WASHINGTON, _June 22, 1860_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
In my message to the House of Representatives of the 28th March last I
solemnly protested against the creation of a committee, at the head of
which was placed my accuser, for the purpose of investigating whether
the President had, "by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought
to influence the action of Congress or any committee thereof for or
against the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any State
or Territory," I protested against this because it was destitute of any
specification; because it referred to no particular act to enable the
President to prepare for his defense; because it deprived him of the
constitutional guards which, in common with every citizen of the United
States, he possesses for his protection, and because it assailed his
constitutional independence as a coordinate branch of the Government.
There is an enlightened justice, as well as a beautiful symmetry, in
every part of the Constitution. This is conspicuously manifested in
regard to impeachments. The House of Representatives possesses "the
sole power of impeachment," the Senate "the sole power to try all
impeachments;" and the impeachable offenses are "treason, bribery, or
other high crimes or misdemeanors." The practice of the House from the
earliest times had been in accordance with its own dignity, the rights
of the accused, and the demands of justice. At the commencement of each
judicial investigation which might lead to an impeachment specific
charges were always preferred; the accused had an opportunity of
cross-examining the witnesses, and he was placed in full possession of
the precise nature of the offense which he had to meet. An impartial and
elevated standing committee was charged with this investigation, upon
which no member inspired with the ancient sense of honor and justice
would have served had he ever expressed an opinion against the accused.
Until the present occasion it was never deemed proper to transform the
accuser into the judge and to confer upon him the selection of his own
committee.
The charges made against me in vague and general terms were of such
a false and atrocious character that I did not entertain a moment's
apprehension for the result. They were abhorrent to every principle
instilled into me from my youth and every practice of my life, and I
did not believe it possible that the man existed who would so basely
perjure himself as to swear to the truth of any such accusations. In
this conviction I am informed I have not been mistaken.
In my former protest, therefore, I truly and emphatically declared
that it was made for no reason personal to myself, but because the
proceedings of the House were in violation of the rights of the
coordinate executive branch of the Government, subversive of its
constitutional independence, and if unresisted would establish
a precedent dangerous and embarrassing to all my successors.
Notwithstanding all this, if the committee had not transcended
the authority conferred upon it by the resolution of the House of
Representatives, broad and general as this was, I should have remained
silent upon the subject. What I now charge is that they have acted as
though they possessed unlimited power, and, without any warrant whatever
in the resolution under which they were appointed, have pursued a course
not merely at war with the constitutional rights of the Executive, but
tending to degrade the Presidential office itself to such a degree as to
render it unworthy of the acceptance of any man of honor or principle.
The resolution of the House, so far as it is accusatory of the
President, is confined to an inquiry whether he had used corrupt or
improper means to influence the action of Congress or any of its
committees on legislative measures pending before them--nothing more,
nothing less. I have not learned through the newspapers or in any other
mode that the committee have touched the other accusatory branch of the
resolution, charging the President with a violation of duty in failing
to execute some law or laws. This branch of the resolution is therefore
out of the question. By what authority, then, have the committee
undertaken to investigate the course of the President in regard to the
convention which framed the Lecompton constitution? By what authority
have they undertaken to pry into our foreign relations for the purpose
of assailing him on account of the instructions given by the Secretary
of State to our minister in Mexico relative to the Tehuantepec route?
By what authority have they inquired into the causes of removal from
office, and this from the parties themselves removed, with a view to
prejudice his character, notwithstanding this power of removal belongs
exclusively to the President under the Constitution, was so decided by
the First Congress in the year 1789, and has accordingly ever since been
exercised? There is in the resolution no pretext of authority for the
committee to investigate the question of the printing of the post-office
blanks; nor is it to be supposed that the House, if asked, would have
granted such an authority, because this question had been previously
committed to two other committees--one in the Senate and the other in
the House. Notwithstanding this absolute want of power, the committee
rushed into this investigation in advance of all other subjects.
The committee proceeded for months, from March 22, 1860, to examine _ex
parte_ and without any notice to myself into every subject which could
possibly affect my character. Interested and vindictive witnesses were
summoned and examined before them; and the first and only information of
their testimony which, in almost every instance, I received was obtained
from the publication of such portions of it as could injuriously affect
myself in the New York journals. It mattered not that these statements
were, so far as I have learned, disproved by the most respectable
witnesses who happened to be on the spot. The telegraph was silent
respecting these contradictions. It was a secret committee in regard
to the testimony in my defense, but it was public in regard to all the
testimony which could by possibility reflect on my character. The poison
was left to produce its effect upon the public mind, whilst the antidote
was carefully withheld.
In their examinations the committee violated the most sacred and
honorable confidences existing among men. Private correspondence,
which a truly honorable man would never even entertain a distant thought
of divulging, was dragged to light. Different persons in official and
confidential relations with myself, and with whom it was supposed I
might have held conversations the revelation of which would do me
injury, were examined. Even members of the Senate and members of my own
Cabinet, both my constitutional advisers, were called upon to testify,
for the purpose of discovering something, if possible, to my discredit.
The distribution of the patronage of the Government is by far the most
disagreeable duty of the President. Applicants are so numerous and their
applications are pressed with such eagerness by their friends, both in
and out of Congress, that the selection of one for any desirable office
gives offense to many. Disappointed applicants, removed officers, and
those who for any cause, real or imaginary, had become hostile to the
Administration presented themselves or were invited by a summons to
appear before the committee. These are the most dangerous witnesses.
Even with the best intentions they are so influenced by prejudice and
disappointment that they almost inevitably discolor truth. They swear to
their own version of private conversations with the President without
the possibility of contradiction. His lips are sealed, and he is left
at their mercy. He can not, as a coordinate branch of the Government,
appear before a committee of investigation to contradict the oaths of
such witnesses. Every coward knows that he can employ insulting language
against the President with impunity, and every false or prejudiced
witness can attempt to swear away his character before such a committee
without the fear of contradiction.
Thus for months, whilst doing my best at one end of the Avenue to
perform my high and responsible duties to the country, has there been a
committee of the House of Representatives in session at the other end of
the Avenue spreading a drag net, without the shadow of authority from
the House, over the whole Union, to catch any disappointed man willing
to malign my character; and all this in secret conclave. The lion's
mouth at Venice, into which secret denunciations were dropped, is an
apt illustration of the Covode committee. The star-chamber, tyrannical
and odious as it was, never proceeded in such a manner. For centuries
there has been nothing like it in any civilized country, except the
revolutionary tribunal of France in the days of Robespierre. Now I
undertake to state and to prove that should the proceedings of the
committee be sanctioned by the House and become a precedent for future
times the balance of the Constitution will be entirely upset, and there
will no longer remain the three coordinate and independent branches of
the Government--legislative, executive, and judicial. The worst fears of
the patriots and statesmen who framed the Constitution in regard to the
usurpations of the legislative on the executive and judicial branches
will then be realized. In the language of Mr. Madison, speaking on this
very subject in the forty-eighth number of the Federalist:
In a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is
carefully limited, both in the extent and duration of its power, and
where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly which is
inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid
confidence in its own strength, which is sufficiently numerous to feel
all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to
be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which
reason prescribes, it is against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions.
And in the expressive and pointed language of Mr. Jefferson, when
speaking of the tendency of the legislative branch of Government to
usurp the rights of the weaker branches:
The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition
of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers
will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one.
One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive
as one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on the Republic of
Venice. As little will it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves.
An elective despotism was not the government we fought for, but one
which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy as that no one could transcend their legal limits
without being effectually checked and controlled by the others.
Should the proceedings of the Covode committee become a precedent, both
the letter and spirit of the Constitution will be violated. One of the
three massive columns on which the whole superstructure rests will be
broken down. Instead of the Executive being a coordinate it will become
a subordinate branch of the Government. The Presidential office will
be dragged into the dust. The House of Representatives will then have
rendered the Executive almost necessarily subservient to its wishes,
instead of being independent. How is it possible that two powers in the
State can be coordinate and independent of each other if the one claims
and exercises the power to reprove and to censure all the official acts
and all the private conversations of the other, and this upon _ex parte_
testimony before a secret inquisitorial committee in short, to assume a
general censorship over the other? The idea is as absurd in public as
it would be in private life. Should the President attempt to assert and
maintain his own independence, future Covode committees may dragoon him
into submission by collecting the hosts of disappointed office hunters,
removed officers, and those who desire to live upon the public Treasury,
which must follow in the wake of every Administration, and they in
secret conclave will swear away his reputation. Under such circumstances
he must be a very bold man should he not surrender at discretion and
consent to exercise his authority according to the will of those
invested with this terrific power. The sovereign people of the several
States have elected him to the highest and most honorable office in
the world. He is their only direct representative in the Government.
By their Constitution they have made him Commander in Chief of their
Army and Navy. He represents them in their intercourse with foreign
nations. Clothed with their dignity and authority, he occupies a proud
position before all nations, civilized and savage. With the consent of
the Senate, he appoints all the important officers of the Government.
He exercises the veto power, and to that extent controls the legislation
of Congress. For the performance of these high duties he is responsible
to the people of the several States, and not in any degree to the House
of Representatives.
Shall he surrender these high powers, conferred upon him as the
representative of the American people for their benefit, to the House
to be exercised under their overshadowing influence and control? Shall
he alone of all the citizens of the United States be denied a fair
trial? Shall he alone not be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation" against him? Shall he alone not "be confronted with the
witnesses" against him? Shall the House of Representatives, usurping the
powers of the Senate, proceed to try the President through the agency of
a secret committee of the body, where it is impossible he can make any
defense, and then, without affording him an opportunity of being heard,
pronounce a judgment of censure against him? The very same rule might
be applied for the very same reason to every judge of every court of
the United States. From what part of the Constitution is this terrible
secret inquisitorial power derived? No such express power exists.
From which of the enumerated powers can it be inferred? It is true the
House can not pronounce the formal judgment against him of "removal
from office," but they can by their judgment of censure asperse his
reputation, and thus to the extent of their influence render the office
contemptible. An example is at hand of the reckless manner in which this
power of censure can be employed in high party times. The House on a
recent occasion have attempted to degrade the President by adopting the
resolution of Mr. John Sherman declaring that he, in conjunction with
the Secretary of the Navy, "by receiving and considering the party
relations of bidders for contracts and the effect of awarding contracts
upon pending elections, have set an example dangerous to the public
safety and deserving the reproof of this House."
It will scarcely be credited that the sole pretext for this vote of
censure was the simple fact that in disposing of the numerous letters
of every imaginable character which I daily receive I had in the usual
course of business referred a letter from Colonel Patterson, of
Philadelphia, in relation to a contract, to the attention of the
Secretary of the Navy, the head of the appropriate Department, without
expressing or intimating any opinion whatever on the subject; and to
make the matter if possible still plainer, the Secretary had informed
the committee that "_the President did not in any manner interfere in
this case, nor has he in any other case of contract since I have been
in the Department_." The absence of all proof to sustain this attempt
to degrade the President, whilst it manifests the venom of the shaft
aimed at him, has destroyed the vigor of the bow.
To return after this digression: Should the House, by the institution
of Covode committees, votes of censure, and other devices to harass the
President, reduce him to subservience to their will and render him their
creature, then the well-balanced Government which our fathers framed
will be annihilated. This conflict has already been commenced in earnest
by the House against the Executive. A bad precedent rarely, if ever,
dies. It will, I fear, be pursued in the time of my successors, no
matter what may be their political character. Should secret committees
be appointed with unlimited authority to range over all the words and
actions, and, if possible, the very thoughts, of the President with a
view to discover something in his past life prejudicial to his character
from parasites and informers, this would be an ordeal which scarcely any
mere man since the fall could endure. It would be to subject him to a
reign of terror from which the stoutest and purest heart might shrink.
I have passed triumphantly through this ordeal. My vindication is
complete. The committee have reported no resolution looking to an
impeachment against me; no resolution of censure; not even a resolution
pointing out any abuses in any of the Executive Departments of the
Government to be corrected by legislation. This is the highest
commendation which could be bestowed on the heads of these Departments.
The sovereign people of the States will, however, I trust, save my
successors, whoever they may be, from any such ordeal. They are frank,
bold, and honest. They detest delators and informers. I therefore, in
the name and as the representative of this great people, and standing
upon the ramparts of the Constitution which they "have ordained and
established," do solemnly protest against these unprecedented and
unconstitutional proceedings.
There was still another committee raised by the House on the 6th
March last, on motion of Mr. Hoard, to which I had not the slightest
objection. The resolution creating it was confined to specific charges,
which I have ever since been ready and willing to meet. I have at
all times invited and defied fair investigation upon constitutional
principles. I have received no notice that this committee have ever
proceeded to the investigation.
Why should the House of Representatives desire to encroach on the other
departments of the Government? Their rightful powers are ample for every
legitimate purpose. They are the impeaching body. In their legislative
capacity it is their most wise and wholesome prerogative to institute
rigid examinations into the manner in which all departments of the
Government are conducted, with a view to reform abuses, to promote
economy, and to improve every branch of administration. Should they
find reason to believe in the course of their examinations that any
grave offense had been committed by the President or any officer of
the Government rendering it proper, in their judgment, to resort to
impeachment, their course would be plain. They would then transfer the
question from their legislative to their accusatory jurisdiction, and
take care that in all the preliminary judicial proceedings preparatory
to the vote of articles of impeachment the accused should enjoy the
benefit of cross-examining the witnesses and all the other safeguards
with which the Constitution surrounds every American citizen.
If in a legislative investigation it should appear that the public
interest required the removal of any officer of the Government, no
President has ever existed who, after giving him a fair hearing, would
hesitate to apply the remedy.
This I take to be the ancient and well-established practice. An
adherence to it will best promote the harmony and the dignity of the
intercourse between the coordinate branches of the Government and render
us all more respectable both in the eyes of our own countrymen and of
foreign nations.