But the problem concerning them is more complex, for they are social in

another sense and, as it were in the second degree. They not only come

from society, but the things which they express are of a social nature.

Not only is it society which has founded them, but their contents are

the different aspects of the social being: the category of class was at

first indistinct from the concept of the human group; it is the rhythm

of social life which is at the basis of the category of time; the

territory occupied by the society furnished the material for the

category of space; it is the collective force which was the prototype of

the concept of efficient force, an essential element in the category of

causality. However, the categories are not made to be applied only to

the social realm; they reach out to all reality. Then how is it that

they have taken from society the models upon which they have been

constructed?

It is because they are the pre-eminent concepts, which have a

preponderating part in our knowledge. In fact, the function of the

categories is to dominate and envelop all the other concepts: they are

permanent moulds for the mental life. Now for them to embrace such an

object, they must be founded upon a reality of equal amplitude.

Undoubtedly the relations which they express exist in an implicit way in

individual consciousnesses. The individual lives in time, and, as we

have said, he has a certain sense of temporal orientation. He is

situated at a determined point in space, and it has even been held, and

sustained with good reasons, that all sensations have something special

about them.[1316] He has a feeling of resemblances; similar

representations are brought together and the new representation formed

by their union has a sort of generic character. We also have the

sensation of a certain regularity in the order of the succession of

phenomena; even an animal is not incapable of this. However, all these

relations are strictly personal for the individual who recognizes them,

and consequently the notion of them which he may have can in no case go

beyond his own narrow horizon. The generic images which are formed in my

consciousness by the fusion of similar images represent only the objects

which I have perceived directly; there is nothing there which could give

me the idea of a class, that is to say, of a mould including the _whole_

group of all possible objects which satisfy the same condition. Also, it

would be necessary to have the idea of group in the first place, and the

mere observations of our interior life could never awaken that in us.

But, above all, there is no individual experience, howsoever extended

and prolonged it may be, which could give a suspicion of the existence

of a whole class which would embrace every single being, and to which

other classes are only co-ordinated or subordinated species. This idea

of _all_, which is at the basis of the classifications which we have

just cited, could not have come from the individual himself, who is only

a part in relation to the whole and who never attains more than an

infinitesimal fraction of reality. And yet there is perhaps no other

category of greater importance; for as the rôle of the categories is to

envelop all the other concepts, the category _par excellence_ would seem

to be this very concept of _totality_. The theorists of knowledge

ordinarily postulate it as if it came of itself, while it really

surpasses the contents of each individual consciousness taken alone to

an infinite degree.

For the same reasons, the space which I know by my senses, of which I am

the centre and where everything is disposed in relation to me, could not

be space in general, which contains all extensions and where these are

co-ordinated by personal guide-lines which are common to everybody. In

the same way, the concrete duration which I feel passing within me and

with me could not give me the idea of time in general: the first

expresses only the rhythm of my individual life; the second should

correspond to the rhythm of a life which is not that of any individual

in particular, but in which all participate.[1317] In the same way,

finally, the regularities which I am able to conceive in the manner in

which my sensations succeed one another may well have a value for me;

they explain how it comes about that when I am given the first of two

phenomena whose concurrence I have observed, I tend to expect the other.

But this personal state of expectation could not be confounded with the

conception of a universal order of succession which imposes itself upon

all minds and all events.

Since the world expressed by the entire system of concepts is the one

that society regards, society alone can furnish the most general notions

with which it should be represented. Such an object can be embraced only

by a subject which contains all the individual subjects within it. Since

the universe does not exist except in so far as it is thought of, and

since it is not completely thought of except by society, it takes a

place in this latter; it becomes a part of society's interior life,

while this is the totality, outside of which nothing exists. The concept

of totality is only the abstract form of the concept of society: it is

the whole which includes all things, the supreme class which embraces

all other classes. Such is the final principle upon which repose all

these primitive classifications where beings from every realm are placed

and classified in social forms, exactly like men.[1318] But if the world

is inside of society, the space which this latter occupies becomes

confounded with space in general. In fact, we have seen how each thing

has its assigned place in social space, and the degree to which this

space in general differs from the concrete expanses which we perceive is

well shown by the fact that this localization is wholly ideal and in no

way resembles what it would have been if it had been dictated to us by

sensuous experience alone.[1319] For the same reason, the rhythm of

collective life dominates and embraces the varied rhythms of all the

elementary lives from which it results; consequently the time which it

expresses dominates and embraces all particular durations. It is time in

general. For a long time the history of the world has been only another

aspect of the history of society. The one commences with the other; the

periods of the first are determined by the periods of the second. This

impersonal and total duration is measured, and the guide-lines in

relation to which it is divided and organized are fixed by the movements

of concentration or dispersion of society; or, more generally, the

periodical necessities for a collective renewal. If these critical

instants are generally attached to some material phenomenon, such as the

regular recurrence of such or such a star or the alternation of the

seasons, it is because objective signs are necessary to make this

essentially social organization intelligible to all. In the same way,

finally, the causal relation, from the moment when it is collectively

stated by the group, becomes independent of every individual

consciousness; it rises above all particular minds and events. It is a

law whose value depends upon no person. We have already shown how it is

clearly thus that it seems to have originated.

Another reason explains why the constituent elements of the categories

should have been taken from social life: it is because the relations

which they express could not have been learned except in and through

society. If they are in a sense immanent in the life of an individual,

he has neither a reason nor the means for learning them, reflecting upon

them and forming them into distinct ideas. In order to orient himself

personally in space and to know at what moments he should satisfy his

various organic needs, he has no need of making, once and for all, a

conceptual representation of time and space. Many animals are able to

find the road which leads to places with which they are familiar; they

come back at a proper moment without knowing any of the categories;

sensations are enough to direct them automatically. They would also be

enough for men, if their sensations had to satisfy only individual

needs. To recognize the fact that one thing resembles another which we

have already experienced, it is in no way necessary that we arrange them

all in groups and species: the way in which similar images call up each

other and unite is enough to give the feeling of resemblance. The

impression that a certain thing has already been seen or experienced

implies no classification. To recognize the things which we should seek

or from which we should flee, it would not be necessary to attach the

effects of the two to their causes by a logical bond, if individual

conveniences were the only ones in question. Purely empirical sequences

and strong connections between the concrete representations would be as

sure guides for the will. Not only is it true that the animal has no

others, but also our own personal conduct frequently supposes nothing

more. The prudent man is the one who has a very clear sensation of what

must be done, but which he would ordinarily be quite incapable of

stating as a general law.

It is a different matter with society. This is possible only when the

individuals and things which compose it are divided into certain groups,

that is to say, classified, and when these groups are classified in

relation to each other. Society supposes a self-conscious organization

which is nothing other than a classification. This organization of

society naturally extends itself to the place which this occupies. To

avoid all collisions, it is necessary that each particular group have a

determined portion of space assigned to it: in other terms, it is

necessary that space in general be divided, differentiated, arranged,

and that these divisions and arrangements be known to everybody. On the

other hand, every summons to a celebration, a hunt or a military

expedition implies fixed and established dates, and consequently that a

common time is agreed upon, which everybody conceives in the same

fashion. Finally, the co-operation of many persons with the same end in

view is possible only when they are in agreement as to the relation

which exists between this end and the means of attaining it, that is to

say, when the same causal relation is admitted by all the co-operators

in the enterprise. It is not surprising, therefore, that social time,

social space, social classes and causality should be the basis of the

corresponding categories, since it is under their social forms that

these different relations were first grasped with a certain clarity by

the human intellect.

In summing up, then, we must say that society is not at all the

illogical or a-logical, incoherent and fantastic being which it has too

often been considered. Quite on the contrary, the collective

consciousness is the highest form of the psychic life, since it is the

consciousness of the consciousnesses. Being placed outside of and above

individual and local contingencies, it sees things only in their

permanent and essential aspects, which it crystallizes into communicable

ideas. At the same time that it sees from above, it sees farther; at

every moment of time, it embraces all known reality; that is why it

alone can furnish the mind with the moulds which are applicable to the

totality of things and which make it possible to think of them. It does

not create these moulds artificially; it finds them within itself; it

does nothing but become conscious of them. They translate the ways of

being which are found in all the stages of reality but which appear in

their full clarity only at the summit, because the extreme complexity of

the psychic life which passes there necessitates a greater development

of consciousness. Attributing social origins to logical thought is not

debasing it or diminishing its value or reducing it to nothing more than

a system of artificial combinations; on the contrary, it is relating it

to a cause which implies it naturally. But this is not saying that the

ideas elaborated in this way are at once adequate for their object. If

society is something universal in relation to the individual, it is none

the less an individuality itself, which has its own personal physiognomy

and its idiosyncrasies; it is a particular subject and consequently

particularizes whatever it thinks of. Therefore collective

representations also contain subjective elements, and these must be

progressively rooted out, if we are to approach reality more closely.

But howsoever crude these may have been at the beginning, the fact

remains that with them the germ of a new mentality was given, to which

the individual could never have raised himself by his own efforts: by

them the way was opened to a stable, impersonal and organized thought

which then had nothing to do except to develop its nature.

Also, the causes which have determined this development do not seem to

be specifically different from those which gave it its initial impulse.

If logical thought tends to rid itself more and more of the subjective

and personal elements which it still retains from its origin, it is not

because extra-social factors have intervened; it is much rather because

a social life of a new sort is developing. It is this international life

which has already resulted in universalizing religious beliefs. As it

extends, the collective horizon enlarges; the society ceases to appear

as the only whole, to become a part of a much vaster one, with

indetermined frontiers, which is susceptible of advancing indefinitely.

Consequently things can no longer be contained in the social moulds

according to which they were primitively classified; they must be

organized according to principles which are their own, so logical

organization differentiates itself from the social organization and

becomes autonomous. Really and truly human thought is not a primitive

fact; it is the product of history; it is the ideal limit towards which

we are constantly approaching, but which in all probability we shall

never succeed in reaching.

Thus it is not at all true that between science on the one hand, and

morals and religion on the other, there exists that sort of antinomy

which has so frequently been admitted, for the two forms of human

activity really come from one and the same source. Kant understood this

very well, and therefore he made the speculative reason and the

practical reason two different aspects of the same faculty. According to

him, what makes their unity is the fact that the two are directed

towards the universal. Rational thinking is thinking according to the

laws which are imposed upon all reasonable beings; acting morally is

conducting one's self according to those maxims which can be extended

without contradiction to all wills. In other words, science and morals

imply that the individual is capable of raising himself above his own

peculiar point of view and of living an impersonal life. In fact, it

cannot be doubted that this is a trait common to all the higher forms of

thought and action. What Kant's system does not explain, however, is the

origin of this sort of contradiction which is realized in man. Why is he

forced to do violence to himself by leaving his individuality, and,

inversely, why is the impersonal law obliged to be dissipated by

incarnating itself in individuals? Is it answered that there are two

antagonistic worlds in which we participate equally, the world of matter

and sense on the one hand, and the world of pure and impersonal reason

on the other? That is merely repeating the question in slightly

different terms, for what we are trying to find out is why we must lead

these two existences at the same time. Why do these two worlds, which

seem to contradict each other, not remain outside of each other, and why

must they mutually penetrate one another in spite of their antagonism?

The only explanation which has ever been given of this singular

necessity is the hypothesis of the Fall, with all the difficulties which

it implies, and which need not be repeated here. On the other hand, all

mystery disappears the moment that it is recognized that impersonal

reason is only another name given to collective thought. For this is

possible only through a group of individuals; it supposes them, and in

their turn, they suppose it, for they can continue to exist only by

grouping themselves together. The kingdom of ends and impersonal truths

can realize itself only by the co-operation of particular wills, and the

reasons for which these participate in it are the same as those for

which they co-operate. In a word, there is something impersonal in us

because there is something social in all of us, and since social life

embraces at once both representations and practices, this impersonality

naturally extends to ideas as well as to acts.

Perhaps some will be surprised to see us connect the most elevated forms

of thought with society: the cause appears quite humble, in

consideration of the value which we attribute to the effect. Between the

world of the senses and appetites on the one hand, and that of reason

and morals on the other, the distance is so considerable that the second

would seem to have been able to add itself to the first only by a

creative act. But attributing to society this preponderating rôle in the

genesis of our nature is not denying this creation; for society has a

creative power which no other observable being can equal. In fact, all

creation, if not a mystical operation which escapes science and

knowledge, is the product of a synthesis. Now if the synthesis of

particular conceptions which take place in each individual consciousness

are already and of themselves productive of novelties, how much more

efficacious these vast syntheses of complete consciousnesses which make

society must be! A society is the most powerful combination of physical

and moral forces of which nature offers us an example. Nowhere else is

an equal richness of different materials, carried to such a degree of

concentration, to be found. Then it is not surprising that a higher life

disengages itself which, by reacting upon the elements of which it is

the product, raises them to a higher plane of existence and transforms

them.

Thus sociology appears destined to open a new way to the science of man.

Up to the present, thinkers were placed before this double alternative:

either explain the superior and specific faculties of men by connecting

them to the inferior forms of his being, the reason to the senses, or

the mind to matter, which is equivalent to denying their uniqueness; or

else attach them to some super-experimental reality which was

postulated, but whose existence could be established by no observation.

What put them in this difficulty was the fact that the individual passed

as being the _finis naturæ_--the ultimate creation of nature; it seemed

that there was nothing beyond him, or at least nothing that science

could touch. But from the moment when it is recognized that above the

individual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being

created by reason, but a system of active forces, a new manner of

explaining men becomes possible. To conserve his distinctive traits it

is no longer necessary to put them outside experience. At least, before

going to this last extremity, it would be well to see if that which

surpasses the individual, though it is within him, does not come from

this super-individual reality which we experience in society. To be

sure, it cannot be said at present to what point these explanations may

be able to reach, and whether or not they are of a nature to resolve all

the problems. But it is equally impossible to mark in advance a limit

beyond which they cannot go. What must be done is to try the hypothesis

and submit it as methodically as possible to the control of facts. This

is what we have tried to do.

INDEX

_Alatunja_, 327.

_Alcheringa_, or mythical period, 247.

Ambiguity of sacredness, 409 ff.;

explanation of, 412 ff.

Animal-worship, totemism not, 94, 139, 170 f.

Animism, as expounded by Tylor and Spencer, 49 ff.;

how it explains the origin of the idea of the soul, 50 f.;

of spirits, 51 f.;

their cult, 52;

and the nature-cult, 53 f.;

criticism of these theories, 55 ff.;

implies that religions are systems of hallucinations, 68;

which is its best refutation, 70.

Anthropomorphism, not found among primitives, 67 f.;

denied by Spencer, 53 ff., 65;

cannot explain totemic view of world, 235,

or primitive rites, 406 f.

Apriorism, philosophical, 14 f., 368.

Art, why principal forms of, have been born in religion, 381;

dramatic, in totemic ceremonies, 373, 380;

totemic emblems first form of, 127 and n. 4.

_Arungquiltha_, or magic force, in Australia, 197 f.;

how it enables us to understand totemic principle, 198.

Asceticism, nature of, 39, 311;

based on negative rites, 311;

essential element of religious life, 311 f.;

religious function of, 314 ff.;

sociological import of, 316;

implied in the notion of sacredness, 317,

its antagonism to the profane, 39 f., 317,

and its contagiousness, 318;

not dependent upon idea of divine personalities, 321;

positive effects of, 312 ff., 386.

Atonement for faults by rites, 385, 405, 408.

Authority, moral, of society, 207 f., 208 n. 4;

based on social opinion, 208, 213.

Beliefs, how related to rites, 101, 403;

translate social facts, 431,

what they seem destined to become, 429 ff.;

all contain an element of truth, 438.

Blood, human, sacredness of, 126, 137, 330 f.

Body, essentially profane, 262;

explanation of this, 263.

Bull-roarers, definition of, 119.

Categories of the understanding, religious origin of, 9 ff.;

social origin of, 10 ff., 439;

necessity of, explained, 17 ff.;

real function of, 440;

only social necessity for, 443;

modelled on social forms, 18 ff., 144 ff., 440.

Causality, law of, 362 ff.;

first stated in imitative rites, 363;

social origin, 363, 367 f., 443;

imposed by society, 368;

sociological theory of, and classical theories, 368 f., 443;

varying statements of, 369 and n. 1.

Charms, magic, explanation of, 356.

Church, essential to religion, 44 ff.

_Churinga_, definition of, 119;

eminently sacred character of, 120;

due to totemic mark, 122 f.;

as religious force, 198 and n. 4.

Civilizing heroes, 283 ff.;

common to whole tribe, 284;

tribal rites personified, 285;

moral rôle of, 285;

connecting link between spirits and gods, 290 f.

Clan, characteristics of, 102;

basis of simplest social system known, 96, 167;

how recruited, 106 f.;

totem as name of, 102 f.;

symbolized by totem, 206;

implied by totemism, 167;

basis for classification of natural things, 141 ff.

Classes, logical, religious origin of, 148 ff.;

in higher religions, 144;

based on social classifications, 141 ff.;

collective life basis of, 147 ff., 443.

Communion, alimentary, essential to sacrifice, 337;

found in Australia, 334 f., 337, 340;

positive effects of, 337 f.

Concept, society's rôle in the genesis of, 432 ff.;

not equivalent to general idea, 432;

distinguished from sensations, 433;

immutability of, 433;

universality of, 433;

essentially social nature of, 435;

coeval with humanity, 438;

objective truth of, 437 ff.

Contagiousness of sacredness, 222;

at basis of ascetic rites, 318 ff.;

not due to associations of ideas, 321,

but to the externality of religious forces, 323 f.;

at basis of logical classifications, 324 f.

Contradiction, idea of, religious nature of, 38 f.;

social nature of, 12 f.;

based on social life, 146;

origin of, 234 ff.

Contraries, logical, nature of primitive, 235, 238 f.

_Corrobbori_, 215 n. 2, 380.

Cosmology of totemism, 141 ff.;

in all religions, 9, 428 ff.

Cult, needed by gods, 345 ff.;

moral reasons for, 63, 346, 417 f.;

social interpretation of, 347 ff.;

real function of, 386;

periodical nature of, 63;

imitative rites first form of, 387;

æsthetic nature of, 382.

Death, insufficiency of, to make a soul into a spirit, 60 f., 398,

or give sacredness, 62.

Deity. See _Gods_, _Spiritual Beings_.

Dreams, as origin of idea of double or soul, 50 f., 58 f., 264;

inadequacy of this theory, 56 f.;

as suggesting posthumous life, 268.

Ecstasy, in religion, explained, 226 f.

Efficacy, idea of, social origin of, 363 f.

Emblem, totem as, of clan, 206, 219 ff.;

psychological need for, 220, 230;

creates unity of group, 230;

and maintains it, 231;

incarnates collective sentiments, 232;

why primitives chose theirs in animal or vegetable worlds, 233 f.

Empiricism, philosophical, 13 f., 368.

_Ertnatulunga_, 120, 247.

Eschatology, Australian, 245, 287.

Evil spirits, 281 ff., 420.

Expiatory rites, 406 ff.

Faith, religious, nature of, 360 f., 430 f.

Family group, based on totemism, 106 n. 2.

Fear, religion not based on, 223 ff., 406.

Fetishism, 175.

Folk-lore, how related to religion, 41, 83 n. 1;

related to totemism, 90.

Force, religious, ambiguity of, 222;

why outside object in which it resides, 229;

as collective force, 221, 229;

takes form from society, 336;

represents how collective consciousness acts on individuals, 223;

idea of, precedes that of scientific force, 203 f., 363;

collective force as prototype of physical force, 365.

See _Sacred_, _Totemic Principle_.

Formalism, religious, explanation of, 35;

first form of legal, 35 f.

Free-will, doctrine of, how explained, 271 f.

Games, born in religion, 381 and n. 1.

Gods, religions without, 30 ff.;

in Australia, 285 ff.;

immortal, 286;

creators, 287;

benefactors, 287;

connected with initiation rites, 288;

international character of, 288, 294 f., 425 ff.;

of indigenous origin, 289 f.;

developed form of civilizing heroes, 290 f., 295;

closely connected with totemic system, 191, 291 f.;

first conceived in tribal assemblies, 293;

expressions of tribal unity, 294, 426.

Hair, human, sacredness of, 64, 137 f.

Hazing, sociological import of, 313 n. 4.

Ideal, the, in religion, 420 ff.;

formation of, a natural and necessary product of collective life, 422.

Idealism, essential, of social and religious worlds, 228, 345, 347.

Imitative Rites, 351 ff.;

in Australia, 351 ff.;

based on so-called sympathetic magic, 355 ff.;

distinguished from charms, 356;

reasons for, 357 ff.;

material efficacy attributed to, 359;

explained by moral efficacy of, 359 f.;

first expression of law of causality, 363;

original form of cult, 387.

Immortality of soul, idea of, not established for moral purposes, 267;

nor to escape annihilation, 267;

influence of dreams, 268;

but this not enough to account for doctrine, 268;

doctrine of, invented to explain origin of souls, 268 f.,

and expresses the immortality of society, 268 f.;

moral value of, an after-thought, 269;

doctrine of future judgment in Australia, 245, 287;

influence of mourning upon, 402 f.

Individual totem, 157 ff.;

relations of, to individual, 158 f.;

his _alter ego_, 159;

individual, not a species, 160;

how related to collective totem, 161;

how acquired, 161 ff.;

how related to _genius_, 279;

origin of, 280 f., 281 n. 1.

See _Totemism, Individual_.

Individualism, religious, 157 ff., 172 ff., 179 f.;

importance attributed to, by some, 45 ff., 172;

how explained, 424 f.

Infinite, conception of, in religion, 74;

not equivalent to sacred, 85;

the, not characteristic of religion, 25.

Initiation into tribe by religious ceremonies, 39, 384;

no special rites for, 385 n. 2.

Interdictions, or taboos, various sorts of, 300 ff.;

forms of, in Australia, 302 ff.;

of touch, 302;

of eating, 303;

of seeing, 304;

of speech, 305;

sexual, 304 and n. 1;

of all temporal activity on certain days, 306 f., 334;

ideas at the basis of, 308;

positive effects of, 309 ff.;

implied in notion of sacredness, 317.

_Intichiuma_, 326 ff.;

description of among the Australians, 327-336;

as elementary form of sacrifice, 336;

material efficacy expected of, 331, 333;

alimentary communion in, 334 f., 337;

imitative elements in, 353;

commemorative nature of, 371 f.;

used for initiating young men into tribe, 385 and n. 1.

Knowledge, theory of. See _Apriorism_, _Empiricism_, _Sociological_.

Language, importance of, for logical thought, 75 ff., 434;

social character of, 434.

Logic, related to religion and society, 234, 237 ff.;

basis for, furnished by society, 18 ff., 148, 431 ff.

Magic, based on religious ideas, 42 ff., 361 f., 362 n. 1;

distinguished from religion, 43 ff.;

hostility of, towards religion, 43;

sympathetic, 355 ff.

Majesty, essentially religious nature of idea of, 62, cf. 213.

Man, sacred character of, 134,

explained, 221 f.;

partakes of nature of totemic animal, 134 ff.;

sacred to varying degrees, 138 ff.;

double nature of, 263 f., 444 ff.

Mana, of the Melanesians, 194 f. See _Totemic Principle_.

Matrimonial classes, definition of, 109.

Metempsychosis, not found in Australia, 169, cf. 261 f.

Mourning, 390 ff.;

nature of, determined by etiquette, 391;

especially severe for women, 391 ff., 400 ff.;

anger as well as sorrow expressed in, 393;

how related to vendetta, 394;

not the expression of individual emotions, 397,

but a duty imposed by group, 397;

classic interpretation of, unsustainable, 398 f.;

not connected with ideas of souls or spirits, 398, 401;

social interpretation of, 399 ff.

Mystery in religion, 25;

idea of, not primitive, 25;

absent from many religions, 29.

Myths, essential element of religious life, 82;

distinguished from fables, 83 n. 1;

as work of art, 82, 101;

interpret rites, 101, 130;

as a society's representation of man and the world, 375.

_Nanji_, rock or tree, 250 f.

Naturism, as expounded by Max Müller, 73 ff.;

seeks to establish religion in reality, 73;

teaches that gods are personifications of natural phenomena, 73;

distinguishes between religion and mythology, 81;

but makes religion a fabric of errors, 79 ff.;

cannot account for origin of sacredness, 84 ff.

Negative rites, nature of, in Australia, 302 ff.;

see also _Interdictions_;

positive effects of, 309 ff.;

as preparation for positive rites, 310 f.;

basis of asceticism, 311;

in mourning, 390.

_Nurtunja_, 124;

as rallying-centre for group, 125.

Oblations, essential to sacrifice, 341;

this denied by Smith, 340 f.;

found in Australia, 341 f.;

vicious circle implied in, 340 f.,

explained, 344 ff.;

profound reasons for, 344 f.

_Orenda_, of the Iroquois, 193 f., 198.

See _Totemic Principle_.

Origins, definition of, 8 n. 1.

Pantheism, totemic, 153 f.

Part equal to whole, religious principle that, explained, 229;

in magic, 229 n. 3;

in sacrificial communions, 338.

Personality, idea of, double origin of, 270;

impersonal elements in, 271;

its alleged autonomy explained, 271;

importance of social elements in, 272;

represented by individual totem, 280.

Phratry, definition of, 107 ff.;

predecessor of clan, 108 and n. 9, 109, 145;

as basis for classifications of natural things, 141 ff., 145.

Piacular rites, definition of, 389;

distinguished from ascetic rites, 396;

based on same needs as positive rites, 399-403;

material benefits expected of, 404 f.;

as expiation for ritual faults, 405 f.;

social function of, 407 f.

_Pitchi_, 334.

Primitives, definition of, 1 n. 1;

best studied in Australia, 95;

why especially important for us, 3 ff.

Profane, absolute distinction of, from sacred, 38 f.

Ratapa, or soul-germs, 251, 252.

Recreative elements of religion, 379 ff., 382 f.

Reincarnation of souls, doctrine of, in Australia, 169, 250, 253 f.,

256, 265.

Religion, must have a foundation in reality, 2, 70, 225;

none are false, 3, 417, 438;

real purpose of, 416;

eternal elements of, 427 ff.;

as source of all civilization, 9, 70, 223, 418 f., 419 n. 1;

source of science and philosophy, 9, 203, 238, 325, 362 ff.;

so-called conflict of, with science, 416 ff.;

speculative functions of, 430;

recreative and æsthetic elements of, 379 ff.;

as pre-eminent expression of social life, 419 ff.;

said to be characterized by supernatural, 24 ff.,

or by idea of spiritual beings, 29 ff.;

not based on fear, 223 ff.,

but happy confidence, 224;

characterized by that which is sacred, 37;

distinguished from magic, 42 ff.;

none proceeds on any unique principle, 41;

importance of primitive, 3 ff.;

totemism most elementary form of, 167 f.;

definition of, 47.

Representative rites, 370 ff.;

value of, for showing real reasons for cult, 371, 378 f.;

as dramatic representations, 373, 376 ff., 380;

moral purpose of, evident, 375;

expect no material benefits, 377 ff.

Respect, inspired by society, 207 f.

Rites, how related to beliefs, 101;

totemic principle attached to, 200;

social function of, 226;

material efficacy attributed to, due to moral efficacy of, 346, 359 f.;

moral and social significance of, 370 ff.;

reasons for, as given by Australians, 371;

as form of dramatic art, 373, 380;

æsthetic nature of, 381;

interchangeability of, 384 ff.

Sacred, the, characteristic of all that is religious, 37;

not characterized by its exalted position, 37,

but by its distinction from the profane, 38;

superimposed upon its basis, 229;

created by society, 206 ff.

See _Totemic Principle_;

double nature of, 301, 320, 409 ff.

Sacrifice, forms of, in Australia, 327 ff., 336;

see _Intichiuma_;

theory of Robertson Smith of, 336 ff., 340;

alimentary communion essential part of, 337;

how this strengthens one's religious nature, 337 f.;

sacrilege inherent in, explained, 338 f.;

oblations essential to, 341;

why gods have need of, 38, 346;

social function of, 347 ff.

Science, so-called conflict of, with religion, 416 ff., 430, 445;

religious origin of, 9, 203, 238, 325, 362 ff.;

supplants religious speculation, 429 ff.;

but cannot do so completely, 431;

authority of, 208, 431.

Sexual totems, 165 f.

Social life, basis for religious representations, 221, 316, 347;

rhythm of, and religion, 219, 349;

model for philosophical representations, 18, 19 n. 2, 144 ff.

Society, how forms of, determine character of religion, 94, 196 f., 234;

characterized by institutions, 366 n. 1;

ideal nature of, 288, 345, 420 ff., 422 f.;

not an illogical or a-logical being, 444;

how it recasts animal nature into human nature, 66;

how it arouses sensations of divine, 206 ff.,

of dependence, 206 f.,

of respect, 207,

of moral authority, 207 f.,

of an external moral force, 209,

of kindly external forces, 212,

of the sacred, 212 ff., 218;

stimulating and sustaining action of, 209 ff.;

how it gives men their most characteristic attributes, 212;

how it exists only through its individual members, 221, 347;

how this gives men their sacred character, 221 f.;

foundation of religious experience, 418.

Sociological theory of knowledge, 13, 15 ff., 18 ff., 144 ff., 203 f.,

234 ff., 269 ff., 321 ff., 362 ff., 431 ff., 439 ff.

Soul, idea of, found in all religions, 240;

various representations of, 241 ff.;

relation of, to body, 242 ff.;

after death, 244 ff.;

origin of, according to the Arunta, 247 ff.;

reincarnation of, 250, 253 ff., 265;

as totemic principle incarnate in the individual, 248 ff., 254 ff.,

259 ff.;

or parts of totemic divinity, 65, 249;

close relations of, with totemic animal, 259 f;

sacred character of, 262;

notion of, founded in reality, 262 f.;

represents the social part of our nature, 262 f.;

reality of our double nature, 263 f., 444 ff.;

coeval with notion of mana, 266 f.;

how a secondary formation, 266;

idea of immortality of, explained, 267 ff., see _Immortality_;

how related to idea of personality, 269 ff., see _Personality_;

distinguished from spirit, 273;

form in which human force is represented, 366;

social elements of, 366;

how employed to explain mourning, 401;

origin of idea of, according to animism, 50 f.

Space, category of, religious and social origin of, 11 f., 441 and n. 1.

Spirits, distinguished from souls, 273;

from ghosts, 274;

related to Roman _genius_, 275;

relations of, to things, 275 f.;

how derived from idea of soul, 277 f.;

objective basis of idea of, 280 f.;

spirits of evil, 281 f., 420;

animistic theory of origin of, 51 f.

Spiritual beings, as characteristic of religion, 29;

absent from many religions, 30, 137,

or strictly religious rites, 35;

not sufficient to explain religion, 35.

See _Soul_, _Spirits_.

Spiritualism, Lang's theory of, as origin of idea of soul, 60 n. 1.

Suffering, religious rôle of, in inferior societies, 312 ff.;

believed to give extra strength, 314;

how this idea is well founded, 315.

Supernatural, the, as characteristic of religion, 24 ff.;

conception of, quite modern, 26;

not the essential element of religion, 28.

Sympathetic magic, so-called, at basis of imitative rites, 355 ff.;

fundamental principles of, 356;

why this term is inexact, 361 f.

Taboo, derivation of word, 300. See _Interdictions_.

Tattooings, totemic, 117, 232.

Time, category of, religious and social origin of, 10 f., 440 f.,

441 n. 1.

Totality, concept of,

could never be suggested by individual experience, 441;

related to concepts of society and divinity, 442 n. 1.

Totem, derivation of word, 103;

as name of clan, 102 f.;

nature of things serving as, 103 ff.;

species, not individuals, 104 f.;

how inherited, 106 ff.;

of phratries, 107 ff., 112;

of matrimonial classes, 109 ff.;

as emblem or coat-of-arms of group, 113;

religious nature of, 119;

relations of, with men and things, 150;

sub-totems, 151;

individual totems, 157 ff.;

symbol of totemic principle of clan, 206;

clan inseparable from, 167.

Totemic animals,

interdiction against eating by men of that clan, 128 ff.;

or by those of other clans of the same phratry, 131 and n. 1;

and against killing, 132;

less sacred and powerful than totemic emblems, 133;

related to men, 134, 139, 259 ff.;

sacredness of, due to resemblance to emblem, 222.

Totemic emblem, as collective emblem, 113;

sacred character of, 122, 126;

conventional nature of, 126 f.;

more sacred and powerful than totemic animal, 133;

as first form of art, 127 n. 4.

Totemic principle, or Mana,

cause of the sacredness of things, 62 ff., 188, 199 f.;

totem material representation of, 189, 206;

as a force, 190;

as source of moral life of clan, 190;

compared to totemic god, 189;

personified in gods of higher religions, 191, 199, 291 f.;

as Wakan, 192 f.;

as Orenda, 193 f.;

as Mana, 194 f.;

ubiquity of, 189, 193, 194;

multiformity of, 193;

used in magic, 198, 201 f.;

attached to rites, words, etc., 200;

as representation of clan, 206, 214 ff.;

first conceived in the midst of great social effervescence, 218 f.;

how it comes to be symbolized by totem, 219 ff.

Totemic system, unity of, 295 f.;

work of whole tribe, 154 f., 283, 295.

Totemism, early theoricians of, 88 ff.;

Australia as classic land of, 93 f.;

importance of American, 96 f.;

as most elementary religion, 88, 167;

former universality of, unimportant, 95;

religious nature of, unquestionable, 167;

not animal-worship, 139, 170 f.,

nor nature-cult, 171 f.;

contains all the elements of the religious life, 415;

conceptional totemism, inadequacies of, 180 ff.

Tribe, totemic system work of whole, 154 f., 283, 295;

unity of, expressed by great gods, 294 f.

Universalism, religious, 294 f.;

how explained, 425 ff.

Vendetta, how related to rites of mourning, 394.

_Wakan_, or "great spirit" of Sioux, 192 f., 195 f., 199.

See _Totemic Principle_.

_Waninga_, 124.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In the same way, we shall say of these societies that they are

primitive, and we shall call the men of these societies primitives.

Undoubtedly the expression lacks precision, but that is hardly evitable,

and besides, when we have taken pains to fix the meaning, it is not

inconvenient.

[2] But that is not equivalent to saying that all luxury is lacking to

the primitive cults. On the contrary, we shall see that in every

religion there are beliefs and practices which do not aim at strictly

utilitarian ends (Bk. III, ch. iv, § 2). This luxury is indispensable to

the religious life; it is at its very heart. But it is much more

rudimentary in the inferior religions than in the others, so we are

better able to determine its reason for existence here.

[3] It is seen that we give a wholly relative sense to this word

"origins," just as to the word "primitive." By it we do not mean an

absolute beginning, but the most simple social condition that is

actually known or that beyond which we cannot go at present. When we

speak of the origins or of the commencement of religious history or

thought, it is in this sense that our statements should be understood.

[4] We say that time and space are categories because there is no

difference between the rôle played by these ideas in the intellectual

life and that which falls to the ideas of class or cause (on this point

see, Hamelin, _Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation_,

pp. 63, 76).

[5] See the support given this assertion in Hubert and Mauss, _Mélanges

d'Histoire des Religions_ (_Travaux de l'Année Sociologique_), chapter

on _La Représentation du Temps dans la Religion_.

[6] Thus we see all the difference which exists between the group of

sensations and images which serve to locate us in time, and the category

of time. The first are the summary of individual experiences, which are

of value only for the person who experienced them. But what the category

of time expresses is a time common to the group, a social time, so to

speak. In itself it is a veritable social institution. Also, it is

peculiar to man; animals have no representations of this sort.

This distinction between the category of time and the corresponding

sensations could be made equally well in regard to space or cause.

Perhaps this would aid in clearing up certain confusions which are

maintained by the controversies of which these questions are the

subject. We shall return to this point in the conclusion of the present

work (§ 4).

[7] _Op. cit._, pp. 75 ff.

[8] Or else it would be necessary to admit that all individuals, in

virtue of their organo-physical constitution, are spontaneously affected

in the same manner by the different parts of space: which is more

improbable, especially as in themselves the different regions are

sympathetically indifferent. Also, the divisions of space vary with

different societies, which is a proof that they are not founded

exclusively upon the congenital nature of man.

[9] See Durkheim and Mauss, _De quelques formes primitives de

classification_, in _Année Sociologique_, VI, pp. 47 ff.

[10] See Durkheim and Mauss, _De quelques formes primitives de

classification_, in _Année Sociologique_, VI, p. 34.

[11] _Zuñi Creation Myths_, in _13th Rep. of the Bureau of Amer.

Ethnol._, pp. 367 ff.

[12] See Hertz, _La prééminence de la main droite_. _Etude de polarité

religieuse_, in the _Revue Philosophique_, Dec., 1909. On this same

question of the relations between the representation of space and the

form of the group, see the chapter in Ratzel, _Politische Geographie_,

entitled _Der Raum in Geist der Völker_.

[13] We do not mean to say that mythological thought ignores it, but

that it contradicts it more frequently and openly than scientific

thought does. Inversely, we shall show that science cannot escape

violating it, though it holds to it far more scrupulously than religion

does. On this subject, as on many others, there are only differences of

degree between science and religion; but if these differences should not

be exaggerated, they must be noted, for they are significant.

[14] This hypothesis has already been set forth by the founders

of the _Völkerpsychologie_. It is especially remarked in a short

article by Windelbrand entitled _Die Erkenntnisslehre unter

dem Völkerpsychologischen Gesichtspunke_, in the _Zeitsch. f.

Völkerpsychologie_, viii, pp. 166 ff. Cf. a note of Steinthal on

the same subject, _ibid._, pp. 178 ff.

[15] Even in the theory of Spencer, it is by individual experience that

the categories are made. The only difference which there is in this

regard between ordinary empiricism and evolutionary empiricism is that

according to this latter, the results of individual experience are

accumulated by heredity. But this accumulation adds nothing essential to

them; no element enters into their composition which does not have its

origin in the experience of the individual. According to this theory,

also, the necessity with which the categories actually impose themselves

upon us is the product of an illusion and a superstitious prejudice,

strongly rooted in the organism, to be sure, but without foundation in

the nature of things.

[16] Perhaps some will be surprised that we do not define the apriorist

theory by the hypothesis of innateness. But this conception really plays

a secondary part in the doctrine. It is a simple way of stating the

impossibility of reducing rational knowledge to empirical data. Saying

that the former is innate is only a positive way of saying that it is

not the product of experience, such as it is ordinarily conceived.

[17] At least, in so far as there are any representations which are

individual and hence wholly empirical. But there are in fact probably

none where the two elements are not found closely united.

[18] This irreducibility must not be taken in any absolute sense. We do

not wish to say that there is nothing in the empirical representations

which shows rational ones, nor that there is nothing in the individual

which could be taken as a sign of social life. If experience were

completely separated from all that is rational, reason could not operate

upon it; in the same way, if the psychic nature of the individual were

absolutely opposed to the social life, society would be impossible. A

complete analysis of the categories should seek these germs of

rationality even in the individual consciousness. We shall have occasion

to come back to this point in our conclusion. All that we wish to

establish here is that between these indistinct germs of reason and the

reason properly so called, there is a difference comparable to that

which separates the properties of the mineral elements out of which a

living being is composed from the characteristic attributes of life

after this has once been constituted.

[19] It has frequently been remarked that social disturbances result in

multiplying mental disturbances. This is one more proof that logical

discipline is a special aspect of social discipline. The first gives way

as the second is weakened.

[20] There is an analogy between this logical necessity and moral

obligation but there is not an actual identity. To-day society treats

criminals in a different fashion than subjects whose intelligence only

is abnormal; that is a proof that the authority attached to logical

rules and that inherent in moral rules are not of the same nature, in

spite of certain similarities. They are two species of the same class.

It would be interesting to make a study on the nature and origin of this

difference, which is probably not primitive, for during a long time, the

public conscience has poorly distinguished between the deranged and the

delinquent. We confine ourselves to signalizing this question. By this

example, one may see the number of problems which are raised by the

analysis of these notions which generally pass as being elementary and

simple, but which are really of an extreme complexity.

[21] This question will be treated again in the conclusion of this work.

[22] The rationalism which is imminent in the sociological theory of

knowledge is thus midway between the classical empiricism and apriorism.

For the first, the categories are purely artificial constructions; for

the second, on the contrary, they are given by nature; for us, they are

in a sense a work of art, but of an art which imitates nature with a

perfection capable of increasing unlimitedly.

[23] For example, that which is at the foundation of the category of

time is the rhythm of social life; but if there is a rhythm in

collective life, one may rest assured that there is another in the life

of the individual, and more generally, in that of the universe. The

first is merely more marked and apparent than the others. In the same

way, we shall see that the notion of class is founded on that of the

human group. But if men form natural groups, it can be assumed that

among things there exists groups which are at once analogous and

different. Classes and species are natural groups of things.

If it seems to many minds that a social origin cannot be attributed to

the categories without depriving them of all speculative value, it is

because society is still too frequently regarded as something that is

not natural; hence it is concluded that the representations which

express it express nothing in nature. But the conclusion is not worth

more than the premise.

[24] This is how it is legitimate to compare the categories to tools;

for on its side, a tool is material accumulated capital. There is a

close relationship between the three ideas of tool, category and

institution.

[25] We have already attempted to define religious phenomena in a paper

which was published in the _Année Sociologique_ (Vol. II, pp. 1 ff.).

The definition then given differs, as will be seen, from the one we give

to-day. At the end of this chapter (p. 47, n. 1), we shall explain the

reasons which have led us to these modifications, but which imply no

essential change in the conception of the facts.

[26] See above, p. 3. We shall say nothing more upon the necessity of

these preliminary definitions nor upon the method to be followed to

attain them. That is exposed in our _Règles de la Méthode sociologique_,

pp. 43 ff. Cf. _Le Suicide_, pp. 1 ff. (Paris, F. Alcan).

[27] _First Principles_, p. 37.

[28] _Introduction to the Science of Religions_, p. 18. Cf. _Origin and

Development of Religion_, p. 23.

[29] This same frame of mind is also found in the scholastic period, as

is witnessed by the formula with which philosophy was defined at this

time: _Fides quærens intellectum_.

[30] _Introduction to the History of Religions_, pp. 15 ff.

[31] _Introduction to the History of Religions_, p. 23.

[32] See below, Bk. III, ch. ii.

[33] _Prolegomena to the History of Religions_, p. 25 (tr. by Squire).

[34] _Primitive Culture_, I, p. 424. (Fourth edition, 1903.)

[35] Beginning with the first edition of the _Golden Bough_, I, pp.

30-32.

[36] Notably Spencer and Gillen and even Preuss, who gives the name

magic to all non-individualized religious forces.

[37] Burnouf, _Introduction à l'histoire du bouddhisme indien_, sec.

edit., p. 464. The last word of the text shows that Buddhism does not

even admit the existence of an eternal Nature.

[38] Barth, _The Religions of India_, p. 110 (tr. by Wood).

[39] Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 53 (tr. by Hoey).

[40] Oldenberg, _ibid._, pp. 313 ff. Cf. Kern, _Histoire du bouddhisme

dans l'Inde_, I, pp. 389 ff.

[41] Oldenberg, p. 250; Barth, p. 110.

[42] Oldenberg, p. 314.

[43] Barth, p. 109. In the same way, Burnouf says, "I have the profound

conviction that if Çâkya had not found about him a Pantheon already

peopled with the gods just named, he would have felt no need of

inventing them" (_Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien_, p. 119).

[44] Burnouf, _op. cit._, p. 117.

[45] Kern, _op. cit._, I, p. 289.

[46] "The belief, universally admitted in India, that great holiness is

necessarily accompanied by supernatural faculties, is the only support

which he (Çâkya) should find in spirits" (Burnouf, p. 119).

[47] Burnouf, p. 120.

[48] _Ibid._, p. 107.

[49] _Ibid._, p. 302.

[50] This is what Kern expresses in the following terms: "In certain

regards, he is a man; in certain others, he is not a man; in others, he

is neither the one nor the other" (_op. cit._, I, p. 290).

[51] "The conception" "was foreign to Buddhism" "that the divine Head of

the Community is not absent from his people, but that he dwells

powerfully in their midst as their lord and king, so that all cultus is

nothing else but the expression of this continuing living fellowship.

Buddha has entered into Nirvâna; if his believers desired to invoke him,

he could not hear them" (Oldenberg, p. 369).

[52] "Buddhist doctrine might be in all its essentials what it actually

is, even if the idea of Buddha remained completely foreign to it"

(Oldenberg, p. 322).--And whatever is said of the historic Buddha can be

applied equally well to the mythological Buddhas.

[53] For the same idea, see Max Müller, _Natural Religion_, pp. 103 ff.

and 190.

[54] _Op. cit._, p. 146.

[55] Barth, in _Encyclopédie des sciences religieuses_, VI, p. 548.

[56] Oldenberg, _op. cit._, p. 53.

[57] 1 Sam. xxi., 6.

[58] Levit. xii.

[59] Deut. xxii., 10 and 11.

[60] _La religion védique_, I, p. 122.

[61] _Ibid._, p. 133.

[62] "No text," says Bergaigne, "bears better witness to the

consciousness of a magic action by man upon the waters of heaven than

verse x, 32, 7, where this belief is expressed in general terms,

applicable to an actual man, as well as to his real or mythological

ancestors: 'The ignorant man has questioned the wise; instructed by the

wise, he acts, and here is the profit of his instruction: he obtains the

flowing of streams'" (p. 137).

[63] _Ibid._, p. 139.

[64] Examples will also be found in Hubert, art. _Magia_ in the

_Dictionnaire des Antiquités_, VI, p. 1509.

[65] Not to mention the sage and the saint who practise these truths and

who for that reason are sacred.

[66] This is not saying that these relations cannot take a religious

character. But they do not do so necessarily.

[67] Schultze, _Fetichismus_, p. 129.

[68] Examples of these usages will be found in Frazer, _Golden Bough_,

2 edit., I, pp. 81 ff.

[69] The conception according to which the profane is opposed to the

sacred, just as the irrational is to the rational, or the intelligible

is to the mysterious, is only one of the forms under which this

opposition is expressed. Science being once constituted, it has taken a

profane character, especially in the eyes of the Christian religions;

from that it appears as though it could not be applied to sacred things.

[70] See Frazer, _On Some Ceremonies of the Central Australian Tribes in

Australian Association for the Advancement of Science_, 1901, pp. 313

ff. This conception is also of an extreme generality. In India, the

simple participation in the sacrificial act has the same effects; the

sacrificer, by the mere act of entering within the circle of sacred

things, changes his personality. (See, Hubert and Mauss, _Essai sur le

Sacrifice in the Année Sociologique_, II, p. 101.)

[71] See what was said of the initiation above, p. 39.

[72] We shall point out below how, for example, certain species of

sacred things exist, between which there is an incompatibility as

all-exclusive as that between the sacred and the profane (Bk. III, ch.

v, § 4).

[73] This is the case with certain marriage and funeral rites, for

example.

[74] See Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, pp.

534 ff.; _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 463; Howitt, _Native

Tribes of S.E. Australia_, pp. 359-361.

[75] See Codrington, _The Melanesians_, ch. xii.

[76] See Hubert, art. _Magia_ in _Dictionnaire des Antiquités_.

[77] For example, in Melanesia, the _tindalo_ is a spirit, now

religious, now magic (Codrington, pp. 125 ff., 194 ff.).

[78] See Hubert and Mauss, _Théorie Générale de la Magie_, in _Année

Sociologique_, vol. VII, pp. 83-84.

[79] For example, the host is profaned in the black mass.

[80] One turns his back to the altar, or goes around the altar

commencing by the left instead of by the right.

[81] _Loc. cit._, p. 19.

[82] Undoubtedly it is rare that a ceremony does not have some director

at the moment when it is celebrated; even in the most crudely organized

societies, there are generally certain men whom the importance of their

social position points out to exercise a directing influence over the

religious life (for example, the chiefs of the local groups of certain

Australian societies). But this attribution of functions is still very

uncertain.

[83] At Athens, the gods to whom the domestic cult was addressed were

only specialized forms of the gods of the city ([Greek: Zeus ktêsios,

Zeus herkeios]). In the same way, in the Middle Ages, the patrons of the

guilds were saints of the calendar.

[84] For the name Church is ordinarily applied only to a group whose

common beliefs refer to a circle of more special affairs.

[85] Hubert and Mauss, _loc. cit._, p. 18.

[86] Robertson Smith has already pointed out that magic is opposed to

religion, as the individual to the social (_The Religion of the

Semites_, 2 edit., pp. 264-265). Also, in thus distinguishing magic from

religion, we do not mean to establish a break of continuity between

them. The frontiers between the two domains are frequently uncertain.

[87] Codrington, _Trans. and Proc. Roy. Soc. of Victoria_, XVI, p. 136.

[88] Negrioli, _Dei Genii presso i Romani_.

[89] This is the conclusion reached by Spencer in his _Ecclesiastical

Institutions_ (ch. xvi), and by Sabatier in his _Outlines of a

Philosophy of Religion, based on Psychology and History_ (tr. by Seed),

and by all the school to which he belongs.

[90] Notably among numerous Indian tribes of North America.

[91] This statement of fact does not touch the question whether exterior

and public religion is not merely the development of an interior and

personal religion which was the primitive fact, or whether, on the

contrary, the second is not the projection of the first into individual

consciences. The problem will be directly attacked below (Bk. II, ch. v,

§ 2, cf. the same book, ch. vi and vii, § 1). For the moment, we confine

ourselves to remarking that the individual cult is presented to the

observer as an element of, and something dependent upon, the collective

cult.

[92] It is by this that our present definition is connected to the one

we have already proposed in the _Année Sociologique_. In this other

work, we defined religious beliefs exclusively by their obligatory

character; but, as we shall show, this obligation evidently comes from

the fact that these beliefs are the possession of a group which imposes

them upon its members. The two definitions are thus in a large part the

same. If we have thought it best to propose a new one, it is because the

first was too formal, and neglected the contents of the religious

representations too much. It will be seen, in the discussions which

follow, how important it is to put this characteristic into evidence at

once. Moreover, if their imperative character is really a distinctive

trait of religious beliefs, it allows of an infinite number of degrees;

consequently there are even cases where it is not easily perceptible.

Hence come difficulties and embarrassments which are avoided by

substituting for this criterium the one we now employ.

[93] We thus leave aside here those theories which, in whole or in part,

make use of super-experimental data. This is the case with the theory

which Andrew Lang exposed in his book, _The Making of Religion_, and

which Father Schmidt has taken up again, with variations of detail, in a

series of articles on _The Origin of the Idea of God_ (_Anthropos_,

1908, 1909). Lang does not set animism definitely aside, but in the last

analysis, he admits a sense or intuition of the divine directly. Also,

if we do not consider it necessary to expose and discuss this conception

in the present chapter, we do not intend to pass it over in silence; we

shall come to it again below, when we shall ourselves explain the facts

upon which it is founded (Bk. II, ch. ix, § 4).

[94] This is the case, for example, of Fustel de Coulanges who accepts

the two conceptions together (_The Ancient City_, Bk. I and Bk. III, ch.

ii).

[95] This is the case with Jevons, who criticizes the animism taught by

Tylor, but accepts his theories on the origin of the idea of the soul

and the anthropomorphic instinct of man. Inversely, Usener, in his

_Götternamen_, rejects certain hypotheses of Max Müller which will be

described below, but admits the principal postulates of naturism.

[96] _Primitive Culture_, chs. xi-xviii.

[97] _Principles of Sociology_, Parts I and VI.

[98] This is the word used by Tylor. It has the inconvenience of seeming

to imply that men, in the proper sense of the term, existed before there

was a civilization. However, there is no proper term for expressing the

idea; that of primitive, which we prefer to use, lacking a better, is,

as we have said, far from satisfactory.

[99] Tylor, _op. cit._, I, pp. 455 f.

[100] See Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, I, pp. 143 ff., and Tylor,

_op. cit._, I, pp. 434 ff., 445 ff.

[101] Tylor, II, pp. 113 ff.

[102] Tylor, I, pp. 481 ff.

[103] _Principles of Sociology_, I, p. 126.

[104] _Ibid._, pp. 322 ff.

[105] _Ibid._, pp. 366-367.

[106] _Ibid._, p. 346. Cf. p. 384.

[107] See below, Bk. II, ch. viii.

[108] See Spencer and Gillen, _The Native Tribes of Central Australia_,

pp. 123-127; Strehlow, _Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral

Australien_, II, pp. 52 ff.

[109] _The Melanesians_, pp. 249-250.

[110] Howitt, _The Native Tribes of South-Eastern Australia_, p. 358.

[111] _Ibid._, pp. 434-442.

[112] Of the negroes of southern Guinea, Tylor says that "their sleeping

hours are characterized by almost as much intercourse with the dead as

their waking are with the living" (_Primitive Culture_, I, p. 443). In

regard to these peoples, the same author cites this remark of an

observer: "_All their dreams_ are construed into visits from the spirits

of their deceased friends" (_ibid._, p. 443). This statement is

certainly exaggerated; but it is one more proof of the frequency of

mystic dreams among the primitives. The etymology which Strehlow

proposes for the Arunta word _altjirerama_, which means "to dream," also

tends to confirm this theory. This word is composed of _altjira_, which

Strehlow translates by "god" and _rama_, which means "see." Thus a

dream would be the moment when a man is in relations with sacred beings

(_Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme_, I, p. 2).

[113] Andrew Lang, who also refuses to admit that the idea of the soul

was suggested to men by their dream experiences, believes that he can

derive it from other empirical data: these are the data of spiritualism

(telepathy, distance-seeing, etc.). We do not consider it necessary to

discuss the theory such as it has been exposed in his book _The Making

of Religion_. It reposes upon the hypothesis that spiritualism is a fact

of constant observation, and that distance-seeing is a real faculty of

men, or at least of certain men, but it is well known how much this

theory is scientifically contested. What is still more contestable is

that the facts of spiritualism are apparent enough and of a sufficient

frequency to have been able to serve as the basis for all the religious

beliefs and practices which are connected with souls and spirits. The

examination of these questions would carry us too far from what is the

object of our study. It is still less necessary to engage ourselves in

this examination, since the theory of Lang remains open to many of the

objections which we shall address to that of Tylor in the paragraphs

which follow.

[114] Jevons has made a similar remark. With Tylor, he admits that the

idea of the soul comes from dreams, and that after it was created, men

projected it into things. But, he adds, the fact that nature has been

conceived as animated like men does not explain how it became the object

of a cult. "The man who believes the bowing tree or the leaping flame to

be a living thing like himself, does not therefore believe it to be a

supernatural being--rather, so far as it is like himself, it, like

himself, is not supernatural" (_Introduction to the History of

Religions_, p. 55).

[115] See Spencer and Gillen, _Nor. Tr._, p. 506, and _Nat. Tr._, p.

512.

[116] This is the ritual and mythical theme which Frazer studies in his

_Golden Bough_.

[117] _The Melanesians_, p. 119.

[118] _Ibid._, p. 125.

[119] There are sometimes, as it seems, even funeral offerings. (See

Roth, _Superstition, Magic and Medicine_, in _North Queensland Ethnog._,

Bulletin No. 5, § 69 c., and _Burial Customs_, in _ibid._, No. 10, in

_Records of the Australian Museum_, Vol. VI, No. 5, p. 395). But these

offerings are not periodical.

[120] Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, pp. 538, 553, and _Nor. Tr._, pp.

463, 543, 547.

[121] See especially, Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes_, ch. vi,

vii, ix.

[122] _The Religions of Primitive Peoples_, pp. 47 ff.

[123] _Myth, Ritual and Religions_, p. 123.

[124] _Les Religions des peuples non civilisés_, II, _Conclusion_.

[125] _The Religion of the Semites_, 2 ed., pp. 126, 132.

[126] This is the reasoning of Westermarck (_Origins of Human Marriage_,

p. 6).

[127] By sexual communism we do not mean a state of promiscuity where

man knows no matrimonial rules: we believe that such a state has never

existed. But it has frequently happened that groups of men have been

regularly united to one or several women.

[128] See our _Suicide_, pp. 233 ff.

[129] Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, I, pp. 129 f.

[130] _The Melanesians_, p. 123.

[131] Dorsey, _A Study of Siouan Cults_, in _XIth Annual Report of the

Bureau of Amer. Ethnology_, pp. 431 ff., and _passim_.

[132] _La religion des peuples non civilisés_, I, p. 248.

[133] V. W. de Visser, _De Graecorum diis non referentibus speciem

humanam_. Cf. P. Perdrizet, _Bulletin de correspondance hellénique_,

1899, p. 635.

[134] However, according to Spencer, there is a germ of truth in the

belief in spirits: this is the idea that "the power which manifests

itself inside the consciousness is a different form of power from that

manifested outside the consciousness" (_Ecclesiastical Institutions_, §

659). Spencer understands by this that the notion of force in general is

the sentiment of the force which we have extended to the entire

universe; this is what animism admits implicitly when it peoples nature

with spirits analogous to our own. But even if this hypothesis in regard

to the way in which the idea of force is formed were true--and it

requires important reservations which we shall make (Bk. III, ch. iii, §

3)--it has nothing religious about it; it belongs to no cult. It thus

remains that the system of religious symbols and rites, the

classification of things into sacred and profane, all that which is

really religious in religion, corresponds to nothing in reality. Also,

this germ of truth, of which he speaks, is still more a germ of error,

for if it be true that the forces of nature and those of the mind are

related, they are profoundly distinct, and one exposes himself to grave

misconceptions in identifying them.

[135] This is undoubtedly what explains the sympathy which folk-lorists

like Mannhardt have felt for animistic ideas. In popular religions as in

inferior religions, these spiritual beings of a second order hold the

first place.

[136] In the essay entitled _Comparative Mythology_ (pp. 47 ff).

[137] _Herabkunft des Feuers und G[=o]ttertranks_, Berlin, 1859 (a new

edition was given by Ernst Kuhn in 1886). Cf. _Der Schuss des Wilden

Jägers auf den Sonnen-hirsch_, Zeitschrift f. d. Phil., I, 1869, pp.

89-169. _Entwickelungsstufen des Mythus_, Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad., 1873.

[138] _Der Ursprung der Mythologie_, Berlin, 1860.

[139] In his book _Hercule et Cacus_. _Étude de mythologie comparée._

Max Müller's _Comparative Mythology_ is there signalized as a work

"which marks a new epoch in the history of Mythology" (p. 12).

[140] _Die Griechischen Kulte und Mythen_, I, p. 78.

[141] Among others who have adopted this conception may be cited Renan.

See his _Nouvelles études d'histoire religieuse_, 1884, p. 31.

[142] Aside from the _Comparative Mythology_, the works where Max Müller

has exposed his general theories on religion are: _Hibbert Lectures_

(1878) under the title _The Origin and Development of Religion; Natural

Religion_ (1889); _Physical Religion_ (1890); _Anthropological Religion_

(1892); _Theosophy, or Psychological Religion_ (1893); _Contributions to

the Science of Mythology_ (1897). Since his mythological theories are

closely related to his philosophy of language, these works should be

consulted in connection with the ones consecrated to language or logic,

especially _Lectures on the Science of Language_, and _The Science of

Thought_.

[143] _Natural Religion_, p. 114.

[144] _Physical Religion_, pp. 119-120.

[145] _Ibid._, p. 121; cf. p. 304.

[146] _Natural Religion_, pp. 121 ff., and 149-155.

[147] "The overwhelming pressure of the infinite" (_ibid._, p. 138).

[148] _Ibid._, pp. 195-196.

[149] Max Müller even goes so far as to say that until thought has

passed this first stage, it has very few of the characteristics which we

now attribute to religion (_Physic. Rel._, p. 120).

[150] _Physic. Rel._, p. 128.

[151] _The Science of Thought_, p. 30.

[152] _Natural Religion_, pp. 393 ff.

[153] _Physic. Rel._, p. 133; _The Science of Thought_, p. 219;

_Lectures on the Science of Language_, II, pp. 1 ff.

[154] _The Science of Thought_, p. 272.

[155] _The Science of Thought_, I, p. 327; _Physic. Rel_., pp. 125 ff.

[156] _Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique_, p. 8.

[157] _Anthropological Religion_, pp. 128-130.

[158] This explanation is not as good as that of Tylor. According to Max

Müller, men could not admit that life stopped with death; therefore they

concluded that there were two beings within them, one of which survived

the body. But it is hard to see what made them think that life continued

after the body was decomposed.

[159] For the details, see _Anthrop. Rel._, pp. 351 ff.

[160] _Anthrop. Rel._, p. 130.--This is what keeps Max Müller from

considering Christianity the climax of all this development. The

religion of ancestors, he says, supposes that there is something divine

in man. Now is that idea not the one at the basis of the teaching of

Christ? (_ibid._, pp. 378 ff.). It is useless to insist upon the

strangeness of the conception which makes Christianity the latest of the

cults of the dead.

[161] See the discussion of the hypothesis in Gruppe, _Griechishen Kulte

und Mythen_, pp. 79-184.

[162] See Meillet, _Introduction à l'étude comparative des langues

indo-européennes_, p. 119.

[163] Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Vedas_, pp. 59 ff.; Meillet, _Le dieu

Iranien Mythra_, in _Journal Asiatique_, X, No. 1, July-August, 1907,

pp. 143 ff.

[164] In this category are a large number of the maxims of popular

wisdom.

[165] It is true that this argument does not touch those who see in

religion a code (especially of hygiene) whose provisions, though placed

under the sanction of imaginary beings, are nevertheless well founded.

But we shall not delay to discuss a conception so insupportable, and

which has, in fact, never been sustained in a systematic manner by

persons somewhat informed upon the history of religions. It is difficult

to see what good the terrible practices of the initiation bring to the

health which they threaten; what good the dietetic restrictions, which

generally deal with perfectly clean animals, have hygienically; how

sacrifices, which take place far from a house, make it more solid, etc.

Undoubtedly there are religious precepts which at the same time have a

practical utility; but they are lost in the mass of others, and even the

services which they render are frequently not without some drawbacks. If

there is a religiously enforced cleanliness, there is also a religious

filthiness which is derived from these same principles. The rule which

orders a corpse to be carried away from the camp because it is the seat

of a dreaded spirit is undoubtedly useful. But the same belief requires

the relatives to anoint themselves with the liquids which issue from a

corpse in putrefaction, because they are supposed to have exceptional

virtues.--From this point of view, magic has served a great deal more

than religion.

[166] _Contributions to the Science of Mythology_, I, pp. 68 f.

[167] _Lectures on the Science of Language_, II, p. 456 ff.; _Physic.

Rel._, pp. 276 ff.--Also Bréal, _Mélanges_, p. 6, "To bring the

necessary clarity into this question of the origin of mythology, it is

necessary to distinguish carefully the _gods_, which are the immediate

product of the human intelligence, from the _fables_, which are its

indirect and involuntary product."

[168] Max Müller recognized this. See _Physic. Rel._, p. 132, and

_Comparative Mythology_, p. 58. "The gods are _nomina_ and not _numina_,

names without being and not beings without name."

[169] It is true that Max Müller held that for the Greeks, "Zeus was,

and remained, in spite of all mythological obscurations, the name of the

Supreme Deity" (_Science of Language_, II, p. 478). We shall not dispute

this assertion, though it is historically contestable; but in any case,

this conception of Zeus could never have been more than a glimmer in the

midst of all the other religious beliefs of the Greeks.

Besides this, in a later work, Max Müller went so far as to make even

the notion of god in general the product of a wholly verbal process and

thus of a mythological elaboration (_Physic. Rel._, p. 138).

[170] Undoubtedly outside the real myths there were always fables which

were not believed, or at least were not believed in the same way and to

the same degree, and hence had no religious character. The line of

demarcation between fables and myths is certainly floating and hard to

determine. But this is no reason for making all myths stories, any more

than we should dream of making all stories myths. There is at least one

characteristic which in a number of cases suffices to differentiate the

religious myth: that is its relation to the cult.

[171] See above, p. 28.

[172] More than that, in the language of Max Müller, there is a

veritable abuse of words. Sensuous experience, he says, implies, at

least in certain cases, "beyond the known, _something unknown, something

which I claim the liberty to call infinite_" (_Natural Rel._, p. 195;

cf. p. 218). The unknown is not necessarily the infinite, any more than

the infinite is necessarily the unknown if it is in all points the same,

and consequently like the part which we know. It would be necessary to

prove that the part of it which we perceive differs in nature from that

which we do not perceive.

[173] Max Müller involuntarily recognizes this in certain passages. He

confesses that he sees little difference between Agni, the god of fire,

and the notion of ether, by which the modern physicist explains light

and heat (_Phys. Rel._, pp. 126 f.). Also, he connects the notion of

divinity to that of agency (p. 138) or of a causality which is not

natural and profane. The fact that religion represents the causes thus

imagined, under the form of personal agents, is not enough to explain

how they got a sacred character. A personal agent can be profane, and

also, many religious forces are essentially impersonal.

[174] We shall see below, in speaking of the efficacy of rites and

faith, how these illusions are to be explained (Bk. III, ch. ii).

[175] _Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter._

[176] This idea was so common that even M. Réville continued to make

America the classic land of totemism (_Religions des peuples non

civilisés_, I, p. 242).

[177] _Journals of Two Expeditions in North-West and Western Australia_,

II, p. 228.

[178] _The Worship of Animals and Plants._ _Totems and Totemism_ (1869,

1870).

[179] This idea is found already very clearly expressed in a study by

Gallatin entitled _Synopsis of the Indian Tribes_ (_Archæologia

Americana_, II, pp. 109 ff.), and in a notice by Morgan in the _Cambrian

Journal_, 1860, p. 149.

[180] This work had been prepared for and preceded by two others by the

same author: _The League of the Iroquois_ (1851), and _Systems of

Consanguinity_ and _Affinity of the Human Family_ (1871).

[181] _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, 1880.

[182] In the very first volumes of the _Annual Report of the Bureau of

American Ethnology_ are found the study of Powell, _Wyandot Government_

(I, p. 59), that of Cushing, _Zuñi Fetiches_ (II, p. 9), Smith, _Myths

of the Iroquois_ (_ibid._, p. 77), and the important work of Dorsey,

_Omaha Sociology_ (III, p. 211), which are also contributions to the

study of totemism.

[183] This first appeared, in an abridged form, in the _Encyclopædia

Britannica_ (9th ed.).

[184] In his _Primitive Culture_, Tylor had already attempted an

explanation of totemism, to which we shall return presently, but which

we shall not give here; for by making totemism only a particular case of

the ancestor-cult, he completely misunderstood its importance. In this

chapter we mention only those theories which have contributed to the

progress of the study of totemism.

[185] Published at Cambridge, 1885.

[186] First edition, 1889. This is the arrangement of a course given at

the University of Aberdeen in 1888. Cf. the article _Sacrifice_ in the

_Encyclopædia Britannica_ (9th edition).

[187] London, 1890. A second edition in three volumes has since appeared

(1900) and a third in five volumes is already in course of publication.

[188] In this connection must be mentioned the interesting work of

Sidney Hartland, _The Legend of Perseus_, 3 vols., 1894-1896.

[189] We here confine ourselves to giving the names of the authors;

their works will be indicated below, when we make use of them.

[190] If Spencer and Gillen have been the first to study these tribes in

a scientific and thorough manner, they were not the first to talk about

them. Howitt had already described the social organization of the

Wuaramongo (Warramunga of Spencer and Gillen) in 1888 in his _Further

Notes on the Australian Classes_ in _The Journal of the Anthropological

Institute_ (hereafter, _J.A.I._), pp. 44 f. The Arunta had already been

briefly studied by Schulze (_The Aborigines of the Upper and Middle

Finke River_, in _Transactions of the Royal Society of South Australia_,

Vol. XIV, fasc. 2): the organization of the Chingalee (the Tjingilli of

Spencer and Gillen), the Wombya, etc., by Mathews (_Wombya Organization

of the Australian Aborigines_, in _American Anthropologist_, New Series,

Vol. II, p. 494; _Divisions of some West Australian Tribes_, _ibid._, p.

185; _Proceedings Amer. Philos. Soc._, XXXVII, pp. 151-152, and _Journal

Roy. Soc. of N.S. Wales_, XXXII, p. 71 and XXXIII, p. 111). The first

results of the study made of the Arunta had also been published already

in the _Report on the Work of the Horn Scientific Expedition to Central

Australia_, Pt. IV (1896). The first part of this _Report_ is by

Stirling, the second by Gillen; the entire publication was placed under

the direction of Baldwin Spencer.

[191] London, 1899. Hereafter, _Native Tribes_ or _Nat. Tr._

[192] London, 1904. Hereafter, _Northern Tribes_ or _Nor. Tr._

[193] We write the Arunta, the Anula, the Tjingilli, etc., without

adding the characteristic _s_ of the plural. It does not seem very

logical to add to these words, which are not European, a grammatical

sign which would have no meaning except in our languages. Exceptions to

this rule will be made when the name of the tribe has obviously been

Europeanized (the Hurons for example).

[194] Strehlow has been in Australia since 1892; at first he lived among

the Dieri, and from them he went to the Arunta.

[195] _Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral Australien._ Four

fascicules have been published up to the present. The last appeared at

the moment when the present book was finished, so it could not be used.

The two first have to do with the myths and legends, and the third with

the cult. It is only just to add to the name of Strehlow that of von

Leonhardi, who has had a great deal to do with this publication. Not

only has he charged himself with editing the manuscripts of Strehlow,

but by his judicious questions he has led the latter to be more precise

on more than one point. It would be useful also to consult an article

which von Leonhardi gave the _Globus_, where numerous extracts from his

correspondence with Strehlow will be found (_Ueber einige religiöse und

totemistische Vorstellungen der Aranda und Loritja in Zentral

Australien_, in _Globus_, XCI, p. 285). Cf. an article on the same

subject by N. W. Thomas in Folk-lore, XVI, pp. 428 ff.

[196] Spencer and Gillen are not ignorant of it, but they are far from

possessing it as thoroughly as Strehlow.

[197] Notably by Klaatsch, _Schlussbericht über meine Reise nach

Australien_, in _Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie_, 1907, pp. 635 ff.

[198] The book of K. Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi Tribe_, that of

Eylmann, _Die Eingeborenen der Kolonie Südaustralien_; that of John

Mathews, _Two Representative Tribes of Queensland_, and certain recent

articles of Mathews all show the influence of Spencer and Gillen.

[199] A list of these publications will be found in the preface to his

_Nat. Tr._, pp. 8-9.

[200] London, 1904. Hereafter we shall cite this work by the

abbreviation _Nat. Tr._, but always mentioning the name of Howitt, to

distinguish it from the first work of Spencer and Gillen, which we

abbreviate in the same manner.

[201] _Totemism and Exogamy_, 4 vols., London, 1910. The work begins

with a re-edition of _Totemism_, reproduced without any essential

changes.

[202] It is true that at the end and at the beginning there are some

general theories on totemism, which will be described and discussed

below. But these theories are relatively independent of the collection

of facts which accompanies them, for they had already been published in

different articles in reviews, long before this work appeared. These

articles are reproduced in the first volume (pp. 89-172).

[203] _Totemism_, p. 12.

[204] _Ibid._, p. 15.

[205] _Ibid._, p. 32.

[206] It should be noted that in this connection, the more recent work,

_Totemism and Exogamy_, shows an important progress in the thought as

well as the method of Frazer. Every time that he describes the religious

or domestic institutions of a tribe, he sets himself to determine the

geographic and social conditions in which this tribe is placed.

Howsoever summary these analyses may be, they bear witness nevertheless

to a rupture with the old methods of the anthropological school.

[207] Undoubtedly we also consider that the principal object of the

science of religions is to find out what the religious nature of man

really consists in. However, as we do not regard it as a part of his

constitutional make-up, but rather as the product of social causes, we

consider it impossible to find it, if we leave aside his social

environment.

[208] We cannot repeat too frequently that the importance which we

attach to totemism is absolutely independent of whether it was ever

universal or not.

[209] This is the case with the phratries and matrimonial classes; on

this point, see Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes_, ch. iii; Howitt,

_Native Tribes_, pp. 109 and 137-142; Thomas, _Kinship and Marriage in

Australia_, ch. vi and vii.

[210] _Division du Travail social_, 3rd ed., p. 150.

[211] It is to be understood that this is not always the case. It

frequently happens, as we have already said, that the simpler forms aid

to a better understanding of the more complex. On this point, there is

no rule of method which is applicable to every possible case.

[212] Thus the individual totemism of America will aid us in

understanding the function and importance of that in Australia. As the

latter is very rudimentary, it would probably have passed unobserved.

[213] Besides, there is not one unique type of totemism in America, but

several different species which must be distinguished.

[214] We shall leave this field only very exceptionally, and when a

particularly instructive comparison seems to us to impose itself.

[215] This is the definition given by Cicero: _Gentiles sunt qui inter

se eodem nomine sunt_ (_Top._ 6). (Those are of the same gens who have

the same name among themselves.)

[216] It may be said in a general way that the clan is a family group,

where kinship results solely from a common name; it is in this sense

that the _gens_ is a clan. But the totemic clan is a particular sort of

the class thus constituted.

[217] In a certain sense, these bonds of solidarity extend even beyond

the frontiers of the tribe. When individuals of different tribes have

the same totem, they have peculiar duties towards each other. This fact

is expressly stated for certain tribes of North America (see Frazer,

_Totemism and Exogamy_, III, pp. 57, 81, 299, 356-357). The texts

relative to Australia are less explicit. However, it is probable that

the prohibition of marriage between members of a single totem is

international.

[218] Morgan, _Ancient Society_, p. 165.

[219] In Australia the words employed differ with the tribes. In the

regions observed by Grey, they said _Kobong_; the Dieri say _Murdu_

(Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, p. 91); the Narrinyeri, _Ngaitye_ (Talpin, _in_

Curr, II, p. 244); the Warramunga, _Mungái_ or _Mungáii_ (_Nor. Tr._, p.

754), etc.

[220] _Indian Tribes of the United States_, IV, p. 86.

[221] This fortune of the word is the more regrettable since we do not

even know exactly how it is written. Some write _totam_, others

_toodaim_, or _dodaim_, or _ododam_ (see Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 1). Nor

is the meaning of the word determined exactly. According to the report

of the first observer of the Ojibway, J. Long, the word _totam_

designated the protecting genius, the individual totem, of which we

shall speak below (Bk. II, ch. iv) and not the totem of the clan. But

the accounts of other explorers say exactly the contrary (on this point,

see Frazer, _Totemism and Exogamy_, III, pp. 49-52).

[222] The _Wotjobaluk_ (p. 121) and the _Buandik_ (p. 123).

[223] The same.

[224] The _Wolgal_ (p. 102), the _Wotjobaluk_ and the _Buandik_.

[225] The _Muruburra_ (p. 117), the _Wotjobaluk_ and the _Buandik_.

[226] The _Buandik_ and the _Kaiabara_ (p. 116). It is to be remarked

that all the examples come from only five tribes.

[227] Thus, out of 204 kinds of totems, collected by Spencer and Gillen

out of a large number of tribes, 188 are animals or plants. The

inanimate objects are the boomerang, cold weather, darkness, fire,

lightning, the moon, red ochre, resin, salt water, the evening star, a

stone, the sun, water, the whirlwind, the wind and hail-stones (Nor.

Tr., p. 773. Cf. Frazer, _Totemism and Exogamy_, I, pp. 253-254).

[228] Frazer (_Totemism_, pp. 10 and 13) cites a rather large number of

cases and puts them in a special group which he calls _split-totems_,

but these are taken from tribes where totemism is greatly altered, such

as in Samoa or the tribes of Bengal.

[229] Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, p. 107.

[230] See the tables collected by Strehlow, _op. cit._, II, pp. 61-72

(cf. III, pp. xiii-xvii). It is remarkable that these fragmentary totems

are taken exclusively from animal totems.

[231] Strehlow, II, pp. 52 and 72.

[232] For example, one of these totems is a cave where an ancestor of

the Wild Cat totem rested; another is a subterranean gallery which an

ancestor of the Mouse clan dug, etc. (_ibid._, p. 72).

[233] _Nat. Tr._, pp. 561 ff. Strehlow, II, p. 71, note 2. Howitt, _Nat.

Tr._, pp. 426 ff.; _On Australian Medicine Men_, _J.A.I._, XVI, p. 53;

_Further Notes on the Australian Class Systems_, _J.A.I._, XVIII, pp. 63

ff.

[234] Thaballa means "laughing boy," according to the translation of

Spencer and Gillen. The members of the clan which bear this name think

they hear him laughing in the rocks which are his residence (_Nor. Tr._,

pp. 207, 215, 226 note). According to a myth given on p. 422, there was

an initial group of mythical Thaballa (cf. p. 208). The clan of the

Kati, "full-grown men," as Spencer and Gillen say, seems to be of the

same sort (_Nor. Tr._, p. 207).

[235] _Nor. Tr._, pp. 226 ff.

[236] Strehlow, II, pp. 71 f. He mentions a totem of the Loritja and

Arunta which is very close to the serpent Wollunqua: it is the totem of

a mythical water-snake.

[237] This is the case with Klaatsch, in the article already cited (see

above, p. 92, n. 3).

[238] As we indicated in the preceding chapter, totemism is at the same

time of interest for the question of religion and that of the family,

for the clan is a family. In the lower societies, these two problems are

very closely connected. But both are so complex that it is indispensable

to treat them separately. Also, the primitive family organization cannot

be understood before the primitive religious beliefs are known; for the

latter serve as the basis of the former. This is why it is necessary to

study totemism as a religion before studying the totemic clan as a

family group.

[239] See Taplin, _The Narrinyeri Tribe_, in Curr, II, pp. 244 f.;

Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, p. 131.

[240] _Nor. Tr._, pp. 163, 169, 170, 172. It is to be noted that in all

these tribes, except the Mara and the Anula, the transmission of the

totem in the paternal line is only a general rule, which has exceptions.

[241] According to Spencer and Gillen (Nat. Tr., pp. 123 ff.), the soul

of the ancestor becomes reincarnate in the body of the mother and

becomes the soul of the child; according to Strehlow (II, pp. 51 ff.),

the conception, though being the work of the ancestor, does not imply

any reincarnation; but in neither interpretation does the totem of the

child necessarily depend upon that of the parents.

[242] _Nat. Tr._, p. 133; Strehlow, II, p. 53.

[243] It is in large part the locality where the mother believes that

she conceived which determines the totem of the child. Each totem, as we

shall see, has its centre and the ancestors preferably frequent the

places serving as centres for their respective totems. The totem of the

child is therefore that which belongs to the place where the mother

believes that she conceived. As this should generally be in the vicinity

of the place which serves as totemic centre for her husband, the child

should generally follow the totem of his father. It is undoubtedly this

which explains why the greater part of the inhabitants of a given

locality belong to the same totem (_Nat. Tr._, p. 9).

[244] _The Secret of the Totem_, pp. 159 ff. Cf. Fison and Howitt,

_Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, pp. 40 f.; John Mathews, _Eaglehawk and Crow_;

Thomas, _Kinship and Marriage in Australia_, pp. 52 ff.

[245] Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, p. 124.

[246] Howitt, pp. 121, 123, 124; Curr, III, p. 461.

[247] Howitt, p. 126.

[248] Howitt, pp. 98 ff.

[249] Curr, II, p. 165; Brough Smyth, I, p. 423; Howitt, _op. cit._, p.

429.

[250] Howitt, pp. 101, 102.

[251] J. Mathews, _Two Representative Tribes of Queensland_, p. 139.

[252] Still other reasons could be given in support of this hypothesis,

but it would be necessary to bring in considerations relative to the

organization of the family, and we wish to keep these two studies

separate. Also this question is only of secondary interest to our

subject.

[253] For example, Mukwara, which is the name of a phratry among the

Barkinji, the Paruinji and the Milpulko, designates the eagle-hawk,

according to Brough Smyth; now one of the clans of this phratry has the

eagle-hawk as totem. But here the animal is designated by the word

Bilyara. Many cases of the same thing are cited by Lang, _op. cit._, p.

162.

[254] Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 115. According to Howitt (_op.

cit._, pp. 121 and 454), among the Wotjobaluk, the clan of the pelican

is found in the two phratries equally. This fact seems doubtful to us.

It is very possible that the two clans may have two varieties of

pelicans as totems. Information given by Mathews on the same tribe seems

to point to this (_Aboriginal Tribes of N.S. Wales and Victoria_, in

_Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of N.S. Wales_, 1904, pp.

287 f.).

[255] In connection with this question, see our memoir on _Le

Totémisme_, in the _Année Sociologique_, Vol. V, pp. 82 ff.

[256] On the question of Australian matrimonial classes in general, see

our memoir on _La Prohibition de l'inceste_, in the _Année Soc._, I, pp.

9 ff., and especially for the tribes with eight classes, _L'Organisation

matrimoniale des societés Australiennes_, in _Année Soc._, VIII, pp.

118-147.

[257] This principle is not maintained everywhere with an equal

strictness. In the central tribes of eight classes notably, beside the

class with which marriage is regularly permitted, there is another with

which a sort of secondary concubinage is allowed (Spencer and Gillen,

_Nor. Tr._, p. 106). It is the same with certain tribes of four classes.

Each class has a choice between the two classes of the other phratry.

This is the case with the Kabi (see Mathews, _in_ Curr, III, 162).