CHAPTER III

Preliminary Atrocities--Bravery of the Belgians--Battle of Haelen-Diest

At this stage of the fighting numerous circumstantial stories of German

atrocities began to filter through, though for various reasons large

portions of them were deleted by the Censors. They were generally

summed up in an official statement by the Belgian Government which is

quoted in a subsequent chapter. Dr. Dillon, telegraphing on August

11th, asserted that it was still impossible to throw any light

upon the military operations, which might culminate on Thursday or

Friday in a terrific collision between the forces of disruption and

those of civilisation. Never before, not even during the Japanese

campaign against Russia, had the movements of an army been shrouded

in such impenetrable mystery. Considering the number, audacity, and

ingenuity of the German agents still in Belgium, these precautions

were indispensable. Anyhow, the War Office, the only source of

intelligence, contented itself with a brief assurance that the news was

satisfactory, or that there was no news of importance to communicate.

Concrete facts were learnt mostly from Paris or Holland.

Another fact which was beginning to dawn upon the public was that

the heroic resistance of the Belgian army had been offered hitherto

to covering troops only, and that the enemy's losses did not exceed

5,000, although three German army corps had been thoroughly beaten.

It was believed in Brussels that the hostile main armies would be

ready any time after Wednesday night, August 12th. On the 11th several

detachments of German covering troops were sent forward to the Belgian

advanced posts as feelers. The Belgians when possible concealed

themselves in thickets or in fields, and captured a considerable number

of the invaders.

One Belgian lancer, named Bogaerts, deserves especial mention. His

habit was to sally forth alone, lance in poise, and dash forward

against the Uhlans, one of whom he generally killed or wounded,

whereupon the remainder gave themselves up. In this way he took

fourteen prisoners, wounded several Uhlans, and killed three, without

suffering the slightest injury.

Encounters became frequent in the district stretching from Liège to

Tongres, Hannut, and Tirlemont, whither two divisions succeeded in

penetrating on the 11th.

Already the airships of the different combatants were floating

gracefully into the visual range of the Brussels population, but at

such a height that one could only conjecture the nationality of each;

and the authorities warned the public neither to fear nor attack the

Uhlans.

Anxiety respecting Holland's neutrality was not yet wholly dispelled.

Nobody doubted the firm resolve of the Dutch Government to maintain

its right to hold aloof from the war, but certain misgivings were

entertained as to the adequacy of the troops stationed in the district

where the violation of territory by the Germans was most probable. Some

months previously Dutch Limburg, possessing only a few squadrons of

cavalry, was practically defenceless. Since then a number of infantry

battalions were stationed along the frontier from Maastricht to Venloo,

together with several companies of the local Landwehr. If, as many

military men believed, these troops were the only obstacle to a German

advance in Holland, they constituted an inducement rather than a

deterrent, it was thought.

German spies and secret agents were still numerous and audacious.

Ten days before the declaration of war all trees near the sources of

water in the forest of Soignes, outside Brussels, had notices posted

up in German, with the words, "Potable water." The Mayor of Brussels

had these placards removed, but they were afterwards found posted up

anew. On August 12th when a representative of _The Daily Telegraph_ was

leaving the American Legation, he saw two municipal guards arresting a

lady, whom they politely conducted to the police-station. His chauffeur

cried, "That's no lady. He is a German spy." A couple of men hearing

this rushed up and attempted to maltreat the prisoner, but the guards

protected their charge effectually. At the station the prisoner, who

looked quite collected, was found to be a male German agent possessed

of apparatus for cutting telegraph wires and also of compromising

documents. Belgian treatment of Germans, said the correspondent,

whether civilians or prisoners, erred on side of humanitarianism if it

erred at all.

On the night of August 12th the Press Bureau stated:

Of the twenty-six German army corps the bulk have now been definitely

located, and it is evident that the mass of the German troops are

concentrated between Liège and Luxemburg.

The number known to be on the Western side proves that in the Eastern

theatre of war the frontier, as far as Germany is concerned, is

comparatively lightly guarded, unless by reserve troops.

At this time, beyond some unimportant outpost fighting near Liège, the

position in Belgium was quiet. "A sense of stagnation," as Dr. Dillon

expressed it, was creeping over the public. Of the troops massing

behind the various cavalry covers, of the enemy's numbers, whereabouts,

and plans, nobody but the General Staff knew anything. The vaguest of

conjectures were the sole substitute for knowledge. Some held that the

Germans, disheartened by their failure to traverse Belgium in three

days and by the severe defeat of three army corps, were preparing for

the defensive. This view, taken in official circles, was borne out by

the circumstance that they were entrenching themselves on the River

Ourthe, employing the peasants to make routes in the south of the

province of Liège and in Luxemburg, bringing up fresh troops for the

reinforcement of the line Maestricht-Liège, and withdrawing most of

their covering cavalry regiments.

[Illustration]

Passing from the region of conjecture to that of fact, it was soon

learnt that the enemy's cavalry which advanced on Monday into Belgium

to see how the land lay threw out feelers from Hannut and Saint Trond

towards Tirlemont, Hougaerde, and Jodoigne. They came with artillery

and machine guns, occupied Landen, Neerwinden, Pellaines, and other

places, burning houses and hayricks as they passed. A regiment of

Belgian lancers met them at Dormael, where a sharp encounter gave a

momentary advantage to the defenders, whom the German artillery, which

was opened shortly afterwards, forced to retire.

The Germans then proceeded to shoot seven inmates of the houses on an

unproved charge of firing. They also burned the houses of the village

of Orsmael, and shot three brothers, peasants, on a like allegation.

Universal execration followed the German troops in Belgium, where all

observers were unanimous in accusing them of cruelty towards civilians,

unwarranted by the attitude of the population and forbidden by the

rules of war. Wherever they tarried peaceful inhabitants were shot

down on charges which were emphatically denied by their neighbours. At

Dormael a Uhlan, seeing a priest go forward to administer the last

sacraments to the agonising wounded, cut him down as if he too were a

combatant.

Having compelled the Belgian lancers to retire from Dormael, the German

cavalry advanced in the direction of Tirlemont to the number of about

2,000. Arriving at Bost, which is a mile from Tirlemont, they found

their further advance barred by Belgian infantry, whereupon they fell

back upon Saint Trond and Waremme.

The Belgian troops did not begin the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry

until August 11th, when they drove it beyond Waremme.

Liège became a new centre of an artillery action, both offensive

and defensive. The Germans pounded away at the forts, their shells

exploding on the cupolas and around these, while the forts responded

with vigour unimpaired. Meanwhile the invaders began to construct a

pontoon over the Meuse at Lixhe, for troops and trains of ammunition

and provisions. It was believed that they were also preparing to cross

the river above Liège, for they were forwarding heavy war material in

the direction of Engis.

Meanwhile, the French cavalry showed themselves to the population of

Brussels, who gave them a warm ovation.

The second general engagement in the struggle for the possession of

the Liège forts took place on Wednesday, August 12th, and lasted until

the early morning of the 13th. The Germans attempted a "reconnaissance

in force," and attacked the Belgian army at two points.

Again, however, the Belgian soldier proved more than a match for the

most highly trained troops of the Kaiser. The reconnaissance in force

failed utterly. Two of their finest cavalry divisions and two regiments

of Jaegers suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The attack was made at two points, one to the north of Namur and the

other near Diest, which is a railway junction. About ten in the morning

cavalry patrols reported the advance of the enemy towards Haelen, a

village about three miles south of Diest. At the head of the force rode

the famous 17th Dragoons; behind them marched a regiment of Jaegers

with a battery of artillery and machine-guns. Belgian carbineers

awaited them at Zelck and succeeded in checking the advance until they

could retire on Haelen, which was formerly a fortress.

With reckless courage the Dragoons galloped into what was an armed cul

de sac. In front of them was a battery on the mound of the fort, and

the road was trenched and barricaded. The Belgians opened fire from

buildings which had been loopholed to meet an attack from that quarter.

Under cover of artillery fire and aided by machine-guns the cavalry

attempted to carry the position by assault. It was an enterprise that

did more credit to the courage than to the judgment of the German

soldier.

* * * * *

Mr. William Maxwell, who communicated these facts, added:

At manoeuvres in Germany some years ago I remember the Kaiser asking

Sir Ian Hamilton what he thought of the infantry formation. Sir Ian

ventured to suggest that the formation was too dense. Whereupon the

Emperor rebuked him with these words: "Half of those men would be

killed, but we can afford to lose them." The cavalry seem to act on

this principle. Without a pause they rode upon the barricade, which

they attempted to leap. I counted seven dead horses close to the

barricade, while others lay writhing a hundred yards off, bearing

testimony to the bravery of two-score men who now lie side by side

awaiting burial. So stout was the resistance of the 700 Belgians

who held this position against a division of cavalry and a regiment

of infantry that the enemy soon found it prudent to withdraw. Not

allowed to retire unmolested, though pursuit beyond Zelck would have

been folly, they left behind about forty dead, many wounded, and 300

prisoners.

It was remarkable, according to the accounts of eye-witnesses, how

readily some of these brave men surrendered. One Belgian officer

captured three officers. The first question they asked was, "What is

England doing?" They were evidently ignorant that England had declared

war. Their second question was, "What of our fleet?" The wounded were

treated not only with skill and kindness, but even luxury.

The object of this raid was to feel the nature and strength of the

opposing force, and, if possible, to capture points on the railway as

well as to threaten the capital in order to strike terror--a phrase so

often on the lips of their War Lord--into the heart of the people.

A more detailed version of the Haelen-Diest fight on the road to

Louvain says that the encounter lasted all day. The Germans were

supported by a battery of artillery. The Belgian field forces fought

desperately, and Lieutenant Van Doren even enlisted the Diest fire

brigade against the enemy, whose loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners

was comparatively heavy.

Many of the prisoners were fainting, and the horses were dying from

hunger. The German attacking party had probably been detached from the

Liège right wing for an audacious raid on Louvain and Brussels.

Further details about the Haelen-Diest combat showed that the German

losses must have approached 3,000.

The action, when the German mitrailleuses (machine-guns) were captured,

took place north of Eghezée, on the road from Liège to Namur. Of

course, the main German forces continued to be arrested before Liège,

but they sent forth detachments in every direction to make believe that

they had carried everything before them in their rear and to create

popular panics. Each of these detachments was gradually beaten in its

turn, and this slowly weakened the large forces intended for the great

general battle, and estimated at about seven army corps, or about

250,000 men.

The following official statement was issued at Brussels on Thursday,

August 13th:

The victory gained by the Belgian troops yesterday is now officially

confirmed. The Belgian troops engaged were only one cavalry division

and a brigade of all arms. The German losses were very heavy, and it

is believed that about three-fifths of the enemy engaged was put out

of action. The Belgian losses were relatively slight, only a few men

being killed.

The Belgian cavalry division this morning took up the offensive

against yesterday's defeated troops, in order, it is believed, to pick

up the dead and wounded and to collect the abandoned war material. No

German surprise is expected.

Another encounter took place this morning in the south with the German

troops reported yesterday to be marching towards Eghezée. These

were attacked by our troops and repulsed with very heavy losses. We

captured a number of machine guns mounted on motor-cars.

There is no reason to fear any German cavalry movement on Brussels

from the south, all roads to the capital being guarded by the army and

by the Garde Civique.

The military situation at the time was summed up as follows by Mr. E.

Ashmead-Bartlett, _The Daily Telegraph's_ military expert:

Every single account of conversations with wounded German soldiers

or prisoners serves to show that the rank and file of the German

army have not the smallest idea for what they are fighting, and that

all profess not to have the smallest desire to invade either France

or Belgium. In the war of 1870, the situations were reversed. Every

German knew that the future of his country as a world Power depended

on victory, and all marched to the front with a determination to

conquer or to die. The French, on the other hand, had no idea for what

they were fighting, and their purely professional army left for the

war amidst vague cries of "À Berlin!" buoyed up by no moral principle.

These factors must bear a very far-reaching effect on the eventual

outcome of the campaign.

In a recent journey through France, I noticed nothing so remarkable

as the intense seriousness of the people. Frenchmen will tell you

there has been nothing like it since the Revolutionary wars, prior

to the Napoleonic epoch, when the levée en masse crushed the invader

at Valmy and Jemappes. The French have entered into this struggle

through no love of fighting, but because they know their existence as

an independent nation is at stake. One other fact must also be noted

before the chances of the opposing armies are examined. In 1870 the

French regular army, which should have had a peace strength of 400,000

men, only numbered 270,000, whereas the Germans, at the very start of

the campaign, stood at a total war strength of over 1,200,000 men.

This inequality no longer exists. On paper Germany has a considerable

superiority of numbers, namely twenty-five army corps against

twenty-one, and her reserves are probably more numerous and better

organised than those of the French. On the other hand, she is,

according to the most reliable information, keeping four corps on the

Russian frontier, and, therefore, the numbers available against France

should certainly not show any superiority, and will probably show

an inferiority when the Belgian and British armies are united along

the line of the Meuse. For years German strategists have reckoned on

having to fight both France and Russia at the same time, and they have

professed themselves as being confident of undertaking such a gigantic

task. Four corps especially trained under Von der Goltz to fight in

more open formations were to hold the Russians, whilst the remaining

twenty-one were to be flung with such rapidity against France as to

obtain a decisive success before Russian intervention could make

itself seriously felt.

It is one thing to have twenty-one army corps ready to invade France,

and quite another to find a suitable front on which to deploy them for

such an invasion. All the time-honoured old routes for the invasion

of France are practically closed to modern armies by the chain of

fortresses which the French have constructed, and, vice versa, the old

roads to Germany are closed to a French invasion. Therefore, French,

German, and Belgian strategists have long recognised that the only

route by which a modern German army could invade France and march on

Paris would be via Belgium, and that declarations of neutrality would

count but little in the strategic scale. It was to resist such a

menace that the Belgians constructed two fortified camps at Liège and

Namur. The old routes of 1870 present too many formidable obstacles to

be overcome. A direct advance into France from Alsace would have found

itself faced by the fortified front Belfort-Epinal-Toul, and Verdun,

four formidable fortified camps, supported by forts on the heights

overlooking the Moselle and Meuse.

There are only two routes by which this line can be passed. That by

way of Charmes, between Epinal and Toul, protected by the fort of

Manonvillers, which would enable the Germans to enter Haut Marne and

to gain the valley of the Seine, and the road to Paris via Bar-le-Duc,

St. Dizier, and Troyes. This is the theatre of war of 1814, and also

the road used by the Crown Prince after Froeschwiller, in 1870. But an

invading army would have to take or mask all these entrenched camps,

which would take a very long time, or else have his communications

continually threatened.

The other road is that by Dun-Stenay, north of Verdun, passing through

the defiles of Côtes-de-Meuse and the forest of Argonne to the open

country round Valmy. But this country is extremely difficult for

military operations on a large scale. It was used by the Duke of

Brunswick in 1792.

The Germans confidently expected to overrun the whole of Belgium and

to gain the French frontier before a single French corps could be

concentrated to offer any serious resistance. They reckoned on two

factors which have turned out the reverse of what they hoped. They

relied on a partial break-down in the French mobilisation, especially

on the railway lines. In this supposition they have been completely

mistaken. Nothing so far has been so remarkable as the smooth working

of the railway service, and, consequently, the rapid concentration of

the French armies. The second factor on which the Germans relied was

the readiness of the Belgians to see their country overrun by a swarm

of invaders or else their inability to resist such an invasion. The

quickest route into Belgium is to cross the Meuse at Liège, and from

there to march south by the left bank along the Mons-Charleroi road,

and to gain the French frontier between Maubeuge and Valenciennes. Of

recent years the Germans have made every preparation for such a move.

They have organised depôts for troops and collected large masses of

stores, and have quadrupled lines at Aix-la-Chapelle, Malmedy, St.

Vith, Bitburg, and Trèves. They can thus rapidly concentrate immense

numbers of troops from Dusseldorf, Cologne, and Coblenz in front of

Liège.

But the stubborn and unexpected defence of Liège has thrown all

their plans for a direct advance into Belgium via the Liège-Namur

line out of gear, and, to judge from the meagre reports which are

coming through slowly, they have entrenched that line strongly, and

are holding it on the left bank of the Meuse with the two corps

which were so roughly handled while the bulk of their forces are

preparing to cross the Belgian frontier further north on the line

Maestricht-Roermonde, and to march on Brussels through the Duchy of

Limburg. We read of constant cavalry engagements in this district and

of partial defeats of the German troops, but these stories must not

be taken too seriously, as the German cavalry is merely being used as

a screen to cover the concentration of immense masses of infantry who

will soon be making their presence felt.

The Campaign Round Liège · 第 3 / 6 章