Albany, November, 1777.
Dear Sir:
I arrived here yesterday at noon, and waited upon General Gates
immediately, on the business of my mission; but was sorry to find that
his ideas did not correspond with yours, for drawing off the number of
troops you directed. I used every argument in my power, to convince
him of the propriety of the measure; but he was inflexible in the
opinion, that two brigades, at least, of continental troops, should
remain in and near this place. His reasons were, that the intelligence
of Sir Henry Clinton’s having gone to join Howe, was not sufficiently
authenticated to put it out of doubt; that there was, therefore, a
possibility of his returning up the river, which might expose the
finest arsenal in America (as he calls the one here) to destruction,
should this place be left so bare of troops as I proposed; and that
the want of conveniencies, and the difficulty of the roads, would make
it impossible to remove artillery and stores for a considerable time;
that the New England States would be left open to the depredations
and ravages of the enemy; that it would put it out of his power to
enterprise any thing against Ticonderoga, which he thinks might be done
in the winter, and which he considers it of importance to undertake.
The force of these reasons did by no means strike me; and I did every
thing in my power to show they were unsubstantial: but all I could
effect, was to have one brigade dispatched, in addition to those
already marched. I found myself infinitely embarrassed, and was at a
loss how to act. I felt the importance of strengthening you as much as
possible: but, on the other hand, I found insuperable inconveniences,
in acting diametrically opposite to the opinion of a gentleman, whose
successes have raised him to the highest importance. General Gates has
won the entire confidence of the Eastern States. If disposed to do it,
by addressing himself to the prejudices of the people, he would find
no difficulty to render a measure odious, which it might be said,
with plausibility enough to be believed, was calculated to expose them
to unnecessary dangers, notwithstanding their exertions, during the
campaign, had given them the fullest title to repose and security.
General Gates has influence and interest elsewhere: he might use it,
if he pleased, to discredit the measure there also. On the whole, it
appeared to me dangerous, to insist on sending more troops from hence,
while General Gates appeared so warmly opposed to it. Should any
accident, or inconvenience, happen in consequence of it, there would be
too fair a pretext for censure: and many people are too well disposed
to lay hold of it. At any rate, it might be considered as using him
ill, to take a step so contrary to his judgment, in a case of this
nature. These considerations, and others which I shall be more explicit
in when I have the pleasure of seeing you, determined me not to insist
upon sending either of the other brigades remaining here. I am afraid
what I have done, may not meet with your approbation, as not being
perhaps fully warranted by your instructions: but I ventured to do what
I thought right, hoping that, at least, the goodness of my intention
will excuse the error of my judgment.
I was induced to this relaxation the more readily, as I had directed
to be sent on, two thousand militia, which were not expected by you;
and a thousand continental troops out of those proposed to be left
with General Putnam, which I have written to him, since I found how
matters were circumstanced here, to forward to you with all dispatch.
I did this for several reasons: because your reinforcement would be
more expeditious from that place than from this: because two thousand
continental troops at Peekskill will not be wanted in its present
circumstances; especially as it was really necessary to have a body
of continental troops at this place, for the security of the valuable
stores here: and I should not, if I had my wish, think it expedient to
draw off more than two of the three brigades now here. This being the
case, one of the ends you proposed to be answered, by leaving the ten
regiments with General Putnam, will be equally answered by the troops
here; I mean that of covering and fortifying the Eastern States: and
one thousand continental troops in addition to the militia collected,
and that may be collected, here, will be sufficient, in the Highlands,
for covering the country down that way, and carrying on the works
necessary to be raised for the defence of the river.
The troops gone, and going, to reinforce you, are near five thousand
rank and file, continental troops; and two thousand five hundred
Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia. These and the seven hundred
Jersey militia, will be a larger reinforcement than you expected,
though not quite an equal number of continental troops; nor exactly
in the way directed. General Lincoln tells me, the militia are very
excellent; and though their time will be out by the last of this month,
you will be able, if you think proper, to order the troops still
remaining here, to join you by the time their term of service expires.
I cannot forbear being uneasy, lest my conduct should prove displeasing
to you: but I have done what, considering all circumstances, appeared
to me most eligible and prudent.
Vessels are preparing to carry the brigade to New Windsor, which will
embark this evening. I shall, this afternoon, set out on my return to
camp; and on my way, shall endeavor to hasten the troops forward.
I have the honor to be,
With great esteem and respect,
Your Excellency’s most ob’t,
Alex. Hamilton.