Philadelphia, March 17, 1783.
Sir:
I am duly honored with your Excellency’s letters of the fourth and
twelfth instant. It is much to be regretted, though not to be wondered
at, that steps of so inflammatory a tendency have been taken in the
army. Your Excellency has, in my opinion, acted wisely. The best way
is, ever, not to attempt to stem a torrent, but to divert it.
I am happy to find you coincide in opinion with me on the conduct
proper to be observed by yourself. I am persuaded, more and more, it
is that which is most consistent with your own reputation and the
public safety. Our affairs wear a most serious aspect, as well foreign
as domestic. Before this gets to hand, your Excellency will probably
have seen the provisional articles between Great Britain and these
States. It might, at first appearance, be concluded, that these will be
the prelude to a general peace; but there are strong reasons to doubt
the truth of such a conclusion. Obstacles may arise from different
quarters; from the demands of Spain and Holland; from the hope, in
France, of greater acquisitions in the East; and, perhaps, still more
probably, from the insincerity and duplicity of Lord Shelburne, whose
politics, founded in the peculiarity of his situation, as well as in
the character of the man, may well be suspected of insidiousness.
I am really apprehensive, if peace does not take place, that the
negotiations will tend to sow distrust among the allies, and weaken the
force of the common league. We have, I fear, men among us, and men in
trust, who have a hankering after British connection. We have others
whose confidence in France savors of credulity. The intrigues of the
former, and the incautiousness of the latter, may be both, though in
different degrees, injurious to the American interests, and make it
difficult for prudent men to steer a proper course.
There are delicate circumstances, with respect to the late foreign
transactions, which I am not at liberty to reveal; but which, joined to
our internal weaknesses, disorders, follies, and prejudices, make this
country stand upon precarious ground.
Some use, perhaps, may be made of these ideas, to induce moderation in
the army. An opinion that their country does not stand upon a secure
footing, will operate upon the patriotism of the officers against
hazarding any domestic commotions.
When I make these observations, I cannot forbear adding, that if
no excesses take place, I shall not be sorry that ill-humors have
appeared. I shall not regret importunity, if temperate, from the army.
There are good intentions in the majority of Congress, but there is
not sufficient wisdom or decision. There are dangerous prejudices, in
the particular States, opposed to those measures which alone can give
stability and prosperity to the Union. There is a fatal opposition to
Continental views. Necessity alone can work a reform. But how produce
that necessity, how apply it, and how keep it within salutary bounds? I
fear we have been contending for a shadow.
The affair of accounts I considered as having been put on a
satisfactory footing. The particular States have been required to
settle till the first of August, ’80; and the Superintendent of Finance
has been directed to take measures for settling since that period. I
shall immediately see him on the subject.
We have had eight States and a half in favor of a commutation of the
half pay for an average of ten years’ purchase; that is, five years’
full pay instead of half pay for life, which, on a calculation of
annuities, is nearly an equivalent. I hope this will now shortly take
place.
We have made considerable progress in a plan to be recommended to the
several States for funding all the public debts, including those of
the army; which is certainly the only way to restore public credit,
and enable us to continue the war by borrowing abroad, if it should be
necessary, to continue it.
I omitted mentioning to your Excellency, that, from European
intelligence, there is great reason to believe, at all events, peace or
war, New-York will be evacuated in the spring. It will be a pity if any
domestic disturbances should change the plans of the British Court.
I have the honor to be,
With the greatest respect,
Your Excellency’s most ob’t serv’t,
A. Hamilton.
P. S. Your Excellency mentions, that it has been surmised, the plan
in agitation was formed in Philadelphia; that combinations have been
talked of between the public creditors and the army; and that members
of Congress had encouraged the idea. This is partly true. I have myself
urged, in Congress, the propriety of uniting the influence of the
public creditors, and the army, as a part of them, to prevail upon the
States to enter into their views. I have expressed the same sentiments
out of doors. Several other members of Congress have done the same. The
meaning, however, of all this, was simply, that Congress should adopt
such a plan as would embrace the relief of all the public creditors,
including the army; in order that the personal influence of some, the
connections of others, and a sense of justice to the army, as well as
the apprehension of ill consequences, might form a mass of influence,
in each State, in favor of the measures of Congress. In this view,
as I mentioned to your Excellency in a former letter, I thought the
discontents of the army might be turned to a good account. I am still
of opinion, that their earnest but respectful applications for redress
will have a good effect. As to any combination of _force_, it would
only be productive of the horrors of a civil war, might end in the ruin
of the country, and would certainly end in the ruin of the army.