WASHINGTON, _February 18, 1859_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:
The brief period which remains of your present session and the great
urgency and importance of legislative action before its termination for
the protection of American citizens and their property whilst in transit
across the Isthmus routes between our Atlantic and Pacific possessions
render it my duty again to recall this subject to your notice. I have
heretofore presented it in my annual messages, both in December, 1857
and 1858, to which I beg leave to refer. In the latter I state that--
The executive government of this country in its intercourse with
foreign nations is limited to the employment of diplomacy alone. When
this fails it can proceed no further. It can not legitimately resort
to force without the direct authority of Congress, except in resisting
and repelling hostile attacks. It would have no authority to enter the
territories of Nicaragua even to prevent the destruction of the transit
and protect the lives and property of our own citizens on their
passage. It is true that on a sudden emergency of this character the
President would direct any armed force in the vicinity to march
to their relief, but in doing this he would act upon his own
responsibility.
Under these circumstances I earnestly recommend to Congress the
passage of an act authorizing the President, under such restrictions
as they may deem proper, to employ the land and naval forces of the
United States in preventing the transit from being obstructed or
closed by lawless violence and in protecting the lives and property of
American citizens traveling thereupon, requiring at the same time that
these forces shall be withdrawn the moment the danger shall have passed
away. Without such a provision our citizens will be constantly exposed
to interruption in their progress and to lawless violence.
A similar necessity exists for the passage of such an act for the
protection of the Panama and Tehuantepee routes.
Another subject, equally important, commanded the attention of the
Senate at the last session of Congress.
The Republics south of the United States on this continent have,
unfortunately, been frequently in a state of revolution and civil
war ever since they achieved their independence. As one or the other
party has prevailed and obtained possession of the ports open to foreign
commerce, they have seized and confiscated American vessels and their
cargoes in an arbitrary and lawless manner and exacted money from
American citizens by forced loans and other violent proceedings to
enable them to carry on hostilities. The executive governments of Great
Britain, France, and other countries, possessing the war-making power,
can promptly employ the necessary means to enforce immediate redress for
similar outrages upon their subjects. Not so the executive government
of the United States.
If the President orders a vessel of war to any of these ports to demand
prompt redress for outrages committed, the offending parties are
well aware that in case of refusal the commander can do no more than
remonstrate. He can resort to no hostile act. The question must then be
referred to diplomacy, and in many cases adequate redress can never be
obtained. Thus American citizens are deprived of the same protection
under the flag of their country which the subjects of other nations
enjoy. The remedy for this state of things can only be supplied by
Congress, since the Constitution has confided to that body alone the
power to make war. Without the authority of Congress the Executive can
not lawfully direct any force, however near it may be to the scene of
difficulty, to enter the territory of Mexico, Nicaragua, or New Granada
for the purpose of defending the persons and property of American
citizens, even though they may be violently assailed whilst passing in
peaceful transit over the Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, or Panama routes. He
can not, without transcending his constitutional power, direct a gun to
be fired into a port or land a seaman or marine to protect the lives
of our countrymen on shore or to obtain redress for a recent outrage
on their property. The banditti which infest our neighboring Republic
of Mexico, always claiming to belong to one or other of the hostile
parties, might make a sudden descent on Vera Cruz or on the Tehuantepec
route, and he would have no power to employ the force on shipboard in
the vicinity for their relief, either to prevent the plunder of our
merchants or the destruction of the transit.
In reference to countries where the local authorities are strong
enough to enforce the laws, the difficulty here indicated can seldom
happen; but where this is not the case and the local authorities do not
possess the physical power, even if they possess the will, to protect
our citizens within their limits recent experience has shown that
the American Executive should itself be authorized to render this
protection. Such a grant of authority, thus limited in its extent,
could in no just sense be regarded as a transfer of the war-making
power to the Executive, but only as an appropriate exercise of that
power by the body to whom it exclusively belongs. The riot at Panama
in 1856, in which a great number of our citizens lost their lives,
furnishes a pointed illustration of the necessity which may arise for
the exertion of this authority.
I therefore earnestly recommend to Congress, on whom the responsibility
exclusively rests, to pass a law before their adjournment conferring on
the President the power to protect the lives and property of American
citizens in the cases which I have indicated, under such restrictions
and conditions as they may deem advisable. The knowledge that such a
law exists would of itself go far to prevent the outrages which it is
intended to redress and to render the employment of force unnecessary.
Without this the President may be placed in a painful position before
the meeting of the next Congress. In the present disturbed condition of
Mexico and one or more of the other Republics south of us, no person can
foresee what occurrences may take place before that period. In case
of emergency, our citizens, seeing that they do not enjoy the same
protection with subjects of European Governments, will have just cause
to complain. On the other hand, should the Executive interpose, and
especially should the result prove disastrous and valuable lives be
lost, he might subject himself to severe censure for having assumed a
power not confided to him by the Constitution. It is to guard against
this contingency that I now appeal to Congress.
Having thus recommended to Congress a measure which I deem necessary and
expedient for the interest and honor of the country, I leave the whole
subject to their wisdom and discretion.