The armies of Alexander's successors were still in the main principles
of their organization similar to the army with which Alexander had
conquered Asia. During the years immediately after Alexander the very
Macedonians who had fought under Alexander were ranged against each
other under the banners of the several chiefs. The most noted corps
of veterans, Argyraspides (i.e. the royal Hypaspistae) played a great
part in the first wars of the successors, and covered themselves with
infamy by their betrayal of Eumenes. As the soldiers of Alexander died
off, fresh levies of home-born Macedonians could be raised only by the
chief who held the motherland. The other chiefs had to supply
themselves with Macedonians from the numerous colonies planted before
the break-up of the empire in Asia or Egypt, and from such Macedonians
they continued for the next two centuries to form their phalanx. The
breed--at least if the statement which Livy puts into the mouth of a
Roman general can be relied on--degenerated greatly under Asiatic and
Egyptian skies (Liv. xxxviii. 17, 10); but still old names like that
of _pezetaeri_ attached to the phalangites (Plut. _Tib._ 17), and they
still wielded the national _sarissa_. The latter weapon in the
interval between Alexander and the time of Polybius had been increased
to a length of 21 ft. (Polyb. xviii. 12), a proportion inconsistent
with any degree of mobility; once more indeed the phalanx of the 2nd
century seems to have become a body effective by sheer weight only and
disordered by unevenness of ground. The Antigonid kings were never
able from Macedonian levies to put in the field a phalanx of more than
20,000 at the utmost (Liv. xlii. 51); Antigonus Doson takes with him
to Greece (in 222) one of 10,000 only. The phalanx of Antiochus III.
at Raphia numbered 20,000, and Ptolemy Philopator was able at the same
time to form one of 25,000 men (Polyb. v. 4). As these phalangites are
distinguished both from the Greek mercenaries and the native Egyptian
levies, it looks (although such a fact would be staggering) as if more
Macedonians could be raised for military service in Egypt than in
Macedonia itself (but see Beloch, p. 353). The royal foot-guards are
still described in Macedonia in 171 as the _agema_ (Polyb. v. 25, 1;
27, 3; Liv. xlii. 51), when they number 2000; at the Ptolemaïc court
in 217 the _agema_ had numbered 3000 (Polyb. v. 65, 2); and a similar
corps of _hypaspistae_ is indicated in the Seleucid army (Polyb. vii.
16, 2; xvi. 18, 7). So too the old name of "Companions" was kept up in
the Seleucid kingdom for the Macedonian cavalry (see Polyb. v. 53, 4,
&c.), and divisions of rank in it are still indicated by the terms
_agema_ and royal squadron ([Greek: basilike hile], see Bevan, _House
of Seleucus_, ii. 288). The Antigonid and Seleucid courts had much
valuable material at hand for their armies in the barbarian races
under their sway. The Balkan hill-peoples of Illyrian or Thracian
stock, the hill-peoples of Asia Minor and Iran, the chivalry of Media
and Bactria, the mounted bowmen of the Caspian steppes, the
camel-riders of the Arabian desert, could all be turned to account.
Iranian troops seem to have been employed on a large scale by the
earlier Seleucids. At Raphia, Antiochus III. had 10,000 men drawn from
the provinces, armed and drilled as Macedonians, and another corps of
Iranians numbering 5000 under a native commander (Polyb. v. 79). The
experiment of arming the native Egyptians on a large scale does not
seem to have been made before the campaign of 217, when Ptolemy IV.
formed corps of the Macedonian pattern from Egyptians and Libyans (cf.
Polyb. v. 107, 2; Ptolemy I. had employed Egyptians in the army,
though chiefly as carriers, Diod. xix. 80, 4). From this time native
rebellions in Egypt are recurrent. To the troops drawn from their own
dominions the mercenaries which the kings procured from abroad were an
important supplement. These were mainly the bands of Greek
_condottieri_, and even for their home-born troops Greek officers of
renown were often engaged. The other class of mercenaries were Gauls,
and from the time of the Gallic invasion of Asia Minor in 279 Gauls or
Galatians were a regular constituent in all armies. They were a weapon
apt to be dangerous to the employer, but the terror they inspired was
such that every potentate sought to get hold of them. The elephants
which Alexander brought back from India were used in the armies of his
successors, and in 302 Seleucus procured a new supply. Thenceforward
elephants, either brought fresh from India or bred in the royal
stables at Apamea, regularly figured in the Seleucid armies. The
Ptolemies supplied themselves with this arm from the southern coasts
of the Red Sea, where they established stations for the capture and
shipping of elephants, but the African variety was held inferior to
the Indian. Scythed chariots such as had figured in the old Persian
armies were still used by the Greek masters of Asia (Seleucus I.,
Diod. xx. 113, 4; Molon, Polyb. v. 53, 10; Antiochus III., Liv.
xxxvii. 41), at any rate till the battle of Magnesia. The Hellenistic
armies were distinguished by their external magnificence. They made a
greater display of brilliant metal and gorgeous colour than the Roman
armies, for instance. The description given by Justin of the army
which Antiochus Sidetes took to the East in 130 B.C., boot-nails and
bridles of gold, gives an idea of their standard of splendour (Just.
xxxviii. 10, 1; cf. Polyb. xxxi. 3; Plut. _Eum._ 14; id. _Aemil._ 18;
id. _Sulla_, 16).
During the 3rd century B.C. Egypt was the greatest sea power of the
eastern Mediterranean, and maintained a large fleet (the figures in
App. _Prooem_, 10 are not trustworthy, see Beloch III. i, 364). Its
control of the Aegean was, however, contested not without success by
the Antigonids, who won the two great sea-fights of Cos (c. 256) and
Andros (227), and wrested the overlordship of the Cyclades from the
Ptolemies. Of the numbers and constitution of the Antigonid fleet we
know nothing.[7] At the Seleucid court in 222 the admiral ([Greek:
nauarchos]) appears as a person of high consideration (Polyb. v. 43,
1); in his war with Rome Antiochus III. had 107 decked battleships on
the sea at one time. By the Peace of Apamea (188) the Seleucid navy
was abolished; Antiochus undertook to keep no more than 10 ships of
war.
For the Hellenistic armies and fleets see A. Bauer in L. von Müller's
_Handbuch_, vol. iv.; Delbruck, _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_ (1900).