GREENE TO HAMILTON.

January 10, 1781.

My Dear Colonel:

General Du Portail being on his way to the northward, gives me an

opportunity to write you, which I should have done before, had not my

letters to His Excellency contained as full information of the state of

things as I was able to give, from the little time I had been in the

department.

When I was appointed to this command, I expected to meet with many

new and singular difficulties; but they infinitely exceed what I

apprehended. This is really carrying on a war in an enemy’s country;

for you cannot establish the most inconsiderable magazine, or convey

the smallest quantity of stores from one post to another, without

being obliged to detach guards for their security. The division among

the people is much greater than I imagined; and the whigs and tories

persecute each other with little less than savage fury. There is

nothing but murders and devastations in every quarter.

The loss of our army at Charleston, and the defeat of General Gates,

has been the cause of keeping such shoals of militia on foot; and their

service has been accompanied with such destruction and loss, as has

almost laid waste the whole country. Nothing has been more destructive

to the true interest of this country than the mode adopted for its

defence. Two misfortunes happening one after the other, may have

rendered it unavoidable the last season; but should it be continued,

the inhabitants are inevitably ruined, and the resources of the country

rendered incapable of affording support to an army competent to

its defence. Government here is infinitely more popular than to the

northward; and there is no such thing as national character or national

sentiment. The inhabitants are from all quarters of the globe, and as

various in their opinions, projects, and schemes, as their manners and

habits are from their early education. Those in office, from a vanity

to be thought powerful, join in the measure of imposing upon the public

respecting the strength and resources of these southern States: and

while Congress, and the minister of France, are kept under this fatal

delusion, I fear little support will be given to this department. The

inhabitants are numerous; but they would be rather formidable abroad

than at home. They are scattered over such a vast extent of country,

that it is difficult to collect, and still more difficult to subsist

them. There is a great spirit of enterprise among the black people; and

those that come out as volunteers are not a little formidable to the

enemy. There are, also, some particular corps under Sumpter, Marion,

and Clarke, that are bold and daring; the rest of the militia are

better calculated to destroy provisions than oppose the enemy.

At Philadelphia, and all my journey through the country, I endeavored

to impress upon those in power, the necessity of sending clothing, and

supplies of every kind, immediately to this army. But poverty was urged

as a plea, in bar to every application. They all promised fair, but I

fear will do but little: ability is wanting with some, and inclination

with others.

Public credit is so totally lost, that private people will not give

their aid, though they see themselves involved in one common ruin.

It is my opinion that General Washington’s influence will do more

than all the assemblies upon the continent. I always thought him

exceeding popular; but in many places he is little less than adored,

and universally admired. His influence in this country might possibly

effect something great. However, I found myself exceedingly well

received, but more from being the friend of the General, than from my

own merit.

This country wants, for its defence, a small but well appointed army,

organized so as to move with great celerity. It should consist of

about five thousand infantry, and from eight hundred to a thousand

horse. The enemy cannot maintain a larger force in this quarter,

neither can we. The resources from the country are too small to subsist

a large body of troops at any one point: and to draw supplies from a

distance, through such long tracts of barren land, will be next to

impossible, unless the business can be aided by a water transportation;

and, in either case, it will be accompanied with an amazing expense.

Could we get a superiority of horse, we could soon render it difficult

for Lord Cornwallis to hold his position so far in the country. Nor

should I be under any apprehensions, with a much inferior force to

his, of taking post near him, if I had but such a body of horse. But

the enemy’s horse is so much superior to ours, that we cannot move a

detachment towards them without hazarding its ruin.

When I came to the army, I found it in a most wretched condition. The

officers had lost all confidence in the General, and the troops all

their discipline. The troops had not only lost their discipline, but

they were so addicted to plundering that they were a terror to the

country. The General and I met at least upon very civil terms; and he

expressed the greatest happiness at my being appointed to succeed him.

General Smallwood and he were not upon good terms; the former suspected

the latter of having an intention to supplant him, but many think

without reason. Others, again, are of opinion, his suspicions were well

founded, and that Smallwood was not a little mortified at my being

appointed to this department, and got outrageous when he heard Baron

Steuben was coming also. How the matter was, I know not; certain it

is, he is gone home, having refused to act under Baron Steuben, and

declares he will not serve at all, unless Congress will give him a

commission, dated at least two years before his appointment. This, I

think, can never happen, notwithstanding his private merit, and the

claim of the State. The battle of Camden here is represented widely

different from what it is to the northward.

Colonel Williams thinks that none of the general officers were entitled

to any extraordinary merit. The action was short, and succeeded by a

flight, wherein every body took care of himself, as well officers

as soldiers. Not an officer, except Major Anderson, and one or two

Captains, that brought off the field of battle a single soldier. The

Colonel also says, that General Gates would have shared little more

disgrace than is the common lot of the unfortunate, notwithstanding he

was early off, if he had only halted at the Waxhaws or Charlotte--the

first about sixty, and the last about eighty miles from the field of

battle. What little incidents either give or destroy reputation! How

many long hours a man may labor with an honest zeal in his country’s

service, and be disgraced for the most trifling error either in conduct

or opinion! Hume very justly observes, no man will have reputation

unless he is useful to society, be his merit or abilities what they

may. Therefore, it is necessary for a man to be fortunate, as well as

wise and just. The greater part of the loss of the Maryland line, in

the action of Camden, happened after they began to retreat: indeed,

this was the case with all the troops. What gave Smallwood such great

reputation, was his halt at Salisbury, which was nothing but accident.

You know there are great parties prevailing in the Maryland line; and

perhaps his merit is not a little diminished on that account. I think

him a brave and good officer, but too slow to effect any thing great

in a department like this, where embarrassments are without number,

and where nothing can be effected without the greatest promptitude and

decision. This army is in such a wretched condition that I hardly know

what to do with it. The officers have got such a habit of negligence,

and the soldiers so loose and disorderly, that it is next to impossible

to give it a military complexion. Without clothing, I am sure I shall

never do it. I call no councils of war, and I communicate my intentions

to very few. The army was posted at Charlotte when I came up with

it; and in a council it had been determined to winter there; but the

difficulty of procuring subsistence, and other reasons, induced me not

only to take a new position, but to make an entire new disposition.

All this I effected by a single order, having first made the necessary

inquiry respecting the new positions, by sending a man to examine

the grounds and other requisites. If I cannot inspire the army with

confidence and respect by an independent conduct, I foresee it will

be impossible to instil discipline and order among the troops. General

Leslie has arrived, and joined Lord Cornwallis, whose force now is more

than three times larger than ours. And we are subsisting ourselves by

our own industry; and I am not without hopes of forming something like

a magazine. I am laboring also to get clothing from every quarter.

Baron Steuben is in Virginia, and is indefatigable in equipping and

forwarding the troops from that State. I left General Guest in Maryland

for the same purpose; but I have got nothing from there yet, nor do

I expect much for months to come. The North Carolina State have such

a high opinion of the militia, that I don’t expect they will ever

attempt to raise a single continental soldier; notwithstanding the most

sensible among them will acknowledge the folly of employing militia.

But I must have tried your patience, and therefore will make a full

stop concerning matters in this department, and inquire how you go on

to the northward.

* * * * *

I beg my compliments to General Washington’s family, to General Knox

and his family, and all other of my acquaintances.

I shall be exceedingly obliged to you if you will communicate to me,

with great freedom, every thing worthy of note that is said or respects

this department.

Yours affectionately,

N. Greene.

To Col. Alexander Hamilton.

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