Head-Quarters, 1778.
Dear Sir:
I take the liberty to trouble you with a few hints on a matter of
some importance. Baron Steuben, who will be the bearer of this, waits
on Congress to have his office[2] arranged upon some decisive and
permanent footing. It will not be amiss to be on your guard. The Baron
is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem; and whose zeal,
intelligence, and success, the consequence of both, entitle him to the
greatest credit. But I am apprehensive, with all his good qualities, a
fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him
to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will
be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite
any prejudice against him on this account: perhaps I may be mistaken
in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am: if I
am not, it maybe useful. In either case, the Baron deserves to be
considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which
good policy will warrant.
On the first institution of this office, the General allowed him to
exercise more ample powers than would be proper for a continuance. They
were necessary in the commencement, to put things in a train with a
degree of dispatch which the exigency of our affairs required: but it
has been necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended.
The novelty of the office excited questions about its boundaries; the
extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their
own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising fast to a
height that threatened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary
to apply a remedy. The General has delineated the functions of the
Inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to
Congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the army in general.
It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate essentially from
it. It is of course the General’s intention, that whatever regulations
are adopted by him, should undergo the revision, and receive the
sanction, of Congress: but it is indispensable, in the present state
of our army, that he should have the power, from time to time, to
introduce and authorize the reformations necessary in our system. It is
a work which must be done by occasional and gradual steps; and ought
to be intrusted to a person on the spot, who is thoroughly acquainted
with all our defects, and has judgment sufficient to adopt the
progressive remedies they require. The plan established by Congress, on
a report of the Board of War when Conway was appointed, appears to me
exceptionable in many respects. It makes the Inspector independent of
the Commander-in-chief; confers powers which would produce universal
opposition in the army; and, by making the previous concurrence of
the Board of War requisite to the introduction of every regulation
which should be found necessary, opens such a continual source of
delay as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the
Commander-in-chief introduce, and the legislature afterwards ratify,
or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps you will not differ much
from me, when I suppose, that so far as relates to the Board of War,
the former scheme was a _brat of faction_, and therefore ought to be
renounced.
There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart, which, in good
policy, he can by no means be indulged in: it is the power of enforcing
that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an
obedience to orders. This power can only be properly lodged with the
Commander-in-chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other
hands. Each Captain is vested with it in his company; each Colonel
in his regiment: each General in his particular command: and the
Commander-in-chief in the whole.
When I began this letter, I did not intend to meddle with any other
subject than the Inspectorship; but one just comes into my head which
appears to me of no small importance. The goodness, or force, of an
army, depends as much, perhaps more, on the composition of the corps
which form it, as on its collective number. The composition is good or
bad, not only according to the quality of the men, but in proportion to
the completeness or incompleteness of a corps in respect to numbers. A
regiment, for instance, with a full complement of officers, and fifty
or sixty men, is not half so good as a company with the same number of
men. A Colonel will look upon such a command as unworthy his ambition,
and will neglect and despise it: a Captain would pride himself in it,
and take all the pains in his power to bring it to perfection. In one
case we shall see a total relaxation of discipline, and negligence
of every thing that constitutes military excellence: in the other,
there will be attention, energy, and every thing that can be wished.
Opinion, whether well or ill-founded, is the governing principle of
human affairs. A corps much below its establishment, comparing what it
is with what it ought to be, loses all confidence in itself; and the
whole army loses that confidence and emulation which are essential to
success. These, and a thousand other things that will occur to you,
make it evident, that the most important advantages attend the having
complete corps, and proportional disadvantages the reverse. Ten
thousand men, distributed into twenty imperfect regiments, will not
have the efficiency of the same number in half the number of regiments.
The fact is, with respect to the American army, that the want of
discipline, and other defects we labor under, are as much owing to the
skeleton state of our regiments as to any other cause. What then?
Have we any prospect of filling our regiments? My opinion is, that we
have nearly arrived to our _ne plus ultra_. If so, we ought to reduce
the number of corps, and give them that substance and consistency
which they want, by incorporating them together, so as to bring them
near their establishment. By this measure the army would be infinitely
improved; and the State would be saved the expense of maintaining a
number of superfluous officers.
In the present condition of our regiments, they are incapable even of
performing their common exercises without joining two or more together:
an expedient reluctantly submitted to by those officers who see
themselves made second in command of a battalion, instead of first, as
their commission imports; which happens to every younger Colonel whose
regiment is united with that of an elder.
What would be the inconveniencies, while the officers who remain in
command, and who might be selected from the others on account of
superior merit, would applaud themselves in the preference given them,
and rejoice at a change which confers such additional consequence on
themselves?
Those who should be excluded by the measure, would return home
discontented, and make a noise, which would soon subside and be
forgotten among matters of greater moment. To quiet them still more
effectually, if it should be thought necessary, they might be put upon
half-pay for a certain time.
If, on considering this matter, you should agree with me in sentiment,
it were to be wished the scheme could be immediately adopted, while the
arrangement now in hand is still unexecuted. If it is made, it will be
rather inconvenient, immediately after, to unhinge and throw the whole
system again afloat. When you determined on your last arrangement,
you did not know what success the different States might have had in
draughting and recruiting. It would then have been improper to reduce
the number of corps, as proposed. We have now seen their success: we
have no prospect of seeing the regiments filled; we should reduce them.
Believe me to be,
With great esteem and regard,
Dear Sir, your obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
[2] Inspector-General of the Army.