by observers in Europe and are now before the writer are that the
European Nations had raised their aeroplane efficiency to the
following magnitude: France 1,400, Germany 1,000, Russia 800, Italy
600, England 400 (probably greatly increased since then), Austria 400,
Spain 100, Belgium (in the beginning) 100, Switzerland 20 and Servia
60 aeroplanes. The United States has at present 12 army aeroplanes, 13
naval planes, no dirigibles, 2 aeroplanes old model, total effective
23. The first aero squadron of the army has just been formed at the
Signal Corps Aviation School, San Diego, Cal. It will contain twenty
officers and ninety-six enlisted men. The last House of Congress
refused to consent to the Senate’s appropriation of $400,000 for
military aviation, and the amount available this year was cut down to
$300,000. The Navy Department is making specifications for a small
dirigible, and on February 27 opened bids for the construction of six
hydro-aeroplanes, bi-plane sea-going type, armored, to carry two men,
wireless, guns and ammunition at speeds of from fifty to eighty miles
an hour.
[43] Strength of Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, 1914, as per returns
of inspecting officers, 5,369 men, 424 officers.
[44] Only eleven States had on hand at the time of the last annual
inspection one complete uniform (less shoes) for each enlisted man of
the authorized minimum strength.... “In the opinion of the Division of
Militia Affairs the States could have by this time, by proper economy
and care in the use of property and the expenditure of funds, acquired
stores sufficient to equip the militia at war strength.... The militia
is not now equipped with supplies sufficient for peace strength.... In
no State is the prescribed minimum peace strength maintained.”--Pages
206, 283 and 287, Organization and Federal Property, Annual Reports,
War Department, June 13, 1913 to October 1, 1914.
[45] “We are still without an adequate reserve system either of
officers or men.”--Leonard Wood, Major General, Chief of Staff, U. S.
A., official report, January 20, 1914.
[46] So stated in instructions issued to foreign armies for the event
of disembarkation.
[47] Landing barges of this capacity are possessed by at least three
Powers and have been tested in maneuvers.
[48] All these details, and many more, are systematically worked out
in European army instructions, both confidential and public.
[49] Under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry,
1,000 cavalry and 60 guns in six hours.... In the Crimean War 45,000
men, 83 guns and 100 horses were disembarked and set on shore in less
than eleven hours, without modern appliances.--“Over-Seas Operations.”
See also British and French records.
[50] This quotation is a literal quotation from the War Department
report on “The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States,”
August 10, 1912.
[51] This point has been emphasized in practically every War
Department report on organization for many years back. Congress never
has acted on the matter. The Chief of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., was
forced to report in his last report that: “Little or no progress
appears to be making toward correct Divisional organization.”--Part
III, 1914, Report on Organization. Only two States have approachably
organized their militia in correct proportions.
[52] The Division is the fundamental army unit.... The mobile elements
of the Regular Army should have a Divisional organization in time of
peace.--Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., January 20, 1914.
[53] Tables 17 and 18, pages 228, 229, Annual Report Division of
Militia Affairs, U. S. A., October 1, 1914.... “The States which send
their Infantry into active service without having made every possible
effort to supply it with an adequate Field Artillery support, will
see in the needless sacrifice of that Infantry the cost of their
short-sightedness in time of preparation.”--A. L. Mills, Brigadier
General, General Staff, U. S. A.
[54] Page 26, Organization of the Land forces of the United States, U.
S. Army report.
[55] “While the men who wish to spend the Army and Navy appropriation
upon unnecessary army posts or unfit navy yards have such a voice as
well as a vote,” i.e. in the Houses of Congress, “a great deal of
waste and extravagance is sure to result.”--Henry L. Stimson, former
Secretary of War.
[56] Only the most perfectly organized intelligence department can
extract from the incredible mass of reports that come in during army
movements, the few true and important facts on which the final orders
of the commander may be based. An inadequate scouting service is worse
than merely weak. It betrays its own forces to disaster.
[57] The Long Island Sound defenses are built to prevent the entrance
of a hostile fleet into Long Island Sound. By thus closing Long Island
Sound they protect all the Sound cities and the City of New York; but
they cannot and do not protect all the possible landing places. Long
Island, the land highway to New York City, is entirely undefended. The
War Department desires to erect proper defenses on or near Montauk
Point, but has still to get the authority.
[58] Trinitrotol, now being used in Europe largely for under-water
work, is one of the most violently acting explosives known to-day.
[59] The latest type of 16-inch naval gun has a range of 23,000 yards
or eleven and a half nautical miles, which is a little more than
thirteen statute miles.... A projectile from a 12-inch rifled gun
(U. S. A. coast-defense type) which was fired in the presence of the
author, ricochetted seven times.
[60] Not a fanciful description. The impact of a 12-inch projectile
was calculated exactly by Major General Abbot, Chief of Engineers, U.
S. A., in order to formulate a precise comparison.
[61] The writer has seen iron bars two and a half inches wide, which
locked the steel doors to a casemate, buckle and bend outward from the
vacuum created by the blast of a rifled gun.
[62] Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19, 1914,
pages 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15.
[63] The ammunition now on hand and under manufacture is 73 per
cent. of the allowance fixed by the National Coast Defense Board.
Last report to the Chief of Staff, U. S. A.... “The actual supply of
ammunition at present is very considerably behind even that modest
standard,” i.e. the minimum allowance, “and in many cases of our most
important sea-coast guns would be sufficient for only thirty or forty
minutes of firing.”--Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, March
1, 1915.
[64] Army and naval officers, both American and foreign, believe that
5,000 men would be more than sufficient to take such works if they are
manned only by their Coast Artillery companies and undefended by a
mobile army.
[65] We have less than one quarter of the ammunition considered
necessary as an adequate supply and reserve for our full number of
small-arms. (Author’s Note.) ... “We are less adequately supplied
with field artillery material than with any other form of fighting
equipment.”--Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1911.... “A full
supply of this type of material must be stored and ready for use
before war is undertaken.”--W. W. Wotherspoon, Major General, Chief of
Staff, U. S. A., November 15, 1914, Annual Report.
[66] It has been said authoritatively that if all the guns of the army
should have to go into action at any one time there is not enough
ammunition for a single day’s engagement, even at a conservative
estimate of the amount of shells expended by each gun. In some of the
European battles, more guns than our whole supply were engaged on each
side.
[67] There is only enough material on hand to keep our present mobile
army (at its present low peace strength) in the field for six months
in the event of war. There is nothing to spare.
[68] Cavalry troops in the regular army as now constituted are under
law rarely filled to a number of more than 70, while their proper
complement is 100.
[69] A comparatively small number of modern liners would be enough to
aggregate this net tonnage.
[70] Based on foreign army calculations.
[71] Modern artillery is almost invariably concealed. Experienced
soldiers would suspect that an infantry regiment hardly would be
without at least one battery, and more probably two, of field
artillery support.
[72] “Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast
Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to
mere caretaker establishments at some of the defenses.”--E. M. Weaver,
Brigadier General, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19,
1914, Annual Report.
[73] Actual manning detail for New Bedford defenses, 1914, one company
regular Coast Artillery.
[74] There is said to be only one firm in the United States that can
produce the rifling tools, jigs, gauges and other exact and intricate
machinery needed to make a rifle. Consequently, the loss of the
Springfield Arsenal would be disastrous.
[75] Official statistics.
[76] Large numbers of guns and large numbers of ammunition are
liable to capture and destruction.... To start into field operations
with the expectation that the proper proportions will be maintained
without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious.”--Chief of
Staff, U. S. A., 1914.--See Report on Militia Organization, 1914, for
comments on the great loss and destruction of equipment and material.
[77] Some observers of the European War declare that the reserve of
one gun per man has proved itself necessary for the proper equipment
of an active army.
[78] “He,” i.e., Secretary Garrison, present Secretary of War, “asks
for an increase in the number of officers to take the place, in time
of peace, of such officers as are serving with the militia or on
detached duty, and in time of war to assist in the organization of the
citizens’ army. The necessity of these requests is self-evident. Yet
the House of Representatives has completely ignored each and every one
of them, and the pending appropriation bill contains no provision for
them.”--Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War.
[79] The scandal caused in 1898 by appointing incompetent civilians
to the Quartermaster’s Department and the ensuing difficulties with
commissariat, etc., have been the subject of much discussion.
[80] Our War Department has asked for only about five guns to every
thousand men, but has not yet been able to have this quota finished.
European practice has been to increase the number of guns to the
thousand rifles and sabers steadily. Before the war it was at least
five. It has been enormously increased as a result of the experience
gained during the recent fighting, in which it was established that
infantry or cavalry without absolutely dominating gun protection were
hopelessly weak.
[81] These movements of advance bodies and patrols have been carefully
worked out as a campaign problem. The lines of advance mentioned are
those that present themselves to military observers as the ones most
likely to be selected by an invading army moving toward Boston from a
base on Narragansett Bay or Buzzards Bay.
[82] So laid down as the most likely movement to be made by invading
armies with heavy cavalry supports.
[83] The elementary tactics for the procedure of every army that has
to hold any extended territory.
[84] Worked out from a consensus of opinions and plans by tactical
experts both here and abroad.
[85] “When the defenses outside the Continental United States are
provided for, there will remain for home gun defenses 176 officers and
7,543 enlisted men, _which is about one-third of one relief_.”--Page
15, Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June
30, 1914.
[86] “The searchlight project is approximately 50 per cent.
completed.... The fire-control system may be said to be approximately
60 per cent. completed.... Installation of power generating and
distributing equipment is 25 per cent. completed.... Submarine mine
structures are 83 per cent. completed.”--Report, Chief of Coast
Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June 30, 1914.
[87] Regular manning detail for Boston defenses, twelve companies of
Coast Artillery. These have seven systems of defense to maintain.
The companies are not enlisted to their full strength. Even if they
were, there would be less than two hundred men to each defense. This
is not sufficient for any sustained action at the big guns alone. A
sufficiently energetic enemy, even if he might not damage the works,
could wear out the men by incessant attack for a few days and nights.
There certainly would not be men enough to provide for outlying
defense against landing parties.
[88] These are all vitally necessary parts of the defense of the
Boston harbor forts. They are only a small part of what would have
to be done in case of naval attack. The data used here are not
theoretical. They have been developed by actual test.
[89] So developed in sea and land maneuvers undertaken for the purpose
of establishing the very points here mentioned.
[90] It is estimated, from careful calculations, that to put out of
action a searchlight at night with shipfire at a range of 6,000 yards,
more than a thousand shots from 3-inch guns should be required. The
fact is mentioned here to illustrate the great strength of harbor
defenses against fire from the sea, if there be enough mobile troops
on the land to prohibit destruction by landing parties.
[91] That the American harbor defense system and construction are
of the very highest type, has been acknowledged many times by the
technical experts of the world. More than once the author has heard
foreign officers express the belief that they were practically
impregnable to naval fire, providing they were fully supplied and
equipped with the material necessary for continuous defense.
[92] A generous system of reliefs is imperative in harbor defenses
during war. Peace time maneuvers have developed the fact that the mere
strain of incessant watchfulness while waiting for an enemy who may
appear at unexpected points suddenly, is so great that unless the men
have frequent relief, they cannot exert that concentrated energy which
is needed instantly in the crisis.
[93] This system of night attack has been developed and tested by
actual trial, and is such as is now laid down for battle practice in
the tactics of most navies. “The ... squadron will enter ..., and
will maneuver at range of about 9,000 yards from Fort ..., firing
heavily, to induce the defense to expend as much ammunition as
possible.”--Extract from actual orders in author’s possession, given
to a squadron of battleships and cruisers for night attack. It will
be noted that this distance is less than one-half the range of the
12-inch rifled mortars in a harbor defense battery.
[94] The search-light system, recognized as a vital part of harbor
defense by the Endicott Board on harbor defense (appointed in
1885) has grown steadily in importance with the steady increase in
ship armament and ship speed. A thoroughly efficient installation
of search-lights for modern harbors demands as much scientific
calculation and interlocation as do the gun-systems. If the
search-lights cannot infallibly find any vessel that may approach
within range, the guns of the fortification are useless.
[95] The inadequacy of the installation has been made the subject
of continuous reports. It is a fact that a few years ago, when a
mock attack on one of the most important Atlantic defenses was
ordered by the War Department, the commander had to requisition
search-lights from other coast defenses, and that during the maneuvers
the search-light defense, because of its inadequacy and temporary
character, failed at several critical points, permitting attacking
ships to come within less than 4,000 yards of one important battery.
[96] Usually the firing zones are: first, 6,000 yards to the extreme
range of biggest guns; second or intermediate, 3,000 yards to 6,000
yards; third (mine field zone), 3,000 yards. The order of fire is
worked out absolutely for every condition that is possible. The
movements of attacking ships, and their combinations, although very
numerous, can be predicated with some accuracy beforehand.
[97] Estimated number of shots required at night from ships afloat
at 6,000 yards: to destroy position-finding tower which is visible,
22 12-inch shells, 250 4-inch shells or 2,500 3-inch shells; to
destroy invisible station without tower, 400 12-inch shells, 5,000
4-inch shells; to destroy search-light, 24 12-inch shells, 300 4-inch
shells or 3,000 3-inch shells. This fact makes it feasible to protect
outlying and secondary range stations perfectly if sufficient troops
can guard each station to fight off landing parties. An enemy will
surely land men to destroy them unless he knows they are well defended.
[98] Actual records of American harbor batteries: three 6-inch guns on
disappearing carriages, 15 shots in 1 minute, 27 seconds.
[99] From an actual maneuver performed successfully by a destroyer
division attempting to destroy a base station during a mock battle on
the Atlantic coast.
[100] The Weir River would enable assailants to reach the inner harbor
and take the defenses in the rear.
[101] Mr. Garrison, Secretary of War, again represented to Congress
at its last session that changes in the 12-inch gun carriages are
absolutely necessary to give them an elevation of 15 degrees. This
matter has been so well established that all military engineers are
unanimous both as to the urgent need for the change and the excellent
result that will follow.
[102] These are points lying south of the southern defenses of Boston
Harbor, and so near them that modern siege guns planted there could
fire into them at short range.
[103] The primary harbor defense batteries (12-inch, 10-inch and
8-inch guns and 12-inch mortars) are not emplaced for anything except
sea-ward fire, nor should they be. To use them against land attack
would be only a matter of desperation, as in the case here described.
As a matter of fact, they would be rather inefficient against smaller
guns that are more mobile and durable.
[104] “Firing at speed, the shots from a dozen guns shooting at
successive intervals, would not have five seconds between them.”
[105] The tremendous air-compression in fortifications during
gun-action almost always tears out parts of the general installation
even in mere target practice. If fire-control installation, wiring,
telephone systems, etc., are efficient only to the minimum degree,
and there is no adequate reserve supply of material for repairs, they
are certain to break down in any attack that is pressed with vigor.
An attacked harbor-work is subjected to the most terrible destructive
attempts that humanity has been able to devise.
[106] Long range investment with modern artillery serves the double
purpose of commanding the ultimate target, and commanding all the
territory in between, thus giving the artillerist possession of many
miles of area.
[107] Financial Statistics, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 1914.
[108] In Brown versus the United States, the U. S. Supreme Court
decreed that “war gives to the sovereign,” i.e. the conquering power,
“full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the
enemy wherever found.--Humane mitigations may affect exercise of this
right but cannot impair the right itself.”
[109] “The so-called exemption of private property from capture or
seizure on land may be called almost nominal.”--Rear-Admiral Stockton,
Outlines of International Law.
[110] Napoleon made Valencia pay $100,000 for the support of his army.
Receipts were provided for originally when troops made requisitions,
not necessarily to insure pay to the despoiled inhabitants, but merely
to prevent unauthorized plundering.
[111] A universally accepted form of military rule, and distinguished
from merely martial law.
[112] U. S. Census Bureau Report, 1914; also Boston City Manual.
[113] So certified to City Clerk, Boston, by Board of Assessors, June
30, 1914, exact number 123,657.
[114] Statistics of Cities of the United States, 1914.
[115] From “Instructions for Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field” (with exception of statement as to specific punishment
for infraction. Punishment mentioned here, however, is such as all
military authorities will claim the right to inflict.)
[116] The right of quartering troops on the inhabitants of enemy
country is unquestioned and universally exercised. Equally universal
is the military commanders’ right to punish treachery by death.
[117] “Complete conquest carries with it all rights of former
government.”--U. S. Supreme Court.
[118] Benjamin Harris’ “Publick Occurrences,” suppressed after one
issue.
[119] There is an immense literature on military law, and every army
contains officers who have taken degrees in law, for the purpose of
expounding and administering it.
[120] The legal and technical correctness of all acts is of extreme
importance in the peace settlements.
[121] All authority in conquered country is only by and with the
authority of the military conqueror. His power, practically, is
limited only by his motives of policy or kindness.
[122] This requisition is taken almost verbatim from a requisition
issued by a belligerent army in the field. It is an accepted and
acknowledged principle of war that the conqueror may force the enemy
to pay his expenses to as large an extent as possible. A commander may
waive the right, but it is held unimpaired.
[123] This decision covered a case that arose during the Civil
War, and was cited by the Law Office, Division of Insular Affairs,
on several occasions to fortify United States procedure after the
Spanish-American War.
[124] A literal extract from the Sedition Act (No. 292, etc.) of the
Philippine Commission, except that the act provides for specific
imprisonment and fine.
[125] So laid down by nearly all writers on military law who touch on
this subject.
[126] This principle was laid down in regard to territory subjected to
military occupation by the United States during the war with Mexico.
The United States claimed (and sparingly exercised) the right to court
martial and execute as rebels certain leaders of an insurrection
against the military government in New Mexico, 1847-8.
[127] “In many instances the deficiency has reached such a figure as
to leave militia organizations such in name only.”--Page 206, last
report, General Mills, U. S. A.
[128] Table No. 9, Report, Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., 1914.
[129] Range of four miles.
[130] Page 231, Report on militia field artillery, General Mills, U.
S. A., 1914.
[131] Table 9, militia cavalry statistics, Division of Militia
Affairs, U. S. A. Annual Report, 1914.
[132] From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of
the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.
[133] From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of
the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.
[134] A literal transcript of the report of two medical officers on
the conditions existing among good militia troops who were ordered out
for maneuvers distinctly specified as war maneuvers to be conducted
under war conditions.
[135] This figure is purposely placed below what is actually expected.
During the Connecticut maneuvers, 1909, the straggling was a subject
for comment among both militia and regular officers, though the troops
did well considering their softness. One officer reported that the
straggling amounted to 15 to 25 per cent. of some regiments.
[136] From the report of an umpire at a maneuver under war conditions.
He reported that the batteries of both sides fired into woods actually
occupied by their own troops.
[137] So reported by a General of Militia, as the result of his
observations in field practice.
[138] Schedule laid down by General von Bernhardi as the maximum time
that should be expended by properly trained troops under experienced
officers.
[139] Army heads have called the attention of Congress and the public
repeatedly to the fact that officers cannot possibly be prepared for
the complex work of handling an army if they never get an opportunity
to learn by actual experience. The post system is to blame to a
considerable extent.... Remarks about commissary troubles in this
paragraph are based on actual occurrences in the field, as set forth
in an official report.
[140] From “The Army in Action.”