CHAPTER XXVIII

INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN DRIVE

As the month of July approached its end the Russian assaults became

more and more violent. Along the entire front the most bitter and

sanguinary fighting took place day after day and night after night.

Artillery bombardments such as never had been heard before raged at

hundreds of places at the same time. Troops in masses that passed all

former experience were employed by the Russians to break the

resistance of the Teutonic allies.

The latter, however, seemed to have their affairs well in hand. At

many points they lost local engagements. At other points advanced

positions had to be given up, and at still other points occasional

withdrawals of a few miles became inevitable. But, all in all, the

Austro-German lines held considerably well.

During the last two or three days of July, 1916, however, the

German-Austrian forces suffered some serious reverses. On July 21,

1916, General Sakharoff had succeeded in crossing the Lipa River and

in establishing himself firmly on its south bank. This brought him

within striking distance of the important railway point of Brody on

the Dubno-Lemberg railway, very close to the Russo-Galician border,

and only fifty miles northeast of Lemberg.

In spite of the most determined resistance on the part of the Austrian

troops, the Russian general was able to push his advantage during the

next few days, and on July 27, 1916, Brody fell into his hands.

Less successful was the continued attack on the Stokhod line with the

object of reaching Kovel. There the German-Austrian forces repulsed

all Russian advances.

In the Bukowina, however, the Russians gradually pushed on. Slowly but

surely they approached once more the Carpathian Mountain passes.

The same was true in eastern Galicia. After the fall of Kolomea in the

early part of the month, the Russian advance had progressed steadily,

even if slowly, in the direction of Stanislau and Lemberg. Closer and

closer to Stanislau the Russian forces came, until on July 30, 1916,

they were well within striking distance.

In the north, too, General Kuropatkin displayed greatly increased

activity against Von Hindenburg's front, although as a result he

gained only local successes.

Midsummer, 1916, then saw the Russians once more on a strong offensive

along their entire front. How far this movement would ultimately carry

them, it was hard to tell. Once more the way into the Hungarian plains

seemed to be open to the czar's soldiers, and a sufficiently

successful campaign in Galicia might easily force back the center of

the line to such an extent that they might then have prospects of

regaining some of the ground lost during their great retreat.

Interesting details of the terrific struggle which had been going on

on the eastern front for many weeks are given in the following letter

from an English special correspondent:

"I reached the headquarters of a certain Siberian corps about midnight

on July 15, 1916, to find the artillery preparation, which had started

at 4 p. m., in full blast. Floundering around through the mud, we came

almost on to the positions, which were suddenly illuminated with fires

started by Austrian shells in two villages near by, while the jagged

flashes of bursting shells ahead caused us to extinguish the lights of

the motor and to turn across the fields, ultimately arriving at the

headquarters of a corps which I knew well on the Bzura line in Poland.

"Sitting in a tiny room in an unpretentious cottage with the

commander, I followed the preparations which were being made for the

assault. The ticking of the instruments gave news from the front, the

line of which was visible from the windows by flares and rockets and

burning villages. By midnight ten breaches had been made in the barbed

wire, each approximately twenty paces broad, and the attacks were

ordered for three o'clock in the morning.

"Rising at 5 a. m. I accompanied the commander of the corps to his

observation point on a ridge. The attacks had already swept away the

resistance of the enemy's first line.

"Thousands of prisoners were in our hands, and the enemy was already

retiring rapidly. He therefore halted but a few minutes, pushing on to

the advanced positions. The commander stopped repeatedly by the

roadside tapping the field wires, and giving further instructions as

to the disposition of the troops.

"As we moved forward we began to meet the flood from the battle field,

first the lightly wounded, and then Austrian prisoners helping our

heavily wounded, who were in carts.

"Before we were halfway to the positions a cavalry general splashed

with mud met the commander and informed him that six guns were already

in our hands. The next report from the field telephone increased the

number to ten guns, with 2,000 prisoners, including some Germans.

"At quite an early hour the entire country was alive, and every

department of the army beginning to move forward. All the roads were

choked with ammunition parks, batteries, and transports following up

our advancing troops; while the stream of returning caissons, the

wounded, and the prisoners equaled in volume the tide of the advancing

columns.

"The commander took up his position on a ridge which but a few hours

before had been our advanced line. Thence the country could be

observed for miles. Each road was black with moving troops, pushing

forward on the heels of the enemy, whose field gun shells were

bursting on the ridges just beyond.

"Here I met the commander of the division and his staff. Plans were

immediately made for following up our success. Evidently the size of

our group was discernible from some distant enemy observation point,

for within five minutes came the howl of an approaching projectile and

a 6-inch shell burst with a terrific crash in a neighboring field. Its

arrival, which was followed at regular intervals by others ranging

from 4-inch upward, was apparently unnoticed by the general, whose

interest was entirely occupied with pressing his advantage.

"So swift was our advance that nearly half an hour elapsed before the

newly strung field wires were working properly.

"The fire had become so persistent that our group scattered and

hundreds of prisoners, whose black mass could be seen by the enemy,

were removed beyond the possibility of observation. Then the corps

commander, stretched on straw on the crest of the ridge, with his maps

spread out, dictated directions to the operator of the field telephone

who crouched beside him.

"Before and beneath us lay the abandoned line of Austrian trenches,

separated from ours by a small stream, where since daylight the heroic

engineers were laboring under heavy shell fire to construct a bridge

to enable our cavalry and guns to pass in pursuit.

"Leaving the general we proceeded. Our troops had forced the line here

at 3 a. m., wading under machine-gun and rifle fire in water and marsh

above their waists, often to their armpits. The Austrian end of the

bridge was a horrible place, as it was congested with dead, dying and

horribly wounded men, who, as the ambulances were on the other side of

the river, could not be removed. A sweating officer was urging forward

the completion of the bridge, which was then barely wide enough to

permit the waiting cavalry squadrons to pass in single file. On the

opposite bank waited the ambulance to get across after the troops had

passed. A number of German ambulance men were working furiously over

their own and the Austrian wounded, many of whom, I think, must have

been wounded by their own guns in an attempt to prevent the bridging

of the stream. A more bloody scene I have not witnessed, though within

a few hours the entire place was probably cleared up.

"Passing on I, for the first time, witnessed the actual taking of

prisoners, and watched their long blue files as they passed out from

their own trenches and were formed in groups allotted to Russian

soldiers, who served as guides rather than guards, and sent to the

rear.

"Near here I encountered about fifty captured Germans and talked with

about a dozen of them. Certainly none of them showed the smallest

lack of morale or any depression.

"By noon sufficient details of the fighting were available to indicate

that this corps alone had taken between three and five thousand

prisoners and twenty guns, of which four are said to be howitzers.

When one is near the front the perspective of operations is nearly

always faulty, and it was, therefore, impossible to estimate the

effect of the movement as a whole, but I understand that all the other

corps engaged had great success and everywhere advanced."

PART IV--THE BALKANS

CHAPTER XXIX

HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI

The six months ending with March, 1916, had been not only an eventful

period in the Balkans, but a most unfortunate one for the Allies. In

no theater of the war had they sustained such a series of smashing

disasters in diplomacy as well as on the field of battle. First of

all, early in the fall, the Austrians had begun their fourth invasion

of Serbia, this time heavily reenforced by the Germans and in such

numbers that it was obvious before the first attack was begun that

Serbia by herself would not be able to hold back the invaders. And

then, hardly had the real fighting begun, when Bulgaria definitely

cast her lot in with the Teutons and Hungarians and attacked the

Serbians from the rear.

While it was true that King Ferdinand and his governing clique had

made this decision months before, it is nevertheless a fact that it

was probably the blundering diplomacy of the Allies which was

responsible for this action on the part of the Bulgarians. Under all

circumstances King Ferdinand would probably have favored the Teutons,

since by birth and early training he is an Austrian and, moreover, as

he once expressed himself publicly, he was firmly convinced that the

Teutons would ultimately win. But the Bulgarian people are

sentimentally inclined toward the Russians and dislike the Germans.

Had not the diplomatic policy of the Allies played into the hands of

the king, they would naturally have turned toward the Allies.

Above all else the Bulgarians have desired either the freedom or the

annexation of Macedonia, which is almost entirely inhabited by

Bulgars. The Germans made the definite promise that Macedonia should

be theirs if they allied themselves with them. The Allies endeavored

to promise as much, but the protests of Greece and Serbia stood in the

way. Neither of these two nations was willing to give up its

possessions in this disputed territory, though later, when she saw

that her very existence was at stake, Serbia did make some

concessions, but not until after Bulgaria had already taken her

decision. Had the Allies disregarded these greedy bickerings on the

part of her minor allies and promised as much as the Germans had

promised, there is no doubt that the popular sentiment in Bulgaria

would have been strong enough to block Ferdinand's policy.

In Greece, too, there had been the same blundering policy. Here the

situation was much the same as in Bulgaria; the king, with his

Teutonic affiliations, was in favor of the Germans, while the

sentiment of the people was in favor of the Allies. Moreover, here the

popular sentiment was voiced by and personified in quite the strongest

statesman in Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos. Had the Allies made known

to the Greeks definitely and in a public manner just what they were to

expect by joining the Entente, the policy of the king would have been

frustrated. But here again the ambitions of Italy in Asia Minor and in

the Greek archipelago caused the same hesitation. The result was that

popular enthusiasm was so dampened that the king was able to pursue

his own policy.

Then came the disastrous invasion of Serbia; the Serbian armies were

overwhelmed and practically annihilated, a few remnants only being

able to escape through Albania. The assistance that was sent in the

form of an Anglo-French army under General Sarrail came just too late.

Having swept Macedonia clear of the Serbians, the Bulgarians next

attacked the forces under Sarrail and hurled them back into the Greek

territory about Saloniki.

The Italians, too, had attempted to take part in the Balkan

operations, but with their own national interests obviously placed

above the general interests of the whole Entente. They had landed on

the Albanian coast, at Durazzo and Avlona, hoping to hold territory

which they desire ultimately to annex. Then followed the invasion of

Montenegro and Albania by the Austrians and the Bulgarians, and the

Italians were driven out of Durazzo, retaining only a foothold in

Avlona.

By March, 1916, all major military operations had ceased. Except for

the British and French at Saloniki and the Italians at Avlona, the

Teutons and the Bulgarians had cleared the whole Balkan peninsula

south of the Danube of their enemies and were in complete possession.

The railroad running down through Serbia and Bulgaria to

Constantinople was repaired where the Serbians had had time to injure

it, and communications were established between Berlin and the capital

of the Ottoman Empire, which had been one of the main objects of the

campaign.

In the beginning, however, the Bulgarians did not venture to push

their lines across the Greek frontier, though this is a part of

Macedonia which is essentially Bulgarian in population. There are

several reasons why the Bulgarians should have restrained themselves.

The traditional hatred which the Greeks feel for the Bulgarians, so

bitter that an American cannot comprehend its depths, would

undoubtedly have been so roused by the presence of Bulgarian soldiers

on Greek soil that the king would not have been able to have opposed

successfully Venizelos and his party, who were strong adherents of the

Allies. This would not have suited German policy, though to the

victorious Bulgarians it would probably not have made much difference.

Another reason was, as has developed since, that the Bulgarian

communications were but feebly organized, and a further advance would

have been extremely precarious. The roads through Macedonia are few,

and the best are not suited to automobile traffic. The few prisoners

that the French and English were able to take evinced the fact that

the Bulgarians were being badly supplied and that the soldiers were

starved to the point of exhaustion. And finally, from a military point

of view, the Allied troops were now in the most favorable position.

Their lines were drawn in close to their base, Saloniki, with short,

interior communications. The Bulgarians, on the contrary, were

obliged to spread themselves around the wide semicircle formed by the

Anglo-French lines. To have taken Saloniki would have been for them an

extremely costly undertaking, if, indeed, it would have at all been

possible.

On the other hand, it was equally obvious that the Allies were not,

and would not be, for a long time to come, in a position to direct an

effective offensive against the Bulgarians in Macedonia. That they and

their German allies realized this was apparent from the fact that the

German forces now began withdrawing in large numbers.

The Bulgarians, however, did not attempt to assist their German allies

on any of the other fronts, a fact which throws some light on the

Bulgarian policy. Naturally, it is in the interests of the Bulgarians

that the Teutons should win the war, therefore it might have been

expected that they would support them on other fronts, notably in

Galicia. That this has never been done shows conclusively that the

alliance with the Germans is not popular among the Bulgarians. They

have, rather reluctantly, been willing to fight on their own

territory, or what they considered rightly their own territory, but

they have not placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans on the

other fronts. It is obvious that Ferdinand has not trusted to oppose

his soldiers against the Russians.

Meanwhile the forces under Sarrail were being daily augmented and

their position about Saloniki was being strengthened. By this time all

the Serbians who had fled through Albania, including the aged King

Peter, had been transported to the island of Corfu, where a huge

sanitarium was established, for few were the refugees that did not

require some medical treatment. Cholera did, in fact, break out among

them, which caused a protest on the part of the Greek Government. Just

how many Serbians arrived at Corfu has never been definitely stated,

but recent reports would indicate that they numbered approximately

100,000. All those fit for further campaigning needed to be equipped

anew and rearmed.

CHAPTER XXX

MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE

On March 27, 1916, a squadron of seven German aeroplanes attempted to

make a raid on Saloniki. Their purpose was to drop bombs on the

British and French warships in the harbor, but the fire of the Allied

guns frustrated their efforts and four of the aeroplanes were brought

down. But during the encounter some of these aircraft dropped bombs

into the city and twenty Greek civilians were killed, one of the bombs

falling before the residence of General Moschopoulos, commander of the

Greek forces in Saloniki.

Deep resentment against the Germans flared up throughout Greece on

account of this raid, which found expression in bitter editorials in

the Liberal press against the continued neutrality of Greece. The

question of the declaration of martial law was raised in an exciting

session of the Chamber of Deputies, which lasted till late at night.

The Government discouraged all hostile comment on the action of the

Germans, and Premier Skouloudis declined to continue a debate

involving discussion of foreign relations "because the highest

interests impose silence." Notwithstanding the attitude of the

government the raid was characterized in the chamber as "simply

assassination" and as "German frightfulness." Plans were started to

hold mass meetings in Athens and Saloniki, but the police forbade

them. At the funerals of the victims, however, large crowds gathered

in spite of the efforts of the police to disperse them and the

ceremonies were marked by cries of "Down with the barbarians!" and

"Down with the Germans!"

Hardly had this agitation died down when Venizelos, who for a long

time had remained silent, so aloof from politics that, to quote his

own statement, "I do not even read the reports of the proceedings in

the Chamber," resumed active participation in the nation's affairs by

giving out a lengthy interview to the press, as well as with an

editorial in his own personal organ. This latter occupied an entire

page and reviewed completely the position of the Greek monarch since

the dissolution of the last Chamber of Deputies. Referring to the

king's alleged characterization of himself as a "dreamer," M.

Venizelos said:

"By keeping the country in a state of chronic peaceful war through

purposeless mobilization, the present government has brought Greece to

the verge of economic, material and moral bankruptcy. This policy,

unhappily, is not a dream, but downright folly." He further laid great

stress on the Bulgarian peril, pointing out that the utmost to be

gained by the present policy would be to leave Greece the same size,

while Bulgaria, flushed with victory, trained for war, enlarged by the

addition of Serbia and Macedonia and allied with the Turks, would not

wait long before falling on her southern neighbor. "Who thinks," he

continued, "that under these conditions that Greece, unaided, could

drive the Bulgars from Macedonia, once they have seized it, is a fool.

The politicians who do not see this inevitable danger, are blind, and

unfortunate are the kings following such politicians, and more

unfortunate still the lands where sovereigns fall their victims."

And, indeed, the ex-premier's references to the economic ruin of the

country were strongly supported by the dispatches that had for some

time been coming from the Greek capital. "Greece," said a prominent

official to a press correspondent, "is much more likely to be starved

into war than Germany is to be starved out of it."

The deficit in the Greek treasury for the previous year was now shown

to have amounted to L17,000,000, or $85,000,000. The budget for 1916

authorized an expenditure of $100,000,000, which was double the entire

state revenues. For the masses the situation was daily becoming more

difficult. The streets of Athens were said to be alive with the

beggars, while the island of Samos was in a sporadic state of revolt.

At Piraeus and Patras there were disquieting demonstrations of popular

discontent with the increasing cost of living. Many commodities had

more than doubled in price. This situation was largely due to the

mobilization, as in the case of the fishermen. As most of them were

with the colors, the price of fish, which had hitherto been one of the

main food supplies, had become prohibitive to the poorer families.

The sentiment of the people was further expressed on April 7, 1916,

when the Greeks celebrated the 100th anniversary of their national

independence. On this occasion Venizelos appeared in public for the

first time since his retirement from political life, after he had been

obliged to resign by the king. When he left the cathedral in Athens,

where services were held, thousands of persons followed his motor car,

cheering enthusiastically. Finally his car could proceed no farther,

being densely packed about by the people, who broke forth into

deafening cheers and shouts of "Long live our national leader!" and

"Long live Venizelos!"

At about this time, on April 14, 1916, a new critical situation was

precipitated between the Allies and the Greek Government. On that date

the British Minister at Athens had asked permission of the Greek

Government to transport Serbian troops from Corfu to Saloniki by way

of Patras, Larissa, and Volo, which involved the use of the

Peloponnesian railway. This was peremptorily refused as involving a

breach of Greek neutrality.

Under ordinary conditions transports would have conveyed the Serbians

from Corfu to Saloniki, such a trip requiring less than three days.

But the German submarines had been so active in these waters of late

that the Allies desired to evade this danger, contending that it was

with the connivance of the Greek Government officials that the Germans

were able to maintain submarine bases among the islands. Moreover,

they also contended that the cases were different from what it would

have been had the request concerned French or British troops. The

Greeks were allies of the Serbians, bound to them by a formal treaty,

and though they had refused to assist them in a military sense, as the

terms of the treaty demanded, they might at least help them in their

need. Two days later, on April 16, 1916, the Chamber of Deputies

adjourned for the session, which left the whole matter in the hands

of the government. However, this question hung fire for some time, and

later dispatches would indicate that the Allies did not press their

point, for eventually when the arrival of the Serbian troops in

Saloniki was announced, it was stated incidentally that they had come

by means of transports.

But meanwhile Venizelos was continuing his campaign against the

ministry. On April 16, 1916, the Liberals had attempted to hold

several public meetings in Athens, which were vigorously broken up by

the police, or, according to some reports, by agents of the government

in civilian dress. The following day Venizelos gave out an interview

to the press in which he said:

"I beg you to bring the events of yesterday and the earnest protest of

a majority of the Greeks to the knowledge of the American people, who

have struggled for so long to establish free speech as the fundamental

right of a free people. Here in Greece we are confronted by the

question whether we are to have a democracy presided over by a king or

whether at this hour of our history we must accept the doctrine of the

divine rights of kings. The present government represents in no sense

the majority of the Greek people. We Liberals, in the course of a year

received the vote of the majority. At the last election, which was

nothing more than a burlesque on the free exercise of the right of

suffrage, we were not willing to participate in a farcical

formality.... Now it is even sought to deny us the right of free

speech. Our meetings were held within inclosed buildings. Those who

came to them were invited, but the police threw out our doorkeepers,

put in their own and let enter whomsoever they, the police, wanted to

be present at the meetings."

It was now evident that Venizelos had determined to fight the present

government to the bitter end.

On May 7, 1916, it was demonstrated that the contention of the king,

that the agitation in favor of Venizelos and the demonstrations in his

favor were largely artificial, was not true, in one electoral district

of Greece at least. Venizelos had been nominated candidate for deputy

to the National Assembly in Mytelene, and when the election took

place, on the above date, he was elected with practically no

opposition and amid a tremendous enthusiasm. On the following day, May

8, 1916, at a by-election in Kavalla, Eastern Macedonia, Constantine

Jourdanou, a candidate of the Venizelos Liberty party, was also

elected a deputy to the National Assembly by an 85 per cent majority

vote.

But these were merely demonstrations--meant merely as indications of

popular sentiment--for neither Venizelos nor the Kavalla

representative had any intention of taking their seats in the chamber,

which they considered illegally elected.

Meanwhile practically no military activity had been displayed. On

March 17, 1916, a dispatch was issued from Vienna to the effect that

the Austrian army had reached the vicinity of Avlona and had engaged

the Italians in pitched battle outside the town, into which they were

driving them. But apparently there was little truth in this report,

for some weeks later a body of Italian troops were reported to have

crossed the Greek frontier in Epirus, which caused an exchange of

notes between the Greek and Italian governments, by no means the best

of friends, on account of their conflicting ambitions in Albania.

Further encounters between both Austrians and Bulgarians and the

Italians in Avlona were reported during the spring, but apparently the

Italians were well able to hold their own.

There were, however, indications that the Allies in Saloniki had been

steadily strengthening their positions and augmenting their numbers,

and that, conscious of their growing strength, they were throwing out

their lines. In the first week in May came a dispatch announcing that

they had occupied Florina, a small town only some fifteen miles south

of Monastir, though still on Greek territory.

That there was really some truth in these announcements; that the

Allies were really showing some indications of expanding their lines

and were assuming a threatening attitude, was indicated by the next

move made on the board, this time by the Bulgarians; a move, however,

which was obviously of a defensive nature, though at the time it

seemed to portend a Bulgarian offensive.

On May 26, 1916, the Bulgarians for the first time ventured across the

Greek frontier. And not only did they cross the frontier, but, instead

of attacking the Allies, they forced the Greek forces occupying a

point of strategic value to evacuate it and occupied it themselves.

Fort Rupel, on the Struma River, and north of Demir Hissar, is about

six miles within Greek territory. It commands a deep gorge, or defile,

which forms a sort of natural passageway through which troops can be

marched easily into Greek territory from Bulgaria. To either side

tower difficult mountains and rocky hills. On account of these natural

features Greece had fortified this defile after the Balkan Wars so

that she might command it in case of a Bulgarian invasion. On the

commanding prominences the Greeks had also built fortifications.

It was the chief, the most important, of these forts that the

Bulgarians took. A courier was sent forward with notice to the Greek

commander that he had two hours in which to evacuate the position with

his troops. This he did peacefully, and before evening the Bulgarians

were installed, though it was said that they had given due assurances

that their occupation was merely a temporary measure undertaken as a

defensive precaution, and that as soon as the need should cease the

fort would be returned to Greece.

On the following day came the announcement that the Bulgarians, in

strong force, had deployed from Fort Rupel and had also occupied Fort

Dragotin and Fort Kanivo. At the same time unusual activity on the

part of the Bulgarians was also reported from Xanthi. Here, on the

left bank of the Mesta River, which for some distance from its mouth

forms the Bulgar-Greek boundary, the Bulgarians were collecting

material for building pontoon bridges.

Naturally this action on the part of the Bulgarians caused wild

excitement throughout Greece. The government organs stated that the

forts had been taken by German forces, but this was soon proved to be

untrue.

In reporting this movement the Bulgarian Government added, by way of

explanation and excuse:

"Two months ago the Anglo-French troops began the abandonment of the

fortified camp at Saloniki and started a movement toward our frontier.

The principal enemy forces were stationed in the Vardar Valley and to

the eastward through Dovatupete to the Struma Valley, and to the

westward through the district of Subotsko and Vodena to Florina. A

part of the reconstituted Serbian army has also been landed at

Saloniki. Artillery fire has occurred daily during the past month."

Evidently Bulgaria was anxious to impress on the outside world the

fact that she had invaded Greek territory entirely for defensive

purposes, for only several days later a correspondent of the

Associated Press was allowed to send through a report of an inspection

he had made of the Bulgarian camp, something that had not previously

been permitted. From this report it was evident that the Bulgarian

army was not contemplating a forward movement.

These assurances probably had their effect in calming the excitement

in Greece, a result which Germany was no doubt wishful of obtaining.

Nevertheless the fact that the government had quietly permitted the

Bulgarians to take the forts was not by any means calculated to

increase its popularity with the masses and made for the strengthening

of the Venizelos party.

In spite of the formal protests which the Greek Government made

against the occupation of its territory and fortifications by

Bulgarian troops, there was not a little reason for suspecting that

the Skouloudis government was working on some secret understanding, if

not with the Bulgarians, then with the Germans. At least this was the

general impression that was created in France and England, as

reflected in the daily press.

On June 8, 1916, it was reported from Saloniki that the Allies were

about to institute a commercial blockade of Greek ports, preliminary

to presenting certain demands, the exact nature of which was not given

out, but which were expected to include the demobilization of the

Greek army.

The notice of the blockade again aroused the excitement of the Greek

population, but not so much against the Allies as against the

Skouloudis government. And this was because what the Allies were

expected to demand was just what the majority of the Greek masses

seemed most to want, the demobilization of the army; the return to

their vocations of the thousands of workingmen with the colors. The

Venizelos party was especially in favor of such a measure, for its

leaders claimed that it was because the mass of the voters was with

the army and was therefore deprived of their suffrage, that the

sentiment of the Greek people could not be determined.

On June 9, 1916, it was announced from Athens that the king had signed

an order demobilizing twelve classes of the army, amounting to 150,000

men. But this order was not, for some reason, put into execution, nor

was there any indication of the Allies putting an end to the blockade.

On the contrary, on the same day it was announced that the Greek

captain of the port at Saloniki had been removed and a French naval

officer had been put in his place. Entry to the port had also been

refused to Greek ships from Kavala, and an embargo had been placed on

Greek ships in French ports. Obviously the Allies were demanding

something more than the demobilization of the army. As a matter of

fact, they had not yet formally presented their demands.

From later reports it was shown that the Allies had prepared their

demands formally and that they were to have been presented on June 13,

1916. But the evening before, on the 12th, certain events took place

in Athens which caused them to delay the presentation of their note,

holding it back for revision.

On the 12th a military fete had been held at the Stadium, at which

members of the British Legation were present, including the military

attache and Admiral Palmer, the new chief of the British Naval

Mission. When the king and his suite appeared at the Stadium, Greek

police officers immediately grouped themselves around the British

representatives, giving the inference that the royal party needed to

be protected from them. The indignant Englishmen immediately left the

Stadium. After the fete a mob collected in the street and began a

demonstration against the Allies. The crowd was escorted by fifty or

sixty policemen in uniform. It first marched to the Hotel Grande

Bretagne, where the French Minister resided, and began shouting

insulting remarks. Next the British Legation building was visited and

a similar hostile demonstration was made. Thence the mob proceeded to

the office of the "Nea Hellas," a Venizelist journal, hurled stones

through the windows and assaulted the editor and his staff. The

editor, in defending himself, fired a revolver over the heads of the

mob, whereupon he was arrested and thrown into jail. During the same

evening another demonstration was made in a theater, in which the

performers made most insulting remarks regarding the representatives

of the Allies. Several meetings were held in other parts of the city

at the same time, at which resolutions were passed against the Allies,

one of these resolutions denouncing the conduct of the Allies toward

neutral countries, "and especially their conduct toward the President

of the United States."

Finally, on June 23, 1916, the full text of the demands of the Allies

on Greece, signed by the representatives of France, Great Britain, and

Russia and indorsed by Italy, was given out, simultaneously with the

official announcement that all the conditions had been accepted by the

Greek Government. The text was as follows:

"As they have already solemnly declared verbally and in writing, the

three Protecting Powers of Greece do not ask her to emerge from her

neutrality. Of this fact they furnish a striking proof by placing

foremost among their demands the complete demobilization of the Greek

army in order to insure to the Greek people tranquillity and peace.

But they have numerous and legitimate grounds for suspicion against

the Greek Government, whose attitude toward them has not been in

conformity with repeated engagements, nor even with the principles of

loyal neutrality.

"Thus, the Greek Government has all too often favored the activities

of certain foreigners who have openly striven to lead astray Greek

public opinion, to distort the national feeling of Greece, and to

create in Hellenic territory hostile organizations which are contrary

to the neutrality of the country and tend to compromise the security

of the military and naval forces of the Allies.

"The entrance of Bulgarian forces into Greece and the occupation of

Fort Rupel and other strategic points, with the connivance of the

Hellenic Government, constitute for the allied troops a new threat

which imposes on the three powers the obligation of demanding

guarantees and immediate measures.

"Furthermore, the Greek Constitution has been disregarded, the free

exercise of universal suffrage has been impeded, the Chamber of

Deputies has been dissolved a second time within a period of less than

a year against the clearly expressed will of the people, and the

electorate has been summoned to the polls during a period of

mobilization, with the result that the present chamber only represents

an insignificant portion of the electoral college, and that the whole

country has been subjected to a system of oppression and of political

tyranny, and has been kept in leading strings without regard for the

legitimate representations of the powers.

"These powers have not only the right, but also the imperative duty,

of protesting against such violations of the liberties, of which they

are the guardians in the eyes of the Greek people.

"The hostile attitude of the Hellenic Government toward the powers,

who have emancipated Greece from an alien yoke, and have secured her

independence, and the evident collusion of the present cabinet with

the enemies of these powers, constitute for them still stronger

reasons for acting with firmness, in reliance upon the rights which

they derive from treaties, and which have been vindicated for the

preservation of the Greek people upon every occasion upon which it has

been menaced in the exercise of its rights or in the enjoyment of its

liberties.

"The Protecting Powers accordingly see themselves compelled to exact

immediate application of the following measures:

"1. Real and complete demobilization of the Greek Army, which shall

revert as speedily as possible to a peace footing.

"2. Immediate substitution for the existing ministry of a business

cabinet devoid of any political prejudice and presenting all the

necessary guarantees for the application of that benevolent neutrality

which Greece is pledged to observe toward the Allied Powers and for

the honesty of a fresh appeal to the electors.

"3. Immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, followed by

fresh elections within the time limits provided by the constitution,

and as soon as general demobilization will have restored the electoral

body to its normal condition.

"4. Dismissal, in agreement with the Allied Powers, of certain police

officials whose attitude, influenced by foreign guidance, has

facilitated the perpetration of notorious assaults upon peaceable

citizens and the insults which have been leveled at the Allied

Legations and their members.

"The Protecting Powers, who continue to be inspired with the utmost

friendliness and benevolence toward Greece, but who are, at the same

time, determined to secure, without discussion or delay, the

application of these indispensable measures, can but leave to the

Hellenic Government entire responsibility for the events which might

supervene if their just demands were not immediately accepted."

The treaties referred to in the note, on which the "three Protecting

Powers" base their right to intervene in the affairs of Greece to

enforce the carrying out of her constitution, date back to the early

period of last century, when the three nations in question assisted

the newly liberated Greeks in establishing a government and assumed a

semiprotectorate.

This note was presented to Premier Skouloudis, but he refused to

accept it on the ground that no Greek Cabinet existed, as it had been

deposited at the Foreign Office while he was on his way back from the

residence of the king, where he had presented the resignation of the

ministry.

The people were unaware of what had happened until evening, when

newspapers and handbills, distributed broadcast, made known the text

of the demands. King Constantine returned hastily to Athens. All the

troops in the city were ordered under arms. The Deputies were

summoned to the Chamber, where Skouloudis announced that he had

resigned, after which the Chamber immediately adjourned again.

On the following day the king summoned Alexander Zaimis, a Greek

politician, reputed to be in favor of the Allies, to form a new

Cabinet. He immediately organized a new ministry, comprising himself

as Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Callaris, Minister

of War and Marine; George Rallis, Minister of Finance; Phocian Negria,

of Communications; Colonel Harlambis, of the Interior; Anthony

Momperatos, of Justice; Constantine Libourkis, of Instruction, and

Colligas, of National Economy. The first act of the new Cabinet was to

announce a new election of Deputies to the National Chamber, to take

place on August 7, 1916. The new Premier also announced that the

demands of the Allies would be carried out to the letter. As a token

of good faith, the chief of police of Athens was immediately dismissed

and Colonel Zimbrakakis, who had been police chief during the

Venizelos regime, was installed in his place. The Allies, on their

part, at once raised the blockade and agreed to advance Greece a loan

to tide over her present financial difficulties.

For some days afterward large and enthusiastic pro-Venizelos

demonstrations took place in Athens and other Greek cities, in which

the labor unions and the soldiers were reported to take a very

prominent part. Meanwhile the demobilization of the Greek army was

begun in good faith.

During this period there had been no further aggression, or advance,

on the part of the Bulgarians. And while there had been a number of

German officers present at the demand for the evacuation of Fort Rupel

by the Greeks, as well as a small force of German engineers, all the

reports emanating from Bulgaria indicated, directly or indirectly,

that the German forces had been almost entirely drawn away from the

Balkans, to meet the gradually increasing pressure that both the

Russians on the eastern front and the English and French on the

western front were bringing to exert on the Teutonic forces. Being

practically left to themselves, for the Turks, too, had their hands

full in their Asiatic provinces, and considering the need of forces

for garrison duty in conquered territory, especially in Albania and

upper Serbia, as well as the army needed to watch the movements of the

Rumanians, it was doubtful if the Bulgarians had more than 300,000 men

to spare for their lines opposing those of the Allies at Saloniki.

The Allies, on the other hand, had been daily waxing stronger. At

least 100,000 Serbians had been added to their forces about Saloniki

before the beginning of August. There were, at this time, about

350,000 French and British soldiers in Saloniki, so that the total

force was not very far short of half a million. General Mahon, the

British commander, had gone to Egypt, to superintend the removal to

Saloniki of the British troops there, who had been provided as a

defending force when the danger of a German attack in that section

seemed imminent. These forces were estimated at another 200,000. Added

to this the favorable position of the Allies from a strategic point of

view, it was obvious, by the middle of August, that if active

hostilities were to break out on the Saloniki front very shortly, the

initiative would most likely come from the Allies.

PART V--AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XXXI

RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT

Throughout the early part of March, 1916, military operations on the

Italian front were very restricted. At the end of February the

atmospheric conditions, which up till then had remained exceptionally

favorable, changed suddenly, giving place to a period of bad weather,

with meteorological phenomena particularly remarkable in that theater

of the operations, which among all those of the European war is the

most Alpine and the most difficult. In the mountain zone snow fell

very heavily, causing frequent great avalanches and sometimes the

movement of extensive snow fields. Communications of every kind were

seriously interrupted. Not only shelters and huts, but in many cases

columns of men and supplies on the march were swept away. The

unceasing tempest made it difficult and in some cases quite impossible

to render any aid, but owing to an organized service for such

eventualities, ample and effective assistance was given in the great

majority of cases. This led to the speedy restoration of

communications and supplies. Nevertheless the distressing but

inevitable loss of human lives was comparatively large.

In the lowland zone heavy and constant rains caused landslides in the

lines of defense and shelters. The rise of the rivers and the

consequent floods soon made the ground impassable. Even the main roads

were interrupted at several points. In the whole theater of operations

it was a regular battle against adverse circumstances.

Austrian troops in many places used the heavy snowfall to their

advantage. By means of mines, bombs and artillery fire they produced

avalanches artificially. Thus on March 8, 1916, some damage was done

in this manner to Italian positions in the Lagaznos zone. On the same

day Italian forces succeeded in pushing their lines forward for a

slight distance in the zone between the Iofana peaks (in the

Dolomites), as well as in the valley of the middle Isonzo and in the

Zagara sector. Along the entire front vigorous artillery fire was

maintained.

The artillery combat gradually increased in vehemence during the next

few days, especially on the Isonzo front, indicating a resumption of

offensive movements. About the middle of March, 1916, Italian troops

began again to attack the Austrian positions. On March 15, 1916, a

lively artillery duel and a series of attacks and counterattacks were

repulsed from the Isonzo front.

Italian infantry carried out a number of successive attacks in the

region of Monte Rombon in the Plezzo basin and on the height

commanding the position of Lucinico, southeast of San Martino del

Carso. After an intensive preparation by artillery fire the Austrians,

on March 16, 1916, launched at dawn a counterattack against the

positions conquered by the Italians the day before, but were at first

everywhere repulsed, suffering heavy losses.

The Austrian concentration of artillery fire, in which guns of all

caliber were employed, lasted uninterruptedly throughout the day,

forcing the Italians to evacuate the positions during the course of

the night.

The Fella sector of the Carinthian front and also the Col di Lana

sector in the Tyrol were shelled by Italian artillery. Italian airmen

dropped bombs on Trieste without doing any damage.

Again atmospheric conditions enforced a lull in military operations

during the next few days and brought to a sudden end what had seemed

to be an extensive offensive movement on the part of the Italian

forces on the Isonzo front.

On March 17, 1916, however, violent fighting again developed on the

Isonzo front in the region of the Tolmino bridgehead. It began with

greatly increased artillery activity along the entire sector between

Tolmino and Flitsch. Later that day the Austro-Hungarians launched an

attack against the Italian forces which netted them considerable

ground on the northern part of the bridgehead, as well as some 500

prisoners.

The battle in the Tolmino sector continued on March 18 and 19, 1916,

and to a slighter degree on March 20, 1916. On the first of these

three days the Austro-Hungarian troops succeeded in advancing beyond

the road between Celo and Ciginj and to the west of the St. Maria

Mountain. Italian counterattacks failed. South of the Mrzli, too, the

Italians lost a position and had to withdraw toward Gabrije, losing

some 300 prisoners. Increased artillery activity was noticeable on the

Carinthian front, particularly in the Fella sector; in the Dolomites,

especially in the Col di Lana sector; in the Sugana Valley and at some

points on the west Tyrol front. Goritz, too, was again subjected to

heavy Italian gunfire.

On the following day, March 19, 1916, fighting continued at the

Tolmino bridgehead as a result of Italian efforts to conquer positions

firmly in Austro-Hungarian hands. The number of Italians captured

reached 925 and the number of machine guns taken was increased to

seven. Several Italian attacks against Mrzli and Krn (Monte Nero)

broke down. On the Rombon the Austro-Hungarians captured a position

and took 145 Italians and two machine guns.

Lively fighting continued on the Carinthian front. In the Tyrol

frontier district Italian artillery again held the Col di Lana section

and some points south of the front under heavy artillery fire.

On the Goritz bridgehead Austro-Hungarians in the morning set fire to

an Italian position before the southern part of Podgora Height. In the

afternoon Austro-Hungarian artillery shelled heavily the front before

the bridgehead. During the night they ejected Italian forces from a

trench before Bevma.

Again on March 20, 1916, Italian counterattacks against the positions

captured by the Austro-Hungarians during the preceding days failed.

Again fighting slowed down for a few days.

As usual, resumption of military operations was indicated by increased

artillery fire.

In the Rovereto zone on March 23, 1916, an artillery duel was followed

during the night by Austro-Hungarian attacks against Italian positions

at Moriviccio, near Rio Comeraso, and in the Adige and Terragnole

Valleys. These were repulsed. Throughout the theater of operations bad

weather limited, however, artillery action on the Isonzo, which was

active only near Tolmino and the heights northwest of Goritz.

On March 25, 1916, Italian artillery again bombarded the Doberdo

Plateau (south of Goritz), the Fella Valley and various points on the

Tyrolese front. East of Ploecken Pass (on the Carnia front) Italian

positions were penetrated and Italian attacks repulsed near Marter

(Sugana Valley).

Severe fighting took place on March 26, 1916, at several points. At

the Goritz bridgehead the Austro-Hungarians captured an Italian

position fronting on the northern portion of Podgora Heights, taking

525 prisoners. Throughout the entire day and the following night the

Italian troops in vain attempted to regain the positions which they

had lost the day before east of Ploecken Pass.

In the Doberdo sector on March 27, 1916, the artillery was again

active on both sides. Italian attacks on the north slope of Monte San

Michele and near the village of San Martino were repulsed. East of

Selz a severe engagement developed.

In the Ploecken sector all Italian attacks were beaten back under

heavy losses. Before the portion of the Carinthian front held by the

Eighth Chasseurs Battalion more than 500 dead Italians were observed.

Austro-Hungarian airmen dropped bombs on railroads in the province of

Venice.

Especially severe fighting occurred once more in the region of the

Gonby bridgehead during March 27, 28 and 29, 1916. On the last of

these days the Italians lost some 350 prisoners. Without cessation the

guns thundered on both sides on these three days on the Doberdo

Plateau, along the Fella and Ploecken sectors, in the Dolomites and to

the east of Selz. Scattered Italian attacks at various points failed.

Then, with the end of March, the weather again necessitated a stoppage

of military operations.

An interesting description of the territory in which most of this

fighting occurred was rendered by a special correspondent of the

London "Times" who, in part, says:

"There is no prospect on earth quite like the immense irregular

crescent of serrated peak and towering mountain wall that is thrown

around Italy on the north, as it unrolls itself from the plains of

Lombardy and Venetia. How often one has gazed at it in sheer delight

over its bewildering wealth of contrasting color and fantastic form,

its effect of light and shade and measureless space! But now, for

these many months past, keen eyes have been bent upon it; eyes, not of

the artist or the poet, but those of the soldier.

"It was such a pair of military eyes that I had beside me a day or two

ago, as I stood upon the topmost roofs of a high tower, in a certain

little town in northern Italy, where much history has been made of

late; and, since the owner of the eyes was likewise the possessor of a

very well-ordered mind and a gift of lucid exposition, I found myself

able to grasp the main elements of the extraordinarily complex

strategic problem with which the chiefs of the Italian army have had

to grapple. As I looked and listened I felt that the chapter which

Italy is contributing to the record of the greatest war of all time is

one of which she will have every reason to be proud when she has at

length brought it to its victorious conclusion.

"There are few such viewpoints as this. In the luminous stillness of a

perfect morning of the Italian summer I could look north, and east,

and west, upon more than a third of the battle line, that goes snaking

among the mountains from near the Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. And

what a length of line it is! In England some people seem to think this

is a little war that Italy has on hand, little in comparison with the

campaigns in France and Russia. But it is not small, weighed even in

that exacting balance. The front measures out at over 450 miles, which

is not very far short of the length of ribbon of trench and earthwork

that is drawn across western Europe.

"Here, as there, every yard is held and guarded. It is true that there

is not a continuous row of sentries; for on the Austro-Italian front

there are places where the natural barriers are impassable even for

the Alpine troops, who will climb to the aerie of the eagles. But

wherever nature has not barred the way against both sides alike the

trenches and fortified galleries run, stretching across the saddle

between two inaccessible peaks, ringing around the shoulder of a

mountain, dipping it into the valley, and then rising again to the

very summit or passing over it.

"There are guns everywhere--machine guns, mountain guns, field guns,

huge guns of position, 6-inch, 10-inch, 12-inch--which have been

dragged or carried with all their mountings, their equipment, their

tools and appurtenances, up to their stations, it may be, 3,000,

4,000, 6,000 feet above the level. And at those heights are the

larders of shell which must always be kept full so that the

carnivorous mouths of the man-eaters may not go hungry even for the

single hour of the single day which, at any point, an attack may

develop.

"Such is the long Italian battle line. When you know what it is you

are not surprised that here and there, and now and again, it should

bend and give a little before an enemy better supplied with heavy

artillery, and much favored by the topographical conditions; for he

has the higher mountain passes behind him instead of in front, and is

coming down the great Alpine stairway instead of going up.

"That of course is the salient feature of the campaign. The Italians

are going up, the Austrians coming, or trying to come, down. On the

loftier uplands, range beyond range, in enemy territory, the Austrians

before the war had their forts and fortified posts and their strategic

roads; and almost everywhere along the front they have observing

stations which overlook, at greater or less distance, the Italian

lines. Thus the Italians have had to make their advance, and build

their trenches, and place their guns, in the face of an enemy who lies

generally much above them, sometimes so much above them that he can

watch them from his nests of earth and rock as though he were soaring

in an aeroplane."

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SPRING OF 1916 ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

During the early part of the spring of 1916, a large number of

engagements took place at many scattered points along the entire

Austro-Italian front. Neither side apparently had determined as yet

upon any definite plan of operations, or, if they had, they took

special pains to avoid a premature disclosure. To a certain extent the

fighting which occurred was little more than of a reconnoitering

nature. Each side attempted with all the facilities at its command to

improve its positions, even if only in a small way, and to find out

weak spots in the lines of its adversary. It was only natural that

during the process of this type of warfare, fortune should smile one

day on one side and turn its back promptly the next day.

During the first week of April, 1916, there was little to report

anywhere along the front. On the 6th, however, considerable artillery

activity developed along the Isonzo front, where the Italians shelled

once more the city of Goritz. This activity gradually increased in

vehemence. At the end of about two weeks it decreased slightly for a

few days, only to be taken up again with renewed vigor and to be

maintained with hardly a break during the balance of April, 1916.

Coincident with this artillery duel there developed a series of

violent engagements on the Carso plateau to the east of the lower

Isonzo. The first of these occurred on April 12, 1916, when Italian

advance detachments approached Austrian trenches between Monte San

Michelo and San Martino, wrecking them with hand grenades and bombs.

Another engagement of somewhat greater importance occurred on April

22, 1916, east of Selz. Italian infantry, supported by artillery,

despite obstinate resistance occupied strong trenches 350 meters long.

The Austrians receiving reenforcements, violently counterattacked

twice during the night, the second time succeeding in retaking part

of the lost trenches. After a deadly hand-to-hand struggle in which

the Austrians suffered severely, the Italians drove them out,

capturing 133, including six officers, two machine guns, 200 rifles,

several flame throwers, and numerous cases of ammunition and bombs.

The following day, April 23, 1916, Austrian artillery of all calibers

violently shelled the trenches occupied east of Selz, obliging the

Italians to evacuate a small section north of the Selz Valley, which

was especially exposed to the Austrian fire. Another strong attack,

supported by a very destructive gunfire was launched by the Austrians

against these trenches on April 25, 1916, and enabled them to reoccupy

some of the ground previously lost.

Two days later the Italians attempted to regain these positions. At

first they succeeded in entering the Austrian trenches on a larger

front than they had held originally, but when they manifested an

intention to continue the attack, the Austro-Hungarians, by

counterattacks drove them into their former positions and even ejected

them from these in bitter hand-to-hand fighting, thereby regaining all

their former positions.

During the balance of April, and up to May 15, 1916, military

operations on the entire Isonzo front were restricted to artillery

bombardments, which, however, at various times, became extremely

violent, especially so with respect to Goritz and the surrounding

positions.

In the next sector, the Doberdo Plateau, much the same condition was

prevalent. From the 1st of April, until the middle of May, 1916, there

was always more or less artillery activity. Occasionally infantry

engagements of varying importance and extent would occur. On April 7,

1916, the Italians were driven back from some advanced saps. South of

Mrzlivrh, Austro-Hungarian troops conquered Italian positions, taking

forty-three prisoners and one machine gun.

Again on the 9th, hand-to-hand fighting, preceded by bomb throwing,

was reported on the Mrzlivrh front. Another attack, launched early in

the morning of April 13, 1916, by the Austrians, lasted throughout

the day, with varying fortune, but finally resulted in a success for

the Italians. On April 14, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians captured an

Italian position at Mrzlivrh and repulsed several counterattacks. The

Italians suffered heavy losses. Artillery vigorously shelled the

Italian positions at Flitsch and Hontebra.

Other violent engagements took place on the Doberdo Plateau on April

27, May 9, 10, 12, and 13, without, however, having any influence on

the general situation.

In all the other sectors very much the same conditions prevailed.

Artillery fire was maintained on both sides almost constantly.

Infantry attacks were launched wherever and whenever the slightest

opportunity offered itself. Scarcely any of these, however, resulted

in any noticeable advantage to either side, especially in view of the

fact that whenever one side would register a slight gain, the other

side immediately would respond by counterattack and frequently nullify

all previous successes. Comparatively unimportant and restricted,

though, as most of this fighting was, it was so only because it

exerted practically no influence on the general situation. On the

other hand, it was carried on with the greatest display of valor and

persistence that can be imagined and, because of the very nature of

the ground on which it occurred, it forms one of the most spectacular

periods of the war on the Austro-Italian front.

Of these many local operations there were only a few which developed

to such an extent that they need to be mentioned specifically.

One of these was a series of engagements in the Ledro Valley,

southwest of Riva and west of Lake Garda. There the Italians on April

11, 1916, by systematic offensive actions, pushed their occupation of

the heights north of Rio Tonale, between Concei Valley and Lake Garda.

Efficaciously supported by their artillery, their infantry carried

with the bayonet a strong line of intrenchments and redoubts along the

southern slopes of Monte Pari Cimadoro and the crags of Monte Sperone.

On the following day, however, April 12, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians,

by violent surprise attacks, succeeded in rushing a part of the

trenches taken by the Italians at Monte Sperone. In the evening,

after an intense preparation by artillery, Italian infantry

counterattacked, reoccupying the lost positions, after a deadly

hand-to-hand struggle and extending their occupation to the slopes of

Monte Sperone. This was followed by a still further extension on April

16, 1916.

Much of the fighting involved positions on mountain peaks of great

height, creating difficulties for both the attacker and the defender,

which at first glance appeared to be almost insurmountable. Of this

type of warfare in the high mountains, the special correspondent of

the London "Times" gives the following vivid description:

"The Italian dispositions are very complete, and it is at this point

necessary to say a few words upon Alpini warfare, which the Italians

have brought to such a pitch of perfection. They are not the only

mountaineers in the world, nor the only people to possess warriors

famous on the hillside, but they were the first people in Europe,

except the Swiss, to organize mountain warfare scientifically, and in

their Alpine groups they possess a force unrivaled for combat in the

higher mountains. The Alpini are individualists who think and act for

themselves and so can fight for themselves. They are the cream of the

army.

"Locally recruited, they know every track and cranny of the hills,

which have no terrors for them at any season, and their self-contained

groups, which are practically the equivalent of divisions, contain

very tough fighters and have achieved remarkable results during the

war. Their equipment, clothing, artillery, and transport are all well

adapted to mountain warfare, and as the whole frontier has been

accurately surveyed, and well studied from every point of view, the

Italians are at a great advantage in the hills.

[Illustration: An Austrian entrenchment high up on a mountainside. The

soldiers are pulling barbed wire devices up the slope in order to

strengthen their defenses.]

"There is nothing new about these troops, whose turnout and tactics

have been a subject of admiration for many years, but in this war much

has changed, in the Alps as elsewhere, and the use of the heaviest

artillery in the mountains is one of the most striking of these

changes. One finds oneself under the fire of twelve-inch howitzers

from the other side of mountains 10,000 feet high, and it is no

extraordinary experience to find Italian heavy howitzers sheltering

behind precipices rising sheer up several thousand feet, and fighting

with Austrian guns ten miles distant, and beyond one, if not two, high

ranges of hills. One imagines that the Austrians must have many

twelve-inch howitzers to spare, for there are, to give an example, a

couple near Mauthen, beyond the crest of the Carnic Alps, and other

heavy artillery in the same district hidden in caverns. In these

caverns, which are extremely hard to locate, they are secure against

shrapnel and cannot be seen by airmen. I fancy the Austrians use

galleries with several gun positions, which are used in turn.

"This style of fighting compels the Italians to follow suit, or at

least it is supposed to do so, and then, as no road means no heavy

guns, there comes in the Italian engineer, the roadmaker, and the

mason, and in the art of roadmaking the Italian is supreme.

"They are very wonderful, these mountain roads. They play with the

Alps and make impossibilities possible. Thanks to them, and to the

_filovia_, or air railway on chains, it is possible to proceed from

point to point with great rapidity, and to keep garrisons and posts

well supplied. The telephones run everywhere, and observing stations

on the highest peaks enable Italian howitzers to make sure of their

aim. I am not quite sure whether the Italians do not trust too much to

their telephones and will not regret the absence of good flag

signalers. When large forces are operating, and many shells bursting,

the telephone is often a broken reed. The motor lorries, with about a

one and one-half ton of useful load, get about wherever there is a

road, and the handy little steam tractors, which make light of

dragging the heaviest guns up the steepest gradients, are valuable

adjuncts to the defense. At the turns of bad zigzags, the Italians

have a remarkable drill for men on the dragropes, and in fact all

difficulties have been overcome.

"I recall some Italian batteries mounted at an elevation of about

9,000 feet, of which each gun weighed eleven tons, the carriage five

tons, and the platform, which was divided into sections, thirty tons.

These guns, the battery officers declared, were brought up from the

plains by a new mountain road in seven hours, and placed in position

on these platforms five hours later. It is all a question of roads,

but the _filovia_ can carry 400 kilos, and any gun under that weight

can get up to a peak by way of the air.

"It is all very marvelous and very perfect, and the Italians are also

adepts at trench building, and make them most artistically. The only

objection I can see to the mountain road is that, when the enemy gets

a hold of the territory which they serve, he has the benefit of them.

This is true of Trentino operations now, and the enemy has many more

roads at his disposal than the old maps show. Sometimes I wonder

whether the Italians do not immerse themselves a little too much in

these means of war and lose sight a little of the ends, but over

nine-tenths of Italy's frontier the war is Alpine, and it must be

allowed that Italian soldiers have brought the art of mountain

fighting to a degree of perfection which it has never attained before.

"The Italian Alpine group varies in strength and composition. It

usually has the local Alpine battalions reenforced by the mountaineers

of Piedmont, and completed, when necessary, by line infantry, who

usually act in the lower valleys, leaving the high peaks to the

mountaineers. Artillery is added according to needs--mountain, field,

and heavy--while there are engineers in plenty, and the mule transport

is very good.

"The Alpini wear a good hobnailed boot for ordinary service, but for

work on the ice the heel of the boot is taken off, and an iron clamp

with ice nails substituted. For mountaineering feats they often use

_scarpe da gatto_, or cat shoes, made of string soles with felt

uppers, which are more lasting than the Pyrenean straw sandals. The

_Gavetta_, or mess tin of the Alpini, is very practical. It is of the

same shape as ours, but a little deeper, and has a reserve of spirit

at the base and a spirit lamp, enabling the Alpini to make coffee or

heat their wine. They use racquets or skis on the snow, and carry

either the alpenstock or the ice ax.

[Illustration: The Italian Front.]

"I did not realize before coming here that trench warfare, and the

close proximity of hostile trenches, had become as usual in the

mountains as in the plains. The defenses are, of course, not

continuous over such a long, and in parts, impassable line, but tend

to concentrate at the passes and other points of tactical importance.

But here the adversaries draw together, and one often finds lines only

separated by twenty yards.

"The Alpini are usually as much deprived of the power of maneuvering

as their comrades in the plains, and all that is left for them is to

act by surprise. They have a system of attacking by infiltration

forward, not so very dissimilar from Boer methods, and they have a

number of devices and surprises which repay study.

"Their enemy is worthy of them, for the chamois hunters, the

foresters, the cragsmen of the Austrian Alps are no mean antagonists,

as all of us know who have shot and climbed with them. Very fine men,

they shoot quick and straight, and when an officer of Alpini tells us

not to dally to admire the scenery, because we are within view of an

Austrian post within easy range, we recall old days and make no

difficulty about complying.

"The Germans trained their Alpine corps here before it went to Serbia,

and the Italians made many prisoners from it--Bavarians, Westphalians,

and East Prussians. So at least I am told by officers of Alpini who

fought with it, and it is certainly proved beyond all doubt that

German artillery has been, and is now, cooperating with the Austrians

on the Italian front.

"The Alpini hold their positions winter and summer on the highest

peaks and have made a great name for themselves. They have lost

heavily, and the avalanches have also taken a serious toll of them.

One parts with them with regret, for they are indeed very fine

fellows, and the war they wage is very hard.

"One point more. Pasubio is not one of the highest peaks in Italian

hands, but snow fell there in the end of May and will fall again at

the end of August. The time allowed for big things in the Alps by big

armies is strictly limited. Also we must remember that there are

winter defenses to be made in the snow, and summer defenses to be made

in the earth and rock. The Austrians were clever in attacking the

other day, just as the snow defenses had crumbled and the summer

defenses had not been completed. The barbed-wire chevaux-de-frise are

often covered by snow in a night and have to be renewed. When the

snow thaws, all this jumble of obstacles reappears tangled together.

"Other ghastly sights also reappear, like the 600 Austrian corpses on

Monte Nero--almost awe-inspiring of heights. They had fallen in the

snow which had covered them. In the summer they reappeared one morning

in strange attitudes, frozen hard and lifelike, and gave the Italian

garrison their first fright."

On April 11, 1916, in the Monte Adamello zone, while a heavy storm was

raging, Italian detachments attacked the Austrian positions on the

rocky crags of the Lobbia Alta and the Doss di Genova, jutting out

from the glaciers at an altitude of 3,300 meters, (10,918 feet). On

the evening of April 12, 1916, they completely carried the positions,

fortifying themselves in them and taking thirty-one prisoners,

including one officer and one machine gun.

The next day, April 13, 1916, saw some severe fighting in the Sugana

Valley in the Dolomites, where Italian troops carried with the

bayonet, a position at Santosvaldo, west of the Sarganagna torrent,

taking seventy-four prisoners, including five officers.

Three days later, April 17, 1916, Italian Alpine troops in the Monte

Adamello zone, occupied and strengthened the Monte Val di Fumo Pass,

at an altitude of 3,402 meters (11,161 feet).

During the night of April 18, 1916, one of the most spectacular and

important exploits of this period was executed. In the upper Cordevole

zone Italian troops, after successful mining operations, attacked

Austrian positions on the Col di Lana and occupied the western ridge

of Monte Ancora. The Austrian detachment occupying the trenches was

mostly killed. The Italians took as prisoners 164 Kaiserjaegers,

including nine officers.

This successful operation of the Italians was of exceptional

importance. The Col di Lana is a mountain 4,815 feet high, which forms

a natural barrier in the valley of Livinallengo and protects the road

of the Dolomites from Falzarego to the Pordoi Pass and dominates the

road to Caprile. The Italians had already occupied Col di Lana, but

could not drive the Austrians from its western peak, where an entire

battalion of Alpine troops, Kaiserjaegers, was strongly intrenched and

protected by semipermanent fortifications with field and machine guns.

It was impossible for the Italians to attack the enemy's positions,

within range of the Austrian artillery on Mount Sief, which is nearly

on the same level, so the entire western margin of Col di Lana was

carefully and patiently mined, an undertaking which probably took

months of hard work, and several tons of high explosives were

distributed in such a way as to destroy the whole side of the mountain

above which the enemy was intrenched.

The explosion that followed was terrific. The earth shook as if rocked

by an earthquake, and the havoc wrought was so great that out of the

1,000 Austrians who held the position, only 164 survived.

Of course, the Austrians launched many counterattacks against this new

strong position of the Italians. But the latter had fortified it so

well that all attempts of their opponents to dislodge them failed.

Considerable further fighting also occurred during the second half of

April, 1916, and the first half of May, 1916, in the Adamello zone,

adjoining the Camonica Valley, especially in the region of the Tonale

Pass. The same was true of the Tofana sector on the upper Boite. But

though spectacular, the results were of comparatively small

importance.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE AUSTRIAN MAY DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO

About May 15, 1916, the Italians were at the gates of Rovereto, less

than twelve miles south of Trent and seriously threatening that city.

East of Rovereto the Italian lines ran along the crest of Doss di

Somme to the Monte Maggio beyond Val Terragnolo and then northward to

Soglio d'Aspio. The Austrian forts of Folgaria and Lavarone compelled

the Italians to follow the frontier as far as Val Sugana, where they

occupied good strategical positions on Austrian territory and held

Ronsegno, on the railroad between Borgo and Trent. Further north the

Italians held dominating positions in front of the Austrian forts at

Fabonti and Monte Cola.

During the preceding months the Austrian forces along the Italian

front had gradually been increased, until they now numbered about

thirty-eight divisions. Of these, it was estimated that sixteen

divisions, or over 300,000 men had been massed by May 15, 1916,

between the Adige and Brenta Rivers. Artillery, too, in comparatively

great quantity and of as heavy caliber as the country permitted, had

been assembled.

Suddenly on May 15, 1916, the Austrians along the Trentino front

followed up an intense bombardment which had lasted throughout May 14,

1916, with an attack by large masses of infantry against the Italian

positions between the Adige and the upper Astico. Although the

Italians valiantly resisted the first onrush they had finally to give

way, losing some 2,500 men and sixty-five officers. Austrian troops

have occupied Italian positions on Armentara Ridge, south of the

Sugana Valley, on the Folgarone Plateau, north of Cagnolo Valley and

south of Rovereto. On the Oberdo Plateau they entered trenches east of

Monfalcone, capturing five officers and 150 soldiers belonging to five

different Italian cavalry regiments.

The following vivid picture of the vehemence of the Austrian attack is

given in the "Comere della Sera":

"The Austrians have opened a breach in the wall of defense which we

have won by heavy sacrifices beyond our frontier. They have beaten

with a hurricane of fire upon our Alpine line at its most delicate

point, striving with desperate fury to penetrate into Italian

territory. This is the hardest moment of our war; it is also one of

the most bitter and violent assaults of the whole European war.

"The battle rages furiously. The Austrian attack is being made with

colossal forces in the narrow zone between the Adige and the Val

Sugana. The enemy had assembled fourteen divisions of his best troops.

An Austrian officer who was taken prisoner said:

"'You are not far from the truth in reckoning that there are three

hundred thousand men against you. These comprise the armies of Dankl,

Koevess, and the Boroevic, and these armies are served by unlimited

artillery. More than two thousand pieces are raining on a

twenty-five-mile front projectiles of all calibers.'"

"On Sunday morning, May 14, 1916, three shadows approached the Italian

trenches. As they advanced they were recognized as Austrian Slav

deserters. They said:

"'The attack has been ordered for to-morrow. The bombardment will last

from dawn to 6 p. m., when the infantry will attack.'

"The information was exact. A bombardment of incredible violence

began. Aeroplanes regulated the fire of a 15-inch naval gun, which

sent five projectiles on the town of Asiago. After the bombardment had

ceased the first infantry attack came. The troops attacked _en masse_,

and at the same time attacks were made from the Adige to the Val

Sugana. Four onslaughts were made on Zugna Torta. Our machine guns cut

down the blue masses of men; the wire entanglements were heaped with

dead. The bombardment had destroyed all the first-line trenches. The

infantry then hurled itself against the advance posts of the Val

Terragnolo. The Alpini, deafened by twelve hours of bombardment,

defended every foot of the ground, fighting always in snow. Three

terrible bayonet counterattacks lacerated the Austrian lines, but the

assailants were innumerable, and no help could come, as the entire

front was in action. The Alpini who remained, so few in number, threw

themselves on the enemy again, permitting the retirement of the main

body to the line running from Malga Milegna to Soglio d'Aspio. Even

here there was one avalanche of fire. The enemy artillery had been

pouring explosives on these positions for ten hours. The enemy

infantry here attacking were annihilated and the enemy dead filled the

valleys, but fresh troops swarmed up from all parts.

"Night fell on the first day's slaughter."

The following day, May 16, 1916, the Austrians attacked again the

Italian positions on the northern slopes of the Zugna Torta in the

Lagarina Valley in five assaults. In the zone between the Val

Terragnolo and the upper Astico a violent concentrated fire from the

Austrian artillery of all calibers forced the Italians to abandon

their advanced positions. In the Asiago sector persistent attacks were

repulsed. In the Sugana Valley the Austrians vigorously attacked

between the Val Maggio bridgehead and Monte Collo. The prisoners taken

by the Austrians were increased to forty-one officers and 6,200 men,

and the booty to seventeen machine guns and thirteen guns. Along the

whole remaining front there was artillery fire. Sporadic infantry

attacks were made in the San Pellegrino Valley, the upper But, at

Monte Nero, Mrzli, the Tolmino zone, the northern slopes of Monte San

Michele, the region east of Selz, and Monfalcone.

Austrian aeroplanes shelled Castel Tesino, Capedaletto, Montebelluna,

and the stations at Carnia and Gemona. Italian aeroplanes shelled

Dellach and Kotsschach in the Gail Valley.

The shelling of Zugna Torta was renewed on May 17, 1916, when five

attacks against the Italian positions were repulsed with heavy losses.

Meanwhile artillery fire continued against the Italian positions

between Val Terragnolo and the upper Astico. After three days of

intense and uninterrupted artillery fire the Italians abandoned their

positions on Zugna Torta on May 18, 1916, but repulsed two attacks

against their positions further south. The Italians also abandoned

their line of resistance between Monte Soglio d'Aspio and retired upon

other prepared positions.

Zugna Torta, the ridge running down upon Rovereto, between Val

Lagarina and Vallarsa, was a dangerously exposed salient. The western

slopes were commanded by the fire of the Austrian artillery positions

at Biaena, north of More, on the western side of Val Lagarina, and the

rest of the position lay open to Ghello and Fenocchio, east of

Rovereto. The Italians had never been able to push forward their lines

on either side of this salient. Biaena blocked the way on the west,

and the advance east of Vallarsa was held up by the formidable group

of fortifications on the Folgaria Plateau. When the Austrians attacked

Zugna Torta, under cover of a converging artillery fire, the position

quickly became untenable.

On the same day the Austrians, for the first time since the beginning

of hostilities between Italy and Austria, crossed the Italian frontier

in the Lago di Garda region and established themselves on the

Costabella, a ridge of the Monte Baldo, between the lake and the

Lagarina Valley. At this point, where the Austrian offensive met with

the greatest success, the Italians were driven back four miles from

the positions on Austrian soil which they occupied at the opening of

the attack and which they had held early in the war.

The Austrian advance was well maintained on the following day, May 19,

1916, when the Italians were driven from their positions on the Col

Santo, almost directly to the west of Monte Maggio captured the day

before, between the Val di Terragnolo and the Vallarsa.

By that time the number of Italians taken prisoners by the Austrians

since May 15, 1916, had increased to 257 officers and 13,000 men and

the booty to 109 guns, including twelve howitzers, and sixty-eight

machine guns.

An Austrian dispatch forwarded at that time from Trent tells of the

violent fighting which was in progress in the zone of Monte Adamello

and the Tonale Pass and gives a description of the capture by the

Austrians of an unarmed mountain in this region.

The preparatory bombardment was begun at three o'clock in the

afternoon, the Italian guns making only a desultory reply. The

bombardment was continued until after sunset, when the Austrian

infantry began to move forward from the direction of Fort Strino, on

the Noce River, northeast of the Tonale Pass, guided by searchlights

and star shells.

The seasoned Austrian troops encountered an extremely heavy

machine-gun and rifle fire as they climbed the slope, using their

bayonets to give them support on the slippery ground, but continued

the advance, and near the summit engaged the Italian defenders in a

hand-to-hand combat, and after an hour of bayonet fighting drove the

Italians from their positions. Both sides engaging in the encounter

lost heavily, according to the dispatch.

According to Rome dispatches the Austrian troops were under the

command of the Austrian heir-apparent, Archduke Charles Francis

Joseph, as well as Field Marshal Count von Hoetbendorff, chief of the

Austrian General Staff. General Cadorna, the Italian commander in

chief, was also said to have established his headquarters on the

Trentino front to take personal command of the defense.

The special correspondent of the London "Times" describes the fighting

in the Trentino at this period as follows:

"It is the fifth day of the Austrian offensive. 'We have an action in

progress,' says the colonel. The night is clear and mild. A moon, full

red, is rising on the horizon. Headquarters are located in an ancient

Austrian feudal castle, which crowns a hilltop. At our feet the valley

spreads out, and the mountain-chains to the right and left seem to

meet at an angle in the west. Here a blackened mountain mass dominates

the valley. It is the Panarotta, the stronghold of the enemy.

"'The eye of the Austrians,' a young officer exclaims, as from the

crest a beam of light breaks forth, flaring with great intensity on

the Italian positions lower down. Immediately an Italian light

endeavors to shine directly in the path of the Austrian light and

blind its rays. Another Austrian light darts forth from across the

valley. Promptly an Italian searchlight gives battle. Thus for more

than an hour the opposing searchlights endeavor to intercept one

another. To-night the Austrians are on the offensive. Their lights

sweep the hill crests, pursued by Italian rays.

"The moon is now high in the heavens, the snow-clad peaks, the shadowy

ravines, the villages within Italian lines, as well as those beyond

the invisible ring of steel, are bathed in a silvery light. We are

standing less than four miles from the advanced enemy positions. The

stage is set, the battle is about to begin. Information brought in

during the day tells of fresh units of the enemy, massed in second

line. Deserters, surrendering to Italian patrols, report that an

important action is impending. The general commanding bids us good

night.

"We make our way on foot through quiet country lanes. Through the

trees, the glimmer of the searchlights' flashes comes and goes like

giant fireflies. The clear notes of a nightingale ring out in the

stillness of the night. Nestling in the valley lies a large town,

which only a fortnight ago was filled with civilians, 'redeemed

Italians,' who had enjoyed eight months of prosperity and liberty

under Italian rule. Now these have been evacuated and scattered in the

four corners of Italy, and the deserted houses and empty streets add

to the unreality of the scene. The whirring of the field-telephone

wires which hang low, hastily looped over the branches of olive and

mulberry trees, alone indicates any activity of man. There are no

troops in sight, save a patrol which stops us and examines our papers.

It seems difficult to realize that a great battle is impending. No

scene could be more peaceful. In the marshes, frogs are croaking in

loud unison. The scent of new-mown hay is wafted across the valley.

"The minutes hang heavily. A half hour passes. An hour seems

interminable. This afternoon, beyond the mountains, in the next

valley, not more than nine miles away as the crow flies, a bloody

action was fought. Not a sound of the cannonade reached us; what had

happened there we did not know, for the Austrians are attacking from a

single base, and their battle line is not more than fifteen miles

long, pivoting on a central position, whereas the Italian forces in

this same sector are compelled, by the configuration of the mountains

and the intersecting valleys, to fight separate actions which can only

be coordinated with utmost difficulty.

"Shortly before one o'clock in the morning the Austrian batteries open

fire. From the west, the north, the east, the hail of shell and

shrapnel tears open the crest of the hill, the Monte Collo, against

which the attack is directed. So intense an artillery fire has not

hitherto been witnessed on the Italian front; 380's, 305's, 240's,

149's, 105's rain upon the short line of Italian intrenchments.

"For more than three hours the bombardment continues. The Italian guns

apparently refrain from answering. But every battery is in readiness,

every Italian gun is trained on the spot where the enemy must pass.

Every man is at his post, waiting, waiting. It is just before dawn.

The air of this Alpine Valley is cold and raw. A bleak wind blows

through the trees. The cannonade slackens. From our position we cannot

see the enemy advancing, but the black, broad strip of newly-upturned

soil on the crest of the Monte Collo shows the effect of the

bombardment. Split wide open like a yawning crater, the hilltop has

been plowed up in every direction. Barbed wire, parapets, and trench

lines have disappeared, buried under the tangled earth clumps.

"A minute, perhaps five or ten! 'They are coming,' is whispered in the

observation post. A thunder of Italian artillery greets the attacking

forces. On they come. Instinctively one can discern a shadowy mass

moving forward. Huddled together, they crouch low. Shells are falling

and then cease, and the 'click,' 'click,' of the machine gun's

enfilading fire is heard. The enemy reaches the Italian advance

trenches. The first streaks of light, gray and cold, show new

attacking forces coming up over the hill. They penetrate deep into the

plowed soil. They seem to hold the hill. Stumbling through the

cratered terrain the Austrians advance toward the Italian positions.

Then from out of the tawny earth an Italian battalion springs up. One

can almost imagine that one hears their hoarse battle cry, 'Avanti,

Savoia! Avanti!' as they fall upon their enemies.

"We learn later that the losses have been heavy. The Italian

possessions have been badly damaged and have been temporarily

evacuated. Both sides have taken prisoners, and what was the battle

ground is now a neutral zone. Some hours later I again look across to

the Monte Collo. The hill crest is deserted. Below the summit fresh

Italian troops are occupying new and stronger positions, while an

endless stream of pack-mules is winding slowly up the mountainside."

On May 20, 1916, the battles in southern Tyrol, on the Lavarone

Plateau, increased in violence as the result of Italian attacks. The

Austrians reached the summit of the Armentara Ridge and on the

Lavarone Plateau penetrated the first hostile position.

The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph also added to their

successes. They captured the Cima dei Laghi and the Cima di Nesole.

The Italians also were driven from the Borgola Pass toward the south

and lost three more twenty-eight centimeter howitzers and 3,000 men,

84 officers, 25 guns and 8 machine guns.

Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza.

Although the Italian line still held in the main, it could not deny

Austrian advances at certain important points. Slowly the

Austro-Hungarians pushed on everywhere toward the Italian frontier. On

May 21, 1916, an attack of the Graz Corps on Lavarone Plateau was

attended with complete success. The Italians were driven from their

entire position. Other Austrian troops captured Fima, Mandriolo and

the height immediately west of the frontier from the summit as far as

the Astico Valley.

The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph reached the Monte

Tormino Majo line.

Between the Astico and Brenta, in the Sugana Valley, the Austrian

attacks likewise continued, supported by powerful artillery, against

advanced lines in the west valleys of Terra Astico, Doss Maggio and

Campelle.

Since the beginning of the offensive 23,883 Italians, among whom are

482 officers, had now been captured and the number of cannon taken had

been increased to 172.

Between Lake Garda and the Adige large Austrian forces were massed on

May 22, 1916, in the Riva zone. There was also considerable aerial

activity on that day on Monte Baldo (the mountain ridge to the east of

the lake). From the Adige to the Astico there were only

reconnoiterings. Between the Astico and the Brenta Rivers in the

Sugana Valley, the Italians were again forced to fall back gradually

on their main lines after repulsing heavy attacks throughout the day.

The retreat, however, was orderly and spontaneous.

Besides accomplishing their advance in the Val Sugana, the Austrians

continued the reduction of the forts protecting Arsiero, well across

the Italian frontier on the way toward Vicenza. Arsiero is the

terminus of a railway leading down into the Vicenza plain and the city

of Vicenza. Through the capture of the Spitz Tonezza and Monte

Melignone the Austrians now held the entire line across the frontier

as far as Forni on the Astico. They also pushed their advance toward

the ridge north of the Val dei Laghi, and toward Monte Tormino and

Monte Cremone, all three outlying defenses of Arsiero. Meanwhile the

right wing of the Austrian army, after storming Col Santo, had moved

toward Monte Pasubio, and the left wing had stormed the Sasso Alto,

commanding the Armentara Ridge, enabling the Austrians to advance into

the Sugana Valley and to take Roncegno.

In order to appreciate the difficulties connected with all of this

fighting, it must be remembered that the fighting is going on in the

mountains, on ground varying in altitude as much as 5,000 feet per

mile. The mountains were still partly covered with snow and the

transportation of supplies, therefore, was exceedingly difficult.

As the month of May drew to its end, the Austrian advance spread

steadily. By May 23, 1916, the Austrians had occupied north of the

Sugana Valley the ridge from Salubio to Borgo. On the frontier ridge

south of the valley the Italians were driven from Pompeii Mountain.

Further south the Italians successfully defended the heights east of

the Val d'Assa and the fortified district Asiago and Arsiero. The

armored work of Campolono, however, fell into Austro-Hungarian hands.

The Austro-Hungarian troops approached more closely the Val d'Assa and

Posina Valley.

Orderly as the Italian retreat was, it was nevertheless a hasty one.

For the official Italian report for May 23, 1916, admits that

artillery "that could not be removed" was destroyed.

Both the violence and unexpectedness of the Austrian attacks are

testified to by articles published at this time in Italian newspapers.

A writer in the "Giornale d'Italia" of Rome says that "the Austrian

offensive came as a surprise to the Italian command and the taking of

Monte Maggio and other important positions was possible, because the

Italians were not looking for so heavy an attack."

A correspondent of the "Corriere della Sera" of Milan, writing of the

extensive preparations made by the Austrians for the present

offensive, says "that the Austrians massed 2,000 guns, mostly of large

caliber, on the twenty-four-mile front attacked."

Though it was now scarcely more than a week since the beginning of the

Austrian offensive, 24,400 Italians had been made prisoners, among

them 524 officers, and 251 cannon; 101 machine guns had been taken.

The Italians, of course, appreciated fully the deeper meaning of this

Austrian offensive. They understood that the Austrian objective was

not simply to reduce the Italian pressure on Trent or to drive the

Italians out of southern Tyrol, but to advance themselves into Italy.

At the same time, Italy also knew that, though such an advance was not

an impossibility, its successful accomplishment for any great distance

or duration would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the

preponderance of numbers was unquestionably on the Italian and not the

Austrian side. This confidence found expression in an order of the day

issued at this junction by King Victor Emmanuel in which he says:

"Soldiers of land and sea: Responding with enthusiasm to the appeal of

the country a year ago, you hastened to fight, in conjunction with our

brave allies, our hereditary enemy and assure the realization of our

national claims.

"After having surmounted difficulties of every nature, you have fought

in a hundred combats and won, for you have the ideal of Italy in your

heart. But the country again asks of you new efforts and more

sacrifices.

"I do not doubt that you will know how to give new proofs of bravery

and force of mind. The country, proud and grateful, sustains you in

your arduous task by its fervent affections, its calm demeanor and

its admirable confidence.

"I sincerely hope that fortune will accompany us in future battles, as

you accompany my constant thoughts."

Still further Austrian successes were reported on May 24, 1916. In the

Sugana Valley they occupied the Salubio Ridge and drove the Italians

from Kempel Mountain.

In the Lagarina Valley, after an intense night bombardment, Austrian

forces attacked twice toward Serravalle and Col di Buole, but were

vigorously repulsed. Next morning the attack on Col di Buole was

renewed with fresh troops, but again repulsed with heavy loss. Italian

troops followed up this repulse and reoccupied the height of Darmeson,

southeast of Col di Buole.

Between the Val d'Assa and Posina the Austrians, after having kept

Italian positions at Pasubio under violent bombardment, launched a

night attack with strong columns of infantry, which were mowed down by

Italian fire and thrown back in disorder. Between Posina and the

Astico the Austrians unmasked their heavy artillery along the Monte

Maggio-Toraro line, but Italian guns replied effectively.

On May 25, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians occupied the Cima Cista,

crossed the Maso rivulet and entered Strigno in the Val Sugana, four

miles northeast of Borgo and a little less than that distance

southeast of Salubio, with the Maso stream between. They also captured

the Corno di Campo Verde to the east of Grigno, on the Italian border

and occupied Chiesa on the Vallarsa Plateau, southwest of Pasubio.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE RISE AND FAILURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE

By May 26, 1916, the center of the Austro-Hungarian army was sweeping

down toward Arsiero, while another strong force further west was

within ten miles of the Italian city of Schio. Both of these points

are terminals of the railroad system of which Vicenza is the center.

That day some of the armored works of Arsiero and some strongly

fortified positions southwest of Bacarola were captured and Monte

Mochicce was occupied. Another Austrian success was the capture of the

entire mountain range from Corno di Campo Verde to Montemeata (in the

Val d'Assa). The Italians suffered sanguinary losses and also lost

more than 2,500 prisoners, four guns, four machine guns, 300 bicycles

and much other material.

In the Monte Nero zone on the night of May 26, 1916, the

Austro-Hungarians attacked Italian trenches near Vrsic and succeeded

in gaining a temporary foothold. When reenforcements arrived, after a

violent counterattack, the Italians drove out the enemy, taking some

prisoners and machine guns.

The natural difficulties in the way of the Austro-Hungarian invaders

were so manifold and severe that it appeared at times as if the

offensive had come to a standstill. However, this was not the case.

Slowly but surely it progressed and as it progressed it even spread

out. Thus on May 27, 1916, the Austrians not only captured a

fortification at Coronolo, west of Arsiero, and also a barricade in

the Assa Valley, southwest of Monte Interrotto, but also carried their

offensive further toward the west until it included the northern end

of Lake Garda.

Again on May 28, 1916, the Italians had to give way. The Austrians

crossed the Assa Valley near Roana, four and a half miles southwest of

Asiago. They also repulsed Italian attacks near Canove, between Asiago

and Schio, and occupied the southern slopes and captured the

fortifications on the Monte Ingrotto heights, north of Asiago, after

having taken Monte Cebio, Monte Sieglarella and the Corno di Campo

Bianco. In the upper Posina Valley the Italians were driven out of

their positions west and south of Webalen.

With renewed vigor the Austrians attacked on May 29, 1916. As a result

the armored work of Punta Gorda fell into their hands, and west of

Arsiero they forced the crossing of the Posina Brook and occupied the

heights on the southern bank in the face of determined Italian

resistance.

The next day, May 30, 1916, Austrian troops, northeast of Asiago,

drove the Italians from Gallio and stormed positions on the heights

northward. Monte Baldo and Monte Fiara fell into their hands. West of

Asiago the Austrian line south of the Assa Valley was advanced to the

conquered Italian position of Punta Gorda. The troops which had

crossed the day before the Posina took Monte Priafora.

This brought the Austrians so near to Asiago that the Italians deemed

it wise to evacuate this town, holding, however, the hills to the

east. In spite of the gradual advance of the Austrian center, the

Italian wings held and severely punished the attacking Austrians. This

was made possible by the admirable Italian motor transports which

enabled the Italian command to bring up great reenforcements and stop

the gap made in the first line. The most serious loss which they

suffered was that of the big guns the Italians were obliged to abandon

on the Monte Maggio-Spitz Tonezza line.

The Austrian offensive was now in its second week. So far it had

yielded in prisoners 30,388 Italians, including 694 officers and 299

cannon.

Reviewing the Austro-Hungarian offensive up to this point, the

military critic of the Berlin "Tageblatt" says:

"The Austro-Hungarian advance is in progress on a front of thirty-one

miles between the Adige and the Brenta. This is about the same

distance as the front between Gorlice and Tarnow, in Galicia, over

which the offensive against the Russians was conducted thirteen months

ago.

"The general direction of the advance is toward the Italian line

running through Asiago, Arsiero, and Schio, which up to the present

time had been protected by advanced positions. This line represents

the third and last fortified defensive position, the strategic object

of which is to prevent an invasion of the Venetian plain.

"The Austro-Hungarian troops already have disposed of the loftiest

heights, which presents a situation favorable to them. When the heavy

artillery has been brought into place there will be visible evidence

of this.

"The total Italian casualties thus far are not less than 80,000 men.

The loss of more than 200 cannon is exceedingly serious for the

Italians, since they cannot be replaced during the war."

In spite of the fact that on May 30, 1916, the Austrians had forced

their way across the Posina torrent between Posina and Arsiero and

succeeded in partly enveloping the latter, a force which attempted to

take Sant' Ubaldo, immediately southeast of Arsiero, on May 31, 1916,

was driven back by the Italians beyond the Posina, thus relieving the

strongest pressure on the town. A little further west another Austrian

force attacked the Italian positions on Monte Spin, southeast of

Posina. The Italian lines held on the mountain slopes and the Austrian

advance here was checked. West of Posina an Austrian assault on Monte

Forni Alti was repulsed. On the Sette Comuni Plateau, where the

Austrians were advancing against Asiago, they began operations against

the Italian positions on Monte Cengio and Campo Niulo.

On June 1, 1916, however, the Austro-Hungarians in the Arsiero region

captured Monte Barro and gained a firm footing on the south bank of

the Posina torrent. Repeated night attacks along the Posina front

against the northern slopes of Monte Forni Alti and in the direction

of Quaro, southwest of Arsiero, were repulsed.

All day long an intense uninterrupted bombardment by Austrian

batteries of all calibers was maintained against the Italian lines in

the Col di Xomo-Rochette sector (southwest of Posina).

On the left wing the Austrians, leaving massed heavy forces between

Posina and Fusine (in the Posina Valley, east of Posina), made

numerous efforts to advance toward Monte Spin.

On the right wing strong Austro-Hungarian columns in the afternoon

launched a violent attack against Segheschiri. These were completely

repulsed after a fierce engagement.

In the uplands of the Sette Comuni there was an intense and obstinate

struggle along the positions south of the Assa Valley as far as

Asiago. Italian troops holding the Monte Cengio Plateau determinedly

withstood powerful infantry attacks supported by a most violent

bombardment.

On the front parallel with the Asiago-Guglio-Valle road near Campo

Mullo the Italians gained ground by a violent counteroffensive in

spite of the strong Austrian resistance.

Intense artillery and infantry fighting along the Trentino front

continued unabated on June 2, 1916, and according to the official

Italian statement the Austrian offensive in some places was checked.

The Austrian infantry on Zugna Torta was scattered by the fierce

Italian infantry fire.

Around Asiero and on the Asiago Plateau in Italy, the Italians

repulsed Austrian infantry. The Belmonte position northeast of Monte

Cengio, where the struggle was fiercest and which was repeatedly taken

and lost, was finally definitely occupied by the Italians.

Several Italian towns, including Vicenza and Verona, were attacked by

Austrian aeroplanes, while Italian air squadrons in a raid on objects

of military importance in the lower Astico Valley, dropped 100 bombs

on various enemy camps and munition depots.

The next day, June 3, 1916, the Austrian attack once more found fresh

impetus. In spite of desperate Italian resistance on the ridge south

of the Posina Valley and before Monte Cengio, on the Asiago front,

south of Monte Cengio, considerable ground was won and the town of

Cesuna was captured. Italian counterattacks were repulsed.

During this one day 5,600 prisoners, including seventy-eight officers,

were taken and three cannon, eleven machine guns and 126 horses were

captured.

In the region west of the Astico Valley fighting activity was

generally less pronounced on June 4, 1916, than it had been during the

preceding days. South of Posina Austrian troops took a strong point of

support and repulsed several Italian counterattacks.

East of the Astico Valley, Austrian groups situated on the heights

east of Arsiero stormed Monte Panoccio (east of Monte Barco) and

thereby gained command of the Canaglio Valley.

Considerable fighting occurred on June 5, 1916, without, however,

resulting in any important changes. Austro-Hungarian attacks,

preceded by intensive artillery fire, were launched all along the

Trentino front, but were met everywhere with determined Italian

resistance. Italian aeroplanes attacked the railway stations of San

Bona di Piava, Livenca and Lati Sana, while Austrian airmen bombed the

stations of Verona, Ala and Vicenza.

Since June 1, 1916, 9,700 Italians, including 184 officers, had been

captured, as well as thirteen machine guns and five cannons.

On June 6, 1916, activities were restricted to artillery duels,

although the Austrians southwest of Asiago continued the attack near

Cesuna and captured Monte del Busiballo, southwest of Cesuna.

More and more it became evident now that the force of the Austrian

offensive had been spent. The pressure on the Italian center in the

Trentino front gradually diminished as a result of the determined

Italian resistance, which had made impossible an equal progress of the

Austrian wings. Possibly, too, the great Russian offensive on the

southeastern front made itself felt even now. At any rate, there was a

decided slowing down of infantry attacks. At one point, however, on

the Sette Comuni Plateau, the battle raged along the whole front. On

the evening of June 6, 1916, after an intense artillery preparation,

the Austro-Hungarians made repeated attacks against Italian positions

south and southwest of Asiago. The action, raging fiercely throughout

the night of June 6-7, ended in the morning of June 7th with the

defeat of the Austrian columns. During the afternoon the Austrians

renewed their violent efforts against the center and right wing of the

Italian positions. Preceded by the usual intense bombardment, dense

infantry masses repeatedly launched assaults against positions south

of Asiago, east of the Campo Mulo Valley, but were always repulsed

with heavy losses.

Concerning the Austro-Hungarian troops who had carried this offensive

into Italy, the special correspondent of the London "Times" says:

"Trench warfare, for the time being, has been abandoned here. Trench

lines no longer count.

"Great troop masses are maneuvering in the open, through the valleys

and gorges, swarming over the summits of these mountains. The

Austrians dare advance only as far as the long arm of their guns will

reach, and are bending all their energy to bring up these guns. It is

a gigantic task, and the skill of the enemy commander in holding

together and coordinating his attacks, now that his troops have

entered these defiles, must be acknowledged.

"It is sledge-hammer tactics, so dear to the Prussians, that the

Austrian commanders have adopted, and from the general aspect of their

plans, it would appear that these were prepared and matured in Berlin

rather than in Vienna.

"How long can it last? How long before the Austrian effort will have

spent itself?" are the questions that are being asked here as the

second week of this great battle is drawing to a close. For, unlike

Verdun, it is not a fortress that is being assaulted, but a great

drive, carried on by siege methods. Not converging on a single center,

but radiating, like sticks of a fan, from a central base.

"So much has been written regarding the exhaustion of the resources of

the Dual Monarchy, not only of materials, but of men. In how far is

this true?

"To deal first with the question of ordnance. The Austrians, it is

estimated by competent experts, have well over 2,000 pieces of

artillery in action along this battle line. These include a great

number of heavy-caliber guns. Naval guns, with an extreme length of

range, are being used with great skill throughout the engagement. Kept

in reserve, and silent, though posted close up to the firing line,

they have had a disconcerting effect, in that their fire has reached

far behind the Italian lines at intervals between the attacks, firing

shots at random which did little actual damage, but gave the

impression of continued advance. With the front of this battle line

extending now to a length of twenty-two miles, the artillery of the

enemy works out at nearly 100 pieces to the mile, or one gun every

twenty yards.

"The shells fired by this artillery are of excellent workmanship. I

have on my table as I write a fragment of a 10-inch shell which I

picked up here. It is rent in deep fissures, which would prove,

according to competent authority, that the explosive materials used

are good. 'The Austrians fired away all their bad shells during

preliminary actions,' was the comment of a young staff officer who is

in the habit of recording the efficiency of enemy shells. But it is

quantity as well as quality which the enemy is relying upon.

"'Twenty thousand shells were fired against my position the first two

days of the engagement,' an Alpini major, commanding a small knoll,

remarked to me. Using this as a basis, it would not be far from the

truth to assert that over 1,000,000 shells have been fired by the

enemy in the present battle, and there is as yet no slackening of

effort.

"And the troops? This morning a group of some 250 Austrians, taken

during the action last night, are in this village. They are divided in

squads of twenty-five, each in charge of an Austrian noncommissioned

officer. The men had had six hours' rest before I saw them. These

prisoners are Rumanians from Transylvania. They are young, well-set-up

troops. They are naturally glad to be prisoners, though their captors

tell me that they fought valiantly. The equipment of these men is new,

and I was struck by the excellent quality of their boots; high, new

leather, thick mountain boots. In fact, all their leather

accouterments are new, and of good leather. Their uniforms are in many

cases of heavy cotton twill, very tough, and resisting the hard

mountain fighting better than the usual cloth uniform. Nearly every

man has an overcoat, which is of stout new cloth. Only five or six of

the men are without caps. None have helmets of any kind, but all wear

the soft cap with ear flaps tied back. According to answers given to

the interpreter, they are of the class of 1915, and have seen fighting

in Galicia.

[Illustration: Detail of Austrian Offensive, May, 1916.]