Colonel Washington appointed commander-in-chief of the
American forces.... Arrives at Cambridge.... Strength and
disposition of the two armies.... Deficiency of the
Americans in arms and ammunition.... Distress of the British
from the want of fresh provisions.... Falmouth burnt....
Success of the American cruisers.... Measures to form a
continental army.... Difficulty of re-enlisting the
troops.... Plan for attacking Boston.... General Lee
detached to New York.... Possession taken of the heights of
Dorchester.... Boston evacuated.... Correspondence
respecting prisoners.
{1775}
The attention of Colonel Washington, for several years after his
marriage, was principally directed to the management of his estate. He
continued a most respectable member of the legislature of his country,
in which he took an early and a decided part against the claims of
supremacy asserted by the British Parliament. As hostilities
approached, he was chosen by the independent companies, formed through
the northern parts of Virginia, to command them; and was elected a
member of the first congress which met at Philadelphia. The
illustrious patriots who composed it, soon distinguished him as the
soldier of America, and placed him on all those committees whose duty
it was to make arrangements for defence. When it became necessary to
appoint a commander-in-chief, his military character, the solidity of
his judgment, the steady firmness of his temper, the dignity of his
person and deportment, the confidence inspired by his patriotism and
integrity, and the independence of his fortune, combined to designate
him, in the opinion of all, for that important station. Local jealousy
was suppressed, not only by the enthusiasm of the moment, but by that
policy which induced the sagacious delegation from New England, to
prefer a commander-in-chief from the south.
[Sidenote: Colonel Washington appointed Commander-in-chief of the
American forces.]
On the 14th of June, he was unanimously chosen "General, and
Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United Colonies, and all the
forces now raised, or to be raised by them."[9]
[Footnote 9: See note No. IV. at the end of the volume.]
{June 15.}
On the succeeding day, when the President communicated this
appointment to him, he expressed his high sense of the honour
conferred upon him, and his firm determination to exert every power he
possessed in the service of his country and of her "glorious cause."
At the same time he acknowledged the distress he felt from a
consciousness that his abilities and military experience might not be
equal to the extensive and important trust.
He declined all compensation for his services; and avowed an intention
to keep an exact account of his expenses, which he should rely on
Congress to discharge.
A special commission was directed, and a resolution unanimously
passed, declaring that "Congress would maintain, assist, and adhere to
him, as the General and Commander-in-chief of the forces raised, or to
be raised, for the maintenance and preservation of American liberty,
with their lives and fortunes."
He prepared, without delay, to enter upon the arduous duties of his
office; and, remaining only a few days in New York, where several
important arrangements were to be made, proceeded to the head quarters
of the American army.
[Sidenote: Arrives at Cambridge.]
As all orders of men concurred in approving his appointment, all
concurred in expressing their satisfaction at that event, and their
determination to afford him entire support. A committee of the
Congress of Massachusetts waited to receive him at Springfield, on the
confines of the colony, and to escort him to the army. On his arrival,
an address was presented to him by the House of Representatives,
breathing the most cordial affection, and testifying the most exalted
respect. His answer[10] was well calculated to keep up impressions
essential to the success of that arduous contest into which the United
Colonies had entered.
[Footnote 10: It is in the following terms:
"Gentlemen,--Your kind congratulations on my appointment and
arrival, demand my warmest acknowledgments, and will be ever
retained in grateful remembrance. In exchanging the
enjoyments of domestic life for the duties of my present
honourable but arduous situation, I only emulate the virtue
and public spirit of the whole Province of Massachusetts,
which, with a firmness and patriotism without example, has
sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in
support of the rights of mankind, and the welfare of our
common country. My highest ambition is to be the happy
instrument of vindicating these rights, and to see this
devoted Province again restored to peace, liberty, and
safety.
"GEO: WASHINGTON."]
{July 3.}
[Sidenote: Strength and disposition of the two armies.]
The first moments after his arrival in camp were employed in
reconnoitring the enemy, and examining the strength and situation of
the American troops.
The main body of the British army, under the immediate command of
General Howe, was entrenching itself strongly on Bunker's hill. Three
floating batteries lay in Mystic river, near the camp, and a twenty
gun ship below the ferry, between Boston and Charlestown. A strong
battery on the Boston side of the water, on Cop's or Cope's hill,
served to cover and strengthen the post on Bunker's hill. Another
division was deeply entrenched on Roxbury neck. The light horse, and
an inconsiderable body of infantry, were stationed in Boston.
The American army lay on both sides of Charles river. The right
occupied the high grounds about Roxbury; whence it extended towards
Dorchester; and the left was covered by Mystic or Medford river, a
space of at least twelve miles. These extensive lines could not be
contracted without opening to the British general a communication with
the country.
For the purpose of a more distinct arrangement, the army was thrown
into three grand divisions. That part of it which lay about Roxbury
constituted the right wing, and was commanded by Major General Ward;
the troops near Mystic or Medford river formed the left, which was
placed under Major General Lee. The centre, including the reserve, was
under the immediate command of General Washington, whose head quarters
were at Cambridge.
The army consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men; but several
circumstances combined to render this force less effective than its
numbers would indicate.
[Sidenote: Deficiency of the Americans in arms and ammunition.]
So long had the hope of avoiding open hostilities been indulged, that
the time for making preparations to meet them had passed away
unemployed, and the neglect could not be remedied. On General
Washington's arrival in camp, he had ordered a return of the
ammunition to be made; and the report stated three hundred and three
barrels of powder to be in store. A few days after this return, the
alarming discovery was made, that the actual quantity was not more
than sufficient to furnish each man with nine cartridges. This mistake
had been produced by a misapprehension of the committee of supplies,
(for the magazines were not yet in possession of military officers,)
who, instead of returning the existing quantity, reported the whole
which had been originally furnished by the Province. Though the utmost
exertions were made, this critical state of things continued about a
fortnight, when a small supply of powder was received from
Elizabethtown, in New Jersey.[11] The utmost address was used to
conceal from the enemy this alarming deficiency; but when it is
recollected, in how many various directions, and to what various
bodies, application for assistance was unavoidably made, it will
appear scarcely possible that those efforts at concealment could have
been completely successful. It is more probable that the
communications which must have been made to the British general were
discredited; and that he could not permit himself to believe, that an
army without bayonets would be hardy enough to maintain the position
occupied by the Provincials, if destitute of ammunition.
[Footnote 11: A circumstance attending this transaction,
will furnish some idea of the difficulties encountered by
those who then conducted the affairs of America.
All-important to the general safety as was the speedy
replenishment of the magazines of that army which lay
encamped in front of the enemy, the committee of
Elizabethtown was under the necessity of transmitting this
powder secretly, lest the people of the neighbourhood should
seize and detain it for their own security.]
The troops were also in such need of tents, as to be placed in
barracks, instead of being encamped in the open field; and were almost
destitute of clothing. They had, too, been raised by the colonial
governments; each of which organized its quota on different
principles. From this cause resulted not only a want of uniformity,
but other defects which were much more important. In Massachusetts,
the soldiers had chosen their platoon officers, and generally lived
with them as equals. This unmilitary practice was the certain index of
that general insubordination which pervaded every department. The
difficulty of establishing principles of order and obedience, always
considerable among raw troops, was increased by the short terms for
which enlistments had been made. The quotas of some of the colonies
would be entitled to a discharge in November; and none were engaged to
continue in service longer than the last of December. The early orders
evidence a state of things still more loose and unmilitary than was to
be inferred from the circumstances under which the war had been
commenced.
An additional inconvenience, derived from this mixed agency of local
governments with that of the Union, was thus stated by General
Washington in a letter addressed to congress:--"I should be extremely
deficient in gratitude as well as justice, if I did not take the first
opportunity to acknowledge the readiness and attention which the
congress and different committees have shown to make every thing as
convenient and agreeable as possible; but there is a vital and
inherent principle of delay, incompatible with military service, in
transacting business through such various and different channels.[12]
I esteem it my duty, therefore, to represent the inconvenience that
must unavoidably ensue from a dependence on a number of persons for
supplies; and submit it to the consideration of congress, whether the
public service will not be best promoted by appointing a Commissary
General for the purpose."[13]
[Footnote 12: The General was under the necessity of
carrying on a direct correspondence, not only with the
several colonial governments, but with the committees of all
the important towns and some inferior places.]
[Footnote 13: It is strange that an army should have been
formed without such an officer.]
Every military operation was also seriously affected by the total want
of engineers, and the deficiency of working tools.
To increase difficulties already so considerable, the appointment of
general officers, made by congress, gave extensive dissatisfaction,
and determined several of those who thought themselves injured, to
retire from the service.
These disadvantages deducted essentially from the capacity of the
American force: but under them all, the General observed with pleasure
"the materials for a good army." These were "a great number of men,
able bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable
courage." Possessed of these materials, he employed himself
indefatigably in their organization. The army was arranged into
divisions and brigades; and congress was urged to the appointment of a
Paymaster, Quarter-master General, and such other general staff as are
indispensable in the structure of a regular military establishment.
The two armies continued to work on their respective fortifications,
without seriously molesting each other. Slight skirmishes occasionally
took place, in which little execution was done; and, although the
Americans made some advances, no attempt was made to dislodge them.
{September.}
The Commander-in-chief submitted with reluctance to this state of
apparent inactivity. He felt the importance of destroying the army in
Boston, before it should be strengthened by reinforcements in the
ensuing spring; and with a view to this object, frequently
reconnoitred its situation, and was assiduous in collecting every
information respecting its strength. The result of his observations
and inquiries seems to have been, a strong inclination to the opinion,
that to carry the works by storm, though hazardous, was not
impracticable. A council of general officers being unanimously of
opinion, that for the present at least, the attempt ought not to be
made, it was laid aside.
[Sidenote: Distress of the British from the want of fresh provisions.]
A rigorous blockade being maintained, the British army began to suffer
considerably for fresh meat and vegetables. The small parties which
sailed from Boston, in quest of these articles, were frequently
disappointed by the vigilance of the minute men. But the continuance
of active exertion, which this service required on the part of the
inhabitants of the sea coast, soon became burdensome; and the
governors of the several colonies pressed for detachments from the
main army. Although it was impossible to spare the troops required,
without hazarding the cause of the colonies, great irritation was
excited by the refusal to comply with these demands of particular
protection. They at length became so importunate, and the unavoidable
refusal to comply with them was so ill received, that congress was
induced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Boston
was designed only to oppose the enemy at that place, and ought not to
be weakened by detachments for the security of other parts of the
country. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought to secure
the place, by entering into a compromise with Captain Wallace, who
commanded the ships of war on that station, stipulating that he should
be furnished with provisions on condition of his sparing the town, and
committing no depredations on the country. This compromise contravened
so essentially the general plan of distressing the British forces,
that General Washington deemed it necessary to interpose, and
represent to the Governor of that province, the mischief to be
apprehended from so dangerous a practice.
While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, other
events of considerable importance took place elsewhere.
In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates to
represent her in congress: after which, the style of "The thirteen
United Colonies" was assumed; and by that title, the English
Provinces, confederated and in arms, were thenceforward designated.
{September 5.}
After a recess of one month, congress again assembled at Philadelphia.
The state of the colonies, and the letters of the Commander-in-chief
being immediately taken into consideration, the scarcity of arms and
ammunition engaged their most serious attention. Great exertions[14]
had been made, by importation and by domestic manufacture, to
extricate the country from this perilous situation; but the supplies
were unequal to the necessities of the army; and the danger resulting
from the want of articles, so vitally essential in war, still
continued to be great.
[Footnote 14: The agents of congress had the address to
purchase all the powder on the coast of Africa, and that
within the British forts, without attracting notice; and to
seize the magazine in the island of Bermuda. Great exertions
were also made in the interior to obtain saltpetre and
sulphur, for the manufacture of that important article.]
The importance of a maritime force to the military operations of a
country possessing an immense extent of sea coast must always be
sensibly felt; and, in an early stage of the contest, the particular
attention of the United Colonies was directed more immediately to this
interesting object, by an event not very unusual in war, but which, at
this time, excited no ordinary degree of resentment.
Orders had been issued to the commanders of the British ships of war
to proceed, as in the case of actual rebellion, against those seaport
towns which were accessible, and in which any troops should be raised,
or military works erected.
{October.}
[Sidenote: Falmouth burnt.]
Falmouth, a flourishing village on the sea coast of Massachusetts,
having given some particular offence, a small naval force, commanded
by Captain Mowat, was, under colour of these orders, detached for its
destruction. After making an ineffectual effort to induce the
inhabitants to deliver up their arms and ammunition, and four of the
principal citizens as hostages, he commenced a furious cannonade and
bombardment, by which the town was reduced to ashes. An attempt was
then made to penetrate into the country; but the militia and minute
men, rather irritated than intimidated by this wanton act of
unavailing devastation, drove the party, which had landed, back to
their ships.
This measure was loudly reprobated throughout America, and
contributed, not a little, to turn the attention of the United
Colonies to their marine. It was one immediate motive with the
convention of Massachusetts, for granting letters of marque and
reprisal; and was assigned by congress, in addition to the capture of
American merchantmen on the high seas, as an inducement for fitting
out some ships of war; to man which they directed two battalions of
marines to be recruited.
[Sidenote: Success of the American cruisers.]
Though congress deferred granting general letters of reprisal, they
adopted a measure of equal efficacy, but less hostile in appearance.
Their ships of war were authorized to capture all vessels employed in
giving assistance to the enemy; the terms used in their resolution
were such as comprehended every possible capture. A few small cruisers
had already been fitted out by the directions of General Washington;
and the coasts soon swarmed with the privateers of New England. These
naval exertions were attended with valuable consequences. Many
captures were made; and important supplies of ammunition were thus
obtained.
Although the British army had manifested no intention to evacuate
Boston, fears were continually entertained for New York. Mr. Tryon,
who was popular in that province, had been lately recalled from North
Carolina, and appointed its governor. His utmost influence was
employed in detaching that colony from the union; and his exertions
were seconded by the Asia man of war, whose guns commanded the town.
The consequence of these intrigues and of this terror was, that even
in the convention, disaffection to the American cause began openly to
show itself; and a determination to join the king's standard is said
to have been expressed with impunity. These threatening appearances
were rendered the more serious by some confidential communications
from England, stating the intention of administration to send a fleet
into the Hudson, and to occupy both New York and Albany. Under the
alarm thus excited, an effort was made in congress to obtain a
resolution for seizing the governor. He had, however, been artful
enough to make impressions in his favour; and he was defended by a
part of the delegation from New York with so much earnestness that,
for a time, the advocates of the proposition forbore to press it.
Afterwards, when the increasing defection in that province induced
Congress to resume the subject, the resolution was expressed in
general terms; and assumed the form of a recommendation, to those who
exercised the legislative and executive functions in the several
provinces, "to arrest and secure every person in the respective
colonies, whose going at large might, in their opinion, endanger the
safety of the colony, or the liberties of America." Intelligence of
this resolution is supposed to have been received by the governor,
who, after some correspondence with the mayor of the city respecting
his personal safety, retired for security on board the Halifax packet,
and continued to carry on his intrigues with nearly as much advantage
as while on shore.
But the subject which, next to the supply of arms and ammunition, most
interested the American government, was the re-enlistment of the army.
[Illustration: The Historic Washington Elm at Cambridge, Massachusetts
_"Under this tree," as the granite tablet states, "Washington first
took command of the American army, July 3d, 1775." This picture is
from a photograph taken about the year 1900. In spite of the most
determined efforts to preserve this historic relic, the tree fell in
November, 1923._
© U & U]
[Sidenote: Measures to form a continental army.]
On the 29th of September, at the earnest solicitation of General
Washington, a committee had been appointed by congress, with
directions to repair to the camp at Cambridge; there to consult with
the Commander-in-chief, and with the chief magistrates of New
Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and the council of
Massachusetts, "on the most effectual method of continuing,
supporting, and regulating a continental army." On the return of this
committee, congress determined that the new army should consist of
twenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two men, including officers;
to be raised as far as practicable from the troops already in service.
Unfortunately, in constituting this first military establishment of
the union, an essential error was committed; the consequences of which
ceased only with the war. The soldiers, instead of being engaged for
an unlimited time, were enlisted for the term of only one year, if not
sooner discharged by congress. It is not easy to account entirely for
this fatal error. With their jealousy of a permanent army, were
probably intermingled hopes that the war would not be of long
duration, and fears that much difficulty would be encountered in
prevailing on men to enter into engagements of unlimited extent.
Perhaps the habits of the northern colonies, where it had been usual
to raise men for a single campaign, may have contributed to this
measure. Whatever may have been its motives, its consequences were of
the most serious nature; and it brought the American cause, more than
once, into real hazard.
Other resolutions accompanied that for raising and establishing the
new army, which exhibit the perilous condition of the country, and its
want of those means, which were indispensable to the support of the
arduous conflict in which it was engaged.
One resolution ordered the detention, at a valuation, of the arms of
those soldiers who should refuse to re-enlist, although they were
private property, and but ill adapted to military purposes; another,
offered two dollars to every recruit who would supply himself with a
blanket; a third, ordered the purchase of any cloths which could be
procured, without regard to colour, to be delivered to the soldiers,
after deducting the price from their pay; and a fourth, required the
soldiers to furnish their own arms, or to pay for the use of those
which might be supplied by the government.
{October 22.}
Before the arrangements made by the committee were confirmed by
congress, General Washington proceeded to take the preparatory steps
for carrying them into execution.
It being understood that the engagements of the officers, as well as
of the soldiers, would expire with the year; the whole army was to be
formed anew. The officers therefore were required to signify in
writing to their respective colonels, their determination to leave, or
to continue in the service; that it might be communicated to congress
through the officer commanding brigades.
[Sidenote: Difficulty of re-enlisting the army.]
The urgency of the case could not produce a compliance with these
orders. Many disregarded them; and others annexed conditions to their
remaining in the service. Repetitions of them became necessary; and an
unconditional declaration was required.[15] But that high spirit and
enthusiastic ardour, which had brought such numbers into the field
after the battle of Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate; and
that alacrity for the service, which had been expected, was not
displayed. The orders of the day contain the most animating
exhortations to the army, and the strongest appeals to its patriotism;
but there was an ominous hesitation in forming new engagements.
[Footnote 15: In this state of things, several officers,
supposing that commissions and rank might depend on
recruiting men, began, without permission, to recruit
soldiers, to serve particularly under the officer enlisting
them. Every military principle required that this practice
should be arrested; and it was peremptorily forbidden in
general orders.]
{November 12.}
At length, with much labour, the officers were arranged, upon which,
recruiting orders were issued. But the sufferings of the army for
fuel, clothes, and even provisions, had been great; and to this cause
may be attributed the tardiness with which the soldiers in camp
enrolled themselves. One officer from each company was employed to
recruit in the country; but their progress was not such as the crisis
demanded; and the army was dissolving by the expiration of the time
for which it had been enlisted. The impatience of the soldiers to
revisit their friends, overcame all their solicitude for maintaining
the blockade of Boston; and it was with great difficulty that those
entitled to a discharge were detained in camp even for ten days; at
the end of which time a body of militia was expected to supply their
places. This fact, however, did not convince the governments of the
United Colonies, that it was possible to rely too much on individual
patriotism; and that the American cause, if defended entirely by
temporary armies, must be often exposed to imminent hazard.
{November 30.}
Perceiving the difficulty of recruiting the army, the General
earnestly recommended to congress, to try the effect of a bounty. This
proposition was not adopted until late in January; and, on the last
day of December, when all the old troops, not engaged on the new
establishment, were disbanded, only nine thousand six hundred and
fifty men had been enlisted for the army of 1776; many of whom were
unavoidably permitted to be absent on furlough. Their numbers,
however, were considerably augmented during the winter; and, in the
mean time, the militia cheerfully complied with the requisitions made
on them.
{December.}
Notwithstanding these complicated difficulties and embarrassments, the
General viewed with deep mortification the semblance of inactivity to
which his situation compelled him to submit. In the commencement of
the contest, while the minds of many were undetermined, it was of vast
importance to secure the public confidence, and it was necessary to
pay some attention even to the public caprice. The real difficulties
under which he laboured were not generally known. His numbers were
exaggerated, and his means of carrying on offensive operations were
magnified. The expulsion of the British army from Boston had been long
since anticipated by many; and those were not wanting, who endeavoured
to spread discontent by insinuating that the Commander-in-chief was
desirous of prolonging the war, in order to continue his own
importance. To these symptoms of impatience, and to the consequences
they might produce, he could not be insensible; but it was not in his
power to silence such complaints, by disclosing to the world his real
situation. His views still continued to be directed towards Boston;
and, congress having manifested a disposition favourable to an attack
on that place, the general officers had been again assembled, and had
again advised unanimously against the measure. Supposing that fears
for the safety of the town might embarrass the proceedings of the
army, congress resolved, "that if General Washington and his council
of war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made on
the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think
expedient, notwithstanding the town and property in it might be
thereby destroyed."
[Sidenote: Plans for attacking Boston.]
Whilst waiting for a favourable opportunity to execute this bold plan,
the American general availed himself of the occasional aids received
from the militia, to make advances on the besieged, and to seize
positions which would favour ulterior operations. Ploughed Hill,
Cobble Hill, and Lechmere's Point, were successively occupied and
fortified. His approaches were carried within half a mile of the works
on Bunker's Hill; and his guns drove their floating batteries from
their stations, and protected others constructed under his orders.
Hitherto, the object of the war had been a redress of grievances. The
language, that it was a war against a corrupt administration, had been
carefully observed; and allegiance to the British crown was
universally avowed. The progress, however, of the public mind towards
independence, though slow, was certain; and measures were necessarily
taken, which apparently tended to that object. Among these, was the
act of establishing temporary governments in place of that
revolutionary system which followed the suspension of the ancient
institutions.
The first application on this subject was made by Massachusetts;[16]
and her example was soon followed by other colonies. These
applications could not fail to draw forth the sentiments of members on
the very interesting question of separation from the mother country.
They who wished to lead public opinion to independence, were desirous
of establishing a regular government in each province, entirely
competent to the administration of its affairs; while they who were
hostile to that event, opposed every measure which might either
incline the colonies towards it, or strengthen the opinion in Great
Britain, that it was the real object of all who had resisted the
legislative supremacy of parliament. A resolution was with difficulty
obtained in the case of New Hampshire, which formed a precedent for
others of the same nature, recommending to the provincial convention
to call a full and free representation of the people, who should
establish such form of government as would best promote the general
happiness, and most effectually secure peace and good order in the
colony, during the continuance of the present dispute with Great
Britain. Without this last clause, which still maintained the
appearance of preserving the ancient connexion with the parent state,
the recommendation would not have been made. About the same time,
congress also resolved that it would be extremely dangerous to the
liberties and welfare of America, for any colony separately to
petition the king or either house of parliament.
[Footnote 16: On this application congress recommended that
an assembly and council should be chosen in the usual way,
who should exercise the powers of government until a
Governor of his Majesty's appointment should consent to
govern the colony according to its charter.]
Having taken into consideration a proclamation, declaring certain
persons in the colonies to have forgotten their allegiance, and to be
in a state of open rebellion, and threatening with punishment those
who should be found carrying on correspondence with them;--congress
declared, "in the name of the people of these United Colonies, and by
the authority according to the purest maxims of representation derived
from them, that whatever punishment shall be inflicted upon any
persons in the power of their enemies, for favouring, aiding, or
abetting the cause of American liberty, shall be retaliated in the
same kind, and in the same degree, upon those in their power, who have
favoured, aided, or abetted, or shall favour, aid, or abet the system
of ministerial oppression."
The British army, the command of which, on the recall of General Gage,
had devolved upon General Howe, still remained inactive in Boston; and
was still closely blocked up on the land side. The history of this
winter campaign, is a history of successive struggles on the part of
the American general, with the difficulties imposed by the want of
arms, ammunition, and permanent troops, on a person extremely
solicitous, by some grand and useful achievement, to prove himself
worthy of the high station to which the voice of his country had
called him.
{1776}
{January.}
Considering the resolution relative to the attack on Boston as
indicating the desire of congress on that subject, he assured the
president that an attempt would be made to put it in execution the
first moment he should perceive a probability of success. If this
should not occur, as soon as might be expected or wished, he prayed
that his situation might be recollected, and that congress would do
him the justice to believe, that circumstances, not inclination on his
part, occasioned the delay. "It is not," said he, "in the pages of
history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket
shot of the enemy for six months together, without _ammunition_; and
at the same time, to disband one army and recruit another, within that
distance of twenty-odd British regiments, is more than, probably, ever
was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter, as we have
hitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event
of my whole life."
In the month of January a council of war, at which Mr. John Adams, a
member of congress, and Mr. Warren, president of the provincial
congress of Massachusetts, assisted: Resolved, "that a vigorous
attempt ought to be made on the ministerial troops in Boston, before
they can be reinforced in the spring, if the means can be provided,
and a favourable opportunity should offer." It was farther advised,
"that thirteen regiments of militia should be asked for from
Massachusetts and the neighbouring colonies, in order to put the army
in a condition to make the attempt. The militia to assemble on the
first of February, and to continue in service, if necessary, until the
first of March." The colonies readily complied with these
requisitions; but so mild had the season hitherto been, that the
waters about Boston continued open. "Congress would discover in my
last," said the general, on the nineteenth of January, "my motives for
strengthening these lines with militia. But whether, as the weather
turns out exceedingly mild, (insomuch as to promise nothing favourable
from ice,) and there is no appearance of powder, I shall be able to
attempt any thing decisive, time only can determine. No man upon earth
wishes to destroy the nest in Boston more than I do; no person would
be willing to go greater lengths than I shall to accomplish it, if it
shall be thought adviseable; but if we have no powder to bombard with,
nor ice to pass on, we shall be in no better situation than we have
been all the year: we shall be in a worse, as their works are
stronger."
[Sidenote: General Lee detached to New York.]
Early in January, the Commander-in-chief received unquestionable
intelligence that an armament was equipping in Boston, to sail under
General Clinton on a secret expedition. Many considerations induced
him to believe that New York was its destination. He thought the
possession of the Hudson of great importance to the British: and that
the numerous adherents to the royal cause in New York, furnished an
additional reason for transferring the seat of war to that colony.
Whilst deliberating on this subject, he received a letter from General
Lee, requesting to be detached to Connecticut, for the purpose of
assembling a body of volunteers, who should march into New York, and
be employed both for the security of that place, and the expulsion or
suppression of a band of tories collecting on Long Island. Though
inclined to the adoption of this measure, delicacy towards those who
exercised the powers of civil government in the colony, suspended his
decision on it. Mr. John Adams, who possessed great and well merited
influence, was then at Watertown, attending the provincial convention;
and with him, the general held some communications respecting his
powers. That gentleman being decidedly of opinion that they extended
to the case, General Lee was detached, with instructions to raise a
body of volunteers in Connecticut, to reinforce the battalions of New
Jersey and New York, which were placed under his command. His orders
were to proceed to New York; to examine the fortifications of the
city, and up the river; to put them in the best possible state of
defence; to disarm all persons whose conduct rendered them justly
suspected of designs unfriendly to the government, especially those on
Long Island; and to collect the arms and ammunition in their
possession, for the use of the army.
No difficulty was found in raising the volunteers required from
Connecticut. The people of that province were zealous and
enterprising, and Governor Trumbull having sanctioned the measure,
troops were immediately embodied, and Lee commenced his march for New
York at the head of twelve hundred men.
The inhabitants of that place were much alarmed at his approach.
Captain Parker of the Asia man of war had threatened that he would
destroy the town in the event of its being entered by any considerable
body of provincials; and it was believed that these threats would be
executed.
A committee of safety, which had been appointed to exercise the powers
of government during the recess of the provincial congress, addressed
a letter to General Lee, expressing astonishment at the report that he
was about to enter the town without previously intimating his design,
and pressing him earnestly not to pass the confines of Connecticut,
until they could have further explanations with him.
Holding in utter contempt the threats of Captain Parker, Lee continued
his march; and, in a letter[17] to congress, represented in such
strong terms the impolicy of leaving the military arrangements for New
York under the control of the local government, that congress
appointed three of their own body, to consult with him and the council
of safety, respecting the defence of the place; and instructed him to
obey the directions of that committee.
[Footnote 17: See note No. V. at the end of the volume.]
Lee soon acquired that ascendancy which is the prerogative of a
superior mind, over those who were sent for his government, and they
directed him to execute whatever he suggested. A plan recommended by
him, for fortifying the city and preserving its connexion with Long
Island, was adopted, and prosecuted with vigour.
General Clinton arrived almost at the same instant with General Lee,
but without troops. He said openly, that none were coming; that no
hostilities were contemplated against New York; and that he was,
himself, merely on a visit to his friend Tryon. "If it be really so,"
added General Lee, in his letter containing this communication, "it is
the most whimsical piece of civility I ever heard of." General Clinton
did not affect to conceal that his real object was to proceed to North
Carolina, where he expected that five regiments from Europe would join
the small force he should carry with him.
About the middle of February, the cold was intense, and the ice became
sufficiently firm to bear the troops. General Washington was now
disposed to execute the bold plan he had formed, of attacking General
Howe in Boston; but a council of war being almost unanimous against
the measure, it was abandoned. The want of ammunition for the
artillery was a principal inducement to this opinion.
The attempt, probably, would not have succeeded, and must certainly
have been attended with considerable loss. But the advice of the
council seems to have been adopted with regret. In communicating their
opinion to congress, the general observed, "Perhaps the irksomeness of
my situation may have given different ideas to me, from those which
influence the gentlemen I consulted; and might have inclined me to put
more to the hazard than was consistent with prudence. If it had this
effect, I am not sensible of it, as I endeavoured to give the subject
all the consideration a matter of such importance required. True it
is, and I can not help acknowledging, that I have many disagreeable
sensations on account of my situation; for, to have the eyes of the
whole continent fixed on me, with anxious expectation of hearing some
great event, and to be restrained in every military operation for want
of the necessary means to carry it on, is not very pleasing;
especially as the means used to conceal my weakness from the enemy,
conceal it also from our friends, and add to their wonder."
Late in February, various appearances among the British troops
indicated an intention to evacuate Boston; but as these appearances
might be deceptive, and he had now received a small supply of powder,
General Washington determined to prosecute vigorously a plan he had
formed, to force General Howe either to come to an action, or to
abandon the town.
Since the allowance of a bounty, recruiting had been more successful;
and the regular force had been augmented to rather more than fourteen
thousand men. In addition to these troops, the Commander-in-chief had
called to his aid about six thousand of the militia of Massachusetts.
Thus reinforced, he determined to take possession of the heights of
Dorchester, and to fortify them. As the possession of this post would
enable him to annoy the ships in the harbour and the soldiers in the
town, he was persuaded that a general action would ensue. But if this
hope should be disappointed, his purpose was to make the works on the
heights of Dorchester only preparatory to seizing and fortifying
Nook's Hill, and the points opposite the south end of Boston, which
commanded the harbour, a great part of the town, and the beach from
which an embarkation must take place in the event of a retreat.
{March.}
[Sidenote: Possession taken of the heights of Dorchester.]
To facilitate the execution of this plan, a heavy bombardment and
cannonade were commenced on the town and on the British lines, which
were repeated the two succeeding nights. On the last of them,
immediately after the firing had begun, a strong detachment, under the
command of General Thomas, took possession of the heights without
opposition. Such was their activity and industry through the night
that, although the ground was almost impenetrable, the works were
sufficiently advanced by the morning, nearly to cover them. When
day-light disclosed their operations to the British, a considerable
degree of embarrassment appeared, and an ineffectual fire was
commenced on the party in possession of the heights, who in turn
opened a battery on the besieged; and continued with unremitting
labour to strengthen their position.
{March 5.}
It was necessary to dislodge the Americans from the heights, or to
evacuate the town; and General Howe, as had been foreseen, determined
to embrace the former part of the alternative. Three thousand chosen
men, to be commanded by Lord Percy, were ordered on this service.
These troops were embarked, and fell down to the castle, in order to
proceed up the river to the intended scene of action; but were
scattered by a furious storm, which disabled them from immediately
prosecuting the enterprise. Before they could again be in readiness
for the attack, the works were made so strong, that the attempt to
storm them was thought unadviseable, and the evacuation of the town
became inevitable.
In the expectation that the flower of the British troops would be
employed against the heights of Dorchester, General Washington had
concerted a plan for availing himself of that occasion, to attack
Boston itself. The storm which defeated the proposed attack on the
heights defeated this enterprise also.
[Sidenote: Boston evacuated.]
{March 17.}
The determination to evacuate Boston was soon communicated. A paper
signed by some of the select men of the town, and brought out with a
flag, stated the fact. This paper was accompanied by propositions said
to be made on the part of General Howe, but not signed by him,
relative to the security of the town, and the peaceable embarkation of
his army. As these propositions were not addressed to the
Commander-in-chief, and were not authenticated by the signature of
General Howe, nor by any act obligatory on him, General Washington
thought it improper directly to notice them; and ordered the officer
to whom they were delivered to return an answer stating the reasons
why they were not treated with more attention. The determination,
however, to continue his advances and to secure Nook's Hill, was
changed; and considerable detachments were moved towards New York,
before the actual evacuation of Boston. This event took place on the
17th of March; and, in a few days, the whole fleet sailed out of
Nantasket road, directing its course eastward.
The recovery of this important town gave great joy to the United
Colonies. Congress passed a vote of thanks to the General and his
army, "for their wise and spirited conduct in the siege and
acquisition of Boston;" and directed a medal of gold to be struck in
commemoration of the event.
As soon as the British fleet had put to sea, the American army
proceeded by divisions to New York, where it arrived on the 14th of
April.
During the siege of Boston, an altercation concerning prisoners took
place between the commanders of the respective armies, which was
viewed with great interest throughout America. The character of the
war--a war between a sovereign and those who professed to be his
subjects, led to a course of conduct on the part of the British
General, which the actual state of things did not justify.
General Gage, as Governor of Massachusetts, had received all the
irritations of which his mind was susceptible--irritations which
seemed to have had no inconsiderable influence over his conduct as
Commander-in-chief. He regarded the Americans nearly as rebels; and
treated them as if the great national resistance they were making on
principle, was to be viewed as the act of a few daring and turbulent
individuals, rising against laws of unquestionable obligation, who
would soon be quelled, and punished for their disobedience of
legitimate authority. In this spirit, he threw some distinguished
gentlemen of Boston, and the American officers and soldiers who fell
into his hands, into the common jail of felons; and treated them,
without respect to military rank or condition, not as prisoners of
war, but as state criminals.
[Sidenote: Correspondence respecting prisoners.]
General Washington remonstrated very seriously against this
unjustifiable measure. Considering political opinion entirely out of
the question, and "conceiving the obligations of humanity, and the
claims of rank, to be universally binding, except in the case of
retaliation;" he expressed the hope he had entertained, "that they
would have induced, on the part of the British General, a conduct more
conformable to the rights they gave." While he claimed the benefits of
these rights, he declared his determination "to be regulated entirely,
in his conduct towards the prisoners who should fall into his hands,
by the treatment which those in the power of the British General
should receive."
To this letter, a haughty and intemperate answer was returned,
retorting the complaints concerning the treatment of prisoners, and
affecting to consider it as an instance of clemency, that the cord was
not applied to those whose imprisonment was complained of. To this
answer, General Washington gave a manly and dignified reply, which
was, he said, "to close their correspondence perhaps forever;" and
which concluded with saying, "If your officers, our prisoners, receive
from me a treatment different from what I wished to show them, they
and you will remember the occasion of it."
The result of this correspondence was communicated to the council of
Massachusetts,[18] who were requested to order the British officers
then on parole to be confined in close jail, and the soldiers to be
sent to such place of security as the general court should direct.
[Footnote 18: In the early part of the war, congress had
appointed no commissary of prisoners; nor had the government
taken upon itself the custody of them. They were entrusted
for safe keeping to the respective legislatures and
committees, to whom it was necessary to apply for the
execution of every order respecting them.]
On the recall of General Gage, the command devolved on General Howe,
whose conduct was less exceptionable; and this rigorous treatment of
prisoners was relaxed.
Not long after this correspondence with General Gage, while Montgomery
was employed in the siege of St. John's, Colonel Ethan Allen was
captured in a bold and rash attempt on Montreal. Under the pretext of
his having acted without authority, he was put in irons, and sent to
England as a traitor.
While he was yet in Canada, congress requested the Commander-in-chief
to inquire into the fact. He addressed a letter to Sir William Howe,
requiring explanations on it, and assuring him that General Prescot,
who had been taken in Canada, and was understood to have contributed
to the severities inflicted on Colonel Allen, should receive exactly
the fate of that officer.
General Howe, not holding any authority in Canada, or not choosing to
enter fully into this subject, General Schuyler was directed to make
particular inquiries into the conduct of Prescot; and congress, on
being informed of the inefficacy of the application to General Howe,
ordered that officer into close jail.