CHAPTER III

TOTEMIC BELIEFS--_continued_

_The Cosmological System of Totemism and the Idea of Class_

We are beginning to see that totemism is a much more complex religion

than it first appeared to be. We have already distinguished three

classes of things which it recognizes as sacred, in varying degrees: the

totemic emblem, the animal or plant whose appearance this emblem

reproduces, and the members of the clan. However, this list is not yet

complete. In fact, a religion is not merely a collection of fragmentary

beliefs in regard to special objects like those we have just been

discussing. To a greater or less extent, all known religions have been

systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and

to give us a complete representation of the world. If totemism is to be

considered as a religion comparable to the others, it too should offer

us a conception of the universe. As a matter of fact, it does satisfy

this condition.

I

The fact that this aspect of totemism has generally been neglected is

due to the too narrow notion of the clan which has been prevalent.

Ordinarily it is regarded as a mere group of human beings. Being a

simple subdivision of the tribe, it seems that like this, it is made up

of nothing but men. But in reasoning thus, we substitute our European

ideas for those which the primitive has of man and of society. For the

Australian, things themselves, everything which is in the universe, are

a part of the tribe; they are constituent elements of it and, so to

speak, regular members of it; just like men, they have a determined

place in the general scheme of organization of the society. "The South

Australian savage," says Fison, "looks upon the universe as the Great

Tribe, to one of whose divisions he himself belongs; and all things,

animate and inanimate, which belong to his class are parts of the body

corporate whereof he himself is a part."[427] As a consequence of this

principle, whenever the tribe is divided into two phratries, all known

things are distributed between them. "All nature," says Palmer, in

speaking of the Bellinger River tribe, "is also divided into class

[phratry] names.... The sun and moon and stars are said ... to belong

to classes [phratries] just as the blacks themselves."[428] The Port

Mackay tribe in Queensland has two phratries with the names Yungaroo and

Wootaroo, as do the neighbouring tribes. Now as Bridgmann says, "all

things, animate and inanimate, are divided by these tribes into two

classes, named Yungaroo and Wootaroo."[429] Nor does the classification

stop here. The men of each phratry are distributed among a certain

number of clans; likewise, the things attributed to each phratry are in

their turn distributed among the clans of which the phratry is composed.

A certain tree, for example, will be assigned to the Kangaroo clan, and

to it alone; then, just like the human members of the clan, it will have

the Kangaroo as totem; another will belong to the Snake clan; clouds

will be placed under one totem, the sun under another, etc. All known

things will thus be arranged in a sort of tableau or systematic

classification embracing the whole of nature.

We have given a certain number of these classifications elsewhere;[430]

at present we shall confine ourselves to repeating a few of these as

examples. One of the best known of these is the one found in the Mount

Gambier tribe. This tribe includes two phratries, named respectively the

Kumite and the Kroki; each of these, in its turn, is subdivided into

five clans. Now "everything in nature belongs to one or another of these

ten clans";[431] Fison and Howitt say that they are all "included"

within it. In fact, they are classified under these ten totems just like

species in their respective classes. This is well shown by the following

table based on information gathered by Curr and by Fison and

Howitt.[432]

PHRATRIES. CLANS. THINGS CLASSED IN EACH CLAN.

{ Fish-hawk { Smoke, honeysuckle, certain

{ { trees, etc.

{ Pelican { Blackwood-trees, dogs, fire,

{ { frost, etc.

KUMITE { Crow { Rain, thunder, lightning,

{ { clouds, hail, winter, etc.

{ Black cockatoo { The stars, the moon, etc.

{ A non-poisonous snake { Fish, seal, eel, the

{ stringybark-tree, etc.

{ Tea-tree { Duck, crayfish, owls, etc.

{ An edible root { Bustard, quail, a small

KROKI { { kangaroo, etc.

{ A white crestless cockatoo { Kangaroo, the summer, the

{ { sun, wind, the autumn, etc.

{ Details are lacking for the fourth and fifth Kroki clans.

The list of things attached to each clan is quite incomplete; Curr

himself warns us that he has limited himself to enumerating some of

them. But through the work of Mathews and of Howitt[433] we have more

extended information to-day on the classification adopted by the

Wotjobaluk tribe, which enables us to understand better how a system of

this kind is able to include the whole universe, as known to the

natives. The Wotjobaluk also are divided into two phratries called

Gurogity and Gumaty (Krokitch and Gamutch according to Howitt[434]); not

to prolong this enumeration, we shall content ourselves with indicating,

after Mathews, the things classed in some of the clans of the Gurogity

phratry.

In the clan of the Yam are classified the plain-turkey, the native cat,

the _mopoke_, the _dyim-dyim_ owl, the _mallee_ hen, the rosella parrot,

the peewee.

In the Mussel[435] clan are the grey emu, the porcupine, the curlew, the

white cockatoo, the wood-duck, the _mallee_ lizard, the stinking turtle,

the flying squirrel, the ring-tail opossum, the bronze-wing pigeon, the

_wijuggla_.

In the Sun clan are the bandicoot, the moon, the kangaroo-rat, the black

and white magpies, the opossum, the _ng[)u]rt_ hawk, the gum-tree grub,

the wattle-tree grub, the planet Venus.

In the clan of the Warm Wind[436] are the grey-headed eagle-hawk, the

carpet snake, the smoker parrot, the shell parrot, the _murrakan_ hawk,

the _dikkomur_ snake, the ring-neck parrot, the _mirudai_ snake, the

shingle-back lizard.

If we remember that there are many other clans (Howitt names twelve and

Mathews fourteen and adds that his list is incomplete[437]), we will

understand how all the things in which the native takes an interest find

a natural place in these classifications.

Similar arrangements have been observed in the most diverse parts of

the Australian continent; in South Australia, in Victoria, and in New

South Wales (among the Euahlayi[438]); very clear traces of it are found

in the central tribes.[439] In Queensland, where the clans seem to have

disappeared and where the matrimonial classes are the only subdivisions

of the phratry, things are divided up among these classes. Thus, the

Wakelbura are divided into two phratries, Mallera and Wutaru; the

classes of the first are called Kurgilla and Banbe, those of the second,

Wungo and Obu. Now to the Banbe belong the opossum, the kangaroo, the

dog, honey of little bees, etc.; to the Wungo are attributed the emu,

the bandicoot, the black duck, the black snake, the brown snake; to the

Obu, the carpet snake, the honey of stinging bees, etc.; to the

Kurgilla, the porcupine, the turkey of the plains, water, rain, fire,

thunder, etc.[440]

This same organization is found among the Indians of North America. The

Zuñi have a system of classification which, in its essential lines, is

in all points comparable to the one we have just described. That of the

Omaha rests on the same principles as that of the Wotjobaluk.[441] An

echo of these same ideas survives even into the more advanced societies.

Among the Haida, all the gods and mythical beings who are placed in

charge of the different phenomena of nature are classified in one or the

other of the two phratries which make up the tribe just like men; some

are Eagles, the others, Crows.[442] Now the gods of things are only

another aspect of the things which they govern.[443] This mythological

classification is therefore merely another form of the preceding one. So

we may rest assured that this way of conceiving the world is independent

of all ethnic or geographic particularities; and at the same time it is

clearly seen to be closely united to the whole system of totemic

beliefs.

II

In the paper to which we have already made allusion several times, we

have shown what light these facts throw upon the way in which the idea

of kind or class was formed in humanity. In fact, these systematic

classifications are the first we meet with in history, and we have just

seen that they are modelled upon the social organization, or rather that

they have taken the forms of society as their framework. It is the

phratries which have served as classes, and the clans as species. It is

because men were organized that they have been able to organize things,

for in classifying these latter, they limited themselves to giving them

places in the groups they formed themselves. And if these different

classes of things are not merely put next to each other, but are

arranged according to a unified plan, it is because the social groups

with which they commingle themselves are unified and, through their

union, form an organic whole, the tribe. The unity of these first

logical systems merely reproduces the unity of the society. Thus we have

an occasion for verifying the proposition which we laid down at the

commencement of this work, and for assuring ourselves that the

fundamental notions of the intellect, the essential categories of

thought, may be the product of social factors. The above-mentioned facts

show clearly that this is the case with the very notion of category

itself.

However, it is not our intention to deny that the individual intellect

has of itself the power of perceiving resemblances between the different

objects of which it is conscious. Quite on the contrary, it is clear

that even the most primitive and simple classifications presuppose this

faculty. The Australian does not place things in the same clan or in

different clans at random. For him as for us, similar images attract one

another, while opposed ones repel one another, and it is on the basis of

these feelings of affinity or of repulsion that he classifies the

corresponding things in one place or another.

There are also cases where we are able to perceive the reasons which

inspired this. The two phratries were very probably the original and

fundamental bases for these classifications, which were consequently

bifurcate at first. Now, when a classification is reduced to two

classes, these are almost necessarily conceived as antitheses; they are

used primarily as a means of clearly separating things between which

there is a very marked contrast. Some are set at the right, the others

at the left. As a matter of fact this is the character of the Australian

classifications. If the white cockatoo is in one phratry, the black one

is in the other; if the sun is on one side, the moon and the stars of

night are on the opposite side.[444] Very frequently the beings which

serve as the totems of the two phratries have contrary colours.[445]

These oppositions are even met with outside of Australia. Where one of

the phratries is disposed to peace, the other is disposed to war;[446]

if one has water as its totem, the other has earth.[447] This is

undoubtedly the explanation of why the two phratries have frequently

been thought of as naturally antagonistic to one another. They say that

there is a sort of rivalry or even a constitutional hostility between

them.[448] This opposition of things has extended itself to persons; the

logical contrast has begotten a sort of social conflict.[449]

It is also to be observed that within each phratry, those things have

been placed in a single clan which seem to have the greatest affinity

with that serving as totem. For example, the moon has been placed with

the black cockatoo, but the sun, together with the atmosphere and the

wind, with the white cockatoo. Or again, to a totemic animal has been

united all that serves him as food,[450] as well as the animals with

which he has the closest connection.[451] Of course, we cannot always

understand the obscure psychology which has caused many of these

connections and distinctions, but the preceding examples are enough to

show that a certain intuition of the resemblances and differences

presented by things has played an important part in the genesis of

these classifications.

But the feeling of resemblances is one thing and the idea of class is

another. The class is the external framework of which objects perceived

to be similar form, in part, the contents. Now the contents cannot

furnish the frame into which they fit. They are made up of _vague and

fluctuating_ images, due to the super-imposition and partial fusion of a

_determined number of individual images_, which are found to have common

elements; the framework, on the contrary, is a _definite form_, with

fixed outlines, but which may be applied to an _undetermined number of

things_, perceived or not, actual or possible. In fact, every class has

possibilities of extension which go far beyond the circle of objects

which we know, either from direct experience or from resemblance. This

is why every school of thinkers has refused, and not with good reason,

to identify the idea of class with that of a generic image. The generic

image is only the indistinctly-bounded residual representation left in

us by similar representations, when they are present in consciousness

simultaneously; the class is a logical symbol by means of which we think

distinctly of these similarities and of other analogous ones. Moreover,

the best proof of the distance separating these two notions is that an

animal is able to form generic images though ignorant of the art of

thinking in classes and species.

The idea of class is an instrument of thought which has obviously been

constructed by men. But in constructing it, we have at least had need of

a model; for how could this idea ever have been born, if there had been

nothing either in us or around us which was capable of suggesting it to

us? To reply that it was given to us _a priori_ is not to reply at all;

this lazy man's solution is, as has been said, the death of analysis.

But it is hard to see where we could have found this indispensable model

except in the spectacle of the collective life. In fact, a class is not

an ideal, but a clearly defined group of things between which internal

relationships exist, similar to those of kindred. Now the only groups of

this sort known from experience are those formed by men in associating

themselves. Material things may be able to form collections of units, or

heaps, or mechanical assemblages with no internal unity, but not groups

in the sense we have given the word. A heap of sand or a pile of rock is

in no way comparable to that variety of definite and organized society

which forms a class. In all probability, we would never have thought of

uniting the beings of the universe into homogeneous groups, called

classes, if we had not had the example of human societies before our

eyes, if we had not even commenced by making things themselves members

of men's society, and also if human groups and logical groups had not

been confused at first.[452]

It is also to be borne in mind that a classification is a system whose

parts are arranged according to a hierarchy. There are dominating

members and others which are subordinate to the first; species and their

distinctive properties depend upon classes and the attributes which

characterize them; again, the different species of a single class are

conceived as all placed on the same level in regard to each other. Does

someone prefer to regard them from the point of view of the

understanding? Then he represents things to himself in an inverse order:

he puts at the top the species that are the most particularized and the

richest in reality, while the types that are most general and the

poorest in qualities are at the bottom. Nevertheless, all are

represented in a hierarchic form. And we must be careful not to believe

that the expression has only a metaphorical sense here: there are really

relations of subordination and co-ordination, the establishment of which

is the object of all classification, and men would never have thought of

arranging their knowledge in this way if they had not known beforehand

what a hierarchy was. But neither the spectacle of physical nature nor

the mechanism of mental associations could furnish them with this

knowledge. The hierarchy is exclusively a social affair. It is only in

society that there are superiors, inferiors and equals. Consequently,

even if the facts were not enough to prove it, the mere analysis of

these ideas would reveal their origin. We have taken them from society,

and projected them into our conceptions of the world. It is society that

has furnished the outlines which logical thought has filled in.

III

But these primitive classifications have a no less direct interest for

the origins of religious thought.

They imply that all the things thus classed in a single clan or a single

phratry are closely related both to each other and to the thing serving

as the totem of this clan or phratry. When an Australian of the Port

Mackay tribe says that the sun, snakes, etc., are of the Yungaroo

phratry, he does not mean merely to apply a common, but none the less a

purely conventional, nomenclature to these different things; the word

has an objective signification for him. He believes that "alligators

really _are_ Yungaroo and that kangaroos are Wootaroo. The sun _is_

Yungaroo, the moon Wootaroo, and so on for the constellations, trees,

plants, etc."[453] An internal bond attaches them to the group in which

they are placed; they are regular members of it. It is said that they

belong to the group,[454] just exactly as the individual men make a part

of it; consequently, the same sort of a relation unites them to these

latter. Men regard the things in their clan as their relatives or

associates; they call them their friends and think that they are made

out of the same flesh as themselves.[455] Therefore, between the two

there are elective affinities and quite special relations of agreement.

Things and people have a common name, and in a certain way they

naturally understand each other and harmonize with one another. For

example, when a Wakelbura of the Mallera phratry is buried, the scaffold

upon which the body is exposed "must be made of the wood of some tree

belonging to the Mallera phratry."[456] The same is true for the

branches that cover the corpse. If the deceased is of the Banbe class, a

Banbe tree must be used. In this same tribe, a magician can use in his

art only those things which belong to his own phratry;[457] since the

others are strangers to him, he does not know how to make them obey him.

Thus a bond of mystic sympathy unites each individual to those beings,

whether living or not, which are associated with him; the result of this

is a belief in the possibility of deducing what he will do or what he

has done from what they are doing. Among these same Wakelbura, when a

man dreams that he has killed an animal belonging to a certain social

division, he expects to meet a man of this same division the next

day.[458] Inversely, the things attributed to a clan or phratry cannot

be used against the members of this clan or phratry. Among the

Wotjobaluk, each phratry has its own special trees. Now in hunting an

animal of the Gurogity phratry, only arms whose wood is taken from trees

of the other phratry may be used, and _vice versa_; otherwise the hunter

is sure to miss his aim.[459] The native is convinced that the arrow

would turn of itself and refuse, so to speak, to hit a kindred and

friendly animal.

Thus the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form

by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate

sympathetically. This organization, which at first may have appeared to

us as purely logical, is at the same time moral. A single principle

animates it and makes its unity: this is the totem. Just as a man who

belongs to the Crow clan has within him something of this animal, so the

rain, since it is of the same clan and belongs to the same totem, is

also necessarily considered as being "the same thing as a crow"; for the

same reason, the moon is a black cockatoo, the sun a white cockatoo,

every black-nut tree a pelican, etc. All the beings arranged in a single

clan, whether men, animals, plants or inanimate objects, are merely

forms of the totemic being. This is the meaning of the formula which we

have just cited and this is what makes the two really of the same

species: all are really of the same flesh in the sense that all partake

of the nature of the totemic animal. Also, the qualifiers given them are

those given to the totem.[460] The Wotjobaluk give the name _Mir_ both

to the totem and to the things classed with it.[461] It is true that

among the Arunta, where visible traces of classification still exist, as

we shall see, different words designate the totem and the other beings

placed with it; however, the name given to these latter bears witness to

the close relations which unite them to the totemic animal. It is said

that they are its _intimates_, its _associates_, its _friends_; it is

believed that they are inseparable from it.[462] So there is a feeling

that these are very closely related things.

But we also know that the totemic animal is a sacred being. All the

things that are classified in the clan of which it is the emblem have

this same character, because in one sense, they are animals of the same

species, just as the man is. They, too, are sacred, and the

classifications which locate them in relation to the other things of the

universe, by that very act give them a place in the religious world. For

this reason, the animals or plants among these may not be eaten freely

by the human members of the clan. Thus in the Mount Gambier tribe, the

men whose totem is a certain non-poisonous snake must not merely refrain

from eating the flesh of this snake; that of seals, eels, etc., is also

forbidden to them.[463] If, driven by necessity, they do eat some of it,

they must at least attenuate the sacrilege by expiatory rites, just as

if they had eaten the totem itself.[464] Among the Euahlayi, where it

is permitted to use the totem, but not to abuse it, the same rule is

applied to the other members of the clan.[465] Among the Arunta, the

interdictions protecting the totemic animal extend over the associated

animals;[466] and in any case, particular attention must be given to

these latter.[467] The sentiments inspired by the two are

identical.[468]

But the fact that the things thus attached to the totem are not of a

different nature from it, and consequently have a religious character,

is best proved by the fact that on certain occasions they fulfil the

same functions. They are accessory or secondary totems, or, according to

an expression now consecrated by usage, they are sub-totems.[469] It is

constantly happening in the clans that under the influence of various

sympathies, particular affinities are forming, smaller groups and more

limited associations arise, which tend to lead a relatively autonomous

life and to form a new subdivision like a sub-clan within the larger

one. In order to distinguish and individualize itself, this sub-clan

needs a special totem or, consequently, a sub-totem.[470] Now the totems

of these secondary groups are chosen from among the things classified

under the principal totem. So they are always almost totems and the

slightest circumstance is enough to make them actually so. There is a

latent totemic nature in them, which shows itself as soon as conditions

permit it or demand it. It thus happens that a single individual has

two totems, a principal totem common to the whole clan and a sub-totem

which is special to the sub-clan of which he is a member. This is

something analogous to the _nomen_ and _cognomen_ of the Romans.[471]

Sometimes we see a sub-clan emancipate itself completely and become an

autonomous group and an independent clan; then, the sub-totem, on its

side, becomes a regular totem. One tribe where this process of

segmentation has been pushed to the limit, so to speak, is the Arunta.

The information contained in the first book of Spencer and Gillen showed

that there were some sixty totems among the Arunta;[472] but the recent

researches of Strehlow have shown the number to be much larger. He

counted no less than 442.[473] Spencer and Gillen did not exaggerate at

all when they said, "In fact, there is scarcely an object, animate or

inanimate, to be found in the country occupied by the natives which does

not give its name to some totemic group."[474] Now this multitude of

totems, whose number is prodigious when compared to the population, is

due to the fact that under special circumstances, the original clans

have divided and sub-divided infinitely; consequently nearly all the

sub-totems have passed to the stage of totems.

This has been definitely proved by the observations of Strehlow. Spencer

and Gillen cited only certain isolated cases of associated totems.[475]

Strehlow has shown that this is in reality an absolutely general

organization. He has been able to draw up a table where nearly all the

totems of the Arunta are classified according to this principle: all are

attached, either as associates or as auxiliaries, to some sixty

principal totems.[476] The first are believed to be in the service of

the second.[477] This state of dependence is very probably the echo of

a time when the "allies" of to-day were only sub-totems, and

consequently when the tribe contained only a small number of clans

subdivided into sub-clans. Numerous survivals confirm this hypothesis.

It frequently happens that two groups thus associated have the same

totemic emblem: now this unity of emblem is explicable only if the two

groups were at first only one.[478] The relation of the two clans is

also shown by the part and the interest that each one takes in the

rites of the other. The two cults are still only imperfectly separated;

this is very probably because they were at first completely

intermingled.[479] Tradition explains the bonds which unite them by

imagining that formerly the two clans occupied neighbouring places.[480]

In other cases, the myth says expressly that one of them was derived

from the other. It is related that at first the associated animal

belonged to the species still serving as principal totem; it

differentiated itself at a later period. Thus the chantunga birds, which

are associated with the witchetly grub to-day, were witchetly grubs in

fabulous times, who later transformed themselves into birds. Two species

which are now attached to the honey-ant were formerly honey-ants,

etc.[481] This transformation of a sub-totem into a totem goes on by

imperceptible degrees, so that in certain cases the situation is

undecided, and it is hard to say whether one is dealing with a principal

totem or a secondary one.[482] As Howitt says in regard to the

Wotjobaluk, there are sub-totems which are totems in formation.[483]

Thus the different things classified in a clan constitute, as it were,

so many nuclei around which new totemic cults are able to form. This is

the best proof of the religious sentiments which they inspire. If they

did not have a sacred character, they could not be promoted so easily to

the same dignity as the things which are sacred before all others, the

regular totems.

So the field of religious things extends well beyond the limits within

which it seemed to be confined at first. It embraces not only the

totemic animals and the human members of the clan; but since no known

thing exists that is not classified in a clan and under a totem, there

is likewise nothing which does not receive to some degree something of

a religious character. When, in the religions which later come into

being, the gods properly so-called appear, each of them will be set over

a special category of natural phenomena, this one over the sea, that one

over the air, another over the harvest or over fruits, etc., and each of

these provinces of nature will be believed to draw what life there is in

it from the god upon whom it depends. This division of nature among the

different divinities constitutes the conception which these religions

give us of the universe. Now so long as humanity has not passed the

phase of totemism, the different totems of the tribe fulfil exactly the

same functions that will later fall upon the divine personalities. In

the Mount Gambier tribe, which we have taken as our principal example,

there are ten clans; consequently the entire world is divided into ten

classes, or rather into ten families, each of which has a special totem

as its basis. It is from this basis that the things classed in the clan

get all their reality, for they are thought of as variant forms of the

totemic being; to return to our example, the rain, thunder, lightning,

clouds, hail and winter are regarded as different sorts of crows. When

brought together, these ten families of things make up a complete and

systematic representation of the world; and this representation is

religious, for religious notions furnish its basis. Far from being

limited to one or two categories of beings, the domain of totemic

religion extends to the final limits of the known universe. Just like

the Greek religion, it puts the divine everywhere; the celebrated

formula [Greek: panta plêrê theôn] (everything is full of the gods),

might equally well serve it as motto.

However, if totemism is to be represented thus, the notion of it which

has long been held must be modified on one essential point. Until the

discoveries of recent years, it was made to consist entirely in the cult

of one particular totem, and it was defined as the religion of the clan.

From this point of view, each tribe seemed to have as many totemic

religions, each independent of the others, as it had different clans.

This conception was also in harmony with the idea currently held of the

clan; in fact, this was regarded as an autonomous society,[484] more or

less closed to other similar societies, or having only external and

superficial relations with these latter. But the reality is more

complex. Undoubtedly, the cult of each totem has its home in the

corresponding clan; it is there, and only there, that it is celebrated;

it is members of the clan who have charge of it; it is through them

that it is transmitted from one generation to another, along with the

beliefs which are its basis. But it is also true that the different

totemic cults thus practised within a single tribe do not have a

parallel development, though remaining ignorant of each other, as if

each of them constituted a complete and self-sufficing religion. On the

contrary, they mutually imply each other; they are only the parts of a

single whole, the elements of a single religion. The men of one clan

never regard the beliefs of neighbouring clans with that indifference,

scepticism or hostility which one religion ordinarily inspires for

another which is foreign to it; they partake of these beliefs

themselves. The Crow people are also convinced that the Snake people

have a mythical serpent as ancestor, and that they owe special virtues

and marvellous powers to this origin. And have we not seen that at least

in certain conditions, a man may eat a totem that is not his own only

after he has observed certain ritual formalities? Especially, he must

demand the permission of the men of this totem, if any are present. So

for him also, this food is not entirely profane; he also admits that

there are intimate affinities between the members of a clan of which he

is not a member and the animal whose name they bear. Also, this

community of belief is sometimes shown in the cult. If in theory the

rites concerning a totem can be performed only by the men of this totem,

nevertheless representatives of different clans frequently assist at

them. It sometimes happens that their part is not simply that of

spectators; it is true that they do not officiate, but they decorate the

officiants and prepare the service. They themselves have an interest in

its being celebrated; therefore, in certain tribes, it is they who

invite the qualified clan to proceed with the ceremonies.[485] There is

even a whole cycle of rites which must take place in the presence of the

assembled tribe: these are the totemic ceremonies of initiation.[486]

Finally, the totemic organization, such as we have just described it,

must obviously be the result of some sort of an indistinct understanding

between all the members of the tribe. It is impossible that each clan

should have made its beliefs in an absolutely independent manner; it is

absolutely necessary that the cults of the different totems should be in

some way adjusted to each other, since they complete one another

exactly. In fact, we have seen that normally a single totem is not

repeated twice in the same tribe, and that the whole universe is divided

up among the totems thus constituted in such a way that the same object

is not found in two different clans. So methodical a division could

never have been made without an agreement, tacit or planned, in which

the whole tribe participated. So the group of beliefs which thus arise

are partially (but only partially) a tribal affair.[487]

To sum up, then, in order to form an adequate idea of totemism, we must

not confine ourselves within the limits of the clan, but must consider

the tribe as a whole. It is true that the particular cult of each clan

enjoys a very great autonomy; we can now see that it is within the clan

that the active ferment of the religious life takes place. But it is

also true that these cults fit into each other and the totemic religion

is a complex system formed by their union, just as Greek polytheism was

made by the union of all the particular cults addressed to the different

divinities. We have just shown that, thus understood, totemism also has

it cosmology.

The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life · 第 3 / 14 章