TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:
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signs=, spaced text with +plus signs+, small capitals as ALL CAPITALS,
and text in superscript is preceded by a ^carat. Inconsistencies in
hyphenation, punctuation, spelling and abbreviations have not been
corrected. A list of other corrections can be found at the end of the
document.
_BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY._
TWO ESSAYS
BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
LONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS
PORTUGAL ST. LINCOLN'S INN, W.C.
CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.
BOMBAY: A. H. WHEELER & CO.
ON
THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
AND
ON THE WILL IN NATURE.
TWO ESSAYS BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
TRANSLATED BY MME. KARL HILLEBRAND.
_REVISED EDITION._
LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1907
CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
In venturing to lay the present translation[1] before the public, I
am aware of the great difficulties of my task, and indeed can hardly
hope to do justice to the Author. In fact, had it not been for the
considerations I am about to state, I might probably never have
published what had originally been undertaken in order to acquire a
clearer comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to
publicity.
[1] From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenstädt. "Fourfold Root,"
Leipzig, 1875; "Will in Nature," Leipzig, 1878.
The two treatises which form the contents of the present volume have so
much importance for a profound and correct knowledge of Schopenhauer's
philosophy, that it may even be doubted whether the translation of
his chief work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," can contribute
much towards the appreciation of his system without the help at
least of the "Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde."
Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently insists upon a previous
thorough knowledge of Kant's philosophy, as the basis, and of his
own "Fourfold Root," as the key, to his own system, asserting that
knowledge to be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension
of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the "Fourfold Root"
nor the "Will in Nature" have as yet found a translator; therefore,
considering the dawning interest which has begun to make itself felt
for Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and in America, and the fact
that no more competent scholar has come forward to do the work, it may
not seem presumptuous to suppose that this version may be acceptable
to those who wish to acquire a more than superficial knowledge of this
remarkable thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not permit
them to read his works in the original.
Now although some portions of both the Essays published in the present
volume have of course become antiquated, owing to the subsequent
development of the empirical sciences, while others--such as, for
instance, Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of
Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and Pathology[2]--can
have no interest for the reader of the present day, I have nevertheless
given them just as he left them and refrained from all suppression or
alteration. And if, on the whole, the "Will in Nature" may be less
indispensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's views
than the "Fourfold Root," being merely a record of the confirmations
which had been contributed during his lifetime by the various branches
of Natural Science to his doctrine, that _the thing in itself is the
will_, the Second Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much
importance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement. For they
both throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the Universe in its double
aspect as Will and as Representation, each being as it were _a résumé_
of the exposition of one of those aspects. My plea for uniting them in
one volume, in spite of the difference of their contents and the wide
lapse of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be, that
they complete each other, and that their great weight and intrinsic
value seem to point them out as peculiarly fitted to be introduced to
the English thinker.
[2] See "Will in Nature," pp. 9-18 of the original; pp. 224-234 of
the present translation.
In endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as he expresses
them, I have necessarily encountered many and great difficulties. His
meaning, though always clearly expressed, is not always easy to seize,
even for his countrymen; as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have
failed to grasp, let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this
case besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot
be shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the consummate
perfection of Schopenhauer's prose is universally recognised, even by
those who reject, or at least who do not share, his views. An eminent
German writer of our time has not hesitated to rank him immediately
after Lessing and Göthe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and
only quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered with
the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's philosophy, was reluctantly
obliged to admit that his works would remain on account of their
literary value. Göthe himself expressed admiration for the clearness of
exposition in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.
The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these Essays, did
not therefore consist in the obscurity of the Author's style, nor even
in the difficulty of finding appropriate terms wherewith to convey his
meaning; although at times certainly the want of complete precision in
our philosophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selection
was often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference in the
way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts which lies between
the two nations. The regions of German and English thought are indeed
separated by a gulf, which at first seems impassable, yet which must
be bridged over by some means or other, if a right comprehension is to
be achieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically a single
thought in a long period consisting of various members; he proceeds
steadily to unravel the seemingly tangled skein, while he keeps the
reader ever on the alert, making him assist actively in the process
and never letting him lose sight of the main thread. The English
author, on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid confusion
and misunderstanding, and ready for this end not only to sacrifice
harmony of proportion in construction, but to submit to the necessity
of occasional artificial joining, usually adopts the analytical
method. He prefers to divide the thread of his discourse into several
smaller skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting the
convenience of the English thinker, to whom long periods are trying and
bewildering, and who is not always willing to wait half a page or more
for the point of a sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could
be done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the original,
I have broken up the longer periods in these essays into smaller
sentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension. At times however
Schopenhauer recapitulates a whole side of his view of the Universe
in a single period of what seems intolerable length to the English
reader: as, for instance, the _résumé_ contained in the Introduction
to his "Will in Nature,"[3] which could not be divided without damage
to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem advisable to sacrifice
the unity and harmony of his design and to disturb both his form and
his meaning, in order to minister to the reader's dislike for mental
exertion; in keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to
make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in which the
single parts are presented to the eye.
[3] Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and pp. 216 to 218 of the present
translation.
As regards the terms chosen to convey the German meaning, I can hardly
hope to have succeeded in every case in adequately rendering it, still
less can I expect to have satisfied my English readers. Several words
of frequent occurrence and of considerable importance for the right
understanding of the original, have been used at different times by
different English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our
philosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater
precision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer
or translator to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought
that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by
leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which
give most latitude for misapprehension, explaining the sense in which
I employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by
Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as
follows.
(_a._) _Anschauung_ (_anschauen_, literally 'to behold') I have
rendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When
used to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as
the cause of a sensation received, it is rendered by _perception_.
When used to lay stress upon _immediate_, as opposed to _abstract_
representation, it is rendered by _intuition_. This last occurs however
more often in the adjective form.
(_b._) _Vorstellung_ (_vorstellen_, literally 'to place before') I
render by _representation_ in spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to
the English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German
meaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer
himself as "an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the
brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a
_picture_ there."
(_c._) _Auffassung_ (_auffassen_, literally 'to catch up') has so
many shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many
different ways according to the relation in which it stands in the
context. It signifies _apprehension_, _comprehension_, _perception_,
_viewing_ and _grasping_.
(_d._) _Wahrnehmung_ (_wahrnehmen_, from _wahr_, true, and _nehmen_, to
take), is translated by _apprehension_ or _perception_, according to
the degree of consciousness which accompanies it.
But the two words which have proved most difficult to translate, have
been _Vernehmen_ and _Willkühr_.
(_e._) _Vernehmen_ means, to distinguish by the sense of hearing. This
word conveys a shade of thought which it is almost impossible to render
in English, because we have no word by which to distinguish, from mere
sensuous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than hearing and
less than comprehension. The French _entendre_ comes nearer to it than
our _hearing_, but implies more comprehension than _vernehmen_.
(_f._) As to _Willkühr_ (_arbitrium_, literally '_will-choice_'), after
a great deal of consideration I have chosen (_relative_) _free-will_ as
the nearest approach to the German sense, or at any rate, to that in
which Schopenhauer uses it. _Willkühr_ means in fact what is commonly
understood as free-will; _i.e._ will with power of choice, will
determined by motives and unimpeded by outward obstacles: _arbitrium_
as opposed to _voluntas_: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.
This relative free-will however is quite distinct from _absolute
free-will_ (_liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ_) in a metaphysical sense,
_i.e._ will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary character is
specially emphasized, we call _Willkühr_, _caprice_, but this is not
the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.
Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still to define
the sense in which I have used the term _idea_ in this translation;
for this word has greatly changed its meaning at different times and
with different authors, and is even now apt to confuse and mislead.
Schopenhauer has himself contributed in one way to render its
signification less clear; since, in spite of his declaration in the
"Fourfold Root"[4] to the effect, that he never uses the word _idea_
in any other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself
employed it to translate _Vorstellung_, in a specimen he gives of a
rendering of a passage in Kant's "Prolegomena" in a letter addressed
to Haywood, published in Gwinner's "Biography of Schopenhauer." This
he probably did because some eminent English and French philosophers
had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps that Kant's meaning
would thus be more readily understood. As however he uses the word
'_idea_' everywhere else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense,
I have preferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own
declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers of note have
protested against any other sense being given to it, and modern German
philosophers have more and more returned to the original meaning of the
term.
[4] See p. 113, § 34 of the original, and p. 133 of the present
translation.
Some readers may take exception at such expressions as _à priority_,
_motivation_, _aseity_; for they are not, strictly speaking, English
words. These terms however belong to Schopenhauer's own characteristic
terminology, and have a distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore
they had to be retained in all cases in which they could not be evaded,
in order not to interfere with the Author's intention: a necessity
which the scholar will not fail to recognise, especially when I plead
in my defence that fidelity and accuracy have been my sole aim in this
work.
If moreover Carlyle's words, "He who imports into his own country
any true delineation, any rationally spoken word on any subject, has
done well," are true, I may also be absolved from censure, if I lay
before the public this version of some important utterances of a great
thinker, in the hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement
to, a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.
THE TRANSLATOR.
_May, 1888._
CONTENTS.
ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
CHAP. PAGE
Translator's Preface v
Author's Preface to the Second Edition xvii
Editor's Preface to the Third Edition xx
Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition xxviii
I. Introduction 1
II. General Survey of the most important views hitherto held
concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason 6
III. Insufficiency of the Old and outlines of a New
Demonstration 28
IV. On the First Class of Objects for the Subject, and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which
predominates in it 31
V. On the Second Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which
predominates in it 114
VI. On the Third Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which
predominates in it 153
VII. On the Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which
predominates in it 165
VIII. General observations and results 177
ON THE WILL IN NATURE.
Preface to the Second Edition 193
Editor's Preface to the Third Edition 213
Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition 214
Introduction 215
Physiology and Pathology 224
Comparative Anatomy 252
Physiology of Plants 281
Physical Astronomy 305
Linguistic 322
Animal Magnetism and Magic 326
Sinology 359
Reference to Ethics 372
Conclusion 378
ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT
OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.
Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα +τετρακτύν+,
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως +ῥιζώματ'+ ἔχουσαν.
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
This treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first appeared in the
year 1813, when it procured for me the degree of doctor, afterwards
became the substructure for the whole of my system. It cannot,
therefore, be allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case,
without my knowledge, for the last four years.
On the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this once more into the
world with all its faults and blemishes, seemed to me unjustifiable.
For I am aware that the time cannot be very far off when all correction
will be impossible; but with that time the period of my real influence
will commence, and this period, I trust, will be a long one, for I
firmly rely upon Seneca's promise: "_Etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus
silentium livor indixerit; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia
judicent._"[5] I have done what I could, therefore, to improve this
work of my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty of life,
I must even regard it as an especially fortunate circumstance, to have
been thus permitted to correct in my sixtieth year what I had written
in my twenty-sixth.
[5] Seneca, Ep. 79.
Nevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently with my
younger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even speak his mind
freely, wherever it was possible. But wherever he had advanced what
was incorrect or superfluous, or had even left out the best part,
I have been obliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And
this has happened often enough; so often, indeed, that some of my
readers may perhaps think they hear an old man reading a young man's
book aloud, while he frequently lets it drop, in order to indulge in
digressions of his own on the same subject.
It is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long an interval,
could never acquire the unity and rounded completeness which only
belong to such as are written in one breath. So great a difference
will be found even in style and expression, that no reader of any
tact can ever be in doubt whether it be the older or younger man who
is speaking. For the contrast is indeed striking between the mild,
unassuming tone in which the youth--who is still simple enough to
believe quite seriously that for all whose pursuit is philosophy,
truth, and truth alone, can have importance, and therefore that whoever
promotes truth is sure of a welcome from them--propounds his arguments
with confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat harsh voice
of the old man, who in course of time has necessarily discovered
the true character and real aims of the noble company of mercenary
time-servers into which he has fallen. Nay, the just reader will
hardly find fault with him should he occasionally give free vent to
his indignation; since we see what comes of it when people who profess
to have truth for their sole aim, are always occupied in studying the
purposes of their powerful superiors, and when the _e quovis ligno fit
Mercurius_ is extended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy
_charlatan_, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them? Verily German
Philosophy stands before us loaded with contempt, the laughing-stock of
other nations, expelled from all honest science--like the prostitute
who sells herself for sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another;
and the brains of the present generation of _savants_ are disorganised
by Hegelian nonsense: incapable of reflection, coarse and bewildered,
they fall a prey to the low Materialism which has crept out of the
basilisk's egg. Good speed to them. I return to my subject.
My readers will thus have to get over the difference of tone in this
treatise; for I could not do here what I had done in my chief work,
that is, give the later additions I had made in a separate appendix.
Besides, it is of no consequence that people should know what I wrote
in my twenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year; the only matter of
real importance is, that those who wish to find their way through the
fundamental principles of all philosophizing, to gain a firm footing
and a clear insight, should in these few sheets receive a little volume
by which they may learn something substantial, solid, and true: and
this, I hope, will be the case. From the expansion now given to some
portions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of the entire
faculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting itself strictly to
the research of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, shows the matter
from a new and peculiar side; but then it finds its completion in the
First Book of "The World as Will and Representation," together with
those chapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also in my
Critique of Kantian Philosophy.
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
FRANKFURT AM MAIN,
_September, 1847._
EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
In the present volume I lay before the public the Third Edition of
the "Fourfold Root," including the emendations and additions left
by Schopenhauer in his own interleaved copy. I have already had
occasion elsewhere to relate that he left copies of all his works thus
interleaved, and that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves any
corrections and additions he might intend inserting in future editions.
Schopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that has been added in
the present edition, for he has indicated, by signs in the original
context corresponding to other similar signs in the MS. passages, the
places where he wished his additions to be inserted. All that was left
for me to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he had
purposed adding.
No essential corrections and additions, such as might modify the
fundamental thoughts of the work, will be found in this new edition,
which simply contains corrections, amplifications, and corroborations,
many of them interesting and important. Let me take only a single
instance: § 21, on the "Intellectual Nature of Empirical Perception."
As Schopenhauer attached great importance to his proof of the
_intellectual nature_ of perception, nay, believed he had made a new
discovery by it, he also worked out with special predilection all that
tended to support, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in
this § 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself observed in 1815;
then the instances of Caspar Hauser and others (taken from Franz's
book, "The Eye," &c. &c.); and again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus,
the blind sculptor; and finally, the physiological confirmations he
has found in Flourens' "De la vie et de l'intelligence des Animaux."
An observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic for the
comprehension of physical processes, which is inserted into this same
paragraph, will be found very remarkable, and may be particularly
recommended to those who are inclined to set too high a value on
calculation.
Many interesting and important additions will be found in the other
paragraphs also.
One thing I could have wished to see left out of this Third Edition:
his effusions against the "professors of philosophy." In a conversation
with Schopenhauer in the year 1847, when he told me how he intended
to "chastise the professors of philosophy,"[6] I expressed my dissent
on this point; for even in the Second Edition these passages had
interrupted the measured progress of objective inquiry. At that time,
however, he was not to be persuaded to strike them out; so they were
left to be again included in this Third Edition, where the reader will
accordingly once more find them, although times have changed since then.
[6] See "Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm; über ihn. Ein Wort der
Vertheidigung," von Ernst Otto Lindner, and "Memorabilien, Briefe
und Nachlassstücke," von Julius Frauenstädt (Berlin, 1863), pp.
163-165.
Upon another point, more nearly touching the real issue, I had a
controversy with Schopenhauer in the year 1852. In arguing against
Fichte's derivation of the _Non-Ego_ from the _Ego_ in his chief
work,[7] he had said:--
[7] Schopenhauer, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," second
edition, i., 37 (third edition, i., 39).
"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of Sufficient Reason
still remains with Fichte what it was with all the Schoolmen, an
_œterna veritas_: that is to say, just as the Gods of the ancients
were still ruled over by eternal Destiny, so was the God of the
Schoolmen still ruled over by these _œterna veritates_, _i.e._, by
the metaphysical, mathematical, and metalogical truths, and even,
according to some, by the validity of the moral law. These _veritates_
alone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well as the world,
existed through their necessity. Thus with Fichte the _Ego_, according
to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is the reason of the world or
of the _Non-Ego_, of the Object, which is the product or result of
the _Ego_ itself. He took good care, therefore, neither to examine
nor to check the Principle of Sufficient Reason any farther. But if I
had to indicate the particular form of this principle by which Fichte
was guided in making the _Ego_ spin the _Non-Ego_ out of itself, as
the spider its web, I should point to the Principle of the Sufficient
Reason of Being in Space; for nothing but a reference to this principle
gives any sort of sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the
way in which the _Ego_ produces and manufactures the _Non-Ego_ out
of itself, which form the contents of the most senseless and--simply
on this account--most tiresome book ever written. The only interest
this Fichteian philosophy has for us at all--otherwise it would not
be worth mentioning--lies in its being the tardy appearance of the
real antithesis to ancient Materialism, which was the most consistent
starting from the Object, just as Fichte's philosophy was the most
consistent starting from the Subject. As Materialism overlooked the
fact, that with the simplest Object it forthwith posited the Subject
also; so Fichte not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject
(whatever name he might choose to give it) he had already posited
the Object also, because no Subject can be thought without it; he
likewise overlooked the fact, that all derivation _à priori_, nay,
all demonstration whatsoever, rests upon a necessity, and that all
necessity itself rests entirely and exclusively on the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, because to be necessary, and to result from a given
reason, are convertible terms; that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
is still nothing but the common form of the Object as such: therefore
that it always presupposes the Object and does not, as valid before and
independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object
arise in conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting from
the Object and the above-mentioned starting from the Subject have in
common, that both presuppose what they pretend to derive: _i.e._, the
necessary correlate of their starting-point."
This last assertion "that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
_already presupposes the Object_, but does not, as valid before
and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the
Object arise in conformity with its own legislation," seemed to me
so far to clash with the proof given by Schopenhauer in § 21 of the
"Fourfold Root," as, according to the latter, it is _the function of
the Subject's understanding_ which primarily creates the _objective_
world out of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the
application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; so that all that is
Object, as such, after all comes into being only in conformity with
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, consequently that this principle
cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted in his polemic against Fichte, already
presuppose the Object. In 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to
Schopenhauer:--
"In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that the Principle
of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the Object, and cannot, as
valid before and independently of it, first introduce it, the objection
occurred to me anew, that in your "Fourfold Root" you had made the
Object of perception first come into being through the application of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and that you yourself, therefore,
derive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance, p. 73 of the
"Fourfold Root" (2nd edition). How then can you maintain against Fichte
that the Object is always pre-supposed by the Subject? I know of no
way of solving this difficulty but the following: The Subject only
presupposes in the Object what belongs to the thing in itself, what is
inscrutable; but it creates itself the _representation_ of the Object,
_i.e._ that by which the thing in itself becomes _phenomenon_. For
instance, when I see a tree, my Subject assumes the thing in itself of
that tree; whereas the _representation_ of it conversely presupposes
the operation of my Subject, the transition from the effect (in my eye)
to its cause."
To this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of July, 1852:--
"Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the right ones.
Here there cannot yet be a question of the thing in itself, and the
distinction between representation and object is inadmissible: the
world is representation. The matter stands rather as follows--Fichte's
derivation of the _Non-Ego_ from the _Ego_, is quite abstract:--A = A,
_ergo_, I = I, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the Object is
at once posited with the Subject. For to be Subject means, to know;
and to know means, to have representations. Object and representation
are one and the same thing. In the "Fourfold Root," therefore, I have
divided all objects or representations into four classes, within which
the Principle of Sufficient Reason always reigns, though in each class
under a different form; nevertheless, the Principle of Sufficient
Reason always presupposes the class itself, and indeed, properly
speaking, they coincide.[8] Now, in reality, the existence of the
Subject of knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not
exist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped from the sky;
it appears as the instrument of some individual phenomenon of the Will
(animal, human being), whose purposes it is destined to serve, and
which thereby now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself,
on the other hand, of everything else. The question next arises, as
to how or out of what _elements_ the representation of the outer
world is brought about within this consciousness. This I have already
answered in my "Theory of Colours" and also in my chief work,[9] but
most thoroughly and exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the
"Fourfold Root," § 21, where it is shown, that all those elements are
of _subjective_ origin; wherefore attention is especially drawn to the
great difference between all this and Fichte's humbug. For the whole
of my exposition is but the full carrying out of Kant's Transcendental
Idealism."[10]
[8] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p.
39 of the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer
in the second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21,
and vol. i. p. 40).
[9] Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 _et seqq._, and vol. ii.
chap. ii. of the second edition; vol. i. p. 22, § 6, and vol. ii.
chap. ii. of the third edition.
[10] The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer's letter is
also to be found among the letters published in my book, "Arthur
Schopenhauer. Von ihm, über ihn, u. s. w.," p. 541 _et seqq._, and
it results from this, as well as from several other letters which
likewise deal with important and knotty points in his philosophy,
that this correspondence may perhaps not be quite so worthless
and unimportant as many--among them Gwinner, in his pamphlet,
"Schopenhauer und seine Freunde" (Leipzig, 1863)--represent it
to be. This pamphlet of Gwinner's, by the way, has met with the
treatment it deserves in the Preface to the collection, "Aus
Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichen Aphorismen und Nachlass.
Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Fragmente." (Leipzig, 1864).
I have thought it advisable to give this passage of his letter, as
being relevant to the matter in question. As to the division in
chapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this new edition as in the
last. By comparing each single paragraph of the second with the same
paragraph of the present edition, it will be easy to find out what has
been newly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a short list
of the principal passages which are new.
List of Additions to the Third Edition.
§ 8, p. 13, the passages from "_Notandum_," &c., to "_Ex necessitate_,"
and p. 14, from "_Zunächst adoptirt_" down to the end of the page
(English version, p. 14, "_Not._," &c., to "_Ex nec._"; p. 15, from
"First he adopts" down to the end of the paragraph, p. 16, "_est_ causa
sui"), in confirmation of his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged
and confounded the relation between reason of knowledge and consequent,
with that between cause and effect.
§ 9, p. 17, from "_er proklamirt_" down to "_gewusst haben wird_." (E.
v., § 9, p. 19, from "He proclaims it" down to "by others before.")
§ 20, p. 42, in speaking of _reciprocity_ (_Wechselwirkung_), from
the words "_Ja, wo einem Schreiber_" down to "_ins Bodenlose gerathen
sei_." (E. v., § 20, p. 45, from "Nay, it is precisely" down to "his
depth.")
§ 21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, "_und räumlich konstruirt_,"
down to p. 62, "_Data erhält_," together with the quotation concerning
the blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus. (E. v., § 21, p. 67, the words "and
constructs in Space" down to "of the Understanding,") and the note.
§ 21, pp. 67-68, from "_Ein specieller und interessanter Beleg_" down
to "_albernes Zeug dazu_." (E. v., § 21, p. 73, "I will here add" down
to p. 74, "followed by twaddle.")
§ 21, p. 73, _sq._, the instances of Caspar Hauser, &c., from Franz,
"The Eye," &c., and the physiological corroborations from Flourens,
"_De la vie et de l'intelligence_," &c. (E. v., p. 80, and following.)
§ 21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation. (E. v., p.
83, "All comprehension," &c.)
§ 21, p. 83, the words "_da ferner Substanz_" down to "_das Wirken_ in
concreto." (E. v., § 21, p. 90, "Substance and Matter" down to "_in
concreto_.")
§ 29, p. 105, the words "_im Lateinischen_" down to "_erkannte_." (E.
v., § 29, p. 116, from "In Latin" down to "κατ' ἐξοχήν.")
§ 34, p. 116, the words "_Ueberall ist_" down to "_Praxis und
Theorie_." (E. v., § 34, p. 128, the words "Reasonable or Rational"
down to "theory and practice.")
§ 34, p. 121, the verses from Göthe's "West-Östlicher Divan."
§ 34, p. 125, _Anmerkung_, the words "_Auch ist Brahma_" down to
"_die erstere_," and p. 126, the quotation from I. J. Schmidt's
"Forschungen." (E. v., § 34, p. 138, note, "Brahma is also" down to
"first of these.")
§ 34, p. 127, the words from "_Aber der naive_" down to "_judaisirten
gouverneurs_" (E. v., § 34, p. 150, sentence beginning "But the
artless" down to "infancy," and the Greek quotation from Plutarch in
the note.)
§ 34, p. 128, the words from "_Ganz übereinstimmend_" down to
"_überflüssige sein soll_." (E. v., p. 151, from "J. F. Davis" down to
"superfluous.")
§ 45, p. 147, the words "_Eben daher kommt es_" down to "_sich
erhält_." (E. v., § 45, p. 163, "It is just for this reason too" down
to "their possession.")
§ 45, p. 149, the words "_Man suche Das_," &c., down to "_gelesen
haben_." (E. v., § 45, p. 164, from "We should" down to "read in
books.")
§ 49, p. 154, the words "_Der bei den Philosophastern_," down to
"_zu kontroliren sind_." (E. v., § 49, p. 169, from the words "The
conception of our," &c., down to "by perception.")
§ 50, p. 156, the words "_Denn der Satz vom Grunde_" down to "_nur
sich selbst nicht_." (E. v., § 50, p. 172, from "For the Principle of
Sufficient Reason," &c., down to "everything else.")
§ 52, p. 158, the words "_Der allgemeine Sinn des Satzes vom Grunde_,"
down to "_der Kosmologische Beweis ist_." (E. v., § 52, p. 173, from "The
general meaning" down to "the Cosmological Proof.")
JULIUS FRAUENSTÄDT.
BERLIN, _August, 1864_.
EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
The present Fourth Edition is of the same content as the Third;
therefore it contains the same corrections and additions which I
had already inserted in the Third Edition from Schopenhauer's own
interleaved copy of this work.
JULIUS FRAUENSTÄDT.
BERLIN, _September, 1877_.
ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
§ 1. _The Method._
The divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their mighty voices
in recommending a rule, to serve as the method of all philosophising
as well as of all other science.[11] Two laws, they tell us: the law
of _homogeneity_ and the law of _specification_, should be equally
observed, neither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of
_homogeneity_ directs us to collect things together into kinds by
observing their resemblances and correspondences, to collect kinds
again into species, species into genera, and so on, till at last we
come to the highest all-comprehensive conception. Now this law, being
transcendental, _i.e._ essential to our Reason, takes for granted
that Nature conforms with it: an assumption which is expressed by the
ancient formula, _entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda_.
As for the law of _specification_, Kant expresses it thus: _entium
varietates non temere esse minuendas_. It requires namely, that we
should clearly distinguish one from another the different genera
collected under one comprehensive conception; likewise that we should
not confound the higher and lower species comprised in each genus;
that we should be careful not to overleap any, and never to classify
inferior species, let alone individuals, immediately under the generic
conception: each conception being susceptible of subdivision, and none
even coming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both laws are
transcendental, fundamental principles of our Reason, which postulate
conformity of things with them _à priori_; and Plato, when he tells us
that these rules were flung down from the seat of the gods with the
Promethean fire, seems to express the same thought in his own way.
[11] Platon, "Phileb." pp. 219-223. "Politic." 62, 63. "Phædr."
361-363, ed. Bip. Kant, "Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang zur
transcend. Dialektik." English Translation by F. Max Müller.
"Appendix to the Transc. Dialectic." pp. 551, and _seqq._
§ 2. _Application of the Method in the present case._
In spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find that the second
of these two laws has been far too rarely applied to a fundamental
principle of all knowledge: _the Principle of Sufficient Reason_.
For although this principle has been often and long ago stated in a
general way, still sufficient distinction has not been made between
its extremely different applications, in each of which it acquires
a new meaning; its origin in various mental faculties thus becoming
evident. If we compare Kant's philosophy with all preceding systems, we
perceive that, precisely in the observation of our mental faculties,
many persistent errors have been caused by applying the principle
of homogeneity, while the opposite principle of specification was
neglected; whereas the law of specification has led to the greatest
and most important results. I therefore crave permission to quote a
passage from Kant, in which the application of the law of specification
to the sources of our knowledge is especially recommended; for it gives
countenance to my present endeavour:--
"It is of the highest importance to _isolate_ various sorts of
knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from others, and to
take great care lest they be mixed up with those others with which,
for practical purposes, they are generally united. What is done by the
chemist in the analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in
pure mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher, in order
to enable him to define clearly the part which, in the promiscuous
employment of the understanding, belongs to a special kind of
knowledge, as well as its peculiar value and influence."[12]
[12] Kant, "Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptstück," p.
842 of the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. Müller. "Architectonic
of Pure Reason," p. 723.
§ 3. _Utility of this Inquiry._
Should I succeed in showing that the principle which forms the subject
of the present inquiry does not issue directly from _one_ primitive
notion of our intellect, but rather in the first instance from
_various_ ones, it will then follow, that neither can the necessity
it brings with it, as a firmly established _à priori_ principle, be
_one_ and the _same_ in all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as
manifold as the sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore
bases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation of
clearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he founds his
conclusion and of designating that ground by a special name, such
as I am about to suggest. I hope that this may be a step towards
promoting greater lucidity and precision in philosophising; for I hold
the extreme clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of
each single expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence both
against error and against intentional deception, and also as a means
of securing to ourselves the permanent, unalienable possession of
each newly acquired notion within the sphere of philosophy beyond the
fear of losing it again on account of any misunderstanding or double
meaning which might hereafter be detected. The true philosopher will
indeed always seek after light and perspicuity, and will endeavour
to resemble a Swiss lake--which through its peacefulness is enabled
to unite great depth with great clearness, the depth revealing
itself precisely by the clearness--rather than a turbid, impetuous
mountain torrent. "_La clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes_,"
says Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the contrary, use speech,
not indeed to conceal their thoughts, as M. de Talleyrand has it,
but rather to conceal the absence of them, and are apt to make their
readers responsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems, which
really proceeds from their own confused thinking. This explains why in
certain writers--Schelling, for instance--the tone of instruction so
often passes into that of reproach, and frequently the reader is even
taken to task beforehand for his assumed inability to understand.
§ 4. _Importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason._
Its importance is indeed very great, since it may truly be called the
basis of all science. For by _science_ we understand a _system_ of
notions, _i.e._ a totality of connected, as opposed to a mere aggregate
of disconnected, notions. But what is it that binds together the
members of a system, if not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That
which distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is precisely,
that its notions are derived one from another as from their reason.
So it was long ago observed by Plato: καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς
οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις ἀυτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ (_etiam
opiniones veræ non multi pretii sunt, donec quis illas ratiocinatione
a causis ducta liget_).[13] Nearly every science, moreover, contains
notions of causes from which the effects may be deduced, and likewise
other notions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as will be
seen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle has expressed this as
follows: πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητική, ἢ καὶ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, περὶ
αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστι (_omnis intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo
intellectu participans, circa causas et principia est_).[14] Now, as
it is this very assumption _à priori_ that all things must have their
reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the _why_, we may
safely call this _why_ the mother of all science.
[13] "Meno." p. 385, ed Bip. "Even true opinions are not of
much value until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause."
[Translator's addition.]
[14] Aristot. "Metaph." v. 1. "All knowledge which is intellectual
or partakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and
principles." [Tr.'s add.]
§ 5. _The Principle itself._
We purpose showing further on that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
is an expression common to several _à priori_ notions. Meanwhile, it
must be stated under some formula or other. I choose Wolf's as being
the most comprehensive: _Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam
non sit._ Nothing is without a reason for its being.[15]
[15] Here the translator gives Schopenhauer's free version of
Wolf's formula.