While on a visit to Cleveland, Ohio, some time ago, the guest of my
good friend George A. Myers, my attention was called to Rhodes'
History of the United States. This was due, no doubt, to the fact that
Mr. Myers had been in correspondence with Mr. Rhodes relative to
certain points in the career of the late M. A. Hanna, brought out by
Mr. Rhodes, which, in the opinion of Mr. Myers, were not accurate. In
glancing over one of the volumes, I came across the chapters giving
information about what took place in the State of Mississippi during
the period of Reconstruction. I detected so many statements and
representations which to my own knowledge were absolutely groundless
that I decided to read carefully the entire work. I regret to say
that, so far as the Reconstruction period is concerned, it is not only
inaccurate and unreliable but it is the most biased, partisan and
prejudiced historical work I have ever read. In his preface to volume
six, the author was frank enough to use the following language:
"Nineteen years' almost exclusive devotion to the study of one period
of American history has had the tendency to narrow my field of
vision." Without doing the slightest violence to the truth, he could
have appropriately added these words: "And since the sources of my
information touching the Reconstruction period were partial, partisan
and prejudiced, my field of vision has not only been narrowed, but my
mind has been poisoned, my judgment has been warped, my decisions and
deductions have been biased and my opinions have been so influenced
that my alleged facts have not only been exaggerated, but my comments,
arguments, inferences and deductions based upon them, can have very
little if any value for historical purposes."
Many of his alleged facts were so magnified and others so minimized as
to make them harmonize with what the author thought the facts should
be rather than what they actually were. In the first place, the very
name of his work is a misnomer: "History of the United States from the
Compromise of 1850 _to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South
in 1877_." I have emphasized the words "to the final restoration of
home rule at the South in 1877" because those are the words that
constitute the misnomer. If home rule were finally restored to the
South in 1877, the natural and necessary inference to be drawn is that
prior to that time those States were subjected to some other kind of
rule, presumably that of foreigners and strangers, an inference which
is wholly at variance with the truth. Another inference to be drawn is
that those States had enjoyed home rule until the same was
revolutionized or set aside by the Reconstruction Acts of Congress and
that it was finally restored in 1877. If this is the inference which
the writer meant to have the reader make, it is conclusive evidence of
the fact that he was unpardonably and inexcusably ignorant of the
subject matter about which he wrote. As that term is usually and
generally understood, there never was a time when those States did not
have home rule, unless we except the brief period when they were under
military control, and even then the military commanders utilized home
material in making appointments to office. Since the officers,
however, were not elected by the people, it may be plausibly claimed
that they did not have home rule. But the State governments that were
organized and brought into existence under the Reconstruction Acts of
Congress were the first and only governments that were genuinely
republican in form. The form of government which existed in
ante-bellum days was that of an aristocracy. That which has existed
since what Mr. Rhodes is pleased to term the restoration of home rule
is simply that of a local despotic oligarchy. The former _was_ not,
and the present _is_ not, based upon the will and choice of the
masses; but the former was by far the better of the two, for whatever
may be truthfully said in condemnation and in derogation of the
southern aristocracy of ante-bellum days, it can not be denied that
they represented the wealth, the intelligence, the decency and the
respectability of their respective States. While the State governments
that were dominated by the aristocrats were not based upon the will of
the people, as a whole, yet from an administrative point of view they
were not necessarily bad. Such can not be said of those who are now
the representatives of what Mr. Rhodes is pleased to term home rule.
On page 171 of his seventh volume, Mr. Rhodes says: "Some Southern men
at first acted with the Republican party, but they gradually slipped
away from it as the color line was drawn and reckless and corrupt
financial legislation inaugurated." That thousands of white men in the
South, who identified themselves with the Republican party between
1868 and 1876, subsequently left it, will not be denied, but the
reasons for their action are not those given by Mr. Rhodes. In fact,
there is no truth in the allegation about the drawing of the color
line and very little in the one about corrupt or questionable
financial legislation. The true reason why so many white men at the
South left the Republican party may be stated under three heads:
first, the Democratic victories of 1874 which were accepted by
southern Democrats as a national repudiation of the congressional plan
of Reconstruction; second, the closeness of the Presidential election
of 1876 together with the supposed bargain entered into between the
Hayes managers and southern Democratic members of Congress, by which
the South was to be turned over to the Democrats of that section in
consideration of which the said southern Democrats gave their consent
to the peaceable inauguration of Hayes; third, the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States by which the doctrine of States'
Rights was given new life and strength.
It is true there are some men whose party affiliations are based upon
principle and convictions regardless of consequences personal to
themselves. Occasionally there are found some who are even willing to
be martyrs, but they are exceptions to the general rule. The average
man is politically ambitious. He desires political distinction and
official recognition. In determining his party affiliations,
therefore, he is more than apt to cast his lot with the party through
which he believes that ambition may be gratified. After the
consummation of the events above referred to, the conviction became
settled in the minds of white men at the South that the Democratic
party in that section would be, for a generation, at least, the only
channel through which it would be possible for any one to have his
political ambition realized. Hence, thousands of those who had
previously joined the Republican party returned to the Democratic
since that party presented the only hope of their future political
salvation.
Mr. Rhodes would lead one to infer that the southern white men who
came into the Republican party in the South between 1868 and 1876 were
not among the most intelligent, cultivated, refined and representative
men of that section. As a rule, they were men who belonged to, and
were identified with, what was known as the "Southern aristocracy."
Such men, for instance, as Ex-Governors Orr of South Carolina, Parsons
of Alabama, Reynolds of Texas, and Brown of Georgia. Also such men as
Mosby, Wickham, and subsequently Mahone, Massey, Paul, Fulkerson and
Riddleberger, of Virginia. General R. E. Lee was known to have
leanings in the same direction, but since he was not politically
ambitious, his views were not made a matter of public discussion. In
addition to Ex-Governor Brown of Georgia, they included such men as
General Longstreet, Joshua Hill, Bullock and many others of like
caliber. Even Ben Hill was suspected by some and accused by others of
leaning in the same direction. In Louisiana, not less than 25 per
cent. of the best and most substantial white men of that State became
identified with the Republican party under the leadership of such men
as Ex-Governor Hahn and the Honorable Mr. Hunt (who was appointed
Secretary of the Navy by President Garfield), Wells, Anderson and many
others. General Beauregard was known, or at any rate believed, to be
in sympathy with these men and the cause they represented, although he
took no active part in politics. But it was in my own State of
Mississippi, where I had an intimate knowledge of, and acquaintance
with, the solid and substantial white men who identified themselves
with the Republican party and whose leadership the newly enfranchised
blacks faithfully followed. They included such men as James L. Alcorn,
who was elected Governor of the State by the Republicans in 1869 and
to the United States Senate by the legislature that was elected at the
same time. Alcorn was one of the aristocrats of the past. He served
with Mr. Lamar in the secession convention of 1861 and was a general
in the Confederate Army.
Mr. Rhodes failed to inform his readers of the fact that the
Democratic candidate for Governor against Alcorn, Judge Louis Dent,
belonged to that much abused class called "carpet baggers," but who,
like thousands of others of that class, both Democrats and
Republicans, was a man of honor and integrity. The same was true of
Tarbell, Powers, Pierce, McKee, Jeffords, Speed and others of the same
type in both parties. In addition to Alcorn, there was Col. R. W.
Flournoy, who also served with Mr. Lamar as a member of the secession
convention and who was the Republican candidate for Congress against
Mr. Lamar in 1872, also Judge Jason Niles, who served as a member of
the State legislature, Judge of the Circuit Court and member of
Congress. His able and brilliant son, Judge Henry Clay Niles, is now
the United States District Judge for that State, having been appointed
by President Harrison. He has the reputation of being one of the best
and finest Judges on the Federal Bench. The State never had before
and has not had since, a finer judiciary than it had under the
administrations of Alcorn, Powers and Ames, the three Republican
Governors. In referring to the three justices of the State Supreme
Court, Mr. Rhodes made the statement that eligible material in the
Republican party was so scarce that, in order to get three competent
judges the Governor was obliged to select a Democrat. This is not
true. Chief Justice E. G. Peyton and Associate Justice H. F. Simrall
were both southern Republicans. Justice Tarbell, though a so-called
"carpet bagger," was also a Republican and an able judge, who enjoyed
the confidence and respect of the bench and bar. When he retired from
the bench he was made Second Comptroller of the United States
Treasury.
In addition to these able and brilliant men, I feel justified in
naming a few others, such as R. W. Millsaps, in whose honor one of the
educational institutions at Jackson was named; W. M. Compton; T. W.
Hunt; J. B. Deason; W. H. Vasser; Luke Lea, who was at one time United
States District Attorney; his son, A. M. Lea, who subsequently held
the same office; J. L. Morphis, who was one of the first Republicans
elected to Congress; Judge Hiram Cassidy, who was the recognized
leader of the bar in the southern part of the State; his able and
brilliant son, Hiram Cassidy, Jr.; and his law partner, Hon. J. F.
Sessions. Among the circuit and chancery court judges there were such
jurists as Messrs. Chandler, Davis, Hancock, Walton, Smyley,
Henderson, Hill, Osgood, Walker, Millsaps, McMillan, and Drane.
Moreover, there were thousands of others, such as J. N. Carpenter and
James Surget, men of character, wealth and intelligence, who had no
ambition for official recognition or political distinction, but who
were actuated by what they honestly believed to be conducive to the
best interests of their country, their State and their section. In
fact, the southern white men that came into the Republican party were
typical representatives of the best blood and the finest manhood of
the South, than whom no better men ever lived. And yet to read what
Mr. Rhodes has written, one would naturally assume that the opposite
of this was true, that the Republican party in that section was under
the domination of northern "carpet baggers," a few worthless southern
whites and a number of dishonest and incompetent colored men. This, no
doubt, is the false, deceptive and misleading picture which had been
painted from the vividness of his partial, mistaken, prejudiced and
diseased imagination.
That many mistakes were made during the progress of Reconstruction
cannot and will not be denied. No friend and supporter of the
congressional plan of Reconstruction will maintain that every thing
was perfect. On the contrary, it is frankly admitted that quite a
number of grave blunders were made; but they were not confined to any
one party. Neither Republicans nor Democrats can justly lay claim to
all that was good or truthfully charge the other with all that was
bad. Of those who were selected as representatives of the two parties,
the Democrats had, in point of experience and intelligence, a slight
advantage over the Republicans; but in point of honesty and integrity
the impartial historian will record the fact that the advantage was
with the Republicans. How could either escape error? The Civil War had
just come to a close; sectional animosity was bitter and intense. The
Republican party was looked upon as the party of the North and,
therefore, the bitter enemy of the South. The southern white men who
joined the Republican party were accused of being traitors to their
section and false to their own race and blood; they were called
Scalawags. Through a process of intimidation, chiefly by means of
social ostracism, independent thought and action on the part of
southern whites, during the early period of Reconstruction, were
pretty effectually prevented. Through such methods, they were quite
successfully held under the subjection and control of those whose
leadership they had been accustomed to follow.
Under such circumstances, the reader may ask the question, why was it
and how was it that so many of the best white men of that section
joined the Republican party? The answer is that, prior to the election
of General Grant to the presidency in 1868, very few of them did so.
It was never a question of men. It was always a question of party.
Under such circumstances, thousands of white men were obliged to vote
for certain Democratic candidates who were otherwise objectionable as
against certain Republicans who were otherwise acceptable. In like
manner, thousands of colored men were obliged to vote for certain
Republican candidates who were otherwise objectionable as against
certain Democrats who were otherwise acceptable. The wonder,
therefore, is, not that so many, but that so few mistakes were made;
not that so many, but that so few objectionable persons were elected
to important and responsible positions.
After the election of Grant, however, in 1868 the feeling of
intolerance somewhat subsided, resulting in a large number of
accessions to the Republican party from the ranks of the best and most
substantial white men of that section. But it was not until the
reelection of Grant in 1872 that the feeling of political
proscription, social ostracism and intolerance among the whites
seemingly disappeared. It was then that white men came into, took
charge of and assumed the leadership of the Republican party, in large
numbers. They then had nothing to fear and nothing to lose by being
identified with the Republican party when social distinctions growing
out of politics ceased to be effective. The South then entered upon a
new era which was destined to bring to that section wealth and
prosperity with happiness and contentment among its people of both
races, all living under local governments successfully controlled by
the better element of native whites with the cooperation and
participation to some extent of the newly enfranchised blacks.
The writer of this article has always believed it to be a misfortune
to his race and to the country, if conditions be such as to make it
necessary for any race or group, of which our citizenship is composed,
to act in a solid body with any one political party. The writer timely
called attention to this in a speech which he delivered on the floor
of the House of Representatives over thirty years ago. He then made
an appeal to the Democrats to change the attitude of their party
towards the colored Americans. While the colored people, he said, were
grateful to the Republican party for their physical emancipation, they
would be equally grateful to the Democratic party for their political
emancipation. While he was a Republican from choice, he personally
knew of many members of his race who were Republicans, not from choice
but from necessity, and that the Democratic party was responsible for
the existence of that necessity. Upon economic questions there are
differences of opinion among colored as well as white persons. It is
an injustice to the colored race and a misfortune to the country, if
they can not vote in accordance with their convictions upon such
questions. No race or group can be true and independent American
citizens, as all should be, when they are made to feel that the
exercise and enjoyment by them of their civil and political rights are
contingent upon the result of an election. It must be said to the
credit of the late Grover Cleveland that he did all in his power both
as Governor of New York and as President of the United States to bring
about this necessary change and reform in his party. That his efforts
were not crowned with success, was through no fault of his.
The newly enfranchised blacks at the South, as I have endeavored to
show, had no other alternative than to act with the Republican party.
That some objectionable persons should have been elected by them under
such conditions, could not very well have been prevented. But the
reader of Mr. Rhodes's history cannot fail to see that he believed it
was a grave mistake to have given the colored men at the South the
right to vote, and in order to make the alleged historical facts
harmonize with his own views upon this point, he took particular pains
to magnify the virtues and minimize the faults of the Democrats and to
magnify the faults and minimize the virtues of the Republicans, the
colored men especially. On page 97 of his fifth volume, for instance,
Mr. Rhodes says: "But few Negroes were competent to perform the
duties; for instance, it was said that the colored man, who for four
years was Sheriff of DeSoto County, could neither read nor write. The
Negro incumbent generally farmed out his office to a white deputy for
a share of the revenue."
The foregoing is one of the most barefaced and glaring
misrepresentations that can possibly be made. The reader will notice
that the allegation is based upon "it has been said." But if Mr.
Rhodes had been anxious to record only what was accurate and true, he
should have, as he easily could have done, found out just what the
facts were, as I have done. The facts were these. When Tate County was
created the greater part of the territory composing the new county had
been taken from the county of DeSoto. The then sheriff of DeSoto
County lived in that section which was made a part of the new county
of Tate. It thus became necessary for a new sheriff to be appointed by
the Governor for DeSoto County to hold office until the election of a
sheriff at the next regular election. Rev. J. J. Evans, a colored
Baptist minister and a Union soldier, was thereupon appointed. Since
this took place in 1873, the appointment must have been made by
Governor R. C. Powers, who had been elected Lieutenant Governor on the
ticket with Alcorn in 1869 and had become Governor when Alcorn went to
the United States Senate in 1871. Although he was one of those who
belonged to that class called "carpet baggers," Governor Powers was
known to be an honest and an upright man and one who exercised great
care in all of his appointments. Governor Powers never could have been
induced to appoint as sheriff of any county a man who could neither
read nor write.
Mr. Evans discharged the duties of his position with such entire
satisfaction that he was nominated by the Republicans and elected to
succeed himself at the regular election in November, 1873, for the
full term of two years. In 1875 he was renominated by his party to
succeed himself. Mr. Evans's administration had been so satisfactory
that when the Democratic county convention met to nominate a local
ticket, no nomination was made for the office of sheriff. But between
the nomination and election the Democratic organization in the State
saw a new light. It was decided that the State must be "_redeemed_,"
and that nearly all of the counties must be included in that
redemption. The Democratic executive committee of DeSoto County was,
therefore, directed to meet and complete the local ticket by
nominating a candidate for sheriff. This was done, and the ticket as
thus completed was, of course, declared elected and DeSoto County
"_redeemed_."
It is a fact of which Mr. Rhodes may not be aware, that the county
sheriff in Mississippi is also the county tax collector, and as such
he is required to give a heavy bond. These bonds are usually given by
property owners of the county, nearly all of whom are white men and
Democrats. Had Mr. Evans been the man described by Mr. Rhodes, he
never could have qualified for the office. It is also a fact of which
Mr. Rhodes may not be aware, that the county sheriff in Mississippi as
the chief executive and administrative officer of his county, is
necessarily obliged, regardless of his own qualifications and fitness,
to employ a number of assistants and deputies to aid him in running
the office. The number of persons, with the salary or compensation of
each, is fixed by law or the court and they are paid according to law
out of money appropriated for that purpose. In making these
appointments, it is both reasonable and natural that the appointing
power would favorably consider a suggestion or recommendation from any
one of the sureties. At any rate, Mr. Evans had the good sense to
surround himself with honest, efficient and capable assistants. He is
still living at Hernando, DeSoto County, Mississippi. As I write these
lines, an autograph letter from him is before me. While it is clear
that he is not a college graduate, his letter effectually disproves
the allegation that he can neither read nor write. Moreover, even if
his education is limited, this cannot be considered exceptional, for
the sheriffs of many counties in the South today are illiterate and
mentally undeveloped. I judge from the contents of Mr. Evans's letter
that there is no truth in the allegation that he divided any part of
his own compensation with any one or more of his assistants. He left
the office with a spotless record, every dollar of the public funds
that passed through his hands, and for which he was liable, having
been honestly and faithfully accounted for.
But even if Mr. Evans had been the man described by Mr. Rhodes, it
would have been manifestly unfair and unjust to the colored voters of
Mississippi to select him as a typical representative of those who
were elected to important and responsible positions by the votes of
colored men. Out of seventy-two counties of which the State was then
composed, not more than twelve ever had colored sheriffs at any time,
and they did not all hold office at the same time. Of those who were
thus honored, the writer of these lines was personally acquainted with
not less than ten. Mr. Evans was one of the few whom he did not then
know personally. If Mr. Rhodes had desired to be fair and impartial,
he would have taken all of them into consideration and would have
drawn an average. But this would not have answered his purpose. It
would have shown that in point of intelligence, capacity, and honesty
the colored sheriffs would have favorably compared with the whites.
Take, for instance, the county of Adams-Natchez, my own home, where
two colored men at different times held the office of sheriff. The
first of the two was Wm. McCary, who was elected in 1873. He belonged
to that small class known as free persons of color during the days of
slavery. His father was the leading barber of Natchez for white
business men and a private school teacher. He taught the children of
those who were identified with his own class, of which there were
quite a number, having privileges and advantages which were denied to
the children of slaves. His own children, of course, were not
neglected. Wm. McCary, therefore, had a good English education. He was
also a property owner and a taxpayer. He was one of the two colored
men who qualified as a surety on the bond of the writer of these lines
when he was appointed a Justice of the Peace in 1869. Mr. McCary was
held in high esteem by the people of the city of Natchez and the
county of Adams, both white and colored. Prior to his election to the
office of sheriff he had served as a member of the board of aldermen
for the city of Natchez and also as treasurer of the county of Adams,
and subsequently as postmaster of Natchez, the duties of all of which
he discharged with credit to himself and satisfaction to the public.
In 1875 he was succeeded as sheriff by another colored man, Robert H.
Wood, who in all important particulars was about on a par with McCary.
Wood had previously served as mayor of Natchez, to which position he
was elected by popular vote in December, 1870. He was serving the
people of Natchez as their postmaster when he was elected to the
office of sheriff.
These men not only gave satisfaction to the people whom they served,
but they reflected credit upon themselves, their race, their party and
the community that was so fortunate as to have the benefit of their
services. What was true of these two men was also true in a large
measure of Harney of Hinds, Scott of Issaquena, Sumner of Holmes, and
several others. But, if Mr. Rhodes had desired to be impartial and
preferred to select but one man as a typical representative of those
who were elected to such positions by the votes of colored men, he
would have selected B. K. Bruce, who was sheriff of Bolivar County
when he was elected to the United States Senate. Mr. Bruce needs no
introduction to intelligent and reading Americans. He developed into a
national character. He reflected credit not only upon himself, his
race and his party but his country as well. And yet he typified in a
most remarkable degree the colored men who were elected to important
and responsible positions chiefly by the votes of members of that
race. But the reader of Rhodes's history will look in vain for
anything that will give him accurate information along these lines.
His history, therefore, is remarkable, not only for what it says, but
for what it leaves unsaid. In fact, it is plain to the intelligent
reader that he started out with preconceived notions as to what the
facts were or should have been, and that he took particular pains to
select such data and so to color the same as to make them harmonize
with his opinions. He thus passed over in silence all facts which
could not be so distorted as to make them thus harmonize. He could
find nothing that was creditable or meritorious in the career of any
colored member of either house of Congress, notwithstanding the
favorable impression made and the important and dignified service
rendered by Revels and Bruce in the Senate and by Rainey, Rapier,
Elliott, Smalls, Cain, Langston, Miller, Ohara, Cheatham, White and
others in the House.[403]
But, to return to Mississippi, let us take up another error of Mr.
Rhodes. Referring to the political and sanguinary revolution which
took place in Mississippi in 1875, Mr. Rhodes makes use of these
words: "Whilst regretting some of the means employed, all lovers of
good government must rejoice at the redemption of Mississippi....
Since 1876 Mississippi has increased in population and in wealth; her
bonded indebtedness and taxation are low."[404] It is difficult to
conceive how an intelligent man, claiming to be an impartial recorder
of historical events, could be induced to make such glaring statements
as the above, when he ought to have known that just the opposite of
what he affirms is true, except as to increase in population and in
wealth. "All lovers of good government must rejoice at the
_redemption_ of Mississippi." _Redemption_ from what? The reader is
led to believe that the "_redemption_" is from bad to good government,
from high to low taxes, from increased to decreased bonded
indebtedness, from incompetent, inefficient and dishonest
administration to one that was competent, efficient and honest.
Now let us see just what the facts were and are. In 1875 there was
just one State officer to be elected, that of State treasurer, to
fill the vacancy caused by the death of George H. Holland, who was
elected on the ticket with Ames in 1873. The Democrats nominated Hon.
Wm. L. Hemingway, of Carroll County, whose nomination was favorably
received. He had the reputation of being a capable, an honest and
upright man. In addition to this, he was identified with that wing of
his party which was known to be progressive, liberal and fair. In the
early days of Reconstruction, the Democratic party in the State was
sharply divided into two factions. One, the major faction, adopted
what they termed a policy of "masterly inactivity," which meant that
the white Democrats should take no part in the organization of a State
government under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, with a view of
making the work of Reconstruction as odious, as objectionable and as
unpopular as possible. The other faction believed it to be the duty of
the white Democrats to take an active part in the formation of a State
government, elect as many Democrats to the State Constitutional
Convention of 1868 as possible with a view of framing a new
constitution that would have very few if any objectionable clauses.
Wm. L. Hemingway was one of that number, and as such he was elected to
the convention from Carroll County. The nomination of Hemingway for
State treasurer by the Democratic State Convention in 1875 was looked
upon as a concession to that element of the party.
The Republicans did not fail to see that in order to carry the State
they must nominate their strongest and best man, even if the election
should be fair and honest, which they hoped would be the case, but
which hope they had good reasons to apprehend would not be fully
realized. Capt. George M. Buchanan, of Marshal County, was nominated.
Buchanan had been a brave and gallant Confederate soldier. He had
served as sheriff of Marshal County for a number of years. He was
strong, able and popular. He was known to be the best fitted and best
qualified man for the office of State treasurer. With a half-way
decent election his triumph, even over so popular a man as Wm. L.
Hemingway, was an assured fact. The Democrats, however, had decided
that the time had come for the State to be "_redeemed_," peaceably and
fairly if possible, violently and unfairly if necessary. With George
M. Buchanan as the Republican candidate, it was necessary to employ
means which Mr. Rhodes so much regretted, but which he justifies
because, as he understands it, they were employed in the interest of
good government.
Was that true? Let us see. Buchanan, of course, was declared defeated
and Hemingway declared elected. Mississippi was thus "_redeemed_, for
which all lovers of good government must rejoice," but Mr. Rhodes
failed to record the fact that this man who was the representative of
the _redemption_ of the State had been in office a comparatively brief
period when the discovery was made that he was a defaulter to the
amount of $315,612.19.[405] It would be a reflection upon Mr. Rhodes's
intelligence to assume that he was ignorant of this important fact.
Oh, no! he must have known about it, but to make any allusion to it
would be out of harmony with the purposes he evidently had in view. It
is safe to assume that, if the will of a majority of the legal voters
of the State had not been violently suppressed in the interest of
_good_ and _honest_ government, which would have resulted in the
election of honest George M. Buchanan, while the State would not have
been _redeemed_, it would have been saved from the loss of
$315,612.19. The writer of these lines has never believed that
Hemingway was the personal beneficiary of this money or any part
thereof, but that he was the instrument in the hands of others. Still
he was the official representative of the _redemption_ of the State
for which "all lovers of good government must rejoice."
That there was a material increase in the population and in the wealth
of the State will not be denied. These results would have followed,
even if the State had never been _redeemed_. They were not due to
_redemption_ but in spite of it. In fact, there was a marked increase
in population and in wealth before as well as subsequent to the
_redemption_. But when the author states that the bonded indebtedness
and taxation are low, the impression necessarily made, and intended to
be made upon the mind of the reader, is that after the _redemption_
took place and as a result thereof, the _rate_ of taxation was
reduced, the volume of money paid into the State treasury annually for
the support of the government was less than it had been before, and
that there had been a material reduction in the bonded debt of the
State, neither of which is true.[406] If Mr. Rhodes had been disposed
to record the truth and nothing but the truth, which is presumed to be
the aim of an impartial historian, he could have easily obtained the
facts, because they are matters of record. To give the reader an idea
of what the facts were and are, I will take, for purposes of
comparison, one year prior and one subsequent to the _redemption_ of
the State. In 1875, the year that the _redemption_ took place, the
assessed value of taxable property was $119,313,834. The receipts from
all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. Disbursements for the
same year, $1,430,192.83. In 1907 the assessed value of taxable
property was reported to be $373,584,960. Receipts from all sources,
same year, $3,391,127.15. Disbursements, same year, $3,730,343.29. The
above figures speak for themselves. They are from the official
records, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.[407] The records
show too that during the administration of Governor Ames, which was
about half over when the _redemption_ took place, the rate of taxation
had been reduced from seven mills to four mills and that a material
reduction had been made in the bonded debt of the State and that after
the _redemption_ took place the tax rate was increased from four mills
to six mills and that by 1907 $732,890.74 had been added to the bonded
debt of the State. And yet in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, these are
conditions for the deliverance from which the employment of
regrettable means was necessary, at which, however, "all lovers of
good government should rejoice," since their employment resulted in
the _redemption_ of the State.
But another evidence of Mr. Rhodes's careless and reckless manner of
stating alleged historical facts will be found in a paragraph on page
132 of his seventh volume. In speaking of Governor Ames's unsuccessful
efforts to have troops sent to the State to assist in maintaining
order and insuring a fair and peaceable election, he says: "A number
of the white Republicans of Mississippi who had quarrelled or differed
with Ames, among whom were both the United States senators, used their
influence against the sending of federal troops to Mississippi and
none were sent." The two United States Senators at that time were J.L.
Alcorn and B.K. Bruce. Bruce was a strong friend and loyal supporter
of Ames and did all in his power to have Ames's request granted. This
statement is based upon my own knowledge. Senator Alcorn was one of
the few white Republicans who had quarrelled with Ames. In fact, he
ran as an Independent for governor against Ames in 1873. But he was a
Republican United States Senator and as such he had no sympathy with
the Democratic party. My relations with both senators were cordial. If
Alcorn had used his influence to prevent having federal troops sent to
the State, I am sure I would have known it. If he raised his voice or
used his pen for such purpose, that fact was never brought to my
notice and I am satisfied it was never done. My own opinion is that he
remained reticent and refused to take sides. The true reason why
troops were not sent in compliance with the request of Governor Ames
was that, although the President once directed that the requisition be
complied with, he later rescinded the order when informed by
Republicans from Ohio that such interference would cause the loss of
Ohio to the Republicans at the October election and would not save
Mississippi.[408]
Referring to the Reconstruction policy, Mr. Rhodes says: "Stevens'
Reconstruction Acts, ostensibly in the interest of freedom, were an
attack on civilization.[409] In my judgment Sumner did not show wise
constructive statesmanship in forcing unqualified Negro Suffrage on
the South."[410] The truth is that Stevens and Sumner were wiser than
their day and generation. They were not favorable to an immediate
restoration of the States lately in rebellion upon any conditions.
They knew that after the cessation of hostilities, the flower of the
Confederate Army, an army which it took the entire North with all of
its numbers, immense wealth and almost limitless resources four years
to conquer, would be at the South and that upon the completion of
Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the federal troops, that army
could be utilized to bring about practically the same conditions that
existed before the war. They, therefore, opposed immediate
restoration. This is what Mr. Rhodes characterizes as an attack on
civilization. To what civilization does he refer? He surely could not
have had in mind the civilization which believed in the divine right
of slavery and which recognized and sanctioned the right of one man to
hold another as his property; and yet this was the only civilization
upon which the rebuilding of the rebellious governments was an attack.
But for the adoption of the Congressional plan of Reconstruction and
the subsequent legislation of the nation along the same line, the
abolition of slavery through the ratification of the 13th Amendment
would have been in name only, a legal and constitutional myth. This is
the civilization, however, an attack upon which Mr. Rhodes so deeply
deplores. It is fortunate for the country that a majority of Mr.
Rhodes's fellow citizens did not and do not agree with him along these
lines.
Since Stevens and Sumner could not secure the adoption of the plan
advocated by them, they proceeded to secure the adoption of the best
one that it was possible to obtain under conditions as they then
existed. Hence they insisted, successfully, as was then believed, that
the legislation, including the 14th Amendment, should be so framed as
not only to create national citizenship, as distinguished from State
citizenship, but that it should be made the duty of the Federal
Government to protect its own citizens, when necessary, against
domestic violence, to protect its citizens at home as well as when
they are abroad. The closing clause of the 14th Amendment, therefore,
declares that Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of
the amendment by appropriate legislation.
But Mr. Rhodes says the Congressional plan of Reconstruction was a
failure. The defeat of the Republican party at the North, especially
in 1874, he believes "was due to the failure of the Southern policy of
the Republican party." In speaking of the action of President Hayes,
he says: "Indeed it was the final admission of the Republican party
that their policy of forcing Negro suffrage upon the South was a
failure." Is it true that Reconstruction was a failure? That depends
upon the view one takes of it. Admitting that some of the things
expected of it by many of its friends and supporters were not fully
realized, its failure even to that extent was, in a large measure, one
of the _results_ but not one of the contributory _causes_ of the
Democratic national victory of 1874. On the contrary, that policy was
a grand and brilliant success.
In the first place, when the split between Congress and President
Johnson took place, there was soon developed the fact that the
enfranchisement of the blacks was the only plan which could be adopted
and by which the one advocated by the President could be defeated. It
had been seen and frankly admitted that the war for the preservation
of the Union could not have been brought to a successful conclusion
without putting the musket in the hands of the loyal blacks. The fact
was now made plain that the fruits of the victory that had been won on
the battlefield could not be preserved without putting the ballot in
their hands. Hence, it was done.
Was this a mistake? Mr. Rhodes says it was; but the results prove that
it was not. But for the enfranchisement of the blacks at the South at
the time and in the way it was done the 14th and subsequently the 15th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution never could have been ratified.
The ratification of these two measures alone vindicated the wisdom of
that legislation. The 14th Amendment, among other things, made the
colored people American citizens. It was, in effect, a recall of the
famous Dred Scott decision. The 15th Amendment gave the colored
American access to the ballot box, in every State in the Union. The
fundamental principles that were carried into effect through the
Reconstruction acts of Congress were embodied in these two amendments.
After the ratification of these measures, what had previously been
local to the South became national. No State north, south, east or
west can now legally and constitutionally make or enforce any law
making race or color the basis of discrimination in the exercise and
enjoyment of civil and public rights and privileges, nor can it make
race or color the basis of discrimination in prescribing the
qualification of electors. By the ratification of those amendments the
right of an American citizen to the exercise and enjoyment of civil
and political rights and the right to vote ceased to be local and
became national. But it is claimed by some that because the 15th
Amendment has been successfully evaded in certain States, it is, for
that reason, a failure. I will state here in passing, however, that
there has never been made nor can be made any law or constitution that
can not at certain times and in some places be successfully evaded.
But this does not necessarily prove that the law or constitution in
question was a mistake and should, for that reason, be repealed. To
this extent and for the reasons and purposes above stated, the wisdom
of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress has been more than vindicated.
The failure of the Reconstruction legislation was not due so much to
the change of sentiment in the North as to an unwise interpretation of
these laws. This started with two unfortunate decisions rendered by
the United States Supreme Court, the result of two unwise appointments
to seats on the bench made by President Grant. The Judges referred to
are Waite of Ohio, and Bradley of New Jersey. Both were supposed to be
Republicans and believed to be in accord with the other leaders and
constitutional lawyers in the Republican party in their construction
of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution. But they proved to
be strong States' Rights men and, therefore, strict constructionists.
Those two, with the other States' Rights men already on the bench,
constituted a majority of that tribunal. The result was that the court
declared unconstitutional and void, not only the national civil rights
act, but also the principal sections of the different enforcement acts
which provided for the protection of individual citizens by the
Federal Government against domestic violence. National citizenship had
been created by the 14th Amendment and the Federal Government had been
clothed with power to enforce the provisions of that amendment.
Legislation for that purpose had been placed upon the statute books
and they were being enforced whenever and wherever necessary, as in
the case of the lawless and criminal organization called the Ku Klux
Klan. But the Supreme Court, very much to the surprise of every one,
stepped in and tied the hands of the national administration and
prevented any further prosecutions for violence upon the person of a
citizen of the United States, if committed within the limits of any
one of the States of the Union. In other words, if the State in which
a citizen of the United States may reside can not, does not or will
not protect him in the exercise and enjoyment of his personal, civil
and political rights, he is without a remedy. The result is that the
Federal Government is placed in the awkward and anomalous position of
exacting support and allegiance from its citizens, to whom it can not
in return afford protection, unless they should be outside the
boundaries of their own country. By those unfortunate and fatal
decisions the vicious and mischievous doctrine of States' Rights,
called by some State sovereignty, by others local self government,
which was believed to have perished upon the battlefields of the
country, was given new life, strength and audacity, and fostered by
the preaching of the fear of "Negro domination." The decision
declaring the Civil Rights Law unconstitutional was rendered by Mr.
Justice Bradley, and nearly all of those by which the principal
sections of the different enforcement laws were nullified, were
rendered by Chief Justice Waite.
If in every southern State today no attempt were made to violate or
evade the 15th Amendment and colored men were allowed free and
unrestricted access to the ballot boxes and their votes were fairly
and honestly counted, there would be no more danger of "Negro
domination" in any one of these States than there is of female
domination in States where women have the right to vote. All that
colored men have ever insisted upon, was not to dominate but to
participate, not to rule but to have a voice in the selection of those
who are to rule. In view of their numerical strength the probabilities
are that more of them would be officially recognized than in other
sections of the country, but never out of proportion to their fitness
and capacity, unless there should be a repetition of conditions that
existed in the early days of Reconstruction, which is improbable. The
dominant element in the Democratic party in that section at that time
adopted, as stated above, the policy of "masterly inactivity" which
was intended to prevent white men, through intimidation, from taking
any part in the organization and reconstruction of the State
governments, with a view of making the governments thus organized as
odious and as objectionable as possible, in other words, to make them
as far as possible "Negro governments." This policy proved to be
somewhat effective in many localities. The result was the colored men
found much difficulty in finding desirable white men outside of the
Democratic party for the different local positions to be filled. This
made it necessary in some instances for colored men to be selected to
fill certain positions for which white men would have been chosen. But
under the present order of things, a repetition of any thing of this
sort would be wholly out of the question.
I can not close this article without giving expression to the hope
that a fair, just and impartial historian will, some day, write a
history covering the Reconstruction period, in which an accurate
account based upon actual facts of what took place at that time will
be given, instead of a compilation and condensation of untrue,
unreliable and grossly exaggerated statements taken from political
campaign literature.
JOHN R. LYNCH,
Author of "The Facts of Reconstruction."
4352 FORRESTVILLE AVENUE,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS