MISS CARROLL'S PAPERS TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT -- PLAN OF CAMPAIGN --
LETTERS FROM SCOTT, WADE, AND OTHERS -- DISCUSSIONS -- PAPERS AS THE
CAMPAIGN PROGRESSES.
List of Miss Carroll's papers sent into the War Department in her own
handwriting and signed with her name, originally on file at the War
Department; all in the first division relating to the Tennessee
campaign; sent on various occasions to the Capital to be examined by
military committees, and printed by order of Congress in successive
memorials and reports from 1870 to 1881.
The papers marked with a star are now on file at the War Department.
With the permission of the Secretary of War, these were seen by me and
carefully examined March 7th, 1891. They were sent by Robert Lincoln
to the Court of Claims in 1885, and copies were put on file in the
office of the Attorney General, the original documents being returned
to the War Department. One of these original documents at the War
Department is now incomplete, but must have been in good order in
1885, as the copies then made are complete and in excellent condition.
They were verified as true copies by the Secretary of War. These also
were examined by me at the office of the Attorney General March 23,
1891. The absence of the other documents from the War Office is
accounted for by the remarkable testimony of Benjamin F. Wade and
Samuel Hunt (keeper of the records), as given on page 30, 45th
Congress, 2d session, Mis. Doc. 58, both testifying that the papers
were abstracted from the desk of the Secretary when the Military
Committee were considering Miss Carroll's claim, in 1871. As Miss
Carroll possessed the original draft of these letters, she quickly
reproduced them. The papers having been already examined by the
Committee and by Mr. Hunt, the copies were accepted in place of the
missing file and printed "by order of Congress," and thus guaranteed
they became, to all intents and purposes, the same thing as the
original documents; but apparently they were not sent to the War
Office, not being the original documents sent from there. On March 20,
1891, I examined the files of the 41st Congress, 2d session, at the
Secretary's office of the U. S. Senate, at the Capitol, and there I
found Miss Carroll's first memorial, 1870, with the "plan of campaign"
attached, just as described by Thomas A. Scott.
S. E. BLACKWELL.
FIRST DIVISION.
A paper usually designated as the "plan of campaign."
When given in at the War Office to Thomas A. Scott it was accompanied
by a military map; the paper in Miss Carroll's own handwriting and
signed with her name, the map unsigned.
1. November 30, 1862.
2. January 5, 1862.
3. March 26, 1862.
4. May 2, 1862.*
5. May 14, 1862.*
6. May 15, 1862.*
7. Following Monday, 1862.
8. September 9, 1862.*
9. October ----, 1862.
The letter to Stanton is on file at the office of the Attorney
General, certified as copied from the documents furnished by the War
Department in 1885.
(The letter of October, 1862, was also accompanied by a military map,
"approved and adopted by the Secretary of War and the President and
immediately sent out to the proper military authority." See letter of
B. F. Wade, page 24, Mis. Doc. 58, of Memorial, May 18, 1878.)
SECOND DIVISION.
August 25, 1862.
January 31, 1863.
October 7, 1863.
January 11, 1864.
---- ----, 1865.
A letter, on file from Robert Lincoln, states that the papers of the
second division were returned to Miss Carroll, March 10, 1869.
* * * * *
Miss Carroll's first paper, addressed to the War Department, for a
campaign on the Tennessee river and thence south, placed in the hands
of Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, the 30th of
November, 1861, with accompanying map, is as follows:
"The civil and military authorities seem to be laboring under a great
mistake in regard to the true key to the war in the southwest. _It is
not the Mississippi, but the Tennessee river._ All the military
preparations made in the West indicate that the Mississippi river is
the point to which the authorities are directing their attention. On
that river many battles must be fought and heavy risks incurred before
any impression can be made on the enemy, all of which could be avoided
by using the Tennessee river. This river is navigable for middle-class
boats to the foot of the Muscle Shoals, in Alabama, and is open to
navigation all the year, while the distance is but two hundred and
fifty miles, by the river, from Paducah, on the Ohio. The Tennessee
offers many advantages over the Mississippi. We should avoid the
almost impregnable batteries of the enemy, which cannot be taken
without great danger and great risk of life to our forces, from the
fact that our boats, if crippled, would fall a prey to the enemy by
being swept by the current to him and away from the relief of our
friends; but even should we succeed, still we will only have begun the
war, for we shall then fight for the country from whence the enemy
derives his supplies.
"Now an advance up the Tennessee river would avoid this danger, for
_if our boats were crippled, they would drop back with the current and
escape capture_; but a still greater advantage would be its tendency
_to cut the enemy's lines in two by reaching the Memphis and
Charleston railroad_, threatening Memphis, which lies one hundred
miles due west, and no defensible point between; also Nashville, only
ninety miles northeast, and Florence and Tuscumbia, in North Alabama,
forty miles east.
"A movement in this direction would do more to relieve our friends in
Kentucky and inspire the loyal hearts in East Tennessee than the
possession of the whole of the Mississippi river. If well executed _it
would cause the evacuation of all these formidable fortifications_
upon which the rebels ground their hopes for success; and in the event
of our fleet attacking Mobile, the presence of our troops in the
northern part of Alabama _would be material aid to the fleet_.
"Again, the aid our forces would receive from the loyal men in
Tennessee would enable them soon to crush the last traitor in that
region, and the separation of the two extremes would do more than one
hundred battles for the Union cause.
"The Tennessee river is crossed by the Memphis and Louisville railroad
and the Memphis and Nashville railroad. At Hamburg the river makes the
big bend on the east, touching the northeast corner of Mississippi,
entering the northwest corner of Alabama, forming an arc to the South,
entering the State of Tennessee at the northeast corner of Alabama,
and if it does not touch the northwest corner of Georgia comes very
near it.
"It is but eight miles from Hamburg to the Memphis and Charleston
railroad, which goes through Tuscumbia, only two miles from the river,
which it crosses at Decatur, thirty miles above, intersecting with the
Nashville and Chattanooga road at Stevenson. The Tennessee river has
never less than three feet to Hamburg on the shoalest bar, and during
the fall, winter, and spring months there is always water for the
largest boats that are used on the Mississippi river.
"It follows, from the above facts, that in making the Mississippi the
key to the war in the West, or rather in overlooking the Tennessee
river, the subject is not understood by the superiors in command."
Extracts from a second paper, January 5, 1862, giving additional
particulars for the advance up the Tennessee:
"Having given you my views of the Tennessee river on my return from
the West, showing that this river is the true strategical key to
overcome the rebels in the southwest, I beg again to recur to the
importance of its adoption. This river is never impeded by ice in the
coldest winter, as the Mississippi and the Cumberland sometimes are. I
ascertained, when in St. Louis, that the gunboats then fitting out
could not retreat against the current of the western rivers, and so
stated to you; besides, their principal guns are placed forward and
will not be very efficient against an enemy below them. The fighting
would have to be done by their stern guns--only two; or if they
anchored by the stern they would lose the advantage of motion, which
would prevent the enemy from getting their range. Our gunboats at
anchor would be a target which the enemy will not be slow to improve
and benefit thereby.
"The Tennessee river, beginning at Paducah fifty miles above Cairo,
after leaving the Ohio, runs across south-southeast, rather than
through Kentucky and Tennessee, until it reaches the Mississippi line
directly west of Florence and Tuscumbia, which lie fifty miles east,
and Memphis, one hundred and twenty-five miles west, with the
Charleston and Memphis railroad eight miles from the river. There is
no difficulty in reaching this point at any time of the year, and the
water is known to be deeper than on the Ohio.
"If you will look on the map of the Western States you will see in
what a position Buckner would be placed by a strong advance up the
Tennessee river. He would be obliged to back out of Kentucky, or, if
he did not, our forces could take Nashville in his rear and compel him
to lay down his arms."
Testimony of Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, to Hon.
Jacob M. Howard, chairman of the Military Committee, to consider the
claim presented by Miss Carroll in 1870:
PHILADELPHIA, _June 24, 1870_.
On or about the 30th of November, 1861, Miss Carroll, as stated
in her memorial, called on me, as the Assistant Secretary of War,
and suggested the propriety of abandoning the expedition which
was then preparing to descend the Mississippi, and to adopt
instead the Tennessee river, and handed to me the plan of
campaign, as appended to her memorial; which plan I submitted to
the Secretary of War, and its general ideas were adopted. On my
return from the southwest in 1862 I informed Miss Carroll, as she
states in her memorial, that through the adoption of this plan
the county had been saved millions, and that it entitled her to
the kind consideration of Congress.
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
* * * * *
To the Military Committee, appointed for that purpose in 1872:
Hon. JACOB M. HOWARD, of the Military Committee of the United States
Senate.
Again:
PHILADELPHIA, _May 1, 1872_.
My Dear Sir:
I take pleasure in stating that the plan presented by Miss
Carroll in November, 1861, for a campaign upon the Tennessee
river and thence south, was submitted to the Secretary of War and
President Lincoln, and after Secretary Stanton's appointment I
was directed to go to the Western armies and arrange to increase
their effective force as rapidly as possible. A part of the duty
assigned me was the organization and consolidation into regiments
of all the troops then being recruited in Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and Michigan, for the purpose of carrying through this
campaign, then inaugurated. This work was vigorously prosecuted
by the army, and as the valuable suggestions of Miss Carroll,
made to the Department some months before, were substantially
carried out through the campaigns in that section, great success
followed, and the country was largely benefited in the saving of
time and expenditure.
I hope Congress will reward Miss Carroll liberally for her
patriotic efforts and services.
Very truly yours,
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
* * * * *
Letter from the Hon. Benjamin F. Wade, appended to the report of
General Bragg, of the Military Committee, of March 3, 1881:
Dear Miss Carroll:
I had no part in getting up the Committee [on the Conduct of the
War]. The first intimation to me was that I had been made the
head of it; but I never shirked a public duty, and at once went
to work to do all that was possible to save the country. We went
fully into the examination of the several plans for military
operations then known to the Government, and we saw plainly
enough that the time it must take to execute any of them would
make it fatal to the Union.
We were in the deepest despair, until just at this time Colonel
Scott informed me that there was a plan already devised which, if
executed with secrecy, would open the Tennessee and save the
national cause. I went immediately to Mr. Lincoln and talked the
whole matter over. He said he did not himself doubt that the
plan was feasible, but said there was one difficulty in the way;
that no military or naval man had any idea of such a movement, it
being the work of a civilian, and none of them would believe it
safe to make such an advance upon only a navigable river, with no
protection but a gunboat fleet, and they would not want to take
the risk. He said it was devised by Miss Carroll, and military
men were extremely jealous of all outside interference. I pleaded
earnestly with him, for I found there were influences in his
Cabinet then averse to his taking the responsibility, and wanting
everything done in deference to the views of McClellan and
Halleck. I said to Mr. Lincoln: "You know we are now in the last
extremity, and you have to choose between adopting and at once
executing a plan which you believe to be the right one and save
the country, or defer to the opinions of military men in command
and lose the country." He finally decided he would take the
initiative; but there was Mr. Bates, who had suggested the
gunboat fleet, and wanted to advance down the Mississippi, as
originally designed; but after a little he came to see that no
result could be achieved on that mode of attack, and he united
with us in favor of the change of expedition as you recommended.
After repeated talks with Mr. Stanton I was entirely convinced
that, if placed at the head of the War Department, he would have
your plan executed vigorously, as he fully believed it was the
only means of safety, as I did. Mr. Lincoln, on my suggesting
Stanton, asked me how the leading Republicans would take it; that
Stanton was fresh from the Buchanan Cabinet, and many things were
said of him.[26] I insisted he was our man withal, and brought
him and Lincoln into communication, and Lincoln was entirely
satisfied. But so soon as it got out, the doubters came to the
front. Senators and members called on me. I sent them to Stanton
and told them to decide for themselves. The gunboats were then
nearly ready for the Mississippi expedition, and Mr. Lincoln
agreed, as soon as they were, to start the Tennessee movement. It
was determined that as soon as Mr. Stanton came into the
Department, then Colonel Scott should go out to the Western
armies and make ready for the campaign in pursuance of your plan,
as he has testified before committees. It was a great work to get
the matter started; you have no idea of it. We almost fought for
it. If ever there was a righteous claim on earth, you have one. I
have often been sorry that, knowing all this as I did then, I had
not publicly declared you as the author; but we were fully alive
to the importance of absolute secrecy. I trusted but few of our
people; but to pacify the country I announced from the Senate
that the armies were about to move, and inaction was no longer to
be tolerated. Mr. Fessenden, head of the Finance Committee, who
had been told of the proposed advance, also stated in the Senate
that what would be achieved in a few more days would satisfy the
country and astound the world.
As the expedition advanced, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, and myself
frequently alluded to your extraordinary sagacity and unselfish
patriotism, but all agreed that you should be recognized for your
most noble service and properly rewarded for the same.
The last time I saw Mr. Stanton he was on his deathbed; he was
then most earnest in his desire to have you come before Congress,
as I told you soon after, and said that if he lived he would see
that justice was awarded you. This I have told you often since,
and I believe the truth in this matter will finally prevail.
B. F. WADE.
[Footnote 26: Stanton had been the bitterest of
Democrats. The Republicans then knew nothing
certainly of his course in Buchanan's Cabinet. His
appointment surprised the Senate. Wade knew and
endorsed him there. That was sufficient.--_Riddle's
Life of Wade._]
* * * * *
JEFFERSON, OHIO, _July 27, 1876_.
My Dear Miss Carroll:
Yours of the 22nd is at hand and its contents noticed, but I
cannot perceive, myself, that it is necessary for you to procure
any further testimony to prove to all unprejudiced minds that you
were the first to discover the importance of the Tennessee river
in a military point of view, and was the first to discover that
said river was navigable for heavy gunboats; and to ascertain
these important facts you made a journey to that region, and with
great labor and expense, by examination of pilots and others, and
that with these facts you drew up a plan of campaign which you, I
think, first exhibited to Colonel Scott, who was then Assistant
Secretary of War, which was shown to the President and Mr.
Stanton, which information and plan caused the immediate change
of the campaign from the Mississippi to the Tennessee river, and
this change, with all the immense advantages to the national
cause, was solely due to your labor and sagacity. I do not regard
it as an impeachment of the military sagacity of the officers on
either side that they had not seen all this before, but I suppose
none of them knew or believed the Tennessee river to be navigable
for such craft, for had the Confederate officers known all this
it would have been easy for them to have so fortified its banks
as to have made such an expedition impossible.
Now all the above facts are proved beyond doubt, unless the
witnesses are impeached; but all should bear in mind that when
the Government had concluded to make this important change from
the Mississippi to the Tennessee the utmost secrecy was
absolutely necessary or the whole plan might have been frustrated
by the enemy, and it was so kept that even members of Congress
and Senators never could ascertain who was entitled to the honor
of the plan, as can be seen by their endeavors to find out by
consulting the Congressional Globe, etc. * * * Where is Judge
Evans and how is his health? I am anxious to hear from him, whom
I regard as one of the best of men. Give him my best respects.
Truly yours,
B. F. WADE.
* * * * *
WESTMINSTER PALACE HOTEL,
LONDON, _November 29, 1875_.
My Dear Miss Carroll:
I remember very well that you were the first to advise the
campaign on the Tennessee river in November, 1861. This I have
never heard doubted, and the great events which followed it
demonstrated the value of your suggestions. This will be
recognized by our Government, sooner or later, I cannot doubt. On
reaching home I hope to shake you by the hand once more.
Sincerely your friend,
REVERDY JOHNSON.
* * * * *
_Discussions in Congress Showing the Critical Nature of the
Situation._
IN THE HOUSE, _January 7, 1862_.
Mr. KELLEY: I think the condition of this Capital to-day invites war.
It is environed within a narrow circle of two hundred thousand men in
arms, and yet, sir, that short river which leads to the Capital of a
great and proud country, thus defended and encircled by patriot
troops, is so thoroughly blockaded by rebels that the Government,
though its army has not an adequate supply of forage, cannot bring
upon it a peck of oats to feed a hungry horse. * * * Call it what you
may, it is a sight at which men may well wonder. We have six hundred
thousand men in the field. We have spent I know not how many millions
of dollars, and what have we done? What one evidence of determined war
or military skill have we exhibited to foreign nations, or to our own
people? * * * We have been engaged in war for seven months. * * *
England does respect power. * * * Let her hear the shouts of a
victorious army, and England and the powers of the continent will
pause with bated breath. Sir, it was said yesterday the last days had
come. My heart has felt the last day of our dear country was rapidly
approaching. Before we have reached victory we have reached
bankruptcy. We are to-day flooding the country with an irredeemable
currency. In ninety days, with the patriotism of the people paralyzed
by the inaction of our great army, the funded debt of the country will
depreciate with a rapidity that will startle us. In ninety days more
the nations of the world will, I fear, be justified in saying to us,
"You have no more right to shut up the cotton fields of the world by a
vain and fruitless effort to reconquer the territory now in rebellion
than China or Japan has to wall themselves in", and in the eyes of
international law, in the eyes of the world, and, I fear, in the eyes
of impartial history, they will be justified in breaking our blockade
and giving to the rebels means and munitions of war. * * * But, sir,
in less than ninety days, to come back to the point of time, we shall
be advancing in the month of April, when Northern men will begin to
feel the effects of heat in the neighborhood of Ship Island and the
mouth of the Mississippi. Looking at the period of ninety days, I say
it is not a double but a triple edged sword approaching, perhaps, the
single thread of destiny upon which the welfare of our country hangs.
Bankruptcy and miasmatic pestilence are sure to come within the lapse
of that period, and foreign war may add its horror to theirs.
Mr. WRIGHT: We are gasping for life. This great Government is upon the
brink of a volcano, which is heaving to and fro, and we are not
certain whether we exist or no.
Mr. F. A. CONKLING: In this crisis of our history, when the very
existence of the Republic is threatened, when in all human probability
the next thirty days will decide forever whether the Union is to
maintain its place among the powers of the earth or whether it is to
go down and constitutional liberty is to perish. * * *
* * * * *
IN THE HOUSE, _January 20, 1862_.
Mr. WRIGHT: There is one great abiding and powerful issue to-day, and
that is the issue whether the country and the Constitution shall be
saved or whether it shall be utterly and entirely annihilated. With
Pennsylvania it is a question of national existence, of life or death.
* * * The great heart of Pennsylvania is beating to-day for the cause
of the Union. * * * It is to decide the great question whether the
liberty which has been handed down to us by our fathers shall be
permitted to remain in the land, or whether chaos or desolation shall
blot out the country and Government forever.
* * * * *
IN THE SENATE, _January 22, 1862_.
Mr. WADE: But, sir, though the war lies dormant, still there is war,
and it is not intended that it shall stay in this quiescent state much
longer. The committee to which I belong are determined * * * that it
shall move with energy. If the Congress will not give us, or give
themselves, power to act with efficiency in war, we must confide
everything to the Executive Government and let them usurp everything.
If you would not fix your machinery so that you might advise with me
and act with me, * * * I would act independent of you, and you might
call it what you please. This is for the suppression of the rebellion,
and the measures that we are to sit in secrecy upon look to that end
and none other. No measure rises in importance above that connected
with the suppression of the rebellion. * * * We stand here for the
people and we act for them. * * * There is no danger to be apprehended
from any secrecy which, in the consideration of war measures, we may
deem it proper to adopt. It is proper for us, as it is for the general
in the field, as it is for your Cabinet ministers, to discuss matters
in secret when they pertain to war.
* * * * *
IN THE HOUSE, _January 22, 1862_.
Mr. THADDEUS STEVENS: * * * Remember that every day's delay costs the
nation $1,500,000 and hundreds of lives. * * * What an awful
responsibility rests upon those in authority; their mistakes may bring
mourning to the land and sorrow to many a fireside. * * * If we cannot
save our honor, save at least the lives and the treasure of the
nation.
* * * * *
About this time Miss Carroll was spoken of by those conversant with
her plans as "the great unrecognized member of Lincoln's Cabinet."
But, glorious as was the success, Miss Carroll's plans were not fully
carried out, to the great after regret of the War Department, who
recognized that the war, which might then have been brought to a
speedy termination, had been greatly prolonged through the omission.
Miss Carroll continued her communications to the War Department,
endeavoring to rectify mistakes.
* * * * *
Extract from Miss Carroll's letter to the Department on the reduction
of Island No. 10, and pointing out the advantages of the immediate
seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, March 26, 1862.
"The failure to take Island No. 10, which thus far occasions much
disappointment to the country, excites no surprise in me. When I
looked at the gunboats at St. Louis and was informed as to their
power, and considered that the current of the Mississippi at full tide
runs at the rate of five miles per hour, which is very near the speed
of our gunboats, I could not resist the conclusion that they were not
well fitted to the taking of batteries on the Mississippi river if
assisted by gunboats perhaps equal to our own. Hence it was that I
wrote Colonel Scott from there that the Tennessee was our strategic
point, and the successes at Fort Henry and Donelson established the
justice of these observations. Had our victorious army, after the fall
of Fort Henry, immediately pushed up the Tennessee river and taken a
position on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, between Corinth,
Mississippi, and Decatur, Alabama, which might easily have been done
at that time with a small force, every rebel soldier in Western
Kentucky and Tennessee would have fled from every position to the
south of that railroad; and had Buell pursued the enemy in his retreat
from Nashville, without delay, into a commanding position in North
Alabama, on the railroad between Chattanooga and Decatur, the rebel
government at Richmond would have necessarily been obliged to retreat
to the cotton States. I am fully satisfied that the true policy of
General H----is to strengthen Grant's column by such force as will
enable him at once to seize the Memphis and Charleston railroad, as it
is the readiest means of reducing Island 10 and all the strongholds of
the enemy to Memphis."
Letter written from St. Louis, military headquarters for the
Southwest:
[27]ST. LOUIS, _May 2, 1862_.
"I think the war on the approaches to the Tennessee river has
ended. I think the enemy will retreat to the Grand Junction, some
sixty miles nearer Memphis; and when our forces approach him
there, he will go down the Central Mississippi railroad to
Jackson, and if there is another great battle in the West it will
be there. I think they will try to postpone anything serious
until after the pending battles in Virginia. If they make the
attempt now every leader would be taken in the event of defeat,
without fail, whilst if it is postponed until after the fate of
Virginia is decided the leaders can bring what troops they have
left and, joining them to what they have here, make one last
struggle for life, and if defeated they can escape across the
Mississippi into Arkansas, and through that into Texas and
Mexico. You may rest assured the _leaders_ will not be caught if
they can get away with life; and as to _property_, they have
_that_ secured already. The only way this plan can be frustrated
is to occupy Memphis and Vicksburg strongly, _particularly_ the
_latter_, and send one or more of our gunboats up the _Yazoo_
river _to watch every creek and inlet_, so that they may be
unable to get across the _swamps_ by _canoes_ and _skiffs_.
"I have heard that all the skiffs and canoes have been taken from
Memphis and Vicksburg to some point up the _Yazoo river_ and
fitted up, for what purpose I do not know, but I can think there
is no other than what I name, for _one night's ride_ from Jackson
will carry a man to the edge of the _Yazoo_ river _swamps_, where
it would be impossible to follow unless equally well acquainted
and with boats like theirs. From there their escape would be
easy, as _they would have 400 miles_ of the river to strike, at
any part of which they would find friends to assist them over to
the Arkansas side of the river, and from _there_ pursuit would be
useless."
[Footnote 27: Copied by me on March 23, 1891, from
the file at the office of the Attorney General.
S. E. BLACKWELL.]
[28]Letter from Miss Carroll to Secretary Stanton:
[Footnote 28: Written to recommend Pilot Scott for
information given.]
_May 14, 1862._
Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_:
It will be the obvious policy of the rebels, in the event of
Beauregard's defeat, to send a large column into Texas for the
purpose of holding that country for subsistence, where beef and
wheat abound. Now, all this can be defeated by strongly occupying
Vicksburg and plying a gunboat or two on the Yazoo river. I would
also suggest a gunboat to be placed at the mouth of the Red and
Arkansas rivers. Whether the impending battle in North
Mississippi should occur at Corinth or within the area of a
hundred miles, a large part of the enemy's forces will retreat by
the Yazoo river and by the railroad to Vicksburg, on the
Mississippi, and will then take the railroad through Louisiana
into Texas. I handed Honorable Mr. Watson on Monday a letter
giving information that the canoes, skiffs, and other transports
had been sent up the Yazoo river from Memphis and Vicksburg for
the purpose, undoubtedly, of securing the rebels' retreat from
our pursuing army.
This information I obtained from Mr. Scott, a pilot on the
_Memphis_, which conducted the retreat of the soldiers at the
battle of Belmont, and had been with the fleet in the same
capacity up the Tennessee river. Until June last he resided in
New Orleans, and for twenty years or more has been in his present
employment. His wife stated this to me, and with a view of
obtaining facts about that section of country I requested her to
introduce him to me. I was surprised at his general intelligence
in regard to the war, and from the facts I derived from him and
other practical men I satisfied myself that the Tennessee river
was the true strategic point, and submitted a document to this
effect to Hon. Thomas A. Scott, dated the 30th of November, 1861,
which changed the whole programme of the war in the Southwest,
and inured to the glory of our arms in that section and
throughout the land. The Government is not aware of the
incalculable service rendered by the facts I learned from this
pilot, and I therefore take the present occasion to ask his
promotion to the surveyorship of New Orleans, for which I should
think him well suited in this crisis.
I enclose you a letter describing the battle of Pittsburg
Landing, which will interest you.
Very sincerely,
ANNA ELLA CARROLL.
* * * * *
Extract from the letter to the Secretary of War on the 15th of May,
1862, advising the occupation of Vicksburg:
* * * "It will be the obvious policy of the rebels, in the event
of Beauregard's defeat, to send a large column into Texas for the
purpose of holding that country for subsistence, where beef and
wheat abound. This can be defeated by strongly occupying
Vicksburg and plying a gunboat, to be placed at the mouth of the
Red and Arkansas rivers." * * * "Whether the impending battle in
North Mississippi should occur at Corinth or within the area of a
hundred miles, a large part of the enemy's forces will retreat by
the Yazoo river, and by the railroad to Vicksburg, on the
Mississippi, and will take the railroad through Louisiana into
Texas." * * *
* * * * *
On the following Monday Miss Carroll handed Mr. Watson a letter giving
information that the canoes, skiffs, and other transports had been
sent up the Yazoo from Memphis and Vicksburg for the purpose,
undoubtedly, of securing the rebels' retreat from our pursuing army.
Letter from the file of the Attorney General, Court of Claims:[29]
[Footnote 29: Copied by me from the file at the
office of the Attorney General, March 23, 1891. S.
E. BLACKWELL.]
Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_:
Sir: I find that the Secretary of War and the President are
violently assailed for arresting certain parties in the loyal
States and suspending the writ of _habeas corpus_. It is
represented that a high judicial officer in the State of Vermont
has taken issue with the Administration on this question. It is
also intimated that the State authorities, in Vermont and
elsewhere, are to be invoked for the protection of the citizen
against military arrests. There is very great danger at this time
to be apprehended to the country from a conflict between the
military and the judicial authorities, because the opinion is
almost universal that the authority to suspend the writ of
_habeas corpus_ rests with Congress. The reason that this opinion
has so generally obtained is that in England, whence we have
derived much of our political and judicial system, the power to
suspend the writ is vested alone in Parliament; and our jurists,
without reflecting upon the distinction between the constitutions
of the two Governments, have erroneously made the English theory
applicable to our own.
I believe in my work on the "War Powers of the Government," etc.,
I was the first writer who has succeeded in placing the power of
the Government to arrest for political offences, and to suspend
the writ of _habeas corpus_, on its true foundation. In the
opinion of eminent men, if this work were now placed in the hands
of every lawyer and judge it would stay the evil which threatens
to arise from a conflict between the military and judicial
departments of the country. I therefore respectfully suggest the
propriety of authorizing me to circulate a large edition of this
work, or, what would be still better, that I should write a _new
paper_, specially on the power of the Executive to suspend the
writ of _habeas corpus_, and to arrest political offenders.
ANNA ELLA CARROLL.
* * * * *
In October, 1862, Miss Carroll wrote the following letter to the
Secretary of War, through the hands of John Tucker, Assistant
Secretary, on the reduction of Vicksburg:
"As I understand an expedition is about to go down the river for
the purpose of reducing Vicksburg, I have prepared the enclosed
map in order to demonstrate more clearly the obstacles to be
encountered in the contemplated assault. In the first place, it
is impossible to take Vicksburg in front without too great a loss
of life and material, for the reason that the river is only about
half a mile wide, and our forces would be in point-blank range of
their guns, not only from their water batteries, which line the
shore, but from the batteries that crown the hills, while the
enemy would be protected by the elevation from the range of our
fire. By examining the map I enclose you will at once perceive
why a place of so little apparent strength has been enabled to
resist the combined fleets of the upper and lower Mississippi.
The most economical plan for the reduction of Vicksburg now is to
push a column from Memphis to Corinth, down the Mississippi
Central railroad to Jackson, the capital of the State of
Mississippi. _The occupation of Jackson and the command of the
railroad to New Orleans would compel the immediate evacuation of
Vicksburg_, as well as the retreat of the entire rebel army east
of that line, and by another movement of our army from Jackson,
Mississippi, or from Corinth to Meridian, in the State of
Mississippi, on the Ohio and Mobile railroad, especially if aided
by a movement of our gunboats on Mobile, the Confederate forces,
with all the disloyal men and their slaves, would be compelled to
fly east of the Tombigbee. Mobile being then in our possession,
with 100,000 men at Meridian we would redeem the entire country
from Memphis to the Tombigbee river. Of course I would have the
gunboats with a small force at Vicksburg as auxiliary to this
movement. With regard to the canal, Vicksburg can be rendered
useless to the Confederate army upon the first rise of the river;
but I do not advise this, because Vicksburg belongs to the United
States and we desire to hold and fortify it, for the Mississippi
river at Vicksburg and the Vicksburg-Jackson railroad will become
necessary as a base of our future operations. Vicksburg might
have been reduced eight months ago, as I then advised, after the
fall of Fort Henry, and with much more ease than it can be done
to-day."
* * * * *
WASHINGTON, D. C., _May 10, 1876_.
My Dear Miss Carroll:
Referring to the conversation with Judge Evans last evening, he
called my attention to Colonel Scott's telegram, announcing the
fall of Island No. 10, in 1862, as endorsing your plan, when
Scott said: "The movement in the rear has done the work." I
stated to the Judge, as he and you knew before, that your paper
on the reduction of Vicksburg did the work on that place, after
being so long baffled and with the loss of so much life and
treasure, by trying to take it from the water; that to my
knowledge your paper was approved and adopted by the Secretary of
War and the President, and immediately sent out to the proper
military authority in that Department.
I remember well their remarks upon it at that time, and of all
your other views and suggestions, made after we got the
expedition inaugurated, and know the direction they took. These
matters were often talked over as the campaign advanced, and in
the very last interview with Mr. Stanton, just before his death,
he referred to your services in originating the campaign in the
strongest terms he could express, and, as I have informed you,
stated that if his life was spared he would discharge the great
duty of seeing your services to the country properly recognized
and rewarded. But why need I say more. Your claim is established
beyond controversy, unless the witnesses are impeached, and I
hardly think they would undertake that business. What motive
could any of us have had to mislead or falsify the history of the
war. Your claim is righteous and just, if ever there was one, and
for the honor of my country I trust and hope you will be suitably
rewarded and so declared before the world.
Yours truly,
B. F. WADE.
* * * * *
Miss Carroll's after papers, so far as I can learn, were mainly on
emancipation, on the ballot, and on reconstruction.