OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.
1. The proposition of the following contents. 2. Over whom God is
said to rule by nature. 3. The word of God threefold; reason,
revelation, prophecy. 4. The kingdom of God twofold; natural,
and prophetic. 5. The right whereby God reigns, is seated in his
omnipotence. 6. The same proved from Scripture. 7. The
obligation of yielding obedience to God, proceeds from human
infirmity. 8. The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those
which are recited above in chapters II. III. 9. What honour and
worship is. 10. Worship consists either in attributes or in
actions. 11. And there is one sort natural, another arbitrary.
12. One commanded, another voluntary. 13. What the end or scope
of worship is. 14. What the natural laws are concerning God’s
attributes. 15. What the actions are whereby naturally we do
give worship. 16. In God’s natural kingdom, the city may appoint
what worship of God it pleaseth. 17. God ruling by nature only,
the city, that is to say, that man or court who under God hath
the sovereign authority of the city, is the interpreter of all
the laws. 18. Certain doubts removed. 19. What sin is in the
natural kingdom of God; and what treason against the Divine
Majesty.
[Sidenote: The proposition of the following contents.]
1. We have already in the foregoing chapters, proved both by reason
and testimonies of holy writ, that the estate of nature, that is to
say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs who neither govern nor
are governed, is an anarchy or hostile state; that the precepts
whereby to avoid this state, are _the laws of nature_; that there
can be no civil government without a sovereign; and that they who
have gotten this sovereign command, must be obeyed simply, that is
to say, in all things which repugn not the commandments of God.
There is this one thing only wanting to the complete understanding
of all civil duty, and that is, to know which are the laws and
commandments of God. For else we cannot tell whether that which the
civil power commands us, be against the laws of God, or not; whence
it must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the
civil authority we become stubborn against the divine Majesty; or
for fear of sinning against God we run into disobedience against the
civil power. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know the
divine laws. Now because the knowledge of the laws depends on the
knowledge of the kingdom, we must in what follows speak somewhat
concerning the _kingdom of God_.
[Sidenote: Over whom God is said to reign:]
2. _The Lord is king, the earth may be glad thereof_; saith the
psalmist, (Psalm xcvii. 1). And again the same psalmist, (Psalm
xcix. 1): _The Lord is king, be the people never so impatient; he
sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never so unquiet_; to
wit, whether men will or not, God is the king over all the earth;
nor is he moved from his throne, if there be any who deny either his
_existence_ or his _providence_. Now although God govern all men so
by his power, that none can do anything which he would not have
done: yet this, to speak properly and accurately, is not to reign.
For he is said to reign, who rules not by _acting_, but _speaking_,
that is to say, by _precepts_ and _threatenings_. And therefore we
count not inanimate nor irrational bodies for subjects in the
kingdom of God, although they be subordinate to the divine power;
because they _understand not the commands and threats_ of God: nor
yet the atheists, because they believe not that there is a God; nor
yet those who believing there is a God, do not yet believe that he
rules these inferior things: for even these, although they be
governed by the power of God, yet do they not acknowledge any of his
_commands_, nor stand in awe of his _threats_. Those only therefore
are supposed to belong to God’s kingdom, who acknowledge him to be
the governor of all things, and that he hath given _his commands_ to
men, and appointed _punishments_ for the transgressors. The rest we
must not call subjects, but enemies of God.
[Sidenote: The word of God threefold; reason, revelation, prophesy.]
3. But none are said to govern by _commands_, but they who openly
declare them to those who are governed by them. For the _commands_
of the rulers, are the _laws_ of the ruled; but _laws_ they are not,
if not perspicuously published, insomuch as all excuse of ignorance
may be taken away. Men indeed publish their laws by _word_ or
_voice_; neither can they make their will universally known any
other way. But God’s _laws_ are declared after a threefold manner:
first, _by the tacit dictates of right reason_; next, by _immediate
revelation_, which is supposed to be done either by a supernatural
voice, or by a vision or dream, or divine inspiration; thirdly, by
the _voice of one man_, whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy
of belief, by the working of true miracles. Now he whose voice God
thus makes use of to signify his will unto others, is called a
_prophet_. These three manners may be termed the _threefold word of
God_, to wit, the _rational word_, the _sensible word_, and _the
word of prophecy_. To which answer the three manners whereby we are
said to hear God; _right reasoning_, _sense_, and _faith_. God’s
_sensible word_ hath come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men
by revelation, except particularly to some, and to diverse
diversely; neither have any laws of his kingdom been published on
this manner unto any people.
[Sidenote: The kingdom of God two-fold: natural, and prophetic.]
4. And according to the difference which is between the _rational
word_ and the _word of prophecy_, we attribute a two-fold kingdom
unto God: _natural_, in which he reigns by the dictates of right
reason; and which is universal over all who acknowledge the divine
power, by reason of that rational nature which is common to all: and
_prophetical_, in which he rules also by the _word of prophecy_;
which is peculiar, because he hath not given positive laws to all
men, but to his peculiar people and some certain men elected by him.
[Sidenote: The right whereby God governs, is seated in his
omnipotence.]
5. God in his _natural kingdom_ hath a right to rule, and to punish
those who break his laws, from his sole _irresistible power_. For
all right over others is either from _nature_, or from _contract_.
How the right of governing springs from _contract_, we have already
showed in chap. VI. And the same right is derived from _nature_, in
this very thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For when by
nature all men had a right over all things, every man had a right of
ruling over all as ancient as nature itself. But the reason why this
was abolished among men, was no other but mutual fear, as hath been
declared above in chap. II. art. 3; reason, namely, dictating that
they must forego that right for the preservation of mankind; because
the equality of men among themselves, according to their strength
and natural powers, was necessarily accompanied with war; and with
war joins the destruction of mankind. Now if any man had so far
exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joined forces
could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should
part with that right, which nature had given him. The right
therefore of dominion over all the rest would have remained with
him, by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have
preserved both himself and them. They therefore whose power cannot
be resisted, and by consequence God _Almighty_ derives his right of
sovereignty from the _power_ itself. And as oft as God punisheth or
slays a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned,
yet may we not say that he could not justly have punished or killed
him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in
punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it
therefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends
not on _divine power_, but on _men’s sins_.
[Sidenote: The same proved from Scripture.]
6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients:
_why evil things befal the good, and good things the evil_: is the
same with this of ours; _by what right God dispenseth good and evil
things unto men_; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the
faith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also
philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm lxxiii. 1,
2, 3: _Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean
heart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well
nigh slipped. And why? I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see
the ungodly in such prosperity._ And how bitterly did Job
expostulate with God, that being _just_ he should yet be afflicted
with so many calamities! God himself with open voice resolved this
difficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his right by
arguments drawn not from Job’s sin, but from his own power. For Job
and his friends had argued so among themselves; that they would
needs make him guilty, because he was punished; and he would reprove
their accusation by arguments fetched from his own innocence. But
God, when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation,
not by condemning him of injustice or any sin, but by declaring his
own power, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast thou_ (says he) _when I
laid the foundation of the earth, &c._ And for his friends, God
pronounces himself angry against them (Job. xlii. 7): _Because they
had not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant
Job._ Agreeable to this is that speech of our Saviour’s in the man’s
case who was born blind: when his disciples asking him whether he or
his parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, (John
ix. 3): _Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the
works of God should be manifest in him._ For though it be said,
(Rom. v. 12), _that death entered into the world by sin_: it follows
not but that God by his right might have made men subject to
diseases and death, although they had never sinned; even as he hath
made the other animals mortal and sickly, although they cannot sin.
[Sidenote: The obligation of yielding obedience unto God, proceeds
from human infirmity.]
7. Now if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is
manifest that the _obligation_ of yielding him obedience lies on men
by reason of their weakness.[18] For that _obligation_ which rises
from contract, of which we have spoken in chap. II. can have no
place here; where the right of ruling, no covenant passing between,
rises only from nature. But there are two species of _natural
obligation_. One, when liberty is taken away by corporal
impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and
all creatures, do obey the common laws of their creation. The other,
when it is taken away by hope or fear, according to which the
weaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yield to
the stronger. From this last kind of obligation, that is to say,
from fear or conscience of our own weakness in respect of the divine
power, it comes to pass that we are obliged to obey God in his
natural kingdom; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the divine
power and providence, _that there is no kicking against the pricks_.
Footnote 18:
_By reason of their weakness._] If this shall seem hard to any
man, I desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there were
two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey. I believe he will
confess that neither is bound. If this be true, then it is also
true what I have set down; that men are subject unto God, because
they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour admonishing Paul,
who at that time was an enemy to the Church, that he should not
kick against the pricks; seems to require obedience from him for
this cause, because he had not power enough to resist.
[Sidenote: The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those which
are above set down in chaps. II. III.]
8. Because the _word of God_, ruling by nature only, is supposed to
be nothing else but right reason, and the laws of kings can be known
by their _word_ only; it is manifest that the laws of God, ruling by
nature alone, are only the _natural laws_; namely, those which we
have set down in chaps. II. and III. and deduced from the dictates
of reason, _humility_, _equity_, _justice_, _mercy_; and other
_moral virtues_ befriending _peace_, which pertain to the discharge
of the duties of men one toward the other; and those which right
reason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of
the Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those _natural laws_ or
_moral virtues_ are; but we must see what honours and what divine
worship, that is to say, what _sacred laws_ the same _natural
reason_ doth dictate.
[Sidenote: What honour and worship are.]
9. Honour to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of
another’s _power_ joined with _goodness_; and to _honour_ a man, is
the same with highly esteeming him: and so honour is not in the
party _honoured_, but in the _honourer_. Now three passions do
necessarily follow _honour_ thus placed in opinion; _love_, which
refers to _goodness_; _hope_ and _fear_, which regard _power_. And
from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerful are
appeased and become propitious; and which are the effects, and
therefore also the natural signs of honour itself. But the word
_honour_ is transferred also to those outward effects of _honour_;
in which sense, we are said to _honour_ him, of whose power we
testify ourselves, either in word or deed, to have a very great
respect; insomuch as _honour_ is the same with _worship_. Now
_worship_ is an outward act, the sign of inward honour; and whom we
endeavour by our homage to appease if they be angry, or howsoever to
make them favourable to us, we are said to _worship_.
[Sidenote: Worship consists either in attributes, or in actions.]
10. All signs of the mind are either _words_ or _deeds_; and
therefore all _worship_ consists either in _words_ or _deeds_. Now
both the one and the other are referred to three kinds; whereof the
first is _praise_, or _public declaration of goodness_; the second a
_public declaration of present power_, which is to _magnify_,
μεγάλυνειν; the third is a _public declaration of happiness_, or of
_power secure also for the future_, which is called μακαρισμὸς. I
say that all kinds of honour may be discerned, not in _words_ only,
but in _deeds_ too. But we then praise and celebrate in _words_,
when we do it by way of proposition, or _dogmatically_, that is to
say, by _attributes_ or _titles_; which may be termed praising and
celebrating _categorically_ and _plainly_; as when we declare him
whom we honour to be _liberal_, _strong_, _wise_. And then in
_deeds_, when it is done by _consequence_ or by _hypothesis_ or
supposition; as by _thanksgiving_, which supposeth _goodness_; or by
_obedience_, which supposeth _power_; or by _congratulation_, which
supposeth _happiness_.
[Sidenote: And there is one sort natural, and another arbitrary.]
11. Now whether we desire to praise a man in _words_ or _deeds_, we
shall find some things which signify honour with all men: such as
among _attributes_, are the general words of _virtues_ and _powers_,
which cannot be taken in ill sense; as _good_, _fair_, _strong_,
_just_, and the like: and among _actions_, _obedience_,
_thanksgiving_, _prayers_, and others of that kind, by which an
acknowledgment of virtue and power is ever understood. Others, which
signify honour but with some, and scorn with others, or else
neither; such as in _attributes_, are those words, which, according
to the diversity of opinions, are diversely referred to virtues or
vices, to honest or dishonest things. As that a man slew his enemy,
that he fled, that he is a philosopher, or an orator, and the like;
which with some are had in honour, with others in contempt. In
_deeds_, such as depend on the custom of the place, or prescriptions
of civil laws; as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the
shoes, to bend the body, to petition for anything standing,
prostrate, kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like. Now that
_worship_ which is always and by all men accounted honourable, may
be called _natural_; the other, which follows places and customs,
_arbitrary_.
[Sidenote: One commanded, another voluntary.]
12. Furthermore, _worship_ may be enjoined, to wit, by the _command_
of him that is worshipped, and it may be _voluntary_, namely, such
as seems good to the worshipper. If it be _enjoined_, the actions
expressing it do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as
they are _enjoined_: for they signify _obedience_ immediately,
obedience _power_; insomuch as _worship enjoined_ consists in
obedience. _Voluntary_ is honourable only in the nature of the
actions; which if they do signify honour to the beholders, it is
_worship_, if not, it is _reproach_. Again, _worship_ may be either
_public_ or _private_. But _public_, respecting each single
worshipper, may not be _voluntary_; respecting the city, it may. For
seeing that which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the
doer, there would not one worship be given, but as many worships as
worshippers; except the will of all men were united by the command
of one. But _private_ worship may be _voluntary_, if it be done
secretly; for what is done openly, is restrained either by laws or
through modesty; which is contrary to the nature of a _voluntary_
action.
[Sidenote: What the end or aim of worship is.]
13. Now that we may know what the _scope_ and _end_ of _worshipping_
others is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship.
And we must grant what we have showed elsewhere; that _joy_ consists
in this, that a man contemplates virtue, strength, science, beauty,
friends, or any _power_ whatsoever, as being, or as though it were
his own; and it is nothing else but a _glory_ or triumph of the
mind, conceiving itself honoured, that is to say, loved and feared,
that is to say, having the services and assistances of men in
readiness. Now because men believe him to be powerful, whom they see
honoured, that is to say, esteemed powerful by others; it falls out
that honour is increased by worship; and by the opinion of power
true power is acquired. His _end_ therefore, who either commands or
suffers himself to be worshipped, is, that by this means he may
acquire as many as he can, either through love or fear, to be
obedient unto him.
[Sidenote: What the natural laws are concerning God’s attributes.]
14. But that we may understand what manner of _worship_ of God
_natural reason_ doth assign us, let us begin from his _attributes_.
Where first, it is manifest that _existence_ is to be allowed him;
for there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no
being. Next, those philosophers who said, that God was the world or
the world’s soul, that is to say, a part of it, spake unworthily of
God; for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being.
For by the word _God_ we understand the _world’s cause_. But in
saying that the _world is God_, they say _that it hath no cause_,
that is as much as _there is no God_. In like manner, they who
maintain the world not to be created, but eternal; because there can
be no cause of an eternal thing, in denying _the world to have a
cause_, they deny also that _there is a God_. They also have a
wretched apprehension of God, who imputing idleness to him, do take
from him the government of the world and of mankind. For say, they
should acknowledge him omnipotent; yet if he mind not these inferior
things, that same thread-bare sentence will take place with them:
_quod supra nos, nihil ad nos_; what is above us, doth not concern
us. And seeing there is nothing for which they should either love or
fear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all.
Moreover, in _attributes_ which signify _greatness_ or _power_,
those which signify some finite or limited thing, are not signs at
all of an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily, if we
ascribe less _power_ or _greatness_ to him than possibly we can. But
every finite thing is less than we can; for most easily we may
always assign and attribute more to a finite thing. No _shape_
therefore must be assigned to God, for all _shape_ is _finite_; nor
must he be said to be conceived or comprehended by imagination, or
any other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is
_finite_. And although this word _infinite_ signify a conception of
the mind, yet it follows not that we have any conception of an
_infinite thing_. For when we say that a thing is _infinite_, we
signify nothing really, but the impotency in our own mind; as if we
should say, we know not whether or where it is limited. Neither
speak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an _idea_ of
him in our mind: for an idea is our conception; but conception we
have none, except of a _finite_ thing. Nor they, who say that he
hath _parts_, or that he is some certain _entire_ thing; which are
also attributes of _finite_ things. Nor that he is in any place; for
nothing can be said to be in a _place_, but what hath _bounds_ and
_limits_ of its greatness on all sides. Nor that he is _moved_ or
_is at rest_; for either of them suppose a _being in some place_.
Nor that there are many Gods; because not many infinites.
Furthermore, concerning _attributes of happiness_, those are
unworthy of God which signify _sorrow_; (unless they be taken not
for any passion, but, by a metonomy, for the effect); such as
_repentance_, _anger_, _pity_. Or _want_; as _appetite_, _hope_,
_concupiscence_, and that _love_ which is also called _lust_; for
they are signs of _poverty_; since it cannot be understood that a
man should _desire_, _hope_, and _wish_ for aught, but what he wants
and stands in need of. Or any _passive faculty_; for _suffering_
belongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we
therefore attribute a _will_ to God, it is not to be conceived like
unto ours, which is called _a rational desire_; (for if God
_desires_, he _wants_, which for any man to say, is a contumely);
but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive. In
like manner when we attribute _sight_ and other _acts of the sense_
to him, or _knowledge_, or _understanding_, which in us are nothing
else but a tumult of the mind, raised from outward objects pressing
the organs; we must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity;
for it is a sign of power _depending_ upon some other, which is not
the most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe any other
titles to God than what reason commands, must use such as are either
_negative_, as _infinite_, _eternal_, _incomprehensible_, &c.; or
_superlative_, as _most good_, _most great_, _most powerful_, &c.;
or _indefinite_, as _good_, _just_, _strong_, _creator_, _king_, and
the like; in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is;
(which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our
phantasy); but to confess his own admiration and obedience, which is
the property of humility and of a mind yielding all the honour it
possibly can do. For reason dictates one name alone which doth
signify the _nature_ of God, that is, _existent_, or simply, _that
he is_; and one in _order_ to, and in _relation_ to us, namely
_God_, under which is contained both _King_, and _Lord_, and
_Father_.
[Sidenote: What those actions are, whereby naturally we do give
worship.]
15. Concerning the _outward actions_ wherewith God is to be
worshipped, as also concerning his _titles_; it is a most general
command of reason, that they be signs of a mind yielding honour.
Under which are contained in the first place, _prayers_.
“Qui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus,
Non facit ille deos; qui rogat, ille facit.”
For _prayers_ are the signs of hope; and hope is an acknowledgment
of the divine _power_ or _goodness_.
In the second place, _thanksgiving_; which is a sign of the same
affection, but that _prayers go before_ the benefit, and _thanks
follow it_.
In the third, _gifts_, that is to say, _oblations_ and _sacrifices_;
for these are _thanksgivings_.
In the fourth, _not to swear by any other_. For a man’s oath is an
imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knows
whether he do or not, and can punish him if he do, though he be
never so powerful; which only belongs to God. For if there were any
man from whom his subjects’ _malice_ could not lie hid, and whom no
human power could resist, plighted faith would suffice without
swearing; which broken, might be punished by that man. And for this
very reason there would be no need of an oath.
In the fifth place, _to speak warily of God_; for that is a sign of
_fear_, and _fear_ is an acknowledgment of _power_. It follows from
this precept, _that we may not take the name of God in vain, or use
it rashly_; for either are inconsiderate. _That we must not swear,
where there is no need_; for that is in vain. But need there is
none, unless it be between cities, to avoid or take away contention
by force, which necessarily must arise where there is no faith kept
in promises: or in a city, for the better certainty of judicature.
Also, _that we must not dispute of the divine nature_; for it is
supposed _that all things in the natural kingdom of God are inquired
into by reason only_, that is to say, out of the principles of
natural science. But we are so far off by these to attain to the
knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as reach to
the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies, or of
any other creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these
disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty
according to the small measure of our conceptions. It follows also,
(which belongs to the right of God’s kingdom), that their speech is
inconsiderate and rash, who say, _that this or that doth not stand
with divine justice_. For even men count it an affront that their
children should dispute their right, or measure their justice
otherwise than by the rule of their commands.
In the sixth, _whatsoever is offered up in prayers, thanksgivings,
and sacrifices, must in its kind be the best and most betokening
honour_; namely, _prayers_ must not be rash, or light, or vulgar,
but beautiful, and well composed. For though it were absurd in the
heathen to worship God in an image, yet was it not against reason to
use poetry and music in their churches.
Also _oblations must be clean, and presents sumptuous_; and such as
are significative either of submission or gratitude, or
commemorative of benefits received. For all these proceed from a
desire of honouring.
In the seventh, _that God must be worshipped not privately only, but
openly and publicly in the sight of all men_; because that worship
is so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour and esteem
in others; as hath been declared before in art. 13. Unless others
therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship
vanisheth.
In the last place, _that we use our best endeavour to keep the laws
of nature_. For the undervaluing of our master’s command, exceeds
all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, obedience is
more acceptable than all other sacrifices.
And these are principally the natural laws concerning the worship of
God; those, I mean, which reason dictates to every man. But to whole
cities, every one whereof is one person, the same natural reason
further commands an _uniformity of public worship_. For the actions
done by particular persons, according to their private reasons, are
not the city’s actions; and therefore not the city’s worship. But
what is done by the city, is understood to be done by the command of
him or them who have the sovereignty; wherefore also together with
the consent of all the subjects, that is to say, _uniformly_.
[Sidenote: In the natural kingdom of God, the city may appoint what
worship it pleaseth.]
16. The _natural laws_ set down in the foregoing article concerning
the divine worship, only command the giving of natural signs of
honour. But we must consider that there are two kinds of signs; the
one _natural_; the other done upon _agreement_, or by express or
tacit composition. Now because in every language the use of _words_
and _names_ come by appointment, it may also by appointment be
altered; for that which depends on and derives its force from the
will of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed
again or abolished. Such _names_ therefore as are _attributed_ to
God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken
away. Now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the city
may do. The city therefore by right, that is to say, they who have
the power of the whole city, shall judge what _names_ or
_appellations_ are more, what less _honourable_ for God; that is to
say, what doctrines are to be held and professed concerning the
nature of God and his operations. Now actions do signify not by
men’s appointment, but naturally; even as the effects are signs of
their causes. Whereof some are always signs of scorn to them before
whom they are committed; as those whereby the body’s uncleanness is
discovered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to do before those whom
they respect. Others are always signs of honour, as to draw near and
discourse decently and humbly, to give way or to yield in any matter
of private benefit. In these actions the city can alter nothing. But
there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour or
reproach, are indifferent. Now these, by the institution of the
city, may both be made signs of honour, and being made so, do in
very deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must
obey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign
of honouring God, that is to say, for _worship_; provided it can be
instituted for a sign of honour; because that is a sign of honour,
which by the city’s command is used for such.
[Sidenote: God ruling by nature only, the city, that is to say, that
man or court which under God hath the sovereignty, is the
interpreter of all the laws.]
17. We have already declared which were the laws of God, as well
sacred as secular, in his government by the way of nature only. Now
because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that
it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the
most actions; it may be demanded further, whom God would have to be
the _interpreter of right reason_, that is to say, of his laws. And
as for the _secular_ laws, (I mean those which concern justice and
the carriage of men towards men), by what hath been said before of
the constitution of a city, we have demonstratively showed it
agreeable to reason, that all _judicature_ belongs to the city; and
that _judicature_ is nothing else but an _interpretation of the
laws_; and by consequence, that every where cities, that is to say,
those who have the sovereign power, are the _interpreters of the
laws_. As for the _sacred_ laws, we must consider what hath been
before demonstrated in chap. V. art. 13, that every subject hath
transferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the
supreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of
judging the manner how God is to be honoured; and therefore also he
hath done it. That he could, it appears hence; that the manner of
honouring God before the constitution of a city, was to be fetched
from every man’s _private reason_. But every man can subject his
_private_ reason to the reason of _the whole city_. Moreover, if
each man should follow his own reason in the _worshipping_ of God,
in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge
another’s worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem
to the other to honour God. Even that therefore which were most
consonant to reason, would not be a _worship_; because that the
nature of _worship_ consists in this, that it be the _sign of inward
honour_. But there is no sign, but whereby somewhat becomes known to
others; and therefore is there no sign of honour, but what seems so
to others. Again, that is a true sign, which by the consent of men
becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the
consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the city, becomes
a sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God,
declared by the way of reason only, to give him such signs of honour
as the city shall command. Wherefore subjects can transfer their
right of judging the manner of God’s worship, on him or them who
have the sovereign power. Nay, they must do it; for else all manner
of absurd opinions concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous
ceremonies which have been used by any nations, will be seen at once
in the same city. Whence it will fall out, that every man will
believe that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it cannot
be truly said of any, that he worships God; for no man worships God,
that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things,
whereby he appears to others for to honour him. It may therefore be
concluded, that the _interpretation_ of all laws, as well _sacred_
as _secular_, (God ruling by the way of _nature_ only), depends on
the authority of the city, that is to say, that man or counsel to
whom the sovereign power is committed; and that whatsoever God
commands, he commands by his voice. And on the other side, that
whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of
honouring God, and concerning secular affairs, is commanded by God
himself.
[Sidenote: Certain doubts removed.]
18. Against this, some man may demand, first, whether it doth not
follow that the city must be obeyed, if it command us directly to
affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow,
neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all,
cannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping. Neither
also had any one, before the constitution of a city, of those who
acknowledge God to rule, a right to deny him the honour which was
then due unto him; nor could he therefore transfer a right on the
city of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether
the city must be obeyed, if it command somewhat to be said or done,
which is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by
reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived; as for example,
if it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who
account that honourable: truly it is to be done.[19] For worship is
instituted in sign of honour; but to worship him thus, is a sign of
honour, and increaseth God’s honour among those who do so account of
it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name, which we know not
what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word _God_; that
also must be done. For what we do for honour’s sake, (and we know no
better), if it be taken for a sign of honour, it is a sign of
honour; and therefore if we refuse to do it, we refuse the enlarging
of God’s honour. The same judgment must be had of all the
_attributes_ and _actions_ about the merely rational worship of God,
which may be controverted and disputed. For though this kind of
commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore
sins in them who command them; yet are they not against right
reason, nor sins in subjects; whose right reason, in points of
controversy, is that which submits itself to the reason of the city.
Lastly, if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power, command
himself to be worshipped with the same _attributes_ and _actions_,
wherewith God is to be worshipped; the question is, whether we must
obey? There are many things, which may be commonly attributed both
to God and men; for even men may be _praised_ and _magnified_. And
there are many actions, whereby God and men may be worshipped. But
the significations of the _attributes_ and _actions_ are only to be
regarded. Those _attributes_ therefore, whereby we signify ourselves
to be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a sovereignty
independent from God, or that he is immortal, or of infinite power,
and the like; though commanded by princes, yet must they be
abstained from. As also from those _actions_ signifying the same; as
prayer to the absent; to ask those things which God alone can give,
as rain and fair weather; to offer him what God can only accept, as
oblations, holocausts; or to give a worship, than which a greater
cannot be given, as sacrifice. For these things seem to tend to this
end, that God may not be thought to rule; contrary to what was
supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any
other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civil
worship; for they may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power
only. For divine worship is distinguished from civil, not by the
motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the body, but by the
declaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship. As if we cast
down ourselves before any man, with intention of declaring by that
sign that we esteem him as God, it is divine worship; if we do the
same thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power, it is
civil worship. Neither is the _divine worship_ distinguished from
_civil_, by any action usually understood by the words λατρεία and
δουλεία; whereof the former marking out the _duty_ of servants, the
latter their _destiny_, they are words of the same action in degree.
Footnote 19:
_Truly it is to be done._] We said in art. 14 of this chapter,
that they who attributed limits to God, transgressed the natural
law concerning God’s worship. Now they who worship him in an
image, assign him limits. Wherefore they do that which they ought
not to do. And this place seems to contradict the former. We must
therefore know first, that they who are constrained by authority,
do not set God any bounds; but they who command them. For they who
worship unwillingly, do worship in very deed: but they either
stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by
a lawful sovereign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all
times and everywhere, but on supposition that there is no other
rule of worshipping God, beside the dictates of human reason; for
then the will of the city stands for reason. But in the kingdom of
God by way of covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is
expressly forbid, though the city commands us to worship thus, yet
must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some
repugnancy between this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so
any longer.
[Sidenote: What is sin in the natural kingdom of God, and what
treason against the divine majesty.]
19. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by
the way of natural reason only, subjects do sin, first if they break
the moral laws; which are unfolded in chapters II. and III.
Secondly, if they break the laws or commands of the city, in those
things which pertain to justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God
κατὰ τὰ νόμικα Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in
words and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most
blessed, the Supreme King of the world and of all worldly kings;
that is to say, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the
natural kingdom of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing
chapter in art. 2, is the _sin of treason against the Divine
Majesty_. For it is a denying of the Divine Power, or _atheism_. For
sins proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the
sovereign king, who being himself absent, should rule by his
viceroy. Against whom sure they would transgress, who should not
obey his viceroy in all things; except he usurped the kingdom to
himself, or would give it to some other. But they who should so
absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be
said to be guilty of treason.
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