... ... ... [21];
and the note says, that the Council only declared,
“That they could not be sure, that such another insult would produce
those exertions.”[22] The difference in this article is of great
importance. The declaration made so deep an impression at the time,
that almost the precise words remained in my memory. They were twice
repeated, as well when we saw your Excellency alone, in your own house,
in the morning, as when you delivered to us, in the Council chamber,
the determination of the Council.
Mr. Ellsworth[23], in half an hour afterwards, repeated them to several
members of Congress assembled at the President’s house; and in a few
hours from that time I committed them to writing. I cannot suppose your
Excellency’s recollection fails you in this particular; and I must
pointedly appeal to your candor.
To show the inaccuracy with which the report of the committee was
composed, it is observed, in the notes with respect to that part which
relates to the commission given by the mutineers to the officers whom
they had chosen to represent them, that only two hours had intervened
between that event and the conference with the Council; and that it
was very improbable the knowledge of it could have so early reached
the committee. It is added, that none of the Council remembers to have
heard a single syllable respecting it, during the whole conference.
As to the argument drawn from the short interval between the delivery
of the commission and the conference, it will be sufficient to say,
that the committee held a constant communication with General St.
Clair, and that he kept a vigilant eye upon all the motions of the
mutineers; that his access to them was easy; that the fact in question
was a matter of immediate notoriety; that two hours were abundant time
for a thing of that nature to be conveyed from the barracks to General
St. Clair’s quarters; and that one of the committee had actually seen,
and obtained the intelligence from him, a little time before the
interview with the Council commenced.
It is much more extraordinary that the Council should have been
apprised of it so late, than that the committee should have known it
so early. As to the memory of the Council, it is unfortunate it should
have been so fallible as it is said to have been: but I would rather
suppose, “in the quick succession of circumstances,” the matter had
escaped recollection, than that my minutes, as well as my memory,
should have deceived me. I well recollect, also, that your Excellency,
when it was mentioned, acknowledged that it rather contradicted the
pacific appearance which the conduct of the troops, in other respects,
wore.
These are the essential differences, in point of fact, between the
report of the committee, and the message of Council: the whole
complexion, indeed, of one, materially varies from the other; but the
most common observer must have noticed, how different an aspect the
same facts will bear, differently dressed and arranged. It was to avoid
this, we proposed to reduce them to writing: but as this has not been
done, spectators must judge, from the situation of the parties, and the
course of the transactions, which side has given the justest relation.
I cannot, however, forbear remarking, that I see expressions of
civility, on the part of the committee, making a figure in the message,
very different from their genuine intention; being introduced in a
manner that gives them the air of concessions in favor of the conduct
of the Council. Your Excellency will certainly recollect, that the
committee were very remote from a concurrence in sentiment with the
Council; and though they did not presume to judge of the disposition of
the citizens, strongly urged the expedience and necessity of calling
out the militia, and facility of employing them with success against
an unofficered and disorderly body of mutinous soldiers. It is true,
also, that they acknowledged the candor with which the Council exposed
to them, what they deemed the temper of their citizens, and their own
difficulties and embarrassments; which were, no doubt, delineated
with great energy of language, and display of circumstances: but they
certainly never admitted the candor of refusing an answer in writing,
which was a part of the _business_ transacted with the Council; nor
did they _withdraw_, without giving an intelligible intimation of
their sense of this proceeding. I was also surprised to see any part of
the private and confidential conversation I had with your Excellency,
ushered into the message from the Council; and moulded into such a
shape, as to imply, by an obvious construction, an approbation of
their reasons. Your Excellency will admit the following state of this
transaction to be a just one.
I waited upon the Council to correct a piece of information I had
given them respecting ammunition: but even this is misstated, as will
be seen by my minutes. Having done this, my official business ended;
when I was taken aside by your Excellency, and a conversation passed
in declared confidence. You informed me, that a meeting of the militia
officers was then holding, and in consultation with the Council about
eventual measures (in consequence, as I conjectured, of a communication
to you, the preceding evening, from the delegates of the State, of the
intention of Congress to remove from the city, in case they did not
receive satisfactory assurances of support). You added, that you hoped
nothing would be precipitated; but that proper allowances would be made
for the situation of the Council.
I understood your observations with reference to the departure of
Congress, and replied to this effect: That I viewed the departure of
Congress as a delicate measure, including consequences important to
the national character abroad, and critical with respect to the State
of Pennsylvania, and, in particular, the city of Philadelphia; that
the triumph of a handful of mutinous soldiers, permitted in a place
which is considered as the capital of America, to surround, and, in
fact, imprison Congress, without the least effort, on the part of the
citizens, to uphold their dignity and authority, so as to oblige them
to remove from the place which had been their residence during the
Revolution, would, it was to be feared, be viewed at a distance, as a
general disaffection of the citizens to the Federal Government; might
discredit its negotiations, and affect the national interests: that,
at home, it might give a deep wound to the reputation of Pennsylvania;
might draw upon it the resentments of the other States, and sow discord
between Congress and the State; that the removal of Congress would
probably bring the affair to a crisis; and, by convincing the mutineers
that extremities were intended, would either intimidate them into a
submission, or determine them to immediate excesses; that, impressed
with these considerations, and still hoping, notwithstanding some
appearances to the contrary, that the mutineers might be sincere in
their professions of submission, or that the Council, on further
examination, would find it in their power to act with vigor, I
had declined giving my assent to a report in writing, which would
necessarily be followed by the departure of Congress; that though the
committee had no discretion, by the powers under which they acted, but
were bound by the tenor of their instructions, the moment they did not
receive “satisfactory assurances of prompt and adequate exertions, on
the part of the State, for supporting the public authority,” to advise
the adjournment of Congress to Trenton or Princeton; and I therefore
considered the delay of this advice as at their extreme peril; yet,
as to myself, I should persist in it, till the result of the present
consultation with the militia officers, or till some new circumstance
should turn up, to explain the designs of the mutineers; and in
pursuing this line of conduct, I should counteract the sense of some
gentlemen, whose feelings upon the occasion were keen, and the opinions
of others, who thought the situation of Congress, under the existing
circumstances, extremely awkward, precarious, and unjustifiable to
their constituents.
Your Excellency approved my intention; wished for time; and promised,
if any new resolution should be taken, to give me immediate notice of
it.
The meeting of the militia officers dissolved. I heard nothing from
your Excellency. General St. Clair, about two in the afternoon,
informed the committee, that the officers appointed by the soldiers to
manage their business, had, in the first instance, refused to give him
an account of their transactions; the which was only extracted from
them by a peremptory demand. He mentioned to us the instructions they
had received from the soldiers, which contained faint and affected
concessions, mixed with new and inadmissible claims.
The whole affair wore the complexion of collusion between the officers
of the committee and the soldiery; and of a mere amusement on their
part, till they could gain fresh strength and execute their project,
whatever it might be, with greater advantage.
This behavior of the officers gave the affair a new and more serious
aspect, and overcame my opposition to the report. Mr. Peters, on
hearing the relation of General St. Clair, declared, at once, that he
thought the committee had then no alternative; at least, what he said
was understood in this sense by General St. Clair, Mr. Ellsworth, and
myself. If I am not much mistaken, General St. Clair also expressed his
opinion that Congress were unsafe in the city.
The ideas I suggested to your Excellency, in the conversation I have
mentioned, were substantially expressed to several members of Congress
as the motives of my delay; and particularly, I recollect, to Mr.
Madison, with these observations in addition: That though I was fully
convinced Congress, under an immediate view of circumstances, would,
in reality, be justified in withdrawing from a place where such an
outrage to government had been with impunity perpetrated, by a body
of armed mutineers, still, for several days, in complete command of
the city, and where either the feebleness of public councils, or the
indisposition of the citizens, afforded no assurance of protection
and support; yet, as the opinions of men would be governed by events,
and as the most probable event was, that the removal of Congress,
announcing decisive measures of coercion to the soldiery, would awe
them into submission, there was great danger that the reputation of
Congress would suffer by the easy termination of the business; and that
they would be accused of levity, timidity, or rashness.
Though not within the scope of my original intention, I will indulge
a few additional reflections on this subject. I am sensible that the
Council, in some respects, stand upon advantageous ground in this
discussion. Congress left the city, because they had no forces at
hand, no jurisdiction over the militia, and no assurances of effectual
support from those who had. The Council, as the Executive of the
State, were necessitated to remain on the spot. Soon after Congress
removed, the mutineers were deserted by their leaders, and surrendered
at discretion.
The multitude will be very apt to conclude, that the affair was of
trifling consequence; that it vanished under its own insignificance;
that Congress took up the matter in too high a tone of authority; that
they discovered a prudish nicety and irritability about their own
dignity: that Council were more temperate, more humane, and possessed
of greater foresight.
The bias in favor of an injured army; the propensity of the human mind
to lean to the speciousness of professed humanity, rather than to the
necessary harshness of authority; the vague and imperfect notions of
what is due to public authority, in an infant popular government; and
the insinuating plausibility of a well-constructed _message_; will all
contribute to that conclusion.
But let us suppose an impartial man of sense, well acquainted with
facts, to form an argument upon the subject. It appears to me, he might
naturally fall into this train of combination.
It is a well known fact, that, from the necessities of the war, or
the delinquencies of the several States, Congress were not enabled to
comply with their engagements to the army, which, after a glorious
and successful struggle for their country, much suffering, exemplary
patience, and signal desert, they were compelled, by the irresistible
dictates of an empty treasury and a ruined credit, to disband, after
having given strong indications of their discontent, and resentment of
the public neglect. A large part of the army suffer themselves to be
patiently dismissed; a particular corps of four or five hundred men,
stationed in the place where Congress reside, refuse to accept their
discharges but on certain specified conditions.
They even go further, and, stimulated by their injuries, or encouraged
and misled by designing persons, are emboldened to send a threatening
message to Congress, declaring to them, that unless they would do them
justice immediately, they would find means of redress for themselves.
Measures are indirectly taken to appease this disorder, and give the
discontented soldiers as much satisfaction as the situation of things
will permit. Shortly after, accounts are received, that another corps,
at miles distance, have also mutinied; and that a part of them, to
the number of about eighty men, are on their march to join those who
had already discovered so refractory a disposition. A committee of
Congress is immediately appointed to confer with the Executive of
the State, on the measures proper to be pursued in this exigency.
That committee, in the first instance, suggest to the Council,
the expedience of calling out a body of militia, to intercept the
detachment of mutineers on its march, and represent the danger of
the progress of the spirit of mutiny, and of future outrages, should
those on their march be suffered, without molestation, to join a more
numerous corps in the same temper with themselves.
The Council urge a variety of difficulties: the shortness of the
time to collect the militia before the mutineers would arrive; the
reluctance with which the citizens would obey a call against men whom
they consider as meritorious, and injured, and the like. The committee,
perceiving the unwillingness of the Council to employ the militia,
desist from pressing, and recur to expedients. The day after, the
mutineers march in triumph into the city, and unite themselves with
those who are already there; and the following day, the whole body
assemble in arms, throw off all obedience to their officers, and, in
open defiance of government, march to the place which is the usual
seat of Congress and the Council of the State, while both are actually
sitting; surround it with guards, and send a message to the Council,
demanding authority to appoint, themselves, officers to command them,
with absolute discretion to take such measures as those officers should
think proper, to redress their grievances; accompanied with a threat,
that if there was not a compliance in twenty minutes, they would let in
an injured soldiery upon them, and abide the consequence.
The members of Congress who were at the time assembled, request General
St. Clair, who happened to be present, to take such measures as he
should judge expedient, without committing the honor of government,
to divert the storm, and induce the troops to return to their quarters
without perpetrating acts of violence. General St. Clair, in concert
with the Council, grants the mutineers permission to elect, out of
officers then, or formerly, in commission, such as they should confide
in, to represent their grievances to the Council, with a promise, that
the Council would confer with the persons elected for that purpose.
Having obtained this promise, the mutineers return to their quarters,
in military parade, and continue in open defiance of government.
The concession made was a happy compromise between an attention to
dignity, and a prudent regard to safety.
Men who had dared to carry their insolence to such an extreme, and who
saw no opposition to their outrages, were not to be expected to retreat
without an appearance, at least, of gratifying their demands. The
slightest accident was sufficient to prompt men, in such a temper and
situation, to tragical excesses.
But however it might become the delicacy of government not to depart
from the promise it had given, it was its duty to provide effectually
against a repetition of such outrages; and to put itself in a situation
to give, instead of receiving, the law; and to manifest that its
compliance was not the effect of necessity, but of choice.
This was not to be considered as the disorderly riot of an unarmed mob,
but as the deliberate mutiny of an incensed soldiery, carried to the
utmost point of outrage short of assassination. The licentiousness of
an army is to be dreaded in every government; but, in a republic, it
is more particularly to be restrained; and when directed against the
civil authority, to be checked with energy, and punished with severity.
The merits and sufferings of the troops might be a proper motive for
mitigating punishment, when it was in the power of the government
to inflict it; but it was no reason for relaxing in the measures
necessary to put itself in that situation. Its authority was first to
be vindicated, and then its clemency to be displayed.
The rights of government are as essential to be defended, as the rights
of individuals. The security of the one is inseparable from that of
the other. And, indeed, in every new government, especially of the
popular kind, the great danger is, that public authority will not be
sufficiently respected.
But upon this occasion, there were more particular reasons for decision.
Congress knew there were, within two or three days’ march of the city,
a more considerable body of the same corps, part of which had mutinied
and come to town, and had been the chief actors in the late disorder;
that those men had, with difficulty, been kept, by the exertions of
their officers, from joining the insurgents in the first instance; that
there was another corps in their neighborhood which, a little time
before, had also discovered symptoms of mutiny; that a considerable
part of the same line which were in mutiny in town, was every moment
expected to arrive from the southward, and, there was the greatest
reason to conclude, would be infected with the same spirit, on their
arrival, as had presently happened in the case of a small detachment
which had joined a few days before; that there were, besides, large
numbers of disbanded soldiers, scattered through the country, in want,
and who had not yet had time to settle down to any occupation, and
exchange their military for private habits; that some of these were
really coming in, and adding themselves to the revolters; that an
extensive accession of strength might be gained from these different
quarters; and that there were all the sympathies of like common wrongs,
distresses, and resentments, to bring them together, and to unite them
in one cause. The partial success of those who had already made an
experiment, would be a strong encouragement to others; the rather, as
the whole line had formerly mutinied, not only with impunity, but with
advantage to themselves.
In this state of things, decision was most compatible with the safety
of the community, as well as the dignity of government. Though no
general convulsion might be to be apprehended, serious mischiefs
might attend the progress of the disorder. Indeed, it would have been
meanness, to have negotiated and temporized with an armed banditti of
four or five hundred men; who, in any other situation than surrounding
a defenceless senate, could only become formidable by being feared.
This was not an insurrection of a whole people: it was not an army with
their officers at their head, demanding the justice of their country;
either of which might have made caution and concession respectable: it
was a handful of mutinous soldiers, who had equally violated the laws
of discipline, as the rights of public authority.
Congress, therefore, wisely resolve, that “it is necessary that
effectual measures be immediately taken for supporting the public
authority;” and call upon the State in which they reside, for the
assistance of its militia, at the same time that they send orders for
the march of a body of regular forces as an eventual resource.
There was a propriety in calling for the aid of the militia in the
first place, for different reasons. Civil government may always, with
more peculiar propriety, resort to the aid of the citizens, to repel
military insults or encroachments.
’Tis there, it ought to be supposed, where it may seek its surest
dependence, especially in a democracy, which is the creature of the
people. The citizens of each State are, in an aggregate light, the
citizens of the United States, and bound, as much to support the
representatives of the whole, as their own immediate representatives.
The insult was not to Congress personally; it was to the government,
to public authority in general; and was very properly put upon that
footing. The regular forces, which Congress could command, were at a
great distance, and could not, but in a length of time, be brought
to effectuate their purpose. The disorder continued to exist on the
spot where they were; was likely to increase by delay; and might be
productive of sudden and mischievous effects by being neglected.
The city and the Bank were in immediate danger of being rifled; and,
perhaps, of suffering other calamities. The citizens, therefore, were
the proper persons to make the first exertion.
The objection, that these were not the objects of the care of Congress,
can only serve to mislead the vulgar. The peace and safety of the place
which was the immediate residence of Congress, _endangered, too, by
the troops of the United States_, demanded their interposition. The
President of the State of Pennsylvania was himself of this opinion;
having declared to a member of that body, that as their troops were the
offenders, it was proper for them to declare the necessity of calling
out the militia, as a previous step to its being done.
Nor is there more weight in the supposition that the danger was
inconsiderable; and that, from the pacific appearances of the troops,
it was to be expected, the disorder would subside of itself. The facts
were, that the troops still continued in a state of mutiny; had made no
submissions, nor offered any; and that they affected to negotiate with
their arms in their hands.
A band of mutinous soldiers, in such a situation, uncontrolled, and
elated with their own power, was not to be trusted.
The most sudden vicissitudes and contradictory changes were to be
expected; and a fit of intoxication was sufficient, at any moment,
with men who had already gone such length, to make the city a scene of
plunder and massacre. It was the height of rashness to leave the city
exposed to the bare possibility of such mischiefs.
The only question, in this view, is, Whether there was greater
danger to the city, in attempting their reduction by force, than in
endeavoring, by palliatives, to bring them to a sense of duty? It has
been urged, and appeared to have operated strongly upon the minds of
the Council,[24] that the soldiers being already embodied, accustomed
to arms, and ready to act at a moment’s warning, it would be extremely
hazardous to attempt to collect the citizens to subdue them, as the
mutineers might have taken advantage of the first confusion incident to
the measure, to do a great deal of mischief, before this militia could
have assembled in equal or superior force.
It is not to be denied, but that a small body of disciplined troops,
headed and led by their officers, with a plan of conduct, could have
effected a great deal in similar circumstances; but it is equally
certain, that nothing can be more contemptible, than a body of men,
used to be commanded and to obey, when deprived of the example and
direction of their officers. They are infinitely less to be dreaded
than an equal number of men who have never been broken to command, nor
exchanged their natural courage for that artificial kind which is the
effect of discipline and habit. Soldiers transfer their confidence from
themselves to their officers, face danger by the force of example,
the dread of punishment, and the sense of necessity. Take away these
inducements and leave them to themselves, they are no longer resolute
than till they are opposed.
In the present case, it was to be relied upon, that the appearance of
opposition would instantly bring the mutineers to a sense of their
insignificance, and to submission. Conscious of their weakness, from
the smallness of their numbers; in a populous city, and in the midst of
a populous country; awed by the consequences of resisting government
by arms, and confounded by the want of proper leaders and proper
direction; the common soldiers would have thought of nothing but making
their peace by the sacrifice of those who had been the authors of their
misconduct.
The idea, therefore, of coercion, was the safest and most prudent: for
more was to be apprehended from leaving them to their own passions,
than from attempting to control them by force. It will be seen, by and
by, how far the events, justly appreciated, corresponded with this
reasoning.
Congress were not only right in adopting measures of coercion; but
they were also right in resolving to change their situation, if proper
exertions were not made by the particular government and citizens of
the place where they resided. The want of such exertions would evince
some defect, no matter where, that would prove they ought to have no
confidence in their situation. They were, to all intents and purposes,
in the power of a lawless, armed banditti, enraged, whether justly,
or not, against them. However they might have had a right to expose
their own persons to insult and outrage, they had no right to expose
the character of representatives, or the dignity of the States they
represented, or of the Union. It was plain, they could not, with
propriety, in such a state of things, proceed in their deliberations
where they were; and it was right they should repair to a place where
they could do it. It was far from impossible, that the mutineers might
have been induced to seize their persons, as hostages for their own
security, as well as with a hope of extorting concessions. Had such
an event taken place, the whole country would have exclaimed, Why did
not Congress withdraw from a place where they found they could not be
assured of support; where the government was so feeble, or the citizens
so indisposed, as to suffer three or four hundred mutinous soldiers
to violate, with impunity, the authority of the United States, and of
their own State?
When they resolved to depart, on the want of adequate exertions, they
had reason to doubt their being made, from the disinclination shown by
the Council to call out the militia in the first instance: and when
they did actually depart, they were informed by the Council, that
the efforts of the citizens were not to be looked for, even from a
repetition of the outrage which had already happened; and it was to
be doubted what measure of outrage would produce them. They had also
convincing proof, that the mutiny was more serious than it had even at
first appeared, by the participation of some of the officers.
To throw the blame of harshness and precipitancy upon Congress, it is
said, that their dignity was only _accidentally_ and _undesignedly_
offended. Much stress has been laid upon the message, from the
soldiery being directed to the Council, and not to them. All this,
however, is very immaterial to the real merits of the question.
Whatever might have been the first intention of the mutineers in this
particular act, whether it proceeded from artifice or confusion of
ideas, the indignity to Congress was the same. They knew that Congress
customarily held their deliberations at the State House: and if it
even be admitted, that they knew Saturday to be a day of usual recess,
which, perhaps, is not altogether probable: when they came to the
place they saw, and knew, Congress to be assembled there. They did not
desist in consequence of this; but proceeded to station their guards,
and execute their purposes. Members of Congress went out to them;
remonstrated with them; represented the danger of their proceedings
to themselves, and desired them to withdraw: but they persisted till
they obtained what they supposed a part of their object. A majority of
the same persons had, some days before, sent a message, almost equally
exceptionable, to Congress; and at the time they scarcely spoke of any
other body than Congress; who, indeed, may naturally be supposed to
have been the main object of their resentments: for Congress, having
always appeared to the soldiery, to be the body who contracted with
them, and who had broken faith with them, it is not to be supposed they
were capable of investigating the remote causes of the failures, so as
to transfer the odium from Congress to the State.
But the substantial thing to be considered in this question, is the
violation of public authority. It cannot be disputed, that the mutiny
of troops is a violation of that authority to which they owe obedience.
This was, in the present case, aggravated to a high degree of
atrociousness, by the gross insult to the government of Pennsylvania,
in the face of Congress, and in defiance of their displeasure. It was
further aggravated by continuing in that condition for a series of time.
The reasons have been assigned, that made it incumbent upon Congress
to interpose; and when they called upon the State of Pennsylvania, not
only to vindicate its own rights, but to support their authority, the
declining a compliance was a breach of the Confederation, and of the
duty which the State of Pennsylvania owed to the United States. The
best apology for the government of Pennsylvania, in this case, is,
that they could not command the services of their citizens. But so
improper a disposition in the citizens, if admitted, must operate as an
additional justification to Congress, in their removal.
The subsequent events, justly appreciated, illustrate the propriety
of their conduct. The mutineers did not make voluntary submissions
in consequence of negotiation, persuasion, or conviction. They did
not submit till after Congress had left the city, publishing their
intentions of coercion; till after there had been an _actual call_
upon the militia; till their leaders and instigators, alarmed by the
approach of force, and the fear of being betrayed by the men, fled.
They were reduced by coercion, not overcome by mildness. It appears,
too, that while they were professing repentance, and a return to their
duty, they were tampering with the troops at Yorktown and Lancaster,
to increase their strength; and that two officers, at least, were
concerned in the mutiny, who, by their letters since, have confessed,
that some project of importance was in contemplation.
The call for the militia was made the day after it had been pronounced
ineligible by the Council. There could have been little change, in that
time, either in the temper or preparations of the citizens. The truth
is, that the departure of Congress brought the matter to a crisis; and
that the Council were compelled, by necessity, to do what they ought to
have done before, through choice.
It is to be lamented they did not, by an earlier decision, prevent the
necessity of Congress taking a step which may have many disagreeable
consequences. They then would
[_The residue of the manuscript is not found._]
[20] These blanks are in the manuscript.
[21] This blank is in the manuscript.
[22] “The words, as reported by the committee to Congress, were, ‘It,’
i.e., the arming of the citizens to suppress the mutineers, ‘was not
to be expected, merely from a repetition of the insult which had
happened.’”--Note by Col. Pickering.
[23] “Mr. Ellsworth was the other member of the committee.--T. P.”
[24] Your Excellency will recollect, that, in our private conversation,
you urged this consideration, and appealed to my military experience;
and that I made, substantially, the observations which follow.