“THE GREATEST FAILURE
IN ALL HISTORY”
[Illustration]
BOOKS BY
JOHN SPARGO
“THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY”
RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM
BOLSHEVISM
AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED
HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
ESTABLISHED 1817
“THE GREATEST FAILURE
IN ALL HISTORY”
_A Critical Examination of
The Actual Workings of
Bolshevism In Russia_
BY
JOHN SPARGO
AUTHOR OF
“BOLSHEVISM” “THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM”
“RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM”
“SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED”
[Illustration]
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY
Copyright, 1920, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America
Published August, 1920
G-U
_To The
MISGUIDED, THE MISTAKEN,
AND THE MISINFORMED
Who Have Hailed Bolshevism in Russia as the Advent of
A NEW FREEDOM_
_I Submit a Part of the Indisputable Evidence Upon Which, as a
Socialist, Who Believes in Democracy in Government and Industry--and
in the Generous Individualism Which Communism of Opportunity Alone
Can Give--I Base My Condemnation of Bolshevism as a Mad Attempt, by a
Brutal and Degrading Tyranny, to Carry Out an Impossible Program_
NOTE
My thanks are due to many friends, in this country and in Europe, for
their kindly co-operation, assistance, and advice. I do not name them
all--partly because many of them have requested me not to do so. I
must, however, express my thanks to Mr. Henry L. Slobodin of New York,
for kindly placing his materials at my disposal; Dr. S. Ingerman of
New York, for his valuable assistance; Mr. Jerome Landfield of New
York, for most valuable suggestions; Prof. V. I. Issaiev of London, for
personal courtesies and for the assistance derived from his valuable
collection of data; Dr. Joseph M. Goldstein, author of _Russia,
Her Economic Past and Future_; Mr. Gregor Alexinsky; Mr. Alexander
Kerensky, former Premier of Russia; Madame Catherine Breshkovsky; Dr.
J. O. Gavronsky of London; the editors of _Pour la Russie_, Paris;
Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff, military commander of the Kiev District under
the Provisional Government; Mr. J. Strumillo, of the Russian Social
Democratic Party; Mr. G. Soloveytchik of Queen’s College, Oxford; to
the Institute for Public Service for the diagram used on page 65;
and, finally, my old friend and colleague of twenty-five years ago,
Col. John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., member of the British House of Commons,
founder of the Navvies’ Union, whose courageous struggle against
Bolshevism has won for him the respect and gratitude of all friends of
Russian freedom.
J. S.
CONTENTS
PAGE
NOTE vii
PREFACE xi
I. WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER? 1
II. THE SOVIETS 8
III. THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI 20
IV. THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOVIET STATE 38
V. THE PEASANTS AND THE LAND 67
VI. THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE PEASANTS 90
VII. THE RED TERROR 140
VIII. INDUSTRY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL 192
IX. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--I 240
X. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--II 280
XI. FREEDOM OF PRESS AND ASSEMBLY 309
XII. “THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT” 352
XIII. STATE COMMUNISM AND LABOR CONSCRIPTION 369
XIV. LET THE VERDICT BE RENDERED 410
DOCUMENTS 453
INDEX 473
PREFACE
Like the immortal Topsy, this book may be said to have “just growed.”
In it I have simply assembled in something like an orderly arrangement
a vast amount of carefully investigated evidence concerning the
Bolshevist system and its workings--evidence which, in my judgment,
must compel every honest believer in freedom and democracy to condemn
Bolshevism as a vicious and dangerous form of reaction, subversive
of every form of progress and every agency of civilization and
enlightenment.
I do not discuss theories in this book, except in a very incidental
way. In two earlier volumes my views upon the theories of Bolshevism
have been set forth, clearly and with emphasis. On its theoretical
side, despite the labored pretentiousness of Lenin and his interminable
“Theses,” so suggestive of medieval theology, Bolshevism is the
sorriest medley of antiquated philosophical rubbish and fantastic
speculation to command attention among civilized peoples since
Millerism stirred so many of the American people to a mental process
they mistook for and miscalled thinking.
No one who is capable of honest and straight-forward thinking
upon political and economic questions can read the books of such
Bolshevist writers as Lenin, Trotsky, and Bucharin, and the numerous
proclamations, manifestoes, and decrees issued by the Soviet Government
and the Communist Party, and retain any respect for the Bolsheviki
as thinkers. Neither can any one who is capable of understanding the
essential difference between freedom and despotism read even those
official decrees, programs, and legal codes which they themselves have
caused to be published and doubt that the régime of the Bolsheviki
in Russia is despotic in the extreme. The cretinous-minded admirers
and defenders of Bolshevism, whether they call themselves Liberals,
Radicals, or Socialists--dishonoring thereby words of great and
honorable antecedents--“bawl for freedom in their senseless mood” and,
at the same time, give their hearts’ homage to a monstrous and arrogant
tyranny.
In these pages will be found, I venture to assert, ample and conclusive
evidence to justify to any healthy and rational mind the description of
Bolshevism as “a monstrous and arrogant tyranny.” That is the purpose
of the volume. It is an indictment and arraignment of Bolshevism and
the Bolsheviki at the bar of enlightened public opinion. The evidence
upon which the indictment rests is so largely drawn from official
publications of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party, and
from the authorized writings of the foremost spokesmen of Russian
Bolshevism, that the book might almost be termed a self-revelation
of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki. Such evidence as I have cited from
non-Bolshevist sources is of minor importance, slight in quantity and
merely corroborative of, or supplementary to, the evidence drawn from
the Bolshevist sources already indicated. Much of the evidence has been
published from time to time in numerous articles, state reports, and
pamphlets, both here and in England, but this is the first volume, I
believe, to bring the material together in a systematic arrangement.
Following the publication of my _Bolshevism_ I found myself called
upon to deliver many addresses upon the subject. Some of these were
given before college and university audiences--at Dartmouth, Princeton,
Columbia, Barnard, and elsewhere--while others were given before a
wide variety of public audiences. The circulation of my book and many
magazine and newspaper articles on the subject, together with the
lectures and addresses, had the result of bringing me a veritable
multitude of questions from all parts of the country. The questions
came from men and women of high estate and of low, ranging from
United States Senators to a group of imprisoned Communists awaiting
deportation. Some of the questions were asked in good faith, to elicit
information; others were obviously asked for quite another purpose.
For a long time it seemed that every statement made in the press about
Bolshevism or the Bolsheviki reached me with questions or challenges
concerning it.
To every question which was asked in apparent good faith I did my
best to reply. When--as often happened--the information was not in my
possession, I invoked the assistance of those of my Russian friends
in Europe and this country who have made it their special task to
keep well informed concerning developments in Russia. These friends
not only replied to my specific questions, but sent me from time to
time practically every item of interest concerning developments in
Russia. As a result, I found myself in the possession of an immense
mass of testimony and evidence of varying value. Fully aware of the
unreliability of much of the material thus placed in my hands, for
my own satisfaction I weeded out all stories based upon hearsay, all
stories told by unknown persons, all rumors and indefinite statements,
and, finally, all stories, no matter by whom told, which were not
confirmed by dependable witnesses. This winnowing process left the
following classes of evidence and testimony: (1) Statements by leading
Bolsheviki, contained in their official press or in publications
authorized by them; (2) reports of activities by the Soviet Government
or its officials, published in the official organs of the government;
(3) formal documents--decrees, proclamations, and the like--issued by
the Soviet Government and its responsible officials; (4) statements
made by well-known Russian Socialists and trades-unionists of high
standing upon facts within their own knowledge, where there was
confirmatory evidence; (5) the testimony of well-known Socialists from
other countries, upon matters of which they had personal knowledge and
concerning which there was confirmatory evidence.
Every scrap of evidence adduced in the following pages belongs to one
or other of the five classes above described. Moreover, the reader can
rest assured that every possible care has been taken to guard against
misquotation and against quotation which, while literally accurate,
nevertheless misrepresents the truth. This is often done by unfairly
separating text from context, for example, and in other ways. I believe
that I can assure the reader of the freedom of this book from that
evil; certainly nothing of the sort has been intentionally included.
While I have accepted as correct and authentic certain translations,
such as the translations of Lenin’s _Soviets at Work_ and his _State
and Revolution_, both of which are largely circulated by pro-Bolshevist
propagandists, and such collections of documents as have been published
in this country by the _Nation_--the Soviet Constitution and certain
Decrees--and by _Soviet Russia_, the official organ of the Soviet
Government in this country, I have had almost every other line of
translated quotation examined and verified by some competent and
trustworthy Russian scholar.
The book does not contain all or nearly all the evidence which has come
into my possession in the manner described. I have purposely omitted
much that was merely harrowing and brutal, as well as sensational
incidents which have no direct bearing upon the struggle in Russia, but
properly belong to the category of crimes arising out of the elemental
passions, which are to be found in every country. Crimes and atrocities
by irresponsible individuals I have passed over in silence, confining
myself to those things which reflect the actual purposes, methods, and
results of the régime itself.
I have not tried to make a sensational book, yet now that it is
finished I feel that it is even worse than that. It seems to me to
be a terrible book. The cumulative effect of the evidence of brutal
oppression and savagery, of political trickery and chicane, of
reckless experimentation, of administrative inefficiency, of corrupt
bureaucratism, of outraged idealism and ambitious despotism, seems to
me as terrible as anything I know--more terrible than the descriptions
of czarism which formerly harrowed our feelings. When I remember the
monstrous evils that have been wrought in the name of Socialism, my
soul is torn by an indescribable agony.
Yet more agonizing still is the consciousness that here in the United
States there are men and women of splendid character and apparent
intelligence whose vision has been so warped by hatred of the evils
of the present system, and by a cunning propaganda, that they are
ready to hail this loathsome thing of hatred, this monstrous tyranny,
as an evangel of fraternalism and freedom; ready to bring upon this
nation--where, despite every shortcoming, we are at least two centuries
ahead of Bolshevized Russia, politically, economically, morally--the
curse which during less than thirty months has afflicted unhappy Russia
with greater ills than fifty years of czarism.
They will not succeed. They shall strive in vain to replace the
generous spirit of Lincoln with the brutal spirit of Lenin. For us
there shall be no dictatorship other than that of our own ever-growing
conscience as a nation, seeking freedom and righteousness in our own
way.
We shall defeat and destroy Bolshevism by keeping the light shining
upon it, revealing its ugliness, its brutality, its despotism. We do
not need to adopt the measures which czarism found so unavailing.
Oppression cannot help us in this fight, or offer us any protection
whatsoever. If we would destroy Bolshevism we must destroy the
illusions which surround it. Once its real character is made known,
once men can see it as it is, we shall not need to fear its spread
among our fellow-citizens. Light, abundant light, is the best agent to
fight Bolshevism.
JOHN SPARGO.
“NESTLEDOWN,”
OLD BENNINGTON, VERMONT,
_May, 1920_.
“THE GREATEST FAILURE
IN ALL HISTORY”
“THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY”
I
WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER?
The Bolsheviki are in control of Russia. Never, at any time since
their usurpation of power in November, 1917, have Lenin and Trotsky
and their associates been so free from organized internal opposition
as they are now, after a lapse of more than two and a quarter years.
This is the central fact in the Russian problem. While it is true that
Bolshevist rule is obviously tottering toward its fall, it is equally
true that the anti-Bolshevist forces of Russia have been scattered
like chaff before the wind. While there is plenty of evidence that
the overwhelming mass of the Russian people have been and are opposed
to them, the Bolsheviki rule, nevertheless. This is what many very
thoughtful people who are earnestly seeking to arrive at just and
helpful conclusions concerning Russia find it hard and well-nigh
impossible to understand. Upon every hand one hears the question, “How
is it possible to believe that the Bolsheviki have been able for so
long to maintain and even increase their power against the opposition
of the great mass of the Russian people?”
The complete answer to this question will be developed later, but a
partial and provisional answer may, perhaps, do much to clear the way
for an intelligent and dispassionate study of the manner in which
Bolshevism in Russia has been affected by the acid test of practice.
In the first place, it would be interesting to discuss the naïveté of
the question. Is it a new and unheard-of phenomenon that a despotic
and tyrannical government should increase its strength in spite of
the resentment of the masses? Czarism maintained itself in power for
centuries against the will of the people. If it be objected that only
a minority of the people of Russia actively opposed czarism, and that
the masses as a whole were passive for centuries, no such contention
can be made concerning the period from 1901 to 1906. At that time the
country was aflame with passionate discontent; the people as a whole
were opposed to czarism, yet they lacked the organized physical power
to overthrow it. Czarism ruled by brute force, and the methods which it
developed and used with success have been adopted by the Bolsheviki and
perfected by them.
However, let a veteran Russian revolutionist answer the question:
Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff is an old and honored member of the Party
of Socialists-Revolutionists of Russia and under the old régime
suffered imprisonment and exile on account of his activities in the
revolutionary movement. Under the Provisional Government, while
Kerensky was Premier, he was made Military Commissary of Kiev, at the
request of the local Soviet. General Oberoucheff says:
“Americans often ask the question: ‘How can it be explained that the
Bolsheviki hold power?... Does this not prove that they are supported
by the majority of the people?’ For us Russians the reply to this
question is very simple. The Czars held power for centuries. Is that
proof that their rule was supported by the will of the people? Of
course not. They held power by the rule of blood and iron and did not
rest at all upon the sympathies of the great masses of the people.
The Bolsheviki are retaining their power to-day by the same identical
means.... Russia of the Czars’ time was governed by Blue gendarmes.
Great Russia of to-day is ruled by Red gendarmes. The distinction is
only in color and perhaps somewhat in methods. The methods of the
Red gendarmes are more ruthless and cruel than those of the old Blue
gendarmes.”
The greater part of a year has elapsed since these words were
written by General Oberoucheff. Since that time there have been many
significant changes in Russia, including recently some relaxation of
the brutal oppression. Czarism likewise had its periods of comparative
decency. It still remains true, however, that the rule of the
Bolsheviki rests upon the same basis as that of the old régime. It is,
in fact, only an inverted form of czarism.
As we shall presently see, the precise methods by which monarchism
was so long maintained have been used by the Bolsheviki. The main
support of the old régime was an armed force, consisting of the corps
of gendarmes and special regiments of guards. Under Bolshevism,
corresponding to these, we have the famous Red Guards, certain
divisions of which have been maintained for the express purpose of
dealing with internal disorder and suppressing uprisings. Just as,
under czarism, the guard regiments were specially well paid and
accorded privileges which made them a class apart, so have these Red
Guards of the Bolsheviki enjoyed special privileges, including superior
pay and rations.
Under czarism the _Okhrana_ and the Black Hundreds, together with the
Blue gendarmes, imposed a reign of terror upon the nation. They were
as corrupt as they were cruel. Under the Bolsheviki the Extraordinary
Committees and Revolutionary Tribunals have been just as brutal and
as corrupt as their czaristic predecessors. Under the Bolsheviki the
system of espionage and the use of provocative agents can be fairly
described as a continuance of the methods of the old régime.
Czarism developed an immense bureaucracy; a vast army of petty
officials and functionaries was thus attached to the government. This
bureaucracy was characterized by the graft and corruption indulged in
by its members. They stole from the government and they used their
positions to extort blackmail and graft from the helpless and unhappy
people. In the same manner Bolshevism has developed a new bureaucracy
in Russia, larger than the old, and no less corrupt. As we shall see
later on, the sincere and honest idealists among the Bolsheviki have
loudly protested against this evil. Moreover, the system has become
so burdensome economically that the government itself has become
alarmed. By filling the land with spies and making it almost impossible
for any man to trust his neighbor, by suppressing practically all
non-Bolshevist journals, and by terrorism such as was unknown under the
old régime, the Bolsheviki have maintained themselves in power.
There is a still more important reason why the Bolshevist régime
continues, namely, its own adaptability. Far from being the unbending
and uncompromising devotees of principle they are very generally
regarded as being, the Bolshevist leaders are, above all else,
opportunists. Notwithstanding their adoption of the repressive and
oppressive methods of the old régime, the Bolsheviki could not have
continued in power had they remained steadfast to the economic
theories and principles with which they began. No amount of force
could have continued for so long a system of government based on
economic principles so ruinous. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki
have continued to rule Russia because, without any change of mind or
heart, but under pressure of relentless economic necessity, they have
abandoned their theories. The crude communism which Lenin and his
accomplices set out to impose upon Russia by force has been discarded
and flung upon the scrap-pile of politics. That this is true will be
abundantly demonstrated by the testimony of the Bolsheviki themselves.
No study of the reasons for the success of the Bolsheviki can be
regarded as complete which does not take into account the fact that
Russia has been living upon the stored-up resources of the old order.
When the Bolsheviki seized the reins of government there were in
the country large stores of food, of raw materials, of manufactured
and partially manufactured goods. There were also large numbers of
industrial establishments in working order. With these things alone,
even without any augmentation by new production--except, of course,
agricultural production--the nation could for a considerable time
escape utter destruction. With these resources completely in the hands
of the government, any opposition was necessarily placed at a very
great disadvantage. The principal spokesmen of the Bolsheviki have
themselves recognized this from time to time. On January 3, 1920,
_Pravda_, the official organ of the Communist Party--that is, of the
Bolsheviki--said:
We must not forget that hitherto we have been living on the
stores and machinery, the means of production, which we
inherited from the bourgeoisie. We have been using the old
stores of raw material, half-manufactured and manufactured
goods. But these stores are getting exhausted and the machinery
is wearing out more and more. All our victories in the field
will lead to nothing if we do not add to them victories gained
by the hammer, pick, and lathe.
It must be confessed that the continued rule of the Bolsheviki has,
to a very considerable extent, been due to the political ineptitude
and lack of coherence on the part of their opponents. The truth is
that on more than one occasion the overthrow of the Bolsheviki might
easily have been brought about by the Allies if they had dared do it.
The chancelleries of Europe were, at times, positively afraid that
the Bolshevist Government would be overthrown and that there would be
no sort of government to take its place. In the archives of all the
Allied governments there are filed away confidential reports warning
the governments that if the Bolsheviki should be overthrown Russia
would immediately become a vast welter of anarchy. Many European
diplomats and statesmen, upon the strength of such reports, shrugged
their shoulders and consoled themselves with the thought that, however
bad Bolshevist government might be, it was at least better than no
government at all.
Finally, we must not overlook the fact that the mere existence of
millions of people who, finding it impossible to overthrow the
Bolshevist régime, devote their energies to the task of making it
endurable by bribing officials, conspiring to evade oppressive
regulations, and by outward conformity, tends to keep the national life
going, no matter how bad the government.
II
THE SOVIETS
The first articulate cry of Bolshevism in Russia after the overthrow
of the monarchy was the demand “All power to the Soviets!” which the
Bolshevist leaders raised in the summer of 1917 when the Provisional
Government was bravely struggling to consolidate the democratic
gains of the March Revolution. The Bolsheviki were inspired by that
anti-statism which one finds in the literature of early Marxian
Socialism. It was not the individualistic antagonism to the state of
the anarchist, though easily confounded with and mistaken for it. It
was not motivated by an exaltation of the individual, but that of a
class. The early Marxian Socialists looked upon the modern state, with
its highly centralized authority, as a mere instrument of class rule,
by means of which the capitalist class maintained itself in power and
intensified its exploitation of the wage-earning class. Frederick
Engels, Marx’s great collaborator, described the modern state as being
the managing committee for the capitalist class as a whole.
Naturally, the state being thus identified with capitalist
exploitation, the determination to overthrow the capitalist system
carried with it a like determination to destroy the political state.
Given a victory by the working-class sufficiently comprehensive to
enable it to take possession of the ruling power, the state would
either become obsolete, and die of its own accord, or be forcibly
abolished. This attitude is well and forcibly expressed by Engels in
some well-known passages.
Thus, in his _Socialism, Utopian and Scientific_, Engels says:
The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a
capitalistic machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal
personification of the total national capital. The more it
proceeds to the taking over of productive forces the more does
it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens
does it exploit.... Whilst the capitalist mode of production
... forces on more and more the transformation of the vast
means of production, already socialized, into state property,
it shows itself the way to accomplish this revolution. The
proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of
production into state property.
What Engels meant is made clear in a subsequent paragraph in the same
work. He argues that as long as society was divided into antagonistic
classes the state was a necessity. The ruling class for the time
being required an organized force for the purpose of protecting its
interest and particularly of forcibly keeping the subject class in
order. Under such conditions, the state could only be properly regarded
as the representative of society as a whole in the narrow sense that
the ruling class itself represented society as a whole. Assuming
the extinction of class divisions and antagonisms, the state would
immediately become unnecessary:
The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes
itself the representative of the whole of society--the
taking possession of the means of production in the name of
society--this is, at the same time, its last independent act as
a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one
domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself;
the government of persons is replaced by the administration of
things and by the conduct of processes of production. The state
is not “abolished.” _It dies out._
In another work, _The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the
State_, Engels says:
We are now rapidly approaching a stage of evolution in
production in which the existence of classes has not only
ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive fetter on
production. Hence these classes must fall as inevitably they
once rose. The state must irrevocably fall with them. The
society that is to reorganize production on the basis of a
free and equal association of the producers will transfer the
machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum
of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the
bronze ax.
These passages from the classic literature of Marxian Socialism fairly
and clearly express the character of the anti-statism which inspired
the Bolsheviki at the outset. They wanted to develop a type of social
organization in which there would be practically no “government of
persons,” but only the “administration of things” and the “conduct of
the processes of production.” Modern Socialist thinkers have fairly
generally recognized the muddled character of the thinking upon which
this anti-statism rests. How can there be “administration of things”
without “government of persons”? The only meaning that can possibly
be attached to the “administration of things” by the government is
that human relations established through the medium of things are to
be administered or governed. Certainly the “conduct of the processes
of production” without some regulation of the conduct of the persons
engaged in those processes is unthinkable.
We do not need to discuss the theory farther at this time. It is
enough to recognize that the primitive Marxian doctrine which we have
outlined required that state interference with the individual and with
social relations be reduced to a minimum, if not wholly abolished. It
is a far cry from that conception to the system of conscript labor
recently introduced, and the Code of Labor Laws of Soviet Russia,
which legalizes industrial serfdom and adscription and makes even
the proletarian subject to a more rigid and despotic “government of
persons” than has existed anywhere since the time when feudalism
flourished.
The Bolsheviki believed that they saw in the Soviets of
factory-workers, peasants, and Socialists the beginnings of a form
of social organization which would supplant the state, lacking its
coercive features and better fitted for the administration of the
economic life of the nation. The first Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies
appeared in October, 1905, in Petrograd, at the time of the abortive
revolution. The idea of organizing such a council of workmen’s
representatives originated with the Mensheviki, the faction of the
Social Democratic Party opposed to the Bolsheviki. The sole aim of the
Soviet was to organize the revolutionary forces and sentiment. But,
during the course of its brief existence, it did much in the way of
relieving the distress. The Socialists-Revolutionists joined with the
Mensheviki in the creation of this first Soviet, but the Bolsheviki
were bitterly opposed to it, denouncing it as “the invention of
semi-bourgeois parties to enthrall the proletariat in a non-partizan
swamp.” When the Soviet was well under way, however, and its success
was manifest, the Bolsheviki entered it and became active participants
in its work. With the triumph of czarism, this first Soviet was
crushed, most of its leaders being banished to Siberia.
Even before the formation of the Provisional Government was completed,
in March, 1917, the revolutionary working-class leaders of Petrograd
had organized a Soviet, or council, which they called the Council
of Workmen’s Deputies of Petrograd. Like all the similar Soviets
which sprang up in various parts of the country, this was a very
loose organization and very far from being a democratic body of
representatives. Its members were chosen at casual meetings held in the
factories and workshops and sometimes on the streets. No responsible
organizations arranged or governed the elections. Anybody could
call a mass-meeting, in any manner he pleased, and those who came
selected--usually by show of hands--such “deputies” as they pleased.
If only a score attended and voted in a factory employing hundreds,
the deputies so elected represented that factory in the Soviet. This
description equally applies to practically all the other Soviets which
sprang up in the industrial centers, the rural villages, and in the
army itself. Among the soldiers at the front company Soviets, and even
trench Soviets, were formed. In the cities it was common for groups
of soldiers belonging to the same company, meeting on the streets by
accident, to hold impromptu street meetings and form Soviets. There
was, of course, more order and a better chance to get representative
delegates when the meetings were held in barracks.
Not only were the Soviets far from being responsible democratically
organized representative bodies; quite as significant is the fact that
the deputies selected by the factory-workers were, in many instances,
not workmen at all, but lawyers, university professors, lecturers,
authors and journalists, professional politicians, and so on. Many
of the men who played prominent rôles in the Petrograd Soviet, for
example, as delegates of the factory-workers, were Intellectuals of
the type described. Any well-known revolutionary leader who happened
to be in the public eye at the moment might be selected by a group of
admirers in a factory as their delegate. It was thus that Kerensky, the
brilliant lawyer, found himself a prominent member of the Petrograd
Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies, and that, later on, Trotsky, the
journalist, and Lenin, the scholar, became equally prominent.
It was to such bodies as these that the Bolsheviki wanted to transfer
all the power of the government--political, military, and economic.
The leaders of the Provisional Government, when they found their
task too heavy, urged the Petrograd Soviet to take up the burden,
which it declined to do. That the Soviets were needed in the existing
circumstances, and that, as auxiliaries to the Provisional Government
and the Municipal Council, they were capable of rendering great service
to the democratic cause, can hardly be questioned by any one familiar
with the conditions that prevailed. The Provisional Government, chosen
from the Duma, was not, at first, a democratic body in the full
sense of that word. It did not represent the working-people. It was
essentially representative of the bourgeoisie and it was quite natural,
therefore, that in the Soviets there was developed a very critical
attitude toward the Provisional Government.
Before very long, however, the Provisional Government became more
democratic through the inclusion of a large representation of the
working-class parties, men who were chosen by and directly responsible
to the Petrograd Soviet. This arrangement meant that the Soviet had
definitely entered into co-operation with the Provisional Government;
that in the interest of the success of the Revolution the working-class
joined hands with the bourgeoisie. This was the condition when, in
the summer of 1917, the Bolsheviki raised the cry “All power to the
Soviets!” There was not even the shadow of a pretense that the
Provisional Government was either undemocratic or unrepresentative.
At the same time the new municipal councils were functioning. These
admirable bodies had been elected upon the basis of universal,
equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Arrangements were far advanced
for holding--under the authority of the democratically constituted
municipal councils and Zemstvos--elections for a Constituent Assembly,
upon the same basis of generous democracy: universal, equal, direct,
and secret suffrage, with proportional representation. It will be seen,
therefore, that the work of creating a thoroughly democratic government
for Russia was far advanced and proceeding with great rapidity. Instead
of the power of government being placed in the hands of thoroughly
democratic representative bodies, the Bolsheviki wanted it placed in
the hands of the hastily improvised and loosely organized Soviets.
At first the Bolsheviki had professed great faith in, and solicitude
for, the Constituent Assembly, urging its immediate convocation. In
view of their subsequent conduct, this has been regarded as evidence
of their hypocrisy and dishonesty. It has been assumed that they never
really wanted a Constituent Assembly at all. Of some of the leaders
this is certainly true; of others it is only partially true. Trotsky,
Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others, during the months of June and
July, 1917, opposed the policy of the Provisional Government in making
elaborate preparations for holding the elections to the Constituent
Assembly. They demanded immediate convocation of the Constituent
Assembly, upon the basis of “elections” similar to those of the
Soviets, knowing well that this would give them an irresponsible
mass-meeting, easily swayed and controlled by the demagoguery and
political craft of which they were such perfect masters. Had they
succeeded in their efforts at that time, the Constituent Assembly
would not have been dispersed, in all probability. It would have
been as useful an instrument for their purpose as the Soviets. When
they realized that the Constituent Assembly was to be a responsible
representative body, a deliberative assembly, they began their
agitation to have its place taken by the Soviets. They were perfectly
well aware that these could be much more easily manipulated and
controlled by an aggressive minority than a well-planned, thoroughly
representative assembly could be.
The Bolsheviki wanted to use the Soviets as instruments. In this
simple statement of fact there is implicit a distinction between
Soviet government and Bolshevism, a distinction that is too often
lost sight of. Bolshevism may be defined either as an end to be
attained--communism--or as a policy, a method of attaining the desired
end. Neither the Soviet as an institution nor Soviet government, as
such, had any necessary connection with the particular goal of the
Bolsheviki or their methods. That the Bolsheviki in Russia and in
Hungary have approved Soviet government as the form of government best
adapted to the realization of their program, and found the Soviet a
desirable instrument, must not be regarded as establishing either
the identity of Bolshevism and Soviet government or a necessary
relation between the Soviet and the methods of the Bolsheviki. The same
instrument is capable of being used by the conservative as well as by
the radical.
In this respect the Soviet system of government is like ordinary
parliamentary government. This, also, is an instrument which may be
used by either the reactionary or the revolutionist. The defender of
land monopoly and the Single-taxer can both use it. To reject the
Soviet system simply because it is capable of being used to attain the
ends of Bolshevism, or even because the advocates of Bolshevism find
it better adapted to their purpose than the political systems with
which we are familiar, is extremely foolish. Such a conclusion is as
irrational as that of the superficial idealists who renounce all faith
in organized government and its agencies because they can be used
oppressively, and are in fact sometimes so used.
It is at least possible, and, in the judgment of the present writer,
not at all improbable, that the Soviet system will prove, in Russia
and elsewhere, inclined to conservatism in normal circumstances.
Trades-unions are capable of revolutionary action, but under normal
conditions they incline to a cautious conservatism. The difference
between a trades-union and a factory Soviet is, primarily, that the
former groups the workers of a trade and disregards the fact that they
work in different places, while the latter groups the workers in a
particular factory and disregards the fact that they pursue different
trades or grades of labor. What is there in this difference to warrant
the conclusion that the factory-unit form of organization is more
likely to adopt communist ideals or violent methods than the other form
of organization? Surely the fact that the Bolsheviki have found it
necessary to restrict and modify the Soviet system, even to the extent
of abolishing some of its most important features, disposes of the
mistaken notion that Bolshevism and the Soviet system are inseparable.
It is not without significance that the leading theoretician of
Bolshevism, Lenin, on the basis of pure theory, opposed the Soviets
at first. Nor is the fact that many of the bitterest opponents of
Bolshevism in Russia, among the Socialists-Revolutionists, the
Mensheviki, the Populists, the leaders of the co-operatives and the
trades-unions, are stanch believers in and defenders of the Soviet
system of government, and confidently believe that it will be the
permanent form of Russian government.
For reasons which will be developed in subsequent chapters, the present
writer does not accept this view. The principal objection to the Soviet
system, as such, is not that it is inseparable from Bolshevism, that
it must of necessity be associated with the aims and methods of the
latter, but that--unless greatly modified and limited--it must prove
inefficient to the point of vital danger to society. This does not
mean that organizations similar in structure to the Soviets can have
no place in the government or in industrial management. In some manner
the democratization of industry is to be attained in a not far distant
future. When that time comes it will be found that the ideas which gave
impulse to syndicalism and to Soviet government have found concrete
expression in a form wholly beneficent.
III
THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI
After the _coup d’état_, the Soviets continued to be elected in the
same haphazard manner as before. Even after the adoption, in July,
1918, of the Constitution, which made the Soviets the basis of
the superstructure of governmental power, there was no noticeable
improvement in this respect. Never, at any time, since the Bolsheviki
came into power, have the Soviets attained anything like a truly
representative character. The Constitution of the Russian Socialist
Federal Soviet Republic stamps it as the most undemocratic and
oligarchic of the great modern nations. The city Soviets are composed
of delegates elected by the employees of factories and workshops and
by trades and professional unions, including associations of mothers
and housewives. The Constitution does not prescribe the methods of
election, these being determined by the local Soviets themselves.
In the industrial centers most of the elections take place at open
meetings in the factories, the voting being done by show of hands. In
view of the elaborate system of espionage and the brutal repression
of all hostile criticism, it is easy to understand that such a
system of voting makes possible and easy every form of corruption and
intimidation.
The whole system of government resulting from these methods proved
unrepresentative. A single illustration will make this quite plain:
Within four days of the Czar’s abdication, the workers of Perm, in
the Government of the Urals, organized a Soviet--the Urals Workers’
and Soldiers’ Soviet. At the head of it, as president, was Jandarmov,
a machinist, who had been active in the Revolution of 1905, a Soviet
worker and trades-unionist, many times imprisoned under the old
régime. This Soviet supplemented and co-operated with the Provisional
Government, worked for a democratic Constituent Assembly, and, after
the first few days of excitement had passed, greatly increased
production in the factories. But when the Bolshevist régime was
established, after the adoption of the Constitution, the Government of
the Urals, with its four million inhabitants, did not represent, even
on the basis of the Soviet figures, more than 72,000 workers. That was
the number of workers supposedly represented by the delegates of the
Soviet Government. As a matter of fact, in that number was included
the anti-Bolshevist strength, the workers who had been outvoted or
intimidated, as the case might be. When the peasants elected delegates
they were refused seats, because they were known to be, or believed
to be, anti-Bolshevists. This is the much-vaunted system of Soviet
“elections” concerning which so many of our self-styled Liberals have
been lyrically eloquent.
Of course, even under the conditions described, anti-Bolshevists were
frequently elected to the Soviets. It was a very general practice, in
the early days of the Bolshevist régime, to quite arbitrarily “cleanse”
the Soviets of these “undesirable counter-revolutionaries,” most of
whom were Socialists. In December, 1917, the Soviets in Ufa, Saratov,
Samara, Kazan, and Jaroslav were compelled, under severe penalties, _to
dismiss their non-Bolshevist members_; in January, 1918, the same thing
took place at Perm and at Ekaterinburg; and in February, 1918, the
Soviets of Moscow and Petrograd were similarly “cleansed.”
It was a very ordinary occurrence for Soviets to be suppressed because
their “state of mind” was not pleasing to the Bolsheviki in control of
the central authority. In a word, when a local Soviet election resulted
in a majority of Socialists-Revolutionists or other non-Bolshevist
representatives being chosen, the Council of the People’s Commissaries
dissolved the Soviet and ordered the election of a new one. Frequently
they used troops--generally Lettish or Chinese--to enforce their
orders. Numerous examples of this form of despotism might be cited
from the Bolshevist official press. For example, in April, 1918, the
elections to the Soviet of Jaroslav, a large industrial city north of
Moscow, resulted in a large majority of anti-Bolshevist representatives
being elected. The Council of the People’s Commissaries sent Lettish
troops to dissolve the Soviet and hold a new “election.” This so
enraged the people that they gave a still larger majority for the
anti-Bolshevist parties. Then the Council of the People’s Commissaries
issued a decree stating that as the working-class of Jaroslav had twice
proved their unfitness for self-government they would not be permitted
to have a Soviet at all! The town was proclaimed to be “a nest of
counter-revolutionaries.” Again and again the workers of Jaroslav tried
to set up local self-government, and each time they were crushed by
brutal and bloody violence.[1]
[1] The salient facts in this paragraph are condensed from _L’Ouvrier
Russe_, May, 1918. See also Bullard, _The Russian Pendulum--Autocracy,
Democracy, Bolshevism_, p. 92, for an account of the same events.
L. I. Goldman, member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party, made a report to that body concerning one of
these Jaroslav uprisings in which he wrote:
The population of that city consists mainly of workmen. Having
the assistance of a military organization under the leadership
of General Alexiev and General Savinkov, the laborers of all
the plants and factories took part in the uprising. Before the
uprising began the leaders declared that they would not allow
it unless they had the sympathy of the laborers and other
classes. Trotsky sent a message stating that if the revolt
could not be quelled he would go as far as having the city of
Jaroslav with its 40,000 inhabitants completely destroyed....
Though surrounded by 17,000 Red Guards, Jaroslav resisted, but
was finally captured by the Bolsheviki, due to the superiority
of their artillery. The uprising was suppressed by bloody and
terrible means. The spirit of destruction swayed over Jaroslav,
which is one of the oldest Russian cities.
Bearing in mind that the sole aim of the people of Jaroslav--led by
Socialist workmen--was to establish their own local self-government,
the inviolability of the Soviet elections, let us examine a few of
the many reports concerning the struggle published in the official
Bolshevist organs. Under the caption “Official Bulletin,” _Izvestia_
published, on July 21, 1918, this item:
At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our
troops, has tried to enter into negotiations. _The reply has
been given under the form of redoubled artillery fire._
Four days later, on July 25th, _Izvestia_ published a military
proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav, from which the
following passage is taken:
The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that
all those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in
the course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America
Bridge. Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and
no quarter will be given to any one_. Heavy artillery fire and
gas-bombs will be used against them. _All those who remain will
perish in the ruins of the town with the insurrectionists,
the traitors, and the enemies of the Workers’ and Peasants’
Revolution._
On the day following, July 26th, _Izvestia_ published an article
to the effect that “after minute questionings and full inquiry” a
special commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the Jaroslav
insurrection had listed three hundred and fifty persons as having
“taken an active part in the insurrection and had relations with the
Czechoslovaks,” and that the commissioners had ordered the whole three
hundred and fifty to be shot.
Throughout the summer the struggle went on, and in the _Severnaya
Communa_, September 10, 1918, the following despatch from Jaroslav was
published:
JAROSLAV, _9th September_.--In the whole of the Jaroslav
government a strict registration of the bourgeoisie and its
partizans has been organized. Manifestly anti-Soviet elements
are being shot; suspected persons are interned in concentration
camps; non-working sections of the population are subjected to
forced labor.
Here is further evidence, from official Bolshevist sources, that when
the Soviet elections went against them the Bolshevist Government
simply dissolved the offending Soviets. Here are two despatches from
_Izvestia_, from the issues of July 28 and August 3, 1918, respectively:
KAZAN, _July 26th_.--_As the important offices in the Soviet
were occupied by Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left, the
Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet.
The governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary
Committee._
KAZAN, _August 1st_.--The state of mind of the workmen is
revolutionary. _If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their
propaganda death menaces them._
By way of confirmation we have the following, from _Pravda_, August 6,
1918:
KAZAN, _August 4th_.--The Provisional Congress of the Soviets
of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence from
it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is obviously
counter-revolutionary_.
Whenever a city Soviet was thus suppressed a military revolutionary
committee, designated by the Bolsheviki, was set up in its place.
To these committees the most arbitrary powers were given. Generally
composed of young soldiers from distant parts, over whom there was
practically no restraint, these committees frequently indulged in
frightful acts of violence and spoliation. Not infrequently the
Central Government, after disbanding a local Soviet, would send from
places hundreds of miles away, under military protection, members of
the Communist Party, who were designated as the executive committee
of the Soviet for that locality. There was not even a pretense that
they had been elected by anybody. Thus it was in Tumen: Protected by
a convoy of eight hundred Red Guards, who remained there to enforce
their authority, a group of members of the Communist Party arrived from
Ekaterinburg and announced that they were the executive committee of
the Soviet of Tumen where, in fact, no Soviet existed. This was not at
all an unusual occurrence.
The suppression by force of those Soviets which were not absolutely
subservient to the Central Bolshevik Government went on as long as
there were any such Soviets. This was especially true in the rural
villages among the peasantry. The following statement is by an English
trades-unionist, H. V. Keeling, a member of the Lithographic Artists’
and Engravers’ Society (an English trades-union), who worked in Russia
for five years--1914-19:
In the villages conditions were often quite good, due to the
forming of a local Soviet by the inhabitants who were not
Bolshevik. The villagers elected the men whom they knew, and as
long as they were left alone things proceeded much as usual.
Soon, however, a whisper would reach the district Commissar
that the Soviet was not politically straight; he would then
come with some Red soldiers and dissolve the committee and
order another election, often importing Bolshevik supporters
from the towns, and these men the villagers were instructed
to elect as their committee. Resistance was often made and an
army of Red Guards sent to break it down. Pitched battles often
took place, and _in one case of which I can speak from personal
knowledge twenty-one of the inhabitants were shot, including
the local telegraph-girl operator who had refused to telegraph
for reinforcements_.
The practice of sending young soldiers into the villages which
were not Bolshevik was very general; care was taken to send men
who did not come from the district, so that any scruples might
be overcome. Even then it would happen that after the soldiers
had got food they would make friends with the people, and so
compel the Commissar to send for another set of Red Guards.[2]
[2] _Bolshevism_, by H. V. Keeling, pp. 185-186.
In the chapter dealing with the relation of the Bolsheviki to the
peasants and the land question abundant corroboration of Mr. Keeling’s
testimony is given. The Bolsheviki have, however, found an easier way
to insure absolute control of the Soviets: as a general rule they do
not depend upon these crude methods of violence. Instead, they have
adopted the delightfully simple method of permitting no persons to
be placed in nomination whose names are not approved by them. As a
first step the anti-Bolshevist parties, such as the Menshevist Social
Democrats, Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right and Center, and the
Constitutional Democrats, were excluded by the issuance of a decree
that “the right to nominate candidates belongs exclusively to the
parties of electors which file the declaration that they acknowledge
the Soviet authorities.”
The following resolution was adopted by the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee on June 14, 1918:
The representatives of the Social Revolutionary Party (the
Right wing and the Center) _are excluded_, and at the same time
all Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’, and Cossacks’
Deputies are recommended to expel from their midst all
representatives of this faction.
This resolution, which was duly carried into effect, was strictly in
accordance with the clause in the Constitution of the Soviet Republic
which provides that “guided by the interests of the working-class as
a whole, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic deprives all
individuals and groups of rights which could be utilized by them to the
detriment of the Socialist Revolution.” Thus entire political parties
have been excluded from the Soviets by the party in power. It is a
noteworthy fact that many of those persons in this country, Socialists
and others, who have been most vigorous in denouncing the expulsion
from the New York Legislature of the elected representatives of the
Socialist Party are, at the same time, vigorous supporters of the
Bolsheviki. Comment upon the lack of moral and intellectual integrity
thus manifested is unnecessary.
Let us consider the testimony of three other witnesses of
unquestionable competence: J. E. Oupovalov, chairman of the Votkinsk
Metal Workers’ Union, is a Social Democrat, a working-man. He was a
member of the local Soviet of Nizhni-Novgorod. Three times under Czar
Nicholas II this militant Socialist and trades-unionist was imprisoned
for his activities on behalf of his class. Here, then, is a witness
who is at once a Russian, a Socialist, a trades-unionist, and a
wage-worker, and he writes of matters of which he has intimate personal
knowledge. He does not indulge in generalities, but is precise and
specific in his references to events, places, and dates:
In February, 1919, after the conclusion of the shameful
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviet of Workmen’s Delegates met
in Nizhni-Novgorod for the purpose of electing delegates
to the All-Russian Congress, which would be called upon to
decide the question of peace. The Bolsheviks and the Left
Social-Revolutionaries obtained a chance majority of two
votes in the Soviet. _Taking advantage of this, they deprived
the Social Democrats and Right Social-Revolutionaries of the
right to take part in the election of delegates._ The expelled
members of the Soviet assembled at a separate meeting and
decided to elect independently a proportionate number of
delegates. _But the Bolsheviks immediately sent a band of armed
Letts and we were dispersed._
In March, 1918, the Sormovo workmen demanded the re-election
of the Soviet. After a severe struggle the re-elections took
place, the Mensheviks and the Social-Revolutionaries obtaining
a majority. But the former Bolshevist Soviet _refused to hand
over the management to the newly elected body, and the latter
was dispersed by armed Red Guards on April 8th_. Similar events
took place in Nizhni-Novgorod, Kovrov, Izhevsk, Koloma, and
other places. Who, therefore, would venture to assert that
power in Russia belongs to the Soviets?
Equally pertinent and impressive is the testimony of J. Strumillo, also
a Social Democrat and trades-unionist. This militant working-man is a
member of the Social Democratic Party, to which both Lenin and Trotsky
formerly belonged. He is also a wage-worker, an electric fitter. He is
an official of the Metal Workers’ Union and a member of the Hospital
Funds Board for the town of Perm. He says:
... the Labor masses began to draw away from Bolshevism. This
became particularly evident after the Brest-Litovsk Peace,
which exposed the treacherous way in which the Bolsheviks
had handed over the Russian people to the German Junkers.
Everywhere re-elections began to take place for the Soviets
of Workmen’s Delegates and for the trades-unions. On seeing
that the workmen were withdrawing from them, the Bolsheviks
started by forbidding the re-elections to be held, and finally
_declared that the Bolsheviks alone had the right to elect
and be elected. Thus an enormous number of workmen were
disfranchised...._ The year 1918 saw the complete suppression
of the Labor movement and of the Social Democratic Party.
_All over Russia an order was issued from Moscow to exclude
representatives of the Social Democratic Party from the
Soviets, and the party itself was declared illegal._
V. M. Zenzinov, a member of the Central Committee of the Party of
Socialists-Revolutionists, came to this country in February, 1919, and
spent several weeks, during which time the present writer made his
acquaintance. Zenzinov was many times arrested under czarism for his
revolutionary activities, and more than once sent into Siberian exile.
He was a member of the Constituent Assembly, and later, in September,
1918, at the Ufa Conference, was elected member of the Directory. It
will be remembered that the Directory was forcibly overthrown and the
Kolchak Government set up in its place. Zenzinov is an anti-Bolshevik,
but his testimony is not to be set aside on that account. He says: “The
Soviet Government is not even a true Soviet régime, for the Bolsheviki
have expelled the representatives of all the other political parties
from the Soviets, either by force or by other similar means. The Soviet
Government is a government of the Bolshevist Party, pure and simple; it
is a party dictatorship--not even a dictatorship of the proletariat.”
The apologists for the Bolsheviki in this country have frequently
denied the charge that the Soviets were thus packed and that
anti-Bolshevist parties were not given equal rights to secure
representation in them. Of the facts there can be no question, but
it is interesting to find such a well-known pro-Bolshevist writer
as Mr. Arthur Ransome stating, in the London _Daily News_, January
11, 1919, that “the Mensheviki now stand definitely on the Soviet
platform” and that “a decree has accordingly been passed _readmitting_
them to the Soviets.” Does not the statement that a decree had been
passed “readmitting” this Socialist faction to the Soviets constitute
an admission that until the passing of the decree mentioned that
faction, at least, had been denied representation in the Soviets? Yet
this same Mr. Ransome, in view of this fact, which was well known to
most students of Russian conditions, and of which he can hardly have
been ignorant, addressed his eloquent plea to the people of America
on behalf of the Soviet Government as the true representative of the
Russian people!
Even the trades-unions are not wholly assured of the right of
representation in the Soviets. Only “if their declared relations to the
Soviet Government are approved by the Soviet authorities” can they vote
or nominate candidates. Trades-unions may solemnly declare that they
“acknowledge the Soviet authorities,” but if their immediate relations
with the People’s Commissaries are not good--if they are engaged in
strikes, for example--there is little chance of their getting the
approval of the Soviet authorities, without which they cannot vote.
Finally, no union, party, faction, or group can nominate whomever it
pleases; all candidates must be acceptable to, and approved by, the
central authority!
Numerous witnesses have testified that the Soviets under Bolshevism are
“packed”; that they are not freely elected bodies, in many cases. Thus
H. V. Keeling writes:
The elections for the various posts in our union and local
Soviet were an absolute farce. I had a vote and naturally
consulted with friends whom to vote for. They laughed at me and
said it was all arranged, “we have been told who to vote for.”
I knew some of these “nominated” men quite well, and will go no
farther than saying that they were not the best workmen. It is
a simple truth that no one except he be a Bolshevik was allowed
to be elected for any post.[3]
[3] Keeling, _op. cit._, p. 159.
In _A Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in
Russia_, published by the State Department of the United States,
January, 1920, the following statement by an unnamed Russian appears in
a report dated July 2, 1919:
Discontent and hatred against the Bolsheviks are now so strong
that a shock or the knowledge of approaching help would
suffice to make the people rise and annihilate the Communists.
Considering this discontent and hatred, it would seem that
elections to different councils should produce candidates of
other parties. Nevertheless all councils consist of Communists.
The explanation is very plain. That freedom of election of
which the Bolsheviks write and talk so much consists in the
free election of certain persons, a list of which had already
been prepared. For instance, if in one district six delegates
have to be elected, seven to eight names are mentioned, of
which six can be chosen. Very characteristic in this respect
were the elections February last in the district of ----,
Moscow Province, where I have one of my estates. Nearly all
voters, about 200, of which twelve Communists, came to the
district town. Seven delegates had to be elected and only seven
names were on the prepared list, naturally all Communists.
The local Soviet invited the twelve communistic voters to a
house, treated them with food, tea, and sugar, and gave each
ten rubles per day; the others received nothing, not even
housing. But they, knowing what they had to expect from former
experiences, had provided for such an emergency and decided
to remain to the end. The day of election was fixed and put
off from day to day. After four postponements the Soviet saw
no way out. The result was that the seven delegates elected
by all against twelve votes belonged to the Octobrists and
Constitutional-Democrats. But these seven and a number of the
wealthier voters were immediately arrested as agitators against
the Soviet Republic. New elections were announced three days
later, but this time the place was surrounded by machine-guns.
The next day official papers announced the unanimous election
of Communists in the district of Verea. After a short time
peasant revolts started. To put down these, Chinese and Letts
were sent and about 300 peasants were killed. Then began
arrests, but it is not known how many were executed.
Finally, there is the testimony of the workman, Menshekov, member
of the Social Democratic Party, who was himself given an important
position in one of the largest factories of Russia, the Ijevsky
factory, in the Urals, when the Bolsheviki assumed control. This simple
workman was not, and is not, a “reactionary monarchist,” but a Social
Democrat. He belonged to the same party as Lenin and Trotsky until the
withdrawal of these men and their followers and the creation of the
Communist Party. Menshekov says:
One of the principles which the Bolsheviki proposed is rule by
the Workers’ Councils. In June, 1918, we were told to elect
one of 135 delegates. We did, and only fifty pro-Bolsheviki
got in. _The Bolshevist Government was dissatisfied with
this result and ordered a second election._ This time only
twenty pro-Bolsheviki were elected. Now, I happen to have been
elected a member of this Workers’ Council, from which I was
further elected to sit on the Executive Council. According
to the Bolsheviki’s own principle, the Executive Council has
to do the whole administration. Everything is under it. But
the Bolshevist Government withheld this right from us. For
two weeks we sat and did nothing; then the Bolsheviki solved
the problem for themselves. They arrested some of us--I was
arrested myself--and, instead of an elected Council, _the Red
Government appointed a Council of selected Communists_, and
formed there, as everywhere, a special privileged class.[4]
[4] Menshekov’s account is from a personal communication to the present
writer, who has carefully verified the statements made in it.
All such charges have been scouted by the defenders of the Bolsheviki
in this country and in England. On March 22, 1919, the _Dyelo Naroda_,
organ of the Socialists-Revolutionists, reproduced the following
official document, which fully sustains the accusation that the
ordering of the “election” of certain persons to important offices is
not “an invention of the capitalist press”:
Order of the Department of Information and Instruction of the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’
Delegates of the Melenkovski District:
No. 994. Town of Melenki (Prov. of Vladimir)
Feb. 25, 1919
To the Voinovo Agricultural Council:
The Provincial Department instructs you, on the basis of the
Constitution of the Soviet (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
Republic). Section 43, Sub-section 6, letter _a_, to proceed
without fail with elections for an Agricultural Executive
Committee.
The following _must be elected_ to the committee: As president,
Nikita Riabov; as member, Ivan Soloviev; and as secretary,
Alexander Krainov. These people, as may be gathered from
the posts to which they are named, _must be elected without
fail_. The non-fulfilment of this Order will result in those
responsible being severely punished. Acknowledge the carrying
out of these instructions to Provincial Headquarters by express.
_Head of Provincial Section._
[Signed] J. NAZAROV.
Surely there never was a greater travesty of representative government
than this--not even under czarism! This is worse than anything that
obtained in the old “rotten boroughs” of England before the great
Reform Act. Yet our “Liberals” and “Radicals” hail this vicious
reactionary despotism with gladness.
If it be thought that the judgment of the present writer is too
harsh, he is quite content to rest upon the judgment pronounced by
such a sympathizer as Mr. Isaac Don Levine has shown himself to be.
In the New York _Globe_, January 5, 1920, Mr. Levine said: “To-day
Soviet Russia is a dictatorship, not of the proletariat, but for
the proletariat. It certainly is not democracy.” And again: “_The
dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia is really a dictatorship of
the Bolshevist or Communist Party._ This is the great change wrought
in Soviet Russia since 1918. _The Soviets ceased functioning as
parliamentary bodies._ Soviet elections, which were frequent in 1918,
are very rare now. In Russia, where things are moving so fast and
opinions are changing so rapidly, the majority of the present Soviets
are obsolete and do not represent the present view of the masses.”
If the government is really a dictatorship of the Communist
Party--which does not include in its membership 1 per cent. of
the people of Russia--if the Soviets have ceased functioning as
parliamentary bodies, if the majority of the Soviets are obsolete and
do not represent the present view of the masses, the condemnation
expressed in this chapter is completely justified.
IV
THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOVIET STATE
Mr. Lincoln Steffens is a most amiable idealist who possesses an
extraordinary genius for idealizing commonplace and even sordid
realities. He can always readily idealize a perfectly rotten egg into a
perfectly good omelet. It is surely significant that, in spite of his
very apparent efforts to justify and even glorify the Soviet Government
and the men who have imposed it upon Russia, even Mr. Steffens has to
admit its autocratic character. He says:
The soviet form of government, which sprang up so spontaneously
all over Russia, is established.
This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, it
has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not even
uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, and in
its final development it is not democratic. The present Russian
Government is the most autocratic government I have ever seen.
_Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is farther removed from
the people than the Czar was, or than any actual ruler in
Europe is._
The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These little
informal soviets elect a local soviet; which elects delegates
to the city or country (community) soviet; which elects
delegates to the government (State) soviet. The government
soviets together elect delegates to the All-Russian Soviet,
which elects commissionnaires (who correspond to our Cabinet,
or to a European minority). And these commissionnaires finally
elect Lenin. He is thus five or six removes from the people. To
form an idea of his stability, independence, and power, think
of the process that would have to be gone through with by the
people to remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all
the soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel
or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and
represent the altered will of the people.[5]
[5] Report of Lincoln Steffens, laid before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate, September, 1919. Published in
_The Bullitt Mission to Russia_, pp. 111-112. Italics mine.
This is a very moderate estimate of the government which Lenin and
Trotsky and their associates have imposed upon Russia by the old
agencies--blood and iron. Mr. Steffens is not quite accurate in his
statement that the Soviet form of government “has not yet been written
into the forms of law.” The report from which the above passage is
quoted bears the date of April 2, 1919; at that time there was in
existence, and widely known even outside of Russia, the Constitution
of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, which purports to
be “the Soviet form of government ... written into the forms of law.”
Either it is that or it is a mass of meaningless verbiage. There
existed, too, at that time, a very plethora of laws which purported to
be the written forms of Soviet government, and as such were published
by the Bolshevist Government of Russia. The Fundamental Law of
Socialization of the Land, which went into effect in September, 1918;
the law decreeing the Abolition of Classes and Ranks, dated November
10, 1917; the law creating Regional and Local Boards of National
Economy, dated December 23, 1917; the law creating The People’s Court,
November 24, 1917; the Marriage and Divorce Laws, December 18, 1917;
the Eight Hour Law, October 29, 1917, and the Insurance Law, November
29, 1917, are a few of the bewildering array of laws and decrees which
seem to indicate that the Soviet form of government has “been written
into the forms of law.”
It is in no hypercritical spirit that attention is called to this
rather remarkable error in the report of Mr. Steffens. It is because
the Soviet form of government has “been written into the forms of law”
with so much thoroughness and detail that we are enabled to examine
Bolshevism at its best, as its protagonists have conceived it, and
not merely as it appears in practice, in its experimental stage,
with all its mistakes, abuses, and failures. After all, a written
constitution is a formulation of certain ideals to be attained and
certain principles to be applied as well as very imperfect human beings
can do it. Given a worthy ideal, it would be possible to make generous
allowance for the deficiencies of practice; to believe that these would
be progressively overcome and more or less constant and steady progress
made in the direction of the ideal. On the other hand, when the ideal
itself is inferior to the practice, when by reason of the good sense
and sound morality of the people the actual political life proves
superior to the written constitution and laws, it is not difficult to
appreciate the fact. In such circumstances we are not compelled to
discredit the right practice in order to condemn the wrong theory.
It is true that as a general rule mankind sets its ideals beyond its
immediate reach; but it is also true that men sometimes surpass their
ideals. Most men’s creeds are superior to their deeds, but there are
many men whose deeds are vastly better than their creeds.
Similarly, while the political life of nations generally falls below
the standards set in their formal constitutions and laws, exceptions
to this rule are by no means rare. Constitutions are generally framed
by political theorists and idealists whose inveterate habit it is to
overrate the mental and moral capacity of the great majority of human
beings and to underrate the force of selfishness, ignorance, and other
defects of imperfect humanity. On the other hand, constitutions have
sometimes been framed by selfish and ignorant despots, inferior in
character and intelligence to the majority of the human beings to be
governed by the constitutions so devised. Under the former conditions
political realities fail to attain the high levels of the ideals; under
the latter conditions they rise above them. Finally, people outgrow
constitutions as they outgrow most other political devices and social
arrangements. In old civilizations it is common to find political life
upon a higher level than the formal constitutions, which, unrepealed
and unamended, have in fact become obsolete, ignored by the people of a
wiser and more generous age.
The writer of these pages fully believes that the political reality
in Russia is already better than the ignoble ideal set by the
Bolshevist constitution. The fundamental virtues of the Russian
people, their innate tolerance, their democracy, and their shrewd
sense have mitigated, and tend to increasingly mitigate, the rigors
of the new autocracy. Once more it is demonstrated that “man is more
than constitutions”; that adequate resources of human character
can make a tolerable degree of comfort possible under any sort of
constitution, just as lack of those resources can make life intolerable
under the best constitution ever devised. Men have attained a high
degree of civilization and comfort in spite of despotically conceived
constitutions, and, on the other hand, the evils of Tammany Hall under
a Tweed developed in spite of a constitution conceived in a spirit more
generous than any modern nation had hitherto known. Great spiritual and
moral forces, whose roots are deeply embedded in the soil of historical
development, are shaping Russia’s life. Already there is discernible
much that is better than anything in the constitution imposed upon her.
A more or less vague perception of this fact has led to much muddled
thinking; because the character of the Russian people and the political
and economic conditions prevailing have led to a general disregard of
much of Bolshevist theory, because men and women in Russia are finding
it possible to set aside certain elements of Bolshevism, and thereby
attain increasingly tolerable conditions of life, we are asked to
believe that Bolshevism is less evil than we feared it to be. To call
this “muddled thinking” is to put a strain upon charity of judgment.
The facts are not capable of such interpretation by minds disciplined
by the processes of straight and clear thinking. What they prove is
that, fortunately for mankind, the wholesomeness of the thought and
character of the average Russian has proved too strong to be overcome
by the false ideas and ideals of the Bolsheviki and their contrivances.
The Russian people live, not because they have found good in
Bolshevism, but because they have found means to circumvent Bolshevism
and set it aside. What progress is being made in Russia to-day is
not the result of Bolshevism, but of the growing power of those very
qualities of mind and heart which Bolshevism sought to destroy.
Bolshevism is autocratic and despotic in its essence. Whoever
believes--as the present writer does--that the only rational and
coherent hope for the progress of civilization lies in the growth of
democracy must reject Bolshevism and all its works and ways. It is well
to remember that whatever there is of freedom and good will in Russia,
of democratic growth, exists in fundamental defiance and antagonism to
Bolshevism and would be crushed if the triumph of the latter became
complete. It is still necessary, therefore, to judge Bolshevism by its
ideal and the logical implications of its ideal; not by what results
where it is made powerless by moral or economic forces which it cannot
overcome, but by what it aims at doing and will do if possible. It is
for this reason that we must subject the constitution of Bolshevist
Russia to careful analysis and scrutiny. In this document the
intellectual leaders of Bolshevism have set forth in the precise terms
of organic law the manner in which they would reconstruct the state.
In considering the political constitution of any nation the believer in
democratic government seeks first of all to know the extent and nature
of the franchise of its citizens, how it is obtained, what power it
has, and how it is exercised. The almost uniform experience of those
nations which have developed free and responsible self-government has
led to the conclusion that the ultimate sovereignty of the citizens
must be absolute; that suffrage must be equal, universal, direct, and
free; that it must be exercised under conditions which do not permit
intimidation, coercion, or fraud, and that, finally, the mandate of
the citizens so expressed must be imperative. The validity of these
conclusions may not be absolute; it is at least conceivable that
they may be revised. For that matter, a reversion to aristocracy is
conceivable, highly improbable though it may be. With these uniform
results of the experience of many nations as our criteria, let us
examine the fundamental suffrage provisions of the Constitution of the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the provisions relating
to elections. These are all set forth in Article IV, Chapters XIII to
XV, inclusive:
ARTICLE IV
Chapter XIII
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is
enjoyed by the following citizens of both sexes, irrespective
of religion, nationality, domicile, etc., of the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, who shall have completed
their eighteenth year by the day of election:
(_a_) All who have acquired the means of livelihood through
labor that is productive and useful to society, and also
persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to do
productive work, _i.e._, laborers and employees of all classes
who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc., and
peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who employ no help
for the purpose of making profits.
(_b_) Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets.
(_c_) Citizens of the two preceding categories who have in any
degree lost their capacity to work.
_Note 1_: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central
power, lower the age standard mentioned herein.
_Note 2_: Non-citizens mentioned in Section 20 (Article II.
Chapter V) have the right to vote.
65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor
the right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of
the categories enumerated above, namely:
(_a_) Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it
an increase in profits.
(_b_) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such
as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc.
(_c_) Private merchants, trade and commercial brokers.
(_d_) Monks and clergy of all denominations.
(_e_) Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme
corps, and the _Okhrana_ (Czar’s secret service), also members
of the former reigning dynasty.
(_f_) Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or
mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship.
(_g_) Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their
rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable
offenses, for the period fixed by the sentence.
Chapter XIV
ELECTIONS
66. Elections are conducted according to custom on days fixed
by the local Soviets.
67. Election takes place in the presence of an election
committee and the representative of the local Soviet.
68. In case the representative of the Soviet cannot for valid
causes be present, the chairman of the election meeting
replaces him.
69. Minutes of the proceedings and results of elections are to
be compiled and signed by the members of the election committee
and the representative of the Soviet.
70. Detailed instructions regarding the election proceedings
and the participation in them of professional and other
workers’ organizations are to be issued by the local Soviets,
according to the instructions of the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee.
Chapter XV
THE CHECKING AND CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS AND RECALL OF THE DEPUTIES
71. The respective Soviets receive all the records of the
proceedings of the election.
72. The Soviet appoints a commission to verify the election.
73. This commission reports the results to the Soviet.
74. The Soviet decides the question when there is doubt as to
which candidate is elected.
75. The Soviet announces a new election if the election of one
candidate or another cannot be determined.
76. If an election was irregularly carried on in its entirety,
it may be declared void by a higher Soviet authority.
77. The highest authority in relation to questions of elections
is the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
78. Voters who have sent a deputy to the Soviet have the right
to recall him, and to have a new election, according to general
provisions.
It is quite clear that the suffrage here provided for is not universal;
that certain classes of people commonly found in modern civilized
nations in considerable numbers are not entitled to vote. There may
be some doubt as to the precise meaning of some of the paragraphs in
Chapter XIII, but it is certain that, if the language used is to be
subject to no esoteric interpretation, the following social groups
are excluded from the right to vote: (_a_) all persons who employ
hired labor for profit, including farmers with a single hired helper;
(_b_) all persons who draw incomes from interest, rent, or profit;
(_c_) all persons engaged in private trade, even to the smallest
shopkeeper; (_d_) all ministers of religion of every kind; (_e_) all
persons engaged in work which is not defined by the proper authorities
as “productive and useful to society”; (_f_) members of the old royal
family and those formerly employed in the old police service.
It is obvious that a very large part of the present voting population
of this country would be disfranchised if we should adopt these
restrictions or anything like them. It may be fairly argued in reply,
however, that the disfranchisement would be--and now is, in Russia--a
temporary condition only; that the object of the discriminations, and
of other political and economic arrangements complementary to them,
is to force people out of such categories as are banned and penalized
with disfranchisement--and that this is being done in Russia. In other
words, people are to be forced to cease hiring labor for profit,
engaging in private trade, being ministers of religion, living on
incomes derived from interest, rent, or profits. They are to be forced
into service that is “productive and useful to society,” and when that
is accomplished they will become qualified to vote. Thus practically
universal suffrage is possible, in theory at any rate.
So much may be argued with fair show of reason. We may dispute the
assumption that there is anything to be gained by disfranchising
a man because he engages in trade, and thereby possibly confers a
benefit upon those whom he serves. We may doubt or deny that there is
likely to accrue any advantage to society from the disfranchisement
of all ministers of religion. We may believe that to suppress some of
the categories which are discriminated against would be a disaster,
subversive of the life of society even. When all this has been admitted
it remains the fact that it is possible to conceive of a society
in which there are no employers, traders, recipients of capitalist
incomes, or ministers of religion; it is possible to conceive of such
a society in which, even under this constitution, only a very small
fraction of the adult population would be disfranchised. Of course,
it is so highly improbable that it borders on the fantastic; but it
is, nevertheless, within the bounds of conceivability that practically
universal suffrage might be realized within the limits of this
instrument.
Let us examine, briefly, the conditions under which the franchise is
to be exercised: we do not find any provision for that secrecy of
the ballot which experience and ordinary good sense indicate as the
only practicable method of eliminating coercion, intimidation, and
vote-trafficking. Nor do we find anything like a uniform method of
voting. The holding of elections “conducted according to custom on
days fixed by the local Soviets”--themselves elective bodies--makes
possible an amount of political manipulation and intrigue which almost
staggers the imagination. Not until human beings attain a far greater
degree of perfection than has ever yet been attained, so far as there
is any record, will it be safe or prudent to endow any set of men with
so much arbitrary power over the manner in which their fellows may
exercise the electoral franchise.
There is one paragraph in the above-quoted portions of the Constitution
of Soviet Russia which alone opens the way to a despotism which is
practically unlimited. Paragraph 70 of Chapter XIV provides that:
“Detailed instructions regarding the election proceedings _and the
participation in them of professional and other workers’ organizations_
are to be issued by the local Soviets, _according to the instructions
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee_.” Within the scope of
this general statement every essential principle of representative
government can be lawfully abrogated. Elsewhere it has been shown
that trades-unions have been denied the right to nominate or vote for
candidates unless “their declared relations to the Soviet Government
are approved by the Soviet authorities”; that parties are permitted to
nominate only such candidates as are acceptable to, and approved by,
the central authority; that specific orders to elect certain favored
candidates have actually been issued by responsible officials. Within
the scope of Paragraph 70 of Chapter XIV, all these things are clearly
permissible. No limit to the “instructions” which may be given by the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee is provided by the Constitution
itself. It cannot be argued that the danger of evil practices occurring
is an imaginary one merely; the concrete examples cited in the previous
chapter show that the danger is a very real one.
In this connection it is important to note Paragraph 23 of Chapter V,
Article VI, which reads as follows:
Being guided by the interests of the working-class as a whole,
the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic deprives all
individuals and groups of rights which could be utilized by
them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution.
This means, apparently, that the Council of People’s Commissars can at
any time disfranchise any individual or group or party which aims to
overthrow their rule. This power has been used with tremendous effect
on many occasions.
Was it this power which caused the Bolsheviki to withhold the
electoral franchise from all members of the teaching profession in
Petrograd, we wonder? According to Section 64 of Chapter XIII of
the Soviet Constitution, the “right to vote and to be elected to
the Soviets” belongs, first, to “all who have acquired the means of
livelihood through labor that is productive and useful to society.”
Teachers employed in the public schools and other educational
institutions--especially those controlled by the state--would naturally
be included in this category, without any question, one would suppose,
especially in view of the manner in which the Bolsheviki have paraded
their great passion for education and culture. Nevertheless, it seems
to be a fact that, up to July, 1919, the teaching profession of
Petrograd was excluded from representation in the Soviet. The following
paragraph from the _Izvestia_ of the Petrograd Soviet, dated July 3,
1919, can hardly be otherwise interpreted:
Teachers and other cultural-educational workers this year
_for the first time_ will be able, in an organized manner
through their union, to take an active part in the work of
the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies. _This is the first and most
difficult examination for the working intelligentsia of the
above-named categories._ Comrades and citizens, scholars,
teachers, and other cultural workers, stand this test in a
worthy manner!
Let us now turn our attention to those provisions of the Constitution
of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic which concern the
general political organization of the Soviet state. These are contained
in Article III, Chapters VI to XII, inclusive, and are as follows:
ARTICLE III
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET POWER
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL POWER
Chapter VI
THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS’, PEASANTS’, COSSACKS’,
AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES
24. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is the supreme power of
the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
25. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of
representatives of urban Soviets (one delegate for 25,000
voters), and of representatives of the provincial (_Gubernia_)
congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants).
_Note 1_: In case the Provincial Congress is not called before
the All-Russian Congress is convoked, delegates for the latter
are sent directly from the County (_Oyezd_) Congress.
_Note 2_: In case the Regional (_Oblast_) Congress is convoked
indirectly, previous to the convocation of the All-Russian
Congress, delegates for the latter may be sent by the Regional
Congress.
26. The All-Russian Congress is convoked by the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee at least twice a year.
27. A special All-Russian Congress is convoked by the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee upon its own
initiative, or upon the request of local Soviets having not
less than one-third of the entire population of the Republic.
28. The All-Russian Congress elects an All-Russian Central
Executive Committee of not more than 200 members.
29. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee is entirely
responsible to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
30. In the periods between the convocation of the Congresses,
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme
power of the Republic.