BRIGADIER GENERAL IN ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
When Robert Toombs resigned the Cabinet and took the field, he still
held the seat, as was his prerogative, in the Confederate Congress. This
body, like the British Parliament, sat in chairs, without desks. One
morning Congress was discussing the Produce Loan. By this measure,
invitations were given for contributions of cotton and other crops in
the way of a loan. By the terms of the act these articles were to be
sold and the proceeds turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury, who
was to issue eight per cent bonds for them. This was an extraordinary
measure, and never really amounted to much. Colonel A. R. Lamar, at one
time Secretary of the Provisional Congress, relates that during this
debate General Toombs walked into the hall. "He was faultlessly attired
in a black suit with a military cloak thrown over one shoulder and a
military hat in his left hand. He made a rattling speech against the
measure. Drawing himself up, he said: "Mr. Speaker, we have been told
that Cotton is King, that he will find his way to the vaults of the
bankers of the Old World; that he can march up to the thrones of mighty
potentates, and drag from the arsenals of armed nations the dogs of war;
that he can open our closed ports, and fly our young flag upon all the
seas. And yet, before the first autumnal frost has blighted a leaf upon
his coronet, he comes to this hall a trembling mendicant, and says,
'Give me drink, Titinius, or I perish.'" The effect was magical; Colonel
Lamar, in commenting upon this dramatic incident, sums up the whole
character of Robert Toombs:
"He was cautious and safe in counsel, while wild and exasperating in
speech."
When Mr. Toombs was once asked by an Englishman, where were the files of
the State Department, he answered that "He carried the archives in his
hat." When he resigned the position of Secretary of State, Hon. Robert
M. T. Hunter of Virginia was appointed in his stead. General William M.
Browne had been Assistant Secretary under Mr. Toombs. He was an
Englishman, who came to this country during Buchanan's administration
and edited a Democratic paper in Washington. When General Toombs joined
the Army his staff was made up as follows; D. M. DuBose, Adjutant
General; R. J. Moses, Commissary General; W. F. Alexander, Quartermaster
Major; DeRosset Lamar, Aid-de-camp.
General Toombs' entry into the field, just after the first battle of
Manassas, found the army of the Confederacy flushed with victory, but
badly scattered after the first serious engagement of the war. General
Johnston had declared that even after the decisive advantage at Bull
Run, pursuit was not to be thought of, for his troops were almost as
much disorganized by victory as the Federals by their defeat. Many
soldiers, supposing the war was over, had actually gone home. "Our men,"
said General Johnston, "had in a larger degree the instincts of personal
liberty than those of the North, and it was found very difficult to
subordinate their personal wills to the needs of military discipline."
The battle of Manassas had a powerful effect upon the Northern mind. The
Lincoln Cabinet was seized with fear for the safety of Washington. New
troops were summoned to that city, and the materials for a magnificent
army were placed in the hands of General McClellan, who had succeeded
McDowell, the luckless victim of Manassas. More than one hundred
thousand men were now massed in front of Washington, while Joseph E.
Johnston, with fifty-four thousand, advanced his outposts to
Centreville, and at Munson's Hill Toombs' brigade was in sight of the
national capital. His troops could easily watch the workmen building one
of the wings of the Capitol, and the victorious Confederates, with
prestige in their ranks, were actually flaunting their flag in the face
of Mr. Lincoln. This movement, we are told by good generals, was of no
military value, but it kept the Northern administration in a white heat.
It confused the Union commanders by crossing their counsels with popular
clamor and political pressure, and it crippled McClellan when he finally
moved down the Chesapeake to the peninsula, by detaining a large part of
his force to pacify the authorities in Washington.
When McClellan and Mr. Lincoln were disputing over their change of base,
the military situation was suddenly shifted by the evacuation of
Manassas by the Confederate army, and its retirement first behind the
Rappahannock, then along the Rapidan. Johnston, it seems, wanted to be
nearer his base, and on the 8th of March skillfully managed his
withdrawal, so that the enemy had no idea of his movements. General
Toombs' brigade started in retreat from Centreville. He did not relish
this movement. He writes home from Culpepper:
This has been a sad and destructive business. We were
ordered to send off all our heavy baggage, but so badly did
they manage that none of it was sent back, and every
particle of that baggage, blankets, and every imaginable
useful article, was burned up to prevent its falling into
the hands of the enemy. My brigade must have lost half a
million of property and all the rest were in the same
condition. Millions of stores with guns and ammunition were
destroyed. Never was any business worse managed. The enemy
had no more idea of attacking us in Centreville than they
had of attacking the Peaks of Otter. Of course, when we
retreated, they sent marauding parties in our trail to
watch our retreat and take possession of the country, and
now the whole of the beautiful Counties of Loudon,
Fauquier, Prince William, Fairfax, and the Lord only knows
how many more, are in the possession of the enemy. It was a
sad, distressing sight, all the way along, and one that
frequently drew tears from my eyes. I do not know what it
means, but I would rather have fought ten battles than thus
to have abandoned these poor people. We have got to fight
somewhere, and if I had my way, I would fight them on the
first inch of our soil they invaded, and never cease to
fight them as long as I could rally men to defend their
homes. The great body of the army is now in the
neighborhood, and I suppose we shall abandon these people
and retreat back toward Richmond.... My command is in
excellent condition. A few broke down on the way, but I
managed to have them taken care of there and lost none of
them on the march.
One of the great features of General Toombs' control of his brigade was
the excellent care he took of his men. He never allowed them to be
imposed upon by the officers or by other commands.
This letter betrays the impatience of General Toombs over any
mismanagement. He was the soul of business, and as the transportation
facilities at Manassas were meager, he chafed under the heavy loss to
which his brigade was subjected in this retreat. With impetuous ardor he
calls for resistance, not retreat. He did not approve of the "Fabian
policy" of Joseph E. Johnston. As General Longstreet afterward remarked,
"Toombs chafed at the delays of the commanders in their preparations for
battle. His general idea was that the troops went out to fight, and he
thought that they should be allowed to go at it at once." Near Orange
Court House, he wrote to his wife on the 19th of March, 1862, "I know
not what is to become of this country. Davis' incompetency is more
apparent as our danger increases. Our only hope is Providence."
In January, 1862, the General Assembly of Georgia elected Robert Toombs
a member of the Confederate States Senate. Benjamin H. Hill was to be
his colleague. But General Toombs had a different conception of his
duty. He realized that he had been prominent in shaping the events that
had led to the Civil War, and he did not shirk the sharpest
responsibility. He felt that his duty was in the field. He had condemned
the rush for civil offices and what he called "bombproof positions," and
he wished at least to lead the way to active duty by remaining with his
army.
Two months later an effort was made by some of his friends to have him
appointed Secretary of War. This would have brought him in close contact
with the army, which he was anxious to serve. The parties behind this
movement believed that the great abilities of Mr. Toombs should not be
hidden behind the command of a brigade. He would have made an ideal war
minister. His genius for details and his ability to manage affairs and
plan campaigns would have overmatched Edwin M. Stanton. But Mr. Toombs
promptly cut off this movement in his behalf.
On 22d March, 1862, he wrote to his wife from Orange Court House, Va.:
I thought I had been very explicit on that point. I would
not be Mr. Davis' chief clerk. His Secretary of War can
never be anything else. I told my friends in Richmond to
spare me the necessity of declining if they found it in
contemplation. I have not heard that they had any occasion
to interfere.... So far as I am concerned, Mr. Davis will
never give me a chance for personal distinction. He thinks
I pant for it, poor fool. I want nothing but the defeat of
the public enemy and to retire with you for the balance of
my life in peace and quiet in any decent corner of a free
country. It may be his injustice will drive me from the
army, but I shall not quit it until after a great victory,
in which I shall have the opportunity of doing something
for the country. The day after such an event I shall
retire, if I live through it. I have grievances enough now
to quit, but I shall bide my time. I get along very well
with the army. I have not seen Johnston but once; he was
polite and clever. George W. Smith I see every day. He is a
first-rate gentleman and a good officer. I hear from
Stephens constantly, but from nobody else in Richmond....
You say you pray for me daily. I need it. Put it in your
prayers that if it be the will of God that I shall fall, a
sacrifice in this great conflict, that I may meet it as
becomes a gentleman.
An instance of General Toombs' impatience under red-tape rules may be
recalled. A member of his brigade was taken ill, and he secured for him
entrance into the hospital of Richmond. The hospital was crowded;
regulations were stringent, and under some technical ruling his sick
soldier was shipped back to his brigade. Toombs was fired with
indignation. He proceeded to sift the affair to the bottom, and was told
that General Johnston had fixed the rules. This did not deter him.
Riding up to the commander's tent and securing admission, he proceeded
to upbraid the general as only Toombs could do. When he returned to his
headquarters he narrated the circumstance to Dr. Henry H. Steiner, his
brigade surgeon and lifelong friend. Dr. Steiner, who had been a surgeon
in the regular army, and had served in the Mexican war, was a better
tactical officer than Toombs. He was himself fearless and upright, but
full of tact and discretion. "General," said Dr. Steiner, "you have been
too rash; you will be arrested." Toombs replied that he thought so, too.
He held himself in anticipation for two or three days, but he was not
disturbed. When he was finally summoned to General Johnston's tent, it
was to consult over a plan of movement, and it was noticed that Toombs
was the only brigadier in counsel. General Johnston subsequently
remarked that Toombs was the biggest brained man in the Confederacy. The
boldness and clearness of the impetuous Georgian had captured the grim
hero of Manassas, who forgave the affront in the face of the
overmastering mind of the man.
General McClellan reached Fortress Monroe, April 2, 1862, and commenced
his march up the peninsula. The country is low and flat, and the season
was unusually wet and dismal. The objective point was Richmond,
seventy-five miles away, and the first obstruction met by the Federal
army was at Yorktown. The defense adopted by General Magruder was a
series of dams extending along the Warwick River, which stretched across
the peninsula from the York to the James River, a distance of thirteen
miles. The fords along the Warwick had been destroyed by dams defended
by redoubts, and the invader and defender were stationed in dense
swamps. At dam No. 1 Toombs' troops were often under fire. They fought
with spirit. Each detachment was on duty defending the dam forty-eight
hours, and between long exposure in the trenches, the frequent alarms,
and sharp sorties, the service was very exhausting. It was only possible
to change troops at night. On the 16th of April Toombs writes:
One of my regiments, the 17th Georgia, had a skirmish day
before yesterday. They acted splendidly, charging the
Yankees, and driving them from the rifle-pits, killing,
wounding, and taking prisoners over one hundred of the
enemy. I lost but two killed and a few wounded.
At the siege of Yorktown in the early part of May, 1862, General Toombs
commanded a division consisting of his own and Semmes' brigades. He had
2357 men in his own and 2342 in Semmes' brigade, making about 4700
troops in line. During this siege General Magruder reports that General
Toombs supported Cobb's brigade, and promptly and energetically led the
remainder of his command under fire, arriving just before the enemy
ceased their attack, and in time to share its danger. General Magruder
had only 11,000 men under him in the peninsula, and General Huger but
8000, to oppose McClellan's march with 80,000. Johnston and Lee both
pronounced the peninsula untenable, and on the 4th of May Yorktown was
evacuated.
After the retreat from the peninsula, General Johnston concentrated his
entire army behind the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles from Richmond.
On the 12th of May General Toombs writes home that his command near the
Chickahominy was "resting easily after a disagreeable march from
Yorktown. I hear that there is great consternation in Richmond.... The
loss of New Orleans gives us a terrible blow, and, followed by Norfolk,
makes it necessary for us to strike a decisive blow somewhere." On 19th
of May, 1862, he writes home from the camp near Richmond:
We seem to have come up here to defend this city. You ask
me my opinion of the present state of the country. It is
bad enough. The utter incompetency of Mr. Davis and his
West Point generals have brought us to the verge of ruin.
If McClellan is unwise enough to fight us here, we shall
whip and drive him out of Virginia.... As to Richmond, it
will never be taken while this army is here.
General Toombs' estimate of the army and of the futility of an attack
from McClellan was justified when, after the 26th of June, the Army of
the Potomac, almost in sight of the spires of Richmond, was forced to
reel back, in the deadly clinch of a seven days' combat, to the James
River. The Confederate army changed its position from one of retreat to
a brilliant and aggressive policy, and the subtle tactics of Johnston
gave way to the bold strokes of Lee. The South was thrilled with
victory.
General Toombs frequently referred to the incompetency of Mr. Davis. The
letters which have just been quoted were written to his wife, and were
not made public then, but he did not hesitate to express his opinion
openly. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Toombs had some differences while the
former was Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce and Mr. Toombs was in
the Senate. Mr. Toombs believed that President Davis was too partial to
West Point, at which school Mr. Davis had been trained, and that in his
management of the army he showed the tenacity of a martinet rather than
the breadth of a statesman.
In February, 1859, the Army Appropriation bill had come up before the
United States Senate. Mr. Toombs attacked, and Mr. Davis defended the
whole system. Mr. Toombs contended that the compensation of army
officers was too great. It was more than the same talent could command
in any other walk of life. It was upon a wrong basis. "You take a boy of
sixteen and send him to West Point, and when he comes out you give him
$1400 a year. In the course of a few years you carry him up to $3000,
$6000, or $8000. Take the general employment of the youths of the
country who are educated at the different colleges for all civil
purposes. You may have the highest amount of genius and intellect, and
you get nothing like such average there. It will take them many years to
make that much money." Mr. Toombs declared that a brigadier general's
commission was higher than that of a United States Senator. "I think,"
said he, "it requires as great qualifications to govern this country as
it does to be a brigadier general." Officers had increased far beyond
the wants of the country. Members of Congress appoint cadets for the
different districts; "they are generally associated in some way, as
brothers, sons, or cousins, with the governing power." He thought a
salary of $600 or $900 for the West Point graduates enough. According
to the way army commissions were valued in England, the commission of a
lieutenant who graduated at West Point could not be worth less than
$50,000. The pay of a captain was higher than that of a judge. That
position required the highest ability and integrity, and the average
salary of a judge was but $2000, without traveling expenses. Mr. Toombs
contended that West Point men seldom reflected any opinions but those of
the government which employed them. They seldom sympathized with the
people, and he wanted a government of the people. "You take a boy to
West Point," he said, "give him quarters, and fuel, and clothes, and
maintain him, and you say he has rendered service. When the citizens of
this country send their sons to college they pay their expenses or work
their way through; but when a boy is carried to West Point he is taken
care of; a house is provided for him; clothes are provided for him;
instructors are provided for him, and that is called being in service. I
lay down the proposition that the true theory of wages, if you employ
these people to keep the peace, is exactly the same--a constable's
pay--you ought to pay them what they can be had for."
Mr. Davis held that army officers were constantly tempted to resign by
offers of higher pay. It was the training of these men in the service,
not for the service, it was their attachment for the country which made
them so valuable. It was better to instruct men for officers' places and
then appoint them, than to appoint them and then instruct them. He
thought appointments were free from partisan selection. A soldier's
devotion was as broad as the continent. A West Point cadet is a warrant
officer; he goes there to serve the government as it may direct. It
directs him to stay there until he has sufficient elementary instruction
to properly discharge the duties of an officer.
The debate showed the views of the two men, and indicated the
differences which, from points of public policy, soon deepened into
personal dislike. On the 30th of May, Toombs wrote from the army, "Davis
is polite and formal; so am I."
In the latter part of 1862 it was evident that the two armies must meet
and contend for the mastery in Virginia. The day before the seven days'
fighting commenced, Dr. Steiner said to General Toombs, his intimate
friend: "General, I have a favor to ask of you. Keep your mind unclouded
during these important operations." Dr. Steiner knew that during the
heat and excitement of battle, temptation was great among soldiers to
take ardent spirits, a practice that had grown somewhat upon General
Toombs during his service in the field, and which at times deprived him
of his best powers. "Why, doctor, I gladly promise," said the great
Georgian. Nor did he, during the week, take a glass of any sort of
liquor.
General Toombs' brigade was the First Brigade, First Division, Army of
Northern Virginia, and during the campaign of the peninsula, was in
Magruder's division. On June 15, 1862, Toombs occupied the most exposed
position, which was held for nine days. Magruder recommended relief for
his troops, which had been suffering from lack of rest and care. Just
before the seven days' fight Toombs' brigade was placed in D. R. Jones'
division and Magruder commanded his own, Jones', and McLaw's divisions,
holding about 13,000 men. Toombs' brigade was composed of the 1st, 15th,
17th, and 20th Georgia regiments.
On the 26th of June Toombs' brigade was posted upon the east of
Garnett's House, on Golding's farm, just in front of the enemy. Both
sides threw up breastworks so near that neither could advance its picket
line. "Just before dark," says Dr. Steiner, "Mr. Toombs received orders
to charge the enemy, firing having been heard on the left. The position
was a dangerous one. A charge at that time of the evening was perilous.
Just in front lay a deep gulch--Labor-in-Vain Ravine--which was alive
with the enemy, and the charge must be through an unprotected field of
wheat and clover. General Toombs was astonished at the order. His first
instructions had been to put himself near Garnett House, to hold his
position and to take advantage of any retreat of the enemy. He doubted
the authenticity of the order, and sent word that he would not obey
unless in writing. Pretty soon written instructions were returned and
General Toombs prepared for what he believed to be a forlorn hope. He
advanced seven companies of the 2d Georgia Regiment, 750 men, under
Colonel B. M. Butt, toward the enemy in the face of a heavy front and
flank fire. Colonel Williams' regiment crossed the field at double-quick
under a galling fire from the opposite side of the ravine. Unshaken by
fearful odds, they held their ground and replied with spirit. The 15th
Georgia Regiment, under Colonel McIntosh then entered the fight, and
this gallant officer was mortally wounded. The 17th Georgia charged on
the left and the 20th on the right. The engagement was a very bloody
one. Over 200 of Toombs' men were lost and several valuable officers
were killed. The opposing troops were a part of General Hancock's
command, and the firing ceased only with the night. Next morning the
enemy retreated, and Toombs' men pressed forward and held their
position. General Toombs was censured for this engagement, for which, it
seems, he was in no wise responsible.
On the 1st of July, about three o'clock in the afternoon, commenced one
of the famous battles of the war. McClellan's army had gotten away from
its perilous position astride the Chickahominy, and now found itself
united and strongly intrenched on the heights of Malvern Hill. All hope
of destroying that army was gone, and it was evident that an engagement
must ensue, with the odds in favor of the Union army. It was in many
respects like the battle of Gettysburg, except that the Confederate
forces were not handled with the precision and effectiveness of the
historic sorties against Cemetery Heights. The battlefield was in plain
range of the enemy's gunboats, and there was much surprise that General
Lee should have sanctioned an engagement at that point. General D. H.
Hill misunderstood the signal for attack at Malvern Hill, and late in
the afternoon ordered the charge. Toombs' brigade had been marching and
countermarching all day, and went into action much thinned from the
effects of the sharp fighting at Labor-in-Vain Ravine. There was no
concerted attack. The charge seems to have been made by brigades, even
single regiments being thrown forward. They advanced through a swamp,
and the difficulties of the charge, owing to a murderous fire which
raked the plain from the hills, 600 yards away, cannot be exaggerated.
Toombs' brigade was one of the first to reach the plateau swept by
fifty guns. It advanced with Anderson's brigade, but obliqued to the
left about half-way up the hill, and took position near a fence, where
the troops, suffering fearfully from the cool, deadly aim of the Federal
gunners, were ordered to lie down and secure some shelter from the
cannon-shot. It was at this time that General D. H. Hill rode up to
General Toombs and ordered his brigade forward. Some sharp words ensued
between these officers, and the men moved forward handsomely to the brow
of the hill. At this time, however, the steady stream of fugitives
pressing back from the charge, broke the alignment of the brigade and
separated the regiments. Colonel Butt's regiment went forward with
Kershaw's brigade. The whole Confederate charge was soon checked and the
troops fell back in disorder. Their loss was fully 5000 men, and the
loss in Toombs' brigade was 219 men, making his losses in the two
engagements over one-third of his entire number. Malvern Hill was a
blunder which was never repeated, but it was a disastrous one for the
Georgia troops.
The subjoined correspondence will be understood in the light of the
meeting of General D. H. Hill and General Toombs near Malvern Hill
during the progress of the charge of the Confederate forces.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
In the Field, July 6, 1862.
MAJOR GENERAL D. H. HILL.
_Sir_: Military movements since Tuesday last have prevented
an earlier reply to your conversation with me on the
battlefield that evening. I understood you to say, among
other things, that "Your (my) brigade would not fight";
that you "always knew it would not fight"; that it
"pretended to want to fight, but would not"; "Where were
you when I was riding in front on my horse trying to rally
your brigade?" I desire first to know whether I am correct
in my understanding of your language, and if not, wherein I
am mistaken.
And secondly, to request of you such explanation of that
language as you may choose to give.
I am sir,
Your obedient servant,
ROBERT TOOMBS.
July 6, 1862.
_General_: Your note has just been received. My remarks
were personal to yourself and not to your brigade. I did
not in the slightest degree reflect on your men. What I
said was in substance this: "You have been wanting to
fight, and now that you have one, you have got out of it."
There were witnesses to our conversation, and if my remarks
were severer, I will let you know.
It may be well to suggest to you that, as the commanding
officer on the field, I have an official report to make
which will not be modified by your note.
It is notorious that you have a thousand times expressed
your disgust that the commanding general did not permit you
to fight. It is equally notorious that you retired from
the field. These are the two facts of which I reminded you
on Tuesday. I made no comment upon them, and if the simple
truth has been offensive, the interpretation of it has been
your own.
Yours truly,
D. H. HILL,
BRIGADIER GENERAL TOOMBS. Major General.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
July 6, 1862.
GENERAL D. H. HILL.
_Sir_: Your note of this date has just been received. It is
scarcely necessary for me to say it is not satisfactory. It
would be inappropriate to comment upon it properly in this
note, and for that reason alone I waive it for the present.
As to your remark that you were the commanding officer on
the field on the 1st inst., I never before heard of it, nor
do I now think so, but, however that fact may be, I am at a
loss to know for what reason you state it unless it was to
menace and intimidate me in the pursuit of proper
satisfaction for the unprovoked insult you have cast upon
me. If that was your object, this note will satisfy you
that you have failed in your object. I now demand of you
personal satisfaction for the insult you cast upon my
command and myself on the battlefield on the 1st inst., and
for the repetition and aggravation thereof in your note of
this day. I refer you to my friend Colonel Benning for all
necessary arrangements.
Your obedient servant,
ROBERT TOOMBS.
CAMP NEAR RICHMOND, VA.,
July 12, 1862.
_General_: Your note of the 6th was received yesterday. I
must again enter my protest against your second declaration
that I reflected upon your brigade in the battle of
Malvern Hill. Witnesses to our interview affirm that my
remarks were entirely personal to yourself.
In regard to your demand for satisfaction, I construe it to
mean either that I must apologize to you for the language
used by me on the battlefield, or that I must grant you a
hostile meeting. If the first interpretation be correct, I
will state that I will make full, public, and ample
concessions when satisfied that I did you injustice; and
this I would do without any demand. I certainly thought
that you had taken the field too late, and that you left it
too early. You may, however, have done your whole duty, and
held your ground as long as it was possible for a brave and
skillful officer to hold it. If the facts prove this to be
so, no one will be more gratified than myself, and my
acknowledgment of error will be cordial and complete.
But if your demand means a challenge, its acceptance, when
we have a country to defend and enemies to fight, would be
highly improper and contrary to the dictates of plain duty,
without reference to higher grounds of action. I will not
make myself a party to a course of conduct forbidden alike
by the plainest principles of duty, and the laws which we
have mutually sworn to serve.
Yours truly,
D. H. HILL, Major General.
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBS.
Just what General Toombs replied to this is not known. The letter has
not been preserved in this correspondence. It evidently declared that
the explanation was not satisfactory. Major R. J. Moses, Jr., a member
of General Toombs' staff, submitted in writing the following report of
his recollection of General Hill's words to General Toombs at Malvern
Hill:
Where is your brigade, sir? I told you that I wanted a
fighting brigade, and your brigade will not fight. I knew
it would not, and you are the man who pretends to have been
spoiling for a fight. For shame! Rally your troops! Where
were you when I was riding up and down your line rallying
your troops?
Major Moses adds:
As aid-de-camp of General Robert Toombs, I remained with
him until some time after this conversation. Previous to
this conversation General Toombs had been about fifteen
yards to the rear of the center of his line and his troops
were unbroken. There were many men coming by us, but I saw
not over ten from General Toombs' brigade. The order was
given "Forward, left oblique," and General Toombs moved to
the left of his line. When General Hill met him and
commenced this attack on the character of himself and his
brigade without the slightest provocation, General Toombs
had not only been rallying the troops, but continued to use
his best endeavors to rally them till late at night. I was
with General Toombs the whole time from the commencement of
the action until half or three-quarters of an hour after
the conversation.
The following is the concluding letter of the correspondence:
July 15, 1862.
_General_: I regret that my last note, which was intended
to be conciliatory, has been misunderstood or
misappreciated. I take it for granted that you know enough
of my previous history to be aware that a hostile meeting,
under any circumstances, would be abhorrent to my
principles and character. At this time it would be in the
highest degree improper. I have offered you the only
redress which I could make even after a meeting, viz., an
acknowledgment of error when convinced of that error. As no
good can result from a continued correspondence, it will
close on my part with this communication.
Yours truly,
D. H. HILL, Major General.
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBS.
General Hill was a good man and a brave soldier. His devotion to the
Confederate cause was undoubted, but his zeal sometimes made him harsh,
and more than once he placed himself in the position of reflecting upon
the conduct of others. On one occasion at the battle of Chickamauga,
where General Hill was in command of the extreme right of the
Confederate line, on the second day of the battle information was
brought to him of the sudden and unexpected advance of a strong Federal
force against his line. It proved to be the division of the Federal
General Gordon Granger. General Hill and General W. H. T. Walker, who
commanded two divisions under General Hill, proceeded at once to the
threatened point, to ascertain the situation of affairs, accompanied by
some members of their staff. Arrived at a point where this new arrival
of Federal forces could be seen, General Walker deferred to General Hill
and asked him, "What do you wish me to do?"
"What do I want you to do?" said Hill with severity, and even with
something like a snarl, "I want you to fight."
General Walker flushed up in a moment. He was not a man to deserve any
reflection upon his courage or to bear it when offered. No man in the
old army had a higher and more deserved reputation for dashing courage.
He had been desperately wounded in Florida, and again wounded, supposed
to be mortally, in leading the assault on Chapultepec in the Mexican
War, and had, on many occasions, given undoubted evidence of his valor
and fidelity. He answered hotly, "Of course I will fight; you know that,
General Hill, well enough; but, by God! sir, there are two ways of
fighting, one to whip and the other to get whipped."
The point was a good one. Major Joseph B. Cumming, chief of General
Walker's staff, who related this incident, says it had the desired
effect.
When Longstreet marched against Pope he stationed General Toombs'
brigade to guard one of the fords of the Rapidan. Toombs was absent at
the time and when he rode up ordered them back to camp. General
Longstreet heard of Toombs making stump speeches and "referring in
anything but complimentary terms of his commander." He sent General
Toombs to Gordonsville. Afterward he received an apology from Toombs and
directed him to join his command. ["]As we were preparing for the
charge at Manassas (second battle), Toombs got there, riding rapidly
with his hat in his hand, and was much enthused. I was just sending a
courier to his command with a dispatch. 'Let me take it,' he exclaimed.
'With pleasure,' I responded, and handed him the paper. He put spurs to
his horse and dashed off, accompanied by his courier. When he rode up
and took command of his brigade there was wild enthusiasm, and,
everything being ready, an exultant shout was sent up, and the men
sprang to the charge. I never had any more trouble with Toombs. We were
afterward warm personal friends."
On the 30th of August, 1862, Hon. A. H. Stephens wrote to Mrs. Toombs
that General Toombs was still at Gordonsville. He said:
How long he will remain, I do not know. I thought at first
that it would only be for a day or two, or until General
Longstreet could receive and reply to two notes he had
written, explaining to my mind very fully and
satisfactorily his acts and conduct, which, it seems to me,
General Longstreet had misunderstood. Such is still my
opinion, and yet I may be mistaken. I do not know much of
General Longstreet. I only know that General Toombs, who
does know him, always expressed very high admiration of him
as an officer.
At the second battle of Manassas, August 29, 1862, Toombs' brigade in
Jones' division held the rear of Longstreet's corps. Early in the
morning the brigade took up the march in the direction of the old
battlefield of Manassas, where heavy firing was heard. Arriving at noon
it was stationed on the extreme right, or upon the Manassas Gap
railroad. The brigades formed in echelon. General Longstreet in his
published report commended especially General Toombs for gallant conduct
at Manassas Plain.
General D. R. Jones, in his report of Manassas, says:
General Toombs, released from arrest, under which he had
been since the 18th of August, came upon the field shortly
after his brigade went in under fire and accompanied it in
action.
Captain H. L. French, of the 17th Georgia Regiment, says: "Soon after
our engagement, to our great satisfaction, we unexpectedly met our
gallant commander, Brigadier General Robert Toombs, who, anticipating
the fight, had ridden hard all day. He was greeted with hearty cheers,
and said, 'Boys, I am proud of the report given of you by General Jones.
I could not be with you to-day, but this was owing to no fault of mine.
To-morrow I lead you.'"
One report of this engagement declares that as Toombs dashed into the
fire and joined his men, he waved his hat and shouted, "Go it, boys! I
am with you again. Jeff Davis can make a general, but it takes God
Almighty to make a soldier!"
The expulsion of Pope only accelerated the momentum of the Army of
Northern Virginia. From the front of Richmond, the theater of operations
was transferred at once to the front of Washington, and the Union army
was again on the defensive. General Lee, freed from the necessity of
guarding the Confederate capital, resolved to invade Maryland. He
reasoned that the prestige of the invasion would advance the cause of
the young nation abroad; that it would relieve Virginia from incursions
during the winter, and that the presence of the army in Maryland would
raise the standard of revolt and cause the liberation of that State from
the Union cause. Lee's army, however, was not equal to such an
expedition. It was not well clothed or armed, and barely numbered
40,000, while McClellan had 80,000.
Toombs' brigade accompanied Longstreet's corps in its counter-march from
Hagarstown to Hill's support. On the 14th of September these were
withdrawn to the valley of the Antietam. The creek of Antietam runs
obliquely to the source of the Potomac, and empties into that river six
miles above Harper's Ferry. The Confederate lines were, on the 15th,
drawn up in front of Sharpsburg, Longstreet being on the right of the
road from Sharpsburg.
In this place the creek is crossed by four stone bridges, and three of
these were strongly guarded by the Confederates. Burnside's army corps
was stationed on the Sharpsburg Turnpike, directly in front of bridge
No. 3. The preliminary deploy occupied the 16th of September, an
artillery duel enlivening the time before the battle. Burnside lay
behind the heights on the east bank of the Antietam and opposite the
Confederate right, which, Swinton says, it was designed he should
assail, after forcing the passage of the Antietam by the lower stone
bridge. The part assigned to General Burnside was of the highest
importance, for a successful attack by him upon the Confederate right,
would, by carrying the Sharpsburg Crest, force Lee from his line of
retreat by way of Shepherdstown. Swinton says this task should have been
an easy one, for the Confederate forces at this point had been drawn
upon to recruit the left where Hooker had made his furious assaults.
There was left in the right wing of the Confederate army but a single
division of 2500 men under General D. R. Jones, and the force actually
present to dispute the passage of the stone bridge did not exceed 400.
These troops were under the direction of General Robert Toombs, and this
engagement made his reputation as a fighter and was one of the most
brilliant and memorable of the Civil War. It was one o'clock before
Burnside charged. General Lee, in his report of the battle, said:
In the afternoon the enemy advanced on our right, where
General Jones' division was posted, who handsomely
maintained his position. General Toombs' brigade, guarding
the bridge on Antietam Creek, gallantly resisted the
approach of the enemy, but his superior number enabling him
to extend his left, he crossed below the bridge and assumed
a threatening attitude on our right, which fell back in
confusion. By this time, between 3 and 4 o'clock P.M., A.
P. Hill, with five of his brigades, reached the scene of
action and drove the enemy from the position they had
taken. The bridge was defended with two regiments of
Toombs' brigade (2d and 20th) and the batteries of General
Jones. General Toombs' small command repulsed five
different assaults made by greatly superior forces, and
maintained its position with distinguished gallantry....
Toombs charged the flank of the enemy, while Archer moved
upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief
resistance and then ran in confusion.
Such commendation from the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army
speaks for itself.
Speaking of the last charge, when the Federals were driven back over the
creek in the counter-attack, General Jones says:
General Toombs, whom I had sent for, arriving from the
right with a portion of his brigade (11th Georgia
Regiment) was ordered to charge the enemy. This he did
most gallantly, supported by Archer's brigade, delivering
fire at less than fifty yards, dashing at the enemy with
the bayonet, forcing him from the crest and following him
down the hill.
General Garnett's report credits Toombs with having "reenforced the
right just after it had been driven back, and restored the fortunes of
the day in that quarter."
From the report of General Toombs it appeared that when he first moved
into Maryland he was assigned to command a division composed of Toombs',
Drayton's, and Anderson's brigades, and took possession of Hagerstown.
On September 14 he was ordered to Sharpsburg, two of his regiments
having been sent to Williamsport to protect the wagon trains. With two
small regiments left, General Toombs took position near the bridge over
the Antietam on the road to Harper's Ferry. He took possession of the
ground with the 20th Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Jonathan B.
Cumming, and the 2d Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Holmes. The
creek was comparatively straight by this bridge. He formed his regiments
along the creek in more open order than was desirable on account of the
smallness of his number. Subsequently the 50th Georgia, with scarcely
100 men, was placed under his command. Colonel Eubanks' battery was by
order of General Longstreet placed in his rear. The enemy opened on his
position on Tuesday evening, the 16th of September. On Wednesday
morning, his pickets were driven in and the enemy menaced his position.
The ground descended gently to the creek covered with a narrow strip of
woods, affording slight protection. The enemy approached by the road
parallel with his line of battle, he says, exposing his flank to a
destructive fire. Between 9 A. M. and 1 P. M. the Federals made five
attempts to carry the bridge, and were repulsed by the 2d and 20th
Georgia regiments. Failing to wrest the bridge from its heroic
defenders, the enemy turned his attention to the fords. "Not being able
to get reenforcements, and seeing that the enemy would cross and attack
my front, right flank, and rear, Colonel Holmes having been killed,
Major Harris wounded, both regiments having suffered heavily, ammunition
nearly exhausted, and the battery withdrawn, I withdrew my command to a
position, designated by Longstreet, opposite the lower fords. This
change of position was made very satisfactorily and without serious
loss. The 15th and 17th Georgia regiments and part of the 11th,
previously detached, now came up and occupied the new position. The 20th
and 2d went to the ammunition train to replenish their cartridge boxes.
The enemy moved through the bridge and ford with extreme caution, and
lost nearly two hours in crossing, about which time A. P. Hill's
division came from Harper's Ferry. I was ordered by Longstreet to put my
command in motion to meet the enemy. I found them in possession of the
ground I was ordered to occupy, including the bridge road and the
suburbs of Sharpsburg. With less than one-fifth the numbers of the enemy
and within 100 paces of his lines I determined to give battle. I had
instantly to determine either to retreat or to fight. A retreat would
have left the town of Sharpsburg and General Longstreet's rear open to
the enemy. The enemy advanced in good order to within sixty or eighty
paces, when the effectiveness of the fire threw his column into
considerable confusion, perceiving which I instantly ordered a charge,
which was brilliantly executed by my whole line. The enemy fled in
confusion toward the river, making two or three efforts to rally, which
were soon defeated. The enemy brought over the bridge a battery. I
ordered Richardson's battery to open upon it, and at the same time the
15th and 20th Georgia charged upon it and compelled it to rejoin the
flying infantry. I desired to pursue the enemy across the river, but,
being deficient in artillery, I sent to General Lee for a battery, which
came up too late. I then determined to move my troops to my first
position along the river, but received the order to occupy the heights
on the opposite side of the road leading to the bridge from Sharpsburg,
and there the troops bivouacked for the night."
The gallant conduct of Toombs' brigade at Sharpsburg was the theme on
both sides. The country rang with its exploits and the fiery Georgia
brigadier became the toast of the army. Burnside's heavy losses
abundantly proved the stoutness of the resistance and the deadliness of
the charges of the Georgia troops.
The next evening, on the edge of Sharpsburg, General Toombs and his aids
crossed a little branch on his way to the headquarters of Colonel
Benning. General Toombs rode his famous mare "Gray Alice," so well known
to his command. He was not very far over when a troop of cavalry rode
up. He challenged them, and they answered "We are friends." Captain
Troup of his staff, however, detected the ruse and fired into them. The
squad returned the fire. General Toombs was shot through the hand with
which he was holding the reins. The gray mare at once became
unmanageable and ran back across the branch. As soon as he could control
the mare, General Toombs rode back to Colonel Benning and, reporting his
wound, turned his brigade over to Colonel Benning. When it became known
that General Toombs was wounded his men were deeply pained. Always
solicitous for their welfare, his soldiers were devotedly attached to
him. He took care of his brigade even to the extremity of violating army
discipline. He exacted the utmost consideration for his men, and the
officer who periled their safety, or disputed their efficiency, was
quickly called to account. Whether against Johnston, Longstreet, or
Hill, the First Brigade, First Division, was sure of a fearless champion
in the person of its commander.
The battle of Sharpsburg was a very bloody one. The losses on the
Federal side were nearly 12,500, while the Confederates lost 8000. Lee
withdrew into Virginia, and McClellan was too much demoralized to
follow. Longstreet, in summing up the Manassas and Maryland campaign,
declared that in one month the troops had marched over two hundred miles
upon little more than half rations and fought nine battles and
skirmishes. They had "killed, wounded, and captured nearly as many men
as we had in our ranks, besides taking arms and other munitions of war
in large quantities." General Longstreet compliments Brigadier General
Toombs for his "gallant defense at the bridge of Antietam and his
vigorous charge upon the enemy's flank; he was severely wounded at the
close of the engagement."
General Toombs returned to his home after Sharpsburg, and remained
several months. He rejoined his command near Fredericksburg, but in
March, 1863, wrote a touching farewell to his brigade and resigned his
commission in the army of Northern Virginia. It seemed to him that he
did not have justice done him at Richmond. He aspired, with the ambition
of a soldier, to be promoted in his country's service. His conduct at
Sharpsburg, where he wrung admiration from his superior officers,
appeared to call for recognition from the President, but he did not
receive his major-generalship, and, although more than once in the
actual command of a division, did not secure that title. It is true that
he would have liked the promotion; but he did not expect it. He had
written to his wife that he would not be driven from the army until
after some great battle, when he should have the opportunity of doing
something for his country. "The day after such an event, I will retire
if I live through it." The battle had occurred, his record was written
upon the stone bridge of Antietam, and his work was at an end.
Postmaster-General Reagan was one of those who recognized the merits of
General Toombs. Twice did he approach President Davis with the request
that General Toombs be promoted to the command of a division. That
official replied promptly that he did not oppose it himself, but that he
could not do it without the recommendation of the army officers, and
that recommendation had not been given. Possibly the field officers
believed the suggestion would have been ungracious to Mr. Davis.
General Toombs had not hesitated to criticise the policy and
appointments of the Richmond administration. That practice had strained
his relations with the Confederate Government, but Toombs was a man who
"would not flatter Neptune for his trident."
General Toombs was not a trained soldier, but he had some fine points of
a great commander. He was the soul of energy and common sense. He was
bold, dashing, magnetic. He had the quality of infusing his spirit into
his men. His quick mind seized the points of a campaign, and his
intellect was broad and overmastering. It is related of him that one day
in Virginia he hurried to the rear for a conference with Jefferson
Davis, to which the President had summoned him, upon some point of civil
administration. This business over, he dashed back to the front, where
he had an engagement with General Lee over a plan of attack. General
Longstreet said Toombs had the kindling eye and rare genius of a
soldier, but lacked the discipline of a military man. This was the
serious flaw in his character. He had what General Johnston declared was
the great drawback about the Southern soldier, "a large endowment of the
instinct of personal liberty," and it was difficult to subordinate his
will to the needs of military discipline. He had been accustomed to
priority, and in whatever company, under whatever conditions he found
himself, his had been the part to lead and to rule. As Colonel Thomas W.
Thomas had said of him, "Toombs has always been the big frog in the
pond." Men conceded to him this prestige. Under the cast-iron rule of
the army he found himself subordinated to men intellectually beneath
him, but trained and skilled in the art of war. He was swift to detect
error, and impatient in combating blunder. The rule of mediocrity, the
red tape of the service, the restraints of the corps, the tactics of the
field galled his imperious spirit. He commanded his brigade as he had
represented his State in the Senate--as a sovereign and independent
body, and like the heroic Helvetian had blazoned on his crest, "No one
shall cross me with impunity."
Robert Toombs made a mistake in sinking himself in the routine of a
brigade commander. He should have taken the War Department, or, like
Pitt, have pushed the war from the floor of the Senate. Swinton says
that Abraham Lincoln brought the habits of a politician to military
affairs, in which their intrusion can only result in confusion of just
relations. There is ineradicable antagonism between the maxims which
govern politics and those which govern war.
During General Toombs' absence in the field, he opposed the Conscript
Acts of the Confederate administration. He believed them arbitrary and
unjust. He considered that this was a tendency toward centralization
which the Confederate Government was fighting; that it placed too much
power in the hands of one man; that it was deadly to States' Rights and
personal liberty, and that it would impair the efficiency of the army by
lowering its patriotism. The champion of this anti-administration policy
in Georgia was Linton Stephens, the brother of the vice president.
Toombs in the field, the elder Stephens in Congress, and Linton Stephens
in the Georgia Legislature, fought the Conscription and Impressment
Acts. Hon. Joseph E. Brown, the war Governor of Georgia, was also a
vigorous opponent of this policy. This influence gave rise, in the early
part of 1864, to the Peace Resolutions of Linton Stephens, who sustained
Governor Brown in his policy, to inaugurate State action for "the
preservation of rights and the attainment of peace." Linton Stephens, in
a strong letter to General Toombs at that time, called attention to the
fact that since the war began neither side had made any effort to stop
the effusion of blood. He believed that the professional soldiers and
West Point generals would never permit the cessation of hostilities.
Such men, he thought, would not, in human nature, desire peace. "How can
it be explained," he wrote, "that both governments have fought on during
these long years of blood and tears and desolation, without either one
offering terms of peace, and with both running a swift race of rivalry
in usurping the most despotic power under the ever-recurring and false
plea of necessities of war? Have both governments formed designs that
cannot be accomplished in peace, and which seek opportunity and shelter
in the confusion and panic of war?"
Mr. Linton Stephens was a leading lawyer and legislator in Georgia. He
was a man of great ability. He had started the practice of law in the
office of Robert Toombs, and had been a political follower and close
friend of the great Georgian. He had served upon the bench of the
Supreme Court of his State, and at the close of the war his political
influence was probably greater than that of any man at home. He was
fearless, inflexible, high-toned, and full of power. He did not hesitate
to condemn the legislation asked for by Mr. Davis, and joined Mr. Toombs
in opposing the appointment of General Bragg as supervisor of all
military operations. Mr. Stephens believed that the next step after the
Impressment Act would be the organization of all labor into a military
system under government control.
The result of the policy of Mr. Davis justified the protest of the
Georgians, but there is nothing to warrant the belief that Mr. Davis was
moving toward military despotism or that he relished the continuance of
strife. He saw that the South was in for the war. Desperate situations
required desperate remedies. He grasped the government with a strong
hand, and lacked neither nerve nor patriotism. The principles of this
policy were unsound, but the motives of Jefferson Davis were pure. Nor
was there reason to sustain the wholesale denunciation of West Point.
That school of soldiers was the backbone of the army, and the fact that
so many Southern men gave up commissions in the United States army and
came South when their States seceded, overthrew the idea that they were
tools of the general government and had lost identity or sympathy with
people at home. But General Toombs was bold and impatient in his
positions.
Equally opposed was he to the policy adopted in Georgia of recommending
the planting of all grain and no cotton. From Richmond he wrote in
March, 1864, directions to his brother Gabriel Toombs, who managed his
plantations in Washington:
I do not care to change my crops. I wish to raise an
abundant provision crop and then as much cotton as I
can.... Brown's and Chambers' policy is all foolishness....
As to what I shall choose to plant on my own estates, I
shall neither refer it to newspapers, nor to public
meetings, nor to legislatures. I know what sort of people
compose these classes. Let them take up arms and come with
me to drive the intruders away from our soil, and then we
will settle what sort of seed we will put into it.