepidity, was brought off the ground mortally wounded, having
received three balls through his body; and soon afterwards the gallant
Colonel Knowlton also fell. Not discouraged by the loss of their field
officers, the captains maintained their ground, and continued the
action with great animation. The British were reinforced; and General
Washington ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of New
England and Maryland, to the support of the Americans. Thus
reinforced, they made a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the
wood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther, when the
General, content with the present advantage, called back his troops to
their intrenchments.[44]
[Footnote 44: The author received the account of this
skirmish from the Colonel of the third Virginia Regiment,
and from the Captains commanding the companies that were
engaged.]
In this sharp conflict, the loss of the Americans, in killed and
wounded, did not exceed fifty men. The British lost more than double
that number. But the real importance of the affair was derived from
its operation on the spirits of the whole army. It was the first
success they had obtained during this campaign; and its influence was
very discernible. To give it the more effect, the parole the next day
was Leitch; and the General, in his orders, publicly thanked the
troops under the command of that officer, who had first advanced on
the enemy, and the others who had so resolutely supported them. He
contrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day
before; and the result, he said, evidenced what might be done where
officers and soldiers would exert themselves. Once more, therefore, he
called upon them so to act, as not to disgrace the noble cause in
which they were engaged. He appointed a successor to "the gallant and
brave Colonel Knowlton, who would," he said, "have been an honour to
any country, and who had fallen gloriously, fighting at his post."
In this active part of the campaign, when the utmost stretch of every
faculty was required, to watch and counteract the plans of a skilful
and powerful enemy, the effects of the original errors committed by
the government, in its military establishment, were beginning to be so
seriously felt, as to compel the Commander-in-chief to devote a
portion of his time and attention to the complete removal of the
causes which produced them.
The situation of America was becoming extremely critical. The almost
entire dissolution of the existing army, by the expiration of the time
for which the greater number of the troops had been engaged, was fast
approaching. No steps had been taken to recruit the new regiments
which congress had resolved to raise for the ensuing campaign; and
there was much reason to apprehend, that in the actual state of
things, the terms offered would not hold forth sufficient inducements
to fill them.
{September 24.}
[Sidenote: Letter on the state of the army.]
With so unpromising a prospect before him, the General found himself
pressed by an army, permanent in its establishment, supplied with
every requisite of war, formidable for its discipline and the
experience of its leaders, and superior to him in numbers. These
circumstances, and the impressions they created, will be best
exhibited by an extract from a letter written at the time to congress.
It is in these words: "From the hours allotted to sleep, I will borrow
a few moments to convey my thoughts, on sundry important matters, to
congress. I shall offer them with that sincerity which ought to
characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be used
in giving useful information, without incurring the imputation of
presumption.
"We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our
army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that
occasion last year; the consequences which might have followed the
change, if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy; added to a
knowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops; reflect
but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, and
satisfy me, beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy
and effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be
lost.
"It is in vain to expect that any, or more than a trifling part of
this army, will engage again in the service, on the encouragement
offered by congress. When men find that their townsmen and companions
are receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars, for a few months
service, (which is truly the case,) this can not be expected, without
using compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer no
valuable purpose. When men are irritated, and their passions inflamed,
they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms; but after the first emotions
are over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of an army,
that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest,
is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the
congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
"A soldier, reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged
in, and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with
patience, and acknowledges the truth of your observations; but adds,
that it is of no more consequence to him than to others. The officer
makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will
not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his
country, when every member of the community is equally benefited and
interested by his labours. The few, therefore, who act upon principles
of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop
in the ocean. It becomes evidently clear, then, that as this contest
is not likely to become the work of a day; as the war must be carried
on systematically; and to do it, you must have good officers; there
is, in my judgment, no other possible means to obtain them, but by
establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your
officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen, and men of character,
to engage; and, until the bulk of your officers are composed of such
persons as are actuated by principles of honour and a spirit of
enterprise, you have little to expect from them. They ought to have
such allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the
character of gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the
low and dirty arts which many of them practise, to filch the public of
more than the difference of pay would amount to, upon an ample
allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in
your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic
enjoyments. Why a captain in the continental service should receive no
more than five shillings currency per day, for performing the same
duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service
receives ten shillings sterling for, I never could conceive;
especially, when the latter is provided with every necessary he
requires, upon the best terms, and the former can scarcely procure
them at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence, and
renders him fit for command, like a support that renders him
independent of every body but the state he serves.
"With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them
upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the
continuance of the war ought they to be engaged; as facts
incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistments
increase with time. When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am
persuaded the men might have been got, without a bounty, for the war:
after that, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end
so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence, by
remarking, that to get their militia, in the course of the last year,
many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils
resulting from this, and the destructive consequences which would
unavoidably follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a long
letter, (date not now recollected, as my letter book is not here,) to
recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such
reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me, were well
founded. At that time, twenty dollars would, I am persuaded, have
engaged the men for this term: but it will not do to look back--and if
the present opportunity is slipped, I am persuaded that twelve months
more will increase our difficulties four fold. I shall therefore take
the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a good bounty be
immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least a hundred, or a
hundred and fifty acres of land, and a suit of clothes, and a blanket,
to each non-commissioned officer and soldier, as I have good authority
for saying, that however high the men's pay may appear, it is barely
sufficient, in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of
goods, to keep them in clothes, much less to afford support to their
families. If this encouragement, then, is given to the men, and such
pay allowed to the officers, as will induce gentlemen of liberal
character and liberal sentiments to engage; and proper care and
caution be used in the nomination, (having more regard to the
characters of persons than the number of men they can enlist,) we
should, in a little time, have an army able to cope with any that can
be opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of:
but whilst the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise
men; whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the
character of an officer, regard him no more than a broomstick, being
mixed together as one common herd; no order nor discipline can
prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is
essentially necessary to due subordination.
"To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting upon a
broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic
life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every
kind of military skill, which, being followed by a want of confidence
in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined,
and appointed--superior in knowledge, and superior in arms--makes them
timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden
change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging,
brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such an
unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it
not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves,
but infuses the like spirit into others. Again, men accustomed to
unbounded freedom and no control, can not brook the restraint which is
indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army;
without which, licentiousness, and every kind of disorder,
triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination,
is not the work of a day, a month, or a year; and unhappily for us,
and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been
labouring to establish in the army under my immediate command, is in a
manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been
called together within these few months."
The frequent remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief; the opinions of
all military men; and the severe, but correcting hand of experience,
had at length produced some effect on the government of the
union;--and soon after the defeat on Long Island, congress had
directed the committee composing the board of war, to prepare a plan
of operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report proposed
a permanent army, to be enlisted for the war, and to be raised by the
several states, in proportion to their ability. A bounty of twenty
dollars was offered to each recruit; and small portions of land to
every officer and soldier.
{October 4.}
The resolutions adopting this report were received by the
Commander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoing
letter. Believing the inducements they held forth for the completion
of the army to be still insufficient, he, in his letter acknowledging
the receipt of them, urged in the most serious terms, the necessity of
raising the pay of the officers, and the bounty offered to recruits.
"Give me leave to say, sir," he observed, "I say it with due deference
and respect, (and my knowledge of the facts, added to the importance
of the cause, and the stake I hold it in, must justify the freedom,)
that your affairs are in a more unpromising way than you seem to
apprehend.
"Your army, as mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of political
dissolution. True it is, you have voted a larger one in lieu of it;
but the season is late, and there is a material difference between
voting battalions, and raising men. In the latter, there are more
difficulties than Congress seem aware of; which makes it my duty (as I
have been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army) to
inform them, that unless the pay of the officers (especially that of
the field officers) is raised, the chief part of those that are worth
retaining will leave the service at the expiration of the present
term; as the soldiers will also, if some greater encouragement is not
offered them, than twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land."
After urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberal
compensation to the army, and stating that the British were actually
raising a regiment with a bounty of ten pounds sterling for each
recruit, he added, "when the pay and establishment of an officer once
become objects of interested attention, the sloth, negligence, and
even disobedience of orders, which at this time but too generally
prevail, will be purged off;--but while the service is viewed with
indifference; while the officer conceives that he is rather conferring
than receiving an obligation: there will be a total relaxation of all
order and discipline; and every thing will move heavily on, to the
great detriment of the service, and inexpressible trouble and vexation
of the general.
"The critical situation of our affairs at this time will justify my
saying, that no time is to be lost in making fruitless experiments. An
unavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon the terms proposed,
may render it impracticable to do it at all, and prove fatal to our
cause; as I am not sure whether any rubs in the way of our
enlistments, or unfavourable turn in our affairs, may not prove the
means of the enemy's recruiting men faster than we do."
After stating at large the confusion and delay, inseparable from the
circumstance that the appointments for the new army were to be made by
the states, the letter proceeds, "upon the present plan, I plainly
foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army, which
must be filled with militia, if to be had, with whom no man, who has
any regard for his own reputation, can undertake to be answerable for
consequences. I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do not
lose the most valuable officers in this army, under the present mode
of appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it will
be composed of materials not only entirely raw, but, if uncommon pains
are not taken, entirely unfit: and I see such a distrust and jealousy
of military power, that the Commander-in-chief has not an opportunity,
even by recommendation, to give the least assurance of reward for the
most essential services.
"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before
me, without one flattering hope, that I am thoroughly convinced,
unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately
adopted to remedy these evils, the certain and absolute loss of our
liberties will be the inevitable consequence: as one unhappy stroke
will throw a powerful weight into the scale against us, and enable
General Howe to recruit his army, as fast as we shall ours; numbers
being disposed, and many actually doing so already. Some of the most
probable remedies, and such as experience has brought to my more
intimate knowledge, I have taken the liberty to point out; the rest I
beg leave to submit to the consideration of congress.
"I ask pardon for taking up so much of their time with my opinions,
but I should betray that trust which they and my country have reposed
in me, were I to be silent upon matters so extremely interesting."
On receiving this very serious letter, congress passed resolutions
conforming to many of its suggestions. The pay of the officers was
raised, and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each soldier: The
legislatures of the states having troops in the continental service,
either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New Jersey, were requested to
depute committees to those places in order to officer the regiments on
the new establishment: and it was recommended to the committees to
consult the General on the subject of appointments.
[Illustration: Washington's Headquarters at White Plains
_Here, twenty-two miles northeast of New York City, Washington made
his headquarters in October, 1776, and directed the Battle of White
Plains or Chatterton Hill. Opposed to the American forces was a
British army, greatly superior in numbers, under General Howe, whose
delay in attaching the Americans enabled Washington to take up an
unassailable position at North Castle, preparatory to his subsequent
masterly retreat across New Jersey._]