Of much of this, also, Jefferson himself seems to have been conscious;

and perhaps never does he rise before us with more dignity, with more

truth, than when, late in his lifetime, hurt by the captious and jangling

words of disparagement then recently put into writing by his old

comrade, to the effect that the Declaration of Independence “contained no

new ideas, that it is a commonplace compilation, its sentences hackneyed

in Congress for two years before, and its essence contained in Otis’s

pamphlet,” Jefferson quietly remarked that perhaps these statements might

“all be true: of that I am not to be the judge.... Whether I had gathered

my ideas from reading or reflection, I do not know. I know only that I

turned to neither book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider

it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer

no sentiment which had ever been expressed before.”

Before passing from this phase of the subject, however, it should be

added that, while the Declaration of Independence lacks originality in

the sense just indicated, in another and perhaps in a higher sense, it

possesses originality—it is individualized by the character and by the

genius of its author. Jefferson gathered up the thoughts and emotions

and even the characteristic phrases of the people for whom he wrote,

and these he perfectly incorporated with what was already in his mind,

and then to the music of his own keen, rich, passionate, and enkindling

style, he mustered them into that stately and triumphant procession

wherein, as some of us still think, they will go marching on to the

world’s end.

There were then in Congress several other men who could have written the

Declaration of Independence, and written it well—notably Franklin, either

of the two Adamses, Richard Henry Lee, William Livingston, and, best of

all, but for his own opposition to the measure, John Dickinson; but had

any one of these other men written the Declaration of Independence,

while it would have contained, doubtless, nearly the same topics and

nearly the same great formulas of political statement, it would yet have

been a wholly different composition from this of Jefferson’s. No one at

all familiar with his other writings, as well as with the writings of his

chief contemporaries, could ever have a moment’s doubt, even if the fact

were not already notorious, that this document was by Jefferson. He put

into it something that was his own, and that no one else could have put

there. He put himself into it—his own genius, his own moral force, his

faith in God, his faith in ideas, his love of innovation, his passion for

progress, his invincible enthusiasm, his intolerance of prescription, of

injustice, of cruelty; his sympathy, his clarity of vision, his affluence

of diction, his power to fling out great phrases which will long fire and

cheer the souls of men struggling against political unrighteousness.

And herein lies its essential originality, perhaps the most precious,

and, indeed, almost the only originality ever attaching to any great

literary product that is representative of its time. He made for himself

no improper claim, therefore, when he directed that upon the granite

obelisk at his grave should be carved the words: “Here was buried Thomas

Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence.”

V

If the Declaration of Independence is now to be fairly judged by us, it

must be judged with reference to what it was intended to be, namely,

an impassioned manifesto of one party, and that the weaker party, in a

violent race-quarrel; of a party resolved, at last, upon the extremity

of revolution, and already menaced by the inconceivable disaster of

being defeated in the very act of armed rebellion against the mightiest

military power on earth. This manifesto, then, is not to be censured

because, being avowedly a statement of his own side of the quarrel,

it does not also contain a moderate and judicial statement of the

opposite side; or because, being necessarily partisan in method, it is

likewise both partisan and vehement in tone; or because it bristles

with accusations against the enemy so fierce and so unqualified as now

to seem in some respects overdrawn; or because it resounds with certain

great aphorisms about the natural rights of man, at which, indeed,

political science cannot now smile, except to its own discomfiture

and shame—aphorisms which are likely to abide in this world as the

chief source and inspiration of heroic enterprises among men for

self-deliverance from oppression.

Taking into account, therefore, as we are bound to do, the circumstances

of its origin, and especially its purpose as a solemn and piercing appeal

to mankind on behalf of a small and weak nation against the alleged

injustice and cruelty of a great and powerful one, it still remains our

duty to inquire whether, as has been asserted in our time, history must

set aside either of the two central charges embodied in the Declaration

of Independence.

The first of these charges affirms that the several acts complained of by

the colonists evinced “a design to reduce them under absolute despotism,”

and had as their “direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny”

over the American people. Was this, indeed, a groundless charge, in the

sense intended by the words “despotism” and “tyranny”—that is, in the

sense commonly given to those words in the usage of the English-speaking

race? According to that usage, it was not an Oriental despotism that

was meant, nor a Greek tyranny, nor a Roman, nor a Spanish. The sort of

despot, the sort of tyrant, whom the English people, ever since the time

of King John and especially during the period of the Stuarts, had been

accustomed to look for and to guard against, was the sort of tyrant or

despot that could be evolved out of the conditions of English political

life. Furthermore, he was not by them expected to appear among them at

the outset in the fully developed shape of a Philip or an Alva in the

Netherlands. They were able to recognize him, they were prepared to

resist him, in the earliest and most incipient stage of his being—at the

moment, in fact, when he should make his first attempt to gain all power

over his people, by assuming the single power to take their property

without their consent. Hence it was, as Edmund Burke pointed out in the

House of Commons only a few weeks before the American Revolution entered

upon its military phase, that:

“The great contests for freedom ... were from the earliest times chiefly

upon the question of taxing. Most of the contests in the ancient

commonwealths turned primarily on the right of election of magistrates,

or on the balance among the several orders of the state. The question of

money was not with them so immediate. But in England it was otherwise.

On this point of taxes the ablest pens and most eloquent tongues have

been exercised, the greatest spirits have acted and suffered.... They

took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that

in all monarchies the people must in effect, themselves, mediately or

immediately, possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow

of liberty could subsist. The colonies draw from you, as with their

life-blood, these ideas and principles. Their love of liberty, as with

you, fixed and attached on this specific point of taxing. Liberty might

be safe or might be endangered in twenty other particulars without their

being much pleased or alarmed. Here they felt its pulse, and as they

found that beat, they thought themselves sick or sound.”

Accordingly, the meaning which the English race on both sides of

the Atlantic were accustomed to attach to the words “tyranny” and

“despotism,” was a meaning to some degree ideal; it was a meaning drawn

from the extraordinary political sagacity with which the race is endowed,

from their extraordinary sensitiveness as to the use of the taxing-power

in government, from their instinctive perception of the commanding place

of the taxing-power among all the other forms of power in the state,

from their perfect assurance that he who holds the purse with the power

to fill it and to empty it, holds the key of the situation—can maintain

an army of his own, can rule without consulting Parliament, can silence

criticism, can crush opposition, can strip his subjects of every vestige

of political life; in other words, he can make slaves of them, he can

make a despot and a tyrant of himself. Therefore, the system which in

the end might develop into results so palpably tyrannic and despotic,

they bluntly called a tyranny and a despotism in the beginning. To say,

therefore, that the Declaration of Independence did the same, is to say

that it spoke good English. Of course, history will be ready to set aside

the charge thus made in language not all liable to be misunderstood, just

so soon as history is ready to set aside the common opinion that the

several acts of the British government, from 1764 to 1776, for laying

and enforcing taxation in America, did evince a somewhat particular

and systematic design to take away some portion of the property of the

American people without their consent.

The second of the two great charges contained in the Declaration of

Independence, while intimating that some share in the blame is due to the

British Parliament and to the British people, yet fastens upon the king

himself as the one person chiefly responsible for the scheme of American

tyranny therein set forth, and culminates in the frank description of

him as “a prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may

define a tyrant.” Is this accusation of George the Third now to be set

aside as unhistoric? Was that king, or was he not, chiefly responsible

for the American policy of the British government between the years 1764

and 1776? If he was so, then the historic soundness of the most important

portion of the Declaration of Independence is vindicated.

Fortunately, this question can be answered without hesitation, and in

a few words; and for these few words, an American writer of to-day,

conscious of his own bias of nationality, will rightly prefer to

cite such words as have been uttered upon the subject by the ablest

English historians of our time. Upon their statements alone it must

be concluded that George the Third ascended his throne with the fixed

purpose of resuming to the crown many of those powers which, by the

constitution of England, did not then belong to it, and that in this

purpose, at least during the first twenty-five years of his reign, he

substantially succeeded—himself determining what should be the policy

of each administration, what opinions his ministers should advocate in

Parliament, and what measures Parliament itself should adopt. Says Sir

Erskine May:

“The king desired to undertake personally the chief administration of

public affairs, to direct the policy of his ministers, and himself to

distribute the patronage of the crown. He was ambitious not only to

reign, but to govern. Strong as were the ministers, the king was resolved

to wrest all power from their hands, and to exercise it himself. But

what was this in effect but to assert that the king should be his own

minister?... The king’s tactics were fraught with danger, as well to the

crown itself as to the constitutional liberties of the people.”

Already prior to the year 1778, according to Lecky, the king had

“laboriously built up” in England a “system of personal government”; and

it was because he was unwilling to have this system disturbed that he

then refused, “in defiance of the most earnest representations of his

own minister and of the most eminent politicians of every party ... to

send for the greatest of living statesmen at the moment when the empire

appeared to be in the very agonies of dissolution.... Either Chatham

or Rockingham should have insisted that the policy of the country

should be directed by its responsible ministers and not dictated by an

irresponsible sovereign.”

This refusal of the king to pursue the course which was called for by

the constitution, and which would have taken the control of the policy

of the government out of his hands, was, according to the same great

historian, an act “the most criminal in the whole reign of George the

Third; ... as criminal as any of those acts which led Charles the First

to the scaffold.”

Even so early as the year 1768, according to John Richard Green,

“George the Third had at last reached his aim.... In the early days of

the ministry” (which began in that year) “his influence was felt to be

predominant. In its later and more disastrous days it was supreme; for

Lord North, who became the head of the ministry on Grafton’s retirement

in 1770, was the mere mouthpiece of the king. ‘Not only did he direct

the minister,’ a careful observer tells us, ‘in all important matters of

foreign and domestic policy, but he instructed him as to the management

of debates in Parliament, suggested what motions should be made or

opposed, and how measures should be carried. He reserved for himself all

the patronage, he arranged the whole cast of the administration, settled

the relative place and pretentions of ministers of state, law officers,

and members of the household, nominated and promoted the English and

Scotch judges, appointed and translated bishops and deans, and dispensed

other preferments in the church. He disposed of military governments,

regiments, and commissions, and himself ordered the marching of troops.

He gave and refused titles, honors, and pensions.’ All this immense

patronage was steadily used for the creation of a party in both houses of

Parliament attached to the king himself.... George, was, in fact, sole

minister during the fifteen years which followed; and the shame of the

darkest hour of English history lies wholly at his door.”

Surely, until these tremendous verdicts of English history shall

be set aside, there need be no anxiety in any quarter as to the

historic soundness of the two great accusations which together make

up the principal portion of the Declaration of Independence. In the

presence of these verdicts also, even the passion, the intensity of

language, in which those accusations are uttered, seem to find a

perfect justification. Indeed, in the light of the most recent and most

unprejudiced expert testimony, the whole document, both in its substance

and in its form, seems to have been the logical response of a nation of

brave men to the great words of the greatest of English statesmen, as

spoken in the House of Commons precisely ten years before:

“This kingdom has no right to lay a tax on the colonies. Sir, I rejoice

that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the

feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have

been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest.”

VI

Thus, ever since its first announcement to the world, and down almost to

the present moment, has the Declaration of Independence been tested by

criticism of every possible kind—by criticism intended and expected to

be destructive. Apparently, however, all this criticism has failed to

accomplish its object.

It is proper for us to remember, also, that what we call criticism is not

the only valid test of the genuineness and worth of any piece of writing

of great practical interest to mankind; there is, in addition, the test

of actual use and service, in direct contact with the common sense and

the moral sense of large masses of men, under various conditions, and for

a long period. Probably no writing which is not essentially sound and

true has ever survived this test.

Neither from this test has the great Declaration any need to shrink. As

to the immediate use for which it was sent forth—that of rallying and

uniting the friends of the Revolution, and bracing them for their great

task—its effectiveness was so great and so obvious that it has never

been denied. During the century and a quarter since the Revolution, its

influence on the political character and the political conduct of the

American people has been great beyond calculation. For example, after we

had achieved our own national deliverance, and had advanced into that

enormous and somewhat corrupting material prosperity which followed the

adoption of the constitution and the development of the cotton-interest

and the expansion of the Republic into a transcontinental power, we fell

under an appalling temptation—the temptation to forget, or to repudiate,

or to refuse to apply to the case of our human brethren in bondage, the

principles which we had once proclaimed as the basis of every rightful

government. The prodigious service rendered to us in this awful moral

emergency by the Declaration of Independence, was, that its public

repetition, at least once every year, in the hearing of vast throngs of

the American people in every portion of the Republic, kept constantly

before our minds, in a form of almost religious sanctity, those few

great ideas as to the dignity of human nature, and the sacredness of

personality, and the indestructible rights of man as mere man, with

which it had so gloriously identified the beginnings of our national

existence. It did at last become very hard for us to listen each year

to the preamble of the Declaration and still remain the owners and

users and catchers of slaves; still harder, to accept the doctrine that

the righteousness and prosperity of slavery was to be accepted as the

dominant policy of the nation. The logic of Calhoun was as flawless

as usual, when he concluded that the chief obstruction in the way of

his system was the preamble of the Declaration of Independence. Had it

not been for the inviolable sacredness given by it to those sweeping

aphorisms about the natural rights of man, it may be doubted whether

Calhoun might not have won over an immense majority of the American

people to the support of his compact and plausible scheme for making

slavery the basis of the Republic. It was the preamble of the Declaration

of Independence which elected Lincoln, which sent forth the Emancipation

Proclamation, which gave victory to Grant, which ratified the Thirteenth

Amendment.

We shall not here attempt to delineate the influence of this state

paper upon mankind in general. Of course, the emergence of the American

Republic as an imposing world-power is a phenomenon which has now for

many years attracted the attention of the human race. Surely, no slight

effect must have resulted from the fact that, among all civilized

peoples, the one American document best known is the Declaration of

Independence, and that thus the spectacle of so vast and beneficent a

political success has been everywhere associated with the assertion of

the natural rights of man. “The doctrines it contained,” says Buckle,

“were not merely welcomed by a majority of the French nation, but even

the government itself was unable to withstand the general feeling. Its

effect in hastening the approach of the French Revolution ... was indeed

most remarkable.” Elsewhere, also, in many lands, among many peoples, it

has been cited again and again as an inspiration to political courage, as

a model for political conduct; and if, as the brilliant historian just

alluded to has affirmed, “that noble Declaration ... ought to be hung up

in the nursery of every king, and blazoned on the porch of every royal

palace,” it is because it has become the classic statement of political

truths which must at last abolish kings altogether, or else teach them to

identify their existence with the dignity and happiness of human nature.

V

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION

BY JOSIAH QUINCY

When we speak of the glory of our fathers, we mean not that vulgar renown

to be attained by physical strength; nor yet that higher fame, to be

acquired by intellectual power. Both often exist without lofty thought,

pure intent, or generous purpose. The glory which we celebrate was

strictly of a moral and religious character: righteous as to its ends;

just as to its means.

The American Revolution had its origin neither in ambition, nor avarice,

nor envy, nor in any gross passion; but in the nature and relation of

things, and in the thence-resulting necessity of separation from the

parent state. Its progress was limited by that necessity. Our fathers

displayed great strength and great moderation of purpose. In difficult

times they conducted it with wisdom; in doubtful times, with firmness;

in perilous times, with courage; under oppressive trials, erect; amidst

temptations, unseduced; in the dark hour of danger, fearless; in the

bright hour of prosperity, faithful.

It was not the instant feeling and pressure of despotism that roused

them to resist, but the principle on which that arm was extended. They

could have paid the impositions of the British government, had they

been increased a thousandfold; but payment acknowledged right, and

they spurned the consequences of that acknowledgment. But, above all,

they realized that those burdens, though light in themselves, would to

coming ages—to us, their posterity—be heavy, and probably insupportable.

They preferred to meet the trial in their own times, and to make the

sacrifices in their own persons, that we and our descendants, their

posterity, might reap the harvest and enjoy the increase.

Generous men, exalted patriots, immortal statesmen! For this deep moral

and social affection, for this elevated self-devotion, this bold daring,

the multiplying millions of your posterity, as they spread backward to

the lakes, and from the lakes to the mountains, and from the mountains

to the western waters, shall annually, in all future time, come up to

the temples of the Most High, with song and anthem, and thanksgiving;

with cheerful symphonies and hallelujahs, to repeat your names; to look

steadfastly on the brightness of your glory; to trace its spreading rays

to the points from which they emanate; and to seek in your character and

conduct a practical illustration of public duty in every occurring social

exigency.

THE SONG OF THE CANNON

BY SAM WALTER FOSS

When the diplomats cease from their capers,

Their red-tape requests and replies,

Their shuttlecock battle of papers,

Their saccharine parley of lies;

When the plenipotentiary wrangle

Is tied in a chaos of knots,

And becomes an unwindable tangle

Of verbals unmarried to thoughts;

When they’ve anguished and argued profoundly,

Asserted, assumed, and averred,

Then I end up the dialogue roundly

With my monosyllabical word.

Not mine in a speech academic,

No lexicon lingo is mine,

And in politic parley, polemic,

I was never created to shine.

But I speak with some show of decision,

And I never attempt to be bland,

I hurl my one word with precision,

My hearers—they all understand.

It requires no labored translation,

Its pith and its import to glean;

They gather its signification;

They know at the first what I mean.

The codes of the learned legations,

Of form, and of rule, and decree,

The etiquette books of the nations,—

They were never intended for me.

When your case is talked into confusion,

Then hush you, my diplomat friend,

Give me just a word in conclusion,

Let me bring the dispute to an end.

Ye diplomats, cease to aspire,

A case that’s appealed to debate,

It has gone to a court that is higher,

And I’m the Attorney for Fate.

PAUL REVERE’S RIDE[9]

(April 18, 1775.)

BY HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW

Listen, my children, and you shall hear

Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,

On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-Five:

Hardly a man is now alive

Who remembers that famous day and year.

He said to his friend, “If the British march

By land or sea from the town to-night,

Hang a lantern aloft in the belfry arch

Of the North Church tower as a signal-light,

One, if by land, and two, if by sea;

And I on the opposite shore will be,

Ready to ride and spread the alarm

Through every Middlesex village and farm,

For the country folk to be up and to arm.”

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