WASHINGTON, _June 25, 1860_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
I have approved and signed the bill entitled "An act making
appropriation for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the year
ending the 30th of June, 1861."
In notifying the House of my approval of this bill I deem it proper,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to make a few explanatory
observations, so that my course may not hereafter be misunderstood.
Amid a great variety of important appropriations, this bill contains an
appropriation "for the completion of the Washington Aqueduct, $500,000,
to be expended according to the plans and estimates of Captain Meigs
and under his superintendence: _Provided_, That the office of engineer
of the Potomac Waterworks is hereby abolished and its duties shall
hereafter be discharged by the chief engineer of the Washington
Aqueduct." To this appropriation, for a wise and beneficial object,
I have not the least objection. It is true I had reason to believe when
the last appropriation was made of $800,000 on the 12th of June, 1858,
"_for the completion of the Washington Aqueduct_" this would have been
sufficient for the purpose. It is now discovered, however, that it will
require half a million more "_for the completion of the Washington
Aqueduct_" and this ought to be granted.
The Captain Meigs to whom the bill refers is Montgomery C. Meigs, a
captain in the Corps of Engineers of the Army of the United States, who
has superintended this work from its commencement under the authority
of the late and present Secretary of War.
Had this appropriation been made in the usual form, no difficulty could
have arisen upon it. This bill, however, annexes a declaration to the
appropriation that the money is to be expended under the superintendence
of Captain Meigs.
The first aspect in which this clause presented itself to my mind was
that it interfered with the right of the President to be "Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." If this had really
been the case, there would have been an end to the question. Upon
further examination I deemed it impossible that Congress could have
intended to interfere with the clear right of the President to command
the Army and to order its officers to any duty he might deem most
expedient for the public interest. If they could withdraw an officer
from the command of the President and select him for the performance
of an executive duty, they might upon the same principle annex to an
appropriation to carry on a war a condition requiring it not to be used
for the defense of the country unless a particular person of its own
selection should command the Army. It was impossible that Congress could
have had such an intention, and therefore, according to my construction
of the clause in question, it merely designated Captain Meigs as its
preference for the work, without intending to deprive the President of
the power to order him to any other army duty for the performance of
which he might consider him better adapted. Still, whilst this clause
may not be, and I believe is not, a violation of the Constitution,
yet how destructive it would be to all proper subordination and how
demoralizing its effect upon the morale of the Army if it should become
a precedent for future legislation! Officers might then be found,
instead of performing their appropriate duties, besieging the halls of
Congress for the purpose of obtaining special favors and choice places
by legislative enactment. Under these circumstances I have deemed it
but fair to inform Congress that whilst I do not consider the bill
unconstitutional, this is only because, in my opinion, Congress did not
intend by the language which they have employed to interfere with my
absolute authority to order Captain Meigs to any other service I might
deem expedient. My perfect right still remains, notwithstanding the
clause, to send him away from Washington to any part of the Union to
superintend the erection of a fortification or on any other appropriate
duty.
It has been alleged, I think without sufficient cause, that this
clause is unconstitutional because it has created a new office and has
appointed Captain Meigs to perform its duties. If it had done this, it
would have been a clear question, because Congress have no right to
appoint to any office, this being specially conferred upon the President
and Senate. It is evident that Congress intended nothing more by this
clause than to express a decided opinion that Captain Meigs should be
continued in the employment to which he had been previously assigned
by competent authority.
It is not improbable that another question of grave importance may arise
out of this clause. Is the appropriation conditional and will it fall
provided I do not deem it proper that it shall be expended under the
superintendence of Captain Meigs? This is a question which shall receive
serious consideration, because upon its decision may depend whether
the completion of the waterworks shall be arrested for another season.
It is not probable that Congress could have intended that this great
and important work should depend upon the various casualties and
vicissitudes incident to the natural or official life of a single
officer of the Army. This would be to make the work subordinate to the
man, and not the man to the work, and to reverse our great axiomatic
rule of "principles, not men." I desire to express no opinion upon the
subject. Should the question ever arise, it shall have my serious
consideration.