The doctrine that love is the only motive for sex--that physical
expression is pure only so far as it is the sacramental accidence of
love--leads to important conclusions. There is, for instance, a class of
moralist who teach that the sex-act in marriage must only be for the
purpose of procreation. It would follow from this that it is immoral for
sex intimacies to occur between a man and his wife once she has passed a
certain age. In the ideal marriage, so this school of thought affirms,
copulation is strictly regulated and occurs only when the moment is
favourable for generation.
To this theory I cannot subscribe. It runs counter to the doctrine in
which I believe. It Changes the sex-act from an incident or a result to a
means or a cause. It is really immoral because it lays emphasis on the
physical. This cold-blooded calculation of the times when sex is to be
thus physically expressed is the exact opposite of the principle by which
love directs and the act merely occurs, with no purpose but to express
love physically.
This leads us to a consideration as to how far those practices between man
and woman are moral in which procreation cannot result. It is interesting
to note that the English law holds that "unnatural" acts between husband
and wife are criminal. Although it is true that prosecution cannot occur
unless there is an absence of consent, for otherwise there would be no
evidence--these acts are apparently regarded as _per se_ criminal in
nature. And this indeed is a logical position, when we remember the
standpoint which the State adopts towards all sex questions.
To this class of conduct artificial preventatives are closely allied. A
chaos of opinion rages over this subject, from the neo-malthusian who
advocates the practice as a necessity, to the purist who talks of
"child-murder." It seems clear that this latter designation is an
unwarrantable exaggeration; to prevent the possibility of life coming into
existence cannot by any strain of imagination be confused with destroying
what is actually alive. On the other hand, the moral test which we are
applying to all these problems hardly acquits the practice. It is
difficult to think of preventatives without being conscious that
premeditation of the physical act is being emphasized, and the ideal of a
natural incident almost banished. To prepare for a thing is to insist on
its importance. The minds of the two parties must almost necessarily be
focussed--though not absolutely necessarily--on the physical sex-act.
There is no doubt however that, apart from ideals, preventatives are a
means of averting more serious evils. This is not the place to enter into
a detailed consideration of eugenics. We can only face the blatant fact
that thousands of degenerate parents continue each year to breed
degenerate children. The moral aspect with which alone I am dealing, is
that this is a crime against the community; however irresponsible or
ignorant the perpetrators, they are helping to burden the State with an
altogether undesirable progeny. Now, whether they are allowed to marry or
not, there is not the least likelihood that they will desist from sexual
intercourse. Therefore, it seems to me an obviously lesser evil to remove
all excuse for procreation by placing within reach the artificial means of
prevention.
In this, just as in the divorce problem, we have to determine whether it
is better to insist on an ideal, which we know the majority will not keep,
or to legislate down to the majority. There is no doubt in my own mind
that to legislate on an ideal is not only impracticable but dangerous. I
may believe, for instance, that it would be a higher ideal to live on
vegetables and fruit rather than to slaughter animals and drink their
blood. But even so, I should vehemently oppose a law which attempted to
impose vegetarianism.
I believe, too, that every moral influence should be brought to bear
against marriages where the physical or mental degeneracy[12] of the
parents renders the use of preventatives desirable. I wish to emphasize
that the ideal towards which we should set our faces is that of fewer but
healthier marriages. Both Church and State should, I feel, take pains to
assure themselves that these undesirable elements are absent in all unions
which they are respectively called upon to solemnize. And I emphasize this
because I believe that we are suffering far too much from the popular
fallacy and the smug Puritanic doctrine that the cure for all sexual
proclivities is for men and women to marry, and that once they marry all
things are sexually permissible. It is not only irritating, but it is a
fallacy, for men who are comfortably married to declare that there is
"really no sex-problem." There is probably as much immorality within the
married state as outside it; and far from it being the duty of every man
to marry, there are many men whose duty it is not to do so.
Closely allied with eugenics is the problem of venereal disease, and out
of this again, arises the problem of prostitution. How far is prostitution
tolerable, so that a medical system of registration should be introduced
into England? We have seen why prostitution is immoral; it is concerned
with the physical side of sex, and with little else. But no thoughtful man
could reasonably advocate the suppression of prostitution by law. The
result of such a measure, at the present state of national development,
would be deplorable, even if it were practicable. People do not become
moral because they are frightened to do what they still want to do. It is
always a confession of the weakness of religion or moral influences where
you have to fall back on the police-force of the State for support. In
moral questions, State prosecution seems only to be justifiable where the
liberty of individuals, or the welfare of the community, is endangered.
Prostitution[13] as an evil can only be treated by the slow process of
moral education. Of that I shall speak later. But it is worth while
remembering in this connexion, that the feminist movement must have a
beneficial effect, to some extent, on prostitution. Largely, it is an
economic problem. If a woman were able to earn a decent wage, it is
inconceivable that she should wish to submit herself to every voluptuous
patron who happens to come along. Education and economic independence must
tend largely to breed dissatisfaction with such a slavish occupation. It
will not do so entirely, for a certain percentage of women are prostitutes
because they hunger for promiscuous sex intercourse.
That some serious attempt must be made, not merely to alleviate, but to
prevent venereal disease, is evident to all who are aware how widespread
it has become. And it may therefore be pointed out that it would not be
impossible to prosecute the prostitute, suffering from these diseases,
without introducing the vexed question of registration and official
recognition of prostitution. All unmarried men and women below a certain
age could be compelled to submit to periodical medical examination, and if
any person was found to have solicited, after having been certified as
infected, prosecution would lie. Probably a storm of protest would be
aroused against an alleged interference with individual privacy. But the
danger of syphilis may necessitate such a law, and after all, no one is
being asked to do more than that to which every soldier and sailor has to
submit.
We have seen that love, and therefore marriage, naturally contains the
sense of permanence. There is also a sense of distaste towards incest, and
of the apparently natural evils arising therefrom. No-one will deny that
the State and the Catholic Church are scientifically justified in
insisting upon some table of prohibited degrees. How far this distaste is
essentially natural I do not know. I imagine that a sister who had been
separated from her brother since birth, and who did not know that he was
her brother, might fall in love with him. But the scientific dangers of
such marriages would remain.[14]
The Church of England some years ago found herself immersed in a storm of
controversy over the Deceased Wife's Sister Act. To most men her attitude
seemed pedantic and unworthy of serious attention. The English Church is
unfortunate: her apparently narrow ecclesiasticism was really the result
of a liberal policy at the time of the Reformation. During the Middle
Ages the Church had extended her prohibited degrees to such an extent that
it must have been difficult to know whom one could marry without a
dispensation.[15] Only a person more than four degrees removed from the
other party was an eligible partner without dispensation, the degrees so
being reckoned as to include even second cousins. The English Church swept
away these anomalies and concentrated on an irreducible minimum of
prohibition up to three degrees (reckoned in direct ascending and
descending generation from the common ancestor)--thus sacrificing all
regulation against marriage between first cousins, who are four degrees
removed.
The real opposition to the ecclesiastical attitude was, however, that any
affinity, as distinguished from consanguinity, should be a bar to
marriage. The unhappy deceased wife's sister was merely a convenient
representative. But this is a controversy which is not sufficiently
imminent to engage us in these pages.