In the history of these animals we shall not follow the pedantic method
of schools, which lays down arbitrary maxims as real, and falsities
as truth; such documents are eagerly imbibed by children, but are
judiciously rejected by men, if not founded on solid principles. We
shall, therefore, to avoid such imaginary methodical distributions,
which have been of no other use than to heap a multiplicity, and even
distinct species, of animals into one indiscriminate mass.
What I call an _Ape_ is an animal with a flat visage, and without
a tail, whose teeth, fingers, nails, and hands, resemble those of
the human species, and who also walks upright on its two feet. This
definition, drawn from the nature of the animal, and its resemblance
to man, will exclude every animal that has a tail, or a long snout,
crooked or pointed claws, or whose nature obliges them to walk more
willingly on four feet than on two. After this fixed and precise
rule, let us examine to what animals the name of Ape can properly be
applied. The ancients knew only one; the _pithecos_ of the Greeks, and
the _simia_ of the Latins, is the real ape, and on which Aristotle,
Pliny, and Galen, have instituted all their physical comparisons, and
founded all their relations of the ape to mankind. But this ape of the
ancients, which so greatly resembles man in its external form, and
still more in its internal organization, nevertheless differs from him
in an essential point, namely, magnitude. The size of the human species
is generally above five feet, while that of the _pithecos_ is seldom
more than a fourth of that height. Therefore, if this animal had a
still greater resemblance to the human species, the ancients would have
had reason to regard it only as an _homunculus_, a dwarf, or a pigmy,
capable only of attacking small animals, while man knew how to subdue
the elephant, and even to conquer the lion.
But since the discovery of the southern parts of Africa and India,
another animal of this kind has been found, which possesses this
attribute of size; an ape as tall and as strong as man, and equally as
ardent after a woman as its own females; a species which are sagacious
enough to make use of stones to attack their enemies, and sticks to
defend themselves, and which resembles the human species still more
than the pithecos, for, independently of its having no tail, a flat
face, arms, hands, teeth, and nails, like those of a man, and, like
him walking erect, it has a kind of visage, with features, approaching
to those of mankind: its ears are of the same form; it has a beard on
its chin, and not more hair on its body than man in his natural state.
From these resemblances the more polished Indians have not hesitated
to associate it among the human species, by the name of _orang-outang_,
or wild man of the woods; while the Negroes, who are really as savage,
and almost as ugly, as those animals, and who are not of opinion
that civilization exalts our nature, have denominated it _pongo_,
which signifies a beast, and has no relation to man. In fact this
orang-outang is not only a brute but a very singular one, which man
cannot look upon, without contemplating himself, and being convinced
that his external form is not the most essential part of his nature.
Here then are two animals, the pithecos and the orang-outang, which
must be ranked among the ape kind. There is also a third, to which,
though more deformed, we cannot refuse that appellation; until very
lately this animal was scarcely known, it was brought from the East
Indies by the name of _gibbon_; like the other two it walks erect, is
without a tail, and has a flat face; but its arms, instead of being
proportioned to its height, are of such extraordinary length, that when
it stands erect on its two feet, it touches the ground with its hands,
without the smallest inclination of its body.
Next to these apes, we meet with another race of animals, which we
shall indicate by the generic name of the _baboon_; and to distinguish
them clearly from every other animal of the kind, it is necessary
to observe that the baboon has a short tail, a long face, a broad
muzzle, with canine teeth, larger in proportion than that of man, and
callosities on its rump. By this definition, we exclude from this race
all the apes which have no tails, all the monkies whose tails are as
long, or longer than their bodies, and all the makis, loris, and other
four-handed animals, that have their muzzles sharp and pointed. The
ancients never had a proper name for these animals; Aristotle alone has
pointed out one of those baboons by the name of _simia porcaria_, but
gives a very imperfect indication of it in other respects. The Italians
first called it _babuino_, the Germans _bavion_, the French _babouin_,
the English _baboon_, and every modern author, who has written of it in
Latin, _papio_. We shall therefore term it baboon, to distinguish it
from the other species since discovered in the southern provinces of
Africa and India. We are acquainted with three kinds of these animals.
1. The _baboon_, which is found in Arabia, &c. and which, probably, is
the _simia porcaria_ of Aristotle. 2. The _mandrill_, which is larger
than the baboon, whose face is of a bluish colour, and furrowed with
deep and oblique wrinkles; this is a native of Guinea, and the hottest
parts of Africa. 3. The _ouanderou_, which is less than the baboon and
mandrill; its head and face is surrounded with a very thick and long
hair, and has a large white beard; it is seen in Ceylon, Malabar, and
other southern parts of India. Thus we have precisely defined three
species of the ape, and three of the baboon, and all of them very
distinctly differing from each other.
But as Nature acts on one regular plan, connected and extended
throughout all her works, and as her progress is always by minute
degrees, there must be an intermediate species between the ape and the
baboon. This intermediate species actually exists, and is, in fact, to
be found in the _magot_, which fills up the chasm between the other
two. It differs from the first in having a long muzzle and large canine
teeth; and varies from the second, in not having any tail, although
there is a small protuberance of skin at that part, which has something
of that appearance. This animal, consequently, is neither an ape, nor
a baboon, yet, at the same time, partakes of the nature of both. The
magot, which is a very common animal in Upper Egypt, as well as in
Barbary, was known to the ancients. The Greeks and Latins denominated
it _cynocephalus_, because its muzzle resembles that of a dog. These
animals, then, must be ranged in the following order: _orang-outang_,
or _pongo_, is the first ape; the _pithecos_, the second; the _gibbon_,
the third; the _cynocephalus_, or _magot_, the fourth ape, or the first
baboon. The _papio_, the first baboon; the _mandrill_, the second;
and the _ouanderou_, the third. This order is neither arbitrary nor
fictitious, but strictly conformable to the steps of Nature.
After the species of apes and baboons, immediately follow the
_guenons_, or _monkies_; that is, animals which resemble the two
former, but which have tails as long, or longer than their bodies. The
word guenon was anciently employed, sometimes to denote a small ape,
and at others, the female; it has also been used in the sense we now
take it, to denote the apes with long tails, and was probably derived
from the word _kébos_, which the Greeks made use of for that very
purpose. Of these _guenons_, or _monkies_, we know of nine species,
which we shall distinguish by different names, to avoid confusion,
and for the sake of regularity. The first of these is the _macaque_;
the second, the _patas_, or _red monkey_; the third, the _malbrouck_;
the fourth, the _mangabey_; the fifth the _mone_; the sixth, the
_callitrix_, or _green monkey_; the seventh, the _moustac_; the eighth,
the _talapoin_; and the ninth, the _douc_, so called in Cochin-China,
of which country it is a native. The ancients knew only two of this
class, the mone and the callitrix, which inhabit Arabia and the
northern parts of Africa; they had not the least idea of any other, for
they are only to be found in the southern provinces of Africa and the
East Indies, countries absolutely unknown in the time of Aristotle.
This great philosopher, and the Greeks in general, were so careful to
affix proper names to different animals, that they denominated the ape
without a tail, _pithecos_, and the monkey with a long tail, _kébos_,
both of which they carefully drew from the most apparent character
of these animals. All the apes and baboons which they knew, had a
uniform colour; on the contrary, the monkey which we call _mone_, and
the Greeks, _kébos_, has hair of different colours, and is vulgarly
called the _variegated monkey_; this species was the most common of
all those animals in the time of Aristotle; and from this character
it obtained the name of _kébos_, which in Greek signifies a variety
of colours. Thus all the animals of the ape, baboon, and monkey kind,
mentioned by Aristotle, may be reduced to four, the _pithecos_,
the _cynocephalus_, the _simia porcaria_, and the _kébos_; which we
think ourselves sufficiently justified to rank as the _pithecos_ or
_pigmy_, the _magot_, the _baboon_, and the _mone_, not only because
their particular characters perfectly agree with those mentioned
by Aristotle, but also, because the other species must have been
absolutely unknown to him, since they are natives of those countries
into which the Greek travellers of his time had not penetrated.
Two or three ages after Aristotle, we meet with two new names in the
Greek authors, _callithrix_ and _cercopithecos_, both relative to
the long-tailed monkey. In proportion as discoveries were made, in
the southern regions of Africa and Asia, we meet with new animals,
and other species of monkies; and as most of these monkies likewise
were not of various colours like the kébos, the Greeks composed the
generic name of _cercopithecos_, that is, the _ape with a tail_, to
denote all the species of monkies, or apes with long tails; and having
discovered among them one of a beautiful green colour, they called it
_callithrix_, which signifies beautiful hair. This callithrix is found
in the southern parts of Mauritania, and in the neighbouring countries
of Cape Verd, and commonly known by the name of the _green ape_.
With respect to the other seven species of monkies, which we have
indicated by the names of Macaque, Patas, Malbrouck, Mangabey, Moustac,
Talapoin, and Douc, they were unknown to the ancients. The macaque is
a native of Congo, the patas of Senegal, the mangabey of Madagascar,
the malbrouk of Bengal, the moustac of Guinea, the talapoin of Siam,
and the douc of Cochin-China; all these places were equally unknown to
the ancients, and we have been careful to preserve the original names
affixed to them in their native countries.
But as Nature always proceeds in a regular and gradual manner, never
leaving any chasms, we meet with an intermediate species between the
baboon and monkey, like that of the magot between the ape and the
baboon. The animal which fills up this interval, greatly resembles the
monkey, especially the macaque, but it has a broad muzzle, and short
tail, like the baboon. Being ignorant of its proper name, we have
called it the _maimon_, to distinguish it from other animals of this
kind. It is a native of Sumatra, and is the only animal, as well among
the baboon as the monkey species, that has no hair on its tail; and
upon that account it has been described by the denomination of the
_pig-tailed_ or _rat-tailed ape_.
Thus we have enumerated all the animals of the old continent, to which
the common name of ape has been given, though they are not only of
very distant species, but even of very different genera. But what has
completed the error and confusion in the arrangement of these animals
is, that the names of _ape_, _cynocephalus_, _kébos_, _cercopithecos_,
which were invented by the Greeks fifteen hundred years ago, have been
given to animals of the new continent, which have been discovered
within these two or three centuries. They knew not that the animals of
Africa and of the East Indies, were not to be found in the southern
parts of the new continent. Animals have been found in America with
hands and fingers, and this character alone was thought sufficient
to give them the appellation of apes, without considering that for
transferring a name it was requisite that the animals should be of the
same genus, and to apply it justly, of the same identical species.
Now the animals of America, of which we shall form two classes, by
the names of _sapajous_ and _sagoins_, are very different from all
the monkeys of Asia and Africa; and in the same manner as there are
neither apes, monkeys, nor baboons, to be found in the new continent,
so likewise there are neither the sapajous nor sagoins to be found in
the old. Though we have already mentioned these facts in general, in
our dissertation concerning the animals of the two continents, we can
here prove it in a more particular manner, and demonstrate, that of
seventeen species, to which number we may reduce all the ape species in
the old continent, and of twelve or thirteen, to which this name of ape
has been transferred in the new, there is not any of them alike, or to
be found in both continents, for of the seventeen in the old we must
first retrench three or four of the apes, who do not exist in America,
and to whom the sapajous and the sagoins have no resemblance. Secondly,
we must also retrench three or four of the baboons, which are much
larger than the sagoins or the sapajous, and also of a very different
form; there remains, therefore, only nine monkeys of the old continent
with whom any comparison can be made. Now this species of monkeys, as
well as the apes and baboons, have particular and general characters,
which entirely separate them from the sapajous and sagoins. The first
of these characters consists in the rump being bare, on which are
natural callosities peculiar to those parts. The second is the having
pouches on each side of the jaw, in which the animal can store its
food. The third is in the make of the nostrils, which are narrow,
and the apertures placed in the under parts, like those of man. The
sapajous and sagoins have not one of these characters. The partition
between their nostrils is very thick, and the apertures are placed
on the sides of the nose, and not below it. They have hair on their
posteriors, and no callosities; they have no pouches on each side of
their jaws; and hence these animals differ not only in species but even
in genus, since they have not any of the general characters common to
the whole tribe of monkeys; and this difference in genus supposes still
greater in the species, and demonstrates them to be quite distinct from
each other.
The names of ape and monkey, therefore, have been very improperly
applied to the sapajous and the sagoins. We must preserve their
original names, and instead of ranking them with the apes, we should
begin by comparing them together. These two families differ from each
other by a very remarkable character. All the sapajous make use of
their tails like a finger to hang by, and to procure what they cannot
reach with their hands. The sagoins, on the contrary, cannot make
use of their tail in that manner. Their face, ears, and hair, are
also different; we may, therefore, very properly divide them into two
distinct races.
Avoiding the use of denominations, which can only be applied to the
monkey, baboon, or ape, we have endeavoured to indicate the sapajous
and the sagoins by the names they bear in their native country. We
are acquainted with six or seven species of sapajous, and six of the
sagoins, most of which have varieties. We have carefully searched
after their names in all authors, and particularly in the writings
of observant travellers who have first mentioned them, because, in
general, the names which any one of them have in their native country
is derived from some particular character, which alone was sufficient
to distinguish it from all the rest. With respect to the varieties,
which in this class of animals are, perhaps, more numerous than the
species, we have endeavoured to refer each to its respective species.
We have had in our possession forty of these animals alive, differing
from each other in a greater or less degree, and from a particular and
attentive examination of which, we think the whole may be reduced to
thirty species, viz. three apes, and one intermediate species between
them and the baboons; three baboons, and one intermediate species
between them and the monkeys; nine monkeys, seven sapajous, and six
sagoins; the rest, or at least the greatest part of them, ought to be
considered only as varieties. But as we are not absolutely certain that
some of these varieties may not be distinct species, we shall endeavour
to give all of them proper denominations.
Here, then, let us consider terrestrial animals, some of which
so greatly resemble the human form, in a new point of view. The
affixing the name of _quadruped_ to all these animals has been done
unjustly. If the exceptions were few we should not have objected to
the application of this term. We are convinced that our definitions
and names, however general, do not comprehend the whole; that there
exists particular beings, which escape the most cautious definitions,
and that intermediate species are constantly discovered. We know
that many, though to all appearance holding the middle station, have
escaped enumeration, and that the general names under which they are
included is incomplete; because Nature should never be considered
in the aggregate, but by unities only, because man has invented
general names only to assist his memory, and because he afterwards
weakly regarded those general names as realities; in short, because
he has endeavoured to comprehend, under the same denominations, very
different animals, and which necessarily required other appellations.
I can give both example and proof, without swerving from the class of
quadrupeds, which, of all animals, are those best known to man, and to
which he was, consequently, the best enabled to give the most precise
denominations.
The name of _quadruped_ supposes an animal with _four feet_. If it be
deficient in two, like the manati; if it have hands and arms like the
ape; or if it have wings like the bat; it is not a quadruped: therefore
this general denomination is erroneous when applied to either of those
animals. In order to speak with precision, there should be truth in
the ideas which the words represent; for instance, let us find a
word to convey a perfect idea of an animal with two hands; if we had
a term to denote a two-handed animal, as well as one with two feet,
we might then say, that man alone is biped and bimanous, because he
alone has two hands and two feet; that the manati is only _bimanous_;
that the bat is only a _biped_; and the ape a _quadrimanous_, or
four-handed animal. Let us now apply these _new_ denominations to
every particular being with which they agree, and we shall discover,
that from the two hundred species of animals to which we have given
the common name of _quadrupeds_, there are thirty-five sorts of apes,
baboons, monkeys, sapajous, sagoins, and makis, must be retrenched, as
they are _quadrimanous_, or four-handed; and that to those thirty-five
species we must add the lori, the murine, Virginian and Mexican
opossums, and the jerboas, which are also _quadrimanous_, like those
above-mentioned, and that, consequently, the list of four-handed
animals being at least composed of forty species, the real number of
quadrupeds will be reduced one fifth part. If afterwards we take out
twelve or fifteen species of bipeds, namely, the bats, whose fore-feet
may rather be called wings than feet, and also three or four jerboas,
because they can only walk on their hind feet, those before being too
short; if we remove also the manati, which has no hind feet, and the
different species of the walrus, and the seal, to which animals they
are entirely useless, the number of quadrupeds will be found diminished
a third more; and if we still subtract those animals which make use of
their fore-feet like hands, as the bears, marmots, coatis, squirrels,
rats, and many others, the denomination of quadrupeds will appear to
be misapplied to more than one half of these animals. In fact real
quadrupeds consist only of whole and cloven-footed animals. When we
descend to the digitated class, we find four-handed, or ambiguous
quadrupeds, who use their fore-feet in the manner of hands, and which
ought to be distinguished or separated from the rest. There are three
species of whole hoofed animals, the horse, the zebra, and the ass;
and, by adding the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, and the
camel, whose feet, though terminated by nails, are solid, and only
serve for the purpose of walking, we shall have seven species to which
the name of quadruped perfectly applies.
There is a much greater number of cloven-footed than whole-hoofed
animals. The oxen, the sheep, the goat, the antelope, the bubalus, the
lama, the pacos, the elk, the rein-deer, the stag, the fallow-deer,
the roe-buck, &c. are all cloven-footed, and compose all together full
forty-species. Thus, we have already fifty animals, ten whole hoofed,
and forty cloven-footed, to which the name of quadruped has been
rightly applied. In the digitated animals, the lion, tiger, panther,
leopard, lynx, cat, wolf, fox, dog, hyæna, civet, badger, weasel,
ferret, porcupine, hedge hog, armadillo, ant-eaters, and hog, which
last constitutes the shade between digitated and cloven-footed tribes,
add more than forty other species, to which the name of quadruped also
applies in all the rigour of its acceptation; because, though their
fore-feet are divided into four or five toes, they never use them as
hands; but all the other digitated species who use their fore-feet to
hold and carry food to their mouths, are not, in strict propriety,
quadrupeds. Those species, which are also forty in number, form an
intermediate class between quadrupeds and four-handed animals, and are
in fact neither one nor the other. Therefore, to more than a fourth of
our animals, the name of quadruped does not apply; and with more than
one half it does not agree in all the extent of its acceptation.
The four-handed animals fill up the great chasm between the quadruped
and the human species. The two handed are in the distance between
man and the cetaceous tribes. The bipeds with wings are the shade
between quadrupeds and birds; and the digitated species who use their
fore-feet as hands, fill up all the degrees between the quadrupeds and
the four-handed kinds. But this subject is too extensive to be here
pursued; however useful it might be to give a distinct knowledge of
animals, it is still more so by furnishing us with a new proof, that
not any of our definitions are precise, nor our general terms exact,
when specifically applied to objects, or to beings which they represent.
But why are these definitions and general terms, which seem to be the
master-piece of invention, so exceedingly defective? Is this error the
defect of human understanding? or rather, is it not an incapacity, or
pure inability, of combining, and perceiving a number of objects at
one view? Let us compare the works of nature with those of man: let
us examine how both operate, and then enquire whether the human mind,
however active and extensive, can follow the same route, without being
lost either in the immensity of space, the obscurity of time, or in
the infinite combinations of beings? Let a man direct his mind to
any object if he would avoid being misled, he must walk in a direct
line, pass over the least space, and employ the least possible time to
accomplish his end. But in this pursuit, what a number of reflections
and combinations must he make to avoid those deceitful and fallacious
roads which at first offer themselves in such numbers, that it
requires the greatest and nicest discernment to choose the true and
direct path? This path, however, is not beyond the depth of the human
mind; and by this only sure and solid method he arrives at the destined
point of view; but if he seeks another point, it can only be obtained
by another line. The train of our ideas is a delicate thread, which
only extends in length without any other dimensions; while Nature, on
the contrary, does not take a single step, without extending on all
sides, and passing at once through the three dimensions of length,
breadth and thickness; while man attains but one single point, she
embraces all, and penetrates into every part of a solid mass. By the
power of art, and length of time, our statuaries form a figure which
externally resembles the object proposed; each point of this surface
requires a thousand combinations. Their genius travels over as many
lines as there are lineaments in the figure, and the least false step
would deform it. This piece of marble, so perfectly executed that it
seems to breathe, is, therefore, only a multitude of points to which
the artist arrives by labour and time; for human genius being unable
to seize more than one dimension at a time, and our senses reaching
no further than surfaces, we cannot penetrate the substance; while,
Nature, on the contrary, designs and enters into the depth of things;
she produces forms almost instantaneously; she at once expands them
in all their dimensions; as soon as her movements reach the surface,
the penetrating powers with which she is animated, operate internally.
The smallest atom, when she chooses to make use of it, is obliged to
obey her will. Her actions, therefore, extend over all; she travels
above, below, to the right and left, and consequently, she not
only encompasses the surface, but every particle of the mass. What
difference there consequently is in the result? What comparison can be
made between a statue and an organised body? But also what inequality
in their powers, and how disproportioned the instruments! Man can
only make use of the power he possesses. Confined to a small quantity
of motion, which he can only communicate by impulsion, he can only
exert himself upon surfaces; since the power of impulsion in general
is only transmitted by superficial contact. He only sees and touches,
therefore, the surfaces of bodies, and when he attempts to proceed
further, though he opens, divides, and separates, he still touches
nothing more than surfaces. To penetrate the interior parts of bodies,
he should be possessed of a portion of that power which acts upon
the mass, or of gravity, which is Nature's chief instrument. It is,
therefore, the defect of instruments which prevents the art of man from
approaching that of Nature. His figures, his pictures, his designs,
are only surfaces, or imitations of surfaces, because the images he
receives by his senses are all superficial, and he is unable to give
them the internal parts.
What is true with regard to the arts is the same as to sciences, only
that the latter is less confined, because the mind is the instrument,
and which in the former is subordinate to the senses. But in the
sciences the mind commands the senses, as its only endeavour is to
search into objects, and not to operate on them; to compare, and not
imitate them. The mind, though thus cramped by the senses, though
often abused by their false reports, is, notwithstanding, neither less
pure nor less active. Man, who has a natural desire to knowledge,
began by rectifying, and demonstrating the errors of the senses. He
has treated them as mechanical organs, as instruments, the effects
of which must be left to experience. Pursuing still his desire of
knowledge, he has travelled on with the balance in one hand, and the
compass in the other, and has measured both time and space. Thus, he
has recognized all the exterior parts of Nature's works, but not being
able to penetrate her internal parts by his senses, he has drawn his
conclusions and formed a judgment of them by analogy and comparison. He
discovered that there exists a general force in matter, quite different
from that of impulsion; a force which does not come within the compass
of our senses, and which, though we are unable to make use of, Nature
employs as an universal agent. He has demonstrated, that this force
belongs equally to all matter, in proportion to its mass or real
quantity; that its action extends to immense distances, decreasing as
the space augments. Afterwards, turning his eyes upon living beings,
he found, that heat was another force necessary to their production;
that light was a matter endowed with an unbounded elasticity and
activity; that the formation and expansion of organized beings were
the effects of a combination of all these forces; that the extension
and growth of animal or vegetable bodies, follow exactly the laws of
attraction, and are effected by an increase of all three dimensions at
the same time; and that a mould, when once formed, must, according
to these laws of affinity, produce a succession of others exactly
resembling the original. By combining these attributes, common to
animal and vegetable Nature, he discovered, that there existed in both
an inexhaustible and reversible fund of organic and living substance; a
substance as real as the unformed matter; a substance which continues
always in its live as the other does in its inactive state; a substance
universally diffused, passing from vegetables to animals by means
of nutrition, returning from animals to vegetables by the process
of putrefaction, and maintaining an incessant circulation for the
animation of beings. He also remarked, that these organic particles
existed in every organized body; that they were combined in greater
or less quantities with dead matter; that they were more abundant in
animals where all is full of life, and more scarce in vegetables where
the dead matter predominates, and the living seems to be extinct; where
the organic matter, overpowered by the rude, has neither progressive
motion, sensation, heat, nor life, and is only manifested by its
unfolding and reproduction. Reflecting on the manner each operates,
he discovered, that every living being is a mould that possesses the
power of assimilating the substances by which it is nourished; that
growth is an effect of this assimilation, that the unfolding of a
living body is not a simple augmentation of bulk, but an extension in
every dimension, and a penetration of new matter into every part of the
whole mass; that those parts increasing in proportion to the whole,
and the whole in proportion to the parts, the form is preserved, and
remains always the same till the growth is completed; that when the
body has acquired all its extent, the same matter heretofore employed
in the augmentation, is sent back as superfluous from every part to
which it had been assimilated; and that, by uniting in one common
point, it forms a new being, perfectly like the first, and which to
attain the same dimensions, requires only to be expanded by the same
mode of nutrition. He also observed that man, quadrupeds, cetaceous
animals, birds, reptiles, insects, trees, plants, and herbs, were all
nourished, unfolded, and reproduced by the same universal law; and that
the manner of their nutrition and generation appearing so different,
although dependent on one general and common cause, was because it
could not operate but in a mode relative to the form of each particular
species of being. To acquire these grand truths, required a succession
of ages, and gradual investigation, but having obtained so much, he
began to compare different objects together; and to distinguish one
from the other, he gave them particular names, and invented general
denominations to reunite them under one point of view. He observed, by
taking the body of man as the physical model of every living animal,
and by comparing and examining every living animal in their several
parts, that the form of every thing that breathes is nearly the same;
that the anatomy of a man and an ape are similar; that every animal
has the same organization, the same senses, the same viscera, the same
bones, the same flesh, the same motion of the fluids, and the same
action in the solids. In all of them he has found a heart, veins, and
arteries; the same organs of circulation, respiration, digestion,
nutrition, and secretion; the same solid structure, erected with the
same materials, and put together nearly in the same manner. This
plan he found to proceed uniformly from mankind to the monkey, from
the monkey to quadrupeds, from quadrupeds to the cetaceous animals,
and so on to birds, fish, and reptiles. This plan, I say, when well
comprehended by the human understanding, exhibits a faithful picture of
animated nature, and affords the most simple and general view under
which she can possibly be considered; and when we extend it by passing
from the animal to the vegetable, we shall find this plan, which we
at first found varying only by shades, degenerate by degrees from
reptiles to insects, from insects to worms, from worms to zoophytes,
and from zoophytes to plants; and though changed in all its exterior
parts, nevertheless, still preserving the same character; the principal
features of which are nutrition, expansion, and reproduction. These
features are general and common to every organized substance, they are
eternal and divine; and, far from being effaced or destroyed by time,
are only renewed and rendered more plain and evident.
If, from this great picture of resemblances, in which the living
universe presents itself as but one family, we pass to that of the
differences, wherein each species claims a separate place, and a
distinct portrait, we shall perceive, that excepting some of the larger
species, such as the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the
tiger, and the lion, every other seems to unite with its neighbouring
kind, and to form groups of degraded similitudes, or genera, which our
nomenclators have represented in a network of figures, some of which
are connected by the feet, and others by the teeth, horns, hair, and
others by still smaller affinities. And even the apes, whose form
appears to be the most perfect, that is, approaches nearest to that of
man, are represented confusedly, and require very accurate observations
to distinguish one from the other, because the privilege of separate
species is less owing to form than size. Man himself, although a single
species, and infinitely removed from that of all other animals, yet
being only of a middle size, has more approximations than the larger
kinds. We shall find in the history of the orang-outang that if we were
only to attend to the figure, we might look on that, animal either as
the termination of the human species, or the commencement of the ape;
because, except the intellect, he is not deficient in any one thing
which we possess, and because, in his body, he differs less from man
than from the other animals to which we have given the denomination of
apes.
The mind, thought, and speech, therefore do not depend on the form
or organization of the body. Nothing more strongly proves that they
are peculiar gifts bestowed on man alone, than that the orang-outang
which neither speaks nor thinks, has, nevertheless, the body, the
limbs, the senses, the skull, and the tongue exactly similar to man.
He can counterfeit every motion of the human species, and yet cannot
perfectly perform one single act; which may possibly be owing to a
defect of education, or perhaps yet more to an error in our judgment.
You unjustly compare, it may be said, an ape, who is a native of
the forests, with the man who resides in polished society. To form
a proper judgment between them, a savage man and an ape should be
viewed together; for we have no just idea of man in a pure state of
nature. The head covered with bristly hairs, or with curled wool; the
face partly hid by a long beard, and still longer hairs in the front,
which surround his eyes, destroy his august character, and make them
appear sunk in his head, like those of the brutes; the lips thick and
projecting, the nose flat, the aspect wild or stupid; the ears, body,
and limbs are covered with hair; the nails long, thick, and crooked; a
callous substance like a horn under the soles of the feet; the breasts
of the female long and flabby, and the skin of her belly hanging down
to her knees; the children wallowing in filth, and crawling on their
hands and feet; and the father and mother sitting on their hams,
forming a hideous appearance, rendered more so by being besmeared all
over with stinking grease. This sketch, drawn from a savage Hottentot,
is still a flattering portrait, for there is as great a distance
between a man in a pure state of nature and a Hottentot, as there is
between a Hottentot and us. But if we wish to compare the human species
with that of the ape, we must add to it the affinities of organization,
the agreements of temperament, the vehement desire of male apes for
women, the like conformation of the genitals in both sexes, the
periodic emanations of the females, the compulsive or voluntary
intermixture of the negresses with the apes, the produce of which has
united into both species; and then consider, supposing them not of the
same species, how difficult it is to discover the interval by which
they are separated.
I acknowledge, if we were forced to judge by external appearance alone,
the ape might be taken for a variety in the human species. The Creator
has not formed man's body on a model absolutely different from that
of the mere animal; he has comprehended his figure, as well as that
of every other animal, under one general plan, but at the same time
that he has given him a material form, similar to that of the ape,
he infused this animal body with a divine spirit. If he had granted
the same favour, not to the ape, but to the meanest animal, whose
organization seems to us to be the worst of all constructed beings,
this animal would soon have become the rival of man. Quickened by his
spirit it would have excelled every other animal, by having the power
of thought and speech. Therefore, whatever resemblance there may be
between the Hottentot and the ape, the interval which separates them is
immense, since the former is endowed with the faculties of thinking and
speaking.
Who will ever be able to tell in what the organization of an idiot
differs from that of another man? yet the defect is certainly
in the material organs, since the idiot has a soul like another
person. Now, since in mankind, where the whole structure is entirely
conformable, and perfectly similar, a difference so trifling as to
be entirely imperceptible is sufficient to destroy thought, we must
not be astonished that it never appears in the ape, which has not the
necessary principle.
The action of the soul in general is distinct and independent of
matter. But as it has pleased the Divine Author to unite it with the
body, the exercise of its particular actions depends on the state of
the material organs; and this dependance is not only apparent from
the example of idiots but from persons afflicted with delirium,
from infants who cannot think, from healthful men when asleep, and
from very old people, after the power of thinking is gone. Even the
principle of education seems to consist not so much in instructing
the mind, or bringing its operation to perfection, as in modifying
the material organs, and putting them into the most favourable
condition for exercising the thinking principle. Now there are two
kinds of educations which should be carefully distinguished, as their
effects are quite different; the education of the individual, which
is common both to man and the other animals, and that of the species
which belongs to man alone. A young animal, as well from incitement
as example, learns in a few weeks to perform all the actions of its
parents: a child requires a number of years to attain this degree of
perfection, because when born its growth and strength is incomparably
less forward than in young animals. In the first years the mind is a
void relatively to what it becomes in future. A child, therefore, is
much slower in receiving individual education than that of the brute;
but for this very reason it becomes susceptible of that of the species.
The multiplicity of aids, and the continual cares, which for a long
time, the weak state of the infant exact, entertain and increase the
attachment of its parents, and while they are attending to the care
of the body, they cultivate the mind. The time required to strengthen
the first, turns to the profit of the latter. In the generality of
animals the corporeal faculties are more advanced in two months than
those of an infant in two years; there is, therefore, twelve times as
much time employed in its individual education, without reckoning what
is still remaining to acquire after this period, without considering
that animals quit their young as soon as they are able to provide for
themselves, and that soon after this separation they know each other
no more, so that all attachment, and all education, ceases in them
at the very moment assistance is no longer necessary. Now this time
of education being so short, its effects must be very small; and it
is even astonishing that animals acquire in two months whatever is
necessary for their use during the rest of life: and if we suppose a
child, in an equal space of time, should become sufficiently formed
and strong to leave its parents, and never to return to them for
assistance, would there be any sensible difference between this child
and the brute animal? However ingenious and able the parents were,
could they be able to prepare and modify its organs in so short a
space of time, or to establish the least communication of thought
between their minds and his? Could they be able to excite his memory by
impressions sufficiently reiterated? Could they even modify or unfold
their organs of speech? No, for before the child can pronounce a single
word his ear must have received repeated impressions of the sound
expressing that word; and, before he can be able to apply or pronounce
it properly, the same combination of the word, and the object to which
it belongs, must be frequently presented to him. Education, therefore,
which alone can expand the powers of the mind, will be unremittingly
continued for a length of time; if it should cease, not at the end of
two months, as in animals, but even when twelve months old, the mind
of the child, which could have received no impression, would remain
inactive, like that of an idiot, the defect of whose organs prevents
the reception of knowledge. This reasoning would apply with double
force if we suppose the child born in a pure state of nature, if it
had only a Hottentot mother for its tutoress, and that at the age of
two months it was able to separate from her, and live without her care
and assistance:--would not this child be worse than an idiot, and
entirely on a par with the brutes? But in this state of nature, the
first education, that is, the education of necessity, exacts as much
time as in the civilized state, because in both the child is equally
weak, and equally slow in its growth, and consequently it has need of
the care of its parents for an equal portion of time. In short, it
would infallibly perish if abandoned before the age of three years.
Now this necessary habitude, so long continued between the mother and
the child, is sufficient to communicate to it all that she possesses;
and though we should falsely suppose, that this mother, in a state of
nature, possesses not any one gift, not even that of speech, would
not this long habitude with her child produce a language? Thus this
state of pure nature, wherein we suppose man to be without thought
and speech, is imaginary, and never had existence. This needful and
long intercourse of parents with their children produces society in
the midst of a desart. The family understand each other by signs and
sounds; and this first ray of intelligence, when cherished, cultivated,
and communicated, unfolds, in the process of time, all the buds of
thought; and as this habitual intercourse could not sustain itself so
long without producing mutual signs and sounds, always repeated and
gradually engraven on the memory of the child, would consequently
become constant and intelligible expressions; though the list of words
is short, it still forms a language, which will soon become more
extended as the family increases, and will always follow the steps of
society in improvement. Society being formed, the education of the
child is no longer individual, for then the parents communicate to
it not only what they possess from Nature, but also what they have
received from their ancestors, and from the society of which they form
a part. It is no longer a communication between detached individuals,
confined like animals to the transmission of simple faculties, but an
institution of which the whole species partakes, and whose produce
constitutes the bond and basis of society.
Even among brute animals, though deprived of the thinking principle,
those whose education is the longest are also those which seem to have
the greatest share of intelligence: the elephant, who takes the longest
time in completing its growth, and which requires the assistance of its
mother for the whole of the first year, is also the most intelligent
animal. The Guinea-pig, which requires only three weeks to accomplish
its growth, and be in a generating state, is perhaps, for this reason
alone, one of the most stupid animals in Nature. With respect to
the ape, with a view to ascertain whose nature we have gone into
this investigation, whatever resemblance he may bear to man, yet his
affinity to the brutes is evident from the moment of his birth; he
is then proportionably stronger, and more completely formed than the
infant, and the time of his growth bears no comparison; the assistance
of his mother is only necessary during a few months; his education is
purely individual, and consequently as sterile as that of other animals.
The ape, therefore, notwithstanding his resemblance to the human
form, is a brute, and so far from being second in our species, he is
not even the first in the order of animals, because he is not the
most intelligent among them; therefore it is only on account of the
corporeal resemblance that prejudice has been formed in favour of the
great faculties of the ape. He resembles man it is said both externally
and internally, and therefore he must not only imitate us, but also
of his own accord, act in the same manner as we do. We have seen that
every action which we call human is relative to society: that they
depend, at first on the mind, and afterwards on education, the physical
principle of which is the necessity there is for the long intercourse
between parents and children: that this intercourse is very short
with the ape; that, like other animals, he only receives an education
purely individual, and is not susceptible of any other; consequently he
cannot act like man, since no action of the ape has the same principle,
nor the same end. With respect to imitation, which appears to be the
strongest and most striking character in the ape kind, and which the
vulgar refer to him as a peculiar talent, before we decide, we must
examine whether this imitation be spontaneous or forced. Does the ape
imitate the human species from inclination, or from possessing an
innate capacity of performing those actions without choice or exertion?
I willingly appeal to all those who have observed this animal without
prejudice, and I am convinced they will agree with me, that there
is nothing voluntary in their imitation. The monkey having arms and
hands, makes use of them as we do, but without any idea of copying our
example. The similitude of his limbs and organs necessarily produces
motions resembling ours; being formed like man he must be enabled to
move like him; but this similarity of motion by no means proves that he
acts from imitation. Let us, for instance, construct two pendulums of
the same form, and give them an equal motion, would it not be absurd to
say that these machines imitate each other? It is the same with respect
to the ape, relatively to the body of man; they are two machines,
similarly constructed, and by the impulse of Nature move nearly in the
same manner: however, parity must not be considered as imitation; the
one depends on matter, and the other exists only in reason. Imitation
supposes a design of copying; the ape is incapable of forming this
design, which requires a train of thought and judgment; for this
reason, man, if he choose, can imitate the ape, but the ape cannot have
an idea of imitating man.
This parity is no more than the physical part of imitation, and not
so complete as the similitude, from which, however, it proceeds as an
immediate effect. The ape resembles man more in his body and limbs
than in the use he makes of them. By observing the ape attentively
we shall perceive that all his motions are sudden, intermittent, and
precipitate; and to compare them with those of man we must suppose
a different model. Every action of the ape strongly partakes of his
education, which is purely animal; and they appear to be extravagant,
ridiculous, and inconsequential, because we judge of them by our
own, which is a false comparison. As his nature is vivacious, his
temperament warm, his disposition petulant, and none of his affections
have been polished by education, all his habitudes are excessive,
and more resemble the actions of a lunatic than those of a man, or
even those of a peaceable animal: from the same reason we find him
indocile, and receiving with difficulty the impressions we wish him to
imbibe. He is insensible to kindness, and only to be rendered obedient
through fear of chastisement. He may be kept in captivity, but not in
a domestic state. Always sullen, stubborn, or making grimaces, he may
rather be said to be subdued than tamed; therefore none of this species
has ever been domesticated in any part of the world, and consequently
is more distant from man than most other animals, for docility supposes
some analogy betwixt the giver and the receiver of instruction; a
relative quality, which cannot be exercised but when there is a certain
number of common faculties in both, which only differ from each other
because they are active in the master and passive in the scholar. Now
the passive qualities of the ape have less relation to the active
qualities of man than those of the dog or elephant, who only require
good treatment to receive the kind and even delicate sentiments of a
faithful attachment, voluntary obedience, grateful service, and an
unreserved and ready attention to the commands of their master.
The ape is, therefore, further removed from the human species in
relative qualities, than most other animals: He likewise differs
greatly by temperament. The human species can dwell in every climate;
he lives and multiplies in the northern as well as in the southern
regions; but the ape lives with difficulty in temperate countries, and
can only multiply in the hottest parts of the earth. This difference of
temperament supposes others in organization, which though concealed,
are no less real; it must also have a great influence on his natural
dispositions. The excess of heat so necessary to this animal renders
all his affections, and all his qualities, excessive; and we need not
seek for any other cause to account for his petulance, his lubricity,
and his other passions, which seem to be as violent as they are
extravagant.
Thus the ape, which philosophers, as well as the generality of people,
have regarded as a being difficult to define, and the nature of which
was at least equivocal, and intermediate between that of man and the
brute, is, in fact, no other than a real brute, wearing externally
a human mask, but internally destitute of thought, and every other
attribute which constitutes the human species: an animal inferior to
many others in his relative faculties, and most essentially different
from the human race in his nature, temperament, and also in the time
necessary to his education, gestation, growth, and duration of life;
that is, in every real habitude which constitutes what we call _Nature_
in a particular being.
_Engraved for Barr's Buffon._
[Illustration: FIG. 195. _Jocko._]
[Illustration: FIG. 196. _Small Gibbon._]