CIVIL RIGHTS OF NEGROES
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, prohibiting
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, was
proposed to the legislatures of the thirty-six States on February 1,
1865, a little over two months before the surrender of Lee at
Appomattox, and was declared to have been ratified by twenty-seven
States, the requisite three-fourths, by December 18, 1865. The latter
date marked the Negro’s final freedom from physical bondage. His body
could no longer be owned as chattel property. But there is a vast
difference between being able to say “No man owns my body,” and “I have
the same rights, privileges, and immunities as other free men.” This
difference the Thirty-ninth Congress—that of 1865–1866—fully realized,
and grappled with.
The first ten Amendments were passed soon after the adoption of the
Constitution to satisfy the demands of those who were jealous of the
power of the Federal government. These, in brief, guaranteed to the
citizens of the United States (1) freedom of religion, speech, press,
assembly, and of petition for redress of grievances; (2) the right to
keep and bear arms; (3) the right not to have soldiers quartered in
one’s house in time of peace without one’s consent; (4) freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; (5) the right not to be denied life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; (6) the right to trial
by jury; (7) the right of the accused to be confronted by his accuser;
(8) the right not to have one’s property taken for public use without
compensation; and (9) the right not to be subjected to cruel or unusual
punishment, and not to have excessive bail required. These were
limitations upon the power of Congress, the States themselves having
guaranteed such rights to their own citizens by their bill of rights.
After the War, the Federal government was fearful that the States,
particularly those lately in rebellion, would not grant these rights or
privileges to the freedmen, who, according to the Dred Scott decision,
were not citizens. All the power that Congress had over the States, it
seems, was to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by appropriation
legislation. But it proceeded to make the most of the power it had,
biding its time when another amendment to the Constitution would give it
more power over the States.
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The first step taken by Congress, under the power supposedly arising out
of the Thirteenth Amendment, was an attempt to secure to the Negro his
so-called “civil rights.” Unfortunately, there seems to be no succinct
definition of this term. Bouvier[214] defines the phrase thus: “A term
applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and by
various acts of Congress made in pursuance thereof.” This definition,
however, helps little, and one is thrown back upon the Amendments and
subsidiary enactments themselves to work out from them what are the
civil rights of a citizen and of the Negro in particular.
During the summer and fall of 1865, between the close of the War and the
convening of Congress, there had developed on the part of the radical
element of the Republican party under Thaddeus Stevens an opposition to
President Johnson’s Reconstruction plans. The first Civil Rights Bill
passed the Senate on February 2, 1866, passed the House a few days
later, but on March 27, was returned with the veto of the President. It
was passed, however, over his veto on April 9, 1866, and was thereafter
known as the Civil Rights Bill[215] of 1866. The first section reads:
“All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefits of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.”
It is evident that the first phrase was intended to contravene the Dred
Scott decision and to establish the Negro’s citizenship. While the Bill
was before Congress, the great subject of debate was as to just what
rights would be given thereby to the Negro. Some opposed it because they
thought it would give him the right of suffrage, the right to intermarry
with whites, to attend the same schools and churches, to sit on juries,
and to testify in courts. It must be remembered that the “Black Laws” of
the free States were still in force, and the Congressmen from those
States were as jealous of Federal interference on the subject as those
from the Southern States.
It is not the purpose here to discuss the Civil Rights Bill as it was
regarded by the people, but rather as it was interpreted by the courts.
Although it stood scarcely more than two years before it was eclipsed
and practically superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless it
stood long enough to be tested by the courts.
The Negroes, prompted in some instances probably by white persons,
undertook immediately to see what rights were really secured to them by
the Bill. In Tennessee and Mississippi, in 1866, convictions were had
under the existing State laws against intermarriage, as there had
previously been. Appeal to the Federal Supreme Court was talked of, but
nothing came of it. With a view to testing their rights, Negroes in New
York demanded sleeper accommodations on railroads, and went to
fashionable restaurants and demanded the right to sit with the white
patrons, but in both instances were refused. In Baltimore they sought
accommodations on street cars, in theatres, saloons, etc. with whites,
but were met with the same refusal.[216]
The constitutionality of the Bill was denied in 1867 by the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky,[217] on the ground that it invaded the right of the
State to regulate its own domestic concerns. But its constitutionality
was upheld in two cases: United States v. Rhodes,[218] 1866, in the
Circuit Court, a case involving the right of a Negro to testify, and _In
re_ Turner,[219] in the Circuit Court also, a Maryland case involving
the laws of apprenticeship.
It appears that none of the cases involving the rights of Negroes in
public places, which are being considered particularly in this chapter,
reached the higher courts. But Mr. Flack[220] says: “The instances we
have cited, however, are apparently sufficient to justify the conclusion
that the belief prevailed generally—north, east, west and
south—especially among the Negroes, that the Civil Rights Bill gave the
colored people the same rights and privileges as white men as regards
travel, schools, theatres, churches, and the ordinary rights which may
be legally demanded. There also seems to have been a less general belief
that it also permitted the intermarriage of the races.”
As interesting as it would be to trace this Bill and the subsequent
Federal enactments through Congress, it would take one too far afield.
He must accept the products as they came from the crucible of debate,
and interpret their effect upon the rights of Negroes.
The Civil Rights Bill of 1866 was practically superseded by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified by thirty-six States and
declared operative July 28, 1868. This section reads as follows: “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Mr. Flack[221] says that the purpose in the adoption of this Amendment
was (1) to make the Bill of Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding
upon the States as well as upon the Nation; (2) to give validity to the
Civil Rights Bill of 1866; and (3) to declare who were citizens of the
United States. As he shows by an analysis of the debates in Congress,
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 was doubted by
many of its able advocates, and it was natural that they should desire
to make their tenets secure by incorporating them into the Constitution
itself. It is worth remarking that on May 1, 1870, the Civil Rights Bill
of 1866 was practically re-enacted.[222]
The words “Negro,” “race,” or “color” do not appear in the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment; but a study of the speeches before the
House and Senate would show that the legislators had the Negro primarily
in mind, and so the court understood. In the Slaughter-House Cases[223]
of 1872, cases not having to do with the Negro in the slightest degree,
Mr. Justice Miller gave an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
which has stood as a landmark. He said: “... on the most casual
examination of the language of these Amendments [Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth], no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, laying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom
of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him. It is true that only the Fifteenth Amendment, in terms, mentions
the Negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as
true that each of the other articles were addressed to the grievances of
that race, and designed to remedy them as the Fifteenth. We do not say
that no one else but the Negro can share in their protection.... But we
do say ... that in any fair and just construction of any section or
phrase of these Amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which
we have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they
were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the
Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far
as constitutional law can accomplish it.” Without further citation of
authorities, it may be assumed that the primary purpose of Congress in
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure and protect the rights
and privileges of Negroes.
The next Federal legislation on the subject was the Civil Rights
Bill[224] of 1875, which declared that all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States should be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and
other places of public amusement, subject only to the conditions
established by law and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. The penalty
for the violation of this law was the forfeiture of five hundred dollars
to the person aggrieved and a fine of not less than five hundred dollars
nor more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment not less than three
months nor more than one year. The District and Circuit Courts of the
United States were given exclusive jurisdiction of offences against this
statute. District attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the United
States, and commissioners appointed by the Federal courts were
authorized to proceed against those violating the provisions of the act.
The years between 1865 and 1875 had witnessed changes in the attitude of
Congress toward the civil rights of Negroes. The Bill of 1866 was
general in its terms, yet Congress did not feel secure till the
Fourteenth Amendment had been passed to give validity, in a sense, to
what had already been done. Now in 1875 Congress passed a bill which far
surpassed in scope anything that had theretofore been undertaken. It is
surprising that the test case of its constitutionality did not reach the
court of last resort before 1883. During the year of its passage, 1875,
doubt was thrown upon its validity by Judge Dick in charging the grand
jury of the Federal Circuit Court of North Carolina,[225] who said, in
part: “Every man has a natural and inherent right of selecting his own
associates, and this natural right cannot be properly regulated by
legislative action, but must always be under the control of the
individual taste or inclination.” The same year, Judge Emmons, of the
Circuit Court in Tennessee,[226] ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
applied to State and not individual action, and that the Federal
government could not require individual innkeepers, theatre managers,
etc., to entertain Negroes.
The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill of 1875, however, was
finally settled in 1883. That year five cases[227] reached the Supreme
Court, all of which had to do with the civil rights of Negroes. Two of
them concerned the rights of colored persons in inns and hotels; two,
their rights in theatres; and one, in railroad cars. Mr. Justice
Bradley, delivering the opinion of the court, took the ground that the
first and second sections of the Civil Rights Bill were unconstitutional
for these reasons: (1) They are not authorized by the Thirteenth
Amendment, abolishing and prohibiting slavery, because the separation of
the races in public places is not a badge of servitude. “It would be
running the slavery argument into the ground,” he said, “to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take
into his coach, or cab, or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.” (2) The Civil
Rights Bill is not authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment, because that
refers to action by the State, while the Bill refers to individual
discrimination. It is State action of a particular kind that is
prohibited. “Individual invasion of individual rights,” he argued, “is
not the subject matter of the amendment.... It nullifies and makes void
all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.... It does
not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are
within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief
against State legislation or State action.... It does not authorize
Congress to create a code of municipal laws for the regulation of
private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation of
State laws, and the action of State officers, executive or judicial,
when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
Amendment ... until some State law has been passed, or some State action
through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of
citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no
legislation of the United States under said Amendment, nor any
proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity; for the
prohibitions of the Amendment are against State laws and acts done under
State authority.”
The effect of this decision is that the Federal government cannot
prevent the curtailment of the civil rights of Negroes by individuals
unless such individuals are acting under sanction of State statutes, and
in that case, the Federal court can only declare that the State statute
is unconstitutional.
STATE LEGISLATION BETWEEN 1865 AND 1883
The Civil Rights Bill of 1875 was the last effort of Congress to
guarantee to Negroes their civil rights. It is well now to turn back in
point of time, and trace the action of the State legislatures on the
subject. It has been deemed advisable to let the year 1883 be the
dividing point in the history of the latter legislation. Before that
time the States were moving in conjunction with the Nation; after, the
impotence of the Nation having been declared by its Supreme Court, the
burden of defining and securing civil rights to Negroes devolved upon
the States. Moreover, it is well to treat the Southern States and the
States outside the South separately, because of the abnormal conditions
in the former occasioned by Reconstruction.
_In States Outside of South_
Between 1865 and 1883 there was comparatively little legislation in the
Northern, Eastern, and Western States as to civil rights. This was
naturally so because these States were waiting to see what the Federal
government meant to do. A brief examination of what little legislation
there was will be made.
On May 16, 1865, Massachusetts[228] declared that there should be no
distinction, discrimination, or restriction on account of color or race
in any licensed inn, public place of amusement, public conveyance, or
public meeting, and imposed a fine of fifty dollars for the violation of
this law. The next year it included theatres[229] within the
prohibition, but weakened the force of the statute by saying that there
should be no exclusion or restriction “except for good cause.”
The attitude of Delaware[230] toward civil rights is probably the most
interesting of any of the Northern States. On April 11, 1873, its
legislature passed the following “joint resolution in opposition to
making Negroes the equals of white men, politically or socially”:
“That the members of this General Assembly, for the people they
represent, and for themselves, jointly and individually, do hereby
declare uncompromising opposition to a proposed act of Congress,
introduced by Hon. Charles Sumner at the last session, and now on file
in the Senate of the United States, known as the ‘Supplemental Civil
Rights Bill,’ and all other measures intended or calculated to equalize
or amalgamate the Negro race with the white race, politically or
socially, and especially do they proclaim unceasing opposition to making
Negroes eligible to public offices, to sit on juries, and to their
admission into public schools where white children attend, and to the
admission on terms of equality with white people in the churches, public
conveyances, places of amusement, or hotels, and to any measure designed
or having the effect to promote the equality of the Negro with the white
man in any of the relations of life, or which may possibly conduce to
such result.
“That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives
requested to vote against and use all honorable means to defeat the
passage by Congress of the bill referred to in the foregoing resolution,
known as the ‘Supplemental Civil Rights Bill,’ and all other measures of
a kindred nature, and any and every attempt to make the Negro the peer
of the white man.”
Upon the heels of this resolution, in 1875, Delaware[231] enacted a
statute on March 15, 1875, which provided that no keeper of an inn,
tavern, hotel, or restaurant, or other place of public entertainment or
refreshment of travelers, guests, or customers, should be obliged by law
to furnish entertainment or refreshment to persons whose reception or
entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his
customers, or would injure his business. The term “customers” was taken
to include all who sought entertainment or refreshment. The proprietor
of a theatre or other public place of amusement was not obliged to
receive into his show, or admit into the place where he was pursuing his
occupation, any person whose presence there would be offensive to the
major part of his spectators or patrons, and thereby injure his
business. Any carrier of passengers might make such arrangements in his
business as would, if necessary, assign a particular place in his cars,
carriages, or boats, to such of his customers as he might choose to
place there, and whose presence elsewhere would be offensive to the
major part of the traveling public, where his business was conducted;
but the accommodations must be equal if the same price for carriage was
required of all. This is still the law in Delaware. Taken in connection
with the joint resolution above, there is little doubt that the
legislature intended to make possible the drawing of a color line,
though it did not expressly say so. It is noteworthy that, during the
stormy years of Reconstruction, some case testing its constitutionality
did not arise. Only one other State has had a statute anything like the
Delaware law, and that is Tennessee, which statute and, with it,
apparently the only case involving the constitutionality of the law that
has reached the courts will be discussed later.
A Kansas[232] statute of April 25, 1874, which is still law, provided
that there should be no distinction on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude in any State university, college, or
other school of public instruction, or in any licensed inn, hotel,
boarding house, or any place of public entertainment or amusement, or
any steamboat, railroad, stage coach, omnibus, street car, or any other
means of public carriage for persons or freight, under penalty of a fine
of from ten to one thousand dollars.
New York,[233] on April 9, 1874, passed a Civil Rights Bill which
prohibited race distinctions in inns, public conveyances on land and
water, theatres, other public places of amusements, common schools,
public institutions of learning, and cemeteries. It further declared
that the discrimination against a citizen on account of color, by the
use of the word “white,” or any other term, in any law, statute,
ordinance, or regulation, should be repealed. In 1881, it specifically
mentioned hotels, inns, taverns, restaurants, public conveyances,
theatres, and other places of public resort or amusement.[234]
_In South_
One would naturally expect that most of the legislation in the South
guaranteeing civil rights to Negroes would have come during the period
that their governments were in the hands of the Reconstructionists, and
such is the case.
In 1866 a Florida[235] statute made it a misdemeanor for a person of
color to intrude himself into any religious or other public assembly of
white persons, or into a railroad car or other public vehicle set apart
for the exclusive accommodation of white people, or for a white person
so to intrude upon the accommodations of colored persons. By 1873,
however, the political revolution had come, and a statute[236] of that
year forbade discrimination on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, in the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, etc., of inns, public conveyances on land and water,
licensed theatres, other places of public amusement, common schools,
public institutions of learning, cemeteries, and benevolent associations
supported by general taxation. This prohibition did not apply to private
schools or cemeteries established exclusively for white or colored
persons. It added, as did the law of New York, that there should be no
discrimination in any laws by using the word “white.”
A statute of Louisiana[237] in 1869 prohibited any discrimination on
account of race or color by common carriers, innkeepers, hotel keepers,
or keepers of public resorts. The license of such places had to contain
the stipulation that they must be open to all without distinction or
discrimination on account of color. The penalty was forfeiture of the
license and a suit for damages by the party aggrieved. This statute[238]
was strengthened in 1873 by the further provision that all persons,
without regard to race or color, must have “equal and impartial
accommodations” on public conveyances, in inns and other places of
public resort. It was the duty of the attorney-general to bring suit in
the name of the State to take away the license of anyone violating the
law. The statute imposed a fine upon common carriers running from other
States into Louisiana who made any discrimination against citizens of
the latter on account of race or color.
Arkansas,[239] in 1873, required the same accommodations to be furnished
to all by common carriers, keepers of public houses of entertainment,
inns, hotels, restaurants, saloons, groceries, dramshops, or other
places where liquor was sold, public schools, and benevolent
institutions supported in whole or partly by general taxation.
The law of Tennessee[240] of 1875 is in a very different tone, it being
very much like, as has been said before, that of Delaware. That statute
reads: “The rule of the common law giving a right of action to any
person excluded from any hotel, or public means of transportation, or
place of amusement, is hereby abrogated; and hereafter no keeper of any
hotel, or public house, or carrier of passengers for hire, or
conductors, drivers, or employees of such carrier or keeper, shall be
bound, or under any obligation to entertain, carry, or admit any person,
whom he shall for any reason whatever, choose not to entertain, carry,
or admit, to his house, hotel, carriage, or means of transportation or
place of amusement; nor shall any right exist in favor of any such
person so refused admission, but the right of such keepers of hotels and
public houses, carriers of passengers, and keepers of places of
amusement and their employees to control the access and admission or
exclusion of persons to or from their public houses, means of
transportation, and places of amusement, shall be as perfect and
complete as that of any person over his private house, carriage, or
private theatre, or place of amusement for his family.” This Tennessee
law is even more sweeping than that of Delaware. In the latter, common
carriers may provide separate accommodations for persons that would be
disagreeable to the major portion of the traveling public; in the
former, the common carrier might exclude such persons altogether.
According to the Tennessee statute, every railroad company in the State
had a right to refuse absolutely to carry Negroes on its cars. Of
course, this has been changed by its “Jim Crow” laws. The case of State
v. Lasater,[241] dealing with the second section of the Tennessee
statute, has the following to say about the whole enactment: “This is an
extraordinary statute. It is generally understood to have been passed to
avoid the supposed effects of an act of Congress on the same subject,
known as the Civil Rights Bill.”
The constitutionality of the Tennessee and Delaware statutes has not
been tested, as far as is known. Therefore, in the absence of authority,
an opinion on the matter is of little value, but the following
suggestion is ventured: Originally, hotels and inns were no more public
places than a man’s dwelling, and one could choose his patrons just as
he could choose the guests he would entertain, and might exclude anyone
without giving his reasons for it, as a merchant might refuse to sell
goods to anyone he chose. For historical reasons, which need not be
discussed here, the courts held that an inn-keeper should not be allowed
to refuse an applicant for entertainment unless he had some valid reason
for it. The common law thereafter considered hotels, etc., public
places. It has been seen that the Civil Rights Cases held that the
Federal government cannot prohibit a hotel-keeper from refusing to
receive an applicant, but that the regulation of such domestic relations
is within the exclusive control of the State. If the State sees fit to
pass a statute abrogating the common law, as Tennessee and Delaware did,
and making hotels, etc., private places, as they were originally, there
seems to be no valid constitutional objection. The reasoning that
applies to hotels will apply to other places now considered public,
possibly even to public conveyances.
The following resolution of the legislature of North Carolina[242] of
1877 is worth quoting in full. It is especially significant because it
was passed after the Reconstruction régime was over, and the State
government had passed back into hands of the Democratic party, with
Zebulon B. Vance as Governor.
“_Whereas_, In the providence of God, the colored people have been set
free, and this is their country and their home, as well as that of the
white people, and there should be nothing to prevent the two races from
dwelling together in the land in harmony and peace;
“_Whereas_, We recognize the duty of the stronger race to uphold the
weaker, and that upon it rests the responsibility of an honest and
faithful endeavor to raise the weaker race to the level of intelligent
citizenship; and
“_Whereas_, The colored people have been erroneously taught that
legislation under Democratic auspices would be inimical to their rights
and interests, thereby causing a number of them to entertain honest
fears in the premises,
“The General Assembly of North Carolina do resolve, That, while we
regard with repugnance the absurd attempts, by means of ‘Civil Rights’
Bills, to eradicate certain race distinctions, implanted by nature and
sustained by the habits of forty centuries; and while we are sure that
good government demands for both races alike that the great
representation and executive offices of the country should be
administered by men of the highest intelligence and best experience in
public affairs, we do, nevertheless, heartily accord alike to every
citizen, without distinction of race or color, equality before the law.
“_Resolved_, That we recognize the full purport and intent of that
amendment to the Constitution of the United States which confers the
right of suffrage and citizenship upon the people of color, and that
part of the Constitution of North Carolina conferring educational
privileges upon both races: that we are disposed and determined to carry
out in good faith these as all other constitutional provisions.”
STATE LEGISLATION AFTER 1883
_In South_
The civil rights legislation in the South after 1883 may be shortly
disposed of, for an examination of the session laws of the Southern
States since that time reveals only one statute that can at all properly
be called a Civil Rights Bill. That was a statute of Tennessee[243] of
March 25, 1885, providing against discrimination in theatres, shows,
parks, places of public resort for observation of scenery or amusement
of any kind whatever, where fee or toll is charged. But it adds this
significant section: “That nothing herein contained shall be construed
as interfering with the existing rights to provide separate
accommodations and seats for colored and white persons at such places.”
It may be taken for granted that the Civil Rights Bills passed in the
South by the Reconstruction administrations became inoperative, if they
were not actually repealed, as soon as the government reverted to the
hands of the resident white people. Of course, all the Southern
legislation as to separate schools and separate accommodations in public
conveyances relates to the civil rights of Negroes, and most of this has
come since 1883, but the discussion of these two important subjects is
postponed to later chapters.
_In States Outside of South_
The Federal Civil Rights Bill, as has been seen, was declared
unconstitutional in 1883, and the national government was thereby
declared impotent to secure for Negroes equality of accommodations in
public places. Thus the burden, as has been said before, was thrown upon
the States. Many of the States outside the South responded by adopting
bills which practically copied the Civil Rights Bill of 1875. The
following is a list of the States that have such Civil Rights Bills with
the dates of their adoption and amendments: Connecticut,[244] 1884 and
1905; Iowa,[245] 1884 and 1892; New Jersey,[246] 1884; Ohio,[247] 1884
and 1894; Colorado,[248] 1885 and 1895; Illinois,[249] 1885;
Indiana,[250] 1885; Massachusetts,[251] 1885, 1893, and 1895;
Michigan,[252] 1885; Minnesota,[253] 1885, 1897, and 1899;
Nebraska,[254] 1885 and 1893; Rhode Island,[255] 1885; New York,[256]
1893 and 1895; Pennsylvania,[257] 1887; Washington,[258] 1890;
Wisconsin,[259] 1895; and California,[260] 1897. The Kansas[261] bill
has already been considered.
A clearer idea of what the various State statutes mean and how they
differ from the Civil Rights Bill of 1875 may be got from the
accompanying table. The list contains the names of places where all
citizens, without regard to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude are guaranteed equality of accommodation. It will be noticed
that none of the Southern States have Civil Rights Bills and, therefore,
depend upon the courts to determine the rights of citizens in public
places, and in addition the following States have no such statute:
Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
ANALYSIS OF THE STATE CIVIL RIGHTS BILLS
───────────────┬──────────┬────────┬───────────┬────────┬───────┬────
│ │ │ │ │ │
│California│Colorado│Connecticut│Illinois│Indiana│Iowa
───────────────┼──────────┼────────┼───────────┼────────┼───────┼────
Inns │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ x
Taverns │ │ │ │ │ │
Restaurants │ x │ │ │ x │ x │
Eating houses │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ x
Boarding houses│ │ │ │ │ │
Cafés │ │ │ │ x │ │
Chop houses │ │ │ │ │ │ x
Lunch counters │ │ │ │ │ │ x
Hotels │ x │ │ │ x │ │
Saloons │ │ │ │ │ │
Soda fountains │ │ │ │ x │ │
Ice cream │ │ │ │ │ │
parlors │ │ │ │ x │ │
Bath houses │ x │ │ │ x │ │ x
Barber shops │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ x
Theatres │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ x
Concerts │ │ │ │ x │ │
Music halls │ │ │ │ │ │
Skating rinks │ x │ │ │ x │ │
Bicycle rinks │ │ │ │ x │ │
Churches │ │ x │ │ │ │
Public meetings│ │ │ │ │ │
Elevators │ │ │ │ x │ │
Public │ │ │ │ │ │
conveyances │ │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
State │ │ │ │ │ │
universities │ │ │ │ │ │
State colleges │ │ │ │ │ │
Schools of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ │ │ │ │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ │ │ │ │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
accommodation│ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
amusement │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public resort│ │ x │ │ │ │
Public places │ │ │ │ │ │
kept for │ │ │ │ │ │
hire, gain, │ │ │ │ │ │
or reward │ │ │ │ │ │
Places where │ │ │ │ │ │
refreshments │ │ │ │ │ │
are served │ │ │ │ │ │ x
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
entertainment│ │ │ │ │ │
───────────────┴──────────┴────────┴───────────┴────────┴───────┴────
───────────────┬──────┬─────────────┬────────┬─────────┬────────┬──────
│ │ │ │ │ │ New
│Kansas│Massachusetts│Michigan│Minnesota│Nebraska│Jersey
───────────────┼──────┼─────────────┼────────┼─────────┼────────┼──────
Inns │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
Taverns │ │ │ │ x │ │
Restaurants │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │
Eating houses │ │ │ x │ x │ │
Boarding houses│ x │ │ │ │ │
Cafés │ │ │ │ │ │
Chop houses │ │ │ │ │ │
Lunch counters │ │ │ │ │ │
Hotels │ x │ │ │ x │ │
Saloons │ │ │ │ x │ │
Soda fountains │ │ │ │ │ │
Ice cream │ │ │ │ │ │
parlors │ │ │ │ x │ │
Bath houses │ │ │ │ │ │
Barber shops │ │ x │ x │ x │ x │
Theatres │ │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
Concerts │ │ │ │ │ │
Music halls │ │ │ │ │ │
Skating rinks │ │ x │ │ │ │
Bicycle rinks │ │ │ │ │ │
Churches │ │ │ │ │ │
Public meetings│ │ x │ │ │ │
Elevators │ │ │ │ │ │
Public │ │ │ │ │ │
conveyances │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
State │ │ │ │ │ │
universities │ x │ │ │ │ │
State colleges │ x │ │ │ │ │
Schools of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ x │ │ │ │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ │ │ │ x │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
accommodation│ │ │ x │ x │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │
amusement │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
public resort│ │ │ │ x │ │
Public places │ │ │ │ │ │
kept for │ │ │ │ │ │
hire, gain, │ │ │ │ │ │
or reward │ │ x │ │ │ │
Places where │ │ │ │ │ │
refreshments │ │ │ │ │ │
are served │ │ │ │ x │ │
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │
entertainment│ x │ │ │ x │ │
───────────────┴──────┴─────────────┴────────┴─────────┴────────┴──────
───────────────┬────┬────┬────────────┬──────┬──────────┬─────────┬─────
│New │ │ │Rhode │ │ │
│York│Ohio│Pennsylvania│Island│Washington│Wisconsin│Total
───────────────┼────┼────┼────────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────
Inns │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ x │ 16
Taverns │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Restaurants │ x │ x │ x │ │ x │ x │ 13
Eating houses │ x │ x │ │ │ x │ x │ 11
Boarding houses│ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Cafés │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Chop houses │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Lunch counters │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Hotels │ x │ │ x │ │ │ │ 6
Saloons │ │ │ │ │ │ x │ 2
Soda fountains │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Ice cream │ │ │ │ │ │ │
parlors │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2
Bath houses │ x │ │ │ │ │ │ 4
Barber shops │ x │ x │ │ │ x │ x │ 13
Theatres │ x │ x │ x │ │ x │ │ 14
Concerts │ │ │ x │ │ │ │ 2
Music halls │ x │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Skating rinks │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 3
Bicycle rinks │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Churches │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Public meetings│ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Elevators │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Public │ │ │ │ │ │ │
conveyances │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ 17
State │ │ │ │ │ │ │
universities │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
State colleges │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Schools of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │ │
instruction │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │ │
accommodation│ x │ x │ │ │ x │ x │ 11
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
public │ │ │ │ │ │ │
amusement │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ x │ 18
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
public resort│ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2
Public places │ │ │ │ │ │ │
kept for │ │ │ │ │ │ │
hire, gain, │ │ │ │ │ │ │
or reward │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 1
Places where │ │ │ │ │ │ │
refreshments │ │ │ │ │ │ │
are served │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2
Places of │ │ │ │ │ │ │
entertainment│ │ │ x │ │ │ │ 3
───────────────┴────┴────┴────────────┴──────┴──────────┴─────────┴─────
x Indicates States in which equal accommodations are guaranteed to all
without regard to race.
PENALTY FOR VIOLATING THE LAW
1. CALIFORNIA: Fine not less than $50.
2. COLORADO: Forfeiture between $50 and $500; misdemeanor, fine between
$10 and $300, or imprisonment not over one year.
3. CONNECTICUT: Double damages to person injured.
4. ILLINOIS: Forfeiture between $25 and $500; misdemeanor, fine not over
$500, or imprisonment not over one year.
5. INDIANA: Forfeiture not over $100; misdemeanor, fine not over $100,
or imprisonment not over thirty days, or both.
6. IOWA: Misdemeanor.
7. KANSAS: Misdemeanor, fine between $10 and $1,000, and suit for
damages.
8. MASSACHUSETTS: Forfeiture between $25 and $300; misdemeanor, fine not
over $300, or imprisonment not over one year, or both.
9. MICHIGAN: Misdemeanor, fine not over $100, or imprisonment thirty
days, or both.
10. MINNESOTA: Forfeiture of $500 to aggrieved party; gross misdemeanor.
11. NEBRASKA: Misdemeanor, fine between $25 and $100 and costs.
12. NEW JERSEY: Forfeiture of $500 to aggrieved party and costs;
misdemeanor, fine between $500 and $1,000, imprisonment between thirty
days and one year.
13. NEW YORK: Forfeiture between $100 and $500 to aggrieved party;
misdemeanor, fine between $100 and $500, imprisonment between thirty
days and ninety days, or both.
14. OHIO: Forfeiture between $50 and $500 to aggrieved party;
misdemeanor, fine between $50 and $500, imprisonment between thirty days
and ninety days.
15. PENNSYLVANIA: Misdemeanor, fine between $50 and $100.
16. RHODE ISLAND: Fine not over $100.
17. WASHINGTON: Misdemeanor, fine between $50 and $300, imprisonment
between thirty days and six months.
18. WISCONSIN: Not less than $5 to aggrieved party; fine not over $100,
or imprisonment not over six months.
The wording of all the statutes is essentially the same. Each provides
that all citizens within the jurisdiction of the State, without regard
to race, color, or previous condition of servitude, are entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
the various places mentioned. The offending party may be either indicted
and fined or imprisoned, or he may be sued by the aggrieved party. In
some States, an action by the State is a bar to an action by the party
and vice versa. One who aids or abets in a discrimination against a
person on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is
punished to the same extent as the one actually committing the act.
Heretofore only legislative enactments, State and Federal, as to the
civil rights of Negroes have been considered. It is well now to turn to
the courts to see how the laws have been interpreted as regards various
public places.
HOTELS
Only six States expressly forbid race distinctions in hotels. But it may
be assumed that the sixteen States which mention inns mean to include
hotels.
In 1876 a Negro minister applied for a room at a Philadelphia hotel and
was refused accommodation, though one of the guests offered to share his
room with him. At that time there was no law in Pennsylvania requiring
hotel-keepers to receive colored persons; but the Federal court[262]
held that the clerk might be liable under the Federal Civil Rights Bill
of 1875.
In 1898 one Russ applied for a license to open a hotel in Pennsylvania.
In granting it, the court[263] took the occasion to express its view on
race distinctions in the following words: “A sober, respectable, and
well-behaved colored man or woman is entitled under the law of
Pennsylvania to be received in any house of entertainment and be treated
in the same manner as any other guest. It is time that race
discrimination ceased in this State.... No one objects any longer to his
[the Negro’s] presence in a public conveyance or place of entertainment;
thus far the prejudice of race has been overcome; it is quite certain
that the objection to his presence in a hotel or restaurant will also
pass away as soon as his right under the law to be there is recognized
in fact as it now is by the letter of the statute.... It would be vain
to deny that some race prejudice still exists among us, but the law does
not countenance it, and good citizens should strive to rise above it. We
trust the effort will be made and that toleration and moderation will
mark the conduct of both races.”
In 1896 the members of the Indiana University football team went to the
Nutt House in Crawfordsville, Indiana, for accommodation. One of the
members of the team was a Negro. The clerk refused to take the Negro in
with the rest of the guests, but offered to let him eat at the
“ordinary.” The Negro, being a minor, brought suit through his next
friend, and the Indiana[264] court held that the Civil Rights Bill of
the State could not be satisfied by separate accommodations.
There is no case of race discrimination in the hotels of Massachusetts
that has reached the higher courts, but in April, 1896, the following
resolution[265] was passed by the General Court of the State:
“_Whereas_, On the twenty-ninth day of January, eighteen ninety-six, the
Reverend Benjamin W. Arnett, D.D., of Wilberforce, Ohio, senior bishop
of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, president of the board of
trustees of Wilberforce University, and member of many learned
societies, was refused entertainment at certain reputable hotels in the
city of Boston, because he was a colored man, in spite of the statute
laws against discrimination on account of color; therefore,
“_Resolved_, That the senate and house of representatives of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in general court assembled, successors of
those bodies which repeatedly elected Charles Sumner to the Senate of
the United States, and for four years received messages from John A.
Andrew, hereby express their severest reprobation of such discrimination
and their firm conviction of the truth of the clause of the Declaration
of Independence wherein all men are declared to be created equal; and it
is further
“_Resolved_, That still more to be reprobated is the sentiment of any
part of the public against any class of our fellow citizens whereby such
discrimination is rendered possible, and that a vigorous campaign for
statute rights by the persons most aggrieved will meet the hearty
approval and coöperation of the two branches of the General Court.” This
is very significant as showing the actual attitude of the hotels of
Boston toward receiving Negroes. Whether the “vigorous campaign” was
conducted one cannot tell; certainly no case appears to have reached the
courts. And there is in Boston at present a Negro hotel.
The manager of the Lucerne Hotel in New York City in 1905, refused to
lease a suite to a woman because she was a Jewess. It was a family
hotel, containing small suites like those found in an ordinary apartment
house, rented upon annual leases, transients not being solicited. The
New York court[266] held that it was not a hotel in the sense that the
manager must receive all applicants without regard to race or color. Of
course, this case did not concern the Negro, but the same principle is
involved.
RESTAURANTS
Race discrimination in restaurants is prohibited by thirteen States; in
taverns, by one; in eating-houses, by eleven; in boarding-houses, by
one; in cafés, by one; in chop-houses, by one; and at lunch-counters, by
one. These will be considered under the general head of restaurants.
In 1881 a Negro was refused accommodation in a restaurant in New York.
At that time the laws of the State prohibited discrimination in inns.
The restaurant-keeper argued as a defence in the suit that followed that
the restaurant was not included in the term “inns.” The court[267] held
that the legislature meant by “inn” a place that furnished both lodging
and food to guests, that “restaurant” had no fixed legal meaning, and
that the declaration was sufficient if it said “inn” and then explained
it by calling it a restaurant.
A Negro went to a restaurant in Detroit in 1887 and asked for
accommodation. The clerk told him that he could not be served on the
restaurant side, but that he would be served if he went over on the
saloon side. The colored man complained to the proprietor and was told
that it was the rule of the house not to serve Negroes in the restaurant
room. The statute of Michigan required full and equal accommodation in
restaurants. The court[268] held that the statute would not be satisfied
if the Negro were given as good accommodations but in a different room,
saying: “In Michigan there must be and is an absolute, unconditional
equality of white and colored men before the law.... Whatever right a
white man has in a public place, the black man has also.”
In 1897 a colored man went into a restaurant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
After sitting at the table forty minutes without having his order taken,
he complained, and was told that he was not served because he was
colored. He left, and later brought suit. At the trial, it appeared that
the discrimination was not with the sanction of the proprietor, that he
had told the waiter to serve Negroes, that the waiter had refused to do
so and was discharged therefor. Nevertheless, the court[269] held that
the proprietor was liable for the act of his servant, and gave
compensatory damages to the Negro.
The next year, a restaurant keeper refused to accommodate a Negro in
Lucas County, Ohio, and the court[270] allowed the Negro to recover the
penalty prescribed by the law. The case was decided on a question of
evidence.
In 1905 a Negro was serving on the jury in a civil case in Iowa. The
bailiff had arranged with a boarding-house to serve meals. When the
Negro, along with the other jurors, went for his meals, the
boarding-house keeper refused to allow him to sit at the same table with
the others. It was not questioned that this was in violation of the
Civil Rights Bill of the State if the boarding-house was an
“eating-house” within the terms of the statute. The court[271] charged
the jury that such an eating-house as would come within the statute must
be a place where meals are served to anyone applying at the same prices
charged to all, but that, if meals are served only in pursuance of a
previous arrangement for particular individuals, rather than anyone who
may apply, it is a private boarding-house and not within the statute.
BARBER-SHOPS
Thirteen States provide that barbers must serve all persons without
regard to race or color.
In 1889 a barber in Lincoln, Nebraska, refused to shave a Negro because
he was “colored.” The Civil Rights Bill of that State mentions barbers.
The court[272] held: “A barber, by opening a shop and putting out his
sign, thereby invites every orderly and well-behaved person who may
desire his services to enter his shop during business hours. The statute
will not permit him to say to one, you were a slave or the son of a
slave, therefore I will not shave you. Such prejudices are unworthy of
our better manhood, and are clearly prohibited by the statute.”
Barber-shops were included within the provisions of the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Bill in 1893, but, as a matter of fact, Negroes are not
even now given the same accommodations as whites in barber-shops in
Massachusetts.
The statute of Connecticut requires equality of service in “places of
public accommodation.” A barber refused to serve one Faulkner because he
was a Negro, and the latter brought suit on the ground that a
barber-shop is a place of public accommodation and, hence, within the
Civil Rights Bill of the State. The court[273] held that the barber-shop
is not, in its nature, different from the places of business run for
private gain, and that the common law has never recognized it as
possessing the quality of a place of public accommodation, as a hotel,
public conveyance, etc.
It may be added here that most of the cases have involved the point as
to what are places of public accommodation or amusement or resort. If
the place is mentioned in the Civil Rights Bill, it is, of course,
within the prohibition, and it is a violation of the statute even to
require separate accommodations, although equal in every other respect.
But a vast deal of litigation has arisen out of instances of Negroes
being denied accommodation in places considered public in their nature
but which are not mentioned in the Civil Rights Bill of the State
wherein the case arises.
BOOTBLACK STANDS
In the year 1901, Basso, a bootblack in the basement of one of the
business houses of Rochester, New York, refused to serve Burks because
the latter was a Negro. The law of New York, as has been seen, requires
full and equal accommodations in hotels and “other places of public
accommodation.” The question, therefore, was: Is a bootblack stand a
place of “public accommodation”? The municipal court of Rochester, in
which Burks brought suit, gave judgment for him, thereby answering the
question in the affirmative. The county court reversed the decision. The
appellate division reversed the county court and sustained the
municipal. The court of appeals[274] reversed the appellate division
thereby sustaining the county court, saying: “A bootblacking stand may
be said to be a place of public accommodation, like the store of a dry
goods merchant, a grocer, or the proverbial ‘butcher, baker, and
candlestick maker’; but that is very far from placing it in the same
category with the places specifically named in the statute. Inns,
hotels, and public conveyances are places of public accommodation in the
broadest sense, because they have always been denominated as such under
the common law. Bath-houses and barber-shops are not to be regarded as
included within the statute under the general phrase, ‘and all other
places of public accommodation.’ There is no more relation between a
bootblacking stand and a public conveyance than there is between a
theatre or music-hall and a bath-house or barber-shop. There is, it is
true, a superficial resemblance between the occupation of the barber and
that of the bootblack, in the sense that both minister to the personal
comfort and convenience of others; but the same argument could be
extended far beyond the limits necessary to demonstrate that not ‘all
other places of public accommodation’ are included by relation within
the category of the things specifically enumerated in the statute.”
BILLIARD-ROOMS
In Massachusetts in 1866, a certain Negro was refused, because of his
race or color, the use of a billiard-room. At that time a statute of the
Commonwealth required equal accommodation in public places of amusement.
The Supreme Court[275] of Massachusetts, in which the Negro’s case was
finally heard, held that there was no proof that the room was licensed,
and added: “It cannot be supposed that it was the intent of the
legislature to prescribe the manner in which persons should use their
own premises or permit others to use them, if they did not carry on
therein an occupation or business, or suffer other persons to
appropriate them to a purpose, which required a license in order to
render such an appropriation lawful.”
SALOONS
Only two States, Minnesota and Wisconsin, mention saloons in their Civil
Rights Bills. And in Minnesota, they were not added till 1899, as a
result of the following case: A Negro was denied accommodation in a
saloon. At that time, the statute required equal accommodations in inns
and “places of public resort, refreshment, accommodation, or
entertainment.” The court[276] of that State, in passing on the case,
held that a saloon is not among the other “places of public
refreshment.” The court suggests that “or other” means “other such like”
and includes only places of the same nature as those already mentioned
specifically in the statute. About the Negro, the court said: “It is a
well-known fact that, owing to an unreasonable race prejudice which
still exists to some extent, the promiscuous entertainment of persons of
different races in places where intoxicating drinks are sold not
infrequently result in personal conflicts, especially when the passions
of men are inflamed by liquor. Hence the legislature might have omitted
saloons for that reason.” The next year the legislature answered
otherwise by adding saloons to the Civil Rights Bill.
In 1899 a bar-keeper in Ohio charged a Negro thirty cents for a
cocktail, the regular price to white customers being only fifteen cents.
The Civil Rights Bill of Ohio did not mention saloons, but said “other
places of public accommodation and amusement.” The court[277] held that
saloons were not included, adding, in the same spirit as the Minnesota
court “... nor should we interpret this statute as encouraging a tariff
which the clearly defined policy of the State discourages.”
A statute of Louisiana[278] of 1908 requires separate saloons for white
and colored persons. The Louisiana court,[279] in July, 1909, held that
the sale of liquor to white and colored persons must not be conducted in
the same building, and that the statute is not obeyed by providing
separate bars in the same building. The saloon keeper had attempted to
avoid paying taxes on two saloons by operating two bars in the same
building.
In Atlanta,[280] before State prohibition began, there were separate
saloons for the white and colored people. An ordinance of
Nashville,[281] Tennessee, which went into effect July 7, 1907, required
the segregation of the races in saloons.
SODA FOUNTAINS
The keeper of a soda fountain in Illinois in 1896 refused to sell cold
drinks to a Negro. At that time the law required equal accommodation in
inns and “all other places of accommodation and amusement.” The
court[282] of that State held that a soda fountain is not such a place
of accommodation or amusement. “Such a place,” the court argued, “can be
considered a place of accommodation or amusement to no greater extent
than a places where dry goods or clothing, boots and shoes, hats and
caps, or groceries, are dispensed. The personal liberty of an individual
in his business transactions, and his freedom from restrictions, is a
question of utmost moment, and no construction can be adopted by which
an individual right of action will be included as controlled within a
legislative enactment, unless clearly expressed in such enactment and
certainly included within the constitutional limitation on the power of
the legislature.”
THEATRES
The question of the rights of Negroes in theatres has given rise to a
number of judicial decisions. Fifteen States provide by statute that
there shall be no race distinction in theatres. In 1873, the laws of
Mississippi, under the Reconstruction government, declared that all
persons, without distinction as to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, should have equal and impartial enjoyment of theatres. One
Donnell, held in custody for refusing to pay a fine for violating this
law by refusing to sell theatre tickets to two Negroes, petitioned for a
writ of _habeas corpus_. The court[283] held that the law was not
unconstitutional, because it in no way appropriated private property to
public use.
Two years later, in reply to a question whether it was a crime to refuse
a Negro equal accommodations in a hotel, Judge Emmons in Tennessee
charged the grand jury[284] that the Federal government had no right to
require individual innkeepers, theatre managers, etc., to entertain
Negroes.
In 1876 a Negro in Louisiana bought a ticket to a theatre, which he was
not allowed to use on account of his color. He sued for five thousand
dollars damages. The Constitution of that State, at the time, guaranteed
equal accommodations in public places. The Louisiana court[285] held
that this law “does not enumerate a mere abstraction, but it guarantees
substantial rights.” The Negro’s claim was sustained, but the damages
were reduced to three hundred dollars and costs. Both this and the
Mississippi case arose in the South and were decided favorably to the
rights of the Negro, but both came during the Reconstruction régime.
Since then, no such case appears to have risen in the South.
In 1889 a Negro woman in Illinois, having been refused tickets to a
theatre, had a white man buy them for herself and her husband. On
presenting the tickets they were refused admission to seats in the
theatre which the tickets called for. At the resulting trial, the
proprietor offered to prove that he had, “in order to avoid collision
between the races, adopted a rule (and that such rule was necessary) to
the effect that the colored people should have one row to themselves in
each part of the house, or as many rows as the tickets which they bought
would call for.” This evidence was rejected, the court[286] holding that
the Civil Rights Bill of Illinois could not be satisfied by separate
accommodations.
Missouri has no Civil Rights Bill. A Negro, mistaken for a white man by
the clerk in the box-office, bought tickets for seats in the orchestra
of a Kansas City theatre. When he presented his tickets to the usher he
was refused the seats called for, but was offered in exchange balcony
seats reserved for Negroes. The court[287] before which the case was
tried held that the rule of the theatre requiring separate
accommodations for the races was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The most recent case[288] appears to be a 1905 case in New York in which
a Negro was ejected from a theatre by an employee. The proprietor was
permitted to show that the ejectment was done while he was away and
contrary to his orders, and that he permitted Negroes to enjoy the
privileges of the place. A verdict was thereupon found for him, but the
case was remanded by the appellate court for a new trial, on the ground
that the evidence was improperly admitted.
SKATING RINKS
California, Illinois, and Massachusetts have considered skating rinks of
enough importance to include them in their Civil Rights Bills. In 1885
the keeper of a skating rink in Iowa refused to let a Negro use it, and
the Negro brought suit. The court[289] held that the exclusion of a
colored man from a skating rink not licensed is not illegal. The New
York court[290] has held that a skating rink is a “place of public
amusement” within the meaning of the statute, so that a keeper of one
cannot refuse admission to a Negro.
CEMETERIES
The early Civil Rights Bills of New York, Florida, and Kansas prohibited
race distinctions in public cemeteries. This stipulation, however, does
not appear in the present statutes of any of the States, except Kansas.
Race distinctions in cemeteries are common. The legislature of
Mississippi[291] of 1900, for instance, gave the Ladies’ Auxiliary
Cemetery Association, an organization of white women, permission to
remove the monument and remains of the Negro State Secretary of State,
James Lynch, from the white to the Negro cemetery in Jackson,
Mississippi, provided it was done without expense to the State.
The Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_ of February 20, 1906, quotes the
Germantown, Pa., _Guide_ as calling on the people to provide a cemetery
where Negroes may be buried, saying that “unless something is done, the
bodies of the colored poor will be denied the right of decent burial,
for their disposal, of necessity, will be by means of the dissecting
rooms of anatomical boards.”
The Civil Rights Bills of the eighteen States have now been analyzed,
and the judicial decisions arising therefrom have been considered. It is
noticeable that, if one excepts the theatre cases of the Reconstruction
period, not a case has come from a Southern State. The explanation must
be that those States have never undertaken to require hotel-keepers,
etc., to offer accommodations without regard to color: the Negroes have
taken for granted that they would not be admitted to such places, except
upon condition that they would accept the accommodations set apart for
their race, and consequently have not applied for admission upon any
other terms. In the other States the courts have, as a rule, interpreted
the Civil Rights Bills very strictly. If a place is not specifically
mentioned in the statute, courts have been very slow to include it under
the general head of “other places of amusement or accommodation.” In
other words, this phrase, which is, in substance, tacked on to every
statute, is a dead letter. The courts are chary, as they should be, of
invading individual liberty and freedom of business. But if a place is
specifically mentioned in the statute, the law is not satisfied by
offering separate accommodations to Negroes, even though such
accommodations are equal for both races in every respect; they must be
identical.
RACE DISCRIMINATION BY INSURANCE COMPANIES
Some allied topics may be properly discussed under the general head of
civil rights.
Five States—Connecticut,[292] Massachusetts,[293] Ohio,[294] New
York,[295] and Michigan,[296]—have deemed it necessary to pass laws
prohibiting any discrimination on account of race or color by life
insurance companies. All of the statutes are essentially the same. They
declare that no life insurance company shall make any distinction or
discrimination between white and colored persons wholly or partly of
African descent, as to premiums or rates charged for policies; nor shall
such company demand higher premiums from colored persons than from
whites of the same age, sex, general condition of health, and hope of
longevity; nor shall it make or require any rebate, diminution, or
discount upon the sum to be paid on the policy in case of the death of
the colored person. Such a company is forbidden to add any stipulation
by which the insured binds himself, his heirs, executors, assigns, etc.,
to accept any sum less than the face value of the policy. Massachusetts
provides that if a company refuses to insure a colored person making
application, it must, upon his request, give him a certificate of the
regular examining physician, saying that the refusal was not because the
applicant is a person of color, but solely upon the grounds of general
health and prospect of longevity as would be applicable to white persons
of the same age and sex.
The Connecticut statute enacts that any condition or stipulation in the
policy, inserted because of the color or race of the insured, shall be
void. Ohio provides that any corporation, or officer or agent of such
corporation, violating the provisions of its statute, shall be fined for
each offence not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred
dollars, but that nothing in the act shall be construed as to require
any agent or company to take or receive the application for insurance of
any person. New York makes the violation of the law a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of from fifty dollars to five hundred dollars.
Michigan goes a step further and declares that anyone violating the law
shall forfeit to the State five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the
attorney general, and that any officer or agent who violates it shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by imprisonment in the county jail
not over one year or by a fine of from fifty dollars to five hundred
dollars, or both.
There must have been instances of discrimination by life insurance
companies against Negroes, else these States would not have thought it
necessary to enact such statutes. The explanation of this discrimination
is probably not so much race prejudice as the general belief, based upon
statistics, that the Negro, particularly in the colder climate of the
North and West, has not the same hope of longevity as the white man,
being more subject to pulmonary and other mortal diseases. If the risk
of mortality of the Negro is greater, the insurance company argued that
it was justified in seeking compensation for assuming this increased
risk by charging a higher premium. No case has been found arising under
these statutes.
RACE DISCRIMINATIONS BY LABOR UNIONS
The attitude of labor organizations toward Negroes has of late been the
subject of much comment, especially by the Negroes themselves, who
complain that they are handicapped in the struggle for existence because
of the hostility of such organizations. Mr. Baker,[297] speaking of the
North, said: “And yet, although I expected to find the Negro wholly
ostracised by union labor, I discovered that where the Negro becomes
numerous or skilful enough, he, like the Italian or Russian Jew, begins
to force his way into the unions.... They have got in, ... not because
they are wanted, or because they are liked, but because, by being
prepared, skilled, and energetic, the unions have had to take them in as
a matter of self-protection.... In several great industries North and
South, indeed, the Negro is as much a part of labor unionism as the
white man.” There seems to be more opposition to Negroes joining the
unions of Philadelphia than most Northern cities.[298]
One would expect to find, where the conflict between white and colored
laborers exists, some evidence of it in statutes or court reports. But
this resolution of the General Court of Massachusetts,[299] passed in
1904, is the only trace that has been found: “_Whereas_, the national
league of American wheelmen, at their convention held in Louisville,
Kentucky, on the twentieth day of February, in the present year, voted
to exclude colored persons from membership in said organization, which
exclusion affects the members of the organization resident in
Massachusetts; _Resolved_, That the General Court deprecates the action
of the organization above referred to, and regards the enforcement of
discriminations of this character as a revival of baseless and obsolete
prejudices.”
CHURCHES
Colorado is the only State that has undertaken by legislation to
guarantee to Negroes full and equal accommodations in churches. The rest
have left it to the churches themselves to decide the matter.
It is generally known that during slavery the Negroes, for the most
part, attended the white churches, where galleries were set apart for
them, were members thereof, and were served by white ministers. After
Emancipation, the Negroes withdrew from the white churches and built
places of worship of their own. To-day, in all parts of the country,
where Negroes live in considerable numbers, they have their own
churches. In such cities as Boston, where the doors of all churches are
in theory open to every race, Negro churches are found in the Negro
districts.
Although there is practically race separation in the churches of the
whole country, all the difficulties have not been solved. In 1903, the
Freedman’s Aid and Southern Educational Society, an organization of the
bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, general secretaries of the
church department, and leading laymen, met in session in Lincoln,
Nebraska. Inasmuch as the purpose of this body was to devise and discuss
means of improving the educational opportunities of the Southern
Negroes, the churchmen of that race were present in good numbers. Some
of the hotels in the city gave notice that they could not allow the
colored delegates to eat in the main dining rooms, but that they could
furnish them sleeping accommodations and serve them meals in their
apartments.[300] It is along this line that the difficulty usually
comes.
The Baptist denomination recently organized the General Baptist
Convention of America, which held its first meeting in St. Louis in
1905. The next meeting was to have been in Louisville, Kentucky, May 5
and 16, 1906. The executive committee of the convention postponed the
meeting for a year, assigning as their reason, or one of their reasons,
the fact that they experienced difficulty in securing a church in which
to hold the convention, the white Baptists being averse to having the
colored members of the denomination assemble with them. It was arranged
later that the whites and Negroes should meet in the same edifice, but
that the Negroes should be restricted to the use of the balconies. This,
however, was resented by the Negroes.[301]
The Presbyterian Church also has had to face the race problem. In its
general assembly at Des Moines, Iowa, in 1906, the committee on church
policies recommended the erection of a synod in Alabama to include the
presbyteries of Birmingham, Levere, and Rogersville, which are composed
of colored churches. They had hitherto been included in the synod of
Tennessee. The report provoked such a discussion that it was carried
over to the next meeting, and no subsequent account has appeared.[302]
At the general assembly of 1908, held in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, the
question arose again out of a report of the Board of Freedmen’s
Missions, some of the members from the North resenting such a separation
in the missionary efforts.[303]
The Episcopal Church has probably had the most difficulty with the race
problem. This Church has had no separate organization for Negroes. Both
races meet together in the annual diocese conventions, without
distinction, and participate in the business of the Church. At one of
these conventions, held at Tarboro, North Carolina, in 1907, the
following resolution was passed: “That the time has come when the
welfare of both races in the Southern States requires that each race
should have its own ecclesiastical legislative assemblies, and that we
urge the General Convention to take immediate action.” The colored
clergy and congregations had already expressed their willingness to
submit the whole matter to the general convention. In speaking for
separation, Bishop Cheshire, of North Carolina, said: “I have come to
this conclusion in spite of the sentiments and convictions of a
lifetime, and though my mind and conscience compel my assent to this
necessity, my heart still clings to the old ideal of a church and a
diocese which in its annual gatherings should represent visibly the
oneness of all races and colors in Christ.... We must confront the
actual facts of the day. I believe that, in one way or another, both the
white race and the colored race, consciously or unconsciously, demand a
different arrangement of our ecclesiastical institutions. I believe that
some separate organization for our colored work is coming in the near
future.”[304] At the general convention, which met in Richmond,
Virginia, in October, 1907, the question of the separation of the races
was much discussed, but the actual outcome has not been learned. It
developed in the debate that the Southern bishops desired separation,
wishing to be relieved of the burden of the Negroes in their dioceses,
while the bishops from other sections preferred the present arrangement,
not desiring to be burdened with a class of people not in their
dioceses.[305]
The Young Men’s Christian Associations of the Northern cities have to
meet the problem of the Negro. The New Haven, Connecticut, people
refused to permit Negroes to attend the Y. M. C. A., and a separate
building had to be provided for them.[306]
Within the colored church itself there is manifest a conflict between
the Negroes proper and mulattoes. There is a town in North Carolina in
which they have practical separation in the churches, the black Negroes
going to one church and the bright mulattoes to another. A similar
separation of the Negroes and mulattoes in churches exists, to some
extent, in Charleston, South Carolina. At a Negro Christian Congress at
Washington City, in 1906, the chairman of the meeting was charged with
removing from the program dark-skinned men and substituting
light-skinned men. It provoked such a discussion as to divide the
meeting into two factions.[307]
NEGROES IN THE MILITIA
The Brownsville affair—that is, the dismissal without honor, through the
order of President Roosevelt, of a whole regiment of Negro soldiers
because of the misconduct of some of them and the refusal of the others
to testify against the guilty ones, and the championship of the cause of
the Negroes by Senator Foraker—has brought into much prominence the
question of the Negro as a soldier.
The Southern States have been and are unfavorable to allowing Negroes to
serve in the militia. South Carolina,[308] in 1865, declared that
persons of color constituted no part of the militia of the State.
Arkansas,[309] in 1867, accorded to Negroes all the rights of white
citizens, with a few exceptions, one of which was that nothing in the
statute should be construed as modifying any statute or common law usage
in the State respecting the service of Negroes in the militia. North
Carolina[310] provided that white and colored members of the detailed
militia should not be compelled to serve in the same companies.
Georgia,[311] in 1905, by statute, abolished the colored troops of the
State, active and retired, and discharged the officers and men from the
military service of the State.
There is very little legislation on the subject in the other States. In
1879, the legislature of Connecticut[312] authorized the
commander-in-chief of the State militia to organize four independent
Negro companies of infantry to be part of the National Guard. West
Virginia,[313] in 1889, provided that, if any colored troops should be
organized, they should be enlisted and kept separate and apart from the
other troops, and should be formed into separate companies and
regiments. New Jersey,[314] in 1895, made provision for four companies
of colored infantry, presumably meaning that they should be all colored
and kept separate from the other troops.
SEPARATION OF STATE DEPENDENTS
The Southern States, as a rule, require a separation by race of inmates
of State charitable and penal institutions, and where it is not provided
for by statute, it is done as a matter of custom. Alabama,[315] for
instance, makes it unlawful for any jailer or sheriff, having charge of
white and colored prisoners before conviction, to imprison them
permanently together in the same apartments of the jail or other places
of safe-keeping, if there are enough separate apartments. It is also
unlawful[316] for white and colored convicts to be chained together,
allowed to sleep together, or confined in the same room or apartment
when not at work.
The legislature of Arkansas[317] passed a statute in 1903, directing
that in the State penitentiary and in all county jails, stockades,
convict camps, and all other places where prisoners are confined,
separate apartments should be provided and maintained for white and
Negro prisoners. Separate bunks, beds, bedding, dining tables, and other
furnishings were required, and after they had once been assigned to a
prisoner of one race they must not be changed to the use of one of the
other race. White prisoners must not be handcuffed or otherwise chained
or tied to a Negro prisoner.
Georgia[318] does not allow prison-keepers, or firms leasing or
controlling convicts, to confine white and colored convicts together, or
to work them chained together, or to chain them together in going to and
from their work or at any other time. Mississippi[319] provides that no
discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or previous
condition, in working convicts. This does not mean that they shall not
be separated, as they are in Georgia, but is simply a prohibition
against discrimination in the quality of work assigned to the two races.
At the last session of the legislature of North Carolina,[320] a bill
was passed providing for the separation of white and colored prisoners
in the State penitentiary and in the State and county convict camps
during sleeping and eating hours.
That a separation of the two races exists in the jails of Washington
City is evidenced by a protest issued a year or so ago by the National
Equal Rights Council of that city, a Negro organization, against the
separation of the white and colored prisoners in the jails of the city.
There was no allegation, however, that the cells were not equal in
accommodation, the objection being raised solely at the principle of
separation.[321]
As to reformatories, Georgia[322] provides that they shall be so
constructed as to keep white and colored inmates separate. West
Virginia[323] requires that the white and colored inmates of its reform
school for boys shall be kept separate, and the inmates of its
industrial home for girls (also a reformatory) shall be separate as far
as practicable.
As to paupers, Alabama[324] authorizes the county commissioners of
Washington County to keep separate accommodations for the maintenance of
white and colored paupers.
Not many States have statutes which say in so many words that lunatics,
and that the deaf, mute, and blind shall be kept separated according to
race; but one finds appropriations for colored asylums and schools,
etc., and one is justified in concluding that, where a colored asylum or
school is built, the colored persons are not allowed in the other
asylums and schools of the State. Alabama,[325] for instance, has a
school for the Negro deaf and blind at Talladega, under the control and
management of the board of trustees of the white school for the deaf,
and makes an annual appropriation for the support of the school.
Arkansas[326] also provides that applicants to the deaf-mute asylums
shall be received without restriction on account of race or color, but
does not forbid their separation by race within the asylum.
Tennessee,[327] as early as 1866, provided that there should be separate
asylums for the colored blind, deaf and dumb, and lunatics, and the
trustees of these institutions were given power to prepare buildings for
colored insane, “so as to keep them secure and safe, and yet separate
and apart from the white patients.” In 1881, that State[328]
appropriated $25,000 to provide accommodations for the colored blind at
Nashville, and the same amount for the colored deaf and dumb at
Knoxville. Kentucky[329] likewise provided in 1876 that white and
colored lunatics should not be kept in the same building. New York[330]
has on many occasions made appropriations for asylums for colored
children, thus leaving the impression that such children are not
admitted to the white asylums. North Carolina[331] maintains separate
asylums for its white and colored insane. And Georgia[332] requires the
asylums of the State to provide apartments for the insane Negro
residents of the State. Indiana,[333] in 1879, made an appropriation to
associations formed for the purpose of maintaining an asylum for colored
orphan children. The West Virginia[334] asylum for insane must have
separate wards for white and colored patients.
NOTES
Footnote 214:
Bouvier’s “Law Dictionary,” I, p. 331.
Footnote 215:
14 Stat. L. 27, chap. 31.
Footnote 216:
Flack, “The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” pp. 46–50.
Footnote 217:
Bowlin v. Com., 1867, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5.
Footnote 218:
Fed. Case No. 16,151 (1866).
Footnote 219:
Fed. Case No. 14,247 (1867).
Footnote 220:
“The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” pp. 53–54.
Footnote 221:
_Ibid._, p. 94.
Footnote 222:
16 Stat. L. 144, chap. 114.
Footnote 223:
16 Wall, 36, at pp. 71–72 (1872).
Footnote 224:
18 Stat. L. 335, chap. 114.
Footnote 225:
Fed. Case No. 18,258 (1875).
Footnote 226:
Fed. Case No. 18,260 (1875).
Footnote 227:
Civil Rights Cases, 1875, 109 U. S. 3, at pp. 24, 11, and 13.
Footnote 228:
Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1864–65, p. 650.
Footnote 229:
_Ibid._, Jan. sess., 1866, p. 242.
Footnote 230:
Del. Laws, 1871–73, pp. 686–87.
Footnote 231:
_Ibid._, 1875–77, chap. 194.
Footnote 232:
Laws of Kan., 1874, chap. 49, sec. 1.
Footnote 233:
N. Y. Stat. L., IX, pp. 583–84.
Footnote 234:
Laws of N. Y., 1881, I, p. 541.
Footnote 235:
Laws of Fla., 1865, p. 25.
Footnote 236:
_Ibid._, 1873, chap. 1947.
Footnote 237:
Acts of La., 1869, p. 57. See also Acts of La., 1870, p. 57.
Footnote 238:
_Ibid._, 1873, pp. 156–57.
Footnote 239:
Acts of Ark., 1873, pp. 15–19.
Footnote 240:
Laws of Tenn., 1875, pp. 216–17.
Footnote 241:
9 Baxter, 584.
Footnote 242:
Laws of N. C., 1876–77, pp. 589–90.
Footnote 243:
Laws of Tenn., 1885, pp. 124–25.
Footnote 244:
Revision, 1902, sec. 1164; Pub. Acts of Conn., 1905, p. 323.
Footnote 245:
Annotated Code, 1897, sec. 5008.
Footnote 246:
General Stat., 1709–1895, I, p. 804.
Footnote 247:
Laws of O., 1884, pp. 15–16; 1894, pp. 17–18; Bates’s Annotated Stat.
(Everett’s 6th Ed.) II, p. 2469.
Footnote 248:
Revised Stat., 1908, secs. 609–10; Laws of Colo., 1895, pp. 139–40.
Footnote 249:
Laws of Ill., 1885, pp. 64–65; Jones and Addington’s Supplement, 1902,
IV, p. 395.
Footnote 250:
Burns’s Annotated Stat., 1908, II, secs. 3863–65.
Footnote 251:
Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1885, p. 774; 1893, p. 1320; 1895, p. 519.
Footnote 252:
Compiled Laws, 1897, III, sec. 11,759, p. 3495.
Footnote 253:
Laws of Minn., 1897, p. 616; 1899, chap. 41; Revised Laws, 1905, sec.
2812.
Footnote 254:
Compiled Stat., 1907, secs. 1932–33, p. 501.
Footnote 255:
Laws of R. I., 1884–85, p. 171; General Laws of R. I., 1896, p. 978.
Footnote 256:
Laws of N. Y., 1893, II, p. 1720; 1899, II, p. 1556; Consolidated Laws
of N. Y., 1909, I, pp. 626–27.
Footnote 257:
Laws of Pa., 1887, pp. 130–31.
Footnote 258:
Cotton and Ballinger’s Annotated Codes and Stat., II, secs. 7069–70,
p. 1953.
Footnote 259:
Stat., 1898, II, pp. 2676–77, sec. 4398 c.
Footnote 260:
Civil Code, 1906, pp. 29–30.
Footnote 261:
General Stat., 1905, secs. 2507–08.
Footnote 262:
U. S. v. Newcomer, 1876, Fed. Case No. 15,868.
Footnote 263:
Russ’s Application, 1898, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 510.
Footnote 264:
Furchey v. Eagleson, 1896, 43 N. E. 146.
Footnote 265:
Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1896, pp. 659–60.
Footnote 266:
Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 1905, 46 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 617.
Footnote 267:
Lewis v. Hitchcock, 1882, 10 Fed. 4.
Footnote 268:
Ferguson v. Gies, 1890, 82 Mich. 358; 46 N. W. 718.
Footnote 269:
Bryan v. Adler, 1897, 72 N. W. 368.
Footnote 270:
De Veaux v. Clemmons, 1898, 17 O. Cir. Ct. Rep. 33.
Footnote 271:
Humburd v. Crawford, 1905, 105 N. W. 330.
Footnote 272:
Messenger v. State, 1889, 25 Neb. 674.
Footnote 273:
Faulkner v. Salozzi, 1907, 79 Conn. 541.
Footnote 274:
Burks v. Basso, 1905, 73 N. E. 58.
Footnote 275:
Com. v. Sylvester, 1866, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 247.
Footnote 276:
Rhone v. Loomis, 1898, 74 Minn. 200; 77 N. W. 31.
Footnote 277:
Kellar v. Koerber, 1899, 55 N. E. 1002.
Footnote 278:
Acts of La., 1908, p. 236.
Footnote 279:
State _ex rel._ Tax Collector v. Falkenheimer, 1909, 49 So. 214.
Footnote 280:
Baker, “Following the Colour Line,” p. 36.
Footnote 281:
Nashville, Tenn., _Weekly Journal and Tribune_, Feb. 2, 1907.
Footnote 282:
Cecil v. Green, 1896, 161 Ill. 265; 43 N. E. 1105.
Footnote 283:
Donnell v. State, 1873, 12 Am. Rep. 375; 46 Miss. 661.
Footnote 284:
Fed. Case No. 18,260 (1875).
Footnote 285:
Joseph v. Bidwell, 1876, 28 La. Ann. 382.
Footnote 286:
Baylies v. Curry, 1889, 128 Ill. 287.
Footnote 287:
Younger v. Judah, 1892, 19 S. W. 1109.
Footnote 288:
Thomas v. Williams, 1905, 95 N. Y. Sup. 592.
Footnote 289:
Bowlin v. Lyon, 1885, 67 Ia. 536.
Footnote 290:
People v. King, 1886, 42 Hun. 186; affirmed in 110 N. Y. 418.
Footnote 291:
Laws of Miss., 1900, p. 171.
Footnote 292:
Revision, 1902, sec. 3535.
Footnote 293:
Revised Laws, 1902, II, p. 1153.
Footnote 294:
Laws of O., 1889, pp. 163–64.
Footnote 295:
Laws of N. Y., 1891, p. 288.
Footnote 296:
Pub. Acts of Mich., 1893, pp. 60–61.
Footnote 297:
“Following the Colour Line,” p. 135.
Footnote 298:
_Ibid._, pp. 142 and 160.
Footnote 299:
Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1894, p. 825.
Footnote 300:
Lincoln, Neb., _Star_, Nov. 7, 1903.
Footnote 301:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, April 6, 1906.
Footnote 302:
Norfolk, Va., _Landmark_, May 27, 1906; Raleigh, N. C., _News and
Observer_, May 29, 1906.
Footnote 303:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, June 3, 1908.
Footnote 304:
_Ibid._, May 19 and 26, 1907.
Footnote 305:
_Ibid._, Oct. 9 and 20, 1907.
Footnote 306:
_Ibid._, March 18, 1906.
Footnote 307:
Richmond, Va., _News-Leader_, Aug. 3, 1906.
Footnote 308:
Laws of S. C., 1865, p. 275.
Footnote 309:
Laws of Ark., 1866–67, p. 99.
Footnote 310:
Pub. Laws of N. C., 1868, p. 35.
Footnote 311:
Laws of Ga., 1905, p. 166.
Footnote 312:
Pub. Acts of Conn., 1879, pp. 377–78; 1883, p. 289.
Footnote 313:
Laws of W. Va., 1889–90, p. 87.
Footnote 314:
Laws of N. J., 1895, p. 274.
Footnote 315:
Laws of Ala., 1875–76, p. 285; repeated in the Code of 1876, sec.
4321, p. 915.
Footnote 316:
_Ibid._, 1884–85, p. 192; Code, 1896, II, p. 210.
Footnote 317:
Acts of Ark., 1903, p. 161.
Footnote 318:
Laws of Ga., 1890–91, I, p. 213.
Footnote 319:
Laws of Miss., 1872, p. 85.
Footnote 320:
Laws of N. C., 1909, p. 1215.
Footnote 321:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, July 21, 1907.
Footnote 322:
Laws of Ga., 1893, p. 121.
Footnote 323:
Laws of W. Va., 1889, p. 15; Code, 1906, pp. 770 and 776.
Footnote 324:
Local Acts of Ala., 1898–99, p. 86.
Footnote 325:
Code, 1907, II, secs. 1949–52.
Footnote 326:
Code, 1874, sec. 384; 1884, sec. 2505, p. 572.
Footnote 327:
Laws of Tenn., 1865–66, pp. 5 and 65.
Footnote 328:
_Ibid._, 1881, p. 139.
Footnote 329:
Laws of Ky., 1876, I, p. 112.
Footnote 330:
Laws of N. Y., 1866, II, p. 1675; 1867, II, p. 1850; 1868, II, pp.
1845–49; 1869, II, pp. 2064–66; 1870, II, pp. 1689–90, etc.
Footnote 331:
Laws of N. C., 1874–75, pp. 338–39.
Footnote 332:
Laws of Ga., 1885, p. 399.
Footnote 333:
Code, 1901, II, sec. 4598.
Footnote 334:
Code, 1906, sec. 2699, p. 1104; Laws of W. Va., 1897, p. 42; 1904, p.
160.