Head Quarters, Morristown, April 5, 1777.
Gentlemen:
Since my last I have had the pleasure of receiving your reply to my
two favors of the 29th ultimo and 2d current. I am happy enough to be
able to inform you, that my indisposition, which was the occasion of my
brevity when I last wrote, is now removed.
The opinion I advanced respecting the enemy’s not moving before the
beginning of May, seems to be shaken, though not entirely overthrown,
by some present appearances. We have received information that they are
embarking about three thousand men on board of transports, which are
lying at the Hook, by way of Staten Island. This, it is conjectured,
is with a view to the Delaware; and the supposition is confirmed, by
the circumstance of a confederacy lately detected at Philadelphia,
who, among other things, were endeavoring, by the temptation of
fifty pounds, to engage persons as pilots up that river. The extreme
difficulties they must labor under for want of forage, and the infinite
hazard they must run by moving with a small body of about five thousand
men, with an enemy in the rear, incapable of sparing any considerable
body of troops to form a post behind, and be an asylum to them in case
of accident,--these circumstances will hardly allow me to think they
will be daring enough to make the attempt at this time. But on the
other hand, as they know we are in a progressive state as to numbers,
and other matters of importance, and as they have no prospect of early
reinforcement, and are in a state of uncertainty as to any, from the
bustling aspect of European affairs, it is probable they may conceive
a necessity of making a push at all risks. Perhaps, however, this
embarkation is intended for some other purpose; to make a diversion,
or execute some partisan exploit elsewhere. On the whole, I find it
difficult to believe they are yet ready for any capital operation.
As to your apprehensions of an attempt up the North river, I imagine
you may discard any uneasiness on that score, although it will be at
all times advisable to be on the watch against such a contingency.
It is almost reduced to a certainty, that the principal views of the
enemy, in the ensuing campaign, will be directed towards the southward,
and to Philadelphia more immediately; of which idea, the discovery
before mentioned, with respect to pilots, is no inconsiderable
confirmation. Philadelphia is an object calculated to strike and
attract their attention. It has all along been the main source of
supplies towards the war; and the getting it into their possession,
would deprive us of a wheel we could very badly spare, in the great
political and military machine. They are sensible of this, and are
equally sensible, that it contains, in itself, and is surrounded by,
a prodigious number of persons attached to them, and inimical to us,
who would lend them all the assistance they could, in the further
prosecution of their designs. It is also a common and well-grounded
rule in war, to strike first and principally, at the capital towns and
cities, in order to the conquest of a country.
I must confess I do not see any object equally interesting to draw
their efforts to the northward. Operations merely for plundering and
devastation can never answer their end; and if they could, one part of
the continent would do nearly as well as another. And as to the notion
of forming a junction with the northern army, and cutting off the
communication between the northern and southern States, I apprehend it
will do better in speculation than in practice. Unless the geography
of the country is far different from any thing I can conceive, to
effect this would require a chain of posts, and such a number of men at
each, as would never be practicable or maintainable, but to an immense
army. In their progress, by hanging upon their rear, and seizing
every opportunity of skirmishing, their situation might be rendered
insupportably uneasy.
But for fear of mistake, the General has determined to collect a
considerable body of troops at or about Peekskill, which will not be
drawn off till the intentions of the enemy have acquired a decisive
complexion. These will be ready, according to conjunctures, either to
proceed northerly or southerly, as may be requisite. Every precaution
should be taken to prevent the boats from being destroyed, by
collecting them, at the first movement of the enemy, under cover of
one of the forts, or into some inlet, difficult of access, and easily
defensible with a small number of men. The loss of them would be an
irreparable disadvantage.
The enemy’s attempt upon Peekskill is a demonstration of the folly
of having any quantity of stores at places so near the water, and so
much exposed to a sudden inroad. There should never be more there than
sufficient to answer present demands. We have lost a good deal in this
way at different times, and I hope experience will at last make us
wiser.
His Excellency lately had a visit from the Oneida Chief and five
others. He managed them with a good deal of address, and sent them
away perfectly satisfied. He persuaded them to go to Philadelphia, but
they declined it, alleging their impatience to return, and remove the
erroneous opinions of their countrymen, from the misrepresentations of
British emissaries, which they were apprehensive might draw them into
some rash proceedings. They parted, after having made the most solemn
protestations of friendship and good will. His Excellency has been very
busy all day in dispatching the southern post, which has prevented me
giving him your resolve. It will, no doubt, be very acceptable; and
it is with pleasure I inform you, that the zeal and abilities of the
New-York Convention hold the first rank in his estimation.
No news from France, save that the Congress have obtained a credit
there, for which they can draw bills to the amount of £100,000
sterling. This will be extremely serviceable in carrying on a trade
with the French. The new troops begin to come in. If we can shortly get
any considerable accession of strength, we may be able to strike some
brilliant stroke.
I am, Gentlemen, with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
P. S. We have been some time endeavoring to negotiate a regular cartel;
but it has been lately broken off, principally on account of Major
General Lee. General Howe will not allow him to be comprehended under
the general idea of American prisoners.