TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
Bold text is denoted by =equal signs=.
Fractions have been left in the form a/b except for ¼ ½ ¾. A dozen
or so occurrences of 'nn a-b' have been changed to 'nn-a/b', mainly on
pages 27-40, for consistency.
Footnote anchors in a table are of the form (a) and the corresponding
Footnote is placed at the bottom of that table. Other Footnote anchors
are of the form [A] with placement at the end of that Chapter.
To save table space some column headings use the following
abbreviations:
Pass. for Passenger
Mill. for Millions
Prop. for Proportion
Many wide tables have been split into two or more parts. Each part
after the first is labelled at the top with {table continued}.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
More detail can be found at the end of the book.
THE RAILWAY LIBRARY
1909
A COLLECTION OF NOTEWORTHY CHAPTERS, ADDRESSES
AND PAPERS RELATING TO RAILWAYS, MOSTLY
PUBLISHED DURING THE YEAR.
COMPILED AND EDITED BY
SLASON THOMPSON
MANAGER OF THE BUREAU OF RAILWAY NEWS
AND STATISTICS
CHICAGO
CHICAGO
THE GUNTHORP-WARREN PRINTING CO
1910
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 3
PRE-RAILWAY ERA IN AMERICA 5
By F. A. Cleveland and F. W. Powell.
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
RAILROAD COMPANY 21
By J. Edgar Thomson.
RAILWAYS AND THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 45
By James J. Hill.
SOUTHERN RAILWAYS AND THEIR NEEDS 58
By John F. Wallace.
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AMERICAN RAILWAYS 66
By Daniel Willard.
THE RAILROAD SITUATION OF TO-DAY 80
By Frank Trumbull.
TRANSPORTATION CHARGE AND PRICES 90
By Logan G. McPherson.
THE FREIGHT RATE PRIMER 107
Issued by the N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.
PROGRESSIVE SAFETY IN RAILWAY OPERATION 116
By A. H. Smith.
RAILWAY MAIL PAY 142
By Julius Kruttschnitt.
THE DIMINISHED PURCHASING POWER OF RAILWAY EARNINGS 165
By C. C. McCain.
THE RAILROADS AND PUBLIC APPROVAL 199
By Edward P. Ripley.
RAILROADS AND THE PUBLIC 205
By John C. Spooner.
RAILROAD PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY 211
By J. B. Thayer.
THE RELATION OF THE RAILROADS TO THE STATE 220
By W. M. Acworth, M. A.
RAILWAY NATIONALIZATION 238
By Sir George S. Gibb.
CONCERNING ADVANCES IN RAILWAY RATES 261
By the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 1909.
STATISTICS OF AMERICAN RAILWAYS FOR 1909 291
By Slason Thompson.
I Mileage in 1909 306
II Equipment 314
III Employes and their Compensation 321
IV Capitalization 337
V Cost of Construction 342
VI Ownership of American Railways 345
VII Public Service of the Railways 346
VIII Earnings and Expenses 358
IX Taxes 363
X Damages and Injuries to Persons 365
XI Locomotive Fuel 367
XII The Safety of American Railways 368
XIII Railway Receiverships in 1909 384
XIV Cost of Railway Regulation 385
XV Statistics of Foreign Railways 386
XVI Growth of Railways 391
Recommendations 393
INDEX 395
INTRODUCTION
In the following pages is presented a number of the more timely
papers and addresses of the year 1909 on the present railway
situation, together with chapters from two books of current interest
on the same subject. As the object of the compilation has been to
present in permanent and accessible form information in regard to
American railways worthy of more than the ephemeral life of newspaper
or pamphlet publication, it has been thought well to accompany the
messages of today with a brief glance at the conditions on this
continent before the days of railways. Happily for this purpose
the first two chapters of Messrs. Cleveland and Powell's "Railroad
Promotion and Capitalization in the United States," fresh from the
press, afforded the very background needed, and the first report
of the engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad provided the glasses
through which the reader can look forward from the small beginnings
to what is now known as the greatest railway system on the globe.
After this study of conditions as they were, and of the opportunities
that invited the railway pioneers of 1848, it is instructive to
read the utterances of the latest of our empire builders, whose
foresight and indomitable will anticipated the development of our
Pacific Northwest with railway facilities that already lag behind the
necessities of its amazing growth.
Of the other addresses and papers it is unnecessary to say more than
that they reflect the prevailing sentiments of all thoughtful railway
officials respecting conditions of the gravest import to the great
industry upon which the entire fabric of our national prosperity
and well-being depends. Only the shallowest student of our social,
economic and political system can view the persistent attacks upon
the American system of transportation without serious alarm for the
results. This alarm is the prevailing note of these papers and it
comes from men who are at the helm and who see the financial breakers
upon which the fierce blasts of political exigency are driving the
railways.
The papers by Sir George S. Gibbs and Mr. A. M. Acworth, the leading
authorities on British railways, discuss the alternative to wisely
regulated railways--nationalization of railways. With a continuance
of unwise and burdensome regulation of railways, which strips
responsibility of all discretion, nationalization is inevitable.
The Bureau's statistics of American railways for the year ending June
30, 1909, is included in THE RAILWAY LIBRARY because it affords the
latest data not only as to the railways of the United States but for
the world.
Acknowledgments are made to the authors and publishers of the various
papers, and especially to the publishers of the two works from which
important chapters have been extracted by their courteous permission,
as well as that of their authors.
If this publication fulfils the purpose of its compilation, it will
be succeeded by annual volumes of like character under the same title.
S. T.
Chicago, June 1, 1910.
PRE-RAILWAY ERA IN AMERICA
From Chapters I and II of "Railroad Promotion and
Capitalization in the United States," by F. A. CLEVELAND and E.
W. POWELL. Longmans, Green & Co., 1909.
(By permission of the authors.)
Inland transportation, as we know it, is the product of the last
century. It had its beginning in the industrial revolution. In
England at the close of the eighteenth century the manor as a
productive agency had been supplanted by a system of domestic
production, and this in turn was giving place to the factory. The
combined influences of increasing capital and invention had operated
to centralize the industrial population in the towns. Ocean commerce
was comparatively well developed, and manufacture was fast being
established upon a modern basis; but inland transportation was
still encumbered by such primitive methods as to make difficult the
utilization of the resources of the interior. A century and a half
before, Lord Bacon had called attention to the three great elements
necessary to make a nation great and prosperous--"a fertile soil,
busy workshops, and easy conveyance of men and things from one
place to another,"--but the significance of this reflection was not
appreciated until after the middle of the eighteenth century. The
controlling force of custom--social inertia--had stood in the way of
progress.
IN ENGLAND.
Until about the opening of the nineteenth century the principal
manufacturing towns of Great Britain were situated on or near the
coast; for in the inland country goods were still carried on the
backs of men, or hauled in carts over heavy roads. Said Lardner: "The
internal transport of goods in England was performed by wagon, and
was not only intolerably slow, but so expensive as to exclude every
object except manufactured articles, and such as, being of light
weight and small bulk in proportion to their value, would allow of a
high rate of transport. Thus the charge for carriage by wagon from
London to Leeds was at the rate of £13 ($63.31) a ton, being 13½d.
(27 cents) per ton per mile. Between Liverpool and Manchester it
was 40s. ($9.60) a ton, or 15d. (30 cents) per ton per mile. Heavy
articles, such as coal and other materials, could only be available
for commerce where their position favored transport by sea, and,
consequently, many of the richest districts of the kingdom remained
unproductive, awaiting the tardy advancement of the art of transport."
IN AMERICA.
Before the Revolution the American colonists lived in almost complete
isolation. Travel by land was limited, for water communication
presented fewer obstacles to progress. Population was arranged along
the seaboard, or in isolated groups a short distance inland. Living
narrow, self-centered lives, each community developed a distinct
dialect and characteristic customs and dress. Social activities were
limited to going to mill, market and church, or exchanging friendly
calls; traveling on foot or on horseback along wooded trails. Even
between seacoast towns there was little interchange of products or
population; and a citizen of one colony going to another was at once
struck with the many local peculiarities. It was less than twenty
years before the Revolutionary war when the first stage line was
opened between New York and Philadelphia, and three days were then
required for a single trip. It was ten years later when the first
stage line was established between Philadelphia and Baltimore.
METHODS OF TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT.
Between towns of considerable size there were country roads over
which vehicles could pass when the weather would permit. The stage
coach, which was the only public land conveyance, plied along the
coast and between a few inland centers, but the coaches of that
day were rude boxes swung on wheels by leathern straps instead of
springs, with seats for a dozen or more and accommodations for a
limited amount of baggage. The rate of travel was from two to six
miles an hour, according to the condition of the roads and the
importance of the route. On the farm the mud-boat or stone sledge was
in common use, and at times it was even employed to carry produce to
local markets. In more progressive communities two-wheeled carts and
wagons were to be found. The best of roads, however, were nothing
but "mud roads"; and the wagons, commonly of the linchpin type, were
clumsy and awkward. Some of the more primitive wagons had wheels made
of cross sections of trees, trimmed and centered to roll on axles of
wood. Those who traveled had little thought of time; companionship
found expression in story-telling, gossip and tippling; and an
emergency which required all to get out and "take a wheel" only added
spice to the trip.
We have the following description of the roads about Philadelphia,
the metropolis and commercial center of the New World: "On the best
lines of communication the ruts were deep, the descents precipitous.
* * * Near the great cities the state of the roads was so bad as to
render all approach difficult and dangerous. Out of Philadelphia
a quagmire of black mud covered a long stretch of road near the
village of Rising Sun. There horses were often seen floundering in
the mud up to their bellies. On the York road, long lines of wagons
were every day to be met with, drawn up near Logan's hill, while
the wagoners unhitched their teams, to assist each other in pulling
through the mire. At some places, stakes were set up to warn teams
of the quicksand pits; at others, the fences were pulled down, and
a new road made through the fields." Transportation facilities were
either entirely lacking or such as to make travel both expensive and
hazardous. It is difficult to realize that as late as 1780 the roads
over a large part of Pennsylvania were narrow paths which had been
made through the woods by Indians and traders.
ABSENCE OF ROADS IN THE INTERIOR.
The isolation of interior settlements finds apt illustration in the
Wyoming valley. This rich region along the Susquehanna had been
until 1786 almost completely cut off from the outer world. A small
colony had moved in from the East, and taking color of title from
Connecticut, disclaimed the sovereignty of the Quaker proprietary.
War consequently broke out between this isolated settlement and the
Pennsylvania government. Several military expeditions were sent out
to reduce the "Yankees" to submission; but the absence of roads
and the necessity of carrying provisions on horseback left the
determined pioneers masters of the situation when the larger issue,
the Revolutionary war, suspended local strife. The spring after
Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga the settlers of the Wyoming valley
learned that a detachment of Johnson's "Royal Greens" and Butler's
"Rangers," with a company of Tories, had allied themselves with the
Seneca Indians, and were preparing to descend upon the valley. A
courier was despatched to congress, and appeals for aid were made to
the neighboring states, but the isolation which had before served
for defense now brought disaster. With the June freshet the British
allies came down from Tioga, and nothing but ruins were left to mark
the scene. One of the reasons urged for the removal of the state
capitol from Philadelphia to Harrisburg in 1799 was the cost of
travel, which bore heavily upon legislators from the interior.
THE ROADS OF NEW ENGLAND.
The early settlers of Springfield, Massachusetts, were obliged
to send their household goods from Roxbury around by way of Long
Island Sound and the Connecticut river, but they themselves were
able to proceed on foot along an Indian trail. In time this trail
was widened, and as the "Bay path" and the "Boston road" occupied
an important place among the transportation routes of the colonies.
It was, however, little more than a narrow wagon path until after
the Revolution, and so indistinct was it that travelers frequently
wandered off the route. A curious stone post marks the place
near the national armory at Springfield, where in 1763 a western
Massachusetts merchant lost his way, and set up a guide for other
travelers. Even as late as 1795 there were but two stages between
Boston and New York, and a week was required for the journey. John
Bernard, the English actor, thus described a typical New England
road in 1797: "Though far better than in any other quarter of the
Union, the frequent jolts and plunges of the vehicle brought it into
sad comparison with the bowling-greens of England. Very often we
surprised a family of pigs taking a bath in a gully of sufficient
compass to admit the coach. As often, such chasms were filled with
piles of stones that, at a distance, looked like Indian tumuli. The
driver's skill in steering was eminent. I found there were two evils
to be dreaded in New England traveling--a clayey soil in wet weather,
which, unqualified with gravel, made the road a canal; and a sandy
one in summer, which might emphatically be called an enormous insect
preserve." Such testimony makes real the difficulties which attended
travel over the important routes, and enables one to understand how
it could have required Washington nearly two weeks to make the trip
from Philadelphia to Cambridge at the outbreak of the Revolution.
AFTER THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.
Before the Revolution the subject of road improvement was seldom
considered in public assemblies, and the early laws contain few
provisions even for common roads. Those who proposed measures for
general improvement met with little encouragement. As early as
1690 William Penn suggested the practicability of a waterway from
the Schuylkill to the Susquehanna. In 1762 David Rittenhouse of
Philadelphia, and Provost Smith of the University of Pennsylvania,
proposed a similar project, and made surveys of the route by the
Swatara and the Tulpehocken; in 1769 the American Philosophical
Society interested itself in a canal survey between Chesapeake Bay
and the Delaware, recommending the enterprise to the public. In 1768
Governor Moore of New York projected a canal around the Canajoharie
Falls of the Mohawk. But to none of these suggestions was there any
active response, for the time was not ripe for such undertakings.
Contributing to the road-making impulse immediately after the war of
independence was a newly awakened community interest. At the time of
the adoption of the constitution there were two distinct classes in
the United States: a highly localized class of the seaboard and of
the inland trade routes, and a widely distributed agricultural class.
American commerce was largely confined to American products. England,
France and Holland monopolized the trade of their colonies, and in
other ways favored their own merchantmen in foreign trade. Such
being the condition, our commercial advantage lay in the development
of our own resources. The settlement of the Middle Atlantic states
and of the valleys of the interior only served to strengthen the
interdependence of the people, who found a common interest in
internal improvements. To the agriculturist, cheap conveyance to
market was a prerequisite to profitable industry. To the commercial
class on the seaboard and on the leading trade routes, inland
improvement was at that time no less important.
FIRST ERA OF ROAD MAKING.
There was a notable change in the popular attitude toward road making
after the war, and all public-spirited men now saw in better means
of communication an instrument for the establishing of American
supremacy over the western continent. Legislatures made generous
appropriations for highways. An active migration set in from New York
and northern Pennsylvania to the West. In 1738 the first regular
mail service was established between Albany and Schenectady. In 1793
the horse path from Albany to the Connecticut valley was widened to
a wagon road. Like activity in road making was shown throughout
southern and western New York, middle Pennsylvania, Maryland and
Virginia.
In 1785 Pennsylvania appropriated $10,000 to lay out a road from a
point near the mouth of the Juanita to Pittsburgh. In 1786 an act
was passed appropriating $1,500 "to view and open a road from Lehigh
Water Gap to Wyoming," which was the first road into that valley
from the Delaware. In 1787 another road was authorized between the
Susquehanna and the Delaware. Activity in opening communication
with the interior increased until by 1791 the movement had assumed
proportions to be styled a "mania." By a single act over $150,000 was
appropriated for the improvement of eleven rivers and over a score
of roads in different parts of the state. Other acts were passed at
the same session, granting charters and appropriations for various
transportation enterprises. New York in 1797 authorized the raising
by _lotteries_ of $45,000 for the improvement of various roads
throughout the state. As if by common impulse, all the states now
became interested in road improvement, and congress was asked to aid
by this means the opening up of the resources of the interior.
BEGINNING OF THE CANALS AND PIKES.
The low cost of water transportation had early directed popular
attention to canals as a means of overcoming obstructions in natural
water courses, thereby serving the needs of the inland population,
and also providing the means for diverting trade from one seaport to
another. The Revolutionary war was hardly over when Charles Carroll
organized a company to open a canal about the obstructions in the
lower Susquehanna.
Those who took the most active interest in canal construction at this
time were men who, like Washington, viewed the future with patriotic
interest. This interest, however, was one which did not appeal to the
private investor. An enterprise based upon such public consideration
required government support.
This period also marked the beginning of turnpike construction. The
first turnpike road in this country of which we have a record was
built between Alexandria and the Lower Shenandoah. It was begun in
1785-6, and its completion was the cause of great satisfaction to
Jefferson and other public-spirited men of Virginia, who had labored
in the cause of a "broader national life." Alexandria was at that
time an important competitor of the other seaboard cities. Across the
Maryland peninsula on the Chesapeake lay Baltimore, a commercial
rival of both Alexandria and Philadelphia. In 1787 the grand jury
sitting at Baltimore called attention to the deplorable condition of
the roads leading to that city, and urged the authorities to take
immediate action. As a result, the county government ordered the old
Frederick, Reistertown and York roads turnpiked at public expense.
To the west of Philadelphia lay the Susquehanna valley. The natural
outlet of this growing region was down the Chesapeake to Baltimore.
To attract traffic to the Quaker City a company was organized in
Philadelphia in 1792 to build the Lancaster pike, which was the first
turnpike in this country built by voluntary subscription.
EFFECT OF EUROPEAN WARS ON AMERICAN SITUATION.
The outbreak of the European wars in 1793 was followed by a marked
change in the American industrial situation. The immediate effect
upon the grain growing of the West was to increase the demand for
wheat. Prices of cereals rose to twice their former height. The
average price of flour during the seven years from 1785 to 1793 had
been about $5.40 a barrel; the average price from 1793 to 1806 (the
two years of peace, 1802 and 1803, excluded) was $9.12. Such was the
inducement to grain growing during this period.
Back from the North Atlantic coast radiated rich valleys--large
tracts of agricultural lands which were well adapted to grain
growing. A rush set in for the unclaimed resources of New York,
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and for a time the tide of migration moved
to the westward along the Ohio, and the border of the Great Lakes.
Those who cultivated lands near the coast shared in the increased
prosperity due to the European disturbance, but unless they could
obtain better means of transportation, those who had located inland
soon found that they could profit little. Grain as compared with
cotton and tobacco was a low priced product. At best, the cost of
transportation was ten dollars a ton for each hundred-mile haul; in
many places it was much higher.
AMERICANS TURN TO HOME MARKETS.
Before 1807 the country had come to be divided into three sections:
the commercial, shipbuilding East, the cotton and tobacco exporting
South, and the isolated grain growing interior, linked with which was
a languishing manufacturing interest on or near the seaboard. Beyond
a limited range the producing proportion of our population could not
participate in the profits of the European trade. The grain growers
demanded a market, and the manufacturers saw their profits swept
away by an influx of foreign goods. These were the interests which
suffered from the diversion of capital to shipbuilding and foreign
trade. Both looked to internal improvements as a solution of their
troubles; their only hope was in a _home market_--in better roads,
and in the development of the resources about them.
In the United States agriculturist and manufacturer turned to the
national government for relief. But so long as the administration
remained in the hands of the foreign trade party, the way was blocked
to internal improvements. During the first three administrations
after the adoption of the constitution, the individualistic
republicans had been unable to gain control of the government; but
with the admission of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio and the settlement
of the parts of the sea coast states remote from transportation
facilities, the anti-commercial constituency gained the balance of
power. It was to the voters of these new regions that Jefferson owed
his success. It was to satisfy the demands of the West for an outlet
to the gulf that Louisiana was purchased. To satisfy the insistent
demand for internal improvements the national government also built
the Cumberland road, and contributed to many other transportation
projects. It was the open hostility of the West and South toward
the commercial East which forced the embargo, and broke down the
domination of the seaboard interests in national affairs.
RIVER TRAFFIC DEVELOPED BY PRIVATE CAPITAL.
The inland routes which required the least capital to utilize in
a primitive way were the rivers. Here the chief obstacle was the
current. In the early nineteenth century long lines of rafts,
flat-boats and "arks" might be seen floating down the Connecticut,
the Hudson, the Susquehanna and the Potomac. There were 2,800 miles
of rivers tributary to the Atlantic seaboard which were navigable,
or which needed only to be cleared of snags and rocks to render
them available for use by small craft. It was estimated that on
the eastern slope there were about 25,000 miles of streams which
might be utilized by the construction of locks and canals. In the
Mississippi valley there were 14,000 miles of navigable rivers, and
about 75,000 more which were considered possibilities. But with a
three or four-mile current it was impracticable to row, pole or
warp a boat and cargo upstream for a long distance. The result was
that along those streams which nature had provided as highways the
producer first built his boat out of the timbers of the forest, then
loaded it with the produce of his farm or mill, and floated down
stream to market. Upon reaching his destination, he abandoned his
craft and returned by stage or on foot. This was indeed an expensive
process--expensive in time, expensive in funds and expensive in human
effort. It was an expense of production, however, and one which did
not require capitalization.
It was not until 1807 that the steamboat became a commercial success.
At this time New York was becoming well settled, and as the Hudson
was a natural highway a boat which could drive against wind and
stream had every promise of success. Robert Fulton, who had been
interested in the problem of steam navigation since 1802, returned
from Europe after several years of investigation, and brought back
one of Watt's engines. He obtained the financial co-operation of
Chancellor Livingston, and together they obtained a monopoly of
steam navigation in New York waters. A boat was fitted with the Watt
engine, and a successful trip was made from New York to Albany and
return. The route yielded large profits from the start, and other
boats were built. By 1813 six boats were doing a profitable business
on the Hudson. The success of Fulton and Livingston proved attractive
to others. Crowded out of New York's waters by the monopoly, John
Stevens, in 1809, took a steamboat around from Hoboken into the
Delaware. The Phoenix now found business so good in those waters
where Fitch had failed that it was soon followed by two other boats.
Soon the whole Atlantic seaboard, including the St. Lawrence, was
supplied with steam craft.
But enterprise in steamboat navigation was not confined to the
coast. Business opportunities in the Mississippi valley attracted
the attention of one Nicholas Roosevelt, who proposed to Fulton and
Livingston that he would make a trip to New Orleans to survey the
prospects for an inland water route, with the understanding that
they should finance a steamboat line if his report was favorable. So
favorable was it that he was placed in charge of the construction of
a river boat at Pittsburg, and in 1811 the _New Orleans_ made her
maiden trip down the Mississippi. Thereafter Roosevelt's boat took
a regular route between New Orleans and Natchez. Other boats were
added, but it was not until 1815 that a voyage was made upstream
from New Orleans to Louisville and Cincinnati. After assisting
Jackson in the campaign about New Orleans, the _Enterprise_, taking
advantage of high water, steamed to Louisville in _twenty-five
days_. In 1817 the _Washington_ accomplished the same feat while the
river was within her banks, and the public became convinced of the
practicability of upstream navigation. The same year the _Shelby_
reduced the time to twenty days, and by 1823 _fifteen days sufficed_.
With the success of the steamboat, the Middle West was opened to
rapid communication with the gulf.
WAGON ROADS INTO THE INTERIOR.
From 1807 to 1815 two changes had a marked effect upon the national
attitude toward internal improvements. Before the outbreak of the
European wars manufactures had made some progress in New England and
in Pennsylvania. During the first struggle, and before the peace
of Amiens, the only serious obstacle to American industry was the
tendency to divert capital to wheat raising, shipbuilding and foreign
trade. Prices were high, and the makers of goods found encouragement
in large profits. With the cessation of hostilities American
manufacturers looked to Congress for protection, for foreign goods
poured into the country in such quantities and at such prices as to
threaten the destruction of domestic production.
At the most, however, the manufacturing population was relatively
small, but the disturbances to industry from 1815 to 1818 were
such as to throw many out of employment, and to bring to the
verge of bankruptcy and starvation those who had been engaged in
shipbuilding and foreign trade. A great exodus to the interior was
the result. In wagons, on horseback, or on foot--sometimes using
handcarts, sleds and wheelbarrows to carry their provisions and
light luggage--emigrants crowded the wooded paths that led to the
West, where they might find conditions more favorable to independent
livelihood.
All these conditions conspired to increase the depression in the
East, and drive her people into agriculture and the development of
the interior; while the opening of the Mississippi by the steamboat
added to the attractions of the rich valleys in the Middle West.
But upon his arrival in the West the newcomer found himself beyond
the range of any market except New Orleans. To reach this market he
"would produce or get together a quantity of corn, flour, bacon
and such articles. He would build a flat-bottomed boat on the shore
of some river or large creek, load his wares into it, and, awaiting
the rise, with a few of his negroes to assist him, would float down
to New Orleans. The voyage was long, tedious and expensive. When
he arrived there he found himself in a strange city, filled with
sharpers ready to take advantage of his necessities. Everybody
combined against him to profit by his ignorance of business, want
of friends or commercial connections, and nine times out of ten he
returned a broken merchant. His journey home was performed on foot,
through three or four nations of Indians inhabiting the western parts
of Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky. He returned to a desolate
farm, which had been neglected whilst he had been gone. One crop
was lost by absence and another by taking it to market. This kind
of business was persevered in astonishingly for several years, to
the great injury and utter ruin of a great many people." It was the
demand for safe transportation arising out of this situation which
made Roosevelt's steamboat enterprise a success.
DEVELOPMENT OF COASTWISE COMMERCE.
The British blockade of our coast during the war of 1812 had a marked
effect upon the development of inland routes of transportation, as
may be seen from the following: "The interruption of the coasting
trade was indeed a very serious affair. For years past that trade had
given occupation to thousands of coasters and tens of thousands of
sailors. The shoes made at Lynn, the Yankee notions of Connecticut,
the cotton cards, the domestic cottons, the playing cards produced
in New England, the flour of the Middle States, the East India goods
brought in from abroad had found a ready market at Charleston,
Savannah and Augusta, whence great quantities of rice and cotton
were brought North. On the arrival of the British fleet this trade,
no longer to be carried on in safety by water, began of necessity
to be carried on by land. At first some merchants at Boston, having
chartered a few wagons, despatched them with loads to Philadelphia,
and even to Baltimore. This was enough. The hint was taken. A new
industry sprang up, and by early summer the roads leading southward
exhibited one continuous stream of huge canvas-covered wagons tugged
along by double or triple teams of horses or of oxen. No distance was
then too great, and hundreds of them would make their way from Salem
and Boston to Augusta and Savannah. An estimate made towards the
close of the year (1814) places the number of wagons thus employed at
four thousand, and the number of cattle, horses and oxen at twenty
thousand; nor does this seem excessive, for a traveler who drove from
New York to Richmond declares that he passed two hundred and sixty
wagons on the way."
THE CAPITALIZATION OF TURNPIKES.
Both overland trade and westward migration drew attention to the
importance of good roads, both swelled the receipts of turnpike
companies, and gave encouragement to investment of local capital
in transportation improvement. By 1804 the Lancaster road had been
extended to Pittsburg, and a regular stage line established which
made a trip each way once a week. State governments lent every
encouragement to the building of turnpike roads, _even to the
extent of subscribing to their stock_. From contemporary writings
and charter grants, it is estimated that nearly eight hundred
turnpike companies were organized before the end of the war of 1812.
Pennsylvania was pre-eminent in granting liberal charters, and toll
rights, thereby encouraging the people of the more thickly settled
districts to make such improvements for themselves. The corporations
thus formed had little difficulty in obtaining capital subscriptions,
whether for the construction of turnpikes or bridges, or for the
operation of ferries. To the stock of these corporations several of
the states subscribed in varying amounts. Although a few toll roads
were constructed before that time, the turnpike movement may be said
to date from the opening of the nineteenth century. Turnpikes (so
called from the revolving, or turning bar, or pike which, when set
across a toll road, prevented passage until charges were paid) were
macadamized or otherwise improved at a cost varying from $500 to
$10,000 per mile. Almost without exception they followed in a general
way the old lines which had been worked out when travel on foot or
on horseback was the chief method of communication, but wherever
possible they were made straight, going over and not around hills
and other obstacles. When the Boston and Salem turnpike was built a
small but deep pond was encountered, but instead of going around the
road crossed on a floating bridge. The construction of bridges and
the operation of ferries were parts of this larger turnpike movement,
and like the turnpikes themselves, they were usually disappointing
to those who had invested with the hope of large dividends. At
best, this movement did but little to supply the great need for
improved transportation. To passenger service it was a great boon,
in that it added much to personal comfort, though the time and cost
of travel were little reduced. _It required five dollars and fifty
cents to pay tolls from Philadelphia to New York, besides the hotel
bills and other expenses of the road._ It took a week to go from
Philadelphia to Pittsburg. What the country most needed--a cheap
method of handling the bulky products of the interior--was not
supplied. Freight was carried upon the turnpike with great difficulty
and expense, and heavy goods were compelled to remain untouched on
account of the high tolls.
REVIVAL OF CANAL CONSTRUCTION.
To meet this situation, canals had been proposed long before the
period of turnpike building, and some surveys had been made, but
because of lack of capital, construction was deferred. The earliest
projects were for short cuts around rapids or falls, or between
neighboring waters, but bolder plans followed. The first canal of any
importance actually begun in the United States was the two-mile cut
through the rocks about the South Hadley falls of the Connecticut.
The Massachusetts legislature passed an act in 1792 incorporating
the "Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Connecticut River." Work
was begun at once with Dutch capital, and in two years the canal was
completed.
The Santee canal in South Carolina was the first large work of this
kind constructed in the United States. It connected the Santee river
with the Cooper river at Charleston, and it was opened in 1800. Its
length was twenty-two miles, and its cost $600,000.
A much more important project was the Middlesex canal in
Massachusetts, a charter for which was obtained in 1793. This canal
extended from the Charles river to the Merrimac, twenty-seven miles,
and was designed to attract to Boston the trade normally tributary to
Portsmouth. Work was begun in 1794, and ten years later the canal was
opened for traffic, though it was not entirely completed until 1808.
The successful completion of the Erie canal, which became an assured
fact long before its actual accomplishment in 1825, stimulated
similar projects all over the country. The local strife between
trade centers, combined with the local demand for outlet, set
a number of private projects in motion. Boston, Philadelphia,
Baltimore and Georgetown were successfully appealed to for support
for transportation routes which would enable them to compete with
New York for the trade of the West. The Blackstone Canal Company,
chartered by Rhode Island and Massachusetts in 1823, began the
construction of a canal along the Blackstone river to connect
Providence and Worcester, and this route was opened for traffic in
1828. Another New England project started at about the same time
was for a canal to extend from New Haven northwards to Northampton,
and on up the Connecticut valley into Vermont. Two companies were
chartered for this purpose, the Farmington canal in Connecticut in
1822 and the Hampshire and Hampden canal in Massachusetts in 1823.
The Farmington canal was completed in 1830; but the work on the
Hampshire and Hampden project was for a time abandoned for want of
funds, and the canal was not cut through to Northampton until 1835.
While carrying a large traffic this canal, like the Blackstone canal,
was more beneficial to the general business of the section traversed
than to those who held its stock. Other private works of this period
upon which large sums were expended were: The Delaware and Raritan
canal, connecting Philadelphia with New York; the James River and
Kanawha, an unfinished canal project in Virginia; and the Chesapeake
and Ohio canal, which was not extended further west than Cumberland.
SCARCITY OF CAPITAL FOR CANALS.
On account of local needs, few canal or navigation companies had
difficulty in obtaining their first subscriptions, but most of them
experienced trouble in collecting assessments and in obtaining
additional subscriptions. This timidity of investors, it now appears,
was not without ground, for few of the private canal companies were
able to bring their construction work to completion, and fewer still
paid any dividends to their stockholders. The Middlesex canal was
profitable until the building of a parallel line of railroad; the
Montague canal, also in Massachusetts, yielded a fair return during
the first twenty years that followed its completion in 1800. The
Delaware and Schuylkill canal may be cited as a third exception. But
it early became evident that public works of the number and magnitude
required could be constructed only at national expense. As the
constitution contains no direct provision for internal improvements,
the subject became a party question.
From the first Congress had appropriated money for lighthouses,
public piers, buoys and other aids to navigation, and about such
action there had been no dispute, for it was agreed that these
matters lay strictly within federal jurisdiction. From the first,
also, Congress had been petitioned for appropriations for internal
improvements. Most of these demands were local in character, and so
were easily disposed of; but when the directors of the Chesapeake and
Delaware canal asked Congress to supply the funds which they had been
unable to obtain from sales of shares, the question was forced to an
issue. Two facts were incontestable, the general importance of the
work, and the ability of the national government to carry it on in
view of the revenue surplus in the treasury.
In another way Congress had already committed itself to the support
of public works. So long as the country was made up of states
bordering on the Atlantic seaboard, improvements were matters of
interest to all alike, but with the admission of new states in the
interior, and the prospect of future accessions to the westward as
the country expanded, an element of injustice seemed to enter these
appropriations, which benefited the seaboard states at the expense of
all. The feeling of discontent was intensified by the fact that the
favored states were more thickly settled, and therefore better able
to incur the expense. With the admission of Ohio, however, this was
remedied by the establishment of the five per cent. land fund, and
the self-interest of the seaboard was appealed to by the argument
that the building of roads into the West would so stimulate sales of
the public lands as to increase the national revenues.
The matter of national aid to internal improvements was again brought
before Congress in 1816 by Calhoun, who presented a bill providing
for the direct construction of roads and canals and the improvement
of waterways out of a fund to be created by setting apart the bonus
and dividends received by the government from the United States bank.
This bill, which was drawn up by Clay, passed through Congress in
1817, but it was vetoed by Madison, who, though favorably disposed
toward public works, had inherited from Jefferson a doubt as to the
rights of Congress to participate in their construction without a
constitutional amendment specifically granting the authority. And
Monroe, holding the same opinion, vetoed a bill for the repair of
the Cumberland road, and submitted to Congress a long statement of
the principles involved in his decision. In the meantime, weary of
waiting, New York had succeeded in building the Erie canal. Its
success shifted the whole plan of promotion. With credit established
abroad, internal improvements were taken up by the states, and for
the next two decades transportation interest centers in state funding.
It was during this period of struggle for means of transportation
facilities adequate to meet the demands of those whose fortunes had
been cast in the remote interior that the railroad became the subject
of serious economic interest.
* * * * *
(In subsequent chapters, Messrs. Cleveland & Powell trace the
beginnings of the railroad, the physical and financial difficulties
that beset them at every turn; the indomitable spirit with which
they were projected, promoted and built into every quarter of the
Union, until through the investment of billions of private capital
the United States has been furnished with the best system of internal
transportation in the world. To their pages the reader is referred
for the continuation of this most interesting narrative.)
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY
June 12, 1848.
By J. EDGAR THOMSON. Chief Engineer.
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.
_Philadelphia, June 12, 1848._
To the President and Directors of the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company:
GENTLEMEN--I have the honor to communicate to you the following
Report of the operations of this Department since it was committed to
my charge, now something more than a year.
Under the organization of the Engineer Department, as adopted
previous to my acceptance of the office you have conferred upon me,
the Road was to be divided into three divisions, Eastern, Western and
Middle: Edward Miller, Esq., as associate engineer, was assigned to
the Western, and W. B. Foster, Jr., to the Eastern division. These
gentlemen had entered upon the survey of their respective lines,
previous to my arrival, under instructions from the president, each
with two full corps of assistants. The middle, or mountain division,
not having been provided for, I concluded after a full consideration
of the subject that the interest of the Company would be best
promoted by so altering the organization as to abolish it altogether,
and extend the eastern and western divisions to the summit of the
Allegheny mountains, the natural boundary between them. Under this
arrangement, the surveys have since been prosecuted.
The Board having directed me to cause a location of the whole line,
from Harrisburg to Pittsburg, to be made at the earliest practicable
period, I at once commenced a reconnoissance of that portion of the
intervening country, over which it seemed--from an inspection of a
map of the State--that the Road would probably pass, for the purpose
of determining the best plan of operations to carry out their views.
The Legislature, in their grant to the Company, wisely left the
choice of a route for the Road, between its termini, entirely free,
throwing upon the Board the responsibility of selecting, upon
the wide field that was opened to them, a line for their great
work, which would offer the cheapest railroad conveyance for the
transportation of freight and the most expeditious for travel that
could be selected between the west and the northern Atlantic cities.
Such a route, it was believed from previous surveys, lay within
the borders of Pennsylvania, an expectation which has been fully
justified by the results obtained from our examinations.
Of the several routes proposed, I found no difficulty--after a
careful inspection of the plans of the various surveys, made under
the authority of the Commonwealth, and my reconnoissance of the
country--in coming to the conclusion that the valley of the Juniata
offered advantages for a line which, whether we consider the low
gradients that may be obtained along it or its general directness,
the desiderata required, is without a rival.
This stream has its source in the Alleghenies, and consequently
severs, as it flows towards the Atlantic, all the secondary mountain
ranges that lie east of them, and it heads opposite to the Black
Lick and Conemaugh rivers, both of which sever those on the west,
leaving the main Allegheny only to be surmounted, which would have
to be encountered upon any other _direct_ route, in addition to many
of the inferior mountain ranges. A more northern route, by the west
branch of the Susquehanna (which has its source beyond the Allegheny
mountains), would have encountered less elevation at the principal
summit, but its great increased length precluded its adoption; while,
on the other hand, a southern route, though not indirect, was equally
objectionable on account of the rugged character of the country, and
the high gradients necessary to overcome the numerous summits upon
it. A partial examination of one of the proposed southern routes
was made, which followed the Cumberland Valley Railroad to near
Shippensburg, and thence, crossing to the west side of the valley at
Roxbury, it passed through the Blue Mountain, by a long tunnel, into
Path valley; thence, following around the point of Dividing mountain,
it crossed this valley and passed through Tuscarora, by another
tunnel, to the valley of Augwick creek. Thence it would have been
traced between Broad Top and Sideling mountains, and up Dunning and
Bob's creeks to the summit of the Alleghenies at Bob's Creek gap;
or, turning west by Bedford, crossed the Alleghenies at the head
waters of the tributaries of Castleman's river, where the mountain is
still much more elevated.