ARMOURED SHIPS IN ACTION
When, in 1865, Spain deemed it necessary to give a lesson to her
daughter Peru, whose victorious insurgents held views as to the
non-payment of an indemnity, of which the mother country did not
approve, she found that another of her offspring, Chili, sympathised
with her sister, and it became necessary in Spain’s opinion to extend
the lesson to both States. The best warship she could supply for the
purpose was the _Numancia_. This was a formidable vessel built for
the Spanish Government in the ’sixties, at the time that relations
were likely to be strained to breaking point between Spain and the
two South American States. She was accompanied by some unarmoured
vessels carrying about two hundred and fifty guns altogether, nearly
all of which were old smooth-bores, the others being rifled guns of
no great power. The Chilians had the _Esmeralda_, a small vessel
having a complement of one hundred and twenty-three officers and
men, and carrying eighteen smooth-bores of which the heaviest were
32-pounders. With this vessel they retaliated upon the Spaniards for
their preliminary blockade of the Chilian ports by capturing, in
November, 1865, the gunboat _Covadonga_, a somewhat similar boat to
the _Esmeralda_, with two 68-pounders as her chief weapons. As usual,
the Chilians shot well and the Spaniards shot badly, and the issue of
the engagement was not long in doubt. The Spanish fleet distinguished
itself by a cowardly bombardment of Valparaiso in 1866, notwithstanding
its defenceless condition, when, in spite of their wretched shooting,
the Spaniards caused a great deal of damage, principally owing to the
_Numancia’s_ guns. Valparaiso did not reply.
The Spanish fleet next tried Callao, which was fortified and gave
the Spaniards more to think about than they cared for. The principal
guns in the batteries were four Armstrong rifles, 300-pounders, which
were in turrets faced with 10-inch armour, and five rifles of the
Blakely pattern, firing 450 lb. shot. There were also several smaller
smooth-bore guns. A small vessel of the monitor type, the _Victoria_,
with one 64-pounder, and the monitor _Manco Capac_, with railway
iron armour and two 68-pounders, constituted the Peruvian fleet. The
_Numancia_, at 1,500 yards range, led her consorts to the attack, but
in about half an hour the _Ville de Madrid_ was placed _hors de combat_
with a shot in her steam-pipe. The next disaster to the Spaniards
was when the _Berenguela_ had a hole blown in her side by a Blakely
shell, so that she could do no more fighting. Then two more Spanish
ships had to retire, as they had fired away all their ammunition. The
_Numancia_ was hit repeatedly, but her armour saved her from serious
damage. The smaller projectiles did her no harm at all, but one of the
shells from an Armstrong gun went through her plating and was prevented
by the backing from going farther. Both sides lost heavily, but
notwithstanding the amount of ammunition expended the damage was not
very extensive. This time the honours were distinctly with the shore
batteries, and the Spaniards sailed for home.
That the advantage given by the possession of powerful warships may
be entirely neutralised was demonstrated by the Brazilians in their
conflict with Paraguay, in 1865. The Paraguayans fought with the energy
of despair. They were between the devil and the deep sea, for they
knew that if they did not conquer their enemy, their commander would
reward them with tortures from which death would give them a welcome
release. In these circumstances the Paraguayans displayed extraordinary
daring with a by no means adequate fleet for resisting the Brazilians,
who were allied with Uruguay and the Argentine republic, as the
outcome of the Paraguayan president, Francisco Lopez’s, energetic, if
unconventional, methods. During this war the _Cabral_ and _Colombo_
were added to the Brazilian fleet from Thames builders. They were
each 160 feet long and drew 9 feet 9 inches when loaded, and with two
pairs of direct-acting horizontal engines of 200 h.p., each driving
a screw propeller, so that they were twin-screw boats, they could
attain a speed of ten and a half knots. They were really oblong iron
forts, supported on rafts. There was no central battery, but each
vessel carried six guns forward, two being disposed in the front of the
citadel and two on either side of the fore part. A similar battery was
placed at the other end. The armour-plates were 4½ inches in thickness,
and the deck before and abaft the battery gradually sloped all round
to the water-line, and being covered with 2½-inch armour-plating,
prevented a shot from penetrating into the ship. The arrangement of
the guns enabled these vessels to be fought either end on, or on the
broadside. Each was armed with twelve 70-pounder Whitworth guns. Two
other powerful vessels were also built for Brazil at Birkenhead. One
of the oddest naval encounters on record was fought in March, 1866,
between a powerful Brazilian fleet and a Paraguayan vessel. The
Brazilians had three of these ironclads, a single-turreted monitor,
and several wooden ships. The Paraguayans opposed this armada with a
barge mounting an 8-inch smooth-bore gun. The firing was fast, furious,
and inaccurate. The smooth-bore made good practice. The Brazilians hit
everything in range for some time except the one-gun barge. By dint of
perseverance they struck it eventually and sunk it.[46] This glorious
naval exploit was followed by another piece of daring, in which the
Brazilian fleet engaged in a more or less uninterrupted encounter for
three weeks with a fort mounting one gun; the fleet won.
The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw not a little warlike
activity in one part of the world and another in which the navies
of the contestant powers were conspicuous. The naval engagements in
the Russo-Turkish War were mainly remarkable for the regularity with
which the Turkish warships were blown up by the Russians, the daring
of Russian officers in making attack after attack, and the apparent
disinclination of the Turkish officers to take adequate means to
protect their vessels. Had the Turks been as vigilant as the Russians,
the latter would hardly have scored so many brilliant successes.
The South American Republics, too, were indulging in one of those
periodical bursts of unrest and pugnacity which seem inseparable from
South American States in their relations with each other, or in the
administration of their internal affairs, and when carefully fomented
may lead plotting politicians on to become dictators and the victims
of assassinations--unless they are fortunate enough to retire to Paris
with the spoils and live in luxury and die naturally.
One of these revivals of political ferment brought the _Huascar_ into
prominence, and made her for some years the most famous fighting ship
in the world. The interest taken everywhere in the doings of this
ship was extraordinary. She was launched in 1865 at Birkenhead, from
that yard which has sent so many ships to sea to make history, and if
local associations have their influence over ships, and sailors say
they have, the records of the _Huascar_ show that she was not false
to tradition. Built to the order of the Peruvian Government, she was
a turret ship of 1,800 tons displacement and eleven knots speed, and
carried a belt of armour on the water-line of from 4½ inches thick at
the centre portion to 2½ inches at the ends. Her one turret, which
was placed rather forward of amidships, was built on Captain Coles’s
design, and given 5½-inch iron plates. In it she carried two 10-inch
12½-ton Armstrong muzzle-loaders; and on her decks were two 40-pounders
and one 12-pounder, all three being muzzle-loaders and unprotected.
Her lower foremast was on the tripod system, but this was afterwards
discarded and she was given an ordinary mast. She had a main- and
mizen-mast also, and all three carried topmasts and square sails; when
her masts were altered a military top of iron plates was built upon the
cap of the mainmast.
She had a most exciting career. Her crew mutinied and put to sea in
her, and took to freebooting quite in the spirit of the old days of
the Spanish Main and the South Eastern Pacific. She was declared a
pirate. At the end of May, 1877, the British cruisers _Shah_ and
_Amethyst_, which had been ordered to look for her, discovered her
off Ilo. These were both light unarmoured cruisers, the latter being
much the smaller of the two, and depended largely upon their speed to
render attack upon them more difficult, or to avoid it altogether, or
to assume the offensive at a time best suited to themselves. Their guns
were more modern and powerful than those of the _Huascar_, and also
more numerous, so that in gun power the cruisers were superior to the
ironclad.
This engagement is noteworthy for the reason that in it the first
automobile torpedo ever employed in war was discharged by the _Shah_
against the _Huascar_, and failed to reach its mark. The _Shah_ bore
the brunt of the engagement with the _Huascar_. The latter almost
ignored the _Amethyst_, whose small guns did no more harm to her
sides than a mosquito would do to an elephant, but helped to make the
mutineer’s deck guns useless, and the ironclad reserved her attention
for her more formidable antagonist. Whenever the firing became
unpleasantly severe, as it frequently did, the _Huascar_ steamed in
front of Ilo, and the _Shah_ then hesitated to fire lest her shells
should miss the _Huascar_ and hit the town, notwithstanding that the
_Huascar_ then fired at the _Shah_. But the _Huascar’s_ aim was faulty,
partly because of the poor shooting powers of her gunners, and partly
because the _Shah_ kept rapidly on the move and so presented no steady
mark to the Peruvian gunners. The _Huascar_ tried to ram her, but the
_Shah’s_ speed enabled her to avoid the blow without difficulty, and
give a telling shot at short range in return. Altogether the ironclad
was hit nearly seventy times, but though she was badly dented, only one
shell passed through her 3-inch armour to a sufficient extent to cause
any injury to the interior of the vessel or to her crew. The hulls of
the British ships were not struck once, though their rigging suffered
a little trifling damage. They hoped to capture the _Huascar_ on the
morrow, but by daylight she was out of sight, and during the morning
was surrendered by her commander to the Peruvian Government ships.
But her fighting days were by no means over. This battle was held by
the experts in naval matters to demonstrate the value of armour and
the weakness of the ordinary 9-inch muzzle-loader, and also the prime
necessity of accurate shooting. The English gunnery was bad and that of
the Peruvians was execrable.
When Chili and Peru indulged in a war in 1879-81, the latter
country owned the _Huascar_ and the _Independencia_. The latter
was an armoured vessel of 3,500 tons, built in England in 1865, and
occasionally confused with the other _Independencia_ built on the
Thames a few years later for another South American State, but which
passed into the possession of the British Government. The Peruvian
_Independencia_ carried two 150-pounders, twelve 72-pounders, and
four 30-pounders, all muzzle-loading rifled guns, and for this war
her fighting power was strengthened by the addition of a 9-ton gun
and a 150-pounder. The _Huascar_ had been reboilered since her fight
with the _Shah_ and the _Amethyst_. The Peruvian navy was a fairly
formidable fighting fleet, but what it displayed in this respect was
more than neutralised by the inefficiency of its personnel who, however
brave individually they may have been, sadly lacked order and control.
The Chilians included in their fleet two modern powerful ironclads,
the _Blanco Encalada_ and the _Almirante Cochrane_, both of which
were built in England in 1874-5. Each was of about 3,500 tons, and
designed on the central box battery plan, and as will be seen from the
accompanying particulars of the _Almirante Cochrane_, both vessels were
exceedingly formidable fighting ships. The _Blanco Encalada_ also had
two Nordenfeldts and the _Almirante Cochrane_ one.
The _Almirante Cochrane_ was 210 feet in length on the water-line,
with a breadth of 45 feet 9 inches, and a depth of hold of 21 feet 8
inches; and in fighting trim she drew 18 feet 8 inches of water forward
and a foot more aft. Her whole length in the neighbourhood of the
water-line was protected by a stout belt of armour and teak backing 8
feet wide, with the armour-plates 9 inches thick at the water-line and
the teak backing 10 inches. The battery was amidships, and was armed
with six 12½-ton Armstrong guns. The whole of the armour and backing
was fastened to a double thickness of skin plating by bolts similar
to those used in the British Navy. She was the first ironclad built at
Hull.
With the three guns on each side she was able to fire over all the
points of the compass, this advantage being attained by placing each
of the fore and aft guns at the corners of the battery, and recessing
the side of the ship so as to enable the foremost guns to fire right
forward and in a line with the keel, and in like manner the after guns
to fire right aft. The batteries being octagonal, the corner guns could
be brought into the broadside position and command any single angle
between that and the line of keel. The midship guns on each side were
made to fire on the broadside, and also to support the fire of the
forward guns up to within 20 degrees of the line of keel.
It is unnecessary to describe the naval manœuvres preparatory to the
meeting of the hostile vessels, or to deal with the causes of the war.
The _Huascar_ very nearly blew herself up instead of her antagonist,
the _Abtao_, off Antofagasta. She fired a Lay torpedo at her, but the
missile turned and headed straight at the _Huascar_, whose turbulent
career would most likely have been ended there and then had not one of
her lieutenants dived overboard at the torpedo and diverted it so that
it missed the warship by a few inches.
As soon as the Chilians heard that the Peruvian fleet had come south,
the former left the historic _Esmeralda_ and another wooden ship, the
_Covadonga_, which was equally slow, behind at Iquique, and went to
look for the Peruvian ships. The latter slipped past in the darkness
and sent the _Huascar_ and the _Independencia_ to smash up the two
wooden ships left behind to blockade Iquique. The _Huascar_ attacked
the _Esmeralda_ and the _Independencia_ endeavoured to account for the
_Covadonga_. Thus, two modern powerful ironclads were opposed to two
old wooden ships indifferently armed and painfully slow. On the face
of the paper statistics the battle should have lasted four minutes;
as it was, it lasted four hours. As soon as the Peruvians on shore
saw that the _Esmeralda_ and the _Covadonga_ were to be attacked by
the two Peruvian ironclads they opened fire on the blockading ships
and compelled the _Esmeralda_ to seek a less favourable position. The
_Huascar_, seeing this was a suitable moment, tried to disable her
with the ram, but inflicted very little injury. Before this a shell
from the _Huascar’s_ turret gun pierced the _Esmeralda’s_ engine room,
killing all the engineers and disabling the engines so that for a time
the wooden ship was helpless. But the Chilians patched up the engines
and got them going again. This one shot from the _Huascar_ was probably
due to good luck rather than good shooting, for although she hit once
with her turret gun she missed thirty-nine times. The _Esmeralda_, on
the contrary, hit the _Huascar_ repeatedly, but her smaller projectiles
were harmless against the iron armour, and inflicted no damage to the
hull, but the careful firing of the Chilians rendered it very difficult
for the _Huascar’s_ crew to expose themselves in any degree on deck for
working the other guns. The _Huascar_ again rammed the _Esmeralda_,
this time on the starboard bow, and the Chilians with extraordinary
bravery attempted to carry the ironclad by boarding it, but in the
confusion the order to board was not understood, and the attempt
consequently failed. Again the _Huascar_ rammed, now making a great
gaping wound in the side of her feeble opponent, through which the
water rushed and caused her to founder in a few minutes. She went down
with her colours flying, all her wounded on board, and nearly all the
rest of her crew.
The other duel, between the _Independencia_ and the _Covadonga_, was
of a very different nature. The Chilian boat had an English pilot
on board and determined to effect by strategy what she could not
accomplish by force. She went away along the coast, keeping in the
shallower waters, pursued by the _Independencia_. The _Covadonga_ at
last found herself near the reefs, touched a rock and stopped, but did
not remain fast. The _Independencia_, which was only 200 or 300 yards
behind, thought that this was a grand opportunity to ram her, and
not knowing the reason of the _Covadonga’s_ sudden stoppage, headed
straight for her. Instead of striking the _Covadonga_, she ran on the
reef with all her force, and remained hard and fast. The smaller wooden
boat then steamed into a favourable position astern of the ironclad
where the latter could not bring her great guns to bear, and at short
range poured shell after shell into her stern until it was soon blazing
fiercely. During the pursuit of the _Covadonga_ the two vessels had
exchanged several shots. As usual, the Peruvian gunners, who were
untrained, missed nearly every time, and the Chilian gunners, who shot
carefully, seldom failed to do damage. This ended the career of the
_Independencia_. The _Covadonga_ was sunk by Peruvian torpedoes in
September, 1880, off Chancay.
The _Huascar’s_ next exploit was in 1879, when she fought the
_Almirante Cochrane_ and the _Blanco Encalada_. The _Huascar_ opened
fire at 3,000 yards range but inflicted no injury. The _Cochrane_
steamed in and replied at 700 yards with a broadside which made
the ironclad shiver from stem to stern, for every shot struck. The
_Huascar_ was no match for either of these vessels and certainly not
for them both, but she fought on with a grim determination which has
made this engagement one of the most memorable on record, and has
caused more than one historian to compare it to the famous fight of Sir
Richard Grenville’s little _Revenge_, when that intrepid adventurer
tackled a Spanish fleet numbering fifty-three vessels, and did not
surrender until he himself and nearly all his crew were wounded, and
most of the others killed, and his ship was like to sink under him.
The punishment the _Huascar_ received in this engagement was
extraordinary. No fewer than twenty-seven of the heaviest projectiles
fired by her opponents struck her, thirteen of the blows being severe.
Two of the large shells went through her turret armour and exploded.
Three others struck her conning tower. Her ’tween decks was turned
into a shambles, and almost wrecked by the explosion of five heavy
shells. Three times was she hit severely in the stern. The battle was
fought at close range and the force of the blows inflicted must have
been tremendous. Under the rain of shot and shell the wonder is that
the _Huascar_ remained afloat. Had the Chilian shooting been better
it is doubtful if she could have survived. The _Almirante Cochrane_
fired forty-five 9-inch Palliser shells, and twelve 20-pounder shells,
besides a great number of smaller projectiles; and the _Blanco
Encalada_ delivered thirty-one heavy shells. The _Huascar_ fired about
forty shells, but could do little damage to her formidable antagonists.
The _Cochrane_ was hit three times, but did not sustain much injury,
and the _Blanco Encalada_ escaped practically unhurt. After her
surrender, the _Huascar_ was patched up by the Chilians, and when she
was fit to go to sea again and look for more fighting she flew the
Chilian flag. Under her new owners she captured a small gunboat and
participated in the blockade of Callao. She was on the effective list
of the Chilian navy up to a year or two ago, and is now passing to the
scrap-heap by slow and dignified stages.
In the fighting off Valparaiso in April, 1891, during the Chilian
Revolution, the _Blanco Encalada_ stopped a tug called the _Mary
Florence_ and a torpedo boat from leaving the harbour, and the two
latter, which were Government vessels, were so hotly fired upon that
they were glad to return. A heavy shot from the _Blanco Encalada_
struck the _Mary Florence_ and blew her out of the water, killing the
seventeen men who constituted her crew. The torpedo boat held on, but
the other insurgent vessel, the _O’Higgins_, knocked her into pieces
with a well-directed broadside, and her crew shared the fate of that of
the _Mary Florence_. The _Blanco Encalada_ and _O’Higgins_ then turned
their attention to the forts, and a lively battle followed. Although
it was dark some good shooting seems to have been made, for the forts
at last had the range of the _O’Higgins_, and a heavy shell struck one
of the guns on her quarter-deck. The explosion shook her from end to
end, and when the smoke cleared away it was found that her deck was
almost torn to pieces and the gun itself was lying on the other side of
the deck, while nine of the gun’s crew of twelve were either killed or
blown into the water and drowned. The _O’Higgins_ was immediately taken
out of range, but the _Blanco Encalada_ kept up the fight for a time
without being any the worse and then retired to look after her consort.
After they had gone, the rebel man-of-war _Esmeralda_, which must not
be confounded with the wooden vessel of that name, opened fire on the
town while the inhabitants for and against the Government were having a
pitched battle in the streets. The Government forces got the worst of
the fight, and the _Esmeralda_ took in a supply of coal and provisions,
and steamed away to join other insurgent vessels.
This _Esmeralda_ was designed and built by Armstrong, at Newcastle,
in 1884, for the Chilian Government, and is of more than ordinary
interest, as she was the first example of the modern protected cruiser
class. She was framed on the ordinary transverse system, and had three
decks; the upper, or gun deck, was 11 feet above water, the main deck
about 5 feet, and the lower, or arched protective deck, which was of
1-inch steel and extended from stem to stern, was at the middle 1 foot
below water-level, and at the side 5 feet. It protected the engines,
boilers, magazines, and all the vital parts. Minute sub-divisions of
the hold space below the protective deck and of the space between it
and the main deck were effected by means of transverse and longitudinal
bulkheads and of horizontal flats or platforms; cork was also packed
in the cellular spaces to ensure sufficient buoyancy and trim in case
the water-line region should be riddled. Her twin screws were driven
by two independent sets of 2-stage expansion engines, developing
6,500 h.p., which gave her a speed of 18.25 knots. She had four
double-ended boilers, 13 feet diameter and 18½ feet long, working at
90 lb. pressure, each with six furnaces supplied with forced draught.
Her bunker capacity was 600 tons, sufficient for eight thousand knots
at a speed of eight knots, or six thousand knots at ten knots. Her
armament was two 25-ton 10-inch breechloading rifle guns, protected
by steel screens, and having a training arc of 120 degrees on either
side of the keel; six 4-ton 6-inch breechloading rifle guns; two
6-pounder quick-firers, and a number of machine guns, as well as three
torpedo tubes. Her two military masts had a Gardner gun in each. Her
displacement was 3,000 tons, her length 270 feet, her breadth 42 feet,
and her draught of water 18.5 feet.
On the morning of May 23rd, before daylight, the search-light of the
Government torpedo gunboat _Almirante Condell_ revealed in the distance
the presence of the _Blanco Encalada_. The torpedo gunboat had the
_Almirante Lynch_ as companion, and the pair lost no time in attacking
the ironclad, which was at anchor with banked fires, as part of her
machinery was ashore undergoing repairs. The _Condell_ opened the
ball with her torpedo, which missed, and followed it with discharges
from her Hotchkiss gun. The _Lynch_ also brought her Hotchkiss gun
into play, and as both vessels were firing end-on, they presented a
very small target to the ironclad, upon which, however, they could
make little impression. The _Blanco Encalada_ answered the fire,
but ineffectively. The torpedo boats, attacking her from different
sides, discharged five more torpedoes, which missed, and though the
ironclad was firing carefully, the steel armour of the smaller vessels
turned aside her shot and shell. At last a shell from the ironclad
dropped on the _Condell_, doing a great deal of damage. The _Lynch’s_
Hotchkiss gun played havoc with everything and everybody on the _Blanco
Encalada’s_ deck and above it.
“The officers of the _Lynch_ now determined to make a supreme effort.
Her flag was run up to the peak, and her Hotchkiss gun became silent.
She worked round until she was bow on to the starboard side of the
_Encalada_, and then there was a swish from the tube of the _Lynch’s_
ram. The _Encalada_ got her search-lights on the approaching missile,
as she had on the other four, her gunners poured a leaden rain on
to it for the purpose of sinking it. This, time, however, the aim
of the torpedo was true, and the storm of shot from the _Encalada_
failed to destroy it. The steel torpedo net also failed to avert the
messenger of destruction, so sudden and unexpected was the attack.
The torpedo struck the _Encalada_ just abaft the foremast, and a
deafening explosion followed. A huge hole yawned in her starboard
side, extending below the water-line, and the ironclad quickly filled.
Terror reigned on board the doomed ironclad, and the men scrambled
into the boats hanging upon the rear davits, which were the only
ones which had not been destroyed by the fire of the guns. Both the
_Condell_ and the _Lynch_ now opened fire from the Hotchkiss guns,
and scores of men were killed while attempting to escape. Many of
the sailors sprang into the water, only to meet death by drowning,
or being eaten by sharks, with which the bay abounds. The ironclad
quickly settled and, with a sudden lurch, went down in less than three
minutes, with her officers and crew. Out of two hundred men, only
twelve escaped.”[47]
The naval proceedings in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1 remind
one somewhat of Sir Richard Strachan and the Earl of Chatham, each
of whom, according to the well-known verse, had his sword drawn and
waited for the other. In the Franco-Prussian conflict, however, there
was a hostile meeting at sea, although on a small scale. The only
naval action in this war was that between the French gunboat _Bouvet_,
carrying one 16-centimètre gun and four 12-centimètre guns, with a
complement of eighty-five officers and men, and the German gunboat
_Meteor_, with one 15-centimètre gun and two 12-centimètre guns, and
having sixty-four officers and sailors. They met at Havana, and left
the harbour for the open sea at the prescribed interval. When outside
territorial limits they exchanged cannonades for two hours at 1,200
yards range, with little harm to either. Then the Frenchman decided to
ram, but the _Meteor_ moved and only received a glancing blow which did
little damage to her hull but brought down her main- and mizen-masts.
The _Bouvet_ was going to ram again, when the _Meteor_ gave her a solid
shot in her boiler. There was no further fighting, for the Spanish ship
which had steamed out from Havana to prevent a violation of neutrality,
informed them that they were now in Spanish waters and that the
engagement must stop.
The Turkish fleet at the beginning of the war with Russia in 1876-7
was superior to that of Russia in every respect save efficiency.
The Russian Black Sea fleet, owing to diplomatic restrictions, was
of very little use. The only effective naval work performed by the
Russians in this war was with torpedo boats brought overland by rail
from the Baltic, which were supported by merchant steamers acquired
for the purpose. The Turks had some splendid vessels which should
have given a good account of themselves, and had they performed the
duties expected of them and of which they were quite capable, and
had they been properly handled, the history of that war would have
been very different. When the Turks lost command of the sea they also
lost the war. One of their finest vessels was the _Messoudiye_, a
sister ship to the British _Superb_, which had also been built for
the Turkish Government, but was bought by England. Both were of 9,100
tons displacement, and had engines giving them a speed of thirteen
and a half knots on 1,200 h.p. They had 12-inch armour with a 10-inch
backing, and carried sixteen 10-inch guns. The Turks also had four
vessels of over 6,000 tons displacement, the _Azazieh_, _Mahmoudieh_,
_Orkanieh_, and _Osmanieh_; the _Assar-i-Tewfik_, of 4,000 tons, each
having fifteen 6½-ton guns and one 12-ton gun; and several smaller
vessels. These were all broadside or central battery ships. There were
also a couple of monitors with turrets, and some armoured gunboats,
among which were the _Avni-Illah_, of 2,314 tons displacement, a
more powerful version of the Greek _King George_. Some of the ships
had officers trained in the English Navy, and there were also a few
English officers serving with the Turkish fleet. The vessels on which
these officers were engaged were managed as warships should be, but
those which were left to the tender mercies of the Turkish officers
were sadly neglected, and discipline on board was conspicuous by its
absence. This was one reason why the Russians were successful so
frequently in their surprise attacks. Then, when they were disagreeably
aroused to the presence of the enemy the Turks usually distinguished
themselves by shooting very wildly and widely, and before they knew
what they were about the Russians had dashed in and torpedoed the
Turkish ship. In spite of the preponderance of Turkish ships, they
only came to close quarters once with a Russian ship, and that was a
converted merchantman. It is probably a good thing for the Turks that
the Russian naval force was so weak, for had it been stronger the
Russians would not have hesitated to attack the Turks, and when the
attack was over there would probably have been a repetition of the
story of the Battle of Sinope and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet
which preceded the Crimean War. The ships under English officers would
have given a good account of themselves, especially with such men as
Hobart Pacha in command; as it was, the English did their best, but
their efforts were negatived by the incompetence and indifference of
their Turkish colleagues.
The Turkish warships on the Danube began the roll of Ottoman naval
disasters in this war, the first to be lost being the _Lutfi Djelil_,
launched at Bordeaux in 1868. She was engaged with a Russian battery at
Braila, during the attack on the Turkish squadron, and the engagement
was proceeding fiercely when a shell struck the vessel and blew her up.
As torpedoes and mines were also being employed by the Russians her
destruction has sometimes been ascribed to one of these.
The Russians seem to have had very little difficulty in approaching the
Turkish ships, owing to the neglectful way in which the sentries kept
a look-out, and their daring was certainly rewarded by a remarkable
series of successes in which the luck was unquestionably on their side.
Thus at the attack on the _Seifi_ the latter’s turret guns missed fire
three times, and the Russians got so near that they blew a hole in her
by pushing a Whitehead torpedo under her stern, and exploded another
near her bows in order to hasten her disappearance beneath the waters
of the Black Sea. Possibly one reason why the Turks generally missed
the Russian torpedo boats when they aimed at them was that there were
no quick-firers, as the term is now understood, and that the Turks had
nothing between the clumsy and heavy 40-pounders and the Gatlings,
and had no guns to meet the torpedo attacks, even when they did sight
the approaching torpedo boats. Another reason why they failed to
prevent the attacks by gun-fire was the great difficulty of training
heavy guns upon small fast-moving boats no bigger than steam launches
upon the dark and inclement nights which were usually chosen for the
enterprises. Again, the slow-firing guns of those days had to be
laboriously reloaded afresh and aim had to be taken again, and by that
time the attacking boat might be out of range or have discharged its
dangerous and destructive missile.
The one ship-and-ship encounter of the war took place between the
converted merchant steamer _Vesta_ and the Turkish _Assar-i-Chevket_.
The latter gave chase and steadily overhauled the other until those
on the _Vesta_ began to expect that another few minutes would see her
career brought to an end by the warship overtaking and ramming her.
Both ships had been making good shooting, especially the Turk, but at
the last minute a heavy shot from the _Vesta_ struck the warship’s
conning tower a hard blow, and the warship gave up the chase.
[Illustration: DUEL BETWEEN THE “VESTA” AND “ASSAR-I-CHEVKET.” _From a
Contemporary Wood Engraving._]
[Illustration: RUSSIAN TORPEDO BOATS ON THE DANUBE IN THE RUSSO-TURKISH
WAR.]
Many of the British ironclads, the development of which has been traced
in earlier pages, participated in the bombardment of Alexandria,
in July, 1882. The Egyptian fortifications mounted a great variety
of guns, intended, it was unkindly suggested at that time, to meet
on equal terms all kinds of floating craft from ships’ gigs to
battleships. The forts were provided with a number of heavy Armstrong
and Krupp guns of great calibre and immense power. These included
five 10-inch 18-ton guns, eighteen 9-inch, and fourteen 8-inch guns,
all of which were rifled. The majority of the guns in the forts
were indifferently mounted, to a large extent through carelessness
in the work, and some of the latest pattern had been so recently
delivered that there was no time, as time is reckoned in the East
where a few months seldom matter, to mount them at all. No doubt they
had been intended to supersede the old, small, smooth-bore guns of
which the forts had enough and to spare, there being no fewer than two
hundred and eleven of them, but as this work had not been done the
Egyptian gunners had to make shift as best they could with the guns in
position. There were also thirty-eight mortars. Of course, under the
circumstances many of their projectiles failed to reach the British
vessels at which they were aimed. The Egyptian gunners also served
their weapons very badly, and even when the British ships were within
short range of the heavier guns, nearly every shot missed its mark. The
forts appeared from the outside to be much better constructed than they
really were, and their magazines, though extensive, were by no means
the safe places they should have been for the storage of ammunition and
projectiles, and in this probably lies the explanation of the blowing
up of some of the forts. The heavier Egyptian guns were fired through
embrasures, their gunners being thus afforded a considerable measure of
protection; but most, if not all, of the smooth-bores were fired over
parapets, so that they were more exposed to the fire of the ships.
The disparity in gun power between the fleet and the forts was so great
that the view was confidently expressed in England that if hostilities
should ensue the forts would be reduced in anything from half an
hour to a couple of hours. Yet for eleven hours the Egyptian gunners
maintained the unequal combat. Had their skill been equal to their
determination, Alexandria had not fallen so easily and with so little
damage to the British ships.
The ironclads were the _Inflexible_, firing a broadside of 6,880 lb.
from her four 81-ton guns; the _Temeraire_, 8,540 tons, four 25-ton and
four 18-ton guns; the _Superb_, 9,100 tons, with four 25-ton guns, and
a weight of broadside of 3,280 lb.; the _Alexandra_, 9,490 tons, two
25-ton and ten 18-ton guns; the _Monarch_, 8,230 tons, four 25-ton and
two 6½-ton guns; the _Invincible_, 6,010 tons, ten 12-ton guns; and
the _Penelope_, 4,394 tons, ten 12-ton guns. All these vessels carried
a number of smaller guns as well. The gunboats were the _Beacon_,
_Bittern_, _Cygnet_, _Condor_, and _Decoy_, and there was also a small
despatch boat.
The _Monarch_, _Temeraire_ and _Penelope_ attacked Fort Meks and
Fort Marsa-el-Kanit on the mainland; and the _Superb_, _Sultan_ and
_Alexandra_ opposed the Lighthouse and Pharos forts. The _Inflexible_
co-operated with either squadron as required. The Marabout batteries
at the entrance to the harbour were left to the five gunboats. These
were each armed with a 4½-ton 7-inch rifled Woolwich gun and two
64-pounders, all muzzle-loading. The Marabout forts were protected by
two 18-ton guns, two 12-ton guns, twenty 32-pounders, and five mortars.
This fort had been constructed in such a manner that the guns could not
be trained to fire below a certain angle, and consequently any vessel
which could get within this angle would be comparatively safe from the
fire of the forts, and with the superior training of its guns could
shell the forts at short range with terrible effect.
Lord Charles Beresford, the commander of the _Condor_, saw this, and
determined to make the effort. With magnificent daring and consummately
skilful handling of his small vessel, he managed to get her through the
zone of fire without receiving a shot in return, thanks to the erratic
firing of the Egyptian gunners. Having got under the angle of fire the
_Condor_ began to use her guns with terrible effect.
A certain gun in the Marabout fort was annoying the attacking flotilla
very seriously, and in spite of the efforts of the assailants they
could not suppress its fire entirely. One man at this gun proved that
he was an excellent marksman and sent several shells dangerously close
to the ships.
The story goes that this particularly obnoxious Egyptian gunner was
noticed by Lord Charles Beresford, who ordered his own best gunner to
knock over the Egyptian gun. This was no sooner ordered than done, but
the Egyptians worked hard and mounted the gun again, and once more the
Egyptian gunner was seen to be in charge of the piece.
“Hit that gunner,” Lord Charles commanded.
“Yes, sir. Where shall I hit him?” the gunner asked.
“Hit him in the eye,” was the reply of the future admiral.
“Which eye, sir?” asked the gunner. But before the commander could
indicate any preference as to the particular Egyptian optic which
should be hit with an explosive shell, the gunner had fired, and the
shot took off the man’s head.
The _Condor_ maintained her duel with the forts for an hour and was not
hit seriously once. Almost single-handed she silenced the great guns of
the Marabout fort, and afterwards aided the _Bittern_ and _Cygnet_ to
suppress the other guns. Little wonder was it that when she afterwards
passed the _Invincible_ she was rewarded with the splendid compliment,
“Well done, _Condor_.” The crews of the large warships cheered her
as she passed them, and her own crew returned the compliment, not
forgetting cheers for their popular commander and groans for Arabi
Pacha.
Meanwhile the _Inflexible_, with her terrible 81-ton guns, was
steadily if slowly firing at the Meks and Lighthouse forts. The guns of
one turret sent shell after shell into one of the forts and those of
the other turret were directed upon the other fort. The heavy rumbling
of her immense shells contrasted curiously with the scream of the
lighter shells of the smaller guns. Her enormous projectiles, weighing
about 1,700 lb. each, fired with terrible precision, blew the face of
Fort Ada to pieces, and aided in reducing the Lighthouse fort.
The bombardment was a repetition of the old story of fixed shore
fortifications being assailed by a mobile and powerful fleet. As usual
the fleet could manœuvre to its own best advantage for shelling an
enemy and upsetting his aim. The fleet itself, however, did not escape
entirely without injury. A shell entered the captain’s cabin of the
_Alexandra_ and burst, doing considerable damage to the contents of the
apartment, but singularly little injury to the ship. The _Alexandra’s_
armour was pierced several times, but none of the projectiles succeeded
in getting through the backing, and a portion of her smokestack was
shot away. Altogether she was struck twenty-five times. Most of the
other attacking vessels also bore marks of the engagement, but in
no instance was the injury inflicted serious. Much of the damage
was sustained aloft, thus showing that the Egyptian gunners had for
the most part aimed too high. Some of their shells, also, failed to
explode, and on the whole the firing from the forts was badly directed.
The British had five men killed and twenty-eight wounded. The losses
of the Egyptians were never known accurately, but must have been very
great, for the British shells which did not hit the forts found their
billets in the town behind and, exploding, added to the terror and
death-roll among the natives who had not already fled.
A correspondent who visited the forts immediately after the bombardment
wrote:--
“One is amazed at the destruction accomplished which was not visible
from the sea, and at the bravery of the Arab gunners in remaining
at their posts so long. The number and variety of their guns are
surprising and the stock of projectiles and ammunition is immense. If
they had had more men and been well commanded, the fleet would have
had a very warm reception. In one fort we counted several 18-ton guns,
19-inch Armstrongs. In another four 9-inch and one 10-inch Armstrong;
in another two 15-inch smooth-bores ... besides 40-pounder Armstrongs
and any number of old 32-pounders.... One small battery gave the ships
a great deal of trouble ... it was effectually silenced at last, every
gun being knocked off the trainings. At Bab el Meks some Armstrongs
were knocked down, others were hit up with muzzles in the air, and
embedded in one gun we found shots from a Gatling.”[48]
The present United States navy may be said to date from 1883. After the
close of the rebellion the American Government had no further need of
the majority of the war vessels built or improvised for that struggle,
and having sold some, neglected nearly all the remainder. America and
Spain almost came to blows over what was known as the Virginius affair,
and the great republic prepared to do its best on “the mobilisation in
southern waters of a fleet which consisted in great part of antiquated
and rotting ships.”[49] The United States also sadly missed the
possession of an efficient navy when serious differences arose with a
powerful European state over the right interpretation and application
of the Monroe Doctrine to the Panama Canal and the control thereof.
Both these events, supported by the Ten Years War in Cuba and the
unconcealed American sympathy for the Cubans, prepared the country for
the acceptance of the dictum that a more modern navy was necessary, and
this was emphasised when it was announced during the administration of
President Rutherford B. Hayes that the navy of any European power was
superior to that of the United States, and that even Chili, with the
_Almirante Cochrane_ and the _Huascar_, would be able to bombard San
Francisco and that the United States Government had not the means to
prevent them.
In order to appreciate the enormous progress which the United States
have made as a naval power in the past thirty years one must turn
to the American Navy List for 1879, and compare it with the present
equipment in the matter of ships and personnel, which places the
United States in the position of being the second naval power of the
world--second, indeed, only to Great Britain, and with resources
for the production of warships of the latest design and the highest
fighting capacity scarcely if at all inferior to those of the United
Kingdom itself. In 1879 there--
“Were five steam vessels classed as first-rates, which had been built
twenty-five years before and were then obsolete and practically
useless as men-of-war; twenty-seven second-rates, of which three lay
on the stocks, rotten and worthless, seven were in ordinary unfit
for repair, and only nine were actually in condition for sea duty;
twenty-nine third-rate steam vessels, of which fifteen only were
available for naval purposes; six fourth-rate steam vessels, none of
which was of account as a warship; twenty-two sailing vessels, but
five of which could even navigate the sea; twenty-four ironclads,
fourteen of which were ready for effective service; and two torpedo
vessels, one of which was described as rather heavy for a torpedo
vessel, not working so handily as is desirable for that purpose, and
the other, known as the _Alarm_, was in the experimental stage.... In
the entire navy there was not a single high-power, long-range rifled
gun.”
Of the bravery of the American sailors of whatever rank there has never
been any question, but the methods of selecting them seem to have been
as peculiar as the British methods of corruption in the old days,
when it was possible for an infant in arms to be on the pay roll of a
British ship when he had never so much as seen the sea, to say nothing
of never having been on board the vessel of which he was nominally a
midshipman.
The following racy account,[50] which illustrates the American system
of the past better than any lengthy description could do, of the
examination of Midshipman Joseph Tatnall, a relative of the famous
American officer of “Blood is thicker than water” fame, will be read
with interest in this connection:--
Commodore: Mr. Tatnall, what would be your course, supposing you were
off a lee shore, the wind blowing a gale, both anchors and your rudder
gone, all your canvas carried away, and your ship scudding rapidly
towards the breakers?
Tatnall: I cannot conceive, sir, that such a combination of disasters
could possibly befall a ship in one voyage.
Commodore: Tut, tut, young gentleman; we must have your opinion
supposing such a case to have actually occurred.
Tatnall: Well, sir--sails all carried away, do you say, sir?
Commodore: Aye, all--every rag.
Tatnall: Anchor gone, too, sir?
Commodore: Aye; not an uncommon case.
Tatnall: No rudder, either?
Commodore: Aye, rudder unshipped. (Tatnall drops his head despondently
in deep thought.) Come, sir, come; bear a hand about it! What would
you do?
Tatnall (at last and desperate): Well, I’d let the infernal tub go to
the devil, where she ought to go.
Commodore (joyously): Right, sir; perfectly right! That will do, sir.
The clerk will note that Mr. Tatnall has passed.
A naval advisory board was appointed which, in 1881, recommended that
thirty-eight armoured cruisers should be built, of which eighteen
should be of steel and twenty of wood, besides several other vessels.
An influential minority of the board objected to steel lest it should
be imported instead of being manufactured in the United States. But
in 1882 a House of Representatives committee decided upon steel, not
only as the best but as the only proper material for the construction
of war vessels. The committee, cautious but determined, recommended
the building of two 15-knot cruisers, four 14-knot cruisers, and one
steel ram. The advisory board desired five rams, but one was tried
as an experiment. This was the _Katahdin_, and she was a failure and
the experiment was never repeated. Congress in 1883 decided on two
cruisers, not six, of which one should be between 5,000 and 6,000 tons
displacement and have the highest attainable speed, and the other
of between 4,000 and 4,300 tons displacement; and both were to have
full sail power and full steam power. But as no money was voted the
ships did not appear. Another naval advisory board recommended the
construction of a 4,000-ton vessel and three of about 2,500 tons, all
of steel, and a smaller iron despatch boat. Congress in March, 1883,
adopted the programme, eliminating only one of the smaller cruisers,
and this time voted an appropriation.
[Illustration: U.S. RAM “KATAHDIN.”]
The _Chicago_ was the largest of these vessels; the other three were
the _Boston_, _Atlanta_ and _Dolphin_. They were built of American
materials, and were the first vessels of the modern American
navy. The _Chicago_, besides being a twin-screw vessel, had engines
which recalled the type installed in the famous Stevens battery. The
advocates of the old order adopted with alacrity the role of Job’s
comforters, and predicted with as much cheerfulness as the role would
allow, the absolute failure of the new vessels. The _Chicago’s_
designed displacement was 4,500 tons, her engines, gave her a sea-speed
of fourteen knots, and she was armed with four 8-inch, eight 6-inch,
and two 5-inch breech-loading rifled guns. The _Atlanta_ and _Boston_,
each of 3,000 tons displacement and speed of thirteen knots, carried
two 8-inch and six 6-inch guns. The _Dolphin_, of 1,500 tons and
fifteen knots, the despatch boat, was given one 6-inch gun. All four
vessels had secondary batteries of smaller guns. The three cruisers at
their trials attained sixteen knots or over.
Europe, which had treated the American fleets with derision, began to
take a tolerant and amused interest in American naval construction when
it became known that the new navy had been decided upon. The European
powers only mustered eight 16-knot vessels among them, and when three
American ships of that speed appeared, Europe became profoundly
interested. These ships and the _Yorktown_, built later, constituted
the White Squadron which visited Europe about 1891, and showed the Old
World what the New World could do.
The _Charleston_, the designs for which were purchased abroad, was
provided with machinery and boilers supposed to embody the best
features of the boilers and machinery of various foreign cruisers, but
they had to be altered considerably before she was considered to meet
American requirements. She was the first vessel of the new navy to
be employed on a warlike service. The supposed filibustering steamer
_Itata_, at the time of the Chilian insurrection in 1891, escaped from
the custody of the U.S. marshal at San Diego, and the _Charleston_ was
successful in the mission of overtaking her, which she did at Iquique,
after steaming 6,000 miles. The _Charleston_ was wrecked off Luzon in
1900.
In 1886 the United States made another extraordinary advance by
authorising the construction of the second-class battleship _Texas_,
the armoured cruiser _Maine_, the protected cruiser _Baltimore_, the
dynamite cruiser _Vesuvius_, and the torpedo boat _Cushing_. The
_Texas_ and the _Maine_ were the first modern armoured cruising ships
constructed in the United States. They were decided upon as the result
of the knocking to pieces in half an hour of China’s wooden fleet by
the French in the Min River, in August, 1884.
The _Cushing_, besides being the first American steel torpedo boat, was
the first American warship driven by quadruple expansion engines. She
was named to commemorate the officer who commanded the launch which
rammed and broke a protecting boom, and blew up the _Albemarle_ in the
Civil War. The _Vesuvius_ should be included rather in the category
of freaks or comparative failures, for though her three pneumatic
dynamite guns of 10½-inch calibre, designed by Lieut. Zalinski, could
each hurl shells containing 200 lb. of dynamite or other high explosive
at least a mile, they were soon outclassed by other artillery. These
projectiles were thrown by compressed air, and not by explosions of
dynamite. The _Vesuvius_ was employed at the blockade of Santiago de
Cuba in 1898, where she frightened the Spaniards with her dynamite
shells, but did very little actual damage. Her three pneumatic guns
projected abreast through the forward part of the deck, some distance
aft of the bow, and sloped at an angle of about 45 degrees. The breech
of each gun was in the hold, and the supports of the weapons were so
connected with the ship itself as to be practically built into it.
The guns were therefore fixtures; their elevation was unalterable and
when it was desired to discharge them to right or left or to alter
the range the whole position of the ship had to be moved. The _Texas_
and _Baltimore_ were also built on designs purchased abroad. With the
exception of three vessels acquired just before the war with Spain, all
the American ships are entirely the products of American naval science.
The first triple-screw warships were the _Columbia_--a very handsome
ship, sometimes called the _Gem of the Ocean_--and her sister, the
_Minneapolis_. Up to the attack upon the Spaniards in Cuba, the United
States had retained a number of monitors, but the experiences of 1898
convinced the naval department that vessels of that class were out of
date and unsuitable for modern warfare.
[Illustration: THE U.S. DYNAMITE-GUN BOAT “VESUVIUS.”]
[Illustration: THE “MAINE” ENTERING HAVANA HARBOUR.]
Although the American vessels were built in the United States the
compound armour for the turrets had to be imported at first, and it
was not for some years that American-made armour was available for
the navy. Four battleships were launched in the early ’nineties, and
with the _Texas_ comprised the American battleship force in the war
with Spain in 1898. The Americans showed their inventiveness in the
matter of their warships, and not being content always to follow the
lead of other nations, and being convinced that they could not make
more or greater mistakes than some European naval architects had
perpetrated, produced some remarkable vessels. They were the first to
try the superposed turrets, or one turret placed on top of another.
The _Kearsarge_ and _Kentucky_ were thus equipped, but the experiment
did not give the results anticipated, and was not repeated. But the
Americans had shown that the guns of one turret could fire over
another turret, and some of the latest and most powerful ships of the
super-Dreadnought types have their turrets arranged so that this may
be done.
The _Maine_, really an armoured cruiser, but described as a
second-class battleship, was sent to Havana for political reasons in
January, 1898, and was blown up at her moorings on the evening of the
15th of the following month, two hundred and sixty-six lives being
lost. The explosion was attributed to the Spaniards, but this has been
questioned, as an examination of the wreck, completed in the summer of
1911, was stated to have revealed that the cause of the disaster was
the explosion of the vessel’s magazines, but a later examination is
said to have shown that the explosion was external. War between the two
countries was now regarded as inevitable, and both made preparations
for the struggle, Spain in that lazy and incompetent fashion which
assured her defeat in advance, and the United States with as much
thoroughness and care as the time allowed. The resources of the latter
country were far superior to those of her opponent, but Spain by no
means made the best of what she had. The American naval preparations
were well conceived and as well carried out. The most notable exploit
in this work was the remarkable voyage of the battleship _Oregon_ from
Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, and thence at her utmost
speed round Cape Horn to Key West. It was the first time any steam
warship had essayed such a feat, and that an American ship should
have accomplished it was a feather in the American cap. Two or three
foreign-built warships were acquired, but the European powers were
friendly to Spain rather than to the United States in the war, and the
latter acquired ninety-seven merchant steamers to act as auxiliaries
to its fighting fleet, and distributed among them no fewer than five
hundred and seventy-six guns in order that they might take part in the
fighting if circumstances required.
In the Pacific the American preparations were no less extensive than
in the Atlantic. The first of the great naval battles of the war was
that of Manila Bay. Admiral Dewey’s flagship was the protected cruiser
_Olympia_, 5,800 tons displacement, launched at San Francisco in 1892,
and having four 8-inch and ten 5-inch quick-firers, fourteen 6-pounders
and ten smaller guns. With her were the protected cruisers _Baltimore_
4,600 tons; _Raleigh_, 3,217 tons; _Boston_, 3,000 tons; all heavily
armed for their size, and a couple of gunboats.
The Spanish naval force consisted of the steel cruiser _Reina
Cristina_, 3,520 tons, built at Ferrol in 1886, and carrying six
6·2-inch Hontoria guns, two 2·7 inch, and three 2·2 inch quick-firers,
and ten smaller guns; a wooden cruiser, the _Castilla_, 3,342 tons,
built at Cadiz in 1881, and armed with four 5·9 inch Krupps, and
sixteen quick-firers of various sizes; two steel gunboats of English
build and 1,045 tons, and some smaller Spanish-built gunboats and
a number of torpedo boats. The shore fortifications had also been
strengthened by the addition of a few heavy guns.
Though there was not a great deal of difference between the Spanish
and American fleets at Manila, according to a comparative statement
issued by the American navy department, the difference was on the side
of the Americans, but with the land forces as well the advantage on
paper lay with the Spaniards. The only instructions to Admiral Dewey
were to “capture or destroy” the Spanish fleet. This, as it happened,
was not a difficult task, for the Spanish vessels were in a deplorable
condition of inefficiency, and the best that the Spanish admiral could
do was to get his ships under the protection of the forts and keep
them there. Not finding the Spanish ships at Subig Bay, the Americans
entered Manila Bay to look for them, heedless of the mines supposed to
be strewn about the channel, but choosing a dark night illumined only
by the flashes of lightning from the thunder clouds, as though the
very elements were desirous of taking part in the coming struggle and
were flashing their signals preparatory to the discharge of the sky’s
artillery. The American ships showed no light other than that at the
stern of each vessel but the last, to enable that behind to follow in
line. The defenders sighted them and opened fire, but the ships never
paused, firing upon the batteries as they passed. The Spanish admiral,
who, conscious of the condition of his ships, knew that his command
was doomed before ever a shot had been fired, estimated his available
tonnage at 10,111 as against the American 21,410 tons; his h.p. at
11,200, as against 49,290; his guns at seventy-six, as against the
American one hundred and sixty-three; but he had a slight superiority
in the number of men.
After day broke the Spaniards opened the battle, the batteries of
Cavité and Manila starting the firing and being supported by the
Spanish vessels. The _Concord_ sent two shells at the Manila battery
by way of reply, but the rest of the ships steadily steamed towards
the Spanish ships, and it was not until the _Olympia_ was within 5,600
yards of the ships that Dewey gave permission for the Americans to fire.
“You may fire when you’re ready, Gridley,” Admiral Dewey said in his
imperturbable way. A second later, and one of the _Olympia’s_ forward
guns had answered the Spanish challenge.
The American ships passed parallel to the Spaniards, and one after
another concentrated its fire upon the _Reina Cristina_, the best ship
the enemy possessed, and only fired upon the others when the cruiser
was out of range. The Spanish admiral essayed to attack the Americans
by advancing against them with his one good fighting ship, thinking
that possibly at closer quarters he might be able to meet his opponents
with a better chance of inflicting damage. For bravery and audacity the
feat ranks high in the annals of naval combats. But the chance he hoped
for was never allowed him. A shell penetrated the _Reina Cristina_
near the bows and, exploding, set her on fire. Almost at the same time
a heavy projectile crashed into her stern and an 8-inch shell entered
the hole thus made and exploded, setting her on fire at that end also,
and damaging her engines. She retreated under as heavy a fire as a
modern warship could withstand and yet keep afloat. Of her crew of four
hundred and ninety-three men, but one hundred and sixty, of whom ninety
were wounded, answered to the roll call after the battle.
Three times the Americans passed up and down before the Spanish ships,
gradually decreasing the range to 2,600 yards. Ship after ship was
disabled. Some took refuge behind the Cavité arsenal and were sunk
by the Spaniards rather than be allowed to fall into the Americans’
possession. One little iron gunboat, the _Don Antonio de Ulloa_, whose
commander disregarded the Spanish admiral’s orders to sink his ship,
with sublime audacity prepared to offer battle to the whole American
fleet. The _Baltimore_, _Olympia_ and _Raleigh_ opened fire upon her.
The odds were too great. She fought bravely for a few minutes, but the
guns of the assailing cruisers riddled her sides, and her crew left
as she listed and sank with her colours flying. The American ships
made short work of the shore batteries. The Americans in the battle
of Manila Bay had seven men wounded, while the injury to the vessels
was trivial. The Spaniards lost ten ships and had three hundred and
eighty-one men killed and the wounded numbered hundreds more.
Determined to make no mistakes, the Americans took the Spanish fleet
in the Atlantic at its strength on paper, ignoring the rumours of
its neglect and inefficiency, and prepared to meet it accordingly.
Spain possessed five armoured cruisers and a battleship, which were
admitted by the Americans to be equal to America’s six best ships, a
few other vessels, and some torpedo boat destroyers. The real state of
the Spanish ships is best revealed by Admiral Cervera himself. In one
letter he wrote:--
“The _Colon_ has not received her big guns; the _Carlos V._ has not
been delivered, and her 10-cm. artillery is not yet mounted; the
_Pelayo_ is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt, and, I
believe, her secondary battery; the _Victoria_ has no artillery, and of
the _Numancia_ we had better not speak.”[51]
In another letter he complained of the absence of plans and of the
supplies he had asked for not being forthcoming. “The _Colon_ has not
yet her big guns, and I asked for the bad ones if there were no others.
The 14-cm. ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred shots,
is bad. The defective guns of the _Vizcaya_ and _Oquendo_ have not been
changed. The cartridge cases of the _Colon_ cannot be recharged. We
have not a single Bustamente torpedo.... The repairs of the servomotors
of the _Infanta Maria Teresa_ and the _Vizcaya_ were only made after
they had left Spain.” And after his defeat at Santiago, when asked
where were certain large guns which should have been on his ships, he
answered that he supposed they were in the pockets of certain officials
in Spain.
[Illustration: SPANISH BATTLESHIP “PELAYO.” _Photograph by Marius Bar,
Toulon._]
On May 19th, the Spanish fleet entered Santiago, after having crawled
across the Atlantic to Curaçao, much to the relief of the Americans,
who wondered where the fleet was and feared lest it should attack
New York or some other wealthy Atlantic port. Once the fleet was
inside, a strict blockade was maintained to see that it did not get out
unnoticed. But the venture had to be made sooner or later.
“The fleet under my command offers the news, as a 4th of July present,
of the destruction of the whole of Admiral Cervera’s fleet. Not one
escaped.”
This was the message Admiral Sampson despatched on July 3rd to the
Secretary of the Navy at Washington.
The situation had become a question of days when the Spanish fleet
should find itself exposed to the fire of the American forces ashore.
While his ships, in spite of their condition, were yet able to offer
fight, Admiral Cervera decided on making a desperate sortie, or attempt
to escape. It was the forlornest of forlorn hopes at best, for he had
nowhere to flee to with any hope of reaching a place of safety, and
turn which way he would, the American ships, well cared for, within
easy reach of their base, with almost unlimited supplies, and eager for
battle, were waiting for him. The Admiral, in the _Cristobal Colon_,
led the way seaward through the narrow entrance to Santiago Bay, and
fled down the coast. The other ships followed as best they could. The
Americans sought to ram the Spaniards, but could not do so because of
the latter’s superior speed. The fleeing admiral’s ship did succeed
in getting away for the time being. The other ships as they appeared
were fiercely assailed by the American ships. The Spaniards fought with
that gallantry and reckless bravery which have been a prized Spanish
tradition for centuries, but their shooting was so indifferent that
few of the American ships were hit, some were not touched at all, and
only one Spanish shell got home effectively on an American ship. The
Americans, on their part, fired to hit, and hit they did. The armour
of the Spanish ships proved its value, and rang under the blows like
anvils under the strokes of mighty hammers, and the ships shivered and
heeled under the force of the impact.
The engagement began about half-past nine in the morning; by two
o’clock in the afternoon the last ship, the _Cristobal Colon_, was
run ashore sixty miles down the coast, and Admiral Cervera himself
was a prisoner. In the interval the _Infanta Maria Teresa_, the
_Oquendo_, and the _Vizcaya_ were forced ashore and burnt, blown up,
or surrendered, within twenty miles of Santiago. The _Furor_ and
_Pluton_ were destroyed within four miles of the port. Cervera’s ship
was about two knots faster than the American ships which first assailed
it, but it could not hope to escape the other American vessels lying
off the coast, nor did it. In respect to fighting power, weight of
metal, armour protection, and condition for fighting, the Spanish
ships were hopelessly overmatched; and the Spanish guns, whatever
may have been their value on paper, were as inferior as the Spanish
gunnery. One knows not whether to wonder more at the state of mind of
an administration which could send so ill-equipped and neglected a
fleet to the seat of war, or at the extraordinary bravery of the crews
who went in a patriotic cause to what was little else than certain
death. The indifferent shooting which the Spaniards displayed in the
Santiago affair, from first to last, prompted Captain (afterwards
Admiral) Robley D. Evans, otherwise “Fighting Bob,” to declare that
they “couldn’t hit a d----d thing but the ocean” when they missed his
ship with unfailing regularity.
[Illustration: U.S. BATTLESHIP “TEXAS.”]
[Illustration: U.S. BATTLESHIP “IOWA.”]
When the _Cristobal Colon_ appeared, the _Indiana_ headed close in
shore to get within short range. The Spaniard fired her 11-inch
Hontoria gun and missed. The American ship replied with her 13-inch
guns, and then discharged every weapon she could bring to bear upon her
ill-fated antagonist, one shell exploding on the Spanish cruiser’s
deck. The _Iowa_ and _Texas_ took up the attack upon the _Cristobal
Colon_; the _Indiana_ joined with the _Brooklyn_ and _Texas_ in
smashing the _Oquendo_, which stranded on fire. The _Vizcaya_ next
appeared to run the gauntlet, with two destroyers close behind her.
The destroyers tried to torpedo the _Indiana_, but the American ship’s
secondary battery soon accounted for them, one drifting ashore and
blowing up. The _Vizcaya_ was set on fire by the American shells, but
was fought until she was no longer tenable before she was surrendered.
The _Eulate_ was also surrendered. The _Cristobal Colon_ raced with the
_Brooklyn_ and _Oregon_ for 3,000 yards, until she struck the rocks
bow-on and remained fast.
The destruction in such short spaces of time of the Spanish fleets in
the Pacific and then in the Atlantic, with such little injury to the
American side, demonstrated most unmistakably the importance and power
of the new American navy. A few years later the famous cruise round
the world was undertaken by an American fleet, and enabled the powers
of the Old World to inspect some of the ships, and others of later
date, which wrought such havoc. Yet such has been the progress of naval
construction that not one of the ships which made the cruise is now
included in the first rank of the American fighting line.
After the Japanese had decided to adopt war vessels of the Western
types, they ordered a number of vessels of various kinds from builders
in the United Kingdom. Their first ironclad frigate was the _Foo-So_,
launched from the slip in Messrs. Samuda’s yard at Poplar, from which
the _Thunderbolt_, the first ironclad ever built for the British Navy,
took the water. Another coincidence was that both the _Thunderbolt_
and the _Foo-So_ were launched with every armour-plate upon them.
The _Foo-So_ had as her main deck battery, which was protected by
armour 8 inches thick, four Krupp’s long 23-cm. breech-loading guns,
each weighing 15¼ tons. On the upper deck were placed two long 17-cm.
Krupp guns of 5½ tons each, but these were unprotected. The main deck
battery projecting beyond the sides, permitted of a greater training
to the guns. She carried a powerful ram, and her bowsprit, as was the
custom with all vessels at that time fitted with a ram and bowsprit,
was made so that it could be hauled inboard when a ramming attack was
to be made. The ship was belted on the water-line with 9-inch armour
and the vital parts were equally well protected. She was of 3,700 tons
displacement, and fitted with trunk engines of 3,500 h.p. which, with
a steam pressure of 60 lb., were calculated to give her a speed of
fourteen knots; her coal capacity was expected to enable her to cover
4,500 miles at moderate speed. The first warship on Western lines which
the Japanese built was a little barque-rigged vessel, the _Seika_,
launched in 1875, a model of which is now (1911) in the Museum at the
Royal Naval College at Greenwich.
The naval engagements in the Chino-Japanese war were not remarkable for
much in the way of fighting, but chiefly for a pronounced objection
by the Chinese officers as a whole to anything of the sort. A few of
them, Admiral Ting among the number, did their best, but they were so
hindered by their colleagues’ incompetence and cowardice that they
never had a chance of success. Guns that had been neglected, and shells
from which the powder had been extracted and its place filled with
charcoal, are not the best weapons for warfare, and when to these are
added coal that was not much use and ships that were not in fighting
condition, it will be seen that the victory of the well-organised
Japanese was a foregone conclusion. One or two of the Chinese ships
offered the best resistance they could, but it was a hopeless
resistance from the start. The Battle of the Yalu was won by the
Japanese before a shot was fired. The few survivors of the Yalu fell
victims at Wei-Hai-Wei. The training which a cavalry officer received
in the Chinese army was not such as to fit him to command a fleet
at sea, even of Chinese ships, but the former cavalryman who became
commander of the Chinese fleet tried his utmost; his personal bravery
was unquestioned, and he had preferred death to dishonour when he was
found lifeless in the cabin of his beaten ship with a revolver by his
side and a bullet through his brain.
Disciplinarian he was not. It is recorded that like most Chinamen he
was an inveterate gambler, and that on one occasion when the fleet,
as usual, was doing nothing, he found the time heavy on his hands,
and when a visitor went on board the sentries were engaged in fan-tan
in a secluded corner of the deck, the officers who should have been
on duty were similarly engaged elsewhere, and the admiral himself was
acting banker in that charming game with one or two other officers, and
the sentry, who should have been on duty at the door of the admiral’s
cabin, joining whole-heartedly in the gamble.
Of China’s principal battleships, two fine vessels of 7,400 tons
displacement, one the _Chen-Yuen_, surrendered at Wei-Hai-Wei, and
having been repaired, was taken to Japan and added to the navy of her
captors, and the other was sunk by a Whitehead torpedo during a night
attack by torpedo boats at Wei-Hai-Wei. Similar fates befell a couple
of armoured cruisers, and of the six smaller cruisers which completed
China’s fleet at the Battle of the Yalu, five were sunk or wrecked, and
one surrendered. One was raised and added to the Japanese navy. Some of
the ships of which China was despoiled distinguished themselves in the
Japanese attack upon the Russians at the Battle of Tsushima.
The Battle of Tsushima, which ended Russia’s naval pretensions in
the war between that country and Japan a few years ago, is the only
one in which modern ships and guns have been employed on both sides
in anything approximating to equal terms. After the Russian squadron
already in the Far East had suffered so severely at Port Arthur and
the few vessels at Vladivostok deemed it advisable to stay there,
Russia collected as many sea-going war vessels of all shapes and sizes
as she could muster, and sent them out in two detachments from Europe
in the hope that they would reach Vladivostok, Japan permitting. The
voyage was exciting enough at the start when, through a bad attack of
nerves, the Russians opened fire upon and damaged one or two British
trawlers in the North Sea under the delusion that they were Japanese
torpedo boats advancing to attack them. Loud was the outcry in Great
Britain and great was the clamour that the British fleet should make
short work of the Russian ships before they did any more damage. But
the Government saved its powder and money and put its trust in the
Japanese, confident that the Mikado’s ships would do all that was
necessary if the imaginative Russians ever got that far. The Russian
ships were very slow, the best speed of which the fleet was capable
was nine knots, and as the Russians themselves estimated the Japanese
speed at sixteen knots, and this estimate was endorsed by the naval
experts, it was taken for granted that the Russian fleet was going out
to certain disaster.
[Illustration: THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP “TSAREVITCH” AFTER THE FIGHT OFF
PORT ARTHUR, AUGUST 10, 1905.]
[Illustration: EFFECTS OF JAPANESE SHELLS ON THE “GROMOBOI.”]
The progress of this heterogeneous fleet was a matter of some months,
but at last it approached the Japanese coast, off which the ships
of the Mikado’s fleet were waiting. The Japanese vessels, being of
superior speed, were able to choose their own position for the
attack. No innovations in the way of tactics were attempted. When the
Japanese were ready they attacked, and they selected a moment for doing
so when the slow-moving Russian ships were attempting to carry out an
order of their admiral and were, in consequence of the order being
incompletely executed, unable to offer a resistance to the suddenness
of the attack. This very suddenness, indeed, threw them into greater
disorder, and rendered them the more easily assailable by their
relentless antagonists.
The Russian ships, too, were so overloaded with stores and coal
that the upper edges of their heavy armour-plates were well below
the water-line and, therefore, in so far as the hull protection was
concerned, they were armoured cruisers and not battleships. The cabins,
passages, etc., were so filled with coal that the sanitary arrangements
for the men were blocked in some of the ships since leaving Leghorn,
and the decks were in consequence in an indescribable condition.[52]
The Russian ships are said to have rolled very heavily owing to their
having so much coal on board, and to the circumstance that their bunker
coals were used before their extra supplies carried on their decks were
consumed. However, the Russians fought their ships with the utmost
bravery and determination, but the superior training of the Japanese
sailors and their better gunnery told its tale, and in less than a
couple of hours the Russian fleet was hopelessly defeated.
Admiral Togo, according to Lieut.-Commander W. S. Simms, must have gone
into action with two principal objects clearly defined in his mind. One
was to fight at the maximum range at which actual experience of battle
practice had shown him that he could hit effectively, viz. about 6,000
yards, and at which he knew the Russian fire would not be dangerous;
and the other was to manœuvre so as to maintain as exactly as possible
that range upon the head of the enemy’s column. If he had not been able
to accomplish these two objects, says the American authority, he might
still have won the battle because of the Russian inferiority in many
other respects, but the Japanese fleet would certainly have suffered
more. If the Russians had been able by superior speed to run into
1,800 yards range, the battle range of their choice, they would have
made a large percentage of hits, and those hits would have been very
effective, especially from their modern ships of French design, the
_Suvaroff_, _Alexander III._, _Borodino_, and _Orel_.
The Japanese at first scored three hits to every one they received,
and as the battle progressed and their men became more used to their
work their hits averaged four to every one the Russians could manage
to inflict on them. The accuracy of shooting at a greater distance
than was formerly thought possible in an engagement showed the
necessity of cultivating this branch of naval gunnery, and its value
was demonstrated when the Japanese were able to concentrate the rapid
fire of their best battleships upon the leading vessels of the Russian
columns at such a range that the Russian fire was ineffective and wide
of its intended mark.
Most of the Japanese big guns had lengths equal to thirty-five or forty
times their calibres, and had already seen a great deal of hard work.
This to a great extent may account for the Japanese not having hit
oftener. The Japanese shooting in the later naval stages of the war, as
compared with that in the naval attack on Port Arthur when the Russian
squadron already in Far Eastern waters was crushed, is said to have
shown a slight falling off.
The value of superior speed, of accurate long range firing, and of
protective armour is the principal lesson of the Battle of Tsushima.
The one gives choice of position and all its attendant advantages;
the second enables an enemy to be partially crippled so that he can
be attacked by torpedo boats and sunk or rendered helpless, or can
be overtaken and assailed by a fast cruiser if an attempt be made to
escape. The battle also demonstrated the value of uniformity in speed
of the principal ships, or ships of the line, for the Japanese admiral,
knowing that his six battleships had each a speed of about twenty
knots, knew exactly the positions he could expect each one to maintain.
He had also a number of first and second-class armoured cruisers, and
his scouts were reinforced by some of the best vessels in the Japanese
mercantile marine.
The actual fighting resulted in the _Osliabya_ being driven out of
the fighting line in less than thirty minutes after the battle began,
and in about an hour after the first shot, the gun-fire to which she
had been subjected had set her on fire and caused her to founder. The
_Kniaz Suvaroff_ was obliged to leave the fighting line about forty
minutes after the battle commenced, both these ships being rendered
ineffective before the Russians had travelled five miles. Becoming
isolated from her consorts, the _Suvaroff_ was severely pounded. One of
her masts and her two funnels were shot away, and a couple of torpedo
boats attacked her and injured her below the water-line, so that she
soon had a heavy list, but her watertight bulkheads kept her afloat for
a time. Two Japanese destroyers then took charge of her and torpedoed
her three times, inflicting such injuries that she soon went down.
Shortly before this the _Borodino_ received a shell in her magazine,
which blew up and sent her to the bottom. The _Orel_ surrendered after
the battle, and presented an excellent object lesson of the service her
armour had rendered her, for her partially protected and unprotected
parts were wrecked by the Japanese gun-fire, but not one of the shells
had penetrated her heavy armour, though it bore ample evidence of the
severity of the ordeal through which she had passed.
Enough has been written to show that the range at which naval
engagements have been fought since steel took the place of iron for
guns and armour has steadily increased. The old practice of getting
close to an enemy and blazing away as fast as the guns could be loaded,
in the hope of smothering his fire and a certainty of hitting something
sometimes, has become as extinct as the dodo. Guns are too powerful for
anything of the sort to be attempted now, and the object at present is
to hit at the longest range at which the guns are considered really
effective.
The _Dreadnought_ is the logical outcome.
[Illustration: THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP “ASAHI.”]
[Illustration: THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP “NAVARIN.”]