CHAPTER V

ORIGINS OF THESE BELIEFS

_Critical Examination of Preceding Theories_

The beliefs which we have just summarized are manifestly of a religious

nature, since they imply a division of things into sacred and profane.

It is certain that there is no thought of spiritual beings, and in the

course of our exposition we have not even had occasion to pronounce the

words, spirits, genii or divine personalities. But if certain writers,

of whom we shall have something more to say presently, have, for this

reason, refused to regard totemism as a religion, it is because they

have an inexact notion of what religious phenomena are.

On the other hand, we are assured that this religion is the most

primitive one that is now observable and even, in all probability, that

has ever existed. In fact, it is inseparable from a social organization

on a clan basis. Not only is it impossible, as we have already pointed

out, to define it except in connection with the clan, but it even seems

as though the clan could not exist, in the form it has taken in a great

number of Australian societies, without the totem. For the members of a

single clan are not united to each other either by a common habitat or

by common blood, as they are not necessarily consanguineous and are

frequently scattered over different parts of the tribal territory. Their

unity comes solely from their having the same name and the same emblem,

their believing that they have the same relations with the same

categories of things, their practising the same rites, or, in a word,

from their participating in the same totemic cult. Thus totemism and the

clan mutually imply each other, in so far, at least, as the latter is

not confounded with the local group. Now the social organization on a

clan basis is the simplest which we know. In fact, it exists in all its

essential elements from the moment when the society includes two primary

clans; consequently, we may say that there are none more rudimentary, as

long as societies reduced to a single clan have not been discovered, and

we believe that up to the present no traces of such have been found. A

religion so closely connected to a social system surpassing all others

in simplicity may well be regarded as the most elementary religion we

can possibly know. If we succeed in discovering the origins of the

beliefs which we have just analysed, we shall very probably discover at

the same time the causes leading to the rise of the religious sentiment

in humanity.

But before treating this question for ourselves, we must examine the

most authorized solutions of it which have already been proposed.

I

In the first place, we find a group of scholars who believe that they

can account for totemism by deriving it from some previous religion.

For Tylor[552] and Wilken,[553] totemism is a special form of the cult

of the ancestors; it was the widespread doctrine of the transmigration

of souls that served as a bridge between these two religious systems. A

large number of peoples believe that after death, the soul does not

remain disincarnate for ever, but presently animates another living

body; on the other hand, "the lower psychology, drawing no definite line

of demarcation between the souls of men and of beasts, can at least

admit without difficulty the transmigration of human souls into the

bodies of the lower animals."[554] Tylor cites a certain number of

cases.[555] Under these circumstances, the religious respect inspired by

the ancestor is quite naturally attached to the animal or plant with

which he is presently confounded. The animal thus serving as a

receptacle for a venerated being becomes a holy thing, the object of a

cult, that is, a totem, for all the descendants of the ancestor, who

form the clan descended from him.

Facts pointed out by Wilken among the societies of the Malay Archipelago

would tend to prove that it really was in this manner that the totemic

beliefs originated. In Java and Sumatra, crocodiles are especially

honoured; they are regarded as benevolent protectors who must not be

killed; offerings are made to them. Now the cult thus rendered to them

is due to their being supposed to incarnate the souls of ancestors. The

Malays of the Philippines consider the crocodile their grandfather; the

tiger is treated in the same way for the same reasons. Similar beliefs

have been observed among the Bantous.[556] In Melanesia it sometimes

happens that an influential man, at the moment of death, announces his

desire to reincarnate himself in a certain animal or plant; it is easily

understood how the object thus chosen as his posthumous residence

becomes sacred for his whole family.[557] So, far from being a primitive

fact, totemism would seem to be the product of a more complex religion

which preceded it.[558]

But the societies from which these facts were taken had already arrived

at a rather advanced stage of culture; in any case, they had passed the

stage of pure totemism. They have families and not totemic clans.[559]

Even the majority of the animals to which religious honours are thus

rendered are venerated, not by special groups of families, but by the

tribes as a whole. So if these beliefs and practices do have some

connection with ancient totemic cults, they now represent only altered

forms of them[560] and are consequently not very well fitted for showing

us their origins. It is not by studying an institution at the moment

when it is in full decadence that we can learn how it was formed. If we

want to know how totemism originated, it is neither in Java nor Sumatra

nor Melanesia that we must study it, but in Australia. Here we find

neither a cult of the dead[561] nor the doctrine of transmigration. Of

course they believe that the mythical heroes, the founders of the clan,

reincarnate themselves periodically; _but this is in human bodies only_;

each birth, as we shall see, is the product of one of these

reincarnations. So if the animals of the totemic species are the object

of rites, it is not because the ancestral souls are believed to reside

in them. It is true that the first ancestors are frequently represented

under the form of an animal, and this very common representation is an

important fact for which we must account; but it was not the belief in

metempsychosis which gave it birth, for this belief is unknown among

Australian societies.

Moreover, far from being able to explain totemism, this belief takes for

granted one of the fundamental principles upon which this rests; that is

to say, it begs the question to be explained. It, just as much as

totemism, implies that man is considered a close relative of the

animal; for if these two kingdoms were clearly distinguished in the

mind, men would never believe that a human soul could pass so easily

from one into the other. It is even necessary that the body of the

animal be considered its true home, for it is believed to go there as

soon as it regains its liberty. Now while the doctrine of transmigration

postulates this singular affinity, it offers no explanation of it. The

only explanation offered by Tylor is that men sometimes resemble in

certain traits the anatomy and physiology of the animal. "The half-human

features and actions and characters of animals are watched with

wondering sympathy by the savage, as by the child. The beast is the very

incarnation of familiar qualities of man: and such names as lion, bear,

fox, owl, parrot, viper, worm, when we apply them as epithets to men,

condense into a word some leading features of a human life."[562] But

even if these resemblances are met with, they are uncertain and

exceptional; before all else, men resemble their relatives and

companions, and not plants and animals. Such rare and questionable

analogies could not overcome such unanimous proofs, nor could they lead

a man to think of himself and his forefathers in forms contradicted by

daily experience. So this question remains untouched, and as long as it

is not answered, we cannot say that totemism is explained.[563]

Finally, this whole theory rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding.

For Tylor as for Wundt, totemism is only a particular case of the cult

of animals.[564] But we, on the contrary, know that it is something

very different from a sort of animal-worship.[565] The animal is never

adored; the man is nearly its equal and sometimes even treats it as his

possession, so far is he from being subordinate to it like a believer

before his god. If the animals of the totemic species are really

believed to incarnate the ancestors, the members of foreign clans would

not be allowed to eat their flesh freely. In reality, it is not to the

animal as such that the cult is addressed, but to the emblem and the

image of the totem. Now between this religion of the emblem and the

ancestor-cult, there is no connection whatsoever.

While Tylor derives totemism from the ancestor-cult, Jevons derives it

from the nature-cult,[566] and here is how he does so.

When, under the impulse of the surprise occasioned by the irregularities

observed in the course of phenomena, men had once peopled the world with

supernatural beings,[567] they felt the need of making agreements with

these redoubtable forces with which they had surrounded themselves. They

understood that the best way to escape being overwhelmed by them was to

ally themselves to some of them, and thus make sure of their aid. But at

this period of history men knew no other form of alliance and

association than the one resulting from kinship. All the members of a

single clan aid each other mutually because they are kindred or, as

amounts to the same thing, because they think they are; on the other

hand, different clans treat each other as enemies because they are of

different blood. So the only way of assuring themselves of the support

of these supernatural beings was to adopt them as kindred and to be

adopted by them in the same quality: the well-known processes of the

blood-covenant permitted them to attain this result quite easily. But

since at this period, the individual did not yet have a real

personality, and was regarded only as a part of his group, or clan, it

was the clan as a whole, and not the individual, which collectively

contracted this relationship. For the same reason, it was contracted,

not with a particular object, but with the natural group or species of

which this object was a part; for men think of the world as they think

of themselves, and just as they could not conceive themselves apart from

their clans, so they were unable to conceive of anything else as

distinct from the species to which it belonged. Now a species of things

united to a clan by a bond of kinship is, says Jevons, a totem.

In fact, it is certain that totemism implies the close association of a

clan to a determined category of objects. But that this association was

contracted with a deliberate design and in the full consciousness of an

end sought after, as Jevons would have us believe, is a statement having

but little harmony with what history teaches. Religions are too complex,

and answer to needs that are too many and too obscure, to have their

origin in a premeditated act of the will. And while it sins through

over-simplicity, this hypothesis is also highly improbable. It says that

men sought to assure themselves of the aid of the supernatural beings

upon which things depend. Then they should preferably have addressed

themselves to the most powerful of these, and to those whose protection

promised to be the most beneficial.[568] But quite on the contrary, the

beings with whom they have formed this mystic kinship are often among

the most humble which exist. Also, if it were only a question of making

allies and defenders, they would have tried to make as many as possible;

for one cannot be defended too well. Yet as a matter of fact, each clan

systematically contents itself with a single totem, that is to say, with

one single protector, leaving the other clans to enjoy their own in

perfect liberty. Each group confines itself within its own religious

domain, never seeking to trespass upon that of its neighbours. This

reserve and moderation are inexplicable according to the hypothesis

under consideration.

II

Moreover, all these theories are wrong in omitting one question which

dominates the whole subject. We have seen that there are two sorts of

totemism: that of the individual and that of the clan. There is too

evident a kinship between the two for them not to have some connection

with each other. So we may well ask if one is not derived from the

other, and, in the case of an affirmative answer, which is the more

primitive; according to the solution accepted, the problem of the

origins of totemism will be posed in different terms. This question

becomes all the more necessary because of its general interest.

Individual totemism is an individual aspect of the totemic cult. Then if

it was the primitive fact, we must say that religion is born in the

consciousness of the individual, that before all else, it answers to

individual aspirations, and that its collective form is merely

secondary.

The desire for an undue simplicity, with which ethnologists and

sociologists are too frequently inspired, has naturally led many

scholars to explain, here as elsewhere, the complex by the simple, the

totem of the group by that of the individual. Such, in fact, is the

theory sustained by Frazer in his _Golden Bough_,[569] by Hill

Tout,[570] by Miss Fletcher,[571] by Boas[572] and by Swanton.[573] It

has the additional advantage of being in harmony with the conception of

religion which is currently held; this is quite generally regarded as

something intimate and personal. From this point of view, the totem of

the clan can only be an individual totem which has become generalized.

Some eminent man, having found from experience the value of a totem he

chose for himself by his own free will, transmitted it to his

descendants; these latter, multiplying as time went on, finally formed

the extended family known as a clan, and thus the totem became

collective.

Hill Tout believes that he has found a proof supporting this theory in

the way totemism has spread among certain societies of North-western

America, especially among the Salish and certain Indians on the Thompson

River. Individual totemism and the clan totemism are both found among

these peoples; but they either do not co-exist in the same tribe, or

else, when they do co-exist, they are not equally developed. They vary

in an inverse proportion to each other; where the clan totem tends to

become the general rule, the individual totem tends to disappear, and

_vice versa_. Is that not as much as to say that the first is a more

recent form of the second, which excludes it by replacing it?[574]

Mythology seems to confirm this interpretation. In these same societies,

in fact, the ancestor of the clan is not a totemic animal; the founder

of the group is generally represented in the form of a human being who,

at a certain time, had entered into familiar relations with a fabulous

animal from whom he received his totemic emblem. This emblem, together

with the special powers which are attached to it, was then passed on to

the descendants of this mythical hero by right of heritage. So these

people themselves seem to consider the collective totem as an individual

one, perpetuated in the same family.[575] Moreover, it still happens

to-day that a father transmits his own totem to his children. So if we

imagine that the collective totem had, in a general way, this same

origin, we are assuming that the same thing took place in the past which

is still observable to-day.[576]

It is still to be explained whence the individual totem comes. The reply

given to this question varies with different authors.

Hill Tout considers it a particular case of fetishism. Feeling himself

surrounded on all sides by dreaded spirits, the individual experienced

that sentiment which we have just seen Jevons attribute to the clan: in

order that he might continue to exist, he sought some powerful protector

in this mysterious world. Thus the use of a personal totem became

established.[577] For Frazer, this same institution was rather a

subterfuge or trick of war, invented by men that they might escape from

certain dangers. It is known that according to a belief which is very

widespread in a large number of inferior societies, the human soul is

able, without great inconvenience, to quit the body it inhabits for a

while; howsoever far away it may be, it continues to animate this body

by a sort of detached control. Then, in certain critical moments, when

life is supposed to be particularly menaced, it may be desirable to

withdraw the soul from the body and lead it to some place or into some

object where it will be in greater security. In fact, there are a

certain number of practices whose object is to withdraw the soul in

order to protect it from some danger, either real or imaginary. For

example, at the moment when men are going to enter a newly-built house,

a magician removes their souls and puts them in a sack, to be saved and

returned to their proprietors after the door-sill has been crossed. This

is because the moment when one enters a new house is exceptionally

critical; one may have disturbed, and consequently offended, the spirits

who reside in the ground and especially under the sill, and if

precautions are not taken, these could make a man pay dearly for his

audacity. But when this danger is once passed, and one has been able to

anticipate their anger and even to make sure of their favour through the

accomplishment of certain rites, the souls may safely retake their

accustomed place.[578] It is this same belief which gave birth to the

personal totem. To protect themselves from sorcery, men thought it wise

to hide their souls in the anonymous crowd of some species of animal or

vegetable. But after these relations had once been established, each

individual found himself closely united to the animal or plant where his

own vital principle was believed to reside. Two beings so closely united

were finally thought to be practically indistinguishable: men believed

that each participated in the nature of the other. When this belief had

once been accepted, it facilitated and hastened the transformation of

the personal totem into an hereditary, and consequently a collective,

totem; for it seemed quite evident that this kinship of nature should be

transmitted hereditarily from father to child.

We shall not stop to discuss these two explanations of the individual

totem at length: they are ingenious fabrications of the mind, but they

completely lack all positive proof. If we are going to reduce totemism

to fetishism, we must first establish that the latter is prior to the

former; now, not merely is no fact brought forward to support this

hypothesis, but it is even contradicted by everything that we know. The

ill-determined group of rites going under the name of fetishism seem to

appear only among peoples who have already attained to a certain degree

of civilization; but it is a species of cult unknown in Australia. It is

true that some have described the churinga as a fetish;[579] but even

supposing that this qualification were justified, it would not prove the

priority which is postulated. Quite on the contrary, the churinga

presupposes totemism, since it is essentially an instrument of the

totemic cult and owes the virtues attributed to it to totemic beliefs

alone.

As for the theory of Frazer, it presupposes a thoroughgoing idiocy on

the part of the primitive which known facts do not allow us to attribute

to him. He does have a logic, however strange this may at times appear;

now unless he were completely deprived of it, he could never be guilty

of the reasoning imputed to him. Nothing could be more natural than that

he should believe it possible to assure the survival of his soul by

hiding it in a secret and inaccessible place, as so many heroes of myths

and legends are said to have done. But why should he think it safer in

the body of an animal than in his own? Of course, if it were thus lost

in space, it might have a chance to escape the spells of a magician more

readily, but at the same time it would be prepared for the blows of

hunters. It is a strange way of sheltering it to place it in a material

form exposing it to risks at every instant.[580] But above all, it is

inconceivable that a whole people should allow themselves to be carried

into such an aberration.[581] Finally, in a very large number of cases,

the function of the individual totem is very different from that

assigned it by Frazer; before all else, it is a means of conferring

extraordinary powers upon magicians, hunters or warriors.[582] As to the

kinship of the man and the thing, with all the inconveniences it

implies, it is accepted as a consequence of the rite; but it is not

desired in its and for itself.

There is still less occasion for delaying over this controversy since it

concerns no real problem. What we must know before everything else is

whether or not the individual totem is really a primitive fact, from

which the collective totem was derived; for, according to the reply

given to this question, we must seek the home of the religious life in

one or the other of two opposite directions.

Against the hypothesis of Hill Tout, Miss Fletcher, Boas and Frazer

there is such an array of decisive facts that one is surprised that it

has been so readily and so generally accepted.

In the first place, we know that a man frequently has the greatest

interest not only in respecting, but also in making his companions

respect the species serving him as personal totem; his own life is

connected with it. Then if collective totemism were only a generalized

form of individual totemism, it too should repose upon this same

principle. Not only should the men of a clan abstain from killing and

eating their totem-animal themselves, but they should also do all in

their power to force this same abstention upon others. But as a matter

of fact, far from imposing such a renunciation upon the whole tribe,

each clan, by rites which we shall describe below, takes care that the

plant or animal whose name it bears shall increase and prosper, so as

to assure an abundant supply of food for the other clans. So we must at

least admit that in becoming collective, individual totemism was

transformed profoundly, and we must therefore account for this

transformation.

In the second place, how is it possible to explain, from this point of

view, the fact that except where totemism is in full decay, two clans of

a single tribe always have different totems? It seems that nothing

prevents two or several members of a single tribe, even when there is no

kinship between them, from choosing their personal totem in the same

animal species and passing it on to their descendants. Does it not

happen to-day that two distinct families have the same name? The

carefully regulated way in which the totems and sub-totems are divided

up, first between the two phratries and then among the various clans of

the phratry, obviously presupposes a social agreement and a collective

organization. This is as much as to say that totemism is something more

than an individual practice spontaneously generalized.

Moreover, collective totemism cannot be deduced from individual totemism

except by a misunderstanding of the differences separating the two. The

one is acquired by the child at birth; it is a part of his civil status.

The other is acquired during the course of his life; it presupposes the

accomplishment of a determined rite and a change of condition. Some seek

to diminish this distance by inserting between the two, as a sort of

middle term, the right of each possessor of a totem to transmit it to

whomsoever he pleases. But wherever these transfers do take place, they

are rare and relatively exceptional acts; they cannot be performed

except by magicians or other personages invested with special

powers;[583] in any case, they are possible only through ritual

ceremonies which bring about the change. So it is necessary to explain

how this prerogative of a few became the right of all; how that which at

first implied a profound change in the religious and moral constitution

of the individual, was able to become an element of this constitution;

and finally, how a transmission which at first was the consequence of a

rite was later believed to operate automatically from the nature of

things and without the intervention of any human will.

In support of his interpretation, Hill Tout claims that certain myths

give the totem of the clan an individual origin: they tell how the

totemic emblem was acquired by some special individual, who then

transmitted it to his descendants. But in the first place, it is to be

remarked that these myths are all taken from the Indian tribes of North

America, which are societies arrived at a rather high degree of culture.

How could a mythology so far removed from the origins of things aid in

reconstituting the primitive form of an institution with any degree of

certainty? There are many chances for intermediate causes to have

gravely disfigured the recollection which these people have been able to

retain. Moreover, it is very easy to answer these myths with others,

which seem much more primitive and whose signification is quite

different. The totem is there represented as the very being from whom

the clan is descended. So it must be that it constitutes the substance

of the clan; men have it within them from their birth; it is a part of

their very flesh and blood, so far are they from having received it from

without.[584] More than that, the very myths upon which Hill Tout relies

contain an echo of this ancient conception. The founder who gave his

name to the clan certainly had a human form; but he was a man who, after

living among animals of a certain species, finally came to resemble

them. This is undoubtedly because a time came when the mind was too

cultivated to admit any longer, as it had formerly done, that men might

have been born of animals; so the animal ancestor, now become

inconceivable, is replaced by a human being; but the idea persists that

this man had acquired certain characteristics of the animal either by

imitation or by some other process. Thus even this late mythology bears

the mark of a more remote epoch when the totem of the clan was never

regarded as a sort of individual creation.

But this hypothesis does not merely raise grave logical difficulties; it

is contradicted directly by the following facts.

If individual totemism were the initial fact, it should be more

developed and apparent, the more primitive the societies are, and

inversely, it should lose ground and disappear before the other among

the more advanced peoples. Now it is the contrary which is true. The

Australian tribes are far behind those of North America; yet Australia

is the classic land of collective totemism. _In the great majority of

the tribes, it alone is found, while we do not know a single one where

individual totemism alone is practised._[585] This latter is found in a

characteristic form only in an infinitesimal number of tribes.[586] Even

where it is met with it is generally in a rudimentary form. It is made

up of individual and optional practices having no generality. Only

magicians are acquainted with the art of creating mysterious

relationships with species of animals to which they are not related by

nature. Ordinary people do not enjoy this privilege.[587] In America, on

the contrary, the collective totem is in full decadence; in the

societies of the North-west especially, its religious character is

almost gone. Inversely, the individual totem plays a considerable rôle

among these same peoples. A very great efficacy is attributed to it; it

has become a real public institution. This is because it is the sign of

a higher civilization. This is undoubtedly the explanation of the

inversion of these two forms of totemism, which Hill Tout believes he

has observed among the Salish. If in those parts where collective

totemism is the most fully developed the other form is almost lacking,

it is not because the second has disappeared before the first, but

rather, because the conditions necessary for its existence have not yet

been fully realized.

But a fact which is still more conclusive is that individual totemism,

far from having given birth to the totemism of the clan, presupposes

this latter. It is within the frame of collective totemism that it is

born and lives: it is an integral part of it. In fact, in those very

societies where it is preponderating, the novices do not have the right

of taking any animal as their individual totem; to each clan a certain

definite number of species are assigned, outside of which it may not

choose. In return, those belonging to it thus are its exclusive

property; members of other clans may not usurp them.[588] They are

thought to have relations of close dependence upon the one serving as

totem to the clan as a whole. There are even cases where it is quite

possible to observe these relations: the individual aspect represents a

part or a particular aspect of the collective totem.[589] Among the

Wotjobaluk, each member of the clan considers the personal totems of

his companions as being his own after a fashion;[590] so they are

probably sub-totems. Now the sub-totem supposes the totem, as the

species supposes the class. Thus the first form of individual religion

met with in history appears, not as the active principle of all public

religion, but, on the contrary, as a simple aspect of this latter. The

cult which the individual organizes for himself in his own inner

conscience, far from being the germ of the collective cult, is only this

latter adapted to the personal needs of the individual.

III

In a more recent study,[591] which the works of Spencer and Gillen

suggested to him, Frazer has attempted to substitute a new explanation

of totemism for the one he first proposed, and which we have just been

discussing. It rests on the postulate that the totemism of the Arunta is

the most primitive which we know; Frazer even goes so far as to say that

it scarcely differs from the really and absolutely original type.[592]

The singular thing about it is that the totems are attached neither to

persons nor to determined groups of persons, but to localities. In fact,

each totem has its centre at some definite spot. It is there that the

souls of the first ancestors, who founded the totemic group at the

beginning of time, are believed to have their preferred residence. It is

there that the sanctuary is located where the churinga are kept; there

the cult is celebrated. It is also this geographical distribution of

totems which determines the manner in which the clans are recruited. The

child has neither the totem of his father nor that of his mother, but

the one whose centre is at the spot where the mother believes that she

felt the first symptoms of approaching maternity. For it is said that

the Arunta is ignorant of the exact relation existing between generation

and the sexual act;[593] he thinks that every conception is due to a

sort of mystic fecundation. According to him, it is due to the entrance

of the soul of an ancestor into the body of a woman and its becoming the

principle of a new life there. So at the moment when a woman feels the

first tremblings of the child, she imagines that one of the souls whose

principal residence is at the place where she happens to be, has just

entered into her. As the child who is presently born is merely the

reincarnation of this ancestor, he necessarily has the same totem; thus

his totem is determined by the locality where he is believed to have

been mysteriously conceived.

Now, it is this local totemism which represents the original form of

totemism; at most, it is separated from this by a very short step. This

is how Frazer explains its genesis.

At the exact moment when the woman realizes that she is pregnant, she

must think that the spirit by which she feels herself possessed has come

to her from the objects about her, and especially from one of those

which attract her attention at the moment. So if she is engaged in

plucking a plant, or watching an animal, she believes that the soul of

this plant or animal has passed into her. Among the things to which she

will be particularly inclined to attribute her condition are, in the

first place, the things she has just eaten. If she has recently eaten

emu or yam, she will not doubt that an emu or yam has been born in her

and is developing. Under these conditions, it is evident how the child,

in his turn, will be considered a sort of yam or emu, how he regards

himself as a relative of the plant or animal of the same species, how he

has sympathy and regard for them, how he refuses to eat them, etc.[594]

From this moment, totemism exists in its essential traits: it is the

native's theory of conception that gave rise to it, so Frazer calls this

primitive totemism _conceptional_.

It is from this original type that all the other forms of totemism are

derived. "When several women had, one after the other, felt the first

premonitions of maternity at the same spot and under the same

circumstances, the place would come to be regarded as haunted by spirits

of a peculiar sort; and so the whole country might in time be dotted

over with totem centres and distributed into totem districts."[595] This

is how the local totemism of the Arunta originated. In order that the

totems may subsequently be detached from their territorial base, it is

sufficient to think that the ancestral souls, instead of remaining

immutably fixed to a determined spot, are able to move freely over the

surface of the territory and that in their voyages they follow the men

and women of the same totem as themselves. In this way, a woman may be

impregnated by her own totem or that of her husband, though residing in

a different totemic district. According to whether it is believed that

it is the ancestor of the husband or of the wife who thus follow the

family about, seeking occasions to reincarnate themselves, the totem of

the child will be that of his father or mother. In fact, it is in just

this way that the Guanji and Umbaia on the one hand, and the Urabunna on

the other, explain their systems of filiation.

But this theory, like that of Tylor, rests upon a begging of the

question. If he is to imagine that human souls are the souls of animals

or plants, one must believe beforehand that men take either from the

animal or vegetable world whatever is most essential in them. Now this

belief is one of those at the foundation of totemism. To state it as

something evident is therefore to take for granted that which is to be

explained.

Moreover, from this point of view, the religious character of the totem

is entirely inexplicable, for the vague belief in an obscure kinship

between the man and the animal is not enough to found a cult. This

confusion of distinct kingdoms could never result in dividing the world

into sacred and profane. It is true that, being consistent with himself,

Frazer refuses to admit that totemism is a religion, under the pretext

that he finds in it neither spiritual beings, nor prayers, nor

invocations, nor offerings, etc. According to him, it is only a system

of magic, by which he means a sort of crude and erroneous science, a

first effort to discover the laws of things.[596] But we know how

inexact this conception, both of magic and of religion, is. We have a

religion as soon as the sacred is distinguished from the profane, and we

have seen that totemism is a vast system of sacred things. If we are to

explain it, we must therefore show how it happened that these things

were stamped with this character.[597] But he does not even raise this

problem.

But this system is completely overthrown by the fact that the postulate

upon which it rests can no longer be sustained. The whole argument of

Frazer supposes that the local totemism of the Arunta is the most

primitive we know, and especially that it is clearly prior to

hereditary totemism, either in the paternal or the maternal line. Now as

soon as the facts contained in the first volume of Spencer and Gillen

were at our disposal, we were able to conjecture that there had been a

time in the history of the Arunta people when the totems, instead of

being attached to localities, were transmitted hereditarily from mother

to child.[598] This conjecture is definitely proved by the new facts

discovered by Strehlow,[599] which only confirm the previous

observations of Schulze.[600] In fact, both of these authors tell us

that even now, in addition to his local totem, each Arunta has another

which is completely independent of all geographical conditions, and

which belongs to him as a birthright: it is his mother's. This second

totem, just like the first, is considered a powerful friend and

protector by the natives, which looks after their food, warns them of

possible dangers, etc. They have the right of taking part in its cult.

When they are buried, the corpse is laid so that the face is turned

towards the region of the maternal totemic centre. So after a fashion

this centre is also that of the deceased. In fact it is given the name

_tmara altjira_, which is translated: camp of the totem which is

associated with me. So it is certain that among the Arunta, hereditary

totemism in the uterine line is not later than local totemism, but, on

the contrary, must have preceded it. For to-day, the maternal totem has

only an accessory and supplementary rôle; it is a second totem, which

explains how it was able to escape observation as attentive and careful

as that of Spencer and Gillen. But in order that it should be able to

retain this secondary place, being employed along with the local totem,

there must have been a time when it held the primary place in the

religious life. It is, in part, a fallen totem, but one recalling an

epoch when the totemic organization of the Arunta was very different

from what it is to-day. So the whole superstructure of Frazer's system

is undermined at its foundation.[601]

IV

Although Andrew Lang has actively contested this theory of Frazer's, the

one he proposes himself in his later works,[602] resembles it on more

than one point. Like Frazer, he makes totemism consist in the belief in

a sort of consubstantiality of the man and the animal. But he explains

it differently.

He derives it entirely from the fact that the totem is a name. As soon

as human groups were founded,[603] each one felt the need of

distinguishing between the neighbouring groups with which it came into

contact and, with this end in view, it gave them different names. The

names were preferably chosen from the surrounding flora and fauna

because animals and plants can easily be designated by movements or

represented by drawings.[604] The more or less precise resemblances

which men may have with such and such objects determined the way in

which these collective denominations were distributed among the

groups.[605]

Now, it is a well-known fact that "to the early mind names, and the

things known by names, are in a mystic and transcendental connection of

_rapport_."[606] For example, the name of an individual is not

considered as a simple word or conventional sign, but as an essential

part of the individual himself. So if it were the name of an animal, the

man would have to believe that he himself had the most characteristic

attributes of this same animal. This theory would become better and

better accredited as the historic origins of these denominations became

more remote and were effaced from the memory. Myths arose to make this

strange ambiguity of human nature more easily representable in the mind.

To explain this, they imagined that the animal was the ancestor of the

men, or else that the two were descended from a common ancestor. Thus

came the conception of bonds of kinship uniting each clan to the animal

species whose name it bore. With the origins of this fabulous kinship

once explained, it seems to our author that totemism no longer contains

a mystery.

But whence comes the religious character of the totemic beliefs and

practices? For the fact that a man considers himself an animal of a

certain species does not explain why he attributes marvellous powers to

this species, and especially why he renders a cult to the images

symbolizing it.--To this question Lang gives the same response as

Frazer: he denies that totemism is a religion. "I find in Australia," he

says, "no example of religious practices such as praying to, nourishing

or burying the totem."[607] It was only at a later epoch, when it was

already established, that totemism was drawn into and surrounded by a

system of conceptions properly called religious. According to a remark

of Howitt,[608] when the natives undertake the explanation of the

totemic institutions, they do not attribute them to the totems

themselves nor to a man, but to some supernatural being such as Bunjil

or Baiame. "Accepting this evidence," says Lang, "one source of the

'religious' character of totemism is at once revealed. The totemist

obeys the decree of Bunjil, or Baiame, as the Cretans obeyed the divine

decrees given by Zeus to Minos." Now according to Lang the idea of these

great divinities arose outside of the totemic system; so this is not a

religion in itself; it has merely been given a religious colouring by

contact with a genuine religion.

But these very myths contradict Lang's conception of totemism. If the

Australians had regarded totemism as something human and profane, it

would never have occurred to them to make a divine institution out of

it. If, on the other hand, they have felt the need of connecting it with

a divinity, it is because they have seen a sacred character in it. So

these mythological interpretations prove the religious nature of

totemism, but do not explain it.

Moreover, Lang himself recognizes that this solution is not sufficient.

He realizes that totemic things are treated with a religious

respect;[609] that especially the blood of an animal, as well as that of

a man, is the object of numerous interdictions, or, as he says, taboos

which this comparatively late mythology cannot explain.[610] Then where

do they come from? Here are the words with which Lang answers this

question: "As soon as the animal-named groups evolved the universally

diffused beliefs about the _wakan_ or _mana_, or mystically sacred

quality of the blood as the life, they would also develop the various

taboos."[611] The words _wakan_ and _mana_, as we shall see in the

following chapter, involve the very idea of _sacredness_ itself; the one

is taken from the language of the Sioux, the other from that of the

Melanesian peoples. To explain the sacred character of totemic things by

postulating this characteristic, is to answer the question by the

question. What we must find out is whence this idea of _wakan_ comes and

how it comes to be applied to the totem and all that is derived from it.

As long as these two questions remain unanswered, nothing is explained.

V

We have now passed in review all the principal explanations which have

been given for totemic beliefs,[612] leaving to each of them its own

individuality. But now that this examination is finished, we may state

one criticism which addresses itself to all these systems alike.

If we stick to the letter of the formulæ, it seems that these may be

arranged in two groups. Some (Frazer, Lang) deny the religious character

of totemism; in reality, that amounts to denying the facts. Others

recognize this, but think that they can explain it by deriving it from

an anterior religion out of which totemism developed. But as a matter of

fact, this distinction is only apparent: the first group is contained

within the second. Neither Frazer nor Lang have been able to maintain

their principle systematically and explain totemism as if it were not a

religion. By the very force of facts, they have been compelled to slip

ideas of a religious nature into their explanations. We have just seen

how Lang calls in the idea of sacredness, which is the cardinal idea of

all religion. Frazer, on his side, in each of the theories which he has

successively proposed, appeals openly to the idea of souls or spirits;

for according to him, totemism came from the fact that men thought they

could deposit their souls in safety in some external object, or else

that they attributed conception to a sort of spiritual fecundation of

which a spirit was the agent. Now a soul, and still more, a spirit, are

sacred things and the object of rites; so the ideas expressing them are

essentially religious and it is therefore in vain that Frazer makes

totemism a mere system of magic, for he succeeds in explaining it only

in the terms of another religion.

We have already pointed out the insufficiencies of animism and naturism;

so one may not have recourse to them, as Tylor and Jevons do, without

exposing himself to these same objections. Yet neither Frazer nor Lang

seems to dream of the possibility of another hypothesis.[613] On the

other hand, we know that totemism is tightly bound up with the most

primitive social system which we know, and in all probability, of which

we can conceive. To suppose that it has developed out of another

religion, differing from it only in degree, is to leave the data of

observation and enter into the domain of arbitrary and unverifiable

conjectures. If we wish to remain in harmony with the results we have

already obtained, it is necessary that while affirming the religious

nature of totemism, we abstain from deriving it from another different

religion. There can be no hope of assigning it non-religious ideas as

its cause. But among the representations entering into the conditions

from which it results, there may be some which directly suggest a

religious nature of themselves. These are the ones we must look for.

The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life · 第 5 / 14 章