In October, 1864, President Lincoln, while he knew his re-election to
the White House was in no sense doubtful, knew that if he lost New
York and with it Pennsylvania on the home vote, the moral effect of
his triumph would be broken and his power to prosecute the war and make
peace would be greatly impaired. Colonel A. K. McClure was with Lincoln
a good deal of the time previous to the November election, and tells
this story:
“His usually sad face was deeply shadowed with sorrow when I told him
that I saw no reasonable prospect of carrying Pennsylvania on the home
vote, although we had about held our own in the hand-to-hand conflict
through which we were passing.
“‘Well, what is to be done?’ was Lincoln’s inquiry, after the whole
situation had been presented to him. I answered that the solution of the
problem was a very simple and easy one--that Grant was idle in front of
Petersburg; that Sheridan had won all possible victories in the Valley;
and that if five thousand Pennsylvania soldiers could be furloughed home
from each army, the election could be carried without doubt.
“Lincoln’s face’ brightened instantly at the suggestion, and I saw that
he was quite ready to execute it. I said to him: ‘Of course, you can
trust want to make the suggestion to him to furlough five thousand
Pennsylvania troops for two weeks?’
“‘To my surprise, Lincoln made no answer, and the bright face of a few
moments before was instantly shadowed again. I was much disconcerted,
as I supposed that Grant was the one man to whom Lincoln could turn with
absolute confidence as his friend. I then said, with some earnestness:
‘Surely, Mr. President, you can trust Grant with a confidential
suggestion to furlough Pennsylvania troops?’
“Lincoln remained silent and evidently distressed at the proposition I
was pressing upon him. After a few moments, and speaking with emphasis,
I said: ‘It can’t be possible that Grant is not your friend; he can’t be
such an ingrate?’
“Lincoln hesitated for some time, and then answered in these words:
‘Well, McClure, I have no reason to believe that Grant prefers my
election to that of McClellan.’
“I believe Lincoln was mistaken in his distrust of Grant.”
JUSTICE vs. NUMBERS.
Lincoln was constantly bothered by members of delegations of
“goody-goodies,” who knew all about running the War, but had no inside
information as to what was going on. Yet, they poured out their advice
in streams, until the President was heartily sick of the whole business,
and wished the War would find some way to kill off these nuisances.
“How many men have the Confederates now in the field?” asked one of
these bores one day.
“About one million two hundred thousand,” replied the President.
“Oh, my! Not so many as that, surely, Mr. Lincoln.”
“They have fully twelve hundred thousand, no doubt of it. You see, all
of our generals when they get whipped say the enemy outnumbers them
from three or five to one, and I must believe them. We have four hundred
thousand men in the field, and three times four make twelve,--don’t you
see it? It is as plain to be seen as the nose on a man’s face; and at
the rate things are now going, with the great amount of speculation and
the small crop of fighting, it will take a long time to overcome twelve
hundred thousand rebels in arms.
“If they can get subsistence they have everything else, except a just
cause. Yet it is said that ‘thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel
just.’ I am willing, however, to risk our advantage of thrice in justice
against their thrice in numbers.”