Produced by David Widger <widger@cecomet.net>
MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, VOLUME 3.
By LOUIS ANTOINE FAUVELET DE BOURRIENNE
His Private Secretary
Edited by R. W. Phipps
Colonel, Late Royal Artillery
1891
CONTENTS:
Chapter XV. To Chapter XXVI. 1799
CHAPTER XV.
1798.
Establishment of a divan in each Egyptian province--Desaix in Upper
Egypt--Ibrahim Bey beaten by Bonaparte at Salehye'h--Sulkowsky
wounded--Disaster at Aboukir--Dissatisfaction and murmurs of the
army--Dejection of the General-in-Chief--His plan respecting Egypt
--Meditated descent upon England--Bonaparte's censure of the
Directory--Intercepted correspondence.
From the details I have already given respecting Bonaparte's plans for
colonising Egypt, it will be seen that his energy of mind urged him to
adopt anticipatory measures for the accomplishment of objects which were
never realised. During the short interval in which he sheathed his sword
he planned provisional governments for the towns and provinces occupied
by the French troops, and he adroitly contrived to serve the interests of
his army without appearing to violate those of the country. After he had
been four days at Cairo, during which time he employed himself in
examining everything, and consulting every individual from whom he could
obtain useful information, he published the following order:
HEADQUARTERS, CAIRO,
9th Thermidor, year VI.
BONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE,
AND GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, ORDERS:
Art. 1. There shall be in each province of Egypt a divan, composed
of seven individuals, whose duty will be to superintend the
interests of the province; to communicate to me any complaints that
may be made; to prevent warfare among the different villages; to
apprehend and punish criminals (for which purpose they may demand
assistance from the French commandant); and to take every
opportunity of enlightening the people.
Art. 2. There shall be in each province an aga of the Janizaries,
maintaining constant communication with the French commandant. He
shall have with him a company of sixty armed natives, whom he may
take wherever he pleases, for the maintenance of good order,
subordination, and tranquillity.
Art. 3. There shall be in each province an intendant, whose
business will be to levy the miri, the feddam, and the other
contributions which formerly belonged to the Mamelukes, but which
now belong to the French Republic. The intendants shall have as
many agents as may be necessary.
Art. 4. The said intendant shall have a French agent to correspond
with the Finance Department, and to execute all the orders he may
receive.
(Signed) BONAPARTE.
While Bonaparte was thus actively taking measures for the organization
of the country[1], General Desaix had marched into Upper Egypt in
pursuit of Mourad Bey. We learned that Ibrahim, who, next to Mourad,
was the most influential of the beys, had proceeded towards Syria, by
the way of Belbeis and Salehye'h. The General-in-Chief immediately
determined to march in person against that formidable enemy, and he
left Cairo about fifteen days after he had entered it. It is
unnecessary to describe the well-known engagement in which Bonaparte
drove Ibrahim back upon El-Arish; besides, I do not enter minutely
into the details of battles, my chief object being to record events
which I personally witnessed.
[1]--[Far more thoroughly and actively than those taken by the English
Government in 1882-3-4]--
At the battle of Salehye'h Bonaparte thought he had lost one of his
'aides de camp', Sulkowsky, to whom he was much attached, and who had
been with us during the whole of the campaign of Italy. On the field of
battle one object of regret cannot long engross the mind; yet, on his
return to Cairo, Bonaparte frequently spoke to me of Sulkowsky in terms
of unfeigned sorrow.
"I cannot," said he one day, "sufficiently admire the noble spirit and
determined courage of poor Sulkowsky." He often said that Sulkowsky
would have been a valuable aid to whoever might undertake the
resuscitation of Poland. Fortunately that brave officer was not killed
on that occasion, though seriously wounded. He was, however, killed
shortly after.
The destruction of the French squadron in the roads of Aboukir occurred
during the absence of the General-in-Chief. This event happened on the
1st of August. The details are generally known; but there is one
circumstance to which I cannot refrain from alluding, and which excited
deep interest at the time. This was the heroic courage of the son of
Casablanca, the captain of the 'Orient'. Casablanca was among the
wounded, and when the vessel was blown up his son, a lad of ten years of
age, preferred perishing with him rather than saving himself, when one of
the seamen had secured him the means of escape. I told the 'aide de
camp', sent by General Kleber, who had the command of Alexandria, that
the General-in-Chief was near Salehye'h. He proceeded thither
immediately, and Bonaparte hastened back to Cairo, a distance of about
thirty-three leagues.
In spite of any assertions that may have been made to the contrary, the
fact is, that as soon as the French troops set foot in Egypt, they were
filled with dissatisfaction, and ardently longed to return home[2].
The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality
remained. What bitter murmuring have I not heard from Murat, Lannes,
Berthier, Bessieres, and others! Their complaints were, indeed, often so
unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition. This greatly vexed
Bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language[3].
When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased.
All who had acquired fortunes under Napoleon now began to fear that they
would never enjoy them. All turned their thoughts to Paris, and its
amusements, and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being separated
from their homes and their friends for a period, the termination of which
it was impossible to foresee.
[2]--['Erreurs' objects to this description of the complaints of the
army, but Savary (tome i. pp. 66, 67, and tome i. p. 89) fully
confirms it, giving the reason that the army was not a homogeneous
body, but a mixed force taken from Rome, Florence, Milan, Venice,
Genoa, and Marseilles; see also Thiers, tome v. p. 283. But the
fact is not singular. For a striking instance, in the days of the
Empire, of the soldiers in 1809, in Spain, actually threatening
Napoleon in his own hearing, see De Gonneville (tome i. pp. 190-193):
"The soldiers of Lapisse's division gave loud expression to
the most sinister designs against the Emperor's person, stirring up
each other to fire a shot at him, and bandying accusations of
cowardice for not doing it." He heard it all as plainly as we did,
and seemed as if he did not care a bit for it, but "sent the
division into good quarters, when the men were as enthusiastic as
they were formerly mutinous." In 1796 d'Entraigues, the Bourbon spy,
reports, "As a general rule, the French soldier grumbles and is
discontented. He accuses Bonaparte of being a thief and a rascal.
But to-morrow the very same soldier will obey him blindly" (Iung's
Bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).]--
[3]--[Napoleon related at St. Helena that in a fit of irritation he
rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of
them, who was remarkable for his stature, "you have held seditious
language; but take care I do not perform my duty. Though you are
five feet ten inches high, that shall not save you from being
shot."--Bourrienne.]--
The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the General-in-Chief.
In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply
distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. To the painful
feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in
arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our
fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single
glance. We were now cut off from all communication with France, and all
hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an
implacable and hated enemy. Bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving
his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection. And at
what a time did this disaster befall him? At the very moment when he was
about to apply for the aid of the mother-country.
From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of
August, his object was, having once secured the possession of Egypt; to
return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of
every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces
that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the
purpose of attacking England. It is certain that previously to his
departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to
his plans. He always regarded a descent upon England as possible, though
in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in naval strength;
but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a superiority on one point.
His intention was to return to France. Availing himself of the departure
of the English fleet for the Mediterranean, the alarm excited by his
Egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden
appearance at Boulogne, and his preparations against England, he hoped to
oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the Mediterranean, and
to prevent her sending out troops to Egypt. This project was often in
his head. He would have thought it sublime to date an order of the day
from the ruins of Memphis, and three months later, one from London. The
loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions into mere romantic
visions.
When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. I observed to him
that the disaster was doubtless great, but that it would have been
infinitely more irreparable had Nelson fallen in with us at Malta, or had
he waited for us four-and-twenty hours before Alexandria, or in the open
sea. "Any one of these events," said I, "which were not only possible
but probable, would have deprived us of every resource. We are blockaded
here, but we have provisions and money. Let us then wait patiently to
see what the Directory will do for us."--"The Directory!" exclaimed he
angrily, "the Directory is composed of a set of scoundrels! they envy and
hate me, and would gladly let me perish here. Besides, you see how
dissatisfied the whole army is: not a man is willing to stay."
The pleasing illusions which were cherished at the outset of the
expedition vanished long before our arrival in Cairo. Egypt was no
longer the empire of the Ptolemies, covered with populous and wealthy
cities; it now presented one unvaried scene of devastation and misery.
Instead of being aided by the inhabitants, whom we had ruined, for the
sake of delivering them from the yoke of the beys, we found all against
us: Mamelukes, Arabs, and fellahs. No Frenchman was secure of his life
who happened to stray half a mile from any inhabited place, or the corps
to which he belonged. The hostility which prevailed against us and the
discontent of the army were clearly developed in the numerous letters
which were written to France at the time, and intercepted.
The gloomy reflections which at first assailed Bonaparte, were speedily
banished; and he soon recovered the fortitude and presence of mind which
had been for a moment shaken by the overwhelming news from Aboukir.
He, however, sometimes repeated, in a tone which it would be difficult to
describe, "Unfortunate Brueys, what have you done!"
I have remarked that in some chance observations which escaped Napoleon
at St. Helena he endeavoured to throw all the blame of the affair on
Admiral Brueys. Persons who are determined to make Bonaparte an
exception to human nature have unjustly reproached the Admiral for the
loss of the fleet.