CHAPTER IX

ENGLISH DEMOCRACY

The modern national state is the most powerful political organism ever

known, because it is the conscious or unconscious agency of a people's

will. Government is no longer in England the instrument of a family or

a class; and the only real check upon its power is the circumstance

that in some matters it acts as the executive committee of one party

and is legitimately resisted by the other. Were there no parties, the

government would be a popular despotism absolutely uncontrolled.

Theoretically it is omnicompetent; parliament--or, to use more

technical phraseology, the Crown in Parliament--can make anything law

that it chooses; and no one has a legal right to resist, or authority

to pronounce what parliament has done to be unconstitutional. No Act of

Parliament can be illegal or unconstitutional, because there are no

fundamental laws and no written constitution in this country; and when

people loosely speak of an Act being unconstitutional, all that they

mean is that they do not agree with it. Other countries, like the

United States, have drawn up a written constitution and established a

Supreme Court of Judicature to guard it; and if the American

legislature violates this constitution by any Act, the Supreme Court

may declare that Act unconstitutional, in which case it is void. But

there is no such limitation in England upon the sovereignty of

parliament.

This sovereignty has been gradually evolved. At first it was royal and

personal, but not parliamentary or representative; and medieval kings

had to struggle with the rival claims of the barons and the church. By

calling in the assistance of the people assembled and represented in

parliament, the monarchy triumphed over both the barons and the church;

but when, in the seventeenth century, the two partners to this victory

quarrelled over the spoils, parliament and not the crown established

its claim to be the real representative of the state; and in the cases

of Strafford, Danby, and others it even asserted that loyalty to the

king might be treason to the state. The church, vanquished at the

Reformation, dropped more and more out of the struggle for sovereignty,

because, while the state grew more comprehensive, the church grew more

exclusive. It was not that, after 1662, it seriously narrowed its

formulas or doctrines, but it failed to enlarge them, and a larger and

larger proportion of Englishmen thus found themselves outside its pale.

The state, on the other hand, embraced an ever-widening circle of

dissent; and by degrees Protestant Nonconformists, Roman Catholics,

Quakers, Jews, Atheists, Mohammedans, believers, misbelievers, and

unbelievers of all sorts, were admitted to the fullest rights of

citizenship. State and church ceased to correspond; one became the

whole, the other only a part, and there could be no serious rivalry

between the two.

The state had to contend, however, with more subtle and serious

attacks. This great Leviathan, as Hobbes called it, was not at first a

popular institution; and it frightened many people. The American

colonists, for instance, thought that its absolute sovereignty was too

dangerous a thing to be left loose, and they put sovereignty under a

triple lock and key, giving one to the judicature, one to the

legislature, and a third to the executive. Only by the co-operation of

these three keepers can the American people loose their sovereignty and

use it to amend their constitution; and so jealously is sovereignty

confined that anarchy often seems to reign in its stead. There was,

indeed, some excuse for distrusting a sovereignty claimed by George III

and the unreformed British parliament; and it was natural enough that

people should deny its necessity and set up in its place Declarations

of the Rights of Man. Sovereignty of Hobbes's type was a somewhat novel

conception; men had not grasped its possibilities as an engine of

popular will, because they were only familiar with its exploitation by

kings and oligarchs; and so closely did they identify the thing with

its abuses that they preferred to do without it altogether, or at least

to confine it to the narrowest possible limits. Government and the

people were antagonistic: the less government there was, the less harm

would be done to the people, and so a general body of individualistic,

_laissez-faire_ theory developed, which was expressed in various

Declarations of the Rights of Man, and set up against the "paternal

despotism" of the eighteenth century.

These Rights of Man helped to produce alike the anarchy of the first

French Revolution and the remedial despotism of the Jacobins and their

successor Napoleon; and the oscillation between under-government and

over-government, between individualism and socialism has continued to

this day. Each coincides with obvious human interests: the blessed in

possession prefer a policy of _laissez faire_; they are all for

Liberty and Property, enjoying sufficient means for doing whatsoever

they like with what they are pleased to call their own. But those who

have little to call their own, and much that they would like, prefer

strong government if they can control it; and the strength of

government has steadily grown with popular control. This is due to more

than a predatory instinct; it is natural, and excusable enough, that

people should be reluctant to maintain what is no affair of theirs; but

even staunch Conservatives have been known to pay Radical taxes with

comparative cheerfulness when their party has returned to power.

Government was gradually made the affair of the people by the series of

Reform Acts extending from 1832 to 1885; and it is no mere accident

that this half-century also witnessed the political emancipation of the

British colonies. Nor must we forget the Acts beginning with the repeal

of the Test and Corporation Acts (1828) and Roman Catholic Emancipation

(1829), which extended political rights to men of all religious

persuasions. These and the Franchise Acts made the House of Commons

infinitely more representative than it had been before, and gave it its

conclusive superiority over the House of Lords. Not that the Peers

represent no one but themselves; had that been true, the House of Lords

would have disappeared long ago. In reality it came to embody a fairly

complete representation of the Conservative party; and as a party does

not need two legislative organs, the House of Lords retired whenever

the Conservatives controlled the House of Commons, and only resumed its

proper functions when the Liberals had a majority. Hence its most

indefensible characteristic as a Second Chamber became its strongest

practical bulwark; for it enlisted the support of many who had no

particular views about Second Chambers in the abstract, but were keenly

interested in the predominance of their party.

The restraint thus imposed by the House of Lords upon popular

government checked the development of its power and the extension of

its activity, which would naturally have followed upon the acquisition

by the people of control over the House of Commons and indirectly over

the Cabinet. Other causes co-operated to induce delay. The most

powerful was lack of popular education; constitutional privileges are

of no value to people who do not understand how they may be used, or

are so unimaginative and ill-disciplined as to prefer such immediate

and tangible rewards as a half-crown for their vote, a donation to

their football club or local charity, or a gracious word from an

interested lady, to their distant and infinitesimal share in the

direction of national government. This participation is, in fact, so

minute to the individual voter and so intangible in its operation, that

a high degree of education is required to appreciate its value; and the

Education Acts of 1870 and 1889 were indispensable preliminaries to

anything like a real democracy. A democracy really educated in politics

will express views strange to our ears with an emphasis of which even

yet we have little conception.

Other obstacles to the overthrow of the rule of _laissez faire_

were the vested interests of over-mighty manufacturers and landlords in

the maintenance of that anarchy which is the logical extreme of Liberty

and Property; and such elementary measures of humanity as the Factory

Acts were long resisted by men so humane as Cobden and John Bright as

arbitrary interventions with the natural liberty of man to drive

bargains with his fellows in search of a living wage. There seemed to

be no idea that economic warfare might be quite as degrading as that

primitive condition of natural war, in which Hobbes said that the life

of man was "nasty, short, brutish and mean," and that it might as

urgently require a similar sovereign remedy. The repugnance to such a

remedy was reinforced by crude analogies between a perverted Darwinism

and politics. Darwin's demonstration of evolution by means of the

struggle for existence in the natural world was used to support the

assumption that a similar struggle among civilized men was natural and

therefore inevitable; and that all attempts to interfere with the

conflict between the weak and the strong, the scrupulous and the

unscrupulous, were foredoomed to disastrous failure. It was forgotten

that civilization itself involves a more or less conscious repeal of

"Nature," and that the progress of man depends upon the conquest of

himself and of his surroundings. In a better sense of the word, the

evolution of man's self-control and conscience is just as "natural" as

the gratification of his animal instincts.

The view that each individual should be left without further help from

the state to cope with his environment might be acceptable to landlords

who had already obtained from parliament hundreds of Inclosure Acts,

and to manufacturers whose profits were inflated by laws making it

criminal for workmen to combine. They might rest from political

agitation and be thankful for their constitutional gains; at any rate

they had little to hope from a legislature in which working men had

votes. But the masses, who had just secured the franchise, were

reluctant to believe that the action of the state had lost its virtue

at the moment when the control of the state came within their grasp.

The vote seems to have been given them under the amiable delusion that

they would be happy when they got it, as if it had any value whatever

except as a means to an end. Nor is it adequate as a means: it is not

sufficient for a nation by adult suffrage to express its will; that

will has also to be carried into execution, and it requires a strong

executive to do so. Hence the reversal of the old Liberal attitude

towards the royal prerogative, which may be best dated from 1872, when

Gladstone abolished the purchase of commissions in the army by means of

the royal prerogative, after the proposed reform had been rejected as a

bill by the House of Lords. No Liberal is likely in the future to

suggest that "the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing,

and ought to be diminished"; because the prerogative of the crown has

become the privilege of the people.

The Franchise Acts had apparently provided a solution of the old

antithesis of Man _versus_ the State by comprehending all men

_in_ the state; and the great value of those reforms was that they

tended to eliminate force from the sphere of politics. When men could

vote, there was less reason in rebellion; and the antithesis of Man

_versus_ the State has almost been reduced to one of Woman _versus_ the

State. But representative government, which promised to be ideal when

every man, or every adult, had a vote, is threatened in various

quarters. Its operations are too deliberate and involved to satisfy

impatient spirits, and three alternative methods of procedure are

advocated as improvements upon it. One is the "direct action" of

working men, by which they can speedily obtain their objects through a

general or partial strike paralyzing the food supply or other national

necessities. This is obviously a dangerous and double-edged weapon, the

adoption of which by other sections of the community--the Army and

Navy, for instance, or the medical profession--might mean national

dissolution.

Another method is the Referendum, by which important decisions adopted

by parliament would be referred to a direct popular vote. This proposal

is only logical when coupled with the Initiative, by which a direct

popular vote could compel parliament to pass any measure desired by the

majority of voters; otherwise its object is merely obstructive. The

third method is the supersession of parliament by the action of the

executive. The difficulties which Liberal measures have experienced in

the House of Lords, and the impossibility of the House of Commons

dealing by debate with the increasing complexities of national

business, have encouraged a tendency in Liberal governments to entrust

to their departments decisions which trench upon the legislative

functions of parliament. The trend of hostile opinion is to regard

parliament as an unnecessary middleman, and to advocate in its stead a

sort of plebiscitary bureaucracy, a constitution under which

legislation drafted by officials would be demanded, sanctioned, or

rejected by direct popular vote, and would be discussed, like the

Insurance Bill, in informal conferences outside, rather than inside,

parliament; while administration by a vast army of experts would be

partially controlled by popularly elected ministers; for socialists

waver between their faith in human equality and their trust in the

superman. Others think that the milder method of Devolution, or "Home

Rule all round," would meet the evils caused by the congestion of

business, and restore to the Mother of Parliaments her time-honoured

function of governing by debate.

Parliament has already had to delegate legislative powers to other

bodies than colonial legislatures; and county councils, borough

councils, district councils, and parish councils share with it in

various degrees the task of legislating for the country. They can, of

course, only legislate, as they can only administer, within the limits

imposed by Act of Parliament; but their development, like the

multiplication of central administrative departments, indicates the

latest, but not the final, stages in the growth and specialization of

English government. A century and a half ago two Secretaries of State

were all that Great Britain required; now there are half-a-dozen, and a

dozen other departments have been added. Among them are the Local

Government Board, the Board of Education, the Board of Trade, the Board

of Agriculture, while many sub-departments such as the Public Health

Department of the Local Government Board, the Bankruptcy Department of

the Board of Trade, and the Factory Department of the Home Office, have

more work to do than originally had a Secretary of State. It is

probable, moreover, that departments will multiply and subdivide at an

ever-increasing rate.

All this, however, is merely machinery provided to give effect to

public opinion, which determines the use to which it shall be put. But

its very provision indicates that England expects the state to-day to

do more and more extensive duty for the individual. For one thing the

state has largely taken the place of the church as the organ of the

collective conscience of the community. It can hardly be said that the

Anglican church has an articulate conscience apart from questions of

canon law and ecclesiastical property; and other churches are, as

bodies, no better provided with creeds of social morality. The Eighth

Commandment is never applied to such genteel delinquencies as making a

false return of income, or defrauding a railway company or the customs;

but is reserved for the grosser offences which no member of the

congregation is likely to have committed; and it is left to the state

to provide by warning and penalty against neglect of one's duty to

one's neighbour when one's neighbour is not one individual but the sum

of all. It was not by any ecclesiastical agitation that some humanity

was introduced into the criminal code in the third decade of the

nineteenth century; and the protest against the blind cruelty of

economic _laissez faire_ was made by Sadler, Shaftesbury, Ruskin,

and Carlyle rather than by any church. Their writings and speeches

awoke a conscience in the state, which began to insist by means of

legislation upon humaner hours and conditions of labour, upon decent

sanitation, upon a standard of public education, and upon provision

being made against fraudulent dealings with more helpless fellow-men.

This public conscience has inevitably proved expensive, and the expense

has had to be borne either by the state or by the individual. Now, it

might have been possible, when the expense of these new standards of

public health and comfort began to be incurred, to provide by an heroic

effort of socialism for a perpetuation of the individualistic basis of

social duty. That is to say, if the state had guaranteed to every

individual an income which would enable him to bear his share of this

expense, it might also have imposed upon him the duty of meeting it, of

paying fees for the education of his children, for hospital treatment,

for medical inspection, and so forth. But that effort was not, and

perhaps could not, in the existing condition of public opinion, be

made; and the state has therefore got into the habit of providing and

paying for all these things itself. When the majority of male adults

earn twenty shillings or less a week, and possess a vote, there would

be no raising of standards at all, if they had to pay the cost. Hence

the state has been compelled step by step to meet the expense of

burdens imposed by its conscience. Free education has therefore

followed compulsory education; the demands of sanitary inspectors and

medical officers of health have led to free medical inspection, medical

treatment, the feeding of necessitous school children, and other

piecemeal socialism; and, ignoring the historical causes of this

development, we are embarked on a wordy warfare of socialists and

individualists as to the abstract merits of antagonistic theories.

It is mainly a battle of phrases, in which few pause to examine what

their opponents or they themselves mean by the epithets they employ. In

the sense in which the individualist uses the term socialist, there are

hardly any socialists, and in the sense in which the socialist uses the

term individualist, there are practically no individualists. In reality

we are all both individualists and socialists. It is a question of

degree and not of dogma; and most people are at heart agreed that some

economic socialism is required in order to promote a certain amount of

moral and intellectual individualism. The defect of so-called economic

individualism is that it reduces the mass of workers to one dead level

of common poverty, in which wages, instead of increasing like capital,

barely keep pace with the rise of rent and prices, in which men occupy

dwellings all alike in the same mean streets, pursuing the same routine

of labour and same trivial round of relaxation, and in which there

seems no possibility of securing for the individual adequate

opportunities for that development of his individuality by which alone

he can render his best service to the community.

That service is the common end and object towards which men of all

parties in English history have striven through the growth of conscious

and collective action. A communist has maintained that we are all

communists because we have developed a common army, a common navy, and

a common national government, in place of the individualistic forces

and jurisdictions of feudal barons. We have, indeed, nationalized these

things and many others as well, including the crown, the church, the

administration of justice, education, highways and byways, posts and

telegraphs, woods and forests. Even the House of Lords has been

constrained to abandon its independence by a process akin to that

medieval _peine forte et dure_, by which the obstinate individualist

was, when accused, compelled to surrender his ancient immunity and

submit to the common law; and this common control, which came into

being as the nation emerged out of its diverse elements in the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and slowly gathered force as

it realized its strength under the Tudors, has attained fresh momentum

in the latest ages as the state step by step extended to all sorts and

conditions of men a share in the exercise of its power.

This is the real English conquest, and it forms the chief content of

English history. It is part of the triumph of man over the forces of

nature and over himself, and the two have gone hand in hand. An English

state could hardly exist before men had made roads, but it could no

more exist until they had achieved that great victory of civilized

government by which a minority agrees for the sake of peace to submit

to the greater number. Steam and railways and telegraphs have placed

further powers in the hands of men; they have conquered the land and

the sea and the air; and medical science has built up their physique

and paved the way for empire in tropical climes. But while he has

conquered nature, man has also conquered himself. He has tamed his

combative instincts; he has reduced civil strife to political combats,

restrained national conflicts by treaties of arbitration, and subdued

private wars to judicial proceedings; it is only in partially civilized

countries that gentlemen cannot rule their temper or bend their honour

to the base arbitrament of justice. He looks before and after, and

forgoes the gratification of the present to insure against the

accidents of the future, though the extent to which the community as a

whole can follow the example of individuals in this respect remains at

the moment a test of its self-control and sense of collective

responsibility.

Whether this growth of power in the individual and in the state is a

good or an evil thing depends on the conscience of those who wield it.

The power of the over-mighty subject has generally been a tyranny; and

all power is distrusted by old-fashioned Liberals and philosophic

Anarchists, because they have a traditional suspicion that it will fall

into hostile or unscrupulous hands. But the forces of evil cannot be

overcome by _laissez faire_, and power is an indispensable weapon

of progress. A powerless state means a helpless community; and anarchy

is the worst of all forms of tyranny, because it is irresponsible,

incorrigible, and capricious. Weakness, moreover, is the parent of

panic, and panic brings cruelty in its train. So long as the state was

weak, it was cruel; and the hideous treason-laws of Tudor times were

due to fear. The weak cannot afford to be tolerant any more than the

poor can afford to be generous. Cecil thought that the state could not

afford to tolerate two forms of religion; to-day it tolerates hundreds,

and it laughs at treason because it is strong. We are humanitarian, not

because we are so much better than our ancestors, but because we can

afford the luxury of dissent and conscientious objections so much

better than they could. Political liberty and religious freedom depend

upon the power of the state, inspired, controlled, and guided by the

mind of the community.

Last of all, through this power man has acquired faith, not in

miraculous intervention, but in his capacity to work out his own

destinies by means of the weapons placed in his hands and the dominion

put under his feet. He no longer believes that the weakest must go to

the wall, and the helpless be trampled under foot in the march of

civilization; nature is no longer a mass of inscrutable, iron decrees,

but a treasury of forces to be tamed and used in the redemption of

mankind by man; and mankind is no longer a mob of blind victims to

panic and passion, but a more or less orderly host marching on to more

or less definite goals. The individual, however, can do little by

himself; he needs the strength of union for his herculean tasks; and he

has found that union in the state. It is not an engine of tyranny, but

the lever of social morality; and the function of English government is

not merely to embody the organized might and the executive brain of

England, but also to enforce its collective and coordinating

conscience.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C. 55. Julius Caesar's first invasion of Britain.

A.D. 43-110. Roman occupation of Britain.

410-577. Period of Anglo-Saxon colonization and conquest.

597-664. Conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to Christianity.

617-685. Northumbrian supremacy.

685-825. Mercian supremacy.

8O2-839. Ecgberht establishes West Saxon supremacy.

855. Danes first winter in England.

878. Peace of Wedmore between Alfred and the Danes.

900 (?). Death of Alfred.

9OO (?)-975. Edward the Elder, Athelstan, and Edgar. Reconquest of the

Danelaw.

978-1013. Ethelred the Unready. Return of the Danes.

1016. Edmund Ironside.

1016-1035. Canute.

1042.-1060. Edward the Confessor and the growth of Norman Influence.

1066. Harold and the Battle of Hastings. WILLIAM I.

1066-1071. The Norman Conquest. Submergence of the Anglo-Saxons.

1085-1086. Domesday Book. The Salisbury Oath.

1087-1100. WILLIAM II.

1100-1135. HENRY I and the beginnings of an administrative system. The

Exchequer and _Curia Regis_.

1135-1154. STEPHEN and Matilda. The period of baronial independence,

_i.e._ anarchy.

1154-1189. HENRY II restores order, curbs the military power of the

barons by scutage (1159), the Assize of Arms (1181), and the

substitution of sworn inquest for the ordeal and trial by battle,

and their jurisdiction by the development of the royal court of

justice through assizes of Clarendon, Northampton, etc. Teaches

the people to rely on their judgment. Restrains the sheriffs, and

attempts to limit ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the

constitutions of Clarendon (1164). Quarrel with Becket.

1189-1199. RICHARD I. Crusade and wars In France.

1199-1210. JOHN'S tyranny. Loss of Normandy (1204). Quarrel with the

church and baronage. Tries to retrieve his position by spirited

foreign policy. Defeated at Bouvines (1214) and forced to sign

Magna Carta (1215).

1216-1272. HENRY III. Beginnings of national government under De Burgh.

Naval victory (1217). Alien domination of Henry's favourites

provokes baronial resistance. Growth of native wealth and

influence, and of an English party in the Barons' War (1258-

1265). Simon De Montfort. Townsfolk summoned to Parliament.

1272-1307. EDWARD I, the first English king since the Norman Conquest.

Emergence of the English people, their language, national

weapons, towns, commerce. The Model Parliament(1275, 1295).

Confirmation of the charters(1297). National resistance to the

Papacy, and national enterprises against Wales and Scotland.

1307-1327. EDWARD II. The relapse of Monarchy. Baronage becoming

peerage. Thomas of Lancaster.

1327-1377. EDWARD III. Growth of nationalism in religion, politics,

literature, trade, and war. The Commons take the constitutional

lead abandoned by the peers. Lollardy and hostility to the

Papacy. Decay of manorial system: emancipation of villeins:

growth of industry and towns.

1377-1399. RICHARD II, Revolt of the peasants and artisans (1381).

Tries to emancipate himself from the control of the peers, and is

deposed.

1399-1413. HENRY IV and the Lancastrian dynasty. Revolt of the Percies

(1403). Henry's troubles with over-mighty subjects.

1413-1422. HENRY V seeks escape from domestic troubles in foreign war.

1415. Battle of Agincourt. Treaty of Troyes (1420).

1422. HENRY VI. Rivalry between Beaufort and Gloucester leads to growth

of Lancastrian and Yorkist factions, and these with local anarchy

produce the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485).

1461. EDWARD IV secures the throne, and in 1471 defeats both the

Lancastrians and Warwick the King-maker.

1483. RICHARD III.

1485. HENRY VII and the House of Tudor.

1487. Organization of the Star Chamber to repress disorder and over-

mighty subjects. Diaz doubles the Cape of Good Hope.

1492. Columbus discovers West Indies.

1496-1497. Cabot discovers Newfoundland and Labrador.

1509. HENRY VIII.

1512-1529. Wolsey.

1529-1536. The Reformation Parliament. The submission of the Clergy,

Acts of Annates, Appeals (1532-1533) and Supremacy (1534).

1536. Suppression of the Monasteries and Pilgrimage for Grace.

1539. Act of Six Articles.

1547-1553. EDWARD VI and the Protestant Reformation.

1549. First Act of Uniformity and Book of Common Prayer. Kett's

rebellion.

1552. Second Act of Uniformity and Book of Common Prayer.

1553-1558. MARY and the Roman Catholic reaction. Spanish control in

England.

1558. ELIZABETH.

1559. The Elizabethan settlement of religion.

1560. Elizabeth assists the Scots to expel the French.

1568-1569. Flight of Mary Queen of Scots into England, and rebellion of

the northern earls.

1570. Papal excommunication and deposition of Elizabeth.

1571. Ridolfi's plot.

1572. Execution of Norfolk and extinction of English dukedoms.

Beginning of the Dutch Republic. Massacre of St. Bartholomew.

1577-1580. Drake sails round the world.

1587. Execution of Mary Queen of Scots.

1588. Spanish Armada.

1599-1601. Conquest of Ireland.

1600. Foundation of East India Company.

1603. JAMES VI of Scotland and I of England.

1607. Foundation of Virginia.

1608. Plantation of Ulster.

1620. Sailing of the Mayflower.

1623. Re-creation of dukedoms. Massacre of Amboyna.

1625. CHARLES I.

1628. Petition of Right.

1629. First British capture of Quebec.

1629-1640. The "Eleven Years' Tyranny."

1638-1639. National Covenant. Bishops' war in Scotland.

1640. The Long Parliament.

1642. First Civil War.

1648. Second Civil War.

1649. THE COMMONWEALTH. Abolition of monarchy and the House of Lords.

1650-1651. Navigation Acts and Dutch War.

1653. THE PROTECTORATE. First Cromwellian constitution.

1657. Second Cromwellian constitution.

1658. Cromwell's death.

1660. The Restoration. CHARLES II.

1662. The last Act of Uniformity.

1664. War with the Dutch: conquest of New Netherlands

1667. Fall of Clarendon. The Cabal administration.

1670. Treaty of Dover.

1672. Declaration of Indulgence.

1673. Danby. The Test Act.

1678. Titus Gates' Plot.

1679. Habeas Corpus Act.

1681. Charles II's triumph over the Whigs.

1685. JAMES II. Monmouth's and Argyll's rebellions.

1688. The Revolution. WILLIAM III and MARY.

1689. Bill of Rights. Toleration Act.

1690. Battle of the Boyne.

1694. Bank of England established.

1696. The Whig _Junto_.

1701. Act of Settlement.

1702. ANNE. War with France.

1704. Capture of Gibraltar. England becomes a Mediterranean power.

1707. Act of Union with Scotland.

1708. Capture of Minorca.

1708-1710. Whig ministry.

1710-1714. Tory ministry.

1713. Peace of Utrecht.

1714. GEORGE I and the Hanoverian dynasty.

1721-1742. Walpole's administration. Evolution of the Cabinet and Prime

Minister. Growth of imports and exports,

1727. GEORGE II.

1739. War with Spain.

1741-1748. War of the Austrian Succession. Clive in India.

1756-1763. Seven Years' War.

1757. Battle of Plassey.

1759. Capture of Quebec.

1760. GEORGE III.

1764-1779. Inventions by Arkwright, Hargreaves, and Crompton. Beginning

of the Industrial Revolution.

1765. Grenville's Stamp Act.

1770. Lord North Prime Minister. Captain Cook surveys Australia and New

Zealand.

1774. The Quebec Act.

1776. Declaration of American Independence. Adam Smith's _Wealth of

Nations_.

1778-1779. France and Spain join the Americans.

1780. The "Armed Neutrality." Warren Hastings saves India.

1781. Fall of Yorktown.

1782. Volunteer movement In Ireland. Irish parliamentary independence.

1783. American Independence granted.

1784. Pitt Prime Minister: his India Bill.

1788. Convict settlement in Australia.

1789. French Revolution.

1791. The Canadian Constitutional Act.

1794. The "Glorious First of June."

1795-1796. Conquest of the Cape and of Ceylon.

1797. Battles of St. Vincent and Camperdown.

1798. Battle of the Nile. Irish rebellion.

1799. Wellesley in India. Capture of Seringapatam. Partition of Mysore

and the Carnatic.

1800. Union of Great Britain and Ireland. Seizure of Malta.

1801. Battle of Copenhagen.

1802. Peace of Amiens.

1803. Battles of Assye and Argaum. Defeat of the Mahrattas.

1805. Battle of Trafalgar.

1806. Second capture of the Cape.

1808-1814. Peninsular War.

1810. Capture of Mauritius.

1812-1814. War with the United States.

1814. Corn Laws passed.

1815. Battle of Waterloo.

1820. GEORGE IV.

1825. Huskisson's Tariff Reform.

1827. Battle of Navarino.

1828. Corn Laws revised.

1828-1829. Repeal of Test Act. Roman Catholic Emancipation.

1830. WILLIAM IV. Whigs return to power.

1832. First Reform Act. Representative Government established in

Newfoundland.

1834-1835. Reform of the Poor Law and Municipal corporations.

1837. QUEEN VICTORIA. Mackenzie and Papineau's rebellions in Canada.

Great Boer "trek."

1840. Annexation of New Zealand.

1841-1846. Peel's Free Trade policy.

1842. Representative government in Australia.

1846. Corn Laws repealed.

1848. Responsible self-government In Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova

Scotia.

1849. Repeal of the Navigation Acts.

1852. Responsible government developed In Australia and New Zealand.

1853. Representative government in Cape Colony.

1854-1856. Crimean War.

1855. Responsible government in Newfoundland. 1856. Representative

government in Natal.

1857. Indian Mutiny.

1858. Transference of India to the Crown.

1867. Disraeli's Reform Act. Federation of the Dominion of Canada.

1869. Disestablishment of the Irish Church. Opening of the Suez Canal.

1870. Compulsory education.

1872. Abolition of purchase in the army by executive action.

Responsible government in Cape Colony.

1876. Queen proclaimed Empress of India.

1876-1877. Russo-Turkish War. Dual control established in Egypt.

Annexation of the Transvaal.

1881. Transvaal granted independence.

1882. British administration of Egypt begins.

1885. Fall of Khartoum. Gladstone's Reform Act. Annexation of Burma.

1887. Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy.

1889. Establishment of County Councils.

1890. Free Education. Franco-Russian _entente_. Responsible

government in Western Australia.

1893. Responsible government in Natal.

1894. Establishment of district and parish councils.

1895. Jameson Raid.

1896-1898. Reconquest of the Sudan.

1899-1903. The Great Boer War.

1900. Establishment of the Australian Commonwealth.

1901. EDWARD VII.

1904. Russo-Japanese War.

1905. Anglo-Japanese alliance.

1906-1907. Responsible government granted to the Transvaal and Orange

River Colonies.

1909. The Union of South Africa.

1910. GEORGE V.

1911. Asquith's Parliament Act. Capital of India transferred from

Calcutta to Delhi. Beginnings of National Insurance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

J. R. GREEN'S _Short History of the English People_ (Macmillan), and C.

R. L. FLETCHER'S _Introductory History of England_, 4 vols. (Murray),

both eminently readable in very different styles, illustrate the

diverse methods of treatment to which English history lends itself.

More elaborate surveys are provided by LONGMANS' _Political History of

England_, 12 vols. (edited by W. Hunt and R. L. Poole), and METHUEN'S

_History of England_, 7 vols. (edited by C. Oman).

The student of Constitutional History should begin with F. W.

MAITLAND'S _Lectures on Constitutional History_ (Cambridge University

Press), and for a compendium of facts may use Medley's _Constitutional

History of England_ (Blackwell).

Periods can be studied in greater detail in--J. R. GREEN: _The Making

of England_ and _The Conquest of England_ (Macmillan). FREEMAN: _Norman

Conquest,_ 6 vols., and _William Rufus_, 2 vols. (Oxford University

Press). NORGATE: _England under the Angevins_, 2 vols., and _John

Lackland_ (Macmillan). RAMSAY: _Lancaster and York_, 2 vols. FROUDE:

_History of England_, 1529-1588, 12 vols. (Longmans). GARDINER:

_History of England_, 1603-1642, 10 vols.; _Civil War_, 1642-1649, 4

vols.; _Commonwealth and Protectorate_, 1649-1656, 4 vols. (Longmans).

MACAULAY: _History of England_, 1685-1702 (Longmans). LECKY: _History

of England_, 1714-1793, 7 vols.; _Ireland_, 1714-1800, 5 vols.

(Longmans). SPENCER WALPOLE: _History of England_, 1815-1846, 6 vols.

HERBERT PAUL: _History of Modern England_, 1846-1895, 5 vols.

(Macmillan). MORLEY: _Life of Gladstone_, 2 vols. (Macmillan).

English Constitutional History is detailed in--STUBBS: _Constitutional

History to 1485_, 3 vols. (Oxford University Press). HALLAM:

_Constitutional History_, 1485-1760, 3 vols. (Murray). ERSKINE MAY:

_Constitutional History,_ 1760-1860, 3 vols. (Longmans). ANSON: _Law

and Custom of the Constitution,_ 3 vols. (Oxford University Press).

DICEY: _Custom of the Constitution_ (Macmillan).

For Ecclesiastical History see STEPHENS and HUNT'S _History of the

Church of England,_ 7 vols. (Macmillan); for Colonial History, SEELEY'S

_Expansion of England_ (Macmillan), and _The British Empire_ (ed.

Pollard; League of the Empire); for Economic and Industrial History,

CUNNINGHAM'S _Growth of Industry and Commerce_, 3 vols.; ASHLEY'S

_Economic History_, 2 vols. (Macmillan), and TOYNBEE'S _Industrial

Revolution_; for sketches of movements and biographies, see MACAULAY'S

_Essays_ (Longmans), STUBB'S _Lectures on Mediaeval and Modern History_

(Oxford University Press), and POLLARD'S _Factors in Modern History_

(Constable).

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