had to be replaced by others. For in the course of the war twenty "E"
boats, two "D" boats, and one "L" boat belonging to the flotilla were
lost, and these figures do not include the submarines that were
detached from the Harwich Flotilla to be lost in the Mediterranean and
Baltic. The sailor of to-day has not all the superstitions of his
forefathers, but, like most people, he has some belief in omens.
Certain coincidences made him regard it as very unlucky to sail in a
submarine when a new captain was making his first voyage in her.
Within a short period four submarines that had sailed out of Harwich
under new captains were never heard of again. It was also recognised
that ill luck was likely to attend the first voyage of a newly
launched submarine; but that, so soon as the first voyage had been
safely accomplished, all was well with the ship, which would then be
faced only by the ordinary chances of war.
To turn to an amusing example of the superstition of the sea. In the
course of one cruise a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla had fired
seven torpedoes at various enemy ships without result. The captain
discovered one of his crew kneeling on the deck over a bucket of
sea-water. He was holding under the water and mercilessly wringing an
object against which he was directing a volume of abuse in terms
frankly nautical. Disgusted at the failure of the torpedoes, he was
drowning the ship's mascot, a teddy bear or similar doll, hoping to
change the luck. I wish that I could state that the next torpedo fired
sank a Hun battleship, but I have no record of the sequel.
Even in war there are humorous incidents, and, indeed, there are many
of them. One submarine captain of this flotilla attacked a German
submarine on the surface and gave chase to her with the intention of
torpedoing her. But the Hun had the greater speed; the British
submarine had no gun, and could not get near enough to the receding
foe to use a torpedo. So the captain had to content himself with
signalling insulting messages to the Hun, hoping to taunt him into
fighting; but the shocked Hun dived under the surface and disappeared
in order to avoid the language.
On another occasion a submarine of this flotilla and a German
submarine passed very close to each other in such foul weather that
nothing could be done in the way of fighting, so the two captains
waved their hands cheerily at each other and went their respective
ways. This is the only instance that I can recall of any Hun having
displayed anything remotely resembling a sense of humour in the course
of this war.
Our submarine commanders appear to have been adepts in the art of
successfully bluffing the enemy when the occasion arose. For example,
after one of our air raids on the German coast, a submarine of the
Harwich Flotilla went to the rescue of one of our seaplanes that had
fallen disabled to the water. While she was engaged in sinking the
seaplane and taking off her pilot, a German aircraft came over very
close. The captain of the submarine waved his cap to the enemy airmen,
who concluded that the submarine was a German boat which had brought
down an English seaplane and was capturing her pilot. As soon as the
captain of the submarine had completed his task he dived quickly. The
German must have then realised too late that he was dealing with an
enemy, for as the submarine was moving away beneath the surface there
was felt the shock caused by the bursting of bombs dropped by the Hun
aircraft.
On another occasion, in June 1915, one of the Harwich submarines, on
coming to the surface somewhere near the German coast, found that her
engines were partly disabled. There was a German trawler in sight, and
within range of the submarine's gun. The trawler would certainly have
made a bolt for it, and in all probability would have got safely away,
had she known that the submarine was incapable of giving chase to her.
But the captain of the submarine induced the German to surrender and
compelled him to tow the crippled submarine across the North Sea back
to Harwich, where the trawler and her crew of eight men were handed
over to the authorities.
CHAPTER VIII
RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING
CHAPTER VIII
RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING
The eyes of the Fleet--The _Westphalen_
torpedoed--Mine-laying submarines--Destruction of U boats.
The principal duties of our submarines in the North Sea were
reconnaissance, attack on the enemy's ships, especially on his
submarines, and mine-laying. The Germans were the first to introduce
the system of laying mines with submarines, but we quickly followed
their example and constructed submarines for this purpose. One of our
submarines carries about twenty mines. The weapon of our submarines
is, of course, the torpedo, of which an "E" boat carries ten. Our
submarines, unlike the German, usually carry nothing heavier than the
twelve-pound gun. But towards the end of the war we were constructing
submarines with heavier armament. Our latest "M" boat is armed with a
twelve-inch gun; she was despatched to the Mediterranean, but the
armistice was signed, and prevented her from showing what she could do
in the war.
For reconnaissance work in the North Sea our submarines were
invaluable, for they could patrol close under the enemy shores, seeing
much without being seen themselves, and could do what surface ships
could not do--remain there on the watch for several days at a time if
necessary, for they were able to dive and disappear if detected and in
serious danger. The submarines of the Harwich Flotilla had often to
travel under our own and the enemy minefields. They were ever
patrolling our own great minefields on the east side of the North Sea,
and sending home wireless information as to the movements of the enemy
light forces, and reporting any mine-sweeping operations on the part
of the enemy that seemed to indicate preparations for a sortie. It was
the ambition of every British submarine captain, by giving timely
notice, to bring about what the Huns used to term "The Day," that is,
an action between their somewhat over-shy capital ships and our own.
It was regarded as being of so great importance to obtain the earliest
possible warning of Hun activities in the North Sea that an order was
issued by the Admiralty to the effect that a submarine on lookout
patrol had for her primary duty to come to the surface and send home, by
wireless, information as to _outward_-bound enemy surface craft; while
her secondary duty was to attack. In the case of _homeward_-bound enemy
surface craft, the primary duty was to attack. If there should be any
doubt as to the destination of an enemy surface craft, it was the duty
of the submarine first to report by wireless and then to attack.
I have already shown how, during the critical eight days that saw our
First Expeditionary Force cross the Channel to France, the Harwich
submarines kept a sleepless watch on the German coast, to attack the
enemy ships should they come out to interfere with the transport of
our troops. I have also explained that these submarines had a good
deal to do with the preparation for the action in Heligoland Bight.
It was the E23, too, of this flotilla that, while patrolling, sighted
the German High Sea Fleet on August 19, 1916. She first wirelessed
home the news that the Germans had come out, and then delivered a bold
attack. She torpedoed the battleship _Westphalen_ on the port side.
The result of the explosion gave the battleship a big list, but for a
while she still went on with the battle fleet. As the list increased,
she at last left the line and turned for home, escorted by destroyers.
Thereupon the E23 set out to intercept her, passed through the screen
of enemy destroyers that were zigzagging round the _Westphalen_, and
torpedoed her on the starboard side. The battleship contrived to get
away, but in so damaged a condition that she must have been out of the
war for a considerable time.
The strategical position occupied by the Harwich Flotilla also imposed
upon it another duty of great responsibility. The submarines had to be
ever ready to go south at a moment's notice to cover the eastern
approach to the English Channel against the enemy capital ships,
should these attempt to break through. Had the Germans made the
attempt in earnest, there is no doubt that they would have had to pay
a very heavy toll.
Admiral Sir David Beatty put it well when, in a speech delivered in
Edinburgh, he spoke of our "submarine sentinels who carried out the
same services as the storm-tossed frigates of Cornwallis off Brest."
The only British submarines that were adapted for the laying of mines
were those of the Harwich Flotilla. Consequently, for a considerable
time plenty of arduous, perilous work among the minefields fell to
their lot.
The mine-laying submarines of the Harwich Flotilla were especially
busy on the eastern side of the North Sea, where our great minefields
were. Captains of submarines describe this portion of the sea as an
ideal one for submarine work; for the depth of the water is generally
of from twenty to thirty fathoms, at which depth a submarine can lie
comfortably at the bottom without being subjected to an excessive
pressure. Comfortable is, of course, a relative term. Most people
would never be anything but extremely uncomfortable in the atmosphere
of a submarine after she has been submerged for some hours. A
fresh-air crank would die in it.
The great minefield which was declared by our Government in the summer
of 1917, the preparation of which was a gigantic undertaking, extended
from the Frisian Islands to about latitude 56 degrees north. The
Dutch, for their own purposes, removed their lightships from their
coasts to the western side of this minefield, thus forming a line of
lights running north and south, roughly along the 4th degree of east
longitude. This our sailors facetiously named Piccadilly Circus. It
was the business of the submarines to lay mines on the eastern part of
this minefield, that is, near to the coast. Our surface mine-layers
laid their mines further seaward; while still further west our large
mine-laying ships, one of which can carry as many as three hundred
mines, laid their mines just inside Piccadilly Circus. Our submarines
used to patrol regularly along Piccadilly Circus to look out for and
attack enemy ships, and at intervals went shorewards through the
minefield in order to reconnoitre.
A mine-laying submarine used to adopt the following methods. She would
get close under the enemy coast under cover of the night and then
dive, to remain at the bottom until the morning. As soon as there was
light enough she would rise until her periscope was above the surface,
and ascertain her position by cross bearings of the shore taken
through her periscope. Then she would move to the different positions
at which she had to lay her mines, all the while using her periscope
for the taking of cross bearings. When she had completed her work she
would return home by night, travelling on the surface as before.
The patrolling submarines were bombed constantly by enemy Zeppelins
and seaplanes, but with little effect. To the submarine the mine was
by far the greatest danger, and no doubt the depth charge too
accounted for some of our casualties. But, as I have said, in nearly
all cases when a submarine is lost, no one knows what has happened.
She merely does not come back. The mine-laying of the Harwich
submarines was chiefly directed against the enemy submarines, the
mines being generally laid at about eight feet below the surface, so
as to catch these craft while travelling on the surface. They were
also laid at forty feet or more, so as to strike the submarines when
travelling under water.
The Harwich Flotilla certainly did its full share of the work that
made the North Sea too dangerous for the enemy pirates. Latterly the
German submarines, in their anxiety to reach waters where they could
carry out their operations in conditions of less danger, endeavoured
to escape from the North Sea as quickly as possible, travelling on the
surface. Many of these fell victims to our mines, and, if they dived,
to our depth charges. During the first months of 1918 the British Navy
definitely got the better of the submarine enemy, and so many German
submarines did not return to their base that panic seized the sailors
who manned the "U" boats. We hear strange tales now of submarine crews
that refused to join their ships, and of press-gangs that were sent
to sweep up what men they could find in the brothels and taverns of a
German seaport before the ship could put to sea.
One of the duties of the submarines of the Harwich Flotilla was to
watch for and attack the enemy submarines as they attempted to escape
from the North Sea by one or other of the two swept channels used by
them for this purpose, one channel being carried from Heligoland in a
northwesterly direction, the other one running close under the Frisian
Islands. Ingenious traps were laid for the enemy; they were allowed no
respite. It was in vain that they frequently changed the direction of
their channels. No sooner had they prepared a new channel across the
minefields than our alert submarines discovered it and blocked it with
mines.
Some figures given by Sir Eric Geddes the other day show how effective
was the work done by our submarine mine-layers. During the first six
months of 1918 over a hundred German boats were caught by the mines
laid by our submarines off the German North Sea coast, and in one
month alone the mine barrier across the Channel below Ostend trapped
seventeen German submarines. On the other hand, the Germans also were
very vigilant. Their Zeppelin patrols, especially during last summer,
were efficient, and were successful in discovering the position of the
channels which we had swept across the German minefields.
There can be no doubt that the Zeppelins were of considerable service
to the Germans in the North Sea; not that they did much damage with
the bombs that they dropped--indeed, I have heard of one instance
only of a bomb falling on a ship of the Harwich Force--but for a time
our patrols were persistently followed by these scouting aircraft,
flying overhead out of range of our guns, signalling our movements to
the Huns. To our submarines working on the further side of the North
Sea they were also a source of trouble, for over there the sea is much
clearer than on our side, and a submarine below the surface is, as a
rule, easily to be distinguished by a Zeppelin hovering above it.
Before the end of the war, however, the activities of the Zeppelins
were much reduced by the action of our own aircraft.
The fact remains that, in the long struggle between the German and
British submarines in the North Sea, the work done by the latter was
the most efficient and destructive, and broke the nerve of the enemy
submarine crews, whereas the _moral_ of our men remained unshaken to
the end. The men of the soulless German Navy were brave enough at
first, with the bravery inspired by an ineffable conceit and
arrogance. They had been taught that the German Navy was in every
respect superior to the British--in ships, guns, personnel, and
skilful leadership. It had been impressed upon their submarine crews
that within a few months the unrestricted piracy of the German
submarine would bring England to her knees. Undeceived at last, they
lost heart, and the submarine crews were the first to set the example
of mutiny to the German Navy, the first to refuse to face the enemy
that they had been taught to despise.
Later, the crews of the High Sea Fleet followed the example set by
the submarines. When at last, after long waiting, that fleet was
ordered to put to sea and make a fight of it, the ships' companies
would not obey their officers, and the fleet had to remain in port.
Our Navy had no spectacular victory; there was no knock-out blow; for
the enemy had had enough of it and threw up the sponge.
CHAPTER IX
FINE SUBMARINE RECORDS
CHAPTER IX
FINE SUBMARINE RECORDS
Some narrow escapes--Sinking a Zeppelin--The doings of the
E9--Sinking of the _Prince Adalbert_--The decoy trawler.
That the patrolling and mine-laying on the enemy coast was work of a
highly dangerous nature goes without saying. The first of our
mine-laying submarines was launched in 1916 and joined the Harwich
Flotilla. The new experiment was watched with great interest by naval
men, but the history of that ship seemed of evil augury for the future
of these craft. On her first voyage something went wrong, and she
returned to port three days overdue, having caused much anxiety as to
her fate. From her second trip she never returned.
While it is seldom that anything is known of the fate of our lost
submarines, numerous are the records of the narrow escapes from
destruction. It was not at all unusual, for example, when diving off
the German coast, for a submarine to find herself in difficulties
among the shoals. Thus one of the Harwich submarines, when diving
close to the mouth of the Ems river, struck a sandbank with her stem,
and slid up it until her conning-tower was well out of the water. Here
she stuck firmly. At this critical moment two German destroyers were
seen to come out of the Ems and approach her. Efforts were made in
vain to wriggle her off the bank, and it looked much as if she would
be numbered among our submarines that did not come back. But, as luck
would have it, the Germans passed by without perceiving her.
Ultimately, assisted by a rising tide, the submarine was got off the
bank stern first, bumped along the bottom to the safety of deeper
water, and lived to tell the tale and fight another day.
On Christmas Day, 1914, one of our small submarines, the S1, forming
part of the submarine force that was acting in conjunction with the
Harwich Force during the Cuxhaven air raid, found herself in a
perilous position. While diving to the bottom early that morning she
struck an obstacle and knocked off her forward drop-keel. Relieved of
this heavy weight, she shot to the surface. The order was given to
fill her empty tanks with sea-water; but this failed to destroy her
buoyancy, and it was found impossible to bring her below the surface.
To remain with a submarine that refused to sink, so near to the enemy
shore, was to invite disaster; so the only thing possible was done.
The S1 recrossed the North Sea as fast as she was able, and
fortunately reached Harwich without encountering the enemy.
On one occasion E31 came across a disabled Zeppelin--which earlier in
the day had been winged by light cruisers of the Harwich
Force--sitting on the water. The Zeppelin showed fight; she was sunk
by the submarine's gunfire, and the survivors, seven in number, were
taken off as prisoners. During the night, on the homeward voyage, the
submarine was overtaken by a German light cruiser, which opened fire
on her. "Ach, zey com!" triumphantly exclaimed one of the prisoners,
a sulky German officer, who up till then had not uttered a word. The
order had been given to dive, but for some reason this could not be
effected quickly. Delay was dangerous, so the officer of the watch put
the submarine's helm hard over, and she went round in circles,
presenting a difficult target. The German cruiser now proceeded to
steam round in still larger circles. For a while she was so close to
the submarine that she could not get her guns to bear on her. Then she
attempted to ram her, but in vain. Eventually the E31 dived, and, just
before her stern went under, she was struck in the after casing by a
six-inch shell. When she had sunk she released some oil, and the
Germans, seeing this, reported her as lost. But she was not much
damaged, and got home. This throwing out of oil from a diving
submarine was a ruse employed by both sides, and soon the appearance
of a volume of oil upon the surface of the sea was no longer accepted
as proof of a successful hit. But at any rate it left the other side
in doubt as to what had happened.
Several submarines of the Harwich Flotilla have fine records to show.
Take the E9, for example. She was the first of the flotilla to send an
enemy ship to the bottom. Within a few weeks of the declaration of war
she was lying off Heligoland, at times within three miles of it, on
the watch for enemy ships to come out. She was rewarded by seeing the
German light cruiser _Hela_ steaming out of the harbour. She torpedoed
and sank her. Next we hear of the E9 awaiting her prey at the mouth of
the Ems river. Her main object at the time was to report any sortie
of the German heavier ships to our own cruisers, which were then at
sea. Here she caught a German destroyer and torpedoed her. The
destroyer broke in two, one half of her sinking to the bottom, while
the forward half, being air-locked, sank to a certain depth only, and
there remained with the bow sticking up above the surface. Later in
the war the E9 was detached from the Harwich Flotilla for service in
the Baltic, and there her exploits were numerous. She sailed under
sealed orders, and her instructions were to get into the Baltic as
soon as possible. So she did not waste time by stopping to fight on
her way. Thus, when passing through the Sound on a very dark night,
she was nearly run down by a German destroyer. After the two ships
had passed each other the submarine dived, so as to avoid the enemy's
attentions. But the water was shallow and her periscope was still
above the surface when she touched bottom. However, she escaped after
bumping along the sea-floor for four hours before she found herself in
deeper water. In the Baltic she sank two destroyers and torpedoed and
badly damaged a third. She sank two German transports while they were
being escorted by cruisers. Next she torpedoed a large ship, which
looked like a battleship of the _Deutschland_ class, coming out of
Danzig. She was probably supporting the fleet that was then attacking
the Russians. The ship apparently was severely damaged by the torpedo,
and volumes of smoke were seen to be pouring from her. E9 also sank
four German merchantmen which were running iron ore from Sweden to
Germany. The submarine boarded them, put charges in them, and blew
them up. I need not say that no German lives were lost on this
occasion, for the submarine was flying the British flag. Ultimately,
when the Russian revolution broke out, the E9, with other ships, were
blown up by us in the Gulf of Finland, to prevent them from falling
into the hands of the enemy.
E16, of the Harwich Force, also had a fine record. Among other
exploits, she sank a destroyer, she sank a German submarine, she sank
an auxiliary cruiser; and finally she herself was numbered among those
that did not come back. The submarines that were engaged in
mine-laying also had an occasional successful fight with enemy ships.
Thus E34, while returning from a mine-laying expedition, made a clever
attack on an enemy submarine. The two ships were on the surface,
coming towards each other. The British submarine was the first to
sight the other. She dived and fired a torpedo, which struck the
German in the conning-tower. A violent explosion followed, and
afterwards there was nothing to be seen on the water save two objects,
one of which proved to be the German captain, who was saved, and the
other to be one of the crew, who sank.
It is the practice of the submarine to deliver its attack when below
the surface. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, as when the
attack is made on a dark night, when it would be impossible to
distinguish one's target through a periscope. Thus E52, of the
Harwich Flotilla, in November 1917, while co-operating with the Dover
Patrol, sighted an enemy submarine at about one o'clock in the
morning; she attacked the enemy on the surface, and fired two
torpedoes, both of which struck. The German sank, and only one
survivor was picked up.
And now and again it was bigger game that was brought down, as when
E8, of the Harwich Flotilla, at the time detached for service in the
Baltic, struck the German heavy cruiser _Prince Adalbert_ with a
torpedo at eight hundred yards range. The torpedo must have caused an
explosion in the German's magazine, for she was blown to pieces, and
the submarine had to dive to prevent the falling fragments from
injuring her.
Ingenious methods were employed by our submarines to entrap the
enemy's ships, and especially their submarines. The following plan,
for example, was successfully carried out by the Harwich submarines
until the Germans by chance discovered the trick and thenceforth
became more wary. The enticing of the Hun to his destruction was
effected in this manner. A disreputable old fishing vessel was sent
out to potter about the North Sea as if trawling for fish, thus
inviting the attack of the enemy. But the rope that was trailing
ostentatiously over her side was attached to no innocent trawl-beam,
but to one of our submarines, which she used to tow astern of her at a
depth of about sixty feet below the surface of the sea. The trawler
was commanded by a naval officer, and had a crew composed partly of
bluejackets and partly of trawler sailors. These trawler fishermen,
by the way, eager to avenge their murdered brethren, were at first too
zealous, and had to be prevented from uncovering the concealed gun
which the trawler carried, so soon as an enemy was sighted, thus
giving away the game. The trawler used thus to wander about the sea
towing a submarine for about a fortnight at a spell; but the submarine
was relieved by another submarine, always under cover of the night,
every three or four days. The trawler, when she left port and when she
returned to it, went alone, the submarine joining her or leaving her
outside in the night. There was thus little chance of the Hun
receiving information of what was doing.
Whenever an enemy ship, attracted by the bait thus displayed for her
benefit, made for the apparently defenceless trawler with the object
of sinking her, the trawler, by means of the telephone wire which
connected her with the submerged submarine, communicated to the latter
the movements of the enemy. The submarine--which was enabled by a
device to slip the tow-line from within--when the right moment arrived
delivered her attack, and a torpedo, possibly backed up by a round or
two from the trawler's now disclosed gun, finished the enemy off.
I have before me quite a long list--and it is not a complete one--of
the enemy ships that were sunk in action by the Harwich Submarine
Flotilla, including cruisers, torpedo-boats, armed merchantmen, and
submarines, the latter being the most numerous. It is satisfactory to
know that, heavy though were the losses of the flotilla, the losses
that they inflicted on the enemy (in action alone, exclusive of the
terrible effect of the mines which they laid) were considerably
heavier. But the glory of the little flotilla lies not so much in the
material losses which it caused to the enemy as in the four years'
sleepless watch which it kept in the North Sea, in conjunction with
the other units of our Fleet--the watch that closed the oceans to
Germany while holding them open to ourselves and our Allies, the watch
that kept the great German Navy lying paralysed in its harbours, until
the day came when the battleships that had not fired a shot crawled
across the North Sea to surrender themselves ignominiously to our
Admirals.
CHAPTER X
GERMAN CRIMES
CHAPTER X
GERMAN CRIMES
Loss of the E13--Inhuman Hun methods--Stranding of the U.C.
5--German traps--Risky salvage work.
I will conclude this section of the book with two stories of
submarines which will serve well to contrast Hun methods of sea
warfare with our own. The first story shows how those who manned the
German warships (one cannot employ the term "sailors" when speaking of
Germans) treated a British crew when it was at their mercy and could
not defend itself. The second story shows how our sailors acted in
similar circumstances.
In the summer of 1915 the submarine E13 was detached from the Harwich
Flotilla and sailed to the Baltic. She went aground off Saltholm, an
island in the Sound, near Copenhagen. A German destroyer came up and
opened fire on her while she thus lay helpless. The captain of the
submarine gave the order that she should be abandoned. This was done.
The Huns then opened a heavy fire with shrapnel and machine-guns on
the British sailors in the water, killing many of them. Shortly none
would have been left alive, and the E13 would have been added to the
list of the submarines that did not come back, their fate unknown, had
it not been for the providential appearance on the scene of a ship
belonging to a nation of real sailors, who have known the chivalry of
the sea from the earliest days. A Danish gunboat came up and placed
herself between the submarine and the German destroyer, thus
compelling the latter to cease firing. The Danes picked up the
survivors, who amounted to about one-half of the crew.
In a letter that appeared in the _Morning Post_, a correspondent gives
some further particulars of this incident:--"The Danish gunboat
compelled the Huns to cease firing on the defenceless crew of this
submarine, stranded in Danish territorial waters. Wanton murder was
added to the grave infringement of Danish territorial rights. Both the
Danish sailors and the gunners on the naval fort overlooking the scene
were burning with indignation, and were joyfully awaiting the order to
open fire on the German vessel, if the latter had not immediately
obeyed the Danish signal to stop these inhuman and illegal
proceedings. And the people of Copenhagen found it extremely difficult
to suppress their natural anger when the funeral of the victims took
place amidst scenes of heartfelt sympathy."
And now for the other story. One day in March 1915, while a section of
the Harwich Submarine Flotilla was outside the harbour, engaged in the
work of training men in the use of the torpedo, the _Firedrake_, one
of the three tender destroyers to the flotilla, sighted an object on
the Shipwash, a long, narrow shoal that lies about ten miles east of
Harwich. The captain of the _Firedrake_, wishing to satisfy himself as
to the nature of this object, steamed nearer to it and discovered that
it was the conning-tower of a submarine, obviously of a German
submarine, as none of our own submarines was in the vicinity. The
German was aground on the shoal and at the mercy of the British. As
the _Firedrake_ approached her, the German crew were seen to be
standing on her upper deck, which was awash, and holding up their
hands. When the destroyer got still nearer, the Germans jumped into
the water and were soon picked up by the destroyer's boats, which had
been lowered for the purpose. It was thought that all the men had been
brought on board the _Firedrake_, when a man was observed to hurry up
to the submarine's deck from below. He shouted and waved his hands
frantically, and then jumped overboard. He was picked up and brought
off, but volunteered no information as to what he had been doing
before he had left his ship. This was soon made clear, however, for
several explosions now followed each other on the stranded submarine,
and bits of bedding and other articles and volumes of brown smoke were
seen to be pouring out of her conning-tower.
It was a dirty trick to play after a surrender. Had the explosions
occurred a few minutes later, we should probably have lost some of our
own men, as boats were about to put off to the submarine with a
boarding party. If the case had been reversed, and the crew of a
British stranded ship had done this thing, the Germans would
undoubtedly have shot them, had there been any left to shoot; for
probably shell and machine-gun fire would have been playing upon our
men both before they had abandoned the ship and afterwards while they
were in the water--as witness the E13. The German prisoners taken from
the submarine, however, were treated by the British in a humane
fashion.
And yet, as it turned out, the treacherous Hun had yet another and
more dangerous trap arranged for us. Time having been allowed for any
possible further explosions on the enemy boat, Torpedo-Lieutenant
Paterson and two other officers went off to her, in order to ascertain
her condition. They found that the examination could be more easily
carried out at low water. So two hours later, when the tide had
fallen, they again visited the ship. She proved to be a submarine
mine-layer, the U.C. 5, full of mines. She had been badly holed by the
explosions, and the water was surging about inside of her. The
Admiralty were very anxious to salvage her, for she was the first
German submarine that had fallen into our hands, and she would afford
us the opportunity of learning whatever secrets a German "U" boat
might contain. But it was obvious that it would be impossible to tow
her into harbour without proper salvage plant. As it turned out, the
salving of her proved a long job, occupying twenty-seven days of
anxious and arduous work. A salvage officer and divers were got from
the port to do the preliminary work and get all ready before the
arrival on the scene of Commodore Young, R.N.R., and the heavy salvage
plant. The mines in the submarine, of course, presented a serious
danger, and Lieutenant Paterson was told off as mine adviser to the
salvage people. First, exercising due caution, he made a careful
examination of the wreck, which resulted in the discovery of what
appears to have been the other Hun trap. He found that two of the
mines had been loosed and were projecting through the bottom of the
mine-tubes. Had attempts been made to raise the submarine, the mines
would have fallen out, and their explosion would probably have
annihilated the submarine, the salvage ships, and those engaged in the
salvage work.
Lieutenant Paterson reported what he had discovered, and ordered all
salvage operations to be suspended until these mines had been made
safe. That this had been a deliberately planned trap on the part of
the Hun is indicated by the following incident. Lieutenant Paterson
was told that one of the prisoners taken from the U.C. 5, who was at
that time confined in the _Pandora_ depot ship, had asked if he could
see a British officer, as he had a statement to make. So Paterson
went to see him. The man then said that he had been very well treated
by his captors, and that in recognition of this he wished to warn the
English against making any attempt to salve the submarine, as a trap
had been laid to blow up those who should undertake this task.
Lieutenant Paterson now proceeded to deal with the mines in the
submarine; he had with him an expert and daring naval diver--the
former was awarded a D.S.C. and the latter a Conspicuous Gallantry
Medal and a gratuity, in recognition of their services on this
occasion. It was highly risky work, calling for much dexterity and
ingenuity. It was found that the two projecting mines could not be
drawn back into the tubes, so they were secured where they were with
wire in such a way that they could not fall out; though, of course,
there still remained the possibility of their being exploded by the
ship's bumping on the sand. The upper mines were then rendered
innocuous by the removal of the acid tubes from the horns and other
precautions, but it was impossible to do this with the lower mines, so
they remained active.
Then the salvage work commenced--a heavy business now, for the U.C. 5
was daily sinking deeper into the quicksands of the Shipwash. The
naval salvage plant at Harwich proved too light to move her. At last
she was lashed to a lighter with 6-1/2-inch wire, which was passed round
her in four parts. As the tide rose the lighter lifted the wreck a
little way, and then the wires broke, and back the submarine fell to
the sea-bottom, at imminent risk of exploding the two projecting
mines. Finally, Commodore Young, R.N.R., the salvage expert under whom
the Admiralty Salvage Department has been placed, succeeded, with his
heavy salvage plant, in raising her. He employed 9-inch wire and a
large lighter capable of lifting 500 tons. The wreck was secured to
the lighter's side at low water. The lighter's near tanks were then
emptied, and her outer tanks were filled with water, which thus acted
as a counterweight. This time the U.C. 5 was raised and got off
safely. She was towed into Harwich harbour and placed in the floating
dock--a delicate operation, as the measurements were close, the dock
being only just large enough to receive her, and the two live mines
were still projecting from her. But happily no accident occurred. All
the mines were removed. She was patched up and sent to the Thames,
where, it will be remembered, she was exhibited to the public and
aroused much interest.
It was no small part in the naval war in the North Sea that was played
by the light cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force and the
Harwich Submarine Flotilla. Their province it was to haunt the enemy's
coasts for four years in all seasons and weathers, and harass the Hun
in his own waters. It is a story of daring strategy, ingenious
devices, constant stubborn attack, and as stubborn defence. The facts
speak for themselves.
_Part III_
THE HARWICH AUXILIARY PATROL AND MINE-SWEEPING FORCE
CHAPTER XI
THE ROYAL NAVAL TRAWLER RESERVE
CHAPTER XI
THE ROYAL NAVAL TRAWLER RESERVE
Mine-sweeping trawlers--Captains courageous--Scotch
drifters--The motor launches--Keeping open the swept
channels.
Having in previous chapters dealt with some of the gallant doings in
the war of the Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers and the
Harwich Submarine Flotilla, I will now turn to a third force which had
Harwich as its base--the Harwich Auxiliary Patrol and Mine-sweeping
Force, whose most valuable and most dangerous work it was throughout
the war to clear the sea routes of the enemy's mines over a large and
very vulnerable portion of the North Sea, and, incidentally, to
attack and destroy the enemy's mine-laying submarines whenever
possible, thus keeping open and comparatively safe the channels used
by the Harwich Force and those frequented by our merchant shipping.
A few years before the war the Admiralty had the foresight to found
what may now be regarded as the nucleus of the vast mine-sweeping
organisation that has been developed since 1914. When war broke out
this nucleus contained a personnel of about a thousand officers and
men, belonging to the Royal Naval Trawler Reserve, who used to undergo
a short training each year in mine-sweeping, as it was then known; for
great indeed has been the progress made since in this by no means
simple science. These men were quite apart from the active service
ratings of Fleet Sweeping Flotillas. It was realised how utterly
inadequate was so small a force for the gigantic task that lay before
it, so the Admiralty at once took steps to place the R.N.T.R. on a war
footing. Able officers were set to work to organise the undertaking,
suitable vessels were acquired, crews were enrolled, and the force
expanded rapidly until at last it included approximately 750 sweeping
vessels, all manned from the Trawler Reserve, the total of which was
38,000 at the conclusion of the armistice. The magnitude of the work
carried out may be gathered from the fact that during hostilities
about 2000 square miles of sea were swept daily for mines in our home
waters alone, while nearly 10,000 enemy mines were swept up and
destroyed.
The Harwich Branch of this force--the one with which I am here
dealing--from the outbreak of war has been commanded by two successive
Commanders under the Rear-Admiral of the base. Both these Commanders
have been promoted to captains for good service during the war, while
one has received the D.S.O., and the other the D.S.O. and bar.
This auxiliary unit during the war was composed of something under one
hundred mine-sweeping trawlers, patrol trawlers, and mine-net
drifters, with a complement of about fifteen hundred men. In the year
1916 it became apparent that the mine-sweeping force was not strong
enough to cope with the large number of enemy mines laid in the area.
Consequently the patrol trawlers were converted into mine-sweeping
trawlers.
The vessels employed in mine-sweeping on our coasts are of various
types. I will not touch on the Fleet Sweepers, the twin-screw ships,
the gunboats, and other craft, attached to the Fleet, whose duty it is
to search the approaches to the Fleet bases in advance of the Fleet,
but will confine myself to a description of the work performed by the
hired paddle steamers, trawlers, drifters, and motor launches that
constitute the auxiliary force at the Harwich base.
First to speak of those sturdy little craft, the steam trawlers--as
fine sea-boats as you will find the world over. They are of various
sizes, the largest being of about 350 tons displacement. Their
weatherly qualities make them excellent mine-sweepers; the powerful
winches with which in time of peace they used to hoist in their
trawl-beams enable them to deal efficiently with a mine-sweeping wire.
Their draught, of from fourteen to sixteen feet, is certainly somewhat
against them in their war work, but gives them a good hold of the
water; and as these boats are somewhat down by the stern, their
propellers are so deep that they never race in the heaviest weather. A
certain proportion of them carry wireless. At the beginning of the war
each trawler was armed with a three-pounder gun, which could pierce
and sink a German submarine of the earlier type. Now the trawlers and
drifters carry six-pounders, and in some instances twelve-pounders.
The writer was wont to go out to the Dogger Bank with the Hull
trawlers long ago, when these were all sailing craft, well-found
ketches, no steam being used save for the donkey engine, whose
function it was to haul in the trawl-beam; the crew of each vessel
consisting of five hands, including the small boy and the child cook.
To him, as to all those who knew our North Sea trawlers in the pre-war
days, the change that has been effected in the personnel of these
vessels by war conditions is amazing. Yet these are the same men, the
same rough, hard-bitten fishermen, as fine sailors as use the seas. As
I knew them, many of the trawler skippers could not read or write, but
they knew their North Sea. Charts they despised; with compass and lead
alone they found their way unerringly even to the coasts of Iceland;
for they carried a mental chart in their memories, and had an intimate
knowledge of the soundings of all these waters. They could smell their
way across the North Sea in the thickest weather, so to speak.
These men, who have been fishermen from infancy and have faced danger
throughout their lives, brought up in the roughest of schools, now
belong to the R.N.T.R., the Royal Naval Trawler Reserve, and man the
mine-sweeping trawlers. Some of them might appear rude in speech and
manners to residents of garden cities, but to those who know them
these are true men led by "captains courageous," and they call for the
admiration and respect of all Englishmen for the way in which they
have carried out their perilous duties throughout the war. The
mine-sweeping trawler carries a crew of about fifteen men. One
scarcely recognises in them the whilom fishermen. The skipper of a
craft that used to form part of a fishing fleet now has warrant rank
and is smart in naval uniform. The men, too, wear the badges of a
distinguished service. The discipline enforced in a mine-sweeping
trawler now comes nearly up to the standard of the Grand Fleet ships.
Skippers and men mostly come from the fishing ports of the North
Sea--Hull, Yarmouth, and the others; Harwich itself, of course, is not
a fishing centre. The mine-sweeping trawlers are organised in
divisions of from four to seven vessels, each division being under the
command of an R.N.R. lieutenant.
What I have said of the trawler skippers and crews also applies to
those who man the North Sea drifters, which were taken from the
fishing grounds to do their work among the minefields. These drifters
are for the most part manned by hardy Scotch fishermen, who, like the
East Coast trawler men, took to their new work as a duck takes to
water. These drifters are of lighter draught than the trawlers, and so
can be employed in shallower waters. They proved of great service, not
only in mine-sweeping, but also for laying mine nets and for carrying
out exploratory sweeps. They also took part in the hydrophone patrols,
when several of these craft used to drift noiselessly, listening by
means of their hydrophones for the sound of enemy submarines
travelling below the surface. When a submarine was heard to approach,
working in combination, they used to ascertain its position by taking
cross bearings of the directions of the sound as given by their
respective hydrophones, and gradually closed in on it. When the
position of the submarine was definitely located, an attendant vessel
was signalled to, which did its best to drop depth charges on the
submarine, or, if it came to the surface, attacked it with gunfire.
But it was, of course, possible for the enemy, who also carried his
hydrophones, to slip away; and to successfully trap him by the above
device was an event of rare occurrence. Like the trawlers, the
drifters carry guns and depth charges.
The trawlers and drifters manned by the men who used to fish with
these vessels before the war compose the greater portion of the
Harwich auxiliary force. Shortly after the opening of the war the
Admiralty took over a number of ordinary paddle passenger steamers for
the purpose of mine-sweeping, of which several belong to the Harwich
mine-sweeping unit. These are commanded by R.N.R. captains; carry
six-pounder or twelve-pounder guns, and depth charges. Being of
relatively high speed--some of them attaining a sweeping speed of ten
knots--they can cover a good deal of ground, and being of shallow
draught they are well adapted for mine-sweeping in the Harwich area.
For the tidal range in this portion of the North Sea is about eleven
feet; consequently the paddle steamer, drawing considerably less than
eleven feet, is enabled at high water to engage in sweeping without
incurring much risk of striking a German mine, provided that the area
has been searched at low water and no mines are visible on the
surface. These paddle steamers, which in time of peace had carried
thousands of pleasure-seekers on summer holidays, at once proved very
successful in the work of war. In the year 1917 alone they destroyed
approximately four hundred enemy mines in the immediate approaches to
Harwich. On several occasions the vessels of this section had narrow
escapes; one was twice mined, and one sank in fifty seconds after
striking a mine.
And lastly we come to that interesting class in this heterogeneous
force--the motor launches--the compact M.L. boats and other power
boats of various types, most of which were privately owned pleasure
craft before the war. Handy, rapid, of light draught, these have
proved of great service, especially in enclosed and shallow waters.
They are employed for patrol work, also for mine-sweeping, but are not
powerful enough for this latter work, except under certain conditions.
The duty for which they are very well adapted is the exploration of
enemy minefields at low water, and the sinking of such moored mines as
appear above the surface, as is not infrequently the case in
consequence of the inaccurate laying of the mines. The German mines, I
may mention, were mostly laid at eight feet below the sea-level at low
water.
The motor launches are commanded by R.N.V.R. officers, for the most
part yachting men, among them being barristers, solicitors,
stockbrokers, and other professional men. They have proved that our
amateur sailors who used to handle their own craft in peace-time know
their work, can quickly adapt themselves to war conditions, and are of
the greatest service to their country in time of war. They were ever
ready at the call of duty to push out into the North Sea when the
weather conditions were such as would have prevented any sane man
from venturing forth in time of peace with craft so small. Like the
gentlemen adventurers of old, they were out for high adventure, and
they found it.
The mine-sweeping on the enemy minefields was, of course, the
principal function of the Harwich auxiliary base. The mined areas that
had to be dealt with by this force extended from the south of
Lowestoft to the Naze and twenty miles to seawards, while the
mine-sweepers of the force were also employed in advance of the
Harwich Force on the mined areas on the further side of the North Sea.
The Huns had diligently laid their mines in extraordinary numbers in
the Harwich area. The German mine-laying submarines did their utmost
to block the approaches to Harwich. Captured German mine charts
testify to the magnitude of their operations. The Harwich auxiliary
force had, therefore, to keep open a swept channel running along the
coast, and also several other channels opening from this coast channel
eastward, across the minefields, to the swept War-Channel beyond,
which served as the highway for merchantmen and other vessels passing
up and down the North Sea. It was also part of the duty of the Harwich
boats to sweep the War-Channel so far as this channel passes along the
Harwich area.
Throughout the war the mine-laying work of the Huns was continuous;
that is, so fast as we cleared a channel of their mines, more were
laid by their ever-busy submarines. Consequently the work of our
mine-sweepers had also to be continuous. The Harwich mine-sweepers'
duty was to sweep the above-mentioned channels each day. As light was
needed to see and sink the mines after they had been cut adrift, the
mine-sweepers used to begin their work at daylight, whatever the
conditions of tide or weather, and until they had completed their task
no shipping was permitted to proceed up the channels. The risk at low
water to the mine-sweepers was therefore very great, and heavy were
their losses. They could not await the comparative security of high
water, and the preparatory exploratory work of the shallow-draught
craft at low water could only be carried out when low water happened
to occur at a very early hour, and even then the time available for
exploration was very limited. Since the armistice, the mine-sweeping
is conducted in far safer conditions. No unnecessary risks are taken;
the preliminary exploration at low water can be done thoroughly, and
the mine-sweepers can do their part at high water.
For an officer in charge of the War-Channel sweepers the
responsibility was very great, and often he had to come to a quick
decision when two or more possible courses of action were open to him
and it was not easy to foresee which would be the right course, while
to take the wrong one would probably mean horrible disaster. I will
now give an example of such a situation. In the first place, let it be
borne in mind that the conveyance by sea of our foodstuffs, munitions
of war, and men was a matter of vital importance to England, and that
delays in transportation had to be reduced to a minimum. The Germans,
knowing this, for a long time directed all their mine-laying energy to
that great highway of shipping, the swept War-Channel extending from
the Sunk to the Shipwash light-vessels--the channel the daily sweeping
of which was the charge of the Harwich mine-sweepers. Very often,
owing to the tides being quite unsuitable for sweepers, the choice had
to be made between two evils--stopping all traffic, or risking the
sweepers and convoying the traffic through the danger zone.
Now, on the occasion to which I am referring the War-Channel sweepers
commenced their work at daylight near the Sunk light-vessel, and
sweeping northwards found themselves at 8 a.m., it being dead low
water, in the middle of a dangerous freshly laid minefield about half
way between the Sunk and the Shipwash lightships, and close to the
line of buoys. As some of the mines were showing on the surface, and
the others must necessarily have been close underneath, the order was
given to stop all traffic. Unfortunately the traffic, and particularly
the south-bound portion of it, was very heavy that day, and before all
the vessels could be stopped and anchored many of them were in close
proximity to the minefield. All, however, were safely anchored, and
two hours later, when the flood tide was making, light-draught
steamers were set to sweep the area. The job was a difficult one, for
the sweepers had to twist and turn among the anchored vessels, and in
two cases mines were swept up within fifty feet of these.
In these circumstances it became apparent that the area could not be
properly cleared while the merchant vessels lay there at anchor, and
some further action was necessary. The officer in charge was faced by
a very difficult problem--either he had to keep the whole fleet held
up indefinitely, or take the risk of losing one or two of them. In the
words of one who told me this story, "If the officer in charge delayed
the traffic the powers that be would damn him, and if he lost any of
the ships he would be twice damned." So the officer in charge relied
upon his lucky star to preserve him from both calamities. Choosing the
most favourable time of tide, he ordered all vessels to weigh anchor
and steam out of the minefield on a course at right angles to it.
Happily all the ships got under weigh safely; the sweepers carried on
and swept up eight mines on the ground where the merchantmen had been
anchored, thus proving how dangerous had been the situation; and very
soon after there were sixty-five vessels in sight steaming north and
south along the line of buoys that mark the channel. As my informant
said to me, "If anyone spoke of this incident to the officer who gave
the order, he would probably shrug his shoulders and say, 'I was
lucky'; but he, and he alone, knows what that dreadful hour of anxiety
meant to him."
Despite all precautions, many merchant vessels were mined in the
War-Channel in the course of the war; but these disasters were largely
due to the carelessness of shipmasters, who at times neglected to
comply with the instructions that had been given to them. How well the
Harwich auxiliary vessels carried out their work, and how heavy that
work was, the following figures show. In the year 1917, the total
number of enemy mines swept up and destroyed by the mine-sweepers of
the thirty-three bases of the British Isles amounted to 3400, of which
over 1000 stand to the credit of the Harwich base. It is a notable
fact, too, that in the same year 500 mines were destroyed
consecutively in this area without the loss of a single merchantman,
whereas the average for the United Kingdom had been one merchantman
lost to thirteen mines destroyed.
CHAPTER XII
WORK OF THE AUXILIARIES
CHAPTER XII
WORK OF THE AUXILIARIES
Mine-sweeping methods--Indicator nets--Heavy
losses--Brilliant rescues.
Without going into technical details, I will now give a brief
explanation of the usual methods employed by the mine-sweeping
trawlers of the Harwich base. Two trawlers steaming abreast at about
four hundred yards distance apart tow a sweep wire eight hundred yards
in length, an end of which is attached to each trawler. The wire thus
drags astern in a great loop, which is kept at the requisite
depth--that is, at a depth well exceeding the draught of the deepest
ship which would travel across that area--by kites. This sweep wire
is serrated, so that when towing it quickly saws through the moorings
of the mines, which are thus released and rise to the surface. When
two or more pairs of trawlers are sweeping in unison they adopt what
may be termed an echelon formation. The second pair of mine-sweepers
follows the first pair, at a safe distance astern, on a parallel
course, but on an alignment that causes the space swept by the
following pair of vessels to somewhat overlap that swept by the
leading pair, so that no unswept space is left between the two. If a
third pair of vessels follows, it takes up a similar position astern
of the second pair; and so on, if there be other pairs engaged in the
sweep. When a strong cross tide is running, to carry out this
operation accurately is no easy task. But the skilled North Sea
fishermen who man the trawlers are the right men for this sort of
work. They rapidly acquire all the tricks of sweeping, and soon learn
to detect a mine that has been caught in the sweep by the singing of
the sweep wire, the feel of it, and other delicate signs. The
mine-sweeping trawlers are accompanied by a vessel whose duty it is to
sink or explode by rifle fire the released mines as they appear on the
surface.
The above explanation of mine-sweeping, of course, deals with very
elementary matter. For during the war this science has made immense
progress, and volumes could be written on it. Many are the ingenious
contrivances that have been introduced to improve the efficiency of
the sweep. In fact, in all our operations, offensive and defensive,
below the surface of the sea weird new inventions play an important
part. Take, for example, that grimly humorous invention the indicator
net, to lay which was one of the duties of the drifters of the Harwich
Force. In its early form this was a fine wire net, which, when run
into by a submarine travelling below the surface, was dragged from its
moorings and remained attached to the enemy, accompanying him
whithersoever he went, not impeding his progress, and possibly
unnoticed by him, but dooming him to destruction. For attached to this
net by a long line was a buoy containing a torch which was lighted
automatically when the strain of the tow came on the buoy. So the
unconscious enemy travelled on underneath, announcing his presence by
the flaming torch which accompanied him overhead, thus enabling the
watchful British patrol boats to close in on him and effect his
destruction with depth charges. The above is an ideal case, for in
practice the operation was by no means always so simple or so
successful. But that early type of indicator net has been superseded
by a much more deadly invention.
A great deal of useful work was done by the Harwich drifters in
evolving the best method of working the indicator net, and their
system was eventually adopted as standard by the Admiralty. Great
perfection was attained in this work. Thus, on one occasion in 1917
some Harwich drifters sailed to a certain destination in the North
Sea, and after a week's work in laying and watching their nets
destroyed three "U" boats. The crews received a reward of L3000 from
the Admiralty; for L1000 was the prize given for the total destruction
of one of these enemy submarines.
The mine-sweeping has been described by those who should know as
having been the hardest service in the North Sea during the war. Sir
Edward Carson, who inspected the Harwich auxiliary force, in the
course of a speech, likened the men employed in the mine-sweeping
craft to soldiers in trenches at the front, who were required to go
over the top every day. It was indeed arduous and hazardous work. The
least of the dangers faced was that from the enemy Zeppelins and
aeroplanes which were constantly bombing the vessels--but here, as
elsewhere, with little effect; our fishermen took small notice of
these overhead foes.
It is indeed remarkable how very little damage was ever done by
Zeppelins at sea. On one occasion, it is true, the Zeppelin crews
killed a number of their own countrymen--the survivors of the sinking
_Bluecher_--mistaking them for Englishmen. But our ships suffered
practically nothing from their frequent attacks. Yet the enemy
aircraft did their utmost to interfere with the operations of our
mine-sweepers and mine-net laying drifters. On one occasion a Zeppelin
hovered over a fleet of the latter craft which were lying in wait
watching their deadly nets off the Shipwash. The Zeppelin dropped
about seventeen bombs, some of which fell very close to the vessels,
exploding violently and throwing up huge columns of water; but not a
single hit was made and no damage was done.
But the mines amid which their duties took them daily were a very real
peril. Out of the little Harwich force, twenty-two mine-sweepers were
sunk by mines in the course of the war, while many others were
mined--some more than once--but were brought safely back to port. The
loss of life was heavy. Nearly one-quarter of the officers and men
were killed in the course of the war. In the case of the trawlers
there was small chance for the men when their vessel was mined under
them; but these tough fishermen, whose trade had taught them to face
danger from their childhood, carried on cheerily among the minefields
through all the years of the war. Many heroic deeds stand to their
account.
In times of peace, not few are the wrecks and gallant savings of life
on the stormy North Sea. But in war-time, with the far graver peril
from enemy mines and ships added to that of storm or thick weather,
many were the disasters and many were the courageous rescues of crews
and passengers by our mine-sweepers. In the period extending from the
date of the establishment of the Harwich base up to December 31, 1917,
no fewer than 1065 men, women, and children were picked up and saved
from mined vessels by the Harwich mine-sweepers--a total which was
much exceeded later. Often these craft hurried to the rescue at
fearful risk of being struck themselves by mines of the same group
that had brought about the disaster. One hears of trawlers that put
out their dinghies in the roughest weather in order to save lives; for
example, as when a trawler's dinghy rescued airmen from off the
dangerous shoal of the Longsand when a heavy sea was breaking over it.
For the North Sea fisherman, like his brethren in the Navy, is imbued
with that chivalry of the sea which makes the British sailor what he
is.
And not only lives but ships with valuable cargoes of food were often
saved. For example, there is the notable incident of the saving of the
_Berwen_. In the rapidly falling darkness of a winter day, with a
strong south-west gale blowing and a heavy sea running, the little
wooden drifter _Lloyd George_, manned by ten hardy Scotch fishermen,
while patrolling the War-Channel between the Shipwash and the Sunk
light-vessels, sighted the large merchant steamer _Berwen_, apparently
mined and not under control, to the south-westward of the Shipwash.
The _Lloyd George_ immediately steamed at full speed to the assistance
of the _Berwen_, only to find that the mined ship had been abandoned
by her crew and was rapidly drifting on to a minefield which stretched
to leeward of her, where several moored mines could be plainly seen at
intervals in the rise and fall of the heavy sea. The skipper of the
drifter, realising the danger and the necessity for immediate action,
with great skill and wonderful seamanship placed his drifter alongside
the _Berwen_ and, having put three members of his crew of ten on board
her, passed a tow-line and commenced to tow her to the south-west,
away from the minefields.
The little drifter, not fitted for towing, having none of the
necessary appliances on board, and not having the power to deal with
so heavy a tow, could make little, if any, progress in the teeth of
the ever-increasing gale; but she held on to the _Berwen_ and fought
bravely on throughout the dark night, surrounded by the unknown
dangers of mines, and was able at the coming of daylight to hand her
charge over safely to the tugs for which she had wirelessed.
The _Berwen_ eventually reached the Thames with only a few hundred
tons damaged out of the seven thousand tons of sugar which formed her
cargo. One is not surprised to hear that a grateful country omitted to
pay any salvage to the seamen who, by their gallant action, had
rescued so valuable a cargo, on the ground that the sugar was
Government property.
Worthy of note, too, is the good work done by the trawler _Resono_.
On November 17, 1915, when off the Galloper light-vessel, she
witnessed the blowing up by a mine of the merchant steamer _Ulrikon_.
She took off all the crew of the lost ship, and no sooner had this
rescue been effected than another steamer, the _Athomas_, struck a
mine and was badly injured by the explosion. Her crew abandoned her
and were picked up. The officer commanding the _Resono_, observing
that the _Athomas_ was not in immediate danger of sinking, decided to
salvage her. The men composing her own crew refused to go on board of
her again, though it was explained to them that they would have to go
through the minefield in any case, and that they would be safer in a
ship of large tonnage than in a trawler. Therefore the captain of the
_Resono_ called for volunteers from his own crew, put them on board
the _Athomas_ despite the heavy weather, towed her safely away, and
handed her over to the Sheerness Patrol in sheltered waters. The
_Resono_, after having accomplished much good work, eventually was
blown up by a mine off the Sunk light-vessel on Christmas Day, 1915.
Another well-known trawler was the _Lord Roberts_. During her long
career of patrol work in the Harwich area she went to the assistance
of many mined ships and rescued a very large percentage of their
crews. Unfortunately, she was mined and lost in October 1916, with a
loss of one officer and eight men. The _Lord Roberts_ had become a
familiar and welcome sight to the merchant vessels using the channels
off Harwich, and there was sorrow when she was lost. One Trinity
House pilot, missing her from her usual patrol ground, wrote a letter
to the authorities asking what had become of "our old friend, the
_Lord Roberts_."
As I have shown, a large vessel with watertight compartments has a
fair chance of surviving the effect of a mine. But with the small
vessel it is otherwise, and on her the effect of the explosion of a
German mine is indeed terrible. Thus the official message reporting
the loss, March 31, 1917, of the drifter _Forward III._, of 89 tons,
read, "_Forward III._ mined. No survivors." As far as can be gathered
from the circumstances, the drifter must have struck the mine with her
keel dead amidships, and when the smoke cleared away there was nothing
to be seen on the water beyond a few broken pieces of wood. A large
section of her wooden keel came down on end, pierced the deck of the
drifter _White Lilac_, and remained standing upright, looking, as it
was put to me, like "a monument to the gallant men who had gone."
The loss of the trawler _Burnley_ in November 1916 affords another
example of the total disappearance of vessel and crew after the
striking of a mine. The _Burnley_ was in charge of a subdivision of
trawlers carrying out a patrol in the vicinity of the Shipwash
light-vessel. At the close of the day the senior officer in the
_Burnley_, relying on the superior speed of his vessel to overtake the
others, ordered the two trawlers under him to proceed to their
anchorage in Hollesley Bay. What exactly happened after this will
never be known, but it is surmised that the _Burnley_ stopped to
investigate something suspicious. The _Holdene_, the senior of the
other two trawlers, reached the anchorage as night was setting in, and
had just dropped her anchor when a flash was seen on the eastern
horizon. This was followed by a dull, heavy explosion, which shook the
_Holdene_ from stem to stern. The anchor was immediately weighed and
the _Holdene_ steamed at full speed to the scene of the explosion;
but, though she cruised about for two hours in the darkness, nothing
was to be seen of the _Burnley_ or her crew. On the following day a
fresh group of mines was discovered in the vicinity, so it is probable
that the _Burnley_ had struck one of this group very soon after the
mines had been laid by German submarines.
Among the losses of the Harwich mine-sweepers may be noted that of
the paddle steamer _Queen of the North_, which was mined and sunk
while engaged in mine-sweeping. Despite the gallant efforts of her
consorts, one officer and nineteen men only were saved, seven officers
and twenty-two men being lost. Mine-sweeping in the War-Channel, as I
have explained, had to be carried out whatever the weather, and in
winter the weather conditions often made the work extremely hazardous.
For example, on one occasion a division had swept up eleven enemy
mines. Before any of these mines could be sunk by rifle fire a
blinding snowstorm swept over the sea, making it impossible for the
vessels to distinguish either each other or the drifting mines.
Nevertheless the R.N.R. officer who was in command of the division, by
exercise of good judgment, extricated his vessels from the dangerous
area, and twenty minutes later, when the weather cleared, he was
enabled to destroy all the mines.
One of the many dangers that attend mine-sweeping is caused by the
occasional failure of the sweep wire to cut a mine adrift. The mine
and its sinker come up the sweep wire when the latter is hove in, at
the great risk of causing an explosion under the vessel's stern. Thus,
the paddle steamer _Mercury_, while sweeping off the Sunk, brought up
three mines and their sinkers in this way. An explosion resulted,
which blew her stern off. Fortunately, no lives were lost. She was
towed into port and placed in dry dock for repairs. She was an unlucky
ship, for on her very first trip after the repairs had been effected
she struck another mine while sweeping close to the scene of her
former accident. On this occasion her bows were blown away and two
lives were lost. Again she was towed back to port and repaired, and
she is now once more engaged in mine-sweeping.
There is also a serious danger of a mine fouling a vessel's anchor and
coming up with it to explode under the vessel's bows, as is shown in
the case of the drifter _Cape Colony_, whose crew experienced a
miraculous escape from death. On the evening of January 7, 1917, in
company of other drifters, the _Cape Colony_ laid her mine nets under
cover of the darkness. She was then told off with another drifter to
anchor in the vicinity of the Shipwash to work the hydrophones during
the night. At daylight on the following morning the signal was given
to weigh anchor. The mate of the _Cape Colony_, leaning over the bow
to see the cable come in, suddenly saw the horns of a mine, apparently
foul of the anchor, on the edge of the water and within a foot of the
stem. With great presence of mind he jumped to the capstan and stopped
heaving in, but was unable to reverse and lower away. He immediately
shouted a warning, ran aft, and jumped into the sea, followed by the
rest of the crew. The last man had just got into the water when a
heavy swell rolled along, lifted the drifter's bow, and exploded the
mine, which blew half the drifter into matchwood. She pitched forward
and quickly sank by the head. The crew were rapidly picked up by the
boat from the other drifter, none the worse for their adventure.
Mines in their tens of thousands still lie about the North Sea to
endanger shipping, and probably it will take a year to clear them. For
sweeping up these mines the Admiralty are giving the men a special
rate of pay, and only those who volunteer are now employed. The danger
incurred is practically negligible when compared with the risk that
attended these operations in war-time.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Even those querulous and ignorant pessimists who, during the war, used
to ask, "What is the Navy doing?" must now know what the Navy has
done. Our Navy kept open the sea routes of the world to ourselves and
our allies, while wholly closing them to our enemies. Had our
politicians permitted it, the blockade by our Navy would have brought
the war to an earlier conclusion. The Germans, driven from the surface
of the sea, put their trust in their murderous submarine campaign.
Finding that this failed altogether against our Navy, they directed it
against the merchant shipping of the world. That attempt too failed.
Our Navy gradually mastered the submarines, until at last, towards the
close of the war, the crews of the German "U" boats refused to put to
sea. There was no great decisive naval action, for the good reason
that the High Sea Fleet would not fight it out with our Grand Fleet,
but retired to the shelter of the German minefields whenever it was
attacked. In vain inferior forces were sent to tempt the enemy out.
The German raids on the East Coast had no military value, and
apparently had frightfulness as their sole object. Their fast ships
used to rush across the North Sea under cover of the fog, bombard our
undefended watering-places for half an hour or so, then hurry home
again. These raids reminded one of the mischievous urchin who rings a
front-door bell and runs away. But though there was no great naval
action, there was plenty of hard fighting at sea; many a bold
enterprise was carried through and many a gallant deed was performed.
Of the great British Navy the Harwich Forces formed but a small part,
but they were typical of the whole Navy, and it was no small part that
they took in far the most important theatre of the naval war--the
North Sea. And now the Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers
and the Submarine Flotilla, having carried through their great duty,
are to be dispersed over the four quarters of the globe. Many have
already sailed to the West Indies, to the Mediterranean, to the China
seas, and elsewhere. The close bands of brothers who fought and died
together through the great war are now to be broken up; and it
requires little imagination to feel that they are loth thus to
separate.
In these forces lives a spirit that recalls that of the military
orders in the chivalrous days of the Crusades, when gallant knights
were banded together to fight and sacrifice themselves for a great
cause. To live for a while in these ships is to find oneself in a
purer, breezier atmosphere--an atmosphere of simple loyalty,
old-fashioned patriotism, devotion to the Service, and cheery
good-fellowship. These young men--for in the little ships they are all
young men, full of the joy of life, though veterans in war with great
experiences--make one feel sorry for the people who, in the coming
millennium that is being prepared by the politicians, will never have
the chance of fighting for their country on land or sea.
Englishmen, and especially English naval officers, are not given to
display of sentiment; but the members of the Harwich Force are justly
proud of that Force, and regard themselves as indeed forming a band of
brothers. Thus, after the signing of the armistice, at a dinner which
was given by the captains of the destroyers of the Harwich Force to
the great sailor who commanded that Force during the war, someone
recited the stirring speech which Shakspeare puts into the mouth of
Henry V. before Agincourt. These memorable words indeed well fitted
the occasion:
This day is called--the feast of Crispian:
He that outlives this day, and comes safe home,
Will stand a tip-toe when this day is named,
And rouse him at the name of Crispian.
He that shall live this day, and see old age,
Will yearly on the vigil feast his friends
And say--to-morrow is Saint Crispian:
Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars,
And say, these wounds I had on Crispin's day.
Old men forget; yet all shall be forgot,
But he'll remember, with advantages,
What feats he did that day: Then shall our names,
Familiar in their mouths as household words,--
Harry the king, Bedford, and Exeter,
Warwick and Talbot, Salisbury and Gloster--
Be in their flowing cups freshly remembered:
This story shall the good man teach his son;
And Crispian Crispin shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered:
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me,
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition:
And gentlemen of England, now a-bed,
Shall think themselves accurs'd they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap, while any speaks,
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH.
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End of Project Gutenberg's The Harwich Naval Forces, by E. F. Knight