Questions naturally arose as to the true construction of the articles
of Confederation upon this head; questions as delicate as interesting,
and as difficult of solution.
On one hand, it was doubted whether Congress were authorized by the
Confederation, to proceed upon the idea of a federal provision: on the
other, it was perceived that such a contrary construction would be
dangerous to the Union, including, among other inconveniences, this
consequence: That the United States, in Congress, cannot raise a single
regiment, nor equip a single ship, for the general defence, till after
a declaration of war, or an actual commencement of hostilities.
In this dilemma, on an important constitutional question; other urgent
matters depending before Congress; and the advanced season requiring a
determination upon the mode of securing the western posts in case of
a surrender this fall; all sides of the House concurred in making a
temporary provision, in the manner which has been communicated.
My apprehension of the views of the Legislature was simply this:
That, looking forward to a surrender of the posts, and conceiving,
from some expressions in the articles of Confederation, that separate
provision was to be made for the frontier garrisons; they had thought
it expedient to apply the troops already on foot to that purpose, and
to propose to Congress to give their sanction to it.
Under this apprehension; reflecting, besides, that those troops were
engaged only for a short period, upon a very improper establishment to
continue, on account of the enormous pay to the private men; and that
the expense which is now shared by all, and which would have fallen
solely upon the State, had the application been complied with; would
probably be at the rate of nearly eighty thousand dollars per annum, a
considerable sum for the State in its present situation; I acknowledge
to your Excellency, that I saw with pleasure, rather than regret,
the turn which the affair took. I shall be sorry, however, if it has
contravened the intentions of the Legislature.
I will take the liberty to add, upon this occasion, that it has always
appeared to me of great importance, to this State in particular, as
well as to the Union in general, that Federal, rather than State,
provision should be made for the defence of every part of the
Confederacy, in peace as well as in war.
Without entering into arguments of general policy, it will be
sufficient to observe, that this State is, in all respects _critically
situated_.
Its relative position, shape, and intersections, viewed on the map,
strongly speak this language.--Strengthen the Confederation; give it
exclusively the power of the sword: let each State have no forces but
its militia.
As a question of mere economy, the following considerations deserve
great weight.
The North River facilitates attacks by sea and by land: and, besides
the frontier forts, all military men are of opinion, that a strong post
should be maintained at West Point, or some other position on the lower
part of the river.
If Canada is well governed, it may become well peopled, and by
inhabitants attached to its government. The British nation, while it
preserves the idea of retaining possession of that country, may be
expected to keep on foot there, a large force. The position of that
force, either for defence or offence, will necessarily be such as will
afford a prompt and easy access to us.
Our precautions for defence, must be proportioned to their means of
annoying us: and we may hereafter find it indispensable to increase our
frontier garrisons.
The present charge of a competent force in that quarter, thrown
additionally, into the scale of those contributions which we must make
to the payment of the public debt, and to other objects of general
expense, if the Union lasts, would, I fear, enlarge our burthen beyond
our ability: that charge, hereafter increased, as it may be, would be
oppressively felt by the people. It includes, not only the expense of
paying and subsisting the necessary number of troops, but of keeping
the fortifications in repair; probably of creating others; and of
furnishing the requisite supplies of military stores. I say nothing
of the Indian nations, because, though it will be always prudent to
be upon our guard against them, yet, I am of opinion we diminish the
necessity of it by making them our friends: and I take it for granted,
there cannot be a serious doubt, any where, as to the obvious policy of
endeavoring to do it. Their friendship, alone, can keep our frontiers
in peace. It is essential to the improvement of the fur trade; an
object of immense importance to the State. The attempt at the total
expulsion of so desultory a people, is as chimerical as it would be
pernicious. War with them is as expensive as it is destructive: it has
not a single object; for, the acquisitions of their lands is not to
be wished, till those now vacant are settled: and the surest, as well
as the most just and humane way of removing them, is by extending our
settlements to their neighborhood.
Indeed, it is not impossible they may be already willing to exchange
their former possessions for others more remote.
The foregoing considerations would lose all force, if we had full
security that the rest of the world would make our safety and
prosperity the first object of their reverence and care: but an
expectation of this kind would be too much against the ordinary course
of human affairs; too visionary to be a rule for national conduct.
It is true, our situation secures us from conquest, if internal
dissensions do not open the way: but when nations now make war upon
each other, the object seldom is total conquest. Partial acquisitions;
the jealousy of power; the rivalship of dominion, or of commerce;
sometimes national emulation and antipathy; are the motives.
Nothing shelters us from the operation of either of these causes.
The fisheries; the fur trade; the navigation of the lakes and of the
Mississippi; the western territory; the Islands of the West Indies,
with reference to traffic; in short, the passions of human nature,
are abundant sources of contention and hostility. I will not trespass
further on your Excellency’s patience. I expected, indeed, that my last
letter would have finished my official communications; but Messrs.
Duane and L’Hommedieu having transmitted the extract of your letter
to Mr. Floyd and myself, in order that we might comply with what your
Excellency thought would be expected by the Legislature, it became my
duty to give this explanation. Mr. Floyd having been at Congress but a
little time after the concurrent resolutions arrived, and being now at
a great distance from me, occasions a separate communication.
I have the honor to be,
With perfect respect,
Your Excellency’s
Most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
N. B. I did not at the time inclose the resolution, directing the
General to provide for garrisoning the frontier posts, because I
understood it would in course be transmitted to you by the President,
or the Secretary at War.